United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships Background Policy and Legal Authorities Risks Benefits May 15 2019 Congressional Research Service https crsreports congress gov R45720 222A0E69-13A2-4 985-84AE-73 CC3D FF4D02 --2020 340952 511442 180710 280771 341591 090012 09121 169110 229237 080048 072240 026234 243017 108185 226005 005052 253075 142253 206254 005189 022001 089242 011115 064066 129079 218042 147067 163171 141006 072179 042112 056226 183142 240 01101706 618003 207419 814904 825005 5118 SUMMARY United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships Background Policy and Legal Authorities Risks Benefits R45720 May 15 2019 Michael E DeVine Analyst in Intelligence and National Security From its inception the United States Intelligence Community IC has relied on close relations with foreign partners These relationships often reflect mutual security interests and the trust each side has of the other’s credibility and professionalism They are generally strategic and cover a range of national security priorities involving national defense emerging threats counterterrorism counter-proliferation treaty compliance cybersecurity economic and financial security counter-narcotics and piracy U S intelligence relations with foreign counterparts offer a number of benefits indications and warning of an attack expanded geographic coverage corroboration of national sources accelerated access to a contingency area and a diplomatic backchannel They also present risks of compromise due to poor security espionage geopolitical turmoil manipulation to influence policy incomplete vetting of foreign sources over-reliance on a foreign partner’s intelligence capabilities and concern over a partner’s potentially illegal or unethical tradecraft Because intelligence failures involving a foreign partner sometimes become public the risks to the IC of cooperating with a foreign intelligence service are more easily understood Nevertheless the persistent cultivation of intelligence relations with foreign partners suggests that the IC remains confident that the benefits outweigh the risks These benefits are not always widely recognized due to their sensitivity and the potential for compromising the scope and details of what amounts to intelligence collection The best known of these intelligence relationships are the decades-long ties to America’s closest allies who have shared history values and similar perspectives on national security threats Such ties are often one component of a broader security cooperation arrangement Less well known are liaison relationships with U S adversaries over a particular issue of mutual concern or relations with non-state foreign intelligence organizations such as Kurdish groups Regardless of the partner the U S Intelligence Community’s aim is to enhance national intelligence resources and capabilities and to further U S national security by better understanding the threat environment and thereby enabling informed strategic planning better policy decisions and successful military operations Thus U S foreign intelligence relationships can be an overlooked component of public discussion of various aspects of international cooperation Foreign intelligence agencies with ties to U S intelligence have often escaped the reach of congressional oversight Yet Congress at various times has been interested in both the benefits and the risks of foreign intelligence relationships to U S national security While sometimes extolling the value intelligence foreign partners can provide Congress has also been critical of occasions when the IC has become too dependent on such partners at the expense of IC investment in its own intelligence capabilities Congress has also been concerned with the IC’s ability to independently assess the credibility of foreign intelligence sources as well as the vulnerability of a foreign intelligence partner’s telecommunications infrastructure to compromise by a hostile foreign intelligence service Of particular sensitivity to Congress has been the poor record of human rights by certain foreign intelligence agencies and the potential for foreign intelligence partners to collect and share with the United States information on U S persons This report uses publicly available unclassified sources as the basis of its research and does not reference information in the public domain that was unlawfully disclosed Congressional Research Service United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships Contents Introduction 1 Background and Historical Context 2 Early Years 3 Cold War 4 Post-Cold War 5 Policy and Legal Authorities 6 Roles and Responsibilities 8 Foreign Intelligence Service Collection on U S Persons 10 Benefits of Foreign Intelligence Liaison 12 Intelligence and Information Sharing 12 Indications and Warning I W 13 Burden Sharing Expanded Coverage and Time-Sensitive Contingency Response 14 Joint Intelligence Operations 14 Basing Rights Hosting Equipment 15 Diplomatic Back Channel 16 Risks and Obstacles 16 Training 17 Ethics and Human Rights 17 Challenges Vetting Sources Security Lapses and Espionage 19 Limited Cooperation or Lack of Reciprocation 21 Over-Reliance on the Capabilities of a Foreign Partner 23 Conclusion 23 Contacts Author Information 24 Congressional Research Service United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships Introduction U S foreign intelligence relations are a component of U S international relations that involve cooperation between a U S and a foreign state or non-state intelligence service over an area of mutual interest This cooperation may include simple liaison to discuss or exchange information raw data or finished intelligence Intelligence liaison leverages the relative strengths of the interested intelligence services to provide tactical operational or strategic insight and perspective to provide warning of attack corroboration of national sources or additional possibly unique intelligence that the other service lacks Other forms of cooperation include basing rights to enhance the range of U S collection coverage joint operations and collection from the sovereign territory of a foreign state and training to improve the capacity and professionalism of a foreign intelligence service In areas of the world where the U S Intelligence Community IC has few national intelligence assets cooperative relations with a foreign intelligence service based in the region can effectively increase the range of U S intelligence coverage by using the partner’s source network and linguistic political and cultural expertise Although the Director of National Intelligence DNI provides the policy and criteria and conducts oversight for all IC element intelligence relationships with foreign intelligence services the IC elements themselves have the statutory authority to enter into agreements with foreign counterparts 1 Normally every relationship is formalized through a memorandum of understanding MOU or other written agreement This report provides a historic perspective of traditional and nontraditional foreign intelligence partnerships with the U S It also discusses their risks and benefits in the context of the broader public discussion over the sorts of relationships the United States should have with various actors in the international community In many—but not all—instances intelligence relations with a foreign partner may be viewed as an approximate reflection of the strategic condition of the relationship between the U S and that partner generally They indicate shared interests and a degree of trust in the professional ability of the partner to provide credible intelligence while protecting sources and maintaining security about the nature and extent of the relationship In discussing risk this report emphasizes the risk to the United States However foreign partners also bear risk e g relying too heavily on U S intelligence or having their sensitive sources compromised Congress has a vested interest in understanding the nature and scope of the IC’s relations with foreign intelligence services Congress has expressed both confidence in the value of these relationships and reservations When the IC reduced national intelligence collection resources in the 1970s and the 1990s and the IC became heavily dependent upon intelligence obtained from foreign partners 2 Congress intervened to rebalance national intelligence collection with collection from foreign partners 3 Congress was also critical of deficiencies in the IC’s ability to 1 50 U S C §3001 E O 12333 United States Intelligence Activities The reductions in the 1970s and 1990s were precipitated respectively by the discovery of CIA abuses of its authority in conducting domestic surveillance of anti-Vietnam war activities and the end of the Cold War with the IC’s deemphasis of collection on the former Soviet Union On those occasions over-reliance on reporting from particular foreign intelligence services as a way of compensating for the reduction in United States collection resulted in the IC being surprised by the level of unrest in Iran prior to the fall of the Shah in 1979 and in the IC’s relative lack of access to Al Qa’ida prior to the 9 11 attacks as described later in this report 3 See for example U S Congress Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 2001 Washington DC U S Government Printing Office December 2002 p 91 at https www intelligence senate gov sites default files documents CRPT-107srpt351-5 pdf 2 Congressional Research Service 1 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships assess independently the credibility of foreign intelligence sources one of whom fabricated reporting on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction one reason cited by the Bush Administration for invading Iraq in 2003 4 Most recently Congress has expressed interest in the vulnerability of foreign intelligence partners’ telecommunications technology to penetration by hostile intelligence services 5 Note on Sources Much of what could be known of U S intelligence relations with foreign partners is sensitive remains classified and therefore cannot be included in this report However this report can serve as a general reference to enable an informed perspective on the benefits as well as the risks of foreign intelligence relationships to U S national security It uses publicly available unclassified sources as the basis of its research and does not reference information in the public domain that was unlawfully disclosed Examples cited are also historical and do not necessarily provide a general characterization of the current relationship between the United States and a particular foreign partner Background and Historical Context The United States has cultivated intelligence liaison relations with foreign partners through 1 the exchange of information raw data or finished intelligence 6 2 basing rights for conducting intelligence operations or privileges to host technical intelligence equipment 3 burden sharing in the collection and reporting on issues of mutual interest 4 joint covert action collection or exploitation operations and 5 training Most are bilateral The relationship with the United Kingdom is among the oldest and the best known The IC also has multilateral relationships with NATO member states Five Eyes partners United States United Kingdom Canada Australia and New Zealand and the intelligence organizations supporting coalition partners in operational theaters such as Iraq and Afghanistan 7 U S IC relationships with foreign intelligence partners have developed in parallel with global IC coverage as well as the growing number of interests the U S shares with foreign partners it is also generally recognized that intelligence partnerships can provide mutual benefits for national security IC foreign partnerships have developed as consequences of the most pressing challenges for U S national security over the past century two world wars the Cold War and post-9 11 counter-terrorism operations Although the U S has periodically shared intelligence with adversaries involving a narrow range of mutual interests this type of exchange represents the exception to the norm More typically most intelligence sharing takes place with allied countries or U S affiliated non-state actors within relationships that have been shaped by decades of shared experience in war and peace U S intelligence exchange relationships with foreign partners therefore often reflect the high level of trust and professional confidence the U S IC places in partnerships with particular foreign allies’ intelligence services involving a broad range of Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi code-named “Curveball ” was the source of the German Federal Intelligence Service Bundesnachrichtendienst or BND who fabricated reporting that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction 5 See for example S 245 Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 116th Congress Section 307 6 Intelligence is information that has been evaluated for national security significance Raw data is data that has not been analyzed Finished intelligence is intelligence—information that has been evaluated for national security significance—resulting from the integration of multiple intelligence sources 7 There is however a statutory prohibition from sharing intelligence with the United Nations unless the President waives this provision in the interests of U S national security See 50 U S C §3047 a 1 - 2 4 Congressional Research Service 2 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships overlapping national security political and economic interests 8 A fundamental assumption supported by decades of experience is that building and maintaining these partnerships enhances U S national security by providing some benefit that the U S would otherwise lack access to otherwise inaccessible or hostile targets corroboration of sources cultural or linguistic expertise the capacity to conduct joint assessments providing indications and warning of an attack obtaining basing rights or jointly planning and conducting covert operations or intelligence collection Early Years The earliest efforts by the United States to formally cooperate with foreign partners in intelligence took place during World War I when the British and French provided training advice and tactical intelligence exchanges with the American Expeditionary Force AEF under General John Pershing 9 At the time the United States had only an incipient intelligence capability The British in contrast had had a national intelligence service since 1909 when the Secret Service Bureau was established to address growing concerns about a perceived threat posed by imperial Germany 10 The United States forged closer intelligence ties with allied governments in the years leading up to World War II and during the war itself The UK and U S navies began sharing naval intelligence in the 1930s The first formal arrangement involving signals intelligence was reached in October 1942 when the U S Navy and British Government Code and Cypher School GC CS at Bletchley Park signed the Holden Agreement That agreement enabled collaboration on Japanese German and Italian signals intelligence targets that included a division of labor between each side for more streamlined integrated technical collection and analysis 11 The British-U S communication intelligence agreement BRUSA Agreement signed in 1943 between GC CS and the U S War Department—representing the Army as well as the Navy signals intelligence capabilities—superseded the Holden Agreement This agreement also provided for a division of labor similar to the Holden Agreement whereby the United States had responsibility for collection of signals intelligence targeting the Japanese an operation called Magic and the British had responsibility for collection of signals intelligence on German and Italian targets referred to as Ultra 12 This collaboration proved pivotal in the Allies establishing information dominance during the war 8 A former director of the CIA for example characterized the intelligence relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom as “ties that are and always will be essential to our collective security ” “John Brennan on Transnational Threats to Global Security ” Council on Foreign Relations June 29 2016 at https www cfr org event john-brennan-transnational-threats-global-security 9 Michael Warner The Rise and Fall of Intelligence An International Security History Washington DC Georgetown University Press 2014 pp 60-63 10 The Secret Intelligence Bureau was organized into domestic and foreign sections which today are represented by two separate organizations the Security Service MI5 and the Secret Intelligence Service SIS MI6 respectively See “Our History ” Secret Intelligence Service MI6 at https www sis gov uk our-history html 11 See Ralph Erskine “The Holden Agreement on Naval Sigint The First BRUSA ” Journal of Intelligence and National Security Vol 14 Issue 2 1999 pp 187-197 at https doi org 10 1080 02684529908432545 12 See “An Agreement between British Government Code and Cipher School and U S War Department in Regard to Certain ‘Special Intelligence ’” National Security Agency at https www nsa gov news-features declassifieddocuments ukusa The agreement’s accompanying War Department cover memorandum is dated June 10 1943 The agreement itself is dated May 17 1943 Congressional Research Service 3 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships Cold War Shared interests during the Cold War influenced the next period in the evolution of U S foreign intelligence partnerships U S intelligence relations with traditional allies solidified as one of multiple areas of security cooperation based on a shared perception of the threat posed by the Soviet Union The UKUSA Agreement of March 1946 superseded the BRUSA Agreement and other U S -UK signals intelligence agreements from WWII that had focused exclusively on targeting the Axis powers 13 The UKUSA Agreement added the State Department the Army and Navy on the U S side of the board overseeing the partnership The agreement provided for an expanded exchange of signals intelligence-related products and services concerning targets involving “any country … excluding only the U S the British Commonwealth of Nations and the British Empire ”14 Canada Australia and New Zealand were formally included as “collaborating” partners in the late 1940s and early 1950s Subsequently in a separate agreement the United States and United Kingdom formally established standards for the protection of classified information involved in exchanges 15 Before the establishment of the Office of Strategic Services OSS in 1942 with the encouragement and assistance of the United Kingdom the United States had no foreign intelligence collection or covert action capability to compare to the capabilities of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service MI6 16 The WWII experience of OSS personnel and the investment the United States made in national intelligence including establishing the CIA in 1947 17 enabled the U S to influence the organization and development of other nations’ intelligence agencies these agencies have since become close bilateral partners One example is the establishment of the West German Federal Intelligence Service the Bundesnachrichtendienst BND In 1946 the former head of the eastern branch of the Nazi German intelligence Reinhard Gehlen who was responsible for intelligence targeting the Soviet Union negotiated terms for establishing an intelligence organization in occupied postwar Germany with the United States 18 During the war Gehlen had developed extensive agent networks and had later copied and concealed for safekeeping voluminous amounts of intelligence 13 For a complete reference of declassified signals intelligence agreements and related documents between the United States and United Kingdom from 1943-1961 see the National Security Agency’s site at https www nsa gov newsfeatures declassified-documents ukusa 14 British-U S Communication Intelligence Agreement March 5 1946 declassified and approved for release by NSA at https www nsa gov Portals 70 documents news-features declassified-documents ukusa agreement_outline_5mar46 pdf 15 General Security Agreement April 14 1961 declassified and approved for release by the Department of State at https www documentcloud org documents 4443925-2017-11-02-Privacy-International-State-Production html Bilateral intelligence exchange agreements often have a third-party rule that prohibits the dissemination of intelligence to a third party to include another foreign intelligence entity or even oversight organization without the authorization of the intelligence organization that originated the intelligence in question See also Scarlet Kim Diana Lee Asaf Lubin and Paulina Perlin “Newly Disclosed Documents on the Five Eyes Alliance and What They Tell Us about Intelligence-Sharing Agreements ” Lawfare April 23 2018 at https www lawfareblog com newly-discloseddocuments-five-eyes-alliance-and-what-they-tell-us-about-intelligence-sharing 16 For an account of the British influence on the establishment of the OSS see Joseph F Jakub III Spies and Saboteurs Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations 1940-45 London Palgrave Macmillan 1999 pp 23-28 17 The CIA was established by §102 of the National Security Act of 1947 P L 253-80 codified as 50 U S C §3035 a - b 18 Gehlen commanded Foreign Armies East one of two branches of the Abwehr the Nazi German intelligence organization responsible for intelligence on foreign militaries Congressional Research Service 4 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships on the Soviet Union that he knew would be valuable to the United States Using this leverage Gehlen following his surrender was able to obtain U S support for an autonomous German intelligence organization for collecting and analyzing intelligence on the Soviet Union and other communist states that would become part of a reconstituted German government The Gehlen Organization as it was known became the BND in 1956 and has remained a close albeit independent partner of the United States IC 19 Similarly the United States was influential in the early years of the Mossad Israel’s human intelligence agency The Mossad like the Gehlen organization provided the United States a means to acquire information on the Soviet Union that the United States could not otherwise collect through national sources as Israel was able to draw upon its eastern European émigré population’s extensive contacts in the Soviet Union The CIA in turn was able to offer training to Mossad agents 20 U S relations with the intelligence organizations of Japan Egypt pre-revolutionary Iran Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were also influenced by mutual concern over the threat from the Soviet Union The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 in particular contributed to the CIA’s forming closer ties to Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence Directorate GID and Pakistan’s InterServices Intelligence ISI agency in an effort to provide funding and other covert assistance to the Mujahideen 21 Post-Cold War After the Cold War former communist countries that had long been allied with the Soviet Union became NATO allies and intelligence partners of the United States i e Poland Hungary Czechoslovakia now the Czech Republic and Slovakia Bulgaria Romania and the Baltic states of Estonia Latvia and Lithuania Initially there was some ambivalence about these new partnerships On one hand the history of Soviet influence over Warsaw Pact intelligence organizations suggested the reconstituted intelligence agencies of the eastern European NATO states could pose a counterintelligence risk of Russian penetration and result in greater restraint in intelligence sharing On the other hand by virtue of these services’ extensive experience with the Soviets Union they might prove more capable of providing for themselves protections against Russian penetration 22 These services offered not only a presumable wealth of perspective on and access to post-communist Russia but also support for the U S in other areas of the world where they had had operational experience extensive contacts or were commitment to supporting NATO or U S -led military coalition operations In some cases e g the Polish presence in Iraq 19 See Jeffrey T Richelson Foreign Intelligence Organizations Cambridge Ballinger Publishing Co 1988 pp 132136 See also Jens Wegner “Shaping Germany’s Post-War Intelligence Service The Gehlen Organization the U S Army and Central Intelligence 1945-1949 ” Journal of Intelligence History vol 7 Summer 2007 20 See Ephraim Kahana “Mossad-CIA Cooperation ” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence vol 14 no 3 2001 at https www tandfonline com doi pdf 10 1080 08850600152386873 needAccess true 21 See for example Bruce Riedel What We Won America’s Secret War in Afghanistan 1979-89 Washington DC The Brookings Institution 2014 The CIA’s relations with ISI have subsequently been challenged by ISI’s perceived support for proxy Islamist groups 22 Following the 1989 overthrow of the communist government out of 1 000 agents in the Polish intelligence Office of State Security the government reportedly purged 600 who were seen as sympathetic to Russia The Czech Republic went further establishing an entirely new domestic and foreign intelligence services to replace the State Security Service StB that existed under the communist regime At the same time there was relatively little turnover of personnel in Hungarian intelligence however See Jane Perlez “Touchy Issue of Bigger NATO Spy Agencies ” The New York Times January 5 1998 at https www nytimes com 1998 01 05 world touchy-issue-of-bigger-nato-spyagencies html Congressional Research Service 5 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships part of the motivation may have been simply to gain western or NATO experience and prove their worth as a reliable ally and intelligence partner 23 In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9 11 the U S IC expanded its foreign intelligence liaison relationships as a major component of counterterrorist strategy Working with intelligence partners in the war on terror is broadly viewed as essential to protecting the U S homeland and the allied states who share western values that make them attractive targets for al Qa’ida and the so-called Islamic State 24 These relationships include nontraditional partners in addition to allies non-state organizations such as Kurdish groups in northern Iraq and Syria and traditional adversaries such as Russia The CIA has solidified many of these partnerships through the establishment of a network of Counterterrorist Intelligence Centers CTIC around the world to facilitate sharing intelligence on terrorism such as indications and warning of an attack with a host-nation government to effect the killing or capture of high-value targets The Counterterrorist Center CTC at CIA headquarters manages the CTICs overseas The National Security Agency NSA is also represented in the CTICs underscoring the importance of signals intelligence and the corresponding foreign partnerships to counterterrorist operations 25 Simultaneously the U S IC has found that nontraditional partners remain loyal to their own interests and internal dynamics despite heavy inducement by the U S 26 While these partnerships have proven valuable in certain circumstances they are not all completely beneficial to the U S Each period in the evolution of U S intelligence relations with foreign partners—Pre-World War II World War II the Cold War Post-Cold war—has enabled the United States to strengthen ties to traditional allies while presenting challenges from necessary yet incompletely reliable partners The post-Cold War has been marked by a concerted effort to forge or strengthen ties with allies old and new and to expand the scope of counterterrorism coverage by initiating or increasing the frequency of intelligence exchanges with nontraditional intelligence partners Policy and Legal Authorities Policy and authorities for initiating and managing ties between the IC and foreign intelligence services and specifying the roles and responsibilities of personnel supporting these relationships are found in statute executive orders and intelligence directives 23 Ibid Polish intelligence helped extricate CIA personnel from Iraq in 1990 prior to the Gulf War Polish intelligence personnel also supported the U S -led Multi-National Forces in Iraq MNFI coalition subsequent to the 2003 invasion as well as the NATO mission in Afghanistan 24 Dana Priest “Foreign Network at Front of CIA’s Terror Fight ” Washington Post November 18 2005 athttp www washingtonpost com wp-dyn content article 2005 11 17 AR2005111702070 html 25 Ibid The CTICs were first reported in this Washington Post article by Dana Priest Indonesia Uzbekistan and France were reported as some of the countries where CTICs were located The CTIC in Paris France called Alliance Base in operation from 2002-2009 and involved not only the U S and France as partners but also Britain Germany Canada and Australia Then French President Jacques Chirac directed French intelligence services the DGSE and DGSI share intelligence with the U S “as if they were your own service ” See Dana Priest “Help from France Key in Covert Operations ” Washington Post July 3 2005 at http www washingtonpost com wp-dyn content article 2005 07 02 AR2005070201361 html 26 See for example https www newyorker com news news-desk the-cias-maddening-relationship-with-pakistan https www theatlantic com international archive 2018 10 jamal-khashoggi-american-saudi-counterterrorismrelationship 573148 Congressional Research Service 6 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships Intelligence Community Directive ICD -403 Foreign Disclosure and Release of Classified National Intelligence states U S Government policy on disclosure of U S intelligence to foreign state or non-state intelligence entities 27 U S intelligence is a national asset to be conserved and protected and will be shared with foreign entities only when consistent with U S national security and foreign policy objectives and when an identifiable benefit can be expected to accrue to the U S It is the policy of the U S Government to share intelligence with foreign governments whenever it is consistent with U S law and clearly in the national interest to do so and when it is intended for a specific purpose and general limited in duration 28 ICD-403 also requires that determinations to disclose or release U S intelligence should take into account the professional ability of a foreign intelligence service to protect the classified intelligence from subsequent compromise posing a risk to U S national security However In exceptional cases there may be a benefit to U S interests to disclose or release intelligence to foreign entities under conditions where the recipient’s safeguards are likely to be inadequate In such cases the anticipated benefits must outweigh the potential damage of a likely compromise 29 Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 403 1 ICPG-403 1 further expounds policy in ICD403 by providing criteria for disclosing or releasing classified intelligence to a foreign intelligence entity Its guidance pertains to classified U S intelligence only which does not include other classified information such as defense military or diplomatic information that is not intelligence Disclosure or release of classified intelligence is appropriate when it     is consistent with U S foreign policy and national security objectives can be expected to result in an identifiable commensurate benefit to the U S supports a U S diplomatic political economic military or security policy or treaties and aids U S intelligence or counterintelligence activities 30 ICD-403 defines a foreign entity to include “foreign governments or components thereof international organizations or coalitions consisting of sovereign states and others determined by the DNI ” ICD-403 also defines “disclosure” and “release ” Disclosure is “displaying or revealing classified intelligence whether orally in writing or in any other medium to an authorized foreign recipient without providing the foreign recipients a copy of such information for retention ” Release is “the provision of classified intelligence in writing or in any other medium to authorized foreign recipients for retention ” See ICD-403 Foreign Disclosure and Release of Classified National Intelligence Office of the Director of National Intelligence March 13 2013 at https www dni gov files documents ICD ICD403 pdf 28 Para E 1 ICD-403 Foreign Disclosure and Release of Classified National Intelligence Office of the Director of National Intelligence March 13 2013 at https www dni gov files documents ICD ICD403 pdf 29 Ibid para E 6 b An example might be a conscious decision to disclose U S intelligence to a traditional adversary government in order to provide warning of an impending terrorist attack 30 ICPD-403 1 Criteria for Foreign Disclosure and Release of Classified National Intelligence Office of the Director of National Intelligence March 13 2013 at https www dni gov files documents ICPG ICPG403-1 pdf ICPD-403 1 also provides criteria for intelligence that is not authorized to be disclosed or released This includes intelligence that is contrary to U S law or agreements or treaties between the U S and foreign countries concerns a U S person unless collection retention and dissemination of such information is authorized by E O 12333 and not otherwise prohibited by the Privacy Act 5 U S C §552 a is derived from Grand Jury information under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or is from a foreign intelligence entity that has not consented to or has explicitly prohibited its further disclosure or release U S intelligence is generally not to be disclosed or released if it would reveal intelligence about the recipient foreign entity unless the intelligence was obtained jointly or could jeopardize U S diplomatic military or intelligence liaison relationships or activities or personnel involved in these activities 27 Congressional Research Service 7 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships An intelligence sharing agreement is often formalized in a memorandum of understanding MOU between the U S IC element and its foreign intelligence counterpart There are hundreds of these agreements between the IC and foreign intelligence services They are not legally binding and are generally classified 31 This can present challenges for congressional oversight As one observer of the Intelligence Community remarked “The near invisibility of liaison arrangements to oversight by elected officials is problematic Oversight mechanisms have not kept pace with global issues ”32 For military exchanges that include other types of classified information as well as intelligence the Department of Defense DOD uses General Security of Military Information Agreements GSOMIA that detail the level of classification for the exchange and the categories of information that can be exchanged Whether an MOU or GSOMIA these agreements provide formal frameworks for intelligence relationships that can be fundamental to broader security relationships legal enforceability notwithstanding Roles and Responsibilities The DNI has the statutory authority to “oversee the coordination between elements of the Intelligence Community and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments or international organizations on all matters involving intelligence related to the national security or involving intelligence acquired through clandestine means ”33 Assistant DNI for Partner Engagement ADNI PE supports the DNI in carrying out his her statutory responsibilities which include     Entering into intelligence and counterintelligence arrangements with foreign governments and international organizations Formulating policies concerning these arrangements Aligning and synchronizing foreign intelligence and counterintelligence relationships among IC elements “to further United States national security policy and intelligence objectives ”34 Establishing with the concurrence of departments and agencies concerned joint procedures to coordinate and synchronize intelligence activities conducted by an IC element or funded by the National Intelligence Program NIP with activities that involve foreign intelligence and security services 35 31 5 U S C §552 c 1 governs exceptions to the statutory requirement to disclose to the public meetings of an agency of the government The provisions of this subsection of the statute cover U S intelligence exchanges with foreign partners and the formal agreements that govern these relationships Meetings of an agency of the government are to be open to public observation “ c Except in a case where the agency finds that the public interest requires otherwise… and where the agency properly determines that such portion or portions of its meeting or the disclosure of such information is likely to 1 disclose matters that are A specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign policy and B in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order…” 32 See Richard Aldrich “Dangerous Liaisons Post-September 11 Intelligence Alliances ” Harvard International Review vol 24 no 3 September 2002 pp 49-54 33 50 U S C §3024 k 34 50 U S C §3001 E O 12333 United States Intelligence Activities §1 3 b 4 35 50 U S C §3001 E O 12333 United States Intelligence Activities §1 3 b 21 Congressional Research Service 8 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships The Director of the CIA D CIA is responsible for implementing the DNI’s foreign intelligence engagement policy and coordinating foreign intelligence relationships These responsibilities are specified in Executive Order EO 12333 United States Intelligence Activities CIA has the authority “under the direction and guidance of the DNI … to coordinate the implementation of intelligence and counterintelligence relationships between elements of the IC and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments or international organizations ”36 This authority is reiterated in ICD-310 Coordination of Clandestine Human Source and Human-Enabled Foreign Intelligence Collection and Counterintelligence Activities outside the United States 37 Overseas the U S ambassador or Chief of Mission is responsible for “the direction coordination and supervision of all Government executive branch employees” in a country … who shall be kept “fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government within that country ”38 In other words the U S ambassador has authority over United States intelligence activities within that country The actual management of intelligence programs and activities in a U S embassy however falls to the CIA Chief of Station COS who is to ensure the Chief of Mission is kept appropriately informed 39 ICD-402 Director of National Intelligence Representatives buttresses the CIA’s responsibility to coordinate the implementation of policy for the IC’s foreign intelligence relationships by assigning to the CIA’s Chiefs of Station responsibility as the DNI’s representatives in the locations or organizations where they are assigned 40 In each foreign country therefore the COS has day-to-day management and oversight of not only CIA but all liaison relationships by any IC element with state or non-state foreign intelligence organizations Subject to DNI policy and DCI COS management and guidance each element of the IC has the statutory authority to conduct relations with foreign intelligence services particular to the element’s capability and operational or analytical focus The National Security Agency NSA for example has the statutory authority to conduct foreign cryptologic liaison relations 41 the 36 50 U S C §3001 E O 12333 United States Intelligence Activities §1 7 a 6 See para B 3 of ICD-310 Coordination of Clandestine Human Source and Human-Enabled Foreign Intelligence Collection and Counterintelligence Activities Outside the United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence June 27 2016 at https www dni gov files documents ICD ICD%20310%20%20Coord%20of%20Clandestine%20Human%20and%20Humanenabled%20FI%20and%20CI%20outside%20the%20US%20 27%20June%202016 pdf Of note however there are statutory restrictions on sharing intelligence with the United Nations Congress restricted the sharing of U S intelligence with the United Nations and any organization affiliated with the United Nations unless the President certifies to the congressional intelligence and foreign relations foreign affairs committees that the DNI “in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense has established and implemented procedures and has worked with the United Nations to ensure implementation of procedures for protecting from unauthorized disclosure United States intelligence sources and methods connected to such information ” The President may waive this requirement by providing written certification to these committees that providing intelligence to the United Nations is in the interest of U S national security See 50 U S C §3047 a 1 - 2 38 22 U S C §3927 1 - 2 39 In answers to Director of Central Intelligence pre-confirmation questions Gina Haspel addressed resolution of disagreements between the Chief of Mission and Chief of Station on intelligence activities “Intelligence activities that do not have the approval of the Chief of Mission but remain supported by the Chief of Station are referred back to CIA and the Department of State for resolution ” Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden #2 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 5 May 2018 at https www intelligence senate gov sites default files documents aphq-ghaspel-050918 pdf 40 See para G 1 A of ICD-402 Director of National Intelligence Representatives Office of the Director of National Intelligence December 23 2009 at https www dni gov files documents ICD ICD402 pdf 41 50 U S C §3001 E O 12333 United States Intelligence Activities §1 7 c 8 37 Congressional Research Service 9 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships Defense Intelligence Agency DIA and military service intelligence organizations have the authority to conduct defense intelligence liaison relationships with their foreign defense or military intelligence counterparts 42 ICD-403 specifies the roles and responsibilities of officials making decisions involving the disclosure or release of classified intelligence to a foreign intelligence entity Each IC element has a Senior Foreign Disclosure and Release Authority SFDRA who is a senior official with responsibility for the organization’s foreign disclosure and release program The SFDRA in turn designates Foreign Disclosure and Release Officer s FDRO with the authority to approve or deny requests for disclosure or release of intelligence that originated with that IC element or coordinate with the FDROs of another organization to request disclosure or release of intelligence that originated with that other IC element and has dissemination control markings 43 Under ICD403 the DNI may authorize disclosures or releases of classified intelligence requested by the National Security Council or under circumstances that are not otherwise provided for in policy The DNI is also the final arbiter in resolving any disputes on what can be disclosed or released 44 Foreign Intelligence Service Collection on U S Persons Among the more sensitive aspects of U S relations with any given foreign intelligence partner— and of interest to Congress—are instances of any such partner providing to the IC information on U S persons 45 This may occur unprompted as a result of routine collection or a bulk data transfer or at the request of the United States subject to approval by specifically designated trained individuals 46 In instances when the United States requests intelligence on U S persons from a foreign intelligence service there must be probable cause to believe that U S persons are involved in terrorism espionage other illicit activities or are themselves the target of hostile foreign intelligence services that may threaten U S national security Counterintelligence collected by a foreign intelligence partner to support its own internal national security and shared with the United States that includes information on U S persons requires special handling In these instances the IC must follow the Attorney General Guidelines for implementing Executive Order EO 12333 on properly requesting obtaining and handling the information in order to adhere to privacy and civil liberties protections 47 Information is authorized and handled according to whether it was obtained by standard or special collection techniques Standard collection techniques involve authorization for an IC element to request receive and document routinely acquired information or records on a U S person This can include requests 42 50 U S C §3001 E O 12333 United States Intelligence Activities §§1 7 b 5 and 1 7 f 4 This includes the liaison and reporting responsibility of the Defense Attaché Service DAS in addition to Service-specific intelligence organizations such as the Office of Naval Intelligence 43 ICD-403 Foreign Disclosure and Release of Classified National Intelligence Office of the Director of National Intelligence March 13 2013 at https www dni gov files documents ICD ICD403 pdf ICD-403 also specifies the responsibility of disclosure and release decisions to be coordinated with the D CIA 44 ICD-403 E 7 45 See for example Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden #37 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 5 May 2018 at https www intelligence senate gov sites default files documents aphq-ghaspel-050918 pdf 46 United States officials authorized to request a foreign intelligence service to provide information on U S persons are specified in Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Activities Procedures Approved by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order 12333 January 2017 at https www cia gov about-cia privacy-and-civil-liberties CIAAG-Guidelines-Signed pdf 47 Ibid Congressional Research Service 10 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships made of a foreign intelligence service for information on U S persons abroad that exists in their files or requests of a foreign intelligence service to use their assets to collect information targeting a U S person abroad using standard collection techniques 48 Officials with the authority to authorize standard collection techniques include a Chief of Station Chief of Installation or Chief of Base the Deputy Director of the CIA for Operations DDO the Associate Deputy Director of CIA for Operations ADDO the Chief or Deputy Chiefs of Operations in a CIA Mission Center a first second or third in command of a DO Division or DO Center or supervisory personnel who are designed by these officials 49 Standard collection techniques may also include occasions when an IC element obtains unevaluated bulk data such as a hard drive from a foreign intelligence service that may contain information on U S persons collected by routine unexceptional means In these instances “specifically designated officials must document the purpose of the collection activity how the data was acquired what steps were taken to limit the collection to the smallest subset containing the information necessary to achieve the purpose of the collection and further determine how sensitive the acquired data is so that appropriate controls regarding access querying and retention may be imposed ”50 Special collection techniques are defined as techniques conducted outside the United States targeting a U S person that would require a warrant for the same techniques conducted by the FBI inside the United States 51 They include for example physical search search of nonpublic telephone records and electronic surveillance Both the authorization and handling of this kind of information is more restricted than for standard collection techniques Special collection techniques require exceptional handling as outlined in the Attorney General Guidelines implementing EO 12333 52 For authorization of special collection techniques—including requests for special collection on U S persons by a foreign intelligence service—requests must be forwarded through the agency’s General Counsel for concurrence and approval by the Director of the CIA or a designee the U S Attorney General and where applicable the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 53 48 Ibid Ibid 50 See Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Activities Procedures Approved by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order 12333 January 2017 at https www cia gov about-cia privacy-and-civil-liberties CIA-AGGuidelines-Signed pdf The Attorney General Guidelines implement Section 309 of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2015 “Procedures for the Retention of Incidentally Acquired Communications ” 51 See The CIA’s Updated Executive Order 12333 Attorney General Guidelines January 2017 at https www cia gov about-cia privacy-and-civil-liberties Detailed-Overview-CIA-AG-Guidelines pdf 52 “Unevaluated information subject to routine handling requirements may be treated as if subject to exceptional handling requirements based on policy or prudential concerns ” See Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Activities Procedures Approved by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order 12333 January 2017 at https www cia gov about-cia privacy-and-civil-liberties CIA-AG-Guidelines-Signed pdf An official approving the use of a special collection technique directed at a U S person outside the United States must document in writing that under existing facts and circumstances the official has determined that there is probable cause to believe that the person or entity at whom the special collection technique is directed is an agent of a foreign power or an officer or employee of a foreign power and that the information sought is significant foreign intelligence or counterintelligence p 17 53 Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Activities Procedures Approved by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order 12333 January 2017 at https www cia gov about-cia privacy-and-civil-liberties CIA-AGGuidelines-Signed pdf 49 Congressional Research Service 11 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships A foreign intelligence partner may provide to its counterpart s in the United States intelligence on U S persons acquired by special collection techniques without it being specifically requested by the U S counterpart This would involve occasions where the foreign partner may want to alert U S IC or law enforcement officials of serious counterintelligence concerns in the course of a collection activity employing special collection techniques targeting a mutual adversary such as Russia or China Exceptional handling is required when information is collected by special collection techniques that involves U S persons and subsequently shared with the U S whether or not it is specifically requested by the United States Benefits of Foreign Intelligence Liaison A former member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence remarked recently that foreign intelligence services provide the United States some of its most significant intelligence 54 Two examples are readily apparent Following 9 11 then-French President Jacques Chirac directed the French intelligence services the DGSE and DGSI to share counterterrorist intelligence with the United States “as if they were your own service ”55 Similarly on September 12 2001 the day after the attacks the senior leadership of the British intelligence services MI5 and MI6 visited their counterparts in Washington DC to offer their assistance 56 The U S IC also benefits from intelligence liaison with traditional adversaries and non-state actors e g Kurdish organizations on areas of mutual interest Intelligence and Information Sharing Intelligence sharing or collaboration can be defined as “the liaison or collaboration between intelligence bodies responsible for the collection analysis and or dissemination of information in the field of national security and defense ”57 Sharing finished intelligence derived from multiple sources provides less risk of revealing information of any particular source and is thus more typical of many bilateral or multilateral intelligence relationships The sharing or exchange of raw data or unfinished intelligence takes place either where there is sufficient trust between partners to provide the necessary security from compromise of collection sources and methods as there is between the U S and Five Eyes partners plus France Germany Norway and Japan among others or it can also occur in situations where there is an immediate need to provide perishable information—such as indications and warning of an impending terrorist attack—that may take precedence over the risk of revealing a source The exchange of intelligence or information among the United States and intelligence partners is a daily occurrence treated with great sensitivity Intelligence sharing may help to corroborate U S national sources in addition to possibly providing unique information Intelligence and information exchanges may involve secure conferencing phone calls or among the closest partnerships automated data exchange Attachés belonging to the Defense Attaché Service DAS of the Department of Defense or 54 Remarks of former Senator Bill Nelson George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government panel discussion on congressional oversight of intelligence March 11 2019 55 Dana Priest “Help from France Key in Covert Operations ” The Washington Post July 3 2005 at http www washingtonpost com wp-dyn content article 2005 07 02 AR2005070201361 html 56 Sir Stephen Lander “International Intelligence Cooperation An Inside Perspective ” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17 3 2004 pp 481-493 at https www tandfonline com doi full 10 1080 0955757042000296964 57 Abuse of State Secrecy and National Security Obstacles to Parliamentary and Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights Doc 11907 September 16 2011 cited in Hans Born Ian Leigh Aidan Wills Making International Intelligence Cooperation Accountable Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2015 p 6 Congressional Research Service 12 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships attachés representing other departments such as the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security also regularly conduct exchanges with their host-country counterparts Indications and Warning I W Foreign intelligence relationships that provide indications and warning I W of an impending attack or serious threat to the national security of the partner country may take place by means of sharing proprietary intelligence of a partner agency or collecting intelligence through a joint operation Among the instances that have become part of the public record are these     In 1962 a human intelligence asset of the CIA and British Secret Intelligence Service SIS also known as MI6 Soviet GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovsky provided details of the Soviet nuclear weapons capabilities and nuclear missile sites in Cuba The information Penkovsky provided during the Cuban Missile Crisis enabled President Kennedy to understand he had three days before the Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles would be fully operational It was a warning that the CIA credited as “altering the course of the Cold War ”58 In February 2006 GCHQ the UK signals intelligence counterpart of the U S National Security Agency shared with the United States information from intercepted communications between two Al Qa’ida operatives in Pakistan and the United Kingdom respectively indicating their plans to bomb civilian aircraft Subsequently the CIA was able to share this information with Pakistan’s InterService Intelligence agency leading to the ISI’s apprehension of the lead Al Qa’ida planner 59 In 2010 Saudi Arabia once reluctant to share intelligence with the United States on Al Qa’ida obtained perishable indications of a sophisticated Al Qa’ida plot to attack cargo planes en route to the United States The Saudis provided the information to U S British German and Emirati officials who were able to intercept the bombs and prevent the attack 60 In December 2017 acting on a tip from the CIA Russia’s Federal Security Service FSB was able to break up a plot by an Islamic State-linked terrorist cell to bomb Kazan Cathedral and other prominent sites in St Petersburg Russia 61 “The Capture and Execution of Colonel Penkovsky 1963 ” Central Intelligence Agency News Information at https www cia gov news-information featured-story-archive 2010-featured-story-archive colonel-penkovsky html 59 See Marlow Stern “How the CIA Helped Prevent the Next 9 11—and Why You Can’t Bring Liquids Onto Planes ” The Daily Beast November 24 2018 at https www thedailybeast com how-the-cia-helped-prevent-the-next-911-andwhy-you-cant-bring-liquids-onto-planes ref scroll The lead planner Rashid Rauf later escaped Pakistan’s custody and was subsequently reportedly killed in a U S drone strike 60 Eric Schmitt and Scott Shane “Saudis Warned U S of Attack Before Parcel Bomb Plot ” New York Times November 5 2010 at https www nytimes com 2010 11 06 world middleeast 06terror html 61 Vladimir Isachenkov “Putin Thanks Trump for CIA Tip He Says Stopped Bomb Plot ” AP News December 18 2017 at https www apnews com 0531697a83504a3fbc907294551972ba This example which received extensive media coverage also demonstrates how intelligence can be shared between the U S and a foreign intelligence service that is more typically an adversary 58 Congressional Research Service 13 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships Burden Sharing Expanded Coverage and Time-Sensitive Contingency Response Burden sharing or a division of labor between the personnel and resources of the IC and foreign intelligence partners is possible with the most trusted most capable allied intelligence services The early collaboration between the United States and United Kingdom during the Second World War which resulted in the success of the Magic and Ultra operations has continued to the present day with the integration of personnel and burden sharing or “divisions of effort” involving signals intelligence SIGINT target areas 62 The integration is so close that U S and British customers consumers of their products often do not know which country generated the intelligence they are reading reviewing consuming 63 Similarly U S reliance on Japanese signals intelligence coverage of the western Pacific enabled the United States through receipt of Japanese intercepts of communications between Russian ground controllers and fighter pilots to pinpoint the cause of the shoot-down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in 1983 64 Following the end of the Cold War the United States embarked on a deliberate strategy to benefit from a perceived peace dividend This amounted to relying on foreign partners for intelligence coverage of areas of the world where the United States either did not have access or did not want to expend the resources and effort to establish coverage 65 Foreign intelligence relationships can provide the benefit of second-hand understanding of issues and areas of the world where the United States may lack national intelligence assets Moreover since 9 11 the IC has had to rapidly expand its liaison relationships with state and non-state foreign intelligence organizations for time-sensitive contingency support of fluid counterterrorism operations Yet there is a risk of over-reliance on foreign partnerships as a joint congressional inquiry found when they are not balanced by national intelligence capabilities 66 Joint Intelligence Operations Joint operations may be conducted when the United States and a foreign partner intelligence service contribute complementary abilities in intelligence collection or covert action to achieve a common objective 67 For example one partner may be able to provide access to a source of information and the other the technical capacity to exploit the information for intelligence value In 1949 at the beginning of the Cold War the British Secret Intelligence Service was able to tap the communications cables of the Soviet command center during its post-war occupation of 62 Michael Herman Intelligence Power in Peace and War Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1996 p 202 Sir Stephen Lander “International Intelligence Cooperation An Inside Perspective ” Cambridge Review of International Affairs vol 17 no 3 2004 p 487 64 Jeffrey T Richelson Foreign Intelligence Organizations Cambridge Ballinger Publishing Co 1988 pp 267-268 65 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States The 9 11 Commission Report Washington D C Government Printing Office 2004 p 90 66 A joint congressional inquiry found that the “peace dividend” of the immediate post-Cold War years relied excessively on liaison relationships with foreign intelligence services at the expense of developing national intelligence capabilities See U S Congress Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 2001 Washington DC U S Government Printing Office December 2002 p 91 at https www intelligence senate gov sites default files documents CRPT-107srpt351-5 pdf 67 Covert action is defined in statute as an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political economic or military conditions abroad where it is intended that the role of the United States will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly 50 U S C §3093 e See also CRS Report R45175 Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community Selected Definitions in Brief by Michael E DeVine 63 Congressional Research Service 14 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships Austria The CIA joined the operation due to its technical ability to read the enciphered messages that the SIS intercepted 68 Because of the close link of covert action to national security policy deliberations over conducting joint covert action operations with a foreign partner may affect U S policy decisions and outcomes In 1953 the British lobbied the Eisenhower Administration for a joint covert action operation that resulted in the overthrow of the elected Iranian government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh 69 Similarly the British argued against the United States embarking upon covert action in the 1950s to destabilize Soviet bloc governments in Europe 70 Basing Rights Hosting Equipment Intelligence relations are often part of broader security arrangements with U S partners who may provide privileges to base operational and intelligence personnel and equipment in geographic proximity to both the target area and intelligence personnel and facilities of the allied partner 71 Host-country partners provide political clearance that enables the United States to establish intelligence facilities and may also provide various degrees of infrastructure support This has been true of many close U S allies such as Germany the United Kingdom Japan Italy Spain Portugal and South Korea Other partners that have provided basing rights have risked more politically in doing so e g Turkey Pakistan Iran under the Shah Iraq and Afghanistan During the Cold War Pakistan permitted the United States to maintain a signals intelligence site in the country and permitted the CIA to conduct reconnaissance flights from Pakistani airfields In Iran in return for significant amounts of military aid 72 the Shah’s government permitted two U S signals intelligence sites in the north of the country that enabled the IC to collect missile telemetry from the Soviet missile test facility at Tyuratam 73 U S intelligence liaison relationships which expanded significantly after 9 11 included a multilateral facility in France for collaboration on counterterrorist intelligence Multilateral intelligence sharing—Five Eyes excepted—can sometimes be cited as providing products and services at a level of the least trusted member of the multilateral arrangement The facility in France however which also included representation from the United States United Kingdom 68 Jeffrey T Richelson Foreign Intelligence Organizations Cambridge Ballinger Publishing Co 1988 p 25 See for example Michael Axworthy Revolutionary Iran A History of the Islamic Republic Oxford Oxford University Press 2013 p 49 70 See Richard J Aldrich “British Intelligence and the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’ During the Cold War ” Review of International Studies 1998 pp 340-341 71 In 2009 account in The New York Times for example provides an account of the CIA’s covert operation of drones based in Pakistan to target al Qa’ida operatives in North Waziristan during the Obama Administration See Scott Shane “C I A to Expand Use of Drones in Pakistan ” New York Times December 3 2009 at https www nytimes com 2009 12 04 world asia 04drones html The U S also reportedly for a time provided Pakistan with real-time drone imagery and communications intercepts to assist in Pakistan’s counterterrorism operations However U S intelligence officials had been opposed to jointly operating drones with Pakistan and providing advance notice of drone flight operations believing the information was leaked to militants in the past See Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti “In a First U S Provides Pakistan with Drone Data ” New York Times May 13 2009 at https www nytimes com 2009 05 14 world asia 14drone html 72 See William J Daugherty “A First Tour Like No Other Held Hostage in Iran ” Studies in Intelligence Spring 1998 at https www cia gov library center-for-the-study-of-intelligence csi-publications csi-studies studies spring98 iran html 73 See Jeffrey T Richelson The Wizards of Langley Inside the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology Boulder Westview 2001 p 88 Richardson indicates that these sites provided about 85 percent of U S intelligence on the Soviet ICBM program 69 Congressional Research Service 15 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships Canada Germany and Australia underscored the significant level of cooperation by the French in orchestrating counterterrorist collaboration among allied intelligence services to successfully target terrorists outside of Iraq and Afghanistan 74 U S drone facilities in Djibouti Pakistan and elsewhere have contributed to elimination of certain terrorist threats and have benefited from support from the host-country intelligence services despite—in the case of Pakistan—opposition to the U S presence by many of the local population 75 The CIA drone operations in Pakistan successfully targeted members of the Haqqani Network the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban among others From Djibouti drone strikes have been conducted over Yemen and Somalia with the assistance of the French and permission of the Djiboutian government Diplomatic Back Channel The IC has been used for a diplomatic back channel to foreign governments when there may be few alternatives to reliably communicate important information between heads of state Generally this involves countries with which the United States does not have diplomatic relations In these situations the foreign intelligence services are often closely linked to the head of state and exercise influence similar to that of the foreign ministry Using intelligence services as a diplomatic back channel may be necessary to convey a personal message clarify intentions or diffuse tension One instance that has become public involves the intelligence ties between the CIA North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau and South Korea’s National Intelligence Service 76 This channel between IC counterparts begun in 2009 during the Obama Administration has been used by senior IC officials to send or receive personal communications between the U S President and the North Korean leader 77 Risks and Obstacles There is a variety of risks and obstacles to U S intelligence relationships with foreign partners They result from policy differences differences in assumptions about a threat failure to respect human rights lapses in security espionage and legal and informal limits each side may place upon the other The strongest most enduring relationships have weathered differences in policy or lapses in security that have led to temporary setbacks in intelligence cooperation 78 More formidable to overcome are obstacles to intelligence sharing resulting from fundamental differences in values See Dana Priest “Help from France Key in Covert Operations ” The Washington Post July 3 2005 at http www washingtonpost com wp-dyn content article 2005 07 02 AR2005070201361 html 75 Pakistan however has officially denied its Inter-Services Intelligence ISI agency closely cooperated with the CIA in conducting drone strikes CIA drone operations from within Pakistan ended in December 2011 following a strike that killed 24 members of the Pakistani military See Jonathan A Landay “U S Secret CIA Collaborated with Pakistan Spy Agency in Drone War ” McClatchy DC April 9 2013 at https www mcclatchydc com news nation-world world article24747829 html 76 See Daniel Hoffman “The U S Intelligence Mission Targeting North Korea ” The Cipher Brief June 12 2018 at https www thecipherbrief com column_article 28790 77 Michael R Gordon and Warren P Strobel “Spy Channel Paves Way for Nuke Talks ” Wall Street Journal January 22 2019 78 Examples include the “Suez Crisis” that resulted in rifts in the special relationship between the U S and Britain and New Zealand’s “nuclear-free zone” policy effectively banning nuclear-capable U S Navy ships from making ports of call 74 Congressional Research Service 16 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships Training Bilateral intelligence training of foreign partners’ intelligence services can provide certain advantages to the United States but can also create noteworthy risks In its earliest years the United States as has been noted benefited from the assistance of British and French mentors of the fledgling U S Military Intelligence Division MID during the First World War 79 Since the CIA’s creation training in intelligence collection and analysis has become a means by which the agency and other IC elements have established and maintained ties to foreign partners This report cites elsewhere the efforts by the United States to build the German and Israeli intelligence services Among many other examples of the IC reinforcing strategic ties to foreign partners through intelligence training are U S support in training Iran’s Ministry of State Security SAVAK and Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate GID Yet subsequent problems in U S relations with these countries and others like them underscore the inherent risks of anticipating the second- and third-order effects of establishing close intelligence ties to fragile and unstable foreign governments 80 The Iraqi National Intelligence Service INIS provides a similar example of both the benefits and risks of intelligence-training relationships with foreign partners This organization established with the CIA’s support was one factor—among others—in turning the tide against the Sunni insurgency of 2004-2008 However it also became caught up in Iraq’s Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict and linked to a proxy fight for influence in Iraq between the United States and Iran Iran reportedly was involved in an assassination campaign against the Sunni-dominant INIS 209 of whose officers were reportedly killed from 2004-2009 81 This was partly a consequence of a rivalry with Iraq’s Shia-dominant—and unofficial—intelligence organization within the Ministry of State for National Security operating under Iran’s influence and aligned with Iraq’s then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki Ethics and Human Rights Historically adhering to internationally sanctioned standards for ethics and human rights has challenged the United States IC and its foreign intelligence partners especially in times of crisis While the United States can benefit from intelligence shared by authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere these regimes have relatively few restraints against obtaining information by harsh interrogation or even torture As articulated by one scholar 79 Michael Warner The Rise and Fall of Intelligence An International Security History Washington DC Georgetown Univ Press 2014 pp 60-63 See also James Igoe Walsh “Defection and Hierarchy in International Intelligence Sharing ” Journal of Public Policy vol 27 no 2 May – August 2007 p 167 “British intelligence services provided influential advice and served as an important exemplar during the formative years of the American intelligence community ” 80 Although initially seen as a benefit to cementing a close relationship with the Shah’s Iran as a hedge against Soviet influence in the Middle East long-standing intelligence ties to SAVAK proved to be a significant liability for the U S during the 1979 Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis Close ties between U S intelligence and Egypt’s GID also proved to be problematic when President Gamal Abdel Nasser sought closer relations with the Soviet Union 81 “An Uncertain Future for Iraq’s Intelligence Services ” Stratfor Worldview January 11 2012 at https worldview stratfor com article uncertain-future-iraqs-intelligence-services Although experienced members of Saddam Hussein’s General Intelligence Directorate GID most of whom were Sunni were represented in the INIS the leadership of the organization was intentionally chosen for its non-sectarian orientation Congressional Research Service 17 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships Authoritarian regimes can employ among other things relatively extensive population control measures and invasive intelligence collection methods can readily obtain information superiority and are under relatively little pressure to use minimum force 82 A lack of control and accountability over an authoritarian foreign intelligence partner employing such methods can undermine the credibility of the information obtained Political backing for such methods can also produce the same effect For the U S even the perception of engaging in an intelligence liaison relationship with a foreign partner with a poor human rights record can leave the United States vulnerable to criticism The policy of the IC as described by a former director of the CIA is to refrain from exchanging intelligence with regimes that abuse human rights We the U S government and we CIA are very very clear in terms of the types of behaviors and actions that we will not tolerate… We CIA have not only threatened to cut off relations with some of those liaison partners when we have information that they practice abuses of human rights we have cut off relations So I think we need to keep the pressure on them… The navigation of the shoals that stand between these governments today and a thriving democracy are significant And I think we have to help them navigate it 83 However the U S IC itself has leveraged foreign intelligence partnerships to commit ethical abuses including the well-documented use of so-called black sites overseas Six days after the 9 11 terrorist attacks President George W Bush signed a memorandum of notification MON that granted the CIA a number of counterterrorism authorities including to “undertake operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing serious threat of violence of death to U S persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities ”84 Subsequently DCI George Tenant ordered the agency’s Deputy Director of Operations and the Director of the Counterterrorism Center to assume authority for the capture and detention of terrorists 85 The CIA conducted detentions and interrogations at various secret black sites abroad where CIA personnel including contract interrogators employed what has been termed “enhanced interrogation techniques” as authorized by the Department of Justice 86 Yuri Zhukov as quoted by Cameron Reed “America’s Best Partner in Middle East HUMINT Needs Help ” Defense One June 22 2017 at https www defenseone com ideas 2017 06 americas-best-partner-middle-east-humint-needshelp 138889 83 “John Brennan on Transnational Threats to Global Security ” Council on Foreign Relations June 29 2016 at https www cfr org event john-brennan-transnational-threats-global-security Daniel Coats spoke out against the use of torture during DNI confirmation hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence February 28 2017 See https www congress gov 115 chrg shrg24745 CHRG-115shrg24745 pdf 84 Committee Study on the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program S Rept 113-288 Washington DC Senate Select Committee on Intelligence December 9 2014 p 11 at https www intelligence senate gov sites default files documents CRPT-113srpt288 pdf 85 Special Review Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities September 2001-Octover 2003 20037123-IG Washington DC Office of the General Counsel Central Intelligence Agency May 7 2004 p 3 at https www cialgov library readingroom docs 0005856717 pdf 86 Memorandum for Alberto R Gonzales Counsel to the President Re Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U S C §§ 2340-2340A August 1 2002 at https nsarchive2 gwu edu NSAEBB NSAEBB127 02 08 01 pdf and John C Yoo Deputy Assistant Attorney General Letter to Alberto R Gonzales Counsel to the President August 1 2002 at https nsarchive2 gwu edu NSAEBB NSAEBB127 020801 pdf See also Special Review Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities September 2001-October 2003 2003-7123-IG Washington DC Office of the General Counsel Central Intelligence Agency May 7 2004 pp 19-20 at https www cia gov library readingroom docs 0005856717 pdf In 2004 Jack Goldsmith the successor as head of Office of Legal Counsel OLC to Jason Bybee who signed the two memos withdrew them in 2004 82 Congressional Research Service 18 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships In its study of the program the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence SSCI reported ten detention sites abroad 87 Media sources have indicated as many as nine more sites 88 Although the landmark 2006 Supreme Court ruling Hamdan vs Rumsfeld effectively ended the “enhanced interrogation techniques” the CIA employed at the time and contributed ultimately to the closure of the black sites by 2009 the program proved an embarrassment to the CIA and complicated the IC’s counterterrorism intelligence engagements with foreign partners 89 Challenges Vetting Sources Security Lapses and Espionage U S intelligence agencies’ often long-standing ties to foreign intelligence services have been tested by sharing of uncorroborated information and improper source vetting Germany and Jordan are close intelligence partners of the United States Both however provide examples of the risk of accepting information or intelligence from partner-controlled improperly vetted sources  The now-discredited information of a German Federal Intelligence Service Bundesnachrichtendienst or BND source codenamed Curveball alleging Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction influenced the 2003 U S decision to invade Iraq 90 Although the lessons learned from this historic failure to properly vet a foreign intelligence source have reduced the risk of repetition any intelligence organization can fall victim to accepting unreliable information from an otherwise trusted foreign partner 91 Further some foreign partners could Committee Study on the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program S Rept 113-288 Washington DC Senate Select Committee on Intelligence December 9 2014 at https www intelligence senate gov sites default files documents CRPT-113srpt288 pdf 88 See for example Jane Mayer “Outsourcing Torture The Secret History of America’s ‘Extraordinary Rendition’ Program ” The New Yorker February 14 2005 The SSCI report makes multiple references that may indicate detainees were held in other locations However the number of redactions in the report makes it difficult to ascertain the exact number of locations that may have served as permanent or temporary detention or processing sites 89 Among its findings in Hamdan vs Rumsfeld the Supreme Court determined that detainees were protected by the laws of armed conflict specifically Common Article 3 CA3 of the Geneva Conventions CA3 which governs conflicts “not of an international character ” prescribes the humane treatment of detainees or others who have laid down their arms or are otherwise not taking part in hostilities It prohibits “outrages upon dignity in particular humiliating and degrading treatment…cruel treatment and torture ” See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 p 91 at http www un org en genocideprevention documents atrocity-crimes Doc 32_GC-IIIEN pdf For background on CIA ethics education see CRS In Focus IF10906 CIA Ethics Education Background and Perspectives by Michael E DeVine 90 For more information on the impact of Curveball see for example John Prados “The Record on Curveball Declassified Documents and Key Participants Show the Importance of Phony Intelligence in the Origins of the Iraq War ” George Washington University National Security Archive Briefing Book No 234 at https nsarchive2 gwu edu NSAEBB NSAEBB234 91 The IC’s failure regarding Curveball had several factors which were cited in the Findings and Recommendations of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 1 The IC was faulted for relying a single source Curveball to support claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction despite clear indications prior to the invasion of Iraq that Curveball was unreliable 2 Senior management at CIA failed to heed warnings by officers in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations expressing serious reservations about Curveball’s reliability 3 The Defense Intelligence Agency failed to attempt to validate Curveball’s reporting cited by the Commission as “a major failure in operational tradecraft ” 4 Analysts were unable to question their assumptions about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program despite indications that undermined Curveball’s credibility See Appendix B List of Findings and Recommendations p 558 at https www govinfo gov content pkg GPO-WMD pdf GPO-WMD pdf The Commission was created by Executive Order 13328 February 6 2004 President George W Bush accepted most of the Commission’s recommendations that in part directed efforts to improve intelligence collection and analytical tradecraft See “President Bush Administration Actions to Implement WMD Commission 87 Congressional Research Service 19 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships  render their controlled sources’ information unreliable through use of duress or torture In December 2009 a source under control of Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate GID Humam Khalil al-Balawi blew himself up at a CIA facility at Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost Afghanistan killing seven CIA agents Al-Balawi who had claimed to be the physician to Ayman al-Zawahiri then-deputy to Osama bin Laden was in fact working for al-Qa’ida At the time however he offered the prospect that he could assist the CIA in locating alQa’ida’s senior leadership A subsequent CIA assessment of the circumstances that led to the attack concluded that al-Balawi “was not fully vetted” despite having previously provided information to the U S and Jordan that had been verified 92 In a statement outlining corrective measures resulting from the attack then-CIA Director Leon Panetta determined in part that the agency needed to “more carefully manage information sharing with other intelligence services ”93 The intelligence partnership with Britain has also proven vulnerable to the problems of vetting employees or sources of a foreign intelligence agency The most notorious instance involved five British graduates of Cambridge University the Cambridge Five serving in senior positions in MI6 while engaging in espionage as agents of the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 1950s One of the five Kim Philby served for a time as First Secretary Chief of Station-equivalent of the British embassy in Washington DC Problems with espionage and violations of security have also affected the U S IC Some close partners have brought U S citizens under control as sources for intelligence on the U S These include the cases of Jonathan Pollard and Robert Kim spying on behalf of Israel and South Korea respectively 94 Another dimension of the risk to intelligence sharing with foreign partners involves advances in technology Recently the Trump Administration expressed concern over the potential decision of a foreign intelligence partner to purchase 5G telecommunications infrastructure that could be vulnerable to penetration by a hostile foreign intelligence service or a company controlled by a hostile foreign intelligence service The United States Ambassador to Germany in a letter to the German Minister for Economic Affairs reportedly warned against Germany purchasing 5thgeneration technology 5G telecommunications equipment from China’s Huawei Technologies Co suggesting that doing so might require the United States out of concern for security to cut Recommendations ” June 29 2005 at https georgewbush-whitehouse archives gov news releases 2005 06 200506295 html 92 Leon E Panetta Message from the Director Lessons from Khost posted October 19 2010 at https www cia gov news-information press-releases-statements press-release-2010 message-from-the-director-lessons-from-khowst html 93 Ibid For a more detailed account of the circumstances that led to the attack on the CIA base in Khost see Joby Warrick “Humam Al-Balawi The Triple Agent ” Newsweek June 19 2011 at https www newsweek com humam-albalawi-triple-agent-67873 Despite the policy and operational pressures that ultimately contributed to the failures of intelligence in the Curveball and al-Balawi incidents it should be noted that a number of U S German and Jordanian intelligence professionals expressed reservations about these sources’ credibility 94 For an account of Jonathan Pollard’s espionage on behalf of Israel see Jeffrey T Richelson “The Jonathan Pollard Spy Case The CIA’s 1987 Damage Assessment Declassified ” George Washington University National Security Archive Briefing Book No 407 at https nsarchive2 gwu edu NSAEBB NSAEBB407 For an account of the Robert Kim espionage on behalf of South Korea see David Johnston “Korean Spy Case Called More Serious Than Was Thought ” New York Times October 3 1996 at https www nytimes com 1996 10 03 world korean-spy-case-calledmore-serious-than-was-thought html mtrref www google com gwh 315811738692A70195270F5EF6ADD97A gwt pay Congressional Research Service 20 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships back on intelligence sharing between the United States and its long-standing ally 95 The proposed Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 S 245 would require the head of an IC element entering into an agreement with a foreign intelligence service to consider the vulnerability of the foreign service’s telecommunications infrastructure to an adversary of the United States 96 Limited Cooperation or Lack of Reciprocation Limited cooperation or a lack of reciprocation can occasionally afflict even the closest intelligence foreign intelligence relationships Close partners generally work through these challenges Policy differences may create more persistent obstacles Intelligence sharing may be more limited with foreign intelligence services that do not share western democratic values or that have a fundamentally different perspective of the global environment Non-Five Eyes allies have occasionally expressed frustration with bilateral intelligence ties that are evidently not as close as those of each of the Five Eye countries to the United States Sometimes these limitations are structural intelligence sharing agreements MOUs and GSOMIAs generally define the limits of what can be disclosed or released This may result in either partner placing restrictions on what is shared on an issue of mutual national security interest These structured exchanges may result in overly-general assessments that contribute little to policy-makers’ understanding of an issue 97 Another limitation affecting cooperation on counterterrorist-related intelligence involves the more restrictive privacy protections of some countries compared to those of the United States This was true in Europe prior to the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels in 2015 and 2016 respectively European allies’ stricter privacy laws prevented their processing and sharing with the United States air passenger name request PNR data that could be important to preventing a terrorist attack Since the attacks in Paris and Brussels however the U N Security Council UNSC and European Union EU have partially addressed U S concerns by adopting measures to improve tracking and interception of PNR data these measures are intended to facilitate the sharing of perishable intelligence indicators of terrorist travel 98 See Bojan Pancevski and Sara Germano “Drop Huawei or See Intelligence Sharing Pared Back U S Tells Germany ” The Wall Street Journal March 11 2019 at https www wsj com articles drop-huawei-or-see-intelligencesharing-pared-back-u-s-tells-germany-11552314827 96 See Section 307 “Consideration of adversarial telecommunications and cybersecurity infrastructure when sharing intelligence with foreign governments and entities” of S 245 Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 116th Congress Whenever the head of an element of the intelligence community enters into an intelligence sharing agreement with a foreign government or any other foreign entity the head of the element shall consider the pervasiveness of telecommunications and cybersecurity infrastructure equipment and services provided by adversaries of the United States particularly China and Russia or entities of such adversaries in the country or region of the foreign government or other foreign entity entering into the agreement https www congress gov bill 116th-congress senate-bill 245 text q %7B%22search%22%3A%22%5C%22intelligence authorization act%5C%22%22%7D r 1 s 1#toc-H6688A0FF57E34BEDB123B47BFCD4D468 97 See Richard J Aldrich “British Intelligence and the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’ During the Cold War ” Review of International Studies 1998 pp 345-347 98 See UNSC Resolution 2396 2017 at https www un org press en 2017 sc13138 doc htm The EU’s European Council adopted Directive 2016 681 requiring member states to develop Passenger Name Request PNR tracking data systems for flights outside of the EU See Ambassador Nathan A Sales “Counterterrorism Data Privacy and the Transatlantic Alliance ” German Marshall Fund July 19 2018 at https www state gov documents organization 284459 pdf 95 Congressional Research Service 21 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships In situations involving fundamentally different values and assumptions about the global environment the United States and a foreign partner may limit the intelligence they are willing to share Describing the long-standing U S strategic intelligence relationship with Saudi Arabia for example one scholar noted The Saudi Kingdom in general was often slow to recognize the threat of terrorism and reluctant to cooperate with the United States After the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing the Saudi government did not share vital information with U S intelligence Many of the causes linked to the global jihadist movement like the fighting in Kashmir and Chechnya enjoyed wide legitimacy within the Kingdom and citizen support for these conflicts seemed to pose no direct threat to Saudi security 99 In instances where intelligence relations with foreign entities are part of a larger relationship the benefit to each side might not be directly reciprocated A foreign partner for example may leverage a capability in intelligence such as human intelligence access to a difficult target in order to extract benefits from the United States in other areas of the bilateral relationship such as military assistance In one example Pakistan for years benefited from a relationship with U S intelligence that was part of a broader cooperative relationship in defense counterterrorism governance and development This relationship survived despite strong American objections to indications of Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban Haqqani Network and other Islamist militant groups and Pakistan’s objections to alleged U S violations of its sovereignty In January 2018 the Trump Administration announced a major policy decision to suspend security aid to Pakistan Pakistan retaliated by terminating its counterterrorism intelligence cooperation with the United States 100 The IC also has or has had intelligence liaison relationships with adversaries such as Russia China Syria and Libya There has been benefit in doing so over a relatively narrow range of mutual interests However the apparent benefit of exchanging intelligence with adversaries such as on counterterrorism is typically weighed alongside the risks There is a danger of exposing U S intelligence sources and methods to a traditional adversary Furthermore intelligence liaison about a particular issue—over time—may risk exposing U S sources and methods to the foreign agency as well as exposing knowledge of corruption connected to that government Serious policy differences also can reduce or negate the benefits of sharing intelligence In the case of Syria both Russia and the U S have an interest in resolving the conflict However Russia’s broader strategic objectives oppose those of the United States 101 Daniel L Byman “The U S -Saudi Arabia Counterterrorism Relationship ” testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on Terrorism Nonproliferation and Trade May 24 2016 at https www govinfo gov content pkg CHRG-114hhrg20256 html CHRG-114hhrg20256 htm This is an historic example Saudi Arabia has since become a critical intelligence partner against Al Qaeda As Daniel Byman’s subsequent testimony illustrates “Much changed in 2003 when Al Qaeda began to attack the Kingdom directly…As a result of these attacks the Kingdom embraced intelligence cooperation with the United States and began to see Al Qaeda as a deadly threat Despite this level of cooperation however Byman cautions “The United States and Saudi Arabia share many interests but they do not share common values or a common worldview ” 100 This development received wide press coverage See for example Farhan Bokhari Katrina Manson and Kiran Stacey “Pakistan Halts Intelligence-Sharing with U S after Aid Suspension ” Financial Times January 11 2018 at https www ft com content 59969778-f6b1-11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00 101 See Steven L Hall Intelligence Sharing with Russia A Practitioner’s Perspective Washington DC Carnegie Endowment for International Peace February 9 2017 at https carnegieendowment org files 2-1417_Stephen_Hall_Intelligence_Sharing pdf See also Daniel R Coats “worldwide Threat Assessment of the U S Intelligence Community ” January 29 2019 https www dni gov files ODNI documents 2019-ATA-SFR—SSCI pdf 99 Congressional Research Service 22 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships Over-Reliance on the Capabilities of a Foreign Partner Although foreign intelligence partnerships may have the benefit of expanding the reach of U S intelligence in areas where the U S lacks collection assets they also may pose a risk of the IC relying too heavily on a partner’s unique access and capabilities 102 In the 1970s the IC’s reliance on Iran’s SAVAK intelligence organization contributed to the U S failure to comprehend developments leading up to the overthrow of the Shah 103 More recently Congress in a Joint Inquiry into the conditions leading up to 9 11 the congressional intelligence committees cited the “excessive reliance on foreign liaison services ” as a factor contributing to the failure of the IC to develop its own human intelligence sources that could penetrate Al Qa’ida Lacking access to senior high level al-Qa’ida leadership the Intelligence Community relied on secondhand fragmented and often questionable human intelligence information a great deal of which was obtained from volunteers or sources obtained through the efforts of foreign liaison 104 The dispersed character of terrorists and terrorist organizations is such that it would be difficult to expect the IC to have an optimal number of U S -recruited human intelligence sources in place everywhere they might be needed There will always be an inherent risk in relying on foreign partners in areas where the United States has not had the time resources or capacity to develop its own assets However a greater risk was arguably incurred by the U S intelligence community in its deliberate resource-driven strategy of leveraging foreign partnerships during the 1990s Conclusion U S foreign intelligence relationships may be easily overlooked in discussions of the importance and inherent risks of cooperation with state and non-state actors in the international community Little is publicly known about them in particular how they are structured and how they contribute to U S national security The benefits of these relationships to the United States are weighed against their potential hazards including outright failure Congress’s role in providing oversight 102 This more commonly describes the risk many foreign intelligence partners have in their relations with the U S due to significantly greater resources and capabilities of the U S IC compared to those of its allies 103 See George C Wilson “U S Intelligence Expert Misread Extent of Iran Riots Officials Say ” Washington Post November 20 1978 at https www washingtonpost com archive politics 1978 11 20 us-intelligence-experts-misreadextent-of-iran-riots-officials-say a735c88d-c8f4-4916-a9a3-58172356f300 utm_term 3003243fc6fa The author cites CIA officers who claim that a reduction in human intelligence and covert action in the aftermath of the 1975 congressional investigations into U S intelligence activities resulted in the CIA having to rely excessively on SAVAK for information on Iran’s domestic developments The agency did not understand at the time SAVAK’s interest in shielding the Shah and the U S from presenting a more candid assessment of the deteriorating conditions in the country See also Malcolm Byrne Intelligence Reporting on the Iranian Revolution A Mixed Record George Washington University National Security Archive at https nsarchive gwu edu briefing-book iran 2019-02-11 irans1979-revolution-revisited-failures-few-successes-us-intelligence-diplomatic-reporting 104 U S Congress Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 2001 Washington DC U S Government Printing Office December 2002 p 91 at https www intelligence senate gov sites default files documents CRPT-107srpt351-5 pdf In this study on the conditions leading up to 9 11 Congress found that the consequent “lack of unilateral i e U S -recruited counterterrorism sources was a product of an excessive reliance on foreign liaison services ” emphasis added See p 90 The 9 11 Commission described this as a deliberate strategy whose impetus was a perceived need to cash in on a post-Cold War “peace dividend ” The CIA could thereby reduce unilateral coverage and place “great emphasis on close relations with foreign liaison services whose help was needed to gain information that the United States itself did not have the capacity to collect ” See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States The 9 11 Commission Report Washington D C Government Printing Office 2004 p 90 Congressional Research Service 23 United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships here is different than its oversight of intelligence in other respects With the exception of covert action with foreign partners which is covered by oversight provisions in statute congressional oversight of U S foreign intelligence relationships can be especially challenging due to the passive low-profile character of sharing intelligence and Congress’s inability to penetrate the internal dynamics of a foreign intelligence service Nonetheless these relationships will remain an integral daily aspect of intelligence activities supporting U S national security objectives and thus Congress has a vested interest in conducting oversight of them Author Information Michael E DeVine Analyst in Intelligence and National Security Acknowledgments Wil Mackey provided invaluable research assistance in support of this report Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service CRS CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role CRS Reports as a work of the United States Government are not subject to copyright protection in the United States Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS However as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material Congressional Research Service R45720 · VERSION 2 · NEW 24