CO 68 35 8 9 9FIED U S Departm nt of State Case No F 2017-13804 qoc No C06835899 Date 10 19 2021 ' t Aftl RELEASE IN FULL - BEeltZ'f •- DECLASSIFIED May 10 Moment of Truth o The Summit will put to the test your determination to keep on track two strategies that are crucial to your vision of post-CoJd War Europe admitting new members to NATO and developing a para0el security relationship between the Alliance and Russia o There are two possible outcomes at the Summit - one that we must try as hard as we can to get and another we may have to settle for · 1 The best outcome is that you succeed in allaying Yeltsin's concerns about the pace of NATO expansion and securing ' Russia's engagement ·in PFP The necessary assurances are a not a matter of compromising or retr ating on our policy rather they are a matter of disabusing Yeltsin of his mistaken fears about what is happening - and what will happen during the next two years I you can convince him that it is in Russia's inte est to participate fully and promptly in the Partnership for Peace and if he commits himself to a date-certain· f r signing the PFP documents thus making Russia a full Part er you and he will then be able to initiate the NATO Mussi 'dialogue_ That dialo e should yield by the end of this year a framework for NATO-Russia · relations Such an agreement will be welcomed by our Allies by the Central European aspirants for NATO membershp and in our own country both by most advocates of NATO expansion and by many critics of our policy who fear that NATO expansion jeopardizes· Russian reform 2 The second-best outcome in Moscow is that you and Yeltsin have a tough serious inconclusive but not acrimonious exchange on an extremely difficult subject In short no breakthrough - but no repetition of Budapest either Both Chernomyrdin and Yeltsin 's national-security adviser Ryurikov asked me to assure you that even if you and Yeltsin can't solve the NATO PFP issue Yeltsin will not be a bad host 1 Declassification Authority Geoffrey W Chapman Senior Reviewer A GIS IPS 8 3 2020 • UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No C06835899 Date 10 19 2021 - CO 6 8 3 5 8 9 9 IED U S Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No C06835899 Date 10 19 2021 seeRE'f How We Got Here o· Since your trip to Europe and the former Soviet Union in January 1994 you and the rest of your Administration have been_ consistently asserting a determination to enlarge NATO not a matter of if but when and also to advance the goal of an integrated undivided Europe for the first time in a millenium ••• 0 At your September Summit with Yeltsin in Washington you got him to accept the proposition that NATO would over time bring in new members You assured him that the process would be governed by the four no's no rush expansion would be gradual no surprises it would be transparent no threat it would take account of Russia's legitimate security interests and no exclusion Russia would be at least in theory eligible for membership ·someday There's a fifth no as well no veto o In December Yeltsin backed away from your September understanding for two reasons one connected with his domestic politics the other with ours - First the North Atlantic Council NAC Ministerial that month announced a '95 workplan for the why and how of NATO expansion That action made Yeltsin fear that the expansion train was leaving the station and that the who and when of enlargement would be answered in '96 in_ the midst of his own re-election campaign subjecting him and reformers to withering perhaps fatal attacks from the Communists and nationalists - Second our congressional elections the month before made him fear that the Republicans would push the pace even faster -- and that you in your own re-election campaign would yield to their pressure 2 UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No C06835899 Date 10 19 2021 CO 68358 99 IED U S Department of State Case No F-2 17-13804 Doc No C0_6835899 D te 10 19 2021 SECRET In short Yeltsin concluded that contrary to your promises to him in September we were going to rush expansion and violate· several other no's in the process 0 That is why at your disagreeable encounter with him in Budapest in December Yeltsin said in effect You can have an undivided Europe or an expanded NATO but not both NATO enlargement is inherently hostile to Russia's interests Therefore we'll cooperate on integration but resist on NATO enlargement If you insist on bringing Central European states into NATO you'll risk re-dividing Europe into two competing potentially hostile blocs The implied warning cold peace could be a prelude to a new Cold War 0 Shortly afterward the Vice President calmed Yeltsin down somewhat and got him to accept a new principle -- parallelism NATO's deliberations within its own ranks and' its discussions with PFP members on enlargement would proceed in parallel with a NATORussia dialogue to define a NATO-Russia agreement or relationship prot cting the interests of both sides 0 Since then in two meetings between Chris and Kozyrev the Russians have tried a stalling tactic by going slow on the NATO•Russia track they hope to slow down if not stop any action on the NATO expansion track 0 They are motivated by a fear and a hope The fear is that we'll accelerate the timetable of expansion the hope is that Moscow can drive a wedge between us and our West European Allies who are grousing a bit about pressure from Washington to expand the Alliance 0 We've been trying to persuade the Russians that both their fear and their hope are mistaken we're still guided by the first four no's no rush etc but we're also still guided by the fifith no veto i e there's solidarity among_the Allies and Russia's not going to split us 3 UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No C06835899 Date 10 19 2021 CO 68358 99IED U S Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No C06835899 Date 10 19 2021 9B8RE'P o Our or else in reply to his ''cold peace is that the NATO expansion track will proceed even if the Russians refuse to permit progress on the NATO-Russia track Their current tactics will succeed only in isolating themselves from a process in which it is in their interest to be fully engaged o Kozyrev· has told Chris on several occasions -- and he told me last Saturday - that Yeltsin has taken over this issue personally It must be resolved at the Presidential level · ' I 4 UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No C06835899 Date 10 19 2021 CO 68358 99IED U S Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No C06835899 Date 10 19 2021 9E8RE'I' Where we are now o Virtually all major players in Russia all across the political spectrum are either deeply opposed to or at least deeply worried about NATO expansion Therefore we cannot realistically expect a Russian blessing or endorsement of expansion now or probably any time soon o However almost as much as it fears NATO's expansion Russia fears its own isolation Moreover the Russian military very much wants to cooperate as much as possible with NATO Defense Minister Grachev made this quite clear to Bill Perry Therefore Russia wants a relati onship with NATO an agreement along the lines of what we 're prepared to negotiate especially if that relationship agreement can for now at least be de fined in a way that finesses the question of how large a NATO we're talking about o As for Yeltsin personally much as he dislikes NATO expansion he wants a good Summit with you and he wants to keep open as many doors as possible for Russia's integration into the West Therefore he has a strong personal monve for trying to square the circle - and for doing so at the Summit o Virtually aJl the major players in Western Europe and Central Europe - i e NATO members and would-be members alike - want to see a NATO-Russia relationship Whether they're ambivalent about expansion the West Europeans or enthusiastic about it the Central Europeans they don't want the process to p ovoke spasms of paranoia and countermeasures by the Russians They know from experience that there's nothing more offensive than a Russian on the defensive · 5 UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No C06835899 Date 10 19 2021 CO 68358 99FIED U S Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No C06835899 Date 10 19 2021 • BEeftE'l' -- Therefore Our Goal for the Summit Should Be I 0 0 Yeltsin's agreement to sign the outstanding PFP documents - if possible before May '10 failing that at the Summit or at least at an announced date-certain soon after A joint commitment to negotiate by the end of this year a framework on the NATO-Russian relationship that answers concerns on both sides - 0 A joint statement released at the Summit laying out''the parameters of a new European security order and Russia's role in it · a IMPORTANT It would help if before the Summit you made major_ statement on your vision of European security and integration · One purpose of such a speech would be for you to put on record yet again and in the clearest possible fashion our objectives and an ' authoritative sense of the pace of the process This message will be no fundamental ways reassuring to the Central Europeans for it will reaffirm the· seriousness of our approach we are moving forward At the same time it will be reassuring to the Russians and the West Europeans who are also nervous about rush since it would signal a time frame for ·actual expansion that is in keeping both with realities of the situation no way· is NATO actually going to expand next year and with the assurances you gave Yeltsin in September our forward movement does not put us on a collision course ·with the Russian presidential elections It's important for you to deliver this message in advance - I'd say well in advance -- of the Summit so that what you say in Moscow and what Yeltsin says you said does not appear to be aconcession to him on that occasion rather it will be - and will be understood to be -- fully consistent with long-standing policy 6 UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No C06835899 Date 10 19 2021 CO 68358 99FIED U S Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No C06835899 Date 10 19 2021 SESRl1'1' How to Use the Remaining 25 Days o Today tomorrow We're expecting a Yeltsin reply to your letter on European security It will ask for some familiar assurances that an expanded NATO won't threaten Russia's security or· commercial interests Knowing the questions we are also ready with our answers We don't know whether Yeltsin is insisting on another letter-from you or whether private assurances delivered via our ambassador or by Chris to Kozyrev will do the trick How far we can go in answering Yeltsin 's letter will depend on the format of the reply A letter signed by you cannot go as far as non papers or oral notes ' We'll work this issue over the next several days so that you can include reference' to his letter when you talk to Yeltsin by · phone • o Next Monday or Tuesday Yeltsin has proposed a phone call then In addition to previewing your answer to him I suggest that you stress the importance of resolving these issues as much as possible before the Summit so that in your face-to-face talks in Moscow you can concentrate on the future rather than having to haggle ov er the unfinished business of PFP We'll have the following opportunities to do that -- Jim Comn·s and Mamedov are meeting in London at the end of next week r - Chris and· Kozyrev are meeting in New York and perhaps iri Washington as well at the end of the month ' - If the Russian response to our initiative is sufficiently forthcoming by the time Kozyrev gets here it might be helpful if you had a brief meeting with him yourself -- I should be prepared to make another trip to Moscow either just before or just after the next Chris-Kozyrev session depending on how the Collins-Mamedov talks go 7 UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No C06835899 Date 10 19 2021