V DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON -- March l 1967 Dear Walt The British have given us access to a detailed account of the discussions which Prime Minister Wilson and Foreign Secretary Brown had with Premier Kosygin in London on ABM Since I felt this provided the best and deepest insight we have had into how Soviet leadership looks at the ABM issue I thought you would find it of interest Please note that the British have asked us to give this information very restricted -handling Mr Walt w Rostow Special Assistant to the President The White House ' 1• 1' - • r · ·- · APPJALSREVIEWPANEL DATE_ _ _ DECLASSIFY EXCISE DENY DECLA$IFY IN PART Non-responsive information · RETAIN CLASSIFICATION a _ __ FOIAElemptiom s CLASSIFY AS _ _ _ _ _ OADR PA Eiemption a DOWNGRADE TO 8 C OADR r - _ ' i · • r Me orand m ol C nvenatio _ ' DATR SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS British Disucss ions with the Soviets on· ABMs Ian Smart First Secretary British Embassy Seymour Weiss G PM RmewBy D EPARrMENTOF STATE REVIEW PANEL DATE- G - Mr Koh i February 27 1967 _ 1 EXCISE DENY Non-reaponaive information FOJAEiemptiona s PAEJem ption s DECLASSIFY IN PART· RETAIN CLASSIFICATION a _ __ CLASSIFY AS _ _ _ _ _ OADI DOWNGRADETO S C OADR ·1 Mr lan Smart First Secretary British Embassy asked to see me today He noted that as I was aware Michael Stewart had recently briefed Mr Kohler in a general way on the discussions which th British i Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had with Premier Kosygin Mr ··· Kohler had expressed interest ·in obtaining additional details ·smart handed me a record of the discus sion in London _b ut said that he was not authorized to leave it with me He said he would however be willing to have me make whatever notes I wished Michael Stewart had xplicitly asked that this be called to Mr Kohler's attention with the note that he hoped we would give the information a very restricted handling · assured him this would be conveyed to Mr Kohler My notes ··taken from the record of the conversation which Smart made available are reproduced in the fo lowing paragraphs ·2 Conversation Between Prime Minister Wilson Foreign Secretary Brown and Premier Kosygin on the subject of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems London February 1967 3 The Foreign Secretary raised the separate question of the major development and deployment of ABM systems He said that such a development and deployment would give cause for concern It would interfere •••• --• - ·c ·· I • -- - ···- - - · I '· £ 2• • · ' · ' ' with progress on a comprehensive test ban toward reduced s·tock piles and even toward progress on general non-proliferation He pointed out that the Prime Minister had talked to Mr Kosygin and to the President He wished to ask the Soviet Union to give serious consideration to a mutual understanding to halt development of these systems before things went too far ' ' 4 Mr Kosygin said that the Soviet Union had not taken any final decision so he could not give a considered answer at the moment He thought however that the UK had posed the ·question in a very odd way The attitude of President Johnson and Mr McNamara· seemed to be to ask why they should start making anti-missile systems when it was cheaper to make offensive weapons He was surprised that the UK should support this attitude It was obscurantism and misanthropy ' ' Any child knew that it was easier ·to buy offensive rather than defensive weapons ''What kind of philosophy was it that concerned itself with killing people in the cheapest possible way S The Foreign Secretary _said he was not trying to encourage cheaper systems· In fact he was afraid if we went into this field it woul4 stimulate those people whose only answer was more offensive systems He wanted to achieve a cut-off to get to general disarmament 6 ''Mr Kosygin said he fully understood the view that if one side produced defensive systems it stimulated the other to increase and develop new offensive ones Moreover it was costly But if all countries could perfect defe sive anti-missile systems mankind could live in peace because nuclear war would have been neutralized The philosophy behind the UK question astounded him •••• 7 ''Mr Kosygin said what President Johnson and Mr McNamara were Let's not have ABMs let's develop offensive weapons because they are cheaper What the Soviet Union would like would be a lucid program for the renunciation of al J nuclea r weapons If we did not do this today it would be more difficult and more costly tomorrow The Chinese had tightened their belts stopped their housing program and lowered their already small wages in an effort to obtain an offensive nuclear weapons system He inquired wheth r this suited the UK It certainly did not suit the Soviet Union There was a stand to be taken on nuclear disarmament If 50 or 100 countries were in favor of destroying all nuclear weapons they could coerce the rest When would that be possible 100 years from saying was 3 now 50 years 60 years ·hence or when the first nuclear war broke out Was that what ·the UK wanted The Soviet Union wanted to fore tall this crisis Mr Kosygin said he fully understood the technicalities and the cost inv9lved in ABM systems He was not arguing with the British he was expressing his own views on a question of great importance 8 The Prime Minister said the case of China highlighted the need for the non-proliferation treaty In other areas India and P akistan for example proliferation would divert money and resources from food to nuclear status seeking The Foreign Secretary had not been emphasizing cost he was simply saying that if you develop defensive weapons there is a further development of offensive weapons This would give a further dangerous twist to the anns spiral A stop had · to be put to the process 9 ''Mr Kosygin said if we assured that all plans for ABM defense were scrapped -- and the US was doing less work in this field than the Soviet Union -- then the money would be available for offensive weapons The Prime Minister said not in this country Mr Kosygin asked ·which was more conducive to peace a country which based itself on offensive or defensive systems The answer was that a country which gave itself ABM systems but did not develop its offensive weapons was concerning itself with defense The UK was not developing ABM systems were they trying to save the Americans money The Foreign Secretary said that we wanted to stop the anns race - · r ' -1 10 ''Mr Kosygin said if we i e the UK agreed to complete nuclear disarmament we ought to say so in public The Foreign Secretary said he trusted we were both in favor of total disarma- ment Mr Kosygin said that in short if ABM development was curtailed the funds saved would go into offensive systems This was simply the general logic of the situation Mr Kosygin felt that the UK position was weak -- that it simply amounted to support of the Americans He did not want to develop ABM systems _they were very costly But the position was very complex The US had raised the question and now so had the UK but without taking into account a whole series of circlDllstances