Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress January 2 2020 Congressional Research Service https crsreports congress gov R46146 SUMMARY Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress In the United States state territorial and local governments are responsible for most aspects of selecting and securing election systems and equipment Foreign interference during the 2016 election cycle—and widely reported to be an ongoing threat—has renewed congressional attention to campaign and election security and raised new questions about the nature and extent of the federal government’s role in this policy area This report provides congressional readers with a resource for understanding campaign and election security policy This includes discussion of the federal government’s roles state or territorial responsibilities for election administration and election security an overview of potentially relevant federal statutes and agencies and highlights of recent congressional policy debates The report summarizes related legislation that has advanced beyond introduction during the 116th Congress It also poses questions for consideration as the House and Senate examine whether or how to pursue legislation oversight or appropriations R46146 January 2 2020 R Sam Garrett Coordinator Specialist in American National Government Sarah J Eckman Analyst in American National Government Karen L Shanton Analyst in American National Government In the 116th Congress the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act NDAA S 1790 P L 116-92 enacted in December 2019 contains several provisions related to campaign and election security Most provisions involve providing Congress or federal or state agencies with information about election interference It also requires the Director of National Intelligence in coordination with several other agencies to develop a strategy for countering Russian cyberattacks against U S elections In addition the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2020 P L 116-93 H R 1158 also enacted in December 2019 includes $425 million for payments to states territories and the District of Columbia to make general improvements to the administration of federal elections including upgrades to election technology and security As of this writing 116th Congress legislation that has advanced beyond introduction in at least one chamber includes H R 1 H R 753 H R 1158 H R 2500 H R 2722 H R 3351 H R 3494 H R 3501 H R 4617 H R 4782 H R 4990 S 482 S 1060 S 1321 S 1328 S 1589 S 1790 S 1846 S 2065 and S 2524 Other bills also could have implications for campaign and election security even though they do not specifically reference the topic e g those addressing cybersecurity generally or voter access Several congressional committees also have held legislative or oversight hearings on the topic Federal statutes—such as the Help America Vote Act HAVA Federal Election Campaign Act FECA and the Voting Rights Act VRA —all contain provisions designed to make campaign finance elections or voting more secure Several federal agencies are directly or indirectly involved in campaign and election security These include but are not limited to the Department of Defense DOD Department of Homeland Security DHS Department of Justice DOJ Election Assistance Commission EAC and Federal Election Commission FEC Securing federal elections is a complex policy challenge that crosses disciplinary lines Some of the factors shaping that complexity include divisions of authority between the federal and state or territorial or local governments coordination among federal agencies and communication with state agencies funding changing elections technology and the different needs of different sectors such as campaigns administrators and vendors This report does not attempt to resolve ongoing policy debates about what campaign and election security should entail The report cites other CRS products that contain additional discussion of some of the topics discussed herein The report does not address constitutional or legal issues Congressional Research Service Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Contents Introduction 1 Defining Election Security 2 Scope of the Report 3 Recent Legislative Activity 4 Development of Federal Role in Campaign and Election Security 5 Selected Federal Statutes 7 Selected Federal Agencies 10 Election Assistance Commission EAC 10 Federal Election Commission FEC 11 Department of Homeland Security DHS 11 Department of Justice DOJ 11 Intelligence Community IC 11 Selected Other Federal Agencies 12 Coordination By and Among Selected Federal Agencies 13 Department of Homeland Security Coordination Roles 14 Election Assistance Commission Coordination Roles 15 Intelligence Community Coordination Roles 15 Coordination Roles and Selected Other Federal Agencies 16 Federal Agency Roles and Campaign Security 16 Federal Election Security Guidance 17 Federal Funding for Securing Election Systems 18 Funding for States After the 2016 Election Cycle 18 Funding for Federal Agencies After the 2016 Election Cycle 19 State and Local Role in Election Security 20 Selected Recent Policy Issues for Congress 22 Concluding Observations 28 Tables Table 1 116th Congress Legislation Which Has Passed At Least One Chamber Related to Campaign and Election Security 4 Table 2 Selected Statutes Potentially Relevant for Campaign and Election Security 8 Table 3 Selected Agency Roles in Campaign and Election Security 13 Table 4 Selected Recent Policy Issues Related to Campaign and Election Security 23 Appendixes Appendix Legislation Related to Campaign and Election Security That Has Advanced Beyond Introduction 116th Congress 30 Congressional Research Service Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Contacts Author Information 37 Congressional Research Service Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Introduction Election security is one of the most prominent policy challenges facing Congress A November 2019 warning from the heads of several federal agencies illustrates the interdisciplinary and ongoing nature of the threat to American elections According to the joint statement in the 2020 election cycle “Russia China Iran and other foreign malicious actors all will seek to interfere in the voting process or influence voter perceptions Adversaries may try to accomplish their goals through a variety of means including social media campaigns directing disinformation operations or conducting disruptive or destructive cyber-attacks on state and local infrastructure ”1 These are just the latest challenges in securing American elections Traditionally election administration emphasizes policy goals such as ensuring that all eligible voters and only eligible voters may register and cast ballots that those ballots are counted properly and that the voting public views that process as legitimate and transparent Preserving election continuity is a chief concern Election officials therefore have long prepared contingency plans that address various risks such as equipment malfunctions power outages and natural disasters These traditional concerns remain but have taken on new complexity amid foreign interference in U S elections In addition to managing traditional security concerns about infrastructure and administrative processes e g counting ballots mitigating external threats to the accuracy of information voters receive particularly from foreign sources is a potential challenge for political campaigns election administrators and the public Addressing any one of these topics might involve multiple areas of public policy or law Doing so also can involve complex practical challenges about which levels of government or agencies are best equipped or most appropriate to respond How those entities can or should interact with political campaigns the private sector and voters are also ongoing questions Technical complexity in some areas such as cybersecurity and the federal structure of shared national state or territorial and local responsibility for administering federal elections make election security even more challenging Election security in general appears to be a shared policy goal but debate exists in Congress about which policy issues and options to pursue Debate over the scope of the federal government’s role in election security shapes much of that debate State territorial and local governments are responsible for most aspects of election administration including security This report provides congressional readers with an overview that includes     how campaign and election security has developed as a policy field recent legislative activity especially bills that have advanced beyond introduction federal statutes and agencies that appear to be most relevant for campaign and election security state territorial 2 or local roles in administering elections and federal support for those functions and U S Department of Justice et al “Joint Statement from DOJ DOD DHS DNI FBI NSA and CISA on Ensuring Security of 2020 Elections ” press release November 5 2019 at https www nsa gov news-features press-room Article 2009338 joint-statement-from-doj-dod-dhs-dni-fbi-nsa-and-cisa-on-ensuring-security-of-2 2 In general campaign and election security policy matters are similar in states and territories although specific statutes 1 Congressional Research Service 1 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress  highlights of recent policy debates and potential future questions for congressional consideration Defining Election Security There is no single definition of “election security ” nor is there necessarily agreement on which topics should or should not be included in the policy debate Broadly speaking election security involves efforts to ensure fair accurate and safe elections This can include a variety of activities that happen before during and after voters cast their ballots   A narrow definition of election security might address only efforts to protect traditional election infrastructure such as voter registration databases voting machines polling places and election result tabulations More expansive definitions might also address issues affecting candidates and campaigns This includes for example regulating political advertising or fundraising providing physical or cybersecurity assistance for campaigns or combating disinformation or misinformation in the political debate The policy debates discussed herein can affect different kinds of entities uniquely    Perhaps most notably security concerns affecting campaigns can differ from those for safeguarding elections and voting Campaigns in the United States are about persuading voters in an effort to win elections They are private not governmental operations and are subject to relatively little regulation beyond campaign finance policy Elections are more highly regulated although specific practices can vary as their administration is primarily a state- or local-level responsibility Provisions in state or local law and to a lesser degree federal law regulate how voters cast ballots and who may do so Some security discussions include issues related to voter access while others view access as a separate elections policy matter This report briefly notes that access can be a component of campaign and election security policy debates but the report does not otherwise address access issues 3 This report does not attempt definitively to resolve ongoing policy debates about what campaign and election security entails or should entail nor does it fully address all aspects of the policy issues discussed Instead it provides congressional readers with background information to consider that debate and decide whether or how to pursue legislation including appropriations or distinguish between states and territories in some cases A discussion of how federal election law applies to territories versus states is beyond the scope of this report Unless otherwise noted campaign and election security concerns discussed in the text of this report are relevant for territories 3 Because voter access is primarily a state-level responsibility this report does not address the topic in detail although it does address some Voting Rights Act provisions For 116th Congress discussion of access issues see for example U S Congress House Committee on House Administration Subcommittee on Elections Report on Voting Rights and Election Administration in the United States of America prepared by Chairperson Marcia L Fudge 116th Cong 1st sess at https cha house gov report-voting-rights-and-election-administration-united-states-america which includes discussion of misinformation issues that are potentially relevant for election security and U S Congress House Committee on House Administration Subcommittee on Elections Voting Rights Act Findings Minority Views 116th Cong 1st sess at https republicans-cha house gov voting-rights-act-minority-views Both documents are undated and were released in 2019 See also for example House debate on H R 4 “Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2019 ” House debate Congressional Record daily edition December 6 2019 pp H9308-H9334 Most issues related to H R 4 do not specifically address campaign and election security and are thus beyond the scope of this report Congressional Research Service 2 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress oversight Because all the topics noted above—and others discussed throughout the report—have been components of the recent congressional debate over how to safeguard American campaigns elections and voting this report uses the general term campaign and election security Scope of the Report This report discusses federal agencies statutes and policies designed to prevent or respond to deliberate domestic or foreign security threats to campaigns elections or voting Concepts discussed in the report also have implications for some unintentional threats such as natural disasters or other emergencies that could affect campaigns elections or voting Legislation cited in the report contains specific references to campaign and election security This includes bill text that uses variations of terms such as campaign election or vote near variations of the terms interference or security Some readers might view areas addressed herein as more or less directly related to campaign or election security and alternative methodologies could yield other bills or policy topics for consideration The report does not include detailed attention to more traditional aspects of campaign finance election administration or voting particularly voter mobilization For example the report discusses Help America Vote Act provisions that authorize funding states may use to help secure elections but not provisions that authorize funding for the Election Assistance Commission generally 4 Similarly the report briefly discusses Voting Rights Act provisions that prohibit voter intimidation but it does not discuss other federal statutes enacted to make registration and voting easier 5 In addition the report briefly notes lobbying statutes that might be relevant for regulating certain corporate or foreign activity related to U S election interference but it does not substantially address lobbying as a policy area The report emphasizes domestic implications of campaign and election security This includes attention to protections for U S campaigns and elections from the effects of foreign disinformation and misinformation efforts The Appendix at the end of this report includes sanctions or immigration legislation that specifically references interference in U S elections and which has advanced beyond introduction during the 116th Congress However foreign policy implications of such interference or a discussion of offensive operations and tactics that the United States might or might not use against foreign adversaries are otherwise beyond the scope of this report 6 Because of the still-developing and complex policy challenges surrounding campaign and election security other areas of law policy or practice might also be relevant but are not addressed here The report references other CRS products that contain additional discussion of 4 Similarly the report does not address funds for aspects of election security other than securing election systems such as Intelligence Community efforts to identify sources of election disinformation 5 Other CRS products contain additional discussion See for example CRS Report R45302 Federal Role in U S Campaigns and Elections An Overview by R Sam Garrett CRS Report RS20764 The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act Overview and Issues by R Sam Garrett originally authored by Kevin J Coleman and CRS Report R45030 Federal Role in Voter Registration The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and Subsequent Developments by Sarah J Eckman 6 For additional discussion of foreign policy implications and key concepts see CRS Report R45142 Information Warfare Issues for Congress by Catherine A Theohary and CRS In Focus IF10771 Defense Primer Information Operations by Catherine A Theohary CRS In Focus IF10694 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act by Dianne E Rennack Kenneth Katzman and Cory Welt CRS In Focus IF10779 U S Sanctions on Russia An Overview by Dianne E Rennack and Cory Welt CRS Report R45415 U S Sanctions on Russia coordinated by Cory Welt and CRS In Focus IF10694 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act by Dianne E Rennack Kenneth Katzman and Cory Welt Congressional Research Service 3 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress several such topics The report does not provide legal or constitutional analysis It also does not attempt to catalog all alleged or established instances of campaign and election interference or security concerns or to independently evaluate allegations Recent Legislative Activity Highlights of recent legislative activity include the following Additional discussion appears throughout the report    The 115th Congress 2017-2019 appropriated $380 million for FY2018 for improvements to the administration of federal elections including upgrades to election technology and security The 116th Congress 2019-2021 appropriated $425 million for FY2020 in the consolidated appropriations bill H R 1158 P L 116-93 enacted in December 2019 The “Funding for States After the 2016 Election Cycle” section of this report contains additional detail The 116th Congress enacted S 1790 P L 116-92 the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act NDAA in December 2019 The legislation contains several provisions related to campaign and election security Table 1 below lists bills that have passed at least one chamber The Appendix in this report briefly summarizes 116th Congress legislation containing campaign and election security provisions that has advanced beyond introduction Table 1 116th Congress Legislation Which Has Passed At Least One Chamber Related to Campaign and Election Security See the “Scope of the Report” section and the Appendix of this report for additional detail Bill Number Short Title Latest Major Action H R 1 For the People Act of 2019 Passed House 234-193 03 08 2019 H R 753 Global Electoral Exchange Act of 2019 Passed House voice vote 05 20 2019 H R 1158 Consolidated Appropriations Act 2020 Became P L 116-93 12 20 2019 H R 2500 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 Passed House 220-197 07 12 2019 H R 2722 Securing America’s Federal Elections SAFE Act Passed House 225-184 06 27 2019 H R 3351 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act 2020 Passed House 224-196 06 26 2019 see also H R 1158 H R 3494 Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 2019 and 2020 Passed House 397-31 07 17 2019 H R 4617 Stopping Harmful Interference in Elections for a Lasting Democracy Act SHIELD Act Passed House 227-181 10 23 2019 Congressional Research Service 4 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Bill Number Short Title Latest Major Action S 1321 Defending the Integrity of Voting Systems Act Passed Senate unanimous consent 07 17 2019 S 1328 Defending Elections against Trolls from Enemy Regimes DETER Act Passed Senate unanimous consent 06 03 2019 S 1790 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 Became P L 116-92 12 20 2019 S 1846 State and Local Government Cybersecurity Act of 2019 Passed Senate unanimous consent 11 21 2019 Source CRS analysis of bill texts Notes Bills in the table specifically reference campaign and election and security Other legislation not included in the table could be relevant for campaign or election security once implemented or in practice See the “Scope of the Report” section of this report and the Appendix for additional detail The table excludes resolutions e g proposed constitutional amendments and routine appropriations bills that propose funding for agencies such as the Election Assistance Commission or Federal Election Commission unless the appropriations bill also contains additional provisions specifically addressing campaign and election security  In addition during the 116th Congress committees in both chambers have held hearings on these and related campaign and election security topics 7 The Committee on House Administration and Senate Committee on Rules and Administration exercise primary jurisdiction over federal elections Several other committees oversee related areas such as intelligence or voting rights issues Another CRS product contains additional discussion of committee roles in federal campaigns and elections generally 8 Development of Federal Role in Campaign and Election Security Foreign interference is only the highest-profile and latest campaign and election security policy challenge 9 Physical security to protect voters ballots and vote counts has been an ongoing 7 See for example U S Congress Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U S Election Volume 1 Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure with Additional Views 116th Cong 1st sess July 25 2019 at https www intelligence senate gov sites default files documents Report_Volume1 pdf U S Congress Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U S Election Volume 2 Russia’s Use of Social Media with Additional Views 116th Cong 1st sess October 8 2019 at https www intelligence senate gov sites default files documents Report_Volume2 pdf U S Congress Senate Committee on Rules and Administration Oversight of the U S Election Assistance Commission 116th Cong 1st sess May 15 2019 S Hrg 116-74 Washington GPO 2019 U S Congress House Committee on Homeland Security Defending Our Democracy Building Partnerships to Protect America’s Elections 116th Cong 1st sess February 13 2019 Serial No 116-1 Washington GPO 2019 and U S Congress House Committee on Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security Securing U S Election Infrastructure and Protecting Political Discourse 116th Cong 1st sess February 13 2019 Serial no 116-28 Washington GPO 2019 See also for example discussion and witness testimony presented during an October 22 2019 House Judiciary Committee oversight hearing “Securing America’s Elections Part II Oversight of Government Agencies ” As of this writing the hearing record does not appear to have been published Video and written materials are available on the committee website https judiciary house gov legislation hearings securing-america-s-elections-part-ii-oversightgovernment-agencies 8 See CRS Report R45302 Federal Role in U S Campaigns and Elections An Overview by R Sam Garrett 9 According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence ODNI foreign interference with U S elections falls into “five distinct categories ” Collectively these include “cyber” or “covert” operations “Cyber operations” target Congressional Research Service 5 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress concern Specifically in modern history the federal government’s first role in securing elections was primarily about access and voting rights 10 In 1965 Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act VRA which protects voters against race- or color-based discrimination in registration redistricting and voting 11 More explicitly related to security the VRA prohibits intimidation threats or coercion in voting 12 Congress primarily tasked the U S Department of Justice DOJ with enforcing the statute and related criminal provisions Federal law enforcement agencies especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI also support states and localities—which retain primary responsibility for election administration in the United States—in investigating election crimes and providing physical security at the polls The federal role in election administration expanded after the disputed 2000 presidential election In response Congress authorized federal funding for the states the District of Columbia and territories13 to make improvements to the administration of federal elections It also created the Election Assistance Commission EAC to administer those funds Congress charged the agency with overseeing a voluntary voting system testing and certification program and providing states and localities with voluntary election administration guidance research and best practices These developments notwithstanding securing campaigns and elections historically was not a major policy topic at the federal level as most security matters were reserved for state- or local-level policy The policy environment changed dramatically during the 2016 election cycle when media reports and subsequent congressional14 and federal-agency15 investigations documented Russian election infrastructure campaigns parties or public officials “Covert” operations include efforts to “assist or harm” groups such as campaigns to influence public opinion or sow social or political division or covertly influence policymakers or the public See Office of the Director of National Intelligence National Counterintelligence and Security Center Foreign Threats to U S Elections Election Security Information Needs at https www dni gov files ODNI documents DNI_NCSC_Elections_Brochure_Final pdf The publication is not dated or paginated The quoted material appears on the first full page of text For additional discussion on influence operations generally see CRS Report RL31787 Information Operations Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Capabilities and Related Policy Issues by Catherine A Theohary 10 For an overview of the issues discussed in this paragraph see CRS Report R45302 Federal Role in U S Campaigns and Elections An Overview by R Sam Garrett 11 52 U S C §§10101-10702 For additional discussion see for example CRS Testimony TE10033 History and Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by L Paige Whitaker 12 52 U S C §30107 13 The Help America Vote Act HAVA which contains many of the provisions noted in this section does not include coverage for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands CNMI When Congress enacted the statute in 2002 there were no federal elections in the territory 14 See for example U S Congress Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U S Election Volume 1 Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure with Additional Views 116th Cong 1st sess July 25 2019 at https www intelligence senate gov sites default files documents Report_Volume1 pdf U S Congress Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U S Election Volume 2 Russia’s Use of Social Media with Additional Views 116th Cong 1st sess October 8 2019 at https www intelligence senate gov sites default files documents Report_Volume2 pdf 15 For example Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation GRIZZLY STEPPE—Russian Malicious Cyber Activity joint analysis report JAR-16-20296A December 29 2016 at https www us-cert gov sites default files publications JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229 pdf National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center Department of Homeland Security “Enhanced Analysis of GRIZZLY STEPPE Activity ” analysis report AR-17-20045 February 10 2017 at https www us-cert gov sites default files publications AR-17-20045_Enhanced_Analysis_of_GRIZZLY_STEPPE_Activity pdf Director of National Intelligence Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections Intelligence Community assessment ICA 2017-01D January 6 2017 at https www dni gov files documents ICA_2017_01 pdf Congressional Research Service 6 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress government interference with that year’s U S presidential election According to Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s report these interference efforts targeted private technology firms that provide election-related software and hardware state and local government entities and a major political party and nominee 16 The investigations did not find that this activity was a determinative factor in the election outcome However the possibility of such activity and of additional efforts to affect political attitudes or participation remains In July 2018 remarks at the Hudson Institute then-Director of National Intelligence DNI Dan Coats a former Senator said that the Intelligence Community IC reported “aggressive attempts to manipulate social media and to spread propaganda focused on hot-button issues that are intended to exacerbate socio-political divisions” in elections To the extent that those efforts affect campaigns—including campaign security or the information voters receive from campaigns—campaign finance policy and law could be relevant The Federal Election Campaign Act FECA originated in the 1970s amid concerns about limiting domestic political corruption The act also contains a wide-ranging prohibition on foreign-national involvement in federal state or local U S elections 17 These provisions and disclosure and disclaimer requirements for all “persons” who raise or spend funds to influence federal elections are key elements of regulating both domestic and foreign efforts to affect political fundraising spending and advertising Political committees campaigns parties and political action committees PACs are responsible for their own security measures although as noted elsewhere in this report federal agencies or private-sector entities provide assistance in some cases Today election security is one of the most rapidly evolving policy issues facing Congress and the federal government Both chambers have passed legislation on the topic during the 116th Congress Multiple House and Senate committees have held investigative and oversight hearings Congress and the Obama and Trump Administrations have tasked federal agencies with new responsibilities for supporting states and thwarting future possible interference The Intelligence Community has warned that countering foreign interference in U S elections “will require a whole-of-society approach including support from the private sector and the active engagement of an informed public ”18 Selected Federal Statutes The U S Constitution and federal statutes regulate the division of governmental responsibility for elections No existing statute is devoted specifically to election security although as discussed below some statutes address aspects of the topic 19 Most broadly the Constitution’s Elections 16 Robert S Mueller III Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election U S Department of Justice Special Counsel report submitted pursuant to 28 C F R §600 8 c vol 1 Washington DC March 2019 pp 49-51 17 52 U S C §30121 For additional discussion of historical and recent campaign finance policy developments see CRS Report R41542 The State of Campaign Finance Policy Recent Developments and Issues for Congress by R Sam Garrett See also CRS Report R45320 Campaign Finance Law An Analysis of Key Issues Recent Developments and Constitutional Considerations for Legislation by L Paige Whitaker 18 Office of the Director of National Intelligence National Counterintelligence and Security Center Foreign Threats to U S Elections Election Security Information Needs at https www dni gov files ODNI documents DNI_NCSC_Elections_Brochure_Final pdf The publication is not dated or paginated The quoted material appears on the first full page of text 19 For example certain provisions of HAVA address election security For more on those provisions see the “Federal Congressional Research Service 7 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Clause assigns states with setting the “Times Places and Manner” for House and Senate elections and also permits Congress to “at any time … make or alter such Regulations ”20 As discussed in the “State and Local Role in Election Security” section of this report the federal government thus plays a largely supporting role in election administration generally and in election security specifically Two election-specific statutes can be particularly important for campaign and election security Relevant legislation typically proposes amending one or both First the Help America Vote Act HAVA 2002 is the only federal statute devoted to assisting states with election administration Congress relied on HAVA to establish the Election Assistance Commission provide for a voluntary federal voting system testing and certification program and authorize federal funding states could use to help secure their elections Second FECA’s disclaimer and disclosure provisions and the prohibition on foreign national fundraising or spending in U S elections can be particularly relevant for concerns about foreign interference in U S elections Several other statutes could be relevant in specific cases Table 2 below provides a brief summary Table 2 Selected Statutes Potentially Relevant for Campaign and Election Security Statute U S Code Citation Brief Relevance for Campaign and Election Security Criminal code Various provisions in 18 U S C Prohibits various practices in elections voting such as use of intimidation or threats election fraud etc some provisions also prohibit computer fraud which is referenced in some campaign and election security legislation Federal Election Campaign Act FECA 52 U S C §§30101-30146 Campaign finance statute regulates disclaimer and disclosure requirements prohibits foreignnational fundraising or spending provides Federal Election Commission with civil enforcement authority provides criminal penalties for knowing and willful violations Foreign Agents Registration Act FARA 22 U S C §§611-621 Relevant for some campaign and election security proposals policy debates such as disclosure of certain activity by foreign entities or domestic entities with certain foreign ownership interests primarily developed to address foreign propaganda establishes disclosure requirements Election Security Guidance” section of this report 20 U S Constitution Art I §4 Congressional Research Service 8 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Statute U S Code Citation Brief Relevance for Campaign and Election Security Help America Vote Act HAVA 52 U S C §§20901-21145 Primarily devoted to supporting state- and local-level election administration authorizes funding for election administration-related purposes establishes Election Assistance Commission sets certain federal election administration requirements and provides for a voluntary federal voting system testing and certification program Homeland Security Act HSA Various provisions in 6 U S C Established Department of Homeland Security some election security bills particularly regarding cybersecurity or government information-sharing cite the HSA note see also 42 U S C §5195c on critical infrastructure Lobbying Disclosure Act LDA 2 U S C §§1601-1604 Primarily devoted to lobbying regulation generally lobbyist reporting requirements e g bundling disclosure contained in act could be relevant for some campaign finance legislation National Voter Registration Act NVRA 52 U S C §§20501-20511 Primarily devoted to registration access prohibits intimidation or coercion in registration or knowingly providing false registration or tabulation information establishes Chief State Election Official designation which often is referenced in campaign and election security legislation Telecommunications law Various provisions in 47 U S C Primarily devoted to telecommunications provisions generally political advertising disclaimer and disclosure requirements e g 47 U S C §§315 317 can be relevant in some cases and sometimes are referenced in campaign and election security legislation Voting Rights Act VRA 52 U S C §§10101-10702 Primarily devoted to voting access prohibits intimidation threats or coercion in voting authorizes deploying election observers and monitors to prevent discrimination based on race color or in some cases minority-language status Source CRS analysis of cited statutes and adapted from CRS Report R45302 Federal Role in U S Campaigns and Elections An Overview by R Sam Garrett Notes See the report cited above for additional discussion of some of these statutes and of other campaigns and elections statutes The table excludes general intelligence or law enforcement authorities that could be relevant in specific enforcement scenarios It also excludes appropriations law In some cases agencies rely on Congressional Research Service 9 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress non-elections statutes or other authorities to support campaign and election security This includes for example the January 2017 “critical infrastructure” designation from then-Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson See U S Department of Homeland Security “Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector ” press release January 6 2017 at https www dhs gov news 2017 01 06 statement-secretary-johnson-designation-election-infrastructure-critical and CRS In Focus IF10677 The Designation of Election Systems as Critical Infrastructure by Brian E Humphreys The designation is still in effect although Congress has not codified it Some legislation proposes to do so as noted in the Appendix Selected Federal Agencies No single federal agency has responsibility for providing election or campaign security Only two federal agencies—the Election Assistance Commission EAC and the Federal Election Commission FEC —are devoted entirely to campaigns and elections     The EAC administers congressionally appropriated federal funding oversees a voluntary voting system testing and certification program and provides voluntary election administration guidance research and best practices The FEC is responsible for administration and civil enforcement of FECA Other departments and agencies primarily with responsibilities for other areas of public policy support campaign and election security in specific cases Some agency roles developed from a January 2017 “critical infrastructure” designation 21 Additional detail appears below Additional information about agency roles appears below and in the “Coordination By and Among Selected Federal Agencies” section of this report Election Assistance Commission EAC The EAC is the only federal agency focused specifically on assisting states with election administration Congress has charged the EAC with administering funding states may use to help secure their elections   The EAC also provides states and localities with election administration assistance adopting voluntary voting system guidelines VVSG discussed below providing for systems to be tested to the VVSG and certifying systems as meeting the guidelines It also conducts research about state election administration and voting and shares information about best practices Although not mandated by Congress the EAC also participates in activities related to the designation of election systems as critical infrastructure such as serving on the Election Infrastructure Subsector Government Coordinating Council EIS-GCC and on the EIS-GCC executive committee 22 21 For additional discussion see CRS In Focus IF10677 The Designation of Election Systems as Critical Infrastructure by Brian E Humphreys For additional background on critical infrastructure designations generally see CRS Report RL30153 Critical Infrastructures Background Policy and Implementation by John D Moteff and CRS Report R45809 Critical Infrastructure Emerging Trends and Policy Considerations for Congress by Brian E Humphreys Elections is a “subsector” within the Government Facilities sector 22 See Election Infrastructure Subsector Governing Coordinating Council Charter October 18 2017 at https www dhs gov sites default files publications govt-facilities-election-infrastructure-subsector-gcc-charter-2017508 pdf Congressional Research Service 10 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Federal Election Commission FEC The FEC enforces civil compliance with FECA provisions and commission regulations regarding campaign finance This includes activities related to fundraising spending advertising disclaimers and financial disclosure reports These provisions are relevant for some aspects of security affecting political candidates or campaigns parties political action committees PACs or other entities e g independent spenders that are not political committees that raise or spend funds to affect federal campaigns 23 The FEC does not regulate election administration or voting matters 24 Department of Homeland Security DHS DHS provides states and localities with assistance mitigating risks to their election systems especially concerning cybersecurity    DHS is the sector-specific agency SSA responsible for securing the election infrastructure subsector Additional information appears later in this report DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency CISA is responsible for most of the department’s election security activities including the Election Security Initiative ESI 25 DHS protects major presidential candidates through the U S Secret Service USSS 26 The Secret Service is also the lead security agency for “national special security events” NSSEs such as presidential nominating conventions 27 Department of Justice DOJ The Department of Justice enforces several federal statutes discussed above that could be relevant for campaign and election security Within DOJ the FBI is the lead federal law enforcement agency supporting state and local election administration and is the lead federal agency in investigating and prosecuting foreign influence campaigns Intelligence Community IC Several agencies contribute to or produce intelligence about election security threats 28 For example a declassified version of a January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment ICA 23 Political committees include candidate campaigns parties and PACs See 52 U S C §30101 4 Congress transferred the FEC’s previous responsibilities in election administration and voting to the Election Assistance Commission in HAVA For additional discussion see CRS Report R45770 The U S Election Assistance Commission Overview and Selected Issues for Congress by Karen L Shanton and CRS Report R44318 The Federal Election Commission Overview and Selected Issues for Congress by R Sam Garrett It is possible that prohibited foreign spending to affect election administration or voting could fall under the FEC’s jurisdiction FEC commissioners have debated the agency’s jurisdiction on matters not directly related to campaigns a topic that is beyond the scope of this report 25 Before Congress established CISA in June 2018 the DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate NPPD served these functions For background on CISA and other DHS cybersecurity roles see CRS In Focus IF10683 DHS’s Cybersecurity Mission—An Overview by Chris Jaikaran 26 For additional discussion see for example CRS Report RL34603 The U S Secret Service History and Missions by Shawn Reese and CRS In Focus IF10130 U S Secret Service Protection by Shawn Reese 27 CRS Report R43522 National Special Security Events Fact Sheet by Shawn Reese 28 As CRS has explained elsewhere the Intelligence Community IC includes “17 component organizations” within 24 Congressional Research Service 11 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress documenting Russian attempts to influence 2016-cycle U S elections contained information and analysis from the CIA FBI and NSA 29 The “Coordination By and Among Selected Federal Agencies” section below provides additional discussion of the IC campaign and election security roles Selected Other Federal Agencies    The State Department’s Global Engagement Center GEC is charged with coordinating federal efforts to counter foreign propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining U S national security interests The GEC partners with other U S government agencies including those within the State Department at the Defense Department and elsewhere 30 The Departments of Justice State and the Treasury all can be involved in administering sanctions for election interference As noted previously sanctions policy generally is beyond the scope of this report 31 Via the FY2020 NDAA bill S 1790 P L 116-92 Congress assigned various agencies especially DHS and the DNI additional campaign and election security responsibilities Most provisions involve providing Congress or federal or state agencies with information about election interference The Appendix of this report provides additional detail Table 3 provides a brief overview of selected agency roles in campaign and election security the federal government These include for example the Central Intelligence Agency National Security Agency and intelligence divisions within other departments and agencies For additional detail see CRS In Focus IF10525 Defense Primer National and Defense Intelligence by Michael E DeVine and Heidi M Peters CRS In Focus IF10527 U S Intelligence Community Elements Establishment Provisions by Michael E DeVine and Heidi M Peters and CRS In Focus IF10470 The Director of National Intelligence DNI by Michael E DeVine 29 Office of the Director of National Intelligence Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections” The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution ICA 2017-01D January 6 2017 at https www dni gov files documents ICA_2017_01 pdf For additional CRS discussion of these activities as a component of Russian foreign policy a topic that is beyond the scope of this report see for example CRS Report R44775 Russia Background and U S Policy by Cory Welt 30 For background on the GEC see CRS Insight IN10744 Global Engagement Center Background and Issues by Matthew C Weed See also U S Department of State “Global Engagement Center ” at https www state gov r gec 31 For additional discussion see for example CRS In Focus IF10694 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act by Dianne E Rennack Kenneth Katzman and Cory Welt CRS In Focus IF10779 U S Sanctions on Russia An Overview by Dianne E Rennack and Cory Welt CRS Report R45415 U S Sanctions on Russia coordinated by Cory Welt and CRS In Focus IF10694 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act by Dianne E Rennack Kenneth Katzman and Cory Welt Congressional Research Service 12 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Table 3 Selected Agency Roles in Campaign and Election Security Agency Brief Description of Security Role Department of Commerce National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST advises EAC on technical and scientific matters including voting system testing laboratory accreditation recommendations and assistance with developing the VVSG Department of Defense U S Cyber Command and other services provide cybersecurity and intelligence in some cases U S Cyber Command and National Security agency Election Security Group task force tracks certain foreign threats Federal Voting Assistance Program director included in EAC Board of Advisors some National Guard units assist states with cybersecurity Department of Homeland Security Assists states on cybersecurity matters Sector-Specific Agency SSA for Elections Infrastructure Subsector EIS Secret Service protects major presidential candidates Department of Justice Enforces criminal law and civil aspects of some elections statutes DOJ included in EAC Board of Advisors Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI investigates election crimes and participates in Intelligence Community FBI Foreign Influence Task Force FITF investigates foreign influence operations works with State Department and Department of the Treasury to administer sanctions for elections interference Department of State Global Engagement Center GEC coordinates federal efforts to counter foreign propaganda and disinformation including in elections State Department works with DOJ and Department of the Treasury to administer sanctions for elections interference Department of the Treasury Works with DOJ and State Department to administer sanctions for elections interference can also participate in investigations of prohibited foreign interference in U S elections such as through the department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network FinCEN Election Assistance Commission Administers most HAVA funds oversees a voluntary voting system testing and certification program and provides voluntary election administration guidance research and best practices Federal Election Commission Administers and enforces civil campaign finance law including disclaimer disclosure and foreign-national provisions that can be relevant for campaign and election security Intelligence Community Includes multiple agencies assesses foreign efforts to influence U S campaigns and elections Election Threat Executive is the principal elections adviser to Director of National Intelligence DNI Source Adapted from CRS Report R45302 Federal Role in U S Campaigns and Elections An Overview by R Sam Garrett Coordination By and Among Selected Federal Agencies Because no single federal agency is solely responsible for campaign and election security—and because state and local governments have most practical responsibility for election security— Congressional Research Service 13 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress coordination among agencies and governments is an ongoing congressional concern 32 Adding to the complexity of the election security challenge government agencies in some cases both support and regulate private actors—such as political campaigns—and sometimes rely on those private entities to provide threat information Highlights of federal coordination issues appear below Because some of these relationships appear to be in development some information about agency coordination or the lack thereof remains unclear in the public record Similarly some information about coordination among intelligence-gathering agencies is publicly unavailable beyond the scope of this report or both 33 As such other formal or information coordination among or by agencies likely occurs but is not reflected here Department of Homeland Security Coordination Roles DHS takes a lead role in coordinating the federal support for campaign and election security Most of the DHS coordination role stems from a January 2017 “critical infrastructure” designation that treats election infrastructure as an essential service requiring federal support and protection The designation established the Elections Infrastructure Subsector EIS within the Government Facilities Sector which includes various government buildings and equipment 34   As a result of the critical infrastructure designation DHS prioritizes support for the subsector including to those state and local election jurisdictions that choose to accept such assistance This includes sharing information about threats and conducting cyber hygiene and risk and vulnerability assessments 35 The critical infrastructure designation applies to physical and technical resources related to elections such as communications technology voting equipment and 32 See for example discussion and witness testimony presented during an October 22 2019 House Judiciary Committee oversight hearing “Security America’s Elections Part II Oversight of Government Agencies ” As of this writing the hearing record does not appear to have been published Video and written materials are available on the committee website https judiciary house gov legislation hearings securing-america-s-elections-part-ii-oversightgovernment-agencies See also U S Congress Senate Committee on Rules and Administration Oversight of the U S Election Assistance Commission 116th Cong 1st sess May 15 2019 S Hrg 116-74 Washington GPO 2019 U S Congress House Committee on Homeland Security Defending Our Democracy Building Partnerships to Protect America’s Elections 116th Cong 1st sess February 13 2019 Serial No 116-1 Washington GPO 2019 and U S Congress House Committee on Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security Securing U S Election Infrastructure and Protecting Political Discourse 116th Cong 1st sess February 13 2019 Serial no 116-28 Washington GPO 2019 33 For additional information on federal cybersecurity coordination although not limited to elections issues see CRS Report R41927 The Interplay of Borders Turf Cyberspace and Jurisdiction Issues Confronting U S Law Enforcement by Kristin Finklea 34 U S Department of Homeland Security “Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector ” press release January 6 2017 at https www dhs gov news 2017 01 06 statement-secretary-johnson-designation-election-infrastructure-critical For additional discussion see CRS In Focus IF10677 The Designation of Election Systems as Critical Infrastructure by Brian E Humphreys For additional background on critical infrastructure designations generally see CRS Report RL30153 Critical Infrastructures Background Policy and Implementation by John D Moteff and CRS Report R45809 Critical Infrastructure Emerging Trends and Policy Considerations for Congress by Brian E Humphreys Elections is a “subsector” within the Government Facilities sector 35 For an overview of DHS CISA services to state and local election jurisdictions see for example U S Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Election Infrastructure Security Resource Guide May 2019 This document and several related publications are available for download on the agency’s “Election Security Resource Library ” at https www dhs gov publication election-security-resource-library Congressional Research Service 14 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress polling places It does not apply to political campaigns The designation does not give DHS regulatory authority over federal elections 36 DHS serves as the Sector-Specific Agency SSA for the EIS As SSA the agency plays various coordinating roles among public and private entities as highlighted below  As SSA DHS coordinates information sharing among various governmental and nongovernmental entities e g vendors responsible for election administration In this role DHS also coordinates activities for the EIS Government Coordinating Council GCC  The EIS-GCC includes representatives from DHS EAC and state and local governments DHS also works with a Sector Coordinating Council SCC which consists of industry representatives e g voting-machine manufacturers   DHS also funds the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center EI-ISAC a voluntary membership organization of state and local election jurisdictions run by the private Center for Internet Security The EIISAC coordinates security information sharing among these entities Election Assistance Commission Coordination Roles   As the only federal agency devoted specifically to election administration the EAC helps facilitate communication between state or local election administrators and other federal agencies and vice versa EAC commissioners serve on the EIS Government Coordinating Council EISGCC coordinated by DHS and on the EIS-GCC executive committee Intelligence Community Coordination Roles As noted previously the IC includes more than a dozen agencies from throughout the federal government Highlights of the IC role in coordination surrounding campaign and election security appear below   In July 2019 then-DNI Coats created an IC Election Threats Executive ETE position to serve as the DNI’s principal elections adviser and to coordinate IC election security work Coats also directed IC agencies to assign a senior executive to serve as the point-of-contact for that agency’s election security work and to serve on a new IC Election Executive and Leadership Board 37 U S Cyber Command and the NSA monitors foreign threats to U S elections This reportedly includes a recently established Election Security Group 38 In 36 For additional information see CRS In Focus IF10677 The Designation of Election Systems as Critical Infrastructure by Brian E Humphreys See also CRS In Focus IF10683 DHS’s Cybersecurity Mission—An Overview by Chris Jaikaran 37 It appears that the board could include representatives from non-IC agencies For example the press release announcing the ETE and board notes that “ m embers of this board are senior-executive leads from across the IC and all relevant U S government organizations ” See Office of the Director of National Intelligence “Director of National Intelligence Daniel R Coats Establishes Intelligence Community Election Threats Executive ” press release July 19 2019 at https www dni gov index php newsroom press-releases item 2023-director-of-national-intelligence-daniel-rcoats-establishes-intelligence-community-election-threats-executive 38 See for example Dustin Volz “NSA Forms Cybersecurity Directorate Under More Assertive U S Effort ” Wall Congressional Research Service 15 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress addition the FY2020 NDAA bill requires the DNI to appoint a national counterintelligence officer within the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to coordinate election security counterintelligence particularly regarding foreign interference and equipment issues 39 Coordination Roles and Selected Other Federal Agencies  In addition to coordination on IC threat assessments noted above multiple federal agencies have collaborated on campaign and election security educational resources for political committees election administrators or voters 40 Agencies also have issued joint warnings 41  The State Department’s Global Engagement Center GEC is charged with coordinating federal efforts to counter foreign propaganda and disinformation The State Department also works with the Department of the Treasury and Justice Department to administer sanctions for election interference  The FY2020 NDAA and Coordination Roles    The FY2020 NDAA bill S 1790 P L 116-92 enacted in December 2019 requires the DNI to “develop a whole-of-government strategy for countering the threat of Russian cyberattacks and attempted cyberattacks against election systems and processes in the United States ”42 Congress specified that the strategy should include protecting federal state and local election systems voter registration databases voting tabulation equipment and systems for transmitting election results Congress also required the DNI to develop the strategy “in coordination” with the Secretaries of Defense Homeland Security State and the Treasury and with the Directors of the CIA and FBI 43 Federal Agency Roles and Campaign Security Perhaps because the 2017 critical infrastructure designation does not apply to political campaigns or other political committees it appears that no federal agency has specific responsibility for Street Journal July 23 2019 accessed via CRS subscription Olivia Gazis “The NSA Prepares to Defend 2020 Elections Drawing Lessons From 2018 ” CBS News Online September 7 2019 at https www cbsnews com news the-nsa-prepares-to-defend-2020-elections-drawing-lessons-from-2018-midterms and Martin Matishak “NSA Cyber Command Reveal New Election Security Task Force Leaders ” Politico Pro November 7 2019 accessed via CRS subscription For additional discussion see for example Ellen Nakashima “U S Explores Information Warfare to Check Russia ” The Washington Post December 26 2019 p A1 39 See §6508 S 1790 P L 116-92 116th Congress 40 See for example a fact sheet jointly issued by eight federal agencies Cyber Incident Reporting A Unified Message for Reporting to the Federal Government n d at https www dhs gov publication cyber-incident-reporting-unifiedmessage-reporting-federal-government 41 See for example U S Department of Justice et al “Joint Statement from DOJ DOD DHS DNI FBI NSA and CISA on Ensuring Security of 2020 Elections ” press release November 5 2019 at https www nsa gov newsfeatures press-room Article 2009338 joint-statement-from-doj-dod-dhs-dni-fbi-nsa-and-cisa-on-ensuring-security-of2 42 See §6504 S 1790 P L 116-92 116th Congress 43 See §6504 S 1790 P L 116-92 116th Congress Congressional Research Service 16 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress coordinating security preparations for these entities 44 However federal law enforcement agencies particularly the FBI can and do receive reports of and investigate suspected criminal activity In preparation for the 2020 elections the FBI also established a “Protected Voices” program that provides political campaigns 45 private companies and individuals with information about how to guard against and respond to cyberattacks and foreign influence campaigns In addition DHS CISA the FBI and ODNI have jointly briefed some 2020 federal political campaigns on security threats and best practices 46 Federal Election Security Guidance Federal election law takes a mostly voluntary approach to election security Congress has set some security requirements for federal elections such as directing election officials to provide a certain level of technological security for their HAVA-mandated computerized voter registration lists 47 Most election security standards are set at the state or local levels 48 Some examples of the voluntary election security guidance the federal government provides are the research best practices and technical assistance described in the “Selected Federal Agencies” section of this report HAVA also charges the EAC—with assistance from the agency’s advisory bodies and NIST—with developing voluntary voting system guidelines VVSG accrediting laboratories to test voting systems to the VVSG and certifying systems as meeting the VVSG 49 The proposed update to the VVSG that was in development as of this writing VVSG 2 0 includes some security-related principles and guidelines such as ensuring that voting systems are auditable limiting and logging access to voting systems and preventing or detecting unauthorized physical access to voting system hardware 50 Participation in the federal voting system testing and certification program is voluntary under federal law 51 The testing and certification program covers the “voting system” as defined by 44 CISA offers assistance to campaigns on a voluntary basis U S Congress House Committee on the Judiciary Testimony of Matthew Masterson Senior Cybersecurity Advisor Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency U S Department of Homeland Security for a Hearing on Securing America’s Elections Part II Oversight of Government Agencies hearing 116th Cong 1st sess October 22 2019 p 6 45 The program also appears to provide services to political parties and perhaps to other political committees e g political action committees 46 See testimony from CISA Senior Cybersecurity Advisor and former EAC Commissioner Matthew Masterson at an October 22 2019 House Judiciary Committee oversight hearing “Security America’s Elections Part II Oversight of Government Agencies ” As of this writing the hearing record does not appear to have been published Video and written materials are available on the committee website https judiciary house gov legislation hearings securingamerica-s-elections-part-ii-oversight-government-agencies 47 52 U S C §21083 52 U S C §21081 48 For more on the role states and localities play in setting election security standards see the “State and Local Role in Election Security” section of this report 49 52 U S C §§20961-20971 Technical Guidelines Development Committee Project Charter VVSG Version 2 0 June 26 2016 50 National Institute of Standards and Technology Voluntary Voting System Guidelines VVSG 2 0 Draft Recommendations for Requirements for Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 2 0 October 29 2019 at https collaborate nist gov voting pub Voting VVSG20DraftRequirements vvsg-2 0-2019-10-29-DRAFTrequirements pdf 51 Some states have chosen to make part or all of it mandatory under their own state laws According to the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee and Research and Technology Subcommittee of the House Committee on Science Space and Technology 12 states required full federal certification of their voting systems as of 2019 and 8 states did not require any federal testing or certification U S Congress House Committee on Science Space and Congressional Research Service 17 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress HAVA which does not include some components of the election system such as voter registration databases and election night reporting systems 52 Changes to one part of a voting system such as updating software to patch security vulnerabilities might require recertification of the system under the policies in effect as of this writing 53 and updates to the VVSG require approval by a three-vote majority of the EAC’s commissioners 54 Federal Funding for Securing Election Systems Congress has responded to the threats that emerged during the 2016 election cycle discussed above in part with funding Since the 2016 elections it has provided funding for helping secure election systems both to states territories and the District of Columbia DC and to federal agencies Funding for States After the 2016 Election Cycle The Consolidated Appropriations Act 2020 H R 1158 P L 116-93 and the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2018 P L 115-141 included $425 million and $380 million respectively for payments under provisions of HAVA that authorize funding for general improvements to the administration of federal elections The explanatory statements accompanying the bills listed the following election security-specific purposes as potential uses of the funds      replacing voting equipment that only records a voter’s intent electronically with equipment that utilizes a voter-verified paper record implementing a post-election audit system that provides a high level of confidence in the accuracy of the final vote tally upgrading election-related computer systems to address cyber vulnerabilities identified through DHS or similar scans or assessments of existing election systems facilitating cybersecurity training for the state chief election official’s office and local election officials implementing established cybersecurity best practices for election systems and Technology Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight and Subcommittee on Research and Technology Election Security Voting Technology Vulnerabilities hearing charter 116th Cong 1st sess June 25 2019 p 2 52 52 U S C §21081 House Committee on Science Space and Technology Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight and Subcommittee on Research and Technology Election Security Voting Technology Vulnerabilities p 5 53 U S Election Assistance Commission Testing Certification Program Manual Version 2 0 May 31 2015 at https www eac gov assets 1 6 Cert_Manual_7_8_15_FINAL pdf Some observers have suggested that VVSG certification policies complicate decisions about patching vulnerabilities in voting system software See for example U S Congress House Committee on Science Space and Technology Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight and Subcommittee on Research and Technology Written Testimony of Josh Benaloh Senior Cryptographer Microsoft Research Microsoft Corporation hearing on Election Security Voting Technology Vulnerabilities 116th Cong 1st sess June 25 2019 p 7 The EAC issued a notice of clarification about de minimis changes to voting system software on November 15 2019 U S Election Assistance Commission NOC 19-01 Software De Minimis Changes Silver Spring MD November 15 2019 at https www eac gov assets 1 6 NOC19 01_SoftwareDeMinimisChanges_11-152019 pdf 54 The VVSG was adopted by the EAC in 2005 and updated in 2015 As of this writing another update is in development The EAC lacked the quorum required to adopt an update from December 2010 to January 2015 and from March 2018 to February 2019 For more on the VVSG and quorums at the EAC see CRS Report R45770 The U S Election Assistance Commission Overview and Selected Issues for Congress by Karen L Shanton Congressional Research Service 18 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress  funding other activities that will improve the security of elections for federal office 55 The 50 states DC American Samoa Guam Puerto Rico and the U S Virgin Islands were eligible for both FY2018 and FY2020 payments The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands CNMI was eligible for FY2020 funding 56 Each recipient was guaranteed a minimum payment amount each year it was eligible—$3 million for each of the 50 states and DC and $600 000 per eligible territory—with the remainder of the appropriated funding distributed according to a formula based on voting-age population Recipients are required to provide a 5% match for the FY2018 funds within two years of receiving a federal payment and a 20% match for the FY2020 funding 57 The EAC which was charged with administering the payments reported that all of the FY2018 funds were requested by July 16 2018 and disbursed to the states by September 20 2018 58 Each state has five years to spend the funds according to the EAC and must report on its spending each fiscal year 59 The EAC posts links to the states’ reports—and spending plans—on its website and issues its own overview reports of state spending 60 Funding for Federal Agencies After the 2016 Election Cycle As noted in the “Selected Federal Agencies” section of this report multiple federal agencies are involved in helping secure election systems Congress has designated some of the funding it has appropriated to such agencies specifically for election system security 61 For example following the designation of election systems as critical infrastructure in January 2017 the report language for DHS appropriations measures has specified funding for the department’s election security Rep Rodney Frelinghuysen “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr Frelinghuysen Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations Regarding the House Amendment to Senate Amendment on H R 1625 ” explanatory statement Congressional Record daily edition vol 164 part 50 March 22 2018 p H2519 56 CNMI did not hold federal elections when HAVA was enacted and unlike the other territories listed here was not covered by the act’s funding provisions The FY2020 appropriations bill includes a provision that extends its funding to CNMI 57 Agencies are permitted to waive matching fund requirements for certain U S territories For information on previous disbursements to states territories and the District of Columbia see U S Election Assistance Commission HAVA Funds State Chart View at https www eac gov payments-and-grants hava-funds-state-chart-view and U S Election Assistance Commission Payments Grants at https www eac gov payments-and-grants managing-requirementspayments 58 U S Election Assistance Commission Election Security Grant Funding Requests Received as of 7 16 2018 at https www eac gov assets 1 6 ES_Requests_Received pdf The U S Election Assistance Commission Grant Expenditure Report Fiscal Year 2018 April 4 2019 p 10 at https www eac gov assets 1 6 FY2018HAVAGrantsExpenditureReport pdf 59 Mark W Abbott 2018 HAVA Election Security Grants U S Election Assistance Commission July 2018 https static1 squarespace com static 5a665c98017db2b60bc22084 t 5b5f7eda03ce644ee283b688 1532985050697 HAVA Funding_Mark Abbott_July 2018 pdf U S Election Assistance Commission HAVA Funds State Chart View at https www eac gov payments-and-grants hava-funds-state-chart-view and U S Election Assistance Commission For more on states’ spending of the FY2018 HAVA funds see CRS In Focus IF11356 Election Security States’ Spending of FY2018 HAVA Payments by Karen L Shanton 60 See for example U S Election Assistance Commission Grant Expenditure Report Fiscal Year 2018 Silver Spring MD April 4 2019 at https www eac gov assets 1 6 FY2018HAVAGrantsExpenditureReport pdf 61 Congress has also designated funding for other purposes that might be relevant to election security such as funding for the State Department’s GEC to address propaganda and disinformation As noted above funding for aspects of election security other than securing election systems is outside the scope of the report 55 Congressional Research Service 19 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress initiative 62 The explanatory statement for the FY2018 spending bill also directed the FBI to use some of its funding to help counter threats to democratic institutions and processes 63 Agencies may also spend some of the funding they receive for more general purposes on activities related to election system security The U S Department of Defense’s DOD’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DARPA has provided funding under its System Security Integrated Through Hardware and Firmware SSITH program to advance development of a secure open-source voting system for example and the EAC applies some of its operational funding to the federal voting system testing and certification program described in the “Federal Election Security Guidance” section of this report 64 State and Local Role in Election Security Some threats to U S elections—including both intentional interference efforts and the unintended threats posed by errors and natural disasters—involve the state and local systems used to administer elections 65 Other election security threats involve efforts to spread disinformation about elections or the integrity of the electoral process 66 States and localities may play a role in countering both types of threat 67 First states and localities take the lead on defending their election systems As noted previously states and localities have primary responsibility for administering elections in the United States The federal government has provided some funding and technical support to help them secure the systems they use to run elections but states and localities have primary responsibility for ensuring that their systems are physically and technologically secure 68 U S Department of Homeland Security “Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector ” press release January 6 2017 at https www dhs gov news 2017 01 06 statement-secretary-johnson-designation-election-infrastructure-critical Rep Rodney Frelinghuysen “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr Frelinghuysen Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations Regarding the House Amendment to Senate Amendment on H R 1625 ” p H2557 U S Congress House Committee on Appropriations Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for Fiscal Year 2019 and For Other Purposes conference report to accompany H J Res 31 116th Cong 1st sess February 13 2019 Report 116-9 Washington GPO 2019 p 492 For more on the designation of election systems as critical infrastructure see CRS In Focus IF10677 The Designation of Election Systems as Critical Infrastructure by Brian E Humphreys 63 Rep Rodney Frelinghuysen “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr Frelinghuysen Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations Regarding the House Amendment to Senate Amendment on H R 1625 ” p H2091 64 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency “Hacker Community to Take on DARPA Hardware Defenses at DEF CON 2019 ” press release August 1 2019 at https www darpa mil news-events 2019-08-01 U S Election Assistance Commission Fiscal Year 2020 Congressional Budget Justification March 18 2019 p 11 at https www eac gov assets 1 6 EACFY2020BudgetJustification pdf 65 U S Congress Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U S Election Volume 1 Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure 116th Cong 1st sess 2019 As used in this section “state” is intended also to include U S territories 66 U S Congress Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U S Election Volume 2 Russia’s Use of Social Media 116th Cong 1st sess 2019 67 For more information about the role states and localities play in election administration in general see CRS Report R45549 The State and Local Role in Election Administration Duties and Structures by Karen L Shanton 68 For more information about federal election security funding see the “Federal Funding for Securing Election Systems” section of this report For more on the technical assistance the federal government provides for securing state and local election systems see the “Selected Federal Agencies” and “Federal Election Security Guidance” sections of the report 62 Congressional Research Service 20 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress That includes primary responsibility for funding election system security measures Securing election systems may involve capital expenditures such as replacing voting machines that exceed funding provided by Congress It may also involve ongoing costs—from identifying and addressing emerging security threats to renewing software licenses paying election security staff and conducting post-election audits—that extend beyond the period for which federal funding is available Such expenses are covered if they are covered by states and localities State and local responsibility for election system security also includes primary responsibility for making and implementing most decisions about how to secure election systems Federal law sets some general standards for the administration of elections such as the voter registration list digitization requirement noted in the “Federal Election Security Guidance” section of this report 69 States and localities decide—within the broad parameters set by such general standards—which election equipment and procedures to use and how to mitigate risks to them They choose for example       whether to use electronic devices to capture or count votes whether when and how to conduct post-election audits whether and how to set security standards for election equipment vendors whether to have in-house security staff in local jurisdictions or rely on state or vendor IT support which cybersecurity tools and procedures to use whether and how to train election officials and poll workers on election security how to secure election materials between elections and ensure a secure physical chain of custody on Election Day and what cyber and physical security standards to set for election equipment Second states and localities can help combat disinformation or misinformation about elections or the integrity of the electoral process They can for example   use official websites and social media accounts to share accurate information about elections or counter false information and help educate the public about the steps they take to safeguard the electoral process States also can work through their professional associations—using initiatives such as a public education campaign launched by the National Association of Secretaries of State NASS in November 2019—to help direct voters to trustworthy sources of election information 70 These efforts might occur as part of or in parallel with responses to disinformation or misinformation by the federal government or private entities like social media companies 71 States 69 For more information about federal standards for election administration see CRS Report R45302 Federal Role in U S Campaigns and Elections An Overview by R Sam Garrett CRS Report RS20898 The Help America Vote Act and Election Administration Overview and Selected Issues for the 2016 Election by Arthur L Burris and Eric A Fischer and CRS Report RS20764 The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act Overview and Issues by R Sam Garrett originally authored by Kevin J Coleman 70 National Association of Secretaries of State NASS Launches #TrustedInfo2020 A Public Election Education Initiative at https www nass org node 1749 71 See for example Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency #Protect2020 at https www dhs gov cisa protect2020 and Federal Bureau of Investigation Protected Voices at https www fbi gov investigate Congressional Research Service 21 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress might partner with social media companies to remove posts containing election disinformation for example or adopt disclosure requirements that supplement or override the companies’ policies on digital political advertising 72 Selected Recent Policy Issues for Congress Table 4 below briefly summarizes selected policy issues and options that have shaped recent policy debates in Congress In addition the Appendix at the end of this report briefly summarizes legislation primarily devoted to campaign and election security that has advanced beyond introduction during the 116th Congress The table reflects recent policy debates but is not intended to be exhaustive Some observers might consider other issues not reflected here to be relevant for campaign and election security counterintelligence foreign-influence protected-voices 72 See for example “California Launches New Effort to Fight Election Disinformation ” Capital Public Radio September 23 2018 Kevin Collier “As Feds Struggle States Create Their Own Anti-Election Propaganda Programs ” CNN July 11 2019 and Jim Brunner and Christine Clarridge “Why Google Won’t Run Political Ads in Washington State for Now ” The Seattle Times June 7 2018 Congressional Research Service 22 Table 4 Selected Recent Policy Issues Related to Campaign and Election Security Policy Issue Status Quo Selected Areas of Policy Debate Selected Policy Options Coordination among federal agencies See also Notification of election interference row No single federal agency responsible for campaign and election security see report text for additional discussion Whether or how much additional coordination is needed between agencies to improve information sharing about security threats whether an expanded federal role is appropriate for federal elections or could usurp state authority to administer elections whether additional federal role or regulation could be unnecessary expensive or both Maintain status quo provide additional or less funding to federal agencies create new campaign and election security agency office or position to enhance coordination among federal agencies expand or reduce campaign and election security enforcement authorities in federal law or for specific agencies provide additional or less funding to states in addition to or in lieu of additional federal agency funding provide additional federal agency support to states focus on enforcement of existing statutes Election equipment and procedures States and localities primarily responsible for selecting acquiring and securing election equipment and procedures within broad parameters set by federal law EAC oversees voluntary voting system testing and certification program including VVSG that contain certain security-related recommendations some HAVA funding provided to states may be used to help secure election equipment and procedures DHS EAC and NIST provide other assistance with securing state and local election equipment and procedures such as best practices and technical assistance and FBI and IC provide investigative and intelligence support What the security threats to election equipment and procedures are and whether or how the federal government is best positioned to help address them whether it is appropriate for the federal government to be more involved in funding election equipment and procedures and or making decisions about them whether states and localities need additional assistance to address security threats to election equipment and procedures and if so which types of assistance would be most effective whether existing federal assistance such as the voluntary federal voting system testing and certification program is sufficiently responsive to changes in the election security landscape whether election services vendors should be subject to federal regulation Maintain status quo provide federal agencies or states and localities with additional funding to help secure election equipment and procedures reduce the funding federal agencies receive to help secure election equipment and procedures expand or codify nonfinancial federal assistance such as research best practices technical assistance and investigative or intelligence support require use of specific election equipment or procedures require use of election equipment or procedures that meet certain security standards amend procedures for certifying and recertifying voting systems and or updating the VVSG require disclosure of or prohibit foreign ownership or control of election services vendors require election services vendors to meet certain federal security standards CRS-23 Policy Issue Status Quo Selected Areas of Policy Debate Selected Policy Options Election system security funding States and localities primarily responsible for covering costs of implementing and maintaining election system security measures some HAVA funding provided to states may be used to help secure election systems some appropriations to federal agencies designated for use in helping secure election systems some more general agency appropriations may also be applied to election security-related purposes Whether additional funding should be provided to help secure elections and if so how much which entities or agencies should receive funding what purposes funding should or may be used for whether funding should be provided on an ongoing basis whether funding recipients should be required to meet additional conditions in order to receive funding Maintain status quo provide states localities federal agencies and or independent researchers with additional funding to help secure election systems reduce the funding federal agencies receive to help secure election systems designate funding for general improvements to election security and or specific securityrelated purposes for meeting federal election security requirements and or carrying out voluntary security activities and or for identifying new security solutions and or implementing or maintaining established best practices provide for limited duration and or ongoing funding set conditions on funding such as spending deadlines state match or maintenance of effort requirements or plan performance or reporting requirements Election security standards and guidance States and localities primarily responsible for setting election security standards within broad parameters set by HAVA EAC oversees voluntary voting system testing and certification program including VVSG that contain certain security-related recommendations DHS EAC and NIST provide other voluntary guidance on election security such as research best practices and technical assistance Whether the federal government should set additional federal standards or guidance for election security and if so who should develop them whether additional standards or guidance should be mandatory or voluntary whether the voluntary federal testing and certification program should cover more of the election system whether the federal testing and certification program is sufficiently responsive to changes in the election security landscape Maintain status quo mandate specified federal standards for election security charge EAC NIST DHS or other agency or commission with developing federal standards for election security expand the HAVA definition of “voting system to include parts of election system that are not currently covered by the federal testing and certification program amend procedures for certifying and recertifying voting systems and or updating the VVSG expand or codify voluntary federal election security guidance such as research best practices and technical assistance CRS-24 Policy Issue Status Quo Selected Areas of Policy Debate Selected Policy Options Electronic poll books e-poll books Used in at least one jurisdiction by 36 states and in 26 2% of jurisdictions nationwide during the 2018 election representing a 48 0% increase in usage since 2016 according to the 2018 EAVS report no federal guidelines state cybersecurity or certification standards vary How to maintain the integrity of realtime voter information how to provide for continuity of election if e-poll book used to check in voters is offline or accessing invalid data Maintain status quo include e-poll books as part of HAVA voting systems establish security standards or guidelines for e-poll books require or encourage use of paper poll books or other backup systems Foreign money See also Influence operations row Campaign finance law FECA prohibits fundraising or spending by foreign nationals except permanent resident aliens in federal state and local U S elections Potential for prohibited foreign funds to surreptitiously affect U S elections particularly through entities that do not publicly disclose donors e g politically active tax-exempt organizations such as 501 c 4 groups whether existing FECA prohibition is sufficient whether additional enforcement of existing prohibitions needed whether foreign money is most appropriately addressed through lobbying or antipropaganda policy rather than through campaign finance policy Maintain status quo pursue additional civil or criminal enforcement increase donor disclosure increase disclaimers through campaign finance or lobbying law impose sanctions or immigration restrictions increase reporting or government coordination to detect such funds Influence operations e g disinformation misinformation See also Foreign money row No current overarching federal statute statutes such as FECA FARA and the Homeland Security Act contain provisions that can be relevant in specific circumstances FBI Foreign Influence Task Force FITF lead agency for investigating foreign influence campaigns DHS and EAC offer assistance to election administrators Extent of emphasis on domestic versus foreign sources whether government agencies or nongovernmental entities are best-equipped to combat influence operations extent to which regulation should apply only to election-related information versus more general issue advocacy Maintain status quo require additional federal agency monitoring or enforcement encourage or rely on voters or nongovernmental entities e g advocacy groups universities etc to pursue civic literacy efforts impose sanctions or immigration restrictions increase reporting or government coordination to detect such operations CRS-25 Policy Issue Status Quo Selected Areas of Policy Debate Selected Policy Options Notification of election interference See also Coordination among federal agencies row In general there does not appear to be standard practice among various federal state and local agencies and political groups e g campaigns about sharing election-threat information FY2020 NDAA S 1790 P L 116-92 enacted in December 2019 specifies some additional agency reporting requirements to Congress DHS and FBI can provide consultations and investigations to election jurisdictions or political committees e g campaigns Whether election-specific notification processes are necessary and if so whether they should be mandatory or recommended how broadly such requirements should apply e g governments versus political committees how widely such information should be publicized and when timeliness consistency and level of detail provided from federal agencies to states and local election jurisdictions state and local and or political committee capacity to utilize federal threat information Maintain status quo require federal agencies to notify each other of suspected election interference require federal agencies to notify state local election officials political committees or voters about election interference provide additional or expedited security clearances for election officials require political committees e g campaigns to notify FBI or other federal agency of suspected or offered foreign interference or “things of value” Online political advertising FEC regulations apply disclaimer and disclosure requirements to paid advertising relating to federal candidates independent expenditures public communications and electioneering communications issue advocacy generally is not regulated under campaign finance law Whether funding sources already are sufficiently disclosed whether existing law provides sufficient regulation of issue-oriented ads about the political process but that do not trigger campaign finance law regulation whether additional disclosure requirements would produce sufficient information to warrant additional compliance burden Maintain status quo increase donor disclosure add disclaimer requirements through campaign finance law or other federal statutes require platforms to disclose content or targeting data Protecting voter information and records States vary on voter registration database VRDB cybersecurity practices and policies for obtaining voter lists Whether or how to utilize other sources of information e g agency records other states to update voter data how individuals can update or access their own information without hampering election administration or enabling unauthorized access to voter data whether existing primarily statelevel processes to verify data accuracy or update data are sufficient Maintain status quo require security standards for VRDB access specifying permissible uses for voter data require or encourage opportunity to update information at the time of voting CRS-26 Policy Issue Status Quo Selected Areas of Policy Debate Selected Policy Options Relationship between campaign and election security and voter access States determine registration and voting requirements NVRA and VRA prohibit intimidation threats or coercion in registration voting and elections in addition to other provisions that are beyond the scope of this report Whether or how to alter federal role in the relationship between security and access whether voter access should be pursued as a component of campaign and election security or as a separate policy debate Note Much debate in this area occurs at the state level e g over voteridentification requirements the issue of voter fraud access to absentee ballots etc Maintain status quo make changes to the federal role or federal policy regarding election security that would have implications for voter access pursue voter access as separate policy area from campaign and election security Verifying election results 2018 EAVS report notes 29 6% of states used direct-recording electronic DRE voting machines with no voter-verified paper trail in at least one jurisdiction during the 2018 election A majority of states require some type of postelection audit to ensure that votes are counted correctly but there is no federal requirement EAC provides guidance and VVSG that states may use addressing certain voting system features Whether current state-level verification processes are sufficient what equipment or standards help voters ensure their ballot is cast correctly and help election officials ensure that vote results are complete and accurate whether states have sufficient resources to purchase voting machines or other equipment that would help meet these standards Maintain status quo encourage or require auditing standards such as risk-limiting audits provide additional or less funding for states to implement audits require paper ballots and or voter-verified paper ballot trails Voter registration databases VRDBs HAVA requires states with voter registration to have a “centralized interactive computerized statewide voter registration list” containing certain information NVRA provides some circumstances for removing an individual from a VRDB but states vary on other list maintenance practices Whether cybersecurity standards or guidelines are needed to protect database access contents storage or information sharing how to ensure information remains accurate for eligible voters how to ensure ineligible voters cannot vote and are removed from VRDB Maintain status quo provide funding to states for upgraded equipment resources for VRDB threat assessments require information-sharing requirements if a vulnerability is detected require VRDB access logs or offline backups require or encourage automatic voter registration list maintenance requirements or criteria for removing ineligible voters from lists Source CRS analysis of recent legislation and policy debates Notes The table reflects recent policy debates but is not intended to be exhaustive Some observers might consider other issues not reflected here to be relevant for campaign and election security CRS-27 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Concluding Observations Campaign and election security are developing fields that cross policy and disciplinary boundaries This complexity is reflected in the various statutes agencies and congressional committees that share responsibility for policymaking and administrative matters relevant for security U S campaigns and elections Questions such as those that follow reflect themes discussed throughout this report These and other questions could help congressional readers decide whether they want to maintain the status quo appropriate funds or pursue oversight or legislation  Federal Role A key question for Congress is whether where and how it chooses to be involved in campaign and election security Most broadly this potentially includes how to define this rapidly developing policy area and in so doing considering which issues are most appropriately addressed at the federal level versus at the state or local levels This report has emphasized the federal role because those topics are most relevant for Congress As the report also explains states localities and territories are responsible for making many of their own election security decisions—just as political campaigns parties and PACs are responsible for their own security Therefore there are important debates about what campaign and election security includes that the federal government can influence but that are primarily addressed below the federal level in the private sector or both Examples include but are not limited to how election security might affect voter access and vice versa whether states require voter identification at the polls and whether or to what extent alleged vote fraud exists how much and on what jurisdictions choose to spend available funds and whether states localities or political campaigns and parties have sufficient resources to secure their elections or organizations  Communication Does Congress want to encourage or require additional information sharing about campaign and election security matters between the federal government and nonfederal elections agencies Similarly do state territorial and local elections officials feel that they have or need clear points of contact within federal agencies and do they know which agencies to contact in various circumstances If it determines that the status quo is inadequate does Congress want to encourage or require different reporting protocols agency outreach etc Coordination Various agencies have reported to Congress that they have improved coordination among themselves particularly through working groups or task forces 73 Less clear at least from publicly available information is  73 For an overview see for example U S Congress Senate Committee on Rules and Administration Oversight of the U S Election Assistance Commission 116th Cong 1st sess May 15 2019 S Hrg 116-74 Washington GPO 2019 U S Congress House Committee on Homeland Security Defending Our Democracy Building Partnerships to Protect America’s Elections 116th Cong 1st sess February 13 2019 Serial No 116-1 Washington GPO 2019 and U S Congress House Committee on Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security Securing U S Election Infrastructure and Protecting Political Discourse 116th Cong 1st sess February 13 2019 Serial no 116-28 Washington GPO 2019 See also discussion and witness testimony presented during an October 22 2019 House Judiciary Committee oversight hearing “Security America’s Elections Part II Oversight of Government Agencies ” As of this writing the hearing record does not appear to have been published Video and written materials are available on the committee website https judiciary house gov legislation hearings securing-america-s-elections-part-ii-oversightgovernment-agencies See also for example Martin Matishak “NSA Cyber Command Reveal New Election Security Task Force Leaders ” Politico Pro November 7 2019 accessed via CRS subscription Congressional Research Service 28 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress   specifically how such coordination works and whether current coordinating mechanisms are sufficient or whether agencies need additional resources or mechanisms to improve coordination If it determines that the status quo is inadequate does Congress want to exercise oversight in this area provide additional information-sharing authorities funding etc or does it consider current coordination authorities and mechanisms sufficient Sectors Much of the federal government’s attention to campaign and election security appears to emphasize outreach to election administrators in states territories and localities With respect to the private sector such as political campaigns and equipment manufacturers is federal agency support sufficient To what extent are information-sharing practices among federal agencies and the private sector or voters similar to or different from those that shape communication between federal agencies and state territorial or local governments If it determines that the status quo is inadequate does Congress want to encourage or require additional federal agency support for nongovernmental entities in campaign and election security or reporting requirements for those entities to the federal government Voters Some federal public education campaigns such as those to counter disinformation in elections are aimed at individual voters Overall however much of the federal role in campaign and election security emphasizes communication among government agencies or in some cases the private sector If it determines that the status quo is inadequate does Congress want to task federal agencies—and if so which ones—with additional responsibility for educating voters about campaign and election security to provide funding for nongovernmental organizations to do so etc The scope of potential campaign and election security threats and the federal government’s role in responding to those threats has changed substantially in less than five years The foreign interference revealed during the 2016 cycle—and widely reported to be an ongoing threat—has renewed congressional attention to campaign and election security and raised new questions Whatever Congress determines about whether these or other questions are relevant for its consideration of campaign and election security policy the issue is likely to remain prominent for the foreseeable future Congressional Research Service 29 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Appendix Legislation Related to Campaign and Election Security That Has Advanced Beyond Introduction 116th Congress See the “Scope of the Report” section for additional detail Bill Number Sponsor Short Title Committee Referral Brief Summary of Security-Related Provisions Latest Major Action H R 1 Sarbanes For the People Act of 2019 House Administration Intelligence Judiciary Oversight and Reform Science Space and Technology Education and Labor Ways and Means Financial Services Ethics Homeland Security Codify DHS “critical infrastructure” designation authorize federal funding to assist states to upgrade election equipment or otherwise enhance security including by implementing risk-limiting audits include electronic poll books in HAVA voting systems standards require paper ballots in federal elections require election-threat reports among federal and state governments require developing a national strategy to safeguard democratic institutions expedite security clearances for election officials amend FECA foreign national prohibition to include state and local ballot initiatives and require FEC reporting to Congress on foreign funds in federal elections Passed House 234-193 03 08 2019 H R 753 Castro Global Electoral Exchange Act of 2019 Foreign Affairs Direct Secretary of State to establish a Global Electoral Exchange Program to promote and exchange international best election practices including among other practices cybersecurity transmitting results data transparency election dispute resolution Passed House voice vote 05 20 2019 H R 1158 McCaul Consolidated Appropriations Act 2020 Appropriations In addition to providing some relevant agency appropriations appropriate funds Title V to EAC for disbursement to states to Became P L 11693 12 20 2019 Congressional Research Service 30 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Bill Number Sponsor Short Title Committee Referral Brief Summary of Security-Related Provisions Latest Major Action “improve the administration of elections for Federal office including to enhance election technology and make election security improvements” H R 2500 Smith WA National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 Armed Services Among other provisions require DNI in consultation with FBI NSA and CIA directors to report to Congress on Russian interference with U S elections §1240B Passed House 220-197 07 12 2019 See also S 1790 H R 2722 Lofgren Securing America’s Federal Elections SAFE Act House Administration Space Science and Technology Among other provisions amend HAVA to authorize grants to states for upgrading election equipment cybersecurity and risk-limiting audits require use of voterverified paper ballots specify ballot printing and accessibility requirements and require states to “seek to ensure” that voting equipment is manufactured in the United States Passed House 225-184 06 27 2019 H R 3351 Quigley Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act 2020 Appropriations In addition to providing some relevant agency appropriations appropriate funds Title V to EAC for disbursement to obtain “qualified” election equipment including voter-verified paper audit trail Passed House 224-196 06 26 2019 See also H R 1158 H R 3494 Schiff Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 2019 and 2020 Intelligence Among other provisions require Title XXV development of national strategy for countering Russian interference in U S election require DNI designation of counterintelligence officer to coordinate election security counterintelligence specify various reporting and congressional briefing requirements concerning election interference Passed House 397-31 07 17 2019 See also S 1790 Congressional Research Service 31 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Bill Number Sponsor Short Title Committee Referral Brief Summary of Security-Related Provisions Latest Major Action H R 3501 Engel Safeguard our Elections and Combat Unlawful Interference in Our Democracy Act SECURE Our Democracy Act Foreign Affairs Judiciary Financial Services Impose financial and immigration sanctions on all foreign individuals who have engaged in U S election interference since January 2015 State Department would identify individuals who have engaged or assisted in interference efforts to appropriate congressional committees Foreign Affairs Committee ordered to be reported 07 17 2019 H R 4617 Lofgren Stopping Harmful Interference in Elections for a Lasting Democracy Act SHIELD Act House Administration Judiciary Among other provisions require political committees to report to the FBI and FEC offered or proposed contributions coordination or collaboration with foreign nationals require political committees to establish foreign contact reporting compliance system require FBI reporting to Congress of foreign interference contains Honest Ads Act provisions extending certain disclaimer requirements to online political advertising and requiring online platforms to maintain publicly available advertising data clarify various aspects of FECA foreign-national prohibition require FEC independent report on “media literacy” and “online political content” consumption amend FECA foreign national prohibition to include providing or offering nonpublic campaign material contains Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of 2019 provisions prohibiting providing false elections information or interference with registration amend Immigration and Passed House 227-181 10 23 2019 Congressional Research Service 32 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Bill Number Sponsor Short Title Committee Referral Brief Summary of Security-Related Provisions Latest Major Action Nationality Act to prohibit U S admission for persons believed to have interfered with elections require FEC to notify states of foreign national disinformation campaigns amend FECA to prohibit “materially deceptive media” including “deepfakes” 60 days before elections unless media contains a disclaimer noting such manipulation H R 4782 Thompson MS National Commission on Online Platforms and Homeland Security Act Homeland Security Energy and Commerce Establish National Commission on Online Platforms and Homeland Security to examine how or whether online platforms have been used to promote violence terrorism or foreign influence campaigns including in elections require DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology to conduct research on such topics Homeland Security Committee ordered to be reported 10 23 2019 H R 4990 Sherrill Election Technology Research Act of 2019 Science Space and Technology House Administration Direct NIST in collaboration with National Science Foundation to carry out a research program on voting systems including cybersecurity end-to-end verifiable systems accessibility and humantechnology interface voter privacy and data protections and audit methods direct NIST in collaboration with the EAC to update the HAVA voting system certification process amend HAVA voting systems definition to include other elements of election system and for other purposes Science Space and Technology Committee ordered to be reported 11 14 2019 S 482 Graham Defending American Security from Kremlin Foreign Relations Among other provisions prohibit damaging a critical infrastructure computer including those Reported 12 18 2019 Congressional Research Service 33 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Bill Number Sponsor Short Title Committee Referral Aggression Act of 2019 DASKA Brief Summary of Security-Related Provisions Latest Major Action related to voter registration and voting machines impose immigration restrictions and financial restrictions for foreign interference in U S elections require Secretary of State and DNI to report to Congress on Russian election interference S 1060 Van Hollen Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines Act of 2019 Banking Housing and Urban Affairs Among other provisions require regular federal government assessments of foreign interference in U S elections and require imposing sanctions in such cases Hearing held 07 18 2019 S 1321 Blumenthal Defending the Integrity of Voting Systems Act Judiciary Amend Computer Fraud and Abuse Act CFAA to add voting systems and elections Passed Senate unanimous consent 07 17 2019 S 1328 Durbin Defending Elections against Trolls from Enemy Regimes DETER Act Judiciary Designate foreign persons as ineligible for entry to the United States or subject to deportation if those persons are believed to have interfered with U S elections or to be seeking entry to interfere in U S elections Passed Senate unanimous consent 06 03 2019 S 1589 Burr Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 2019 and 2020 Intelligence Require Title IV assessments by DNI of foreign interference in elections § 408 and Title V reports to Congress from 1 Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis on cyberattacks on election infrastructure during 2016 U S presidential election foreign interference and anticipated future attacks § 501 2 DNI on Intelligence Community posture and analytical capabilities during 2016 election interference §502 3 and DNI in consultation with various other agency heads pre- Reported S Rept 116-47 06 11 2019 See also S 1790 Congressional Research Service 34 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Bill Number Sponsor Short Title Committee Referral Brief Summary of Security-Related Provisions Latest Major Action election foreign intelligence threats §503 DNI in consultation with various other agency heads on Russian influence campaigns directed at non-U S elections §505 require DNI in consultation with various other agency heads to develop “wholeof-government” strategy for protecting U S “electoral systems and processes” from Russian interference §504 require DNI in consultation with various other agency heads to make publicly available pre-election reports on counterintelligence and cyber threats to federal campaigns §506 require DNI to assist DHS in providing security clearances and share information with state election officials §507 require DNI FBI Director and Secretary of Homeland Security to brief Congress if they jointly determine that “significant cyber intrusion or active measures campaigns” intended to influence federal elections §508 require DNI designation of counterintelligence officer to coordinate election security counterintelligence §509 S 1790 Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 Congressional Research Service Armed Services Among other provisions require reports to Congress from 1 Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis on cyberattacks on election infrastructure during 2016 U S presidential election foreign interference and anticipated future attacks §6501 2 DNI on Became P L 11692 12 20 2019 35 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Bill Number Sponsor Short Title Committee Referral Brief Summary of Security-Related Provisions Latest Major Action Intelligence Community posture and analytical capabilities during 2016 election interference §6502 3 DNI in consultation with various other agency heads on pre-election foreign intelligence threats §6503 and DNI in consultation with various other agency heads on Russian influence campaigns directed at non-U S elections §6505 require DNI in consultation with various other agency heads to develop “whole-ofgovernment” strategy for protecting U S “electoral systems and processes” from Russian interference §6504 require DNI to assist DHS in providing security clearances and share information with state election officials §6506 require DNI FBI Director and Secretary of Homeland Security to brief Congress if they jointly determine that “significant cyber intrusion or active measures campaigns” intended to influence federal elections §6507 require DNI designation of counterintelligence officer within National Counterintelligence and Security Center to coordinate election security counterintelligence §6508 S 1846 Peters State and Local Government Cybersecurity Act of 2019 Congressional Research Service Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Among other provisions add “entit ies ” that collaborate with state and local “election officials” as permissible participants in DHS National Cybersecurity and Counterintelligence Center NCCIC Passed Senate unanimous consent 11 21 2019 36 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Bill Number Sponsor Short Title Committee Referral Brief Summary of Security-Related Provisions Latest Major Action S 2065 Portman Deepfake Report Act of 2019 Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Require reports from Secretary of Homeland Security about the state of “digital content forgery technology” Passed Senate unanimous consent 10 24 2019 S 2524 Kennedy Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act 2020 Appropriations In addition to providing some relevant agency appropriations appropriate funds Title V to EAC for disbursement to states to “improve the administration of elections for Federal office including to enhance election technology and make election security improvements” Reported S Rept 116-111 09 19 2019 See also H R 1158 Source CRS analysis of bill texts Notes Bills in the table specifically reference campaigns or elections and security Other legislation not included in the table could be relevant for campaign or election security once implemented or in practice See the “Scope of the Report” section for additional detail The table excludes resolutions e g proposed constitutional amendments and routine appropriations bills that propose funding for agencies such as the Election Assistance Commission or Federal Election Commission unless the appropriations bill also contains additional provisions specifically addressing campaign and election security Author Information R Sam Garrett Coordinator Specialist in American National Government Karen L Shanton Analyst in American National Government Sarah J Eckman Analyst in American National Government Congressional Research Service 37 Campaign and Election Security Policy Overview and Recent Developments for Congress Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service CRS CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role CRS Reports as a work of the United States Government are not subject to copyright protection in the United States Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS However as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material Congressional Research Service R46146 · VERSION 3 · NEW 38