- •--• December 19 1967 NOTES ON WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS Doty Doty Ruina Rathjens and I accompanied by Keeny and Scoville met with Rostow Rostow and Nate Davis the morning of December 6th Rostow first discussed Soviet-U S Soviet U S relations from a broad almost background standpoint He noted that hat it was important for the Soviet to realize that McNamara leaving was not due jue to a change in policy nor did it foreshadow one It was simply that an excellent job of a kind McNamara wanted opened up at the right right time As to the general zeneral state of U S -USSR relations it is Rostow's impression that things are not very different from a year ago He thinks that we and they find it possible sossible to work together when our mutual State interests are involved and he he pointed pointed to to the the Middle Middle East East settlement settlement as as an an example example At At the the same same time time the the Soviets Soviets continue to be recalcitrant on helping in Vietnam and have caused a good good many troubles with their foreign activities notably in support of what Rostow Rostow called the Romantic-Radicals such as Nkrumah and Castro From Rostow's standpoint the over-riding problem is that of strategic balance salance He thinks that it is of the greatest importance that we the US and JSSR must show show restraint USSR As a specific example he thinks it is important that hat we say directly to the Soviet that we are apprehensive that the NTP will aot be durable if a Soviet-US arms race occurs not In Rostow's view we must search immediately for a formula to handle the ABM-ICBM ABM ICBM problem where one search irrrrnediately should think of ICBM as also including IRBM and MRBM In Rostow's view the USSR USSR is is not not yet yet so so deeply deeply corrrrnitted committed to to ABM ABM or or for for that that matter matter to to ICBM ICBM build-up build-up that they cannot withdraw before a catastrophic arms race is in motion thinks thinks that the US position is a similar one months nonths arc critical for t he the US He He does note that the next few The combination of new new Soviet programs plus occasional sccasional sweeping statements of their superiority combined with the political Tetivities of an election year vear could mean that a few more months of unchecked activities -2- Soviet Soviet activity activity could could lead lead us us to to believe believe that we must react and the possibl possiblity ity would e would be on would then then be be that that the the arms arms rac race connection he noted noted that In this connect ion he that their larly helpful in aiding the U S to their FOBS FOBS program program has has not not been been particu particularly to hold the the line line On On the the other other side side at at least one of our programs ie MIRV program s ic developm ent he lly a response to their ABM program development he notes notes as as essentia essentially program Althoug h Rostow Although Rostow di cl did not not say it one could suspect that even though this U S U S developm ent may not be development may not be stopped stopped it might be held down in size in context of an of an agreed t agreed program of restrain restraint A A critica criticall point point to to Rostow Rostow is that we need formal talks of the kind that that were were proposed proposed by by us us in in February February the need for which was reiterat reiterated Johnson ed when Johnson and and Kosygin Kosygin met met In In Rostow's Rostow's view there are a number of options which which the the U S U S would ble and which might be discusse d between us find accepta acceptable and which discussed would find The important importan t thing thing is is for for them them to to accede accede to talks promptly and bring some of their their own own preferen ces out on preferences out in in the the open open for for discussi discussion Rostow clearly hopes that our our discussi ons with discussions with the the Soviet will emphasiz emphasizee this need for more formal formal talks talks between governm ents between the two governments With With respect respect to to the the NPT NPT the Soviets ought to realize the very substan substantial tial cost nt from cost which which getting getting agreeme agreement from some of our Allies has been assumed by by the the U S U S It It is is not not helpful helpful if if as as Kosygin Kosygin did in London the U S S R one U S S R simply berates one of nt allies of our our importa important allies Rostow d that we can clear aa good Rostow is persuade persuaded good plan plan with with our ble to to the U S S R our allies allies ie ie one one accepta acceptable U S S R At the same time getting some s in some of of the the other other countrie countries in e g India will be a joint problem and the U S S R must r U S and and U S U S S R must work work togethe together treaty treaty viable viable This will also be necessa necessary the ry to to keep keep the Parenth etically Rostow noted that if our Europea Parenthetically European alliances n alliance s were y weakene d in his opinion vere seriousl seriously weakened opinion the European countrie countriess would withdraw -3- from from NPT NPT and and develop develop nuclear nuclear weapons weapons In thinks it In this this sense sense he he thinks it worth worth noting noting that -hat our alliances effectively lock the U S into the world and the NPT will carry -arry this farther Rostow turned to the question of Vietnam and noted the failures of the Soviet Soviet in in carrying carrying out out commitments commitments in in Laos Laos As As a a result result there there is is a a clear clear Soviet responsibility for this war and the sophisticated Soviets know it Soviet responsibility He ie thinks that the U S S R U S S R really should be working to reconvene Geneva as they “hey have been repeatedly asked to do The question that he obviously thinks should should be asked the U S S R is what specifically would they do if the U S stopped its bombing of the north On Jn the the question question of of aa bombing bombing stop stop Rostow Rostow noted noted that that in in his his judgment judgment the l y a frontier war ie that fighting increasingly ‘he war has become significant significantly is is occurring on the periphery of South Vietnam rather than in the interior interior and and he noted that this is particularly true with respect to the northern provinces yrovinces Because of this he thinks the San Antonio formula for a bombing pause gt ause is is our our rock-bottom rock-bottom position position I I am am not not sure sure what what this this formula formula is is precisely must gt recisely but but it it is is my my impression impression that that according according to to it it aa bombing bombing pause pause must be be promptly followed by productive discussions discussions ' The The most significant aspect of the Rostow discussion was his feeling that ‘hat the key problem of the time is the question of strategic balance and his hope 1ope that this could be explored at some depth with our Soviet colleagues -4- After After meeting meeting with with Rostow Rostow we we talked talked some some with with Hornig Hornig who who in in his his analysis analysis of the political situation came out very much as had Rostow He noted that we have the position nave strayed strayed away away from from the position we we had had been been in in with with the the USSR USSR of of proceeding proceeding toward toward arms restraint by a process of mutual example and raised as an interesting ing question whether we might not discuss this and persuade them to return to this -his On the question of general relations particularly in science Hornig felt felt that that we we were were likely likely to to be be able able to to agree agree on on an an exchange exchange program program but but that that it it probably would be little different from the current one Ile He noted that some not going some of of the the exchanges exchanges in in technology technology areas areas were were not going very very well well Apparently Apparently the nuclear energy the expected expected exchanges exchanges in in the the field field of of nuclear energy have have bogged bogged down down comcomaE pletely It appears also to be true that some of the proposed information exchanges changes in the area of desalination have bogged down Parenthetically Hornig noted that we are going ahead with the Los Angeles plant and expect to produce 200 million gallons of water daily at a cost some place between 20 and 25 25¢ thousand chousand gallons per The same plant will produce 1800 megawatts of electricity In In Hornig's view the most important technical thing that we needed to do was to think of ways in which we did better at information exchange This was true true in in the the above above areas areas but but equally equally true true in in things things like like meteorological meteorological was programs programs space space programs programs etc etc After After lunch we met with several DOD people in Morton Halperin's office Halperin Halperin felt that there were several principles which ought to guide our discussions of a strategic balance The first principle was that freeze or cutbacks of strategic delivery systems particularly cutbacks for for the U S with only unilateral verification real real step forward 1 aunches was possible launches This Halperin believes is a This is not to say that there might not be interest in discussing the possibilily plnnts or perhnps possibility of inspectors is missile plants perhaps submarine yards larger yards but such verification need only be involved in significantly larger ntbacke cutbacks imnortant thing thine is a good g¢ood deal is possible with no internationa internationall The important -5inspecti on nspection A le is that discussi ons of freezes and restrict A second second princip principle is that discussions restrictions ions should simultan teously involve e and e missile s simultanteously involve both both offensiv offensive and defensiv defensive missiles A A third princip principle le which d is that we should look for simple agreeme which he he felt felt ought ought to to be be discusse discussed agreements nts e g nts relating relating to c missile ssile launch system c 8 agreeme agreements to ballisti ballistic missile and anti-mi anti-missile system In way it was noted In a a very very casual casual way it was noted that that if one threw in on the Soviet side side their their MRBM ' s and MRBM's and IRBM's IRBM's one one might might very well be able to discuss things in terms terms of of an an approxim ate parity measured by perhaps two or three differen approximate parity as as measured differentt measures measures With With respect nts it cespect to to the the simple simple agreeme agreements it was noted that it was probably true th t that the the first to think e i e a freeze first thing thing to think a out about would be a stoppag stoppage Another principl e whkh principle which Halperin felt operated was was that that we should think think in in we should terms nts rather cerms of of informa informall agreeme agreements rather than a treaty A A final general point was was that be a little reluctant reluctan t to produce aa dethat in in aa very very early early stage stage the the U S U S may may be detailed proposa l just tailed proposal just because because we will be hesitan hesitantt to draw fire in context of of aa public on of proposa l before we know that the USSR isscriou public discussi discussion of aa proposal isserious in its its dedes in sire sire to talk As the USSR has not agreed As aa couple couple of of specific specific points points Halperin Halperin noted that the to to the the signing signing of of Protoco Protocoll II II of of the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Agreement Agreeme nt in st use of nuclear weapons on in which which large large powers powers agree agree to to a a non-fir non-first on countrie countries s which nuclear free zone which have have agreed agreed to to aa nuclear found found this this easy easy to to accede accede to to He wonders why the Soviets have have not not As a somewha somewhatt similar point he notes that that we we have rave tabled tabled at at Geneva Geneva and and at at the the UN UN drafts of a no-first no-first-use -use arrangement arrangem ent which which would lear nations would hold hold for for non-nuc non-nuclear nations except when they are supporte supported d by a nuclear nation n ration in in some some active active agressio agression countrie zountriess who have signed the NPT The tion is that this would apply to The implica implication Halperin notes notes that that this this is is close close to to the the Halperin Soviet Soviet position position and and thinks thinks we we should should be able to get some kind of an agreeme agreement nt on this on Tilt' List part p irt of t lws e discussi ons involved nlso Pnul Warneke lhe last of these discussions also Paul Warne-kt himself ly along 1imself general generally along lines lines rather similar to Rostow lec expressed lie expresse u that Among other things that were al problem vere noted noted were were that that aa princip principal problem is that of corranun communication with an interest interesting ication w ith an ing -6- question question being being what what highly highly visible visible thing thing might might the the Soviet Soviet Union Union do do to to indicate indicate that that it it is is prepared prepared to to diminish diminish the the intensity intensity of of its its build-up build-up It It was was also also noted noted that that aa good good illustration illustration of of defensive defensive systems systems that that had had turned turned out out to to be be less than useful arc are airplane defense systems Warncke Warneke commented with vigor on on the importance of establishing with the Soviet Union the second point made in McNamara's self-discussed speech i e that nuclear weapons really have no i e significance significance as as instruments instruments of of foreign foreign policy policy and and that that their their sole sole utility utility now now is that of deterring their use by others get set agreement between two countries This fact should make it easier to