DECLASSIFIED t NA 132UJ1 1- - - -- i - i a z zm- n sf21 _ iARA Date J o Ji J I I Authority MEMOXAND'UM THB WHITB HOUSB w o RECEIVED Friday January 6 1961 w w -a SENSITIVE SE WJra Meetina with the President January 4 196'1 Pl'eaent Secretary McNamara Cien Wheeler Gen Harold K J olmeon Adm David McDonald Gen J obn McConnell Cyrue Vance Gen Alfred Oruentber Dr Jame• R Killian Dr Jerome Wieaner • Herbert F York SUBJECT 15 50 The Vlc• Pr••W nt John Foater · Secretary Haro d BrownSecretary Stanley Reaor Lt Oen Harold Manpum Dr Donald Hornis Dr George Khtlakoweky Mr • Roben Kintner Mr Bill Moyere Mr Walt Roetow • ABM 1a TI- e PrHldent thanked tho•• who h d come from out of town for a1 tendlng and aaked Secy McNamara to the iHue po•• Secy McNamara 1tated in accol danc e with a draft paper which bad b•ten distributed that we faced eHentlally thb choice with reapect to an ABM ayat em -- do nothing I I i • set up a limited •o-called ''thin II system with a capability to protect againet Chlcom miHllHJ accidentally launched mt Hile• n11c lear blackmail ud to furnish additional protection for ou r MINU' l'EM AN -- install a eyatem capable of protect1n 1 our population a gain at heavy s ophieticated Soviet atta k• He stated that he would now eolicit the view• of ihe JCS the Science d• ieora to the President and other He turned to Oen Wheeler who spoke for the JCS Cien Wheeler propoaed1 as the JCS had in the Austin meeting wiib the Preaident that we install a Nike-X ayatem on a ecale capable of protecting 25 major population contera Thie would provide a damaae-limi ting capability i 1 trodu ce uncertaintiea about Soviet capabilities which would make them r ore cautioua at a time of crl1ie stabilize the nuclear balance demonstrate faa t the U s wa a not flnt-1trike minded and deny the Scwlet Union a fir at- strike capability ' GP IIIGMI' SENSITIVE NW4t 35590 I5ocid 31 395085- - II · · · -- I• I DECLASSIFIED Authority ---------------- -- ------------ r • _ NAl i c Jfj Bf24 JARA Date la j I -2- 'P6P 9BOMrf' SENSITIVE l 6 67 The proposed Nike•X deployment could not cope with •U attacks upon us but it wo lld provide a11b1tandal population protection It wowd lso provide the four benefits cited tor tho limited thin • yetem In ahort1 the J'CS reaUinned it1 previoua poeltlon ol aupport for Nike-X deployment to protect 25 population centers ' The view• of the Science Advteora were then •ollcUed by eenlority1 beginning with Ih' Killian Dr Killian stated that he had addreHed himaell to this important • rnatt r putting political conalderatione aalde although be wa• awan that they were ext remely important He wae not persuaded about the need for the rninimwn firet-step ln the form of a limited eyatem Beyond the fl1oat step an ABM eyatern wo lld be extremely dange roua 11 If politlce required the first step the thin eyatem of Secy McNamara was the moat Hnaible He hoped it would not be neceuary He recognised that it might how veJ' toe an advantase to have committed oureelvee to the flrat step in ne1otia t ln1 with the· Soviet UDlon · wa• Dr Kiatiakow• ky stated the iHue of very great importance He agreed completely with the a'l'gwneata of tho•• who were againat maealve c eployment of a ABM The arsument wa1 complex but ln ••••nee it waa this our • yatem of doterren ce _l• designed now to prevent a nuclear war 'l ho mo lfttina of an ABM ayetem conatitute• preparation for nuclear war It would lead to a radical accele ratloa of the arm• race ln which all b ope would· be loat foi- a rma control a1i-eementa He felt the 1ame Z'IUffleDt• applied to a limited flret atep The international effect• would be the aame but they would be atretchecl out ever time The preuare for expan• lOA of the ayatem would be great and i rreaiatible Moreover he dld not believe it would even be effecdve aaalnat Chlcom nuclear blackmail They would prove l111enlou• and could turn for example t sutimarlne-launched delivery eyetem•• or to a dirty bomb exploded 5 0 mile I off shore ••Y• He also doubted that the thin eystem waa the optimum for protect 1 n1 MINUTEMAN again et Soviet attack Therefore he recommended against deployment while we undertook a major diplomatic effort to penuade the Soviet Uni Oil to stand down Conceivably we might put into the bud1et certain lon1 lead time item• for an ABM eyatern to illcreaH our bargaining leveraa•• 'feP 81 18MS' • SENSITIVE NW# 35590 Doc Id 31395985 - ------ I• DECLASSl ED a 1 - ------------------------------ I NA 12 1 tf e 14 -JARA Date ill Ji J ' J Authority 6P 8B8M51 SENSITIVE 1 6 67 -3- Dr Wiesner stated that he supported the argument• presented by his two predeceuora An ABM system cannot buy defense against Soviet attac He stated that U S and Soviet deci·• lons to deploy ABM'• wow d l lad to greater c aeualtle• in a nuclear war not There ls a built-in t lndency to overbuild in compen aatlon for the el'ectlon of a defenaiva ay•tam 'I'he history of Soviet anti-aircraft in relatloa to the expuelon of own Strawli c Air Command l1lu1tsoate dale tendency It l• inhei-eat ln aa offoal••· de£en1ive race • 1•••• With rupect to Communist China there ia no need for an ABM system We can rely on normal deterrence The Chin••• Communist• • are extremely vulnerable to nuclear attack Fony 10-megaton weapon• could cause between 150 and 200 million Chinese caaualUea They coulcl be deUve red by 4fo of our B-52 force Moreover lhe fl rat aeneraUoil of C bin eae Commun tat rniHllee would be soft their location would be bowa 1 and they cow d ·b e taken out in a pre-emptive attack lf we believed they were about to be launcbecl ·The Chineee already have miaeile-ca1'1'ying eubmuinee and our J BM 1 s would provide no protection again at them• Finally Dr Wiener aa id that the lntroductlon of aa ABM race' v1 ould lead to sreat uncertainty and deatabill111e the arm• race We shall certainly overbuild in reaponee to the Soviet ABM'•• He noted that he baa spent a great deal of hi• mature life working on defensive ayatem• · fi rat anti-ah'cl'aft then ABM'•• Heh now convinced tha t ln the 1ame d nuclear deterrence defenae doeen•t work The oflenee will alway• cvercome He noted the irony of hla present poettlon in opposition to the JCS dnce at an earlier time the J'CS had etron1ly oppoaed him when be wa1 i uppol 'tins an aizo defeuee eyatem Geaeral Wheeler noted that it waa a iiffe rent JCS 'tI ·Dr Honig concuned with what had been aald by· bla predeceHore He noted the tseue had been reviewed by three Science Advleory paaeb He concluded that it wae not feasible to bave an effective defea•• against r iiaeilea The facts were that tbe Soviet Union had taken atep• to deploy linlited eyatem azoound Moacow It wa• a poor eyetem and penetrable Hia own people believe the second eyetem now being deployed in the Soviet Union ls not ABM but air defenee Agalnet tbl• bacqround and tbe problems c f eacalaUou inherent ln an ABM deployment he believed it unwise to take the major step recommellded by the JCS As for a thin system he believed that the balance v1•-••v1•the Chine•e wa• such that we did not require an ABM •y•tem for that purpoH c lthough a thin ayetem could help agalnet an accideatally laucbed miHile againat an Nth coUAt ry with nuclear capa'bllity etlrrin g up trouble aad it could rovide aome additional protection to our MINUTEMAN NW# ·35590 Docid 3139S085 DECLASSIFIED Authority NA fb13dc j Cf I B 14 JIARA Date Q j iJu J Sf eF aoe il'l'-SENSITIVE -4- 1 6 67 If it were believed that it would help in our ne9otlation1 with the be would tend to support a limited tbln s ·stem He would however proceed •lower than the thin ay • tem propoaed by Secy McNamara until we bad a definitive responee from the Soviet Unlcm t SSR for an ABM-miulle freeze Oen Gruenther Jtated that he aub•cribed to the limited thin system o tllned by Secy McNamua He would •upport tht• li9ht deployment for the four purpoHa aketched by the Secretary · He wished to underline the dlaasreement in the lntellisence community al -out the function• of the TALLINN aystem all hand• dld not aaree tba t it• was strictly anti-aircraft He aaid that we •hould not put exceHive hope• in diplomatic negotiations on this q_uestion In aayln g that he wanted it understood that he believed in arms control aa the right aolution to the security problem in a nuclear age he was a member of Mr Johll McCloy•• advisory committee to ACDA He wa•• eimply not opt lmiatic about ne gottating prospect• Qr York former Director ol R •earch and Ensineering in the Dt partment of Defense stated hie agreement with the science advisor•• Hf supported a policy of Let'• do nothing· now 11 He ea1d the case aaainet ful 1-acale deployment of Nike-X bad been underatated Tb e worldnga of ihct system could lead to au increase in caaualt le• ln a nuclear war The most th t might be said is that caaualtiee mi ht be cut · What la certain be aaid i• that the arms race would accelerate and the net reault would be lo the futuZ'e aa in the paat that more Americu lives would be at risk each year If the installa1 lon of our defensive system were the last move in the arm• race then ol courae lea• live• would 'be at risk But that would not be the laat move and in the end more u s lives would be in Jeopaiody As for the Soviet system in hie judament it la so ineffective that we can afford to defei- a decision · He repeated we should do uothf ng at this time We have a very vigorous lU D effort golna forward It create• better potential ABM ayatem each year We should maiutain that vigorous effort · The President then aaked Secy McNamara to aummarin He aald ou choices ue NW# 35590 Oocid 31395085 DECLASSIFIED Authority y A i' 2 12007 a JIARA Date io J J i J ' '8P seenT-SENSITIVE 1 -5- 1 6 67 Do nothing 2 The thin system with it• four limited functlona It wa• eatim ted to coat $4 2 billion We m118t count on the actual coat being 25 to s o o bi1he r tJMm tbat It would coet $250 mlllioa a year to oper te• in _ 3 Installing Nike-X to pi-otect the population 1ubatantial numbora in ZS citle Thia •yatem ia now eeti mated to cost $13 billion to build We must expand that reallstlcally to $20 billion In fact his estimate i • that it would cost $40 billion in 10 yeara The ai-gument against deployment waa that the Soviet Union must build a system which will survive a poten1 1 al U S first • trike anc have enough striking power left to inflict such ca• ualtlea on the U S that we would not etrilce the Soviet Union ln the fint place An ABM ay • tem ie not capable of Hd lci_ng u s caaualtlea to the point wbe re the Soviet Union would not be able to carry out lta policy in this matter The counter-argument is that we could try and protect our population to liome degree His view ia that the effort to protect would lead to an offenai 'e increa• e in the Soviet Union which would more than 0£ fset our initial effo-rt to protect our population A8 for the limited thin ay • tem lt might play • ome role in pushing the Soviet Union into negotiations but we cowd not guarantee that It offered • ome protect f Oll again• t a C'hicom attack He • aid that he would be more concerned'tban he now l • with our policy bombing North Vietnam if the Cblcoma had ICBM'•• A thin ay • tem could protect ua agalnet the kind of miHile accident that atatl • ti cally might happen with the paHa1e of tlme and tbe multlplicatl on of miHilH He referred to the Mace ind dent o f January 4 It might al • o provide some protec tlon again at nuclear blackmail He felt the deciaion about a limited thin ayatem waa 11 margila l A8 for the ca• e for dolng nothing the Pl'ealdent bac1 beard the pros and cone The President a • ked Secy McNamara for hi • recommendation He said he would prefer to withhold judgment now and pl'eHnt • view to the P roeident later• • • • • a etmT-SENSITIVE NW# 35590 Docid 31395085 11 DECLASSIFIED NJ JJ i u ff I B 4 JIARA Date j Q Ji J I Authority J l 6 67 ll'8P OD M'i'-SENSITIVE The President then summarized the Chiefs wish to go all the·way acienti • ta eay No but if we go we should go with a thin •y•tem tacause it might help our neaotlati ona with the Soviet Union t 10 Secy McNamara aaid it was hf a Judgment that it would help that fae argument baa some merit There bae been aome evidence in the i aat 3 - 4 weeks But the ABM problem 19 extremely difficult once you start you are pregnant It will be virtually impoaei'ble to atop The President then a • ked for a aummary of intelligence on the Soviet system · Secy McNamara asking Oen Wheeler to correct him if he dleagreed stated that the aaseaament of Nov 17 1966 baaed on July information showe'd disagreement in the intelligence commwuty The m Jority agzoeed t 1at a limited ABM system was beina deployed arO lnd Moscow which waa penetrable by heavy u S attack or through POLAIUS miaallH In addition a wide-scale system waa being deployed which might con tain aa many ae Z40 miuilea by 1971 There wa• aome evidence that tbi• ao-callecl TALLINN system waa solely designed against aircraft but other• believed lt wa1 ABM aystem or dual pur te In December we acquired new evidence that i'C ia more probably anti-aircraft •ince aome unit• are not linked to the radar which la required to track miasilea a a Secy McNamara concluded by sta1ing that in hi• view it made no difference No defensive system could be effective He recalled that when he became Secretary of Defense he fint inveetlgatecl the ability of SAC to penetrate the Soviet Union To'hta aurpri ae be found that the beat eatlmatea bdi ated that 90-95% of the aircraft could 1•t through At the very outelde fae de- ensive system might ahoot down 15% The Soviet Um on baa spent 2-1 2 timea a• much as the U s on defenae and baa not gotten any eerious protection for thoaeexpen diturea The Soviet• have an irrational biaa towards defenaive ayatema Theil' preaent deployment• around Moacow are not n1ilitarily justifiable but represent an ln ati ncti ve almost theolopcal deeire t- protect Moscow aa the center of Rusaiu life tho•• The President again thanked present He stated he would take faeir view• into ccoun t He was putlcw arly grateful for those ou tlide the government who again showed thei1 willingneu to ae rve When he came to make b ia decision he would do ao with areater confidence becav H they had come He bad talked with others about thi• matter including Oenoral Eiaenhower TeP 8B8Miil'f SENSITIVE NW# 35590 Docid 31395085 • •- -• - •••Pt •• - -- • _- • - -