I · -' ' •AEPA0CIUCED AT TH6 NAllONAI J1RCMVES • l 0 • • DECLASSIFIED - ------ A il' ri y N NJ '-1§LOO BY €G l A Oa e IA 1 211 ··· ---- -_ l- -··-- -- _ _ s-s-D 111 'Y DEPARTMENT OF STATE Or PUTY UNDEIISECIU TARY 1i 18 G PM oO A m e · J ----- inber 8 1966 MEMORANDUM FOR THE S Y THRU S S FROM •• G PM - Jeffrey C Kitchen Y SUBJECT • ·f 1 Force Structure 1 6t t acbed is our anaJysis of Secretary McNamara's Five Year Force Structure Memorand1 n11 to the President on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces 2 Because of the complexity of this subject and the n DDbe ' of issues raised we are proposing that we devote the entir ' hour on Wednesday for discussion of this memorandum ' 3 The complexity of the subject also accounts for the _ length of our analysis For your convenience we have divided the analysis jnto three pa rt i - At Tab A is a brief summary - Qf the DOD memorandl Ull Tpb B contains a more detailed anal To gain an adequate perception of the issues it woulR-- _ behlghly desirable if you could find the time to read Tab B ' ab C contains a discussion of the ma or uestions which we e e are raise by the memorandum an which we would propose be the focus of our meeting with you 4 Our Thursday meeting will be devoted to discussing the several other DOD memoranda which deal with other than strategic nuclear force problems I will shortly be-sending to you similar background material on these othe r memoranda 5 You should note that n Milita Assistance t been transmitted to hey will be in the next upon material informally _-- - with the exception of one memorandum e reta McNamara's me ave ou formal as et We expect that few days qur analysis is based made availab ·e to our staff by •- c a jAT TM KATIONA - · ' I A i ri Y Sy DECLASSIFIED € N NJ -2S 1@o 1-11 i Oa e 1t Jf TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE With Attachment Secretary McNamara's staff Our meetings on Wednesday and Thursday are for the purpose of exchanging yiewe 9D £be substance of the memoranda as well as to copsider how And to what extent ou wish to rovide cOllllllents to Secreta McNamara in anticipation of his request Attachments As stated cc U - Mr Katzenbach M - Mr Rostow I I -- ✓ ' G PM swAss LSloss vl TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE With Attachment DECLASSIFIED NN'D ffil1'lO By € HA Oa e t 11 A- 1 ri y TOP SECRET C' ft I Tab A CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION Presidential Memorandum on Strategic J Offensive and Defensive Forces 1 ' Precis 1 The Threat The Soviets are developing a secure second-strike deterrent force Two new ICBM systems are being intro- duced this year in the Soviet force The smaller of these two systems which appears to be primarily a counter-city weapon 55-11 is being deployed at a rapid rate in hardened dispersed silos DOD now estimates the Soviets will have 660 to lOOOland-based missiles by 1971 year DOD es timated 2QQ_ to 800 in 1970 Last Most of the Soviet inventory will be hardened and dispersed Soviet missiles will not have the accuracy of US miss iles in the early 1970's but they will have more missiles capable of carrying large payloads -· - On the defensive side t here is strong evidence of a Soviet ABM deployment in the Moscow area expected to be operational in 1967 or 1968 A second sys- tem near Leningrad and extending across the European USSR may j tended either for ballistic missile defe s gr bomber defense The Soviets also are modernizing their interceptor force to cope with high-performance aircraft TOP SECRET ·-·· - AT - NAl'° - - DECLASSIFIED N ND roB Q s- €if l' A o oa e A ri TOP SECRET r 2 and air-to-surface missiles but they still lack a very low altitude capability against bombers i e under 1000 ft The estimates of the CPR threat are essentially unchanged from last year i e no ICBM before mid-70's These estimates were made prior to the latest Chinese nuclear test II US Strategic Offensive Forces Major improvements are planned in the US missile force no even though major changes are proposed in the basic force structure i e numbers of missiles and bombers By 1968 we will reach a force of 1054 land-based ICBMs and 656 submarine-launched missiles this force is planned at the same levels through 1972 The strategic bomber force will decline from about 600 to 450 by 1972 as previously planned However significant qualitative improvements are to be introduced between now and the early 1970's The larger payload POSEIDON and MINUTEMAN III will replace 500 of the present POu RIS missiles and 400 MINUTEMAN I respectively MIRVs independently targetted multiple warhead will be installed in the MINUTEMAN III an L POSEIDON missiles This will increase the number of warheads in the missile force from the present 1966 level of 1400 TOP SECRET - A T l1E NATIOHA DECLASSIAED NN'I '-ro lt Q A i lily Br£ I AR Oa a 1 1 TOP SECRET 3 to over 4000 by 1972 without increasing the number of launchers Each of these warheads will be independently targetable and all US missile warheads will have greatly increased accuracy This will improve US capability to penetrate Soviet ABM defenses and increased missile accuracies also will improve US counter orce capabilities Also FB-111 bombers will be introduced in the force by 1971 to replace the older B-52 types III US Damage Limiting Program Deployment of NIKE X and related damage limiting measures is again deferred In the case of China it is concluded that our estimate of the Chinese threat does not warrant a deployment decision now In the case of the Soviet Union the uncertainty of their response to an ABM coupled with the substantial cost and relative ineffectiveness of ABM deployments leads the Secretary to disapprove the JCS recommendation to deploy NIKE X On the other hand there are three important findings with respect to damage limiting programs which differ from findings of prior years ··- a - An effective ABM defense against the Chineseballistic missile threat to 1980 might cost about $3 billion TOP SECRET • ' DECLASSIAEO A ithcri NND-1$ t Q 61' € I AP Oa a c 11 TOP SECRET 4 Last year such a defense was estimated to cost $8 to $10 billion b This year defenses of $10 billion and $20 billion with considerable damage limiting potential against certain Soviet attacks are described In prior years the cost of similar defenses against the Soviet Union were estimated at $20 to $30 billion These differences in cost result both from new assessments of our own ABM capabilities and from consideration of ABM effectiveness against less than full-scale surprise attacks on cities c The cost to the Soviets to maintain their secondstrike capability against both improvements in US missile accuracy and ABM is estimated to be about equal to the cost to the US of ABM Previous estimates put the cost to us of an ABM at 2 to 10 times as much as the cost to the Soviets to overcome it TOP SECRET ' ·· ·· I · ' • RiPIICQ Cl 'AT 1WE NATIONA AAOIVO ' OF CLASSIFIED A J i -J BY EG N I JD lftlt O 1 A 0 DJ a ' 11 JfJ TOP SECRET CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION Tab B j Presidential Memorandum on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces I The Threat A Soviet Offensive Capabilities The Soviet strategic missile force i s growing more rapidly than previously estimated and new missiles are being deployed in dispersed hardened silos so that the emerging force will have the characteristics of second-strike deterrent force I secure Pertinent figures are summarized in the following table Estimated Soviet Strategic Missile Forces a 1966 1971 Estimate one year ago for 1970 142-146 168-218 0 310-364 10- 100 630- 900 0 20660-1000 40-150 460-650 0 500-800 709 121-136 546-715 127-244 600-720 120-220 ICBMs Soft Launchers Hard Launchers Mobile Total MR 'lRBMs SLBMs-Launchers f ··r1 -- ' a This is a DOD estimate based on the National Intelli- gence Proje tions for Planning NIPP ICBM figures wer e r evised upward by DOD to reflect later intelUgence than that reflected in NIPP The recently published NIE 11-8-66 has similar but slightly higher ICBM estimates TOP SECRET l ' ' r --- - - --- · A T M N A - DECI ASSIAEO A'J li Y N I IDir ltlO By t G AR Oa e 1 1 TOP SECRET 2 Two new missiles of the storable liquid-fueled type will begin to become operational this year The large SS-9 missile has a payload estimated at 9000 to 12 500 pounds Thus it could carry a single-large warhead 10- 25 Mt or in the future might carry half a dozen 2-3 Mt warheads The smaller SS-11 with a 1000 to 2000 pound payload apparently is designed as a survivable counter-city weapon Like the SS-9 it is being installed in hardened about 300 psi and dispersed launch sites The SS-9 may have a CEP of 0 5 nautical miles initially and the SS-11 about l n m Both missiles could have markedly better CEPs by the early l970' s The rate of deployment of the SS-ll has recently increased to a level about 20% above previous maximum estimates It is this trend which leads DOD to conclude that the Soviets could have as many as 1000 land-based ICBMs by 1971 About two-thirds of these would be SS-lls An alternative possibility is a somewhat smaller force with a highe r percentage of l arger more sophisticated weapons including an advanced version of the SS-9 and a - ·- Mt 1 000 000 tons of TNT equivalent CEP Circular error probable - a measure of missile accuracy n m nautical miles psi pounds per square inch - a measure of resist ance to blast pressure TOP SECRET · i · · t • ' t • REPIIODUCEI AT nE NATlOHAI • DECLASSIFIED A n y NI JD-1 9 oo Sy €ff fl A Da e ' f ' JJ TOP SECRET new solid fuel ICBM 3 There is also evidence that the Soviets are developing a low trajectory ICBM or a fractional orbit bombardment system FOBS which could attack the US from the s uth or other unorthodox threat corridors Both of these systems would complicate the problem of ABM defense and would reduce or even eliminate warning from our present BMEWS system There is as yet no evidence of sophisticated ICBM re-entry systems such as MIRVs or penetration aids of the type which are now in advanced development in the US Neither is there any evidence of the technology required for highly accurate mi ssiles However these are the sort of sophisticated technical developments which are difficult to detect well in advance and it is certainly within Soviet technical capabilities to develop such systems by the mid-1970's DOD estimates that detection of such developments might not occur Until three years before significant deployment or l to 2 years before initial deployment B Soviet Defensive Nuclear Capabilities · There are two relatively large-scale Soviet ·de·f ensive nuclear programs a pparently unde4-way TOP SECRET These are ' DECLASSIFIED A i i y -· N f Jl crolt Q By € I A Oa e c 11 TOP SECRET 4• l a long-range anti-ICBM system in the Moscow area although this system could cover a considerable area of the Western Soviet Union it is estimated that because of the limited numbers of missiles and radars being deployed it is intended to protect the immediate Moscow area only This system is expected to be opera- tional in 1967 or 1968 It is probably not very sophis- ticated by comparison with our NIKE X but it apparently does employ an exo-atmospheric interceptor which would have a very large lethal radius 5 to 50 miles at high altitudes The state of Soviet technical development on a warhead for s uch a missile i s quite uncertain although it appears that some tests were conducted prior to the test ban treaty Therefore the precis e effectiveness of this system is difficult to predict 2 a system near Leningrad and extending across the European USSR intended for either ballistic missile defense long-range surface-to-air bomber defense or some combination of the two As a part of the Intelli- gence Community assessment State and CIA conclu ed hat the deploymen s uggest that this is probably primarily an anti-bomber system However reflecting the DOD view TOP S GRET • 'AlnEIIATI0tW DECLASSIFIED • A il'J ·- - Sy € Nl fl cffiroo IIA A Oa e 1 r@- TOP SECRET 5 II the memorandum t o the President concludes that Soviet defense priorities as we assess the m suggest a probabl e emphasis on ABM Here as with the Moscow system technical capabili ties are quite uncertain C The CPR Nuclear Threat It is estimated in the DOD memorandum that the earliest operational Chinese ICBM is not likely to appear unt il the mid-1970 ' s Recent intell igence data suggests the possibility of a CPR ICBM in the early 1970 1 s DOD esti- ' mates that the Chinese probably would first deploy an MRBM perhaps as early as 1967 Their recent operational test with a nuclear warhead tends to confirm this estimate Although the CPR has one G class ballistic missile submarine and could have missiles available for this submarine in 1967- 1969 DOD believes the system would not pose a credible threat to the US because of its vulnerability to our ASW and its limited operational range II US Strategic Forces US strategic forces are planned to accomplis two missions assured destruction and damage limiting The object veof the a ssur ed destruction mission is to have the clear and unmistakable ability to inflict unacceptable TOP SECRET ·- '' OECLASSIREO A i nl'f N ND 1S lt Q Sr €if IMFt Oa e 1 r lj TOP SECRET 6 damage on the Soviet Union and the CPR even after a surprise attack on our strategic forces The goal of damage limiting is to reduce by both offensive and defensive means the damage an enemy can inflict on the US and its allies should deterrence fail At present the planning of our assured destruction force is heavily influenced by uncertainties with respect to developments in the Soviet Union in particular 1 How effective and how extensive will be the Soviet ABM deploymen and 2 How soon will the Soviets develop greater accur- acy and multiple warheads for their ICBMs1 Because both of these uncertainties affect the capability of ou assured destruction mission and because that mission is fundamental to deterrence these uncertainties have caused us to hedge heavily in planning the future structure of our own s trategic forces At present the design of our forces is being influenced primarily by Soviet ABM deployment but options to counter Soviet MIRVs also are being developed See below Our present and planned damage limiting capability though it can reduce casualties cannot prevent mass ive TOP SECRET · -' I •11otiooucal'AT TH5 NA'llOHAI · · • I • - • - • ' DECLASSIFIED A i n v NI II Cffiiro Sy € 1 A 0 A Oa a 1 l TOP SECRET 7 destruction to the US in a nuclear war with the Soviet 1 ··' ·· ' • - •· 4 · -n• I Union Even a much larger damage limiting program could not provide high confidence of preventing major damage in such a war but it might reduce damage significantly in certain scenarios III The Assured Destruction Problem A Changes in the Force The US is undertaking major improvements in its missile forces while holding the number of missiles constant The planned changes in the missile force are reflected in the following table Present and Planned 1968-72 program US Strategic Missile Forces 1966 1971-72 Land Based Titan Minuteman I Minuteman II Minuteman III Total 54 800 80 45 600 0 400 934 1045 Sea Based Polaris Poseidon Total 512 160 496 656 0 512 Total number of warheads Total ·megatons 1446 Excludes bomber weapon totaling 2970 Mt TOP SECRET 0 4060 1967 program was 2130 1710 1967 program was 1600 ' OF CLASSIFIED A i ri y NND l tro By € 11 i Oa e 8 TOP SECRET ·· The capability of the force is being improved in several ways First the MINUTEMAN 11 and Ill will have a greata r payload 1500 pounds than MINUTEMAN I 1000 pounds and POSEIDON will have a significantly greater payload than POLARIS 3000 pounds vs 1100 pounds Second new warheads will give greater yield in relation to weight Third a new warhead the Mark 17 is being developed for MINUTEMAN II and POSEIDON It will have accuracies CEP of 1 4 n m or less and a yield of 1 5 Mt This will give a single weapon a kill probability of 85% against a hard 300 psi target It would require 2 or 3 of our present warheads to achieve the same result Finally both the POSEIDON and MINUTEMAN III systems are to be equipped with MIRVs multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles These MIRVs also will be highly accurate and will improve our capabilities in several ways A single MINUTEMAN III can carry tHree MK-12 MIRVs each with a yield of 170 kt and POSEIDON up to 14 MK-3 MIRVs each warhead having a yield of about 40 to 70 kt These cnn be used to saturate an ABM defense or to attack inde --- pendent soft targets If a greater counterforce capability is desired the MK-17 can in the future be deployed as a TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED A i n y N NJcromo BY €if 1 t Oa a ' 1 - fO TOP SECRET MIRV on the POSEIDON three per missile 9 Eack MK-17 warhead will have a high kill probability approximately 85% against hard targets because of the yield and accuracy of MK-17 As a result of introducing MIRVs the number of warheads now planned for 1972 will be almost three times that in today's missile force 4000 as compared to 1400 The total number of megatons in the mis$ile force will remain about the same as the new multiple warheads will be smaller than present ones In addition all missile systems are to be equipped with decoys capable of penetrating both area and local ballistic missile defenses B Capability of the Force Against the Most Likely Threat Against what is estimated by DOD to be the most likely Soviet threat in 1972 the presently programmed US force could survive a well-coordinated surprise attack even if the Soviets used all their available strategic offensive forces against our missiles and airfields It is estima- ted that some 2340 US missile-delivered weapons and 830 bomber-delivered weapons would survive such an attack and would be capable of delivering 2280 megatons on the Soviet 'JD P SECRET ' • ATnENA M ci ' 0 ' DECLASSIFIED A it - ri NN r '1$ it'lO B £if P A Oa a 1 $ TOP SECRET Union 10 Even if the Soviets deployed a more extensive ballistic missile defense than now seems to be emerging the US missile force alone without bombers could inflict more than 34% fatalities on the Soviet Union in a second strike Furthermore the planned force could execute limited nuclear attacks on China while still maintaining an assured destruction capability against the Soviet Union C Capability of the Progra1IDDed Force Against Higher than Expected Threats The memorandum also examines three threats in the early 1970 1 s that are higher than expected It is against these threats that the planned US strategic force for 1972 is designed The first is a very extensive Soviet ABM program which costs them the equivalent of $25 billion over a five-year period The second threat is the development of 150 SS-9s each with six highly accurate MIRVs costing about $5 billion a combination of the first two The third threat is If they chose the latter response the Soviets would have to increase the portion of their defense budget devoted to strategic forces by about 40% this would mean either a major reallo ation ·-- - - within or a net increase to the defense budget TOP SECRET Even OF ClASSIFIED ·-·- · A i y NND-l fltla Sy I A Oa ail3J TOP SECRET 11 if the Soviets undertook such a program the programmed US missile and bomber force could inflict 351 fatalities on the Soviets in a second strike Furthermore the resulting Soviet force would not be a good second-strike force unless they devoted s till further resources to protection of their missiles against the increasing accuracy of our missiles D Further Hedges Against Extreme Soviet Threats Although the memorandum concludes that the presently planned force will provide an adequate assured destruction capability even against unlikely Soviet threats in the early 197O's there are under study additional measures which might be taken to modify our missile force should the combined Soviet MIRV and large-scale ABM capability threaten our assured destruction capability in the mid to late 197O's It is not clear from the memorandum what developments would require our resort to these measures These additional measures which are under study include l construction of additional submarines armed with TOP SECRET I - •' DECIJ SSIFIEO A i n y N Nlrfffi t e Sr f sG P A Oa e 1 -d J TOP SECRET 12 POSEIDON missiles only 31 of the 41 currently plaMed boats are capable of being_and now are planned to be converted to POSEIDON 2 development of advanced ICBMs with increased payloads These missiles could carry additional MIRVs they might require active missile defense for protection 3 NIKE X defense of the present MINUTEMAN silos This is considered only as an interim measure if an early Soviet MIRV threat emerges and 4 ballistic missile ships This scheme would be similar to the surface vessel scheme explored for the MLF and would utilize POSEIDON missiles on merchant vessels All of the above schemes would be costly ranging from $1 billion to several billion over the next 5 years Defense Secretary McNamara concludes that while they should be studied there is no need to commit ourselves at the present time to a ny of these programs - _ llombers While the planned bomber force for 1971 remains unchanged from that proposed last year for 1970 255 B-52s and 210 FB-llls it is proposed that the percentage TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED • REPRODUCEC AT THE 'll lNAI A11CN11£S A n -t N NJcffiroo Sr f 1- A Oa a TOP SECRET 13 of the force on alert be reduced from 531 to 431 Thia 1 reduction in the alert rate means that somewhat fewer bomber weapons would survive a Soviet surprise attack 1150 megatons as compared to 1340 mt in the present program but Secretary McNamara concludes that this is acceptable given the marginal contribution of the force to deterrence and planned improvements in the missile force The lower alert rate will help to extend the life of the B-52s-beyond 1975 as a result of being flown leas IV Damage Limiting A General Conclusions The general conclusions reached with respect to damage limiting programs are the same as those reached last year These are 1 that there is as yet no need to develop a damage limiting program against the CPR threat inasmuch as the Chinese Communists are unlikely to have any ICBMs before the mid-1970's and 2 given the substantial cost and relative1feffectivenesa of damage limiting postures against the Soviet Union NIKE x- creployment and related damage limiting mea·su«s are not approved As was the case last year the JCS recommended deployment- of NlKE X and advanced TOP SECRET I ' ' l • AfP110CUCm'AT _ Nl00Vl S DECLASSIAEO • A n y NN -2J7LOO By f Hf Oa e 1 rlf TOP SECRET 14 anti-bomber defenses On the other hand there are some significant new findings from the past year's studies of damage limiting measures 1 An area defense could be effective against the CPR threat through 1980 and might cost as little as $3 billion Last year it was estimated that a defense against the CPR would cost $8 to $10 billion requiring not only an area defense but also local defense of 25 cities 2 A significant damage limiting capability against many poss ible Soviet threats might be achieved for approximately $10 to $20 billion if the Soviets do not respond to such a defense deployment Previous estimates had ranged from $20 to $40 billion based on two major factors The new estimates are First is the assumption in the calculations that greater attrition will be exacted by the NIKE X long-range exo-atmos pheric warhead Second is the inclusion of a broader range of attack scenarios including Soviet counterforce attacks 3 If the US were to deploy a $10 billion or $20 billionaamage limiting program this includes civil defense and bomber defensa as well as ABM the Soviets could respond in several ways with differing f i nancial TOP SECRET l • • T T H l i N A ' DECLASSIFIED A i -J NND ffimo Sr €G 1- A Oa a W 11 - TOP SECRET 15 implications for them but some responses could cost them as much as an ABM program costs us Previous stud- ies estimated that the cost to the offense to overcome a defense was only a fraction of the cost of the defense but the ratios have been changing over the years Five years ago some estimates were 100 to 1 in favor of the offense Only a year ago DOD estimated that the ratios still favored the offense by 2 to 4 to 1 Explicit recognition of the effects of the ·improved accuracy of our missiles on Soviet planning combined with the effect of ABM have resulted in the current findings that at leas t under certain conditions in which the Soviet response involves sophisticated and survivable offensive weapons it may be as costly for them as the defense is for us B Evaluation of Damage Limiting Postures This year's memorandum evaluates three US damage limiting postures agains t three types of Soviet attacks • The three US postures evaluated are 1 The currently approved program extended to 1976 It -sliould be noted that by contrast with previou-s-analysisi the Soviet attacks exclude cruise missiles Also exc uded is the cost to the US of an advanced surface-to-air missile which could provide a local defense against cruise missiles and advanced bombers TOP SECRET · • f' I - AT - DECLASSIFIED • N N'D-ffi It Sy €G P Oa e A i ril' TOP SECRET 16 2 a $10 billion damage limiting program including L $8 billion for NIKE X area defense plus local defense of 25 cities and 3 a $20 billion program including $17 billion for NIKE X area defense and local defense of 52 cities The three Soviet attacks are 1 a combined military-urban attack there are two variations one concentrating on urban targets and one on military targetj 2 a military attack with the attack on cities withheld and 3 a Soviet second strike following a US pre-emptive strike 1 With the current US damage limiting program extended to 1976 fatalities would range from 201 to 451 of the US population in a Soviet first strike The lower end of the range depicts results if the Soviets first strike is counterforce with the urban attack withheld In this circumstance a US counterforce strike would contribute to limiting damage The higher figures are char- acteristic of results if the Soviets first strike places TOP SECRET l • ' •AEPAOOUCU 'AT TOE NATIONAL AACH 'ES ' ' DECLASSIFIED A itt- oi 'J N NJ qTfroe Sy Cif I A Oa a TOP SECRET the bulk of their attack on cities 17 Finally if the US were to strike first assuming a Soviet response with its surviving force against our cities our fatalities are estimated at 247 of the population 2 With a $10 billion damage limiting program US fatalities would range from 57 to 347 in R strike and 67 to 137 in a US first strike Soviet first A $20 billion program would improve the results in Soviet urban attacks reducing maximum fatalities from 347 to 227 but would not significantly affect the calculations in cases where the Soviets strike military targets The above figures would hold only if there were no attempt by the Soviets to offset the US damage limitin program 3 If as seems likely the Soviets responded to a US damage limiting program they would have to take two factors into account if their objective is to maintain a second-strike capability Not only would they have to increase their missile force and or add penetration aids to overcome the US defenses they would also have to expend additional sums t o protect their force against the improving counterforce capability of the US missile force If the Soviets did indeed choose to maintain a TOP SECRET I __ - · _ I · ' ·• •• • • DECLASSIFIED A i n - N f fl ffiroo Sr € I A Oa a W 2' J TOP SECRET 18 second strike capability they would require approximately an expenditure equivalent to our own to counter either the $10 billion or $20 billion US damage limiting program This would reinstate their previous second- strike capability but their first-strike capability would be somewhat less than before the installation of the US defenses Thie is because a large portion of their additional expenditure would go for missile protection rather than payload Although the cost of matching a US ABM certainly is manageable for the Soviets they might choose not to fully offset an ABM or choose a less costly response than reinstatement of their secure second-strike capability e g which emphasized soft missiles in a less stable posture This would result With unprotec ted missiles they might feel greater pressures to pre-empt in a crisis However the current Soviet force development sugge9ts that they place rather high priority on achieving and maintaining a second-strike capability TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED A i l ooi y N N 9 '7 oo Sy € HA Oa ajjzJJJ- TOP SECRET Tab C Questions Raised by the Strategic Forces Memorand DD A Introduction The DOD memorand DD paints a picture of a changing strategic balance While many of these trends have been emerging for several years the present memorandum poses certain questions more sharply than ever before Among the most important are the following 1 How does the emerging strategic balance affect deterrence of a nuclear attack 2 How is the emerging strategic balance likely to affect Soviet policies and actions 3 How does mutual deterrence affect our nuclear guarantee to allies in NATO 4 What reactions can we expect in Europe to the growing realization that deterrence is mutual 5 What effect will the changing strategic balance have on the prospects for arms control 6 Can the US influence the future Soviet posture If so how and in what directions do we want to influence it 7 How are China's policies likely to be affected TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED A i n y N NDj 9 ro Sy € 1- AR Da e ' 1 11 TOP SECRET 2 by their perceptions of the changing strategic balance 8 What should we say publicly about the changes in the Soviet threat and in our own posture 9 Is it now in the US interest to begin a new damage limiting program including ABM or should we try to obtain an ABM freeze 10 What further efforts should the US make to consult with our allies about ABM B The Effect on Deterrence of a Nuclear Attack There are many uncertainties about how the Soviet threat will develop However we have hedged in planning our future strategic forces so that the assured destruction objective appears to be secure even against rather unlikely developments in the threat It seems highly unlikely now or in the foreseeable future that the Soviets would be tempted to initiate a deliberate nuclear attack on the US as they could not have confidence of escaping unacceptable damage to their society Even in crises we would expect they would exercise extreme caution to avoid a nuclear engag l l P t TOP SECRET ·IIORoouc EO'ArTMl NATIONAl ARCMVES I • - DECLASSIFIED A n y N ND m'00 Sr If' I A Oa e TOP SECRET On 3 the other hand the Soviets also have an increas- ingly formidable deterrent and this does have implications for us that will be explored below Both major powers now can wreak great damage on the other even after absorbing a first strike Thus relative damage to the enemy has less and l ess significance It may be worth noting that even now the Soviets capacity to inflict fatalities on the US may exceed our capacity to inflict such damage on the Soviet Union because of their larger missiles and our more concentrated population The increasing accuracy of our missiles will by the early 1970's begin to reduce the Soviet second-strike capabi lity and may force them to develop new means of protecting their missile fore s uch as mobility or active defense In sum we are no more likely to cancel out their deterrent than they are to invalidate ours One implication seems clear We have been cautious in the past in direct confrontations with the Soviets -- and rightly so Are we not likely to be even more cautious in the future Will this in turn invite more aggressive Soviet behavior TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED A ii -J Sr €if NND·ffitOO 1- A Oa e W $ TOP SECRET C 4 The Effect on Soviet Policies and Actions It is possible that Soviet policies will become more aggressive once they have achieved an even larger and better protected strategic force Threats and probes e g as in Berlin or political maneuvering backed by the authority of their nuclear deterrent e g efforts to destroy allied confidence in US commitments might be tempting While this is a possibility it should be recog- nized that such a policy still would entail great risks Aside from the fact that there are many other factors that influence Soviet policy besides the size and character of their missile force they are likely to be uncertain about their strategic capabilities Existing US capability to strike the USSR and further advancea already planned# should limit Soviet behavior We think that the Soviets do understand the dangers of nuclear war quite clearly so that caution with respect to the use of threats is likely to continue • On the other hand they are likely to try to exploit a Sov t_image of increased strength and nuclear parity with the US for political and propaganda purposes with the TOP SECRET • 'AT nE HAltOHA ARO ' OF CLASSIFIED _ ri Y N NJ ffiLOO Sy £if HA Oa a j zf TOP SECREr s objective of enhancing their image as a major power equal to the US and reducing the confidence of our allies in US commitments to their defens e There are a variety of ways in which t he Soviets could do this and they may feel less constrained in chall enging the US in are as that they may consider less vital to our interests and in using nonmilitary means In these circumstances the possibility of miscalculation is always present D Effects on Our Nuclear Guarantees to Allies in NATO When we extended our nucle ar guarantee t o NATO we i n effect agreed to a strat egy ba sed on the use of nuclea r weapons -- first use if necessary -- to prevent NATO territory from being overrun In our Berlin s tra t egy we accepted resort to initiating nuclear att acks if necessary to persevere against the clearly superior Soviet conventional forces At the time these commitments were made the US had marked super ior ity in both strategic and tactical nuclear weaponry The extension of the protection of our deterrent to European allies was based primarily upon this super iority ou the recognit ion by the Soviets that we considered NATO ancr Berlin vital to US interests and the resulting belief by TOP SECRET · IIOWODUCEll AT THE NAl'° - ' '' DECLASSIFIED N 1 1 D' -ffii 00 Sy £if 1- A Da e W@ A i ri TOP SECRET 6 the Soviets that threats to our interests in Europe might logically be met with nuclear force if necessary For the past decade our effective superiority in both tactical and strategic nuclear weaponry has been dwindling While we continue to maintain numerical superiority it is questionable that this has much meaning strategically so long as both sides can inflict very substantial damage on each other both in a tactical or strategic exchange Deterrence of Soviet aggression against NATO has a different character today than it did t en or even five years ago in tha t it de pends on a variety of factors not just the nuclear umbrella First the Soviets are deterred by a desire to avoid aggressive actions which would reawaken a sense of threat and solidify the alliance Second they are deterred from low levels of aggression for limited objectives by a significant NATO conventional force Third they are deterred from large-sca l e con- ventional and or tactical nuclear attack by NATO's· large and well-advertised tactical nuclear capabilities and by TOP SECRET iI A TIE NATIONAL ARCMv6 ' --· DECLASSIFIED A ri y N l CJ q 1 By G I A Oa e TOP SECRET the risk of escalation 7 While they may doubt that we would risk an attack on the US in order to defend Europe they cannot be certain of this particularly in view of our existing commitments and their knowledge that we continue to consider our relationship to Europe to be vital to US interests However if Soviet actions continue to be constrained does not the existence of a growing Soviet deterrent impose greater constraints on US policy and actions in Europe Is our Berlin strategy whicn could force the initiation of a US nuclear attack as valid today as it was when formulated in 1962 Will we be less willing to reaffirm our nuclear commitments to Europe in the unequivocal terms we have in the past Even if we do will such reaffirmation be less persuasive to our allies and to the Soviets given the knowledge that the US would accept griev ous damage as the cost of invoking our nuclear guarantees How will our political relationships with NATO allies be affected E Possible Reactions in Europe pot b s have already been voiced in Europe as to-the TOP SECRET ' • R AT™ENATOW AROIVES DECLASSIFIED A i rify NNJ 9S9 ti By f f 1 A i Oa jfzJfJ TOP SECRET 8 credibility of our nuclear guarantee and these are likely to increase as the growing capability of the Soviet force becomes more widely recognized Already it is increasingly clear to our allies that US interests will not necessarily be served by early use of nuclear weapons While it is by no means certain that in the event of an attack our allie s would want to use nuclear weapons promptly they will want to keep clear the existence of this capability given the heavy emphasis they place on nuclear deterrence Several reactions are possible First there is likely to be a concern among our allies with the US ability to cover with its externally based forces Soviet MRBMs and I RBMs threatening Europe The growth of the Soviet ICBM force and the potential growth of their ABM system suggest the need to allocate more US missiles to the task of exhausting the de• fenses and t o covering the ICBM threat to the US While in t he short run this will not have any significant effect on our ability to continue to cover Soviet missiles threatening Europe it could have an important effect in the long run Views in DOD differ on this point and we will need to have a clearer picture from them on the future nature of- this TOP SECRET • AEPfiooucm'AT THE NA'tlONAI ARCIM S ' ' ' DECLASSIFIED A i n NND m S € P A Oa1a W -§ - TOP SECRET 9 problem so that we can discuss it intelligently with our allies However we question whether any answer we can give will fully reassure our allies Second there could be greater pressure for a larger European role in nuclear strategy and planning to assure that plans are formulated so that the probability that the US deterrent would be invoked promptly would be enhanced Third there could be in time greater pressures for allied control of nuclear forces to insure that plans would be carried out in accordance with the desires of the whole alliance The pressures for such control would stem from a desire for a finger on the trigger and on the safety catch as well Fourth there may be increasing pressures fr om our allies for arms control agreements that might dampen the arms race between the great powers Finally there could be growing pressure for accommodation with the East Growing uncertainty about the US nuclear guarantees also would open new opportunities for DeGaulle to stress the theme of US unreliability and to press for greater European independence'' from the US TOP SECRET DEClASSIFIED A lil'f Sy €G NN1 'rn@o I A Oa e 1 1 J TOP SECRET F On 10 Effects on Arms Control the one hand with rapidly growing strategic capa- bilities on both sides many will perceive a more urgent need to find new ways to stabilize the arms race In this connection our growing inventory of warheads resulting from the MIRV program may appear to be quite destabilizing On the other hand it is difficult on the basis of past experience to place high confidence in arms control prospects The tendency is to try to improve one's own competitive position to out-think and out-produce the adversary In this country we can expect continuing pressures from Congress and from those r esponsible for our military security t o respond to the projected Soviet postur e and to hedge against future uncertainties by producing an even larger and more sophisticated strategic force I t is difficult t o predict how Soviet perception of the s trategic balance is l ike ly to affect their views on arms control In the short run while they were in the midst of their current build-up it would seem unlikely TOP SECRET ' • IIEPAOOUCEl 'AT TIE MATIONA ARCHIVES DECLASSIFIED A ri y N I JJ 9J t c Sy r£ f l A Oa jfzf TOP SECRET 11 that they would be amenable to a missile or ABM freeze In the longer run there are two possibilities a If they realize it is impossible for them to gain a strategic advantage and very costly to try they may try to stabilize arms competition b On the other hand if they feel we have thwarted their objective of achieving a secure second-strike force they may try even harder to obtain such a force and be even less responsive to arms control proposals It is possible that the prospects for a non-proliferation treaty could be impaired as the knowledge of growing US and Soviet strategic capabilities spreads -- as it is virtually certain to do Those non-nuclear states such as India that have considered great power disarmament steps an important condition to their acceptance of a non-proliferation treaty may be less inclined to accept a treaty if they believe USSoviet arms competition is accelerating However this is unlikely to be a major factor in na tional decisions to acquire a nuclear capability G The Proi pects for US Influence on the Future Soviet lore ' Posture One possible way to influence Soviet forces is by TOP SECRET ' IIEl'IICCO ca AT T E NATICNAI -· DECLASSIFIED ' A i ii y Sy r£G NND-lI7t00 P AR Da a 1£- 1 - TOP SECRET 12 succeeding in arms control measures The present US pro- posal for a freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles probably has little promise of acceptance An ABM freeze also appears to have little prospect of acceptance but some believe it may be worth a try This is considered further in Section J below We may also be able to influence the Soviet strategic posture by the ways in which we design our posture but Soviet responses to our actions are uncertain For example DOD argues that as US missile accuracies increase the Soviets will be forced to expend even more of their resources to protect their missile force if they want to maintain a second-strike capability This would they argue result in a more stable Soviet posture for two reasons a better protected force is First less likely to be used pre- emptively or in a spasm-type response Second the more resources the Soviets are forced to spend on protecting their force the smaller that force is likely to be But if the Soviets take protective measures against an improved US counterforce we may be compelled to try to overcome-these measures by new measures of our own · as-we TOP SECRET ' 'AEPlt00UCEl 'AT THE ' TIOHAI AACHVES DECLASSIFIED NND-ff ti Sy € f 1- A Oa e cff - i A r n y TOP SECRET 13 are in fact doing today and thus the cycle could be a continuing one In short while we have argued in the past that we want to stabilize the strategic race by forcing the Soviets to provide more protection for their force and thus improve their second-strike capability paradoxically we are also taking steps to deny them such a capability not unfamiliar dilemma This poses the So long as nuclear deterrence remains fundamental to our strategy and foreign policy US security interests require continuing increases in our own strategic capabilities to match not only present threats but even very unlikely future threats The exercise of self- imposed restraints that might stabilize arms competition continues to be risky and so arms competition continues in new· forms Is there a way to break out of this dilemma without incurring unacceptable risks to US securi y H Effects on China's Policies China's policies are likely to be little affected by the US strategic force programs They are almost certain to continue their efforts to build a nuclear force - ·and to project an image of growing strength TOP SECRET Their hostility ' - · DECLASSIFIED A i nl'f NNJ 'ffiro By l' A 0 Oa e 11 1 TOP SECRET 14 to the US and the Soviets is almost certain to continue and they can be expected to accuse both countries of further increasing the nuclear arms race This will pro- vide them further justification for their own nuclear program But we believe they also will continue to use their military power with caution and as even-· more sophisticated US and Soviet capabilities appear they may begin to realize the limitations of their own strategic forces However at the present time both prudence and intelligence evidence would dictate that we asswne that the CPR will try to deploy an ICBM at the earliest possible date This in turn raises the question of a US ABM deployment See J below I What We Should Say Publicly At present there is not much awareness of the changing strategic balance in this country or abroad but awareness is sure to increase in the coming months Our estimate of growing Soviet capabilities will become available to our allies and will almost certainly become public in general terms Similarly our own efforts to improve our strategic forc es will eventually become more widely known TOP SECRET On the DECLASSIFIED i i ril'f NND-2 fht10 By €if I A Oa e fl TOP SECRET 15 one hand we will want to reassure our own public and our allies that we are taking steps to counter Soviet capabilities To do this we will to some extent make public the improvements we are making in our strategic forces But in doing so we may raise concerns here and abroad that we are stimulating arms competition particularly by our deployment of MIRVs and we may also stimulate further Soviet responses A carefully prepared public affairs program dealing with the implications of the new strategic balance would appear to be most important should such a program emphasize What themes How much information on our own plans can we and should we release J Damage Limiting and ABM Last year Congress voted funds -- not requested by DOD -to initiate procurement of components for the NIKE X The JCS have for the past two years recommended the deployment of ABM and related damage limiting measures Secretary McNamara proposes in his memorandum to defer this decision for yet another year However it is possible that his views on ABM are changing He recently has asked that his TOP SECRET DEClASSIFIEO A rilY N t1lQ ND'rn By €IE l A 0 Oa e 1 j- TOP SECRET 16 staff prepare a White Paper on ABM summarizing the pros and cons of ABM deployment It is not yet clear to what purpose this paper will be put It seems most likely hat it is intended to justify the present position on deferring deployment but it al so could foreshadow a decis ion for deployment in the not too distant future The recent Chinese demonstration of a missile capability could generate further pressures for initiatinc an ABM dep loyment against China It is also likely that as more infot111ation on the Soviet progress in ABM l eaks out pressures in Congress for a US ABM deployment will grow However in his present memorandum Secretary McNamara sees no need t o begin deployment against China because even an initial CPR ICBM capability is some years in t he future and he feels that ABM deployment against the Soviets is not justified in view of the uncertainty of Soviet reactions the high cost and the limited damage limiting capabilities we could expect to achieve Meanwhile there have a l so been suggestions that we approach the Soviets with a proposal to freeze ABM de Joyment TOP SECRET '' DECLASSIFIED A ri y NN1 'illtfl0 6 €G l A 0 Oa ejfzJJJ 17 TOP SECRET It is argued that even if the chances of Soviet acceptance are slim we should make one more effort before they become committed to a larger ABM program since we have little to lose by such an effort The pros and cons of ABM deployment are extremely complex However they might be sl nlllllarized as follows ' g_ An ABM program offers the prospect of saving many millions of American lives should a nuclear war occur While we do not believe such a war is likely it seems only prudent to insure against such a contingency now that the prospects of such a defense seem more promis ing We are uncertain about the capabilities of the Soviet ABM at present and even less certain about its future capabilities We should not give them the chance however remote of achieving a technological breakthrough i n defense that we would not match Such a breakthrough might have important psycho- logica l and s trategic implications Although the Soviets might respond to our ABM deployment and cancel out the effects of our ABM this is by no means certain The financiai resource9 and technica l effort required by them to do so would not be insignificant TOP SECRET ' DF ClASSIRED A iil' ri y N I JD-ffih IQ_ By € HA Oa ' lf 1f TOP SECRET 18 and it is not clear that their response would be fully effective Even if they do respond and their response is effective the resulting strategic equation would be more complex the uncertainties for both sides would grow and thus could enhance deterrence rather than as Some contend decrease it There seems no prospect even with large-scale ABM deployments on both sides that a first strike would appear an attractive option to either party there could still be no confidence of preventing unacceptable damage deterrence would persist Thus At the same time an effective defense would greatly reduce the risks of a major exchange resulting from an accidental launch •ran Nth country attack Even if we do not deploy against the USSR we should at least consider beginning to deploy a defense against China which could be very effective until at least 1980 at modest cost While it seems unlikely that China will have an ICBM before the mid-1970's have one earlier it is possible they could Recent intelligence suggests they may Even a very limited Chinese ICBM deployment would permit the Chinese to exercis e some leverage over US policy and actions Therefore we should not defer any longer a TOP SECRET '' OF CLASSIFIED · REPROOt• Eil' AT THE HAI AROWES N NJ % a o B €If I A Oa e A n -t TOP SECRET 19 decision to deploy The prospects of a freeze agreement on ABM are slim The Soviets have consistently he ld that an ABM was strictly defens ive and that they could not deny such protection to their population They are now deployi ng an ABM themselves and continue a large R D effort in ABM so that r estraint on our part is no l onger likely to impose restrAint on the Soviets They have shown no interest in previous informal British suggestions for an ABM moratorium If we did make such a pr oposal it might gene rate press ures abroad for a freeze which would make it more difficult for us to deploy ABM in the future even if the Soviets rejected a freeze Furthermor e an ABM freeze would not deal with the growing Soviet missile threat Finally it can be argued tha t in the long run a more stab le posture might be created i f there were a bette r bal ance between offensive and defensive force s on both sides I f both major powers could be induced to concentrate more of their resources on defensive rather than offensive systems might reduce the pressures to create even this TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED A i i y BY €tf N N D'-ffi@o HA Oa a TOP SECRET 20 more destructive offensive forces and even make possible a new strategic balance based on more traditional defensive concepts rather than the mutual terror of deterrence • £2 • It is impossible to measure the potential effec- tiveness of ABMs against the Soviets One reason although not the only reason is that the Soviets have the economic capacity and technical capability to offset a US deployment Against the background of their present effort to achieve a credible deterrent it is unrealistic to suppose they would not react in ways designed to mai ntain the effectiveness of their deterrent forces We could in short spend billions of dollars and after years of effort find ourselves as vulnerable as only costs we are today But dollar costs are not the Political tensions between the US and Soviets could increase as uncertainty increased Thus from the Soviet standpoint the US ABMs plus the improved accuracy of US counterforce missiles could raise serious questions about US intentions We might well view changes in their forces the same way If one or the other achieved extensive ABM deployment concern would increase that a first strike might be more attractive Meanwhile our European ailies TOP SECRET · · OF CLASSIFIED • AEPAOOUC Et 'Af tl NA110NAL AACHVES • A' J oi y Sy €tf N I JJ ffi'@o Ill Oa e 1 r1 j TOP SECRET 21 would see themselves caught in the middle of an ever- xpanding arms race which not only afforded them little or no protection but also stood in the way of progress toward better political relations with the Soviets There would be no prospect for further steps in anns control and that fact would affect views not only in Europe but elsewhere Confronted with the prospect of an ever-expanding arms race between the US and Soviets some countries might find less reason to refrain f r om acquiring nuclear anns themselves We cannot predict with certainty that all of these adverse consequences would flow from a US-Soviet ABM race but these risks are present Since the gains from deployment would at best be questionable for both sides and since political and psychological r i sks would be large an argument clearly can be advanced to support an effort to freeze ABM deployment Given Soviet attitudes toward defense such an effort might well fail However the effort to achieve a freeze would be useful even if it failed our allies and others would consider that the effort had been made in their interest as well as our own With respect to the ChiCom threat a freeze would mean that we would depend on TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED N N1 $7t'OO s €ff MA Oa a ' l l 7't A ii -J TOP SECRET 22 deterrence or on a disarming strike if necessary ABM deployment against the ChiComs could not be divorced from the Soviet reactions suggested above and would raise additional questions vis-a-vis our allies and others in Asia Although it is thought that ABMs could be effective against the ChiComs the view here is that our relationship with the Soviets is of higher priority These issues have been debated at great length now for several years in this country and the debate is beginning to extend abroad There is merit to both sets of argwnents While we do not expect that these issues can be resolved easily we do feel that decisions on both an ABM freeze and ABM deployment are closing in Whatever decision is made will have important foreign policy implications and the State Department should be prepared to play a major role in this decision K Further Consultation with Our Allies about ABM While a decision to deploy ABM has been deferred we cannot and should not foreclose the possibility of future deployment if it is in the US interest We have recently held discussions with the British and Canadians on the TOP SECRET OF CLASSIFIED ·J ri -t Sy cEtf N ND-1 7 HA Oa e c 1 11 - TOP SECRET 23 political and strategic implications of an ABM program In these discussions we stressed that the US Government had made no decision to deploy ABM but did not preclude a future decision to deploy We attempted to make clear that we were exploring in some detail the comple x political and s trategic issues related to ABM deployment and were considering the effects on our allies We can expect furt her interest from these two countries and others in discussing this important subject with us It has been proposed that ABM be one of the major topics considered by the NATO Special Committee of Defense Ministers if agreement is reached to establish this Committee on a permanent basis While the papers prepared for the UK talks are intended t o serve a s a vehicle for discussion with other allies we will need to be prepared for more detailed discussions at a later date Interagency planning for such discus- sions should be undertaken soon In particular we will need to give careful conside ration to the pros and cons of overseas deployment of ABM should there be a decision to deploy such a systef I in the us TOP SECRET