CONFIDENTIAL UoSo - SOVIET DISCUSSIONS House of Scientists Moscaw December 28-30 1967 Meeting held under the auspices of the Pugwash Group UoSoSoR Academy of Sciences American participation organized by the Committee on International Studies of Arms Control American Academy of Arts and Sciences t CORRIGENDUM One acti ve Soviet participant is identified throughout the record of the meeting as Schtukin This is in error and should read SHCHUKIN - for Academician A N Shchukin of the Leningrad ElectroTechnical Institute CONTENTS - -List of Participants 1 American Proposed Agenda 2 Meeting Agenda proposed by Soviets and agreed to by Americans 4 Record of Discussions F irst Day - 0 December 28 5 Seco nd Day - December 29 18 Third Day - 28 December 30 Appen dix 1 - American Memorandum for Discussion 49 Appendix 2 - Revised List of Questions for Future Study and Discussion s1 · SUBJECT IND EX Strategic Problems PP NPT pp 14-17 Vietnam PP US-Soviet Re la ti 0 111 S ppo 44-48 0 0 5- 14 32 - 44 47 - 8 18-31 1- -----____' ' -lPARTICIPANTS United States Paul Doty chairman Jerome Bo Wiesner Franklin Ao Long Jack P o Ruina George Wo Rathjens Henry Ao Kissinger Benjamin Ho Brawn MaDo Millionshchikov chairman L Ao Artsimovich PoLa Kapitsa A Po Vinogradov A Ao Blagonravov V So Emel'yanov V M I hvostov AaM Shchukin wrongly identified throughout the record of the meeting as Schtukin 0 Arbatov M M Dubinin The following were also present some cont·nuously others from time to timea They sat in the back r M and did not participate in the discussion AaAo Gryzlov Mo Voslensky I So Glagolev SaM Meir Shchikov so G To M Korzv • ' Sh e lepin Karetnikov Sokolov Sol sev _ I -2AMERICAN PROPOSED AGENDA I ' - -- New Technological Factors that Destabilize the Strat egic Balance • New missile systems Ballistic missile defenses Penetration aids Consequent uncertainty of per f ormance deterrence II relation to Factors Affecting Strategic Security Asymmetry of the requi r ements for de t errence on the two s i des The Problem of Parity Overreaction by each side to technological uncertainties and misreading of intent Response to new nuclea r powers 0 The role of t h e Non- Pr oli fera ti o n Tr e at y I I Io What is Involved· in Stopping and Reversing the Arms Race To what extent can there be a common view of what mutual restraints are possible What principles should govern agreements on mutual restraint limitations on offensive and defensive missiles and further steps toward disarmament What tec hnical factors need be assessed in order to discuss realistic steps on limitations and disarmament Can we restrict numbers and or kinds of delivery systems ' c Can we find mutually acceptable limits on antiballistic missile defenses - _ -- How f ar can we proceed depending only on unilateral verification What concrete steps could be taken soon 0 - 4- MEETING AGENDA I ' I Proposed by Soviet s and agreed to by Americans Io IIo 0 1 ·t I Strategic Problems lo Analysis of the strategic situationo 2o Ways of freezing and c utting back nuclear weapons systems to the level of a minimum umbrellao 3o Ways of reducing anti-ballistic missile systems and keeping them thino General Problems lo Ways to end the Vietnam war and bring about a settlement thereo 2a Overcoming the remaining obstacles to the NPTo 3o The Improvement of Soviet-American relationso -5- First Day - December 28 - -- The meeting began at 10 a rn on December 28 at the House of ScientiEts Millionshchikov welcomed us wannly and brieflyo He said it was not a time for long-winded speecheso He preferred to get down to business at once He outlined his suggestions as to procedure He suggested that he and Doty serve as cochairmen and this was agr-eeda He said t hat on this opening day we would work ntil 2 p rn Tomorrow the 29th the Presid ium of the Academy _of Science oft be USSR would meet during most of the day We would therefore begin our second day's meeting at 5 p rn after which we could work as long as necessary · On t he third day the 30th we could start at 10 a m and go until about 2 o'clock when Ke l dish would give us lunch Then we would resume at 4 p rn and work as long as might be necessary If the group wished we could meet again on the 31st for at least a morning session from 10 until 1 Millionshchikov then turned to the agenda He saic the Soviets agreed to the agenda proposed by the American side and he 9utlined the following items for discussion g 1 Analysis of the strategi c situat i on - 2 The question of freezing a nd cutting back on nuclear weapons systems to the level of a minimum umbrella 3 Ways of reducing ABM systems and keeping them t h in 4 Ways to end the Vietnam conflict and bring about a settlement there S Overcoming the remaining obstacles to the NPTa 6 Improvement in U oS ···Soviet relationso This differs substantially from the VvSo p oposed agenda -- see page 2 0 -6- Emphasizing that it was ne • essa ry to oak at bot ·r offensiye an de ensive systems Mi lions c ikov observed t hat the first three items were all facets of the same problem a _ d could be discussed simultaneously a--s--a sing l e cluster of q uestions He suggested that we begin wi h a full discu ss ' on of t h e first three questions o On the second d ay we co1J ld deal wit the other items NPT Vietnam etc Then on the fi nal day we could return to the first three questions Participants wou d have had time to give t h oug ht to specific sugg-astiort s that might emerge during the first d a y an i we could ave a fnll and frank discussion of themo 0 0 C Paul Doty t h anked t - e Sovie s f or eceivi ng us a this time o He regretted that d u ring tr _ a st t ree y e ars we had not peen able ·to maintain very c l ose cont cto He h pea t at at this meeting both sides wou_d c ke a cri ic3 _ _00k a t h e present situation and consider ow t e a rms race rr g 4 be managed so that systems on bot h sides wo ld b-e kept at t ie lowest possible lei el and stabil · ty cou d be ma tai ed w · _ __ least t hreat to bot u sides o R eqardi g Vietn arr o Doty s3i i tl iie thought that our group co d do · ts best work a aome o _ at we could do in Moscow was very limi ted but we woi i d be g l ad to discuss the matter as fu ly as our Sov · et f ' e ds mi g h _ ' i S ao Doty said that on ques ions re a g t o t e st ategic balance our group ·h olds vie s c l ose t o t ose of t _e Administration in Washington and ou r con tacts in gov ermne¥ are good Even so we were here as i ndivic J a _s a d would speak as individuals distin g ishing w 1en necessa ry b t een a ou r views b the Adrninistr a tion 's views a ti d c na i ona l opi nion which were not necessarily all the a eo Doty said that because of lack of contact t he twc sides may ha ve developed different way51 of viewing tln e strat-· egic postures o Only if we had a corrm ion v i ew and unde rst anding of the problem could we usefully d iscuss specit i cso Re h op ed that at he current session we co d de v elop such a commcfi yiewo Doty begar his analysis by stating t hat e xpieri n- - had shown that GCD had n ot been a u •ef _l ba n d e for comi n g to grips with the arms race in t tis de cadeo Thi s v s regre-c t a j_€o but it was a fact of -ifeo We h c d a or ditio -- of rrn1t ua l deterrence and although t_ i s was a u rLp leasam code by w 1 ich to live it has worked and we kn•- w 2 at i is po s i ble to J i ve - - - - - -1 La -7- by it The key to stable mutual det8 rre ce lay in bot sides having a secure s econd strike b u t not a first-strike ca pa bi it yo He quoted McNamara to the effect that neither s ·· de had a firs strike capability In the early 60s the str teg ic s i u t i cn seemed stab e because the offense could off set any c o m ei vable def se t at might be developed The offensive systems of o h sides wer e seen as invulnerable Doty feared m -e ver t ' '2 ·apid y d eve oping technology in the next decade mig t er ri e be confide ce that one or both sides have had in t h i r fu con •j -st r ik e capability o Wiesner interrupted to say L c in t e ear y 60s some in the U S Government tried to effer · -8' 1' l Ct ions a T ey were not successful He thought it would be i xere s t i g a t some point to tell the Soviets why since c fe t · tai t t e Sovi et Union by its actions and statemen ts w s ·n pairt respo hs i b le o J Doty continued explain L g wv y ma y U oS a observers had felt that an effective ABM system was no co ceivab eo Re mentioned the ease with which t b e offense could i ncrease t e numbers of offensive missiles and deve l op e_e ra ion aids etco However the argument about ABM _ad proved to oe · nco c u sive · and now both sides were evidently det entdned to ave ig __ t ABM systems These systems would not be d angero s to t e strateg c balance so long as they were kept t h n bu bes a· ise of amb · g u ity on this point they tended to be desta t ili z 'ng a T_ er e were moreover other destabilizing f actors il _Jh e pres e nt 1 nvironrnen which Doty listed as followsg 1 The current Soviet b iild-up o 2 Technological pos sibi it'e s for he deye lopme_ of mis siles wit h m ltipl· war - a d s l ilR Vs e t c a 3 The Chinese nuc ear t 1 ceat whi had devel0ped faster th1in expectedo 4 Improvements in ABM ech PJ o l gy 6 nd dtan g 8 in t __ e cost ratio of offen s e 4 defcns a Doty em pb asized that t h se fact u i s -ak 0 get - -er accelerate t h e dynamics of t h e aLms rac- eo H e s s o lt i r r art icular of the interacticin of ABM and _ Va Eac - s ide -_e r - is to assess O _ -8conservatively what the ot ier side is doing and often they overreact The result was a long process of action and reaction constituting an upward spiral of the arms race Both sic i would try to maintain an invul rLerable second-strike capability but tb eir confi den -- e tt t t hey have such capability would diminish Each side might imagine that the other was planning a first strike These 1ere the ingredients of a classic arms race To what end The irony was that as each side develops more powerful sy 5t elT S everybody has less security Both sides ta l c of sup rior it y but such superiority if it exists canrot be translated into political action O '1 he question tha t we all ave to face Doty thought w s whetr er we could level of f Gl· d th en begin to reduce He suggested that the discussion fro in two stages First we could see whether we could ge an agreed assessment of what is driving the ar Ds race T hcrt i ll a second stage we could discuss what might be done to get it under control 0 Ruina agreed wit h Doty's analysis and said he would only add a few details He spoke of the ratchet effect in the arms race which could eridently move forward but not backwarqs He emphasized our desire to hear from the Soviet side what they think causes it He said the P merican side would try to explain their view 0f t h e ffiatter Ruina t hen t u rned to the 1 hin ABM system that the U S contemplated Briefly he said that it consisted or would consist of relati vely few r dars and a few missiles that could give the enttre country a hin protection based on interception far above tb e atmosphere Such a system could handle only a few objects It wou ld no L effective against the Soviet Union but only aga i ns'l w t at a small nuclear power _such as China r igr1t be able to di ro 11 a t us Continuing Rui na sai d t b at a more complex system with advanced radar and many ItlorE interceptors was being researched and dc veloped He was of the opinion that it would still not offer a sure defense Turning to t a mot ivc t i0 r for the U S decision to deploy ABM Ruina mentjoned that although it was designed primarily t o protect us against the Cli inese nevertheless Soviet policy and statements on ABM ha d tad a lot to do with the decision It was hard for opp0 1ents of ABM in the United -9- Sta es to ar g i1 e t t at w 1i1 e t _2 s vict Union might do it the U So shoui d ttGt Sc we a re goin q t J A SM and we are also very active in th de· re lopmc nt ot pen t ration aids The most significant of ew dcvelcprr ent s appear to -b-e multiple warheads These were essentja ly a p enetrat ion ai d and this development is surely stimulated by Soviet ABM act ivity but the fact was t at t hey cc uld inf i ct more da1r_ a c than missiles with single warheads and m'ght there for e be thought of by the other side as constitut inq a first-st ci' e Ji a f_ c r •• Ruina agt' ed with Millionsh hikov that it as not feasible t o · E ·0 ss t _h- ofi nse and defense separately What we had was c- r e prc ccs s of act ic-n md reaction This might not b t 2 ca Sa if it were p o s sil· e 1 0 develop a perfect defense _1 ' t on cur sije we we r - cnvin c ed that no one could do this So ye ' get a spiral eff-t t and all the ingredients of a classic a rrr s r5 Z o To get it u1der control you would have to reduc e both off2nsive anj dcfens · ve systems Reducti n of ABM rnig· t hi an ° i njire t way t o ac' le the arms race problem bu red ion of - f£2 s v weap -ins -as he only d irect way He felt that t j i2 ---- ul d l le n1C fi - Api i it in our discussions and tra tb Cc J··l' 1 s nould · t e J kej a in toto 0 Wi snar al s o greed wi h this view He said C st ess the arguments wo lld be easier to stop something which had not yet atart d Of course the solution to the strategic w e - ons pee l-em wo· id be to get rid of strat egic weap- ins t t bsca UI e c- f t a_e d ifficnlt inspection problem Wies r had crne ·t o favor r'e ctuct icm t o what he called ·a mi irnurn deterrent·• a · whZ1 tr S 0v e t _n t ' 10 me d minimum umbrella 11 WiesnE t' r p htc i t b t h 1 fttl y 3r a it was necessary to dis cuss li111i t ati 0 '15 u1 offense a d defE-hS1 s i rnultaneously He f-r 1inte'1 out t at _c Ua S o Goven nt- nt was willing to carry on s uch disc· 1 s3ir ns a r t i0v2r M tl c vel and he hoped that it would soon be fC• 1r lc 1 0 do thiso n the meantime if we could agi -c- c L_e 1_ t ' set t maet ing rt ways t o get started maybe it would be a gcqj idaa 'tow it e le ers to our respective govern m2nt s r re 5-sn - ir- g cur re conc l n iations Americans h0 1 t endcd i - · r E _E a st against P-BM b-e- a 1st3 t y t -eou _·· _ _ · icsr -ec c t '2 C Vc d t t a ¥·crj' low levels inspection wo ild be 11eed -j 5 't-i t -s d id not t n' inspectio n was practical If one b g a ri c t 1 n_i _ in t6 n- s c-f mnre mode st limits the first p oblerr v-'E i to S cJ i c0nr ar5 't · u 1 i _s_ A missile with a J -10si n g l e wa r head a n d another missile with multiple warheads might each c onst i tut e a unit but would they have the same military effec t i v e11es s Despite t h ese· difficulties Wiesner thought that the only f ea sible basis was numbers of launchers Wie s ne r said that when he suggested the umbrella he thought of numbe rs adequate to give assurance to both sides from o n e hundred t o two h undred rockets At that time this looked rather large t o s ome but it seemed less large now Anyway he thoughL that at · t hat level e en if one's estimate of what the other side had wa s wrong by a considerable margin each side would be satisfied t h at t h ey had a deterrent 0 I 0 Wi e sner s till thoug ht t h at the umbrella was a good ting to aim at b u t now it was n ecessary to ask what is the impact of a d ·efE nsi v e system at var i ous l e vels This raised interesting q u estio n s i according to one's point of view one could say that a d efensive system was unsettling or reassuring Wiesner • s mm view was t h at alt houg it was impossible to develop a s u re r e lia b l e ABM system it would be unsettling in the extremeo Of c o u rse if you we n t to zero on offensive weapons with inspe ct i on of course then ABM might be a good t h ing in that it wou ld probably be e f fective enough to deal with the smal m i rnbe r of weapons t hat might be·· produced clan dest iriely o rJnder these condition s it would not be unsettling If however y ou pu s h ed down to t h e l evel of a minimum deterrent then ABM would b e extremely unsettl i ngo · Kapit s a i n terrupted to ask whether the U S would really ag r ee t o the k i n ds of r eductions that Wiesner was talking about o He observed t h at t h e UoSo had refused to sign the convention b anning c hemical warfare weaponso Now Wiesner was speaking o f a mu ch mo re comp l i c a t ed c ase Would the U S really sign' '1 'WiE sne r r eplied that BCW wa s not inspectab e certainly not by unil teral me a 1s--a nd inspection was the key R t jens s a id that w at was involved was verification nd assurance 0 n o t lt i n spectiono Un i l a teral verification w6uld have bee n e asier a few years ago wh en missiles were big and highly v i sible o It had become harde r now but remained possible He did r1o t kno w Low much l onger t h is would be the case as mis sil es beca me h rd er to see Rat t jens rneitioned here that CJ -11- we had heard reports recently about Soviet development of mobile ICBMs This was worrisome because we could be less sure of how many there were Under these circumstances the U S almost certainly would overreact Long said it was important not thought the crux on NPT would be how the United States manage their own affairs urgency to the need to get the strategic Scht ukin asked whether that ABM had triggered MIRV If er elaborated this argument--see dered whether Wiesner was saying offense bll t keep a defense He t because the defense might have a offensive purposes 0 to forget NPT He Soviet Union and the This gave increasing arms race under control the American side was saying so he disagreed The Soviets latpp 32-33 Secondly he wonthat on could abolish the houg t this would be illusory dual capability and be used for Rathjen s said that the answer to the first question was yes It was actually happening in the u s Poseidon and multiple warhead ICBMs were our response to ABM Perhaps we were overreacting but this was a fact nevertheless Be spoke of the defense conservative psyc h ology that doubtless operated on both sides He had heard it argued that the Soviet mobile ICB was probably a reaction to our ABM He asked whether this was true On the second question raised by Schtukin Wiesner replied by saying that he had merely intended to explore the question whether with ABM you could have a limited umbrella He thought that P BM would not be unsettling only if you went to zero He agreed that conceivably ABM could be converted apd be used for offensive purposes That was why at yery low levels one needed inspection Khvostov said he was very pleased to hear the Americans talking about offense and defense simultaneously e thought this was a new development--very different from what was heard at Udaipur 1964 He recalled that Soviet proposals at Geneva and elsewhere had always aimed at reductions of offense and defense si multaneously Before going further he thought it would be interesting to hear what the American participants thought of the well-known Soviet proposals and w y they were not adequate to deal with these C l -12newer questions Wiesner said that at Udaipu the Americans were just beginning to assess the impact of ABM No_w t he Soviets were saying as they h3 d for some time th t or ie must coup le o ff r r and defense Wiesner agreed and said we were nxinu t ·• the question on this basis r - We then had a coffee break after which Kapit sa asked what was thE difference between mobile lCBM s and Polaris American s had been talking for years bout the virtues of -Polaris as an invulnerable second-scri ke w apon It was supposed to be a good thing Were not mobile ICBMs in the same category Rathjen s replied ttlat sub-tr 1 1 nes were large and could be counted while in produ ctior Tt e land-based mobiles were less visible Wiesner added that if you nad a sausage factory producing n obi e ICBMs there woul d t e muc uncertainty with regard to n mi' c- -- Id a new compi1 xi t y which would be difficult to analyze 0 Kapit s a then said in the st ronges C terms t at the Vietnam war wa s a great gulf between ua The Soviec participants hoped to hear in the course of this meeting what the official U s position on Vietnam was He sa i d t hat t he Soviets ·understand the Middle Eastern war bot h from t e perspective of Israel which was fighting for its life and from the perspective of the Arabs Whether you agreed with t_e positions or not was an other matter At least you could understand what they were saying they made sense 'rhe Soviets could not understan d the Vietnam war Doty said we would answer on Vi etnam wh en e got on to that item Regarding Khvostov l s re tm rks h-e said he thought the answer was that Soviet proposals of 1964 were irrelevant in 1968 In t he first place the proposals were not concrete They proposed moving toward GCD with an undefined umbrella as an i ntermediate step Second we were now in 1968 and both Chi na and France have become nu cle i c fiuwers m a- wou ld be the effects now if t h e Soviet Union and t e United States went to zero Doty felt we bad to get beck o t e ag enda which called for a nalysi s of the strategic si t ua• i or • He observed that the United State5 str 1tegica lly was OP e 1 lat e- 2 u as regards numbers The Soviet Union was rapidly expand1r1g Tl e A mer-ie ans · boped to -13- hear · from the Soviets what they r hink s driving tr e ne w arms rgc If we got clear answers to this qu stion we would perha ps be on our wc1 y toward a comm on un i2rci ta -idi og of the problem Khvostcv said t at t he 1 1JraD rel la was de fined clearly in the Soviet proposalso The proposals had not been discussed because of the priority of NPl' but ' he proposals still stood and the Americans OU1 ht to react to th rr o Wiesner repeated that et chs official level t ere had been some d'scuss i cn of having r a lx s bout offe 1se and defense sim 1tanec u s1 i If at the pr senr m st ing we felt this was impor-c ant ·and urg c we could tel g·overnment s so and recommend that th talks start At the pres enc meeting we ough-c not t o go into deta i s of numbers an sy st err s but o iy try to get a common in-r ellectua understa nding- of ct - - problem 0 OU ' Mil ior shdiikov said h-e falt there rad been a definite advance i n that the UoS participants were now talking of limitations on cf-t ense and defense simul a eously In the circumstances he though that w2 might be able to rr ake real progress toward developing wa _•·s c f accomplishing - uch limi t a't ior s alt hough he agreed with Wiesner that it was ot necessary t o go into specif• ics abo numbe -5 etc Mi lio ish ikc - hop ad t at che U S side would pu soma proposals in writing lie also oped that tne U S arLicipa t would prepare ans· er to q es ions put by the Soviet siae At the same t ime if the P merican side would put some questions the Soviets would try to reply - 0 Millionshchikov went on ' say t 1at Kapit sa 's views of Vietnam re£ e ed t hose of all t b-e Sov iet participan s They felt that nothing could be resolve' wit tc i'ut the establishment of confi dence be-c wee n the two govt rrmeri tsa 'erscnally he ucould not i agine any agreement on arms l mitations·so long as one side w as engaged in a cours•e of ct i on that could lead to the b ciu · of a military confrorrt ati on Dm y therL listed certain q ll ' St ions that he hoped the Soviet par1 icipc 1ts would consider First we sho ld frankly disc 1ss our mut ua reqairements or d - e w et her we can visualize t ow tha arms race can be brought unccr cunt rol 'l'h en we should try to develop a common concept ion oi r i J · Je should respond to nuclear d-e a c 1 m-ent s in China and f ran •e oa e xt '' ° -t are the principles L c t ' r oi l ld govern limit at ' ocu nj mut•-al restraint 7 -14What technical factors need to be taken into account At wr at levels of numbers are viable agreemen s conceivable How far can we iroceed with unilateral verification W'r at mix of offense and defense would make iense in a disarming world Above all what would be possible when the Vietnam war was over Doty stressed the la st questiono He t hought the Soviet an s wer to it would be tr e most useful messa g-e that we could take home to our government Whatever the political difficulties of the moment it was important that both sidas continue to thjnk hard about how to get the arms race under controla Doty observed that Vietnam will pass On the o-cher hand t he nucl ear age will last forever We can never escape from the prob lc ms t at it imposes on us Wiesner said that he would lik e to have discussion of how to improve the formal arrangement s between the governments for studying and coming to understand the arn1s race o He t _ o ught the 18-nation meeting in Geneva was not the best forumo Ideally there should be close continuous bi ateral discussiono 0 Long said that he hoped to hear how the Soviet participants view the function of the nuclear weapons that both sides develop in such variety Increasing y UoSo scientists see these weapons only in terms of their usefu ness as counte - weaponso If--as one of the Soviet participan s wa saying d u ring the coffee break--·we both understand t at tN e won °t bomb t he other then indeed the situation is full of irony But is his an over-simplified view Do the SovieL participants see any ether role for nuclear weapons Non-Prolifer J t ion Treaty We then turned to the question of the non-proliferation treaty and Emel 0 yanov initiated the discussion by saying that he thmlght the main obstacle to agreEm- nt was paragr0ph 3 of t h e draft treatyo After the Tokyo discus sions where some 92 countries includi ng those that are now making ob ject ior s a t-4a d vot ed for IAEA controls 6 he Emel'yanov h d assumed that this would be the agreed form of control Al Uwug t1 he himse lf had originally some doubts about IAEA cor trols Wiesner and ot her s ha d helped him resolve these doubts Now some seemed to bs saying We can control you but you cannot con rol 11 off This was unequal a 1d I _ -15- the Soviet Union could not agreeo · Wiesner agreed that this whole problem was most importanto Another was that countries like India were saying t hat the big nuclear powers must accept some forms of restraint Emel ' yanov said that he thought the crux of tr e matter was that the FRG did not want any control He had discussed it with von Weizsacker after the conference in Czechoslovakiao Weizs cker seemed to be especially fearful that the U S wou rl gain German i ndust ria 1 secrets He had spoken of West i ngr o i se Also France would be in a privileged position and t he Germa n s did not like this Emel'yanov said he was convinced t ha t t he FRG was developing a growing nuclear ability They ha d p i ut on iu m pla nts hey were building reactors sm all ones t o be sure b ut who knew wha t would come next and the FRG does not want _ue details of its operation s to become public property He t _ oug ht the problem was a political one and not a technical one Kissinger said he thought t he d i scussion of NPT s hou d cover t h rae topics lo 2 What form of treaty can be signed by bot h t he United States and the Soviet Union What form of treaty is l i kely to be acce pt e d by others 3 In what spirit will the treaty be implement ed on a global basis Regarding the first question Kissinger thoug · t t h at paragraph 3 was the only problem He wanted however to a dd a political element to t he di scussiono H' e t h ought t he imminence of a treaty had caused a number of nth countries to give priority to studying t he nuclear problem and had cau sed some of t h em to move closer to a nuclear weapons capability Therefore the problem every day became more - irge- nto On the second q1 iest ion he said that pocencial nuclear countries see the UoSo and e Soviet Union engaged in a full arms race and the do not like to be told t h at they cannot participate in even an e l emen c ry way Th e crux of this problem is t hat the United Sta-- es a nd the Soviet Un ion must find ways of reducing their political rivalry and reducing arms Otherwise even if a treaty wer signed it wo u ld not be viable -16- c Long then called attention to the recent citizens' study of the NPT problem He distributed copies to the Soviet participantso The UNA-USA Panel Report o Doty said he had the personal feeling that the Germans were intere sted in one thing--their rivalry with Franceo Wit h Euratom t he Germans have some oversight of French nuclear developmentso If Euratorn dies the Germans will lose this chance of keeping informed Regardi ng the larger probl em of NPT Doty said that potential nuclear powers want security the opportunity t o part icipate in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and Q kind of diplomatic dignityo He called attention to the special problem of India _ which lies outside both alliance syst ems India r seds some guarantees against Chinese nuc l ear blackmai1 Because of this a nd other considerations Sarabhai had evidently shifted his positiono He no longer advocated t hat India s ign a nonproliferation treatyo He was recommending against s ignature r although he did not favor a weapons programo The USG had p oposed a Security Council solution to the reassurance problem r Doty said but the Soviet Union had not respondedo @ 0 Emel I yanov though1 the NPT had nothing to do wit h Eura tom which its members cou l d continue if they wisbed The question was what form of contro l wo uld be applied across tne board He thought the matter was urgento Time was runn ing against us He did not think it proper to link NPT to other things o Wiesner thought that tne Article 3 dispute was a question of tact ic s Both t e Soviet Union and t he United States were agreed tha1 IAEA controls were the answero The United States wanted to sign a crei ity now and struggle later about the exact form of inspection Wiesner then ma de a second point that Euratom was dying and its supporters clung very strongly to its inspection function which was abo lt all that was left Artzimovich also emphasized the urgency of t he prob1-em He thought 1 t would be better for everybody if we could get a treaty nowo He felt that as scientists we s hould indicate this to our governments and tell them to get on with it a The signa ture of an NPT treaty would be important because 1t I -17would move us toward d tente as the test ban treaty had doneo Long said we would all say amen to that - _ Emel 1 yanov said that the Soviet Union could not accept a formulation that would p rmit the self-contained Euratom cou ntries to remo ve themselves from the system of international control Arbatov said he doubted that the dispute over Article 3 was a matter of tactics He thought that U S relations wi th its German ally were very much involved This was more than a question of tactics· and gives rise to apprehension in the Sovie-c Union Wiesner said that although he was not personally involved in any of the uegotiations he had the impression that some ot er Euratorn members were even more concerned than Germanyo Millionshchikov said t hat having heard the viewpoint of both sides he thought there was close proximity between t he two positions and this was encouraging The system of controls remained the stumbling block He thought the United Staces should p r ess its allies harder to bridge the differences We then adjourned for the day At lunch Khvostov told Kissinger that he thoug t the Soviets would be flexible on NPT -18- Second Day - December 29 · I Vietnam We resumed at 5 porno December 29 centered on Vietnam -··- The discussion Doty led off by saying that there were three warsa 1 The guerrilla war 2o The war between the main force units 3 The air war in North Vietnam He also distinguished between three sets of attitudes g 0 1 Those of the American participants 2a Those of the U So Governmento 3 Those of the American public There were some differences and this oug ht to be Kept in mind We then went around the table and Soviet part icipant s posed questions about Vietnam Millionshchikov said there was one question in t he minds of the Soviet participantsi when would the United Sta t es e n d its war in Vietnam He said he had not met a single sci ntist in any country who felt that the war was morally or politically just i fi edo He thought we should analyze the problem in the spirit of Pugw asho In his opinion the way to end tbe war was for the UaSo to with drawo He wondered whether the new NLF program was wide ly known in t h e United Stateso He thought it was a program that could be accepted by democratic public opiniono As scientists the participants at this meeting shou ld help make the · NLF program known and t h ey should also make it clear that UoSo withdra wal was necessaryo Millionshchikov said he understood that the only obstacle o negotiations was the bombing of the north He disagreed with Dcty s thought that t here was a separat e air waro War was a bi i teral thingo The UoSo bombing of t he north was a unilatera l actio o -19Furthermore he did not understand how u s prestige could possibly be more adversely affected than by continuing its present course of enormous investment and nothing to show for it France in withdrawing from Algeria had gained prestige and had also made enormous gains economically Millionshchikov said he hoped to hear from his American colleagues how the war could be ended It was throwing a shadow across Soviet-American relations and seriously retarding many steps that could be taken tow3 rds disarmament Millionshchikov wondered why public opinion in the United States was not sufficiently active to end the war Kapitsa asked what the u s military leaders and specifically General Westmoreland meant when they used the phrase complet military victory Artzimovich said that he thought Vietnam was t e most unfortunate of all wars that the United Stat es had ever foug t It was incomprehensib e to him how the USG expected to find a way out We had half a million men in South Vietnam Why was it necessary to bomb the north It was a display of extrao dinary incompetence 0 Vinogradov asked 1 what are the U S aims in Vietnam 2 what is the outlook as regards the possible spread o f t e war to Cambodia and Laos Emel ' yanov said he could not understand why withdrawal would hurt UaSo prestige when the war itself was causing UaSo prestige to declinef and our reputation had been brought so low that it could scarcely go further He to wanted to be informed about United States goals in Vietnam He wondered wt iet her t e United States was trying to replace the United Kingdom France and the Netherlands in the area Arbatov asked how Americans who have analyzed local wars view the Vietnam wara Presumably he said they have learned that local wars have unlocal consequ ncesa He thocght that in the context of what had been said the day before about action and reaction there were dangerous possibilities herea Secondly Arbatov wanted to know more about the relationsh p of the war to what he termed background changes in the UoSo He asked Wi 11 the tendencies in the U S that operate to prolong the Vietnam war not also operate afterwards and ensure more u -20 Vietnam-type wars ls the rigidifying of the UoSo position a consequence of the coming election Finally Arb tov toe asked about the possibility that t · e UoSo would go above t h e 17th Parallel anq _move into Cambodia and Laos Kissi nger said he would deal with the problem i two parts First he would try to answer the specific questions that had been raised and this would involve some explanation of official U S Government views Second he would tak e Arbatov•s questions and use them as a b3sis for looking at the future and at where we might go from hereo Regarding Millionshchikov · s question as to why public opinion was not more active in stop ping the war Kissinger pointed out that alt h oug h some in t he tlnic e d States had dou ts about the war there were many oLh er s w o wanted to win whatever that might mean Opinion was quit e polarized and the most recent poll s howed that 58 oe r cent of respondents inclined toward the view that the United Staces ad to do whatever might be necessary to win issinger t h o ug there was no doubt tha_ the President felt more pressure from this group than from critics of the war - 0 As for the meaning to be given -c o Westmoreland ' s talk about military victory 'issinger said t a t in West moreland ' s opinion the guerrilla activities were viable only because of the activities of the main f orce uni ts from t e northo If t e main force units are dealt with the guerrilla war wi come to a halt The problem was tha-c as the main force u nit s are hurt they n a turally take sanctuary wherever they cano He ice the pressure in the United States for pursuing t e fleei ng enemy into Laos Cambodia etco Regarding United States goals in Vietnam Kissin ger said the main goal was to give Sout Vietnam freedo to c 0os its own political forms free of outside interference o Of co· 2 rse it was difficult to define what constituted outside interference but the view was a sincere oneo As for the question of how - e Vi tnam war fits into the a nalys es of local wars Kissinger said that he and ot hers who had written on t e subject had had in mind the Korean model--that is a clear aggression across a frontier for territorial gain--not a case such as Viet n 21u w - ere foreign influence and help was inse ted into a civil war sit uat1ono Kissinger then developed che thesis hat the UoSo reaction in Vietnam was in its early stages a response by President Kennedy to Khrushchev's 1960 challenge on wars c f -21 national liberation As for the deeper issues Kissinger felt it was a mistake to think that the great powers conducted foreign policy in terms of some deep design wi th clearly esta b is h ed objectives and well articulated moves Bureaucracy a nd inertia had to be taken into account The point was that governments usually found that it was easier to continue doing what they were doing than to stop and adopt a different course of action Kissinger emphasized that now that the United States has half a million men in Vietnam the problem is not n abstract problem It ha s to be considered in terms of the 3ctual situation that we are in He agreed with Doty that there were three wars in progress He also agreed that every effort should be lliade to end the war honorably as soon as possible He felt that nobody wanted to see the United States humiliated and therefore in suggesting steps to end the war one should have t hi s constrai t also in mind Finally an end to t he bombing was clear · y easiar to contemplate than troop withdrawal in the initial stages Therefore perhaps this is what one should concentrate on in the search for an acceptable formula for de-escalationo Kissinger said he assumed it would not do any good tQ indulge in recriminations about the past He appreciated t ae calm mood and tone of the Soviet participants i n t eir comrnen s about Vietnam 0 Kissinger pointed out some of the asymmet rie s in t·e Viet nam situation On the one hand the U S was a great wor'd power with worldwide responsibilities Hanoi was a ma 1 power wit h only local responsibilities The Vietnamese haa foug __t bravely_ and gallantly But the very qualities t at had ade this possible tended to make them inexpert and obstina te i n diplomacyo The question of how to get negotiations started was critical If either side should start with the appearance of weakness it would rapidly begin to lose strength in t e Sour h o If for exar1iple the United States made subs-cant i al conc-ess ons to the 1LF the position of the Saigon government would be weakened Kissinger's impression was that most Vie na ese tended to go along with whatever power they though wou d win out in the long run o and if the position of one side seemed to be crumbling t here would be a r1 lsh to the other sid- u 1 ssinger spoke of the difficulties of get ing a cease-fire in a sit 3 ion where the gove rnment controlled 80 per cent of the coun ry by day -22- and the insurgents controlled 60 per cent by n ighto Wh ere could you draw a cease-fire line There was no territorial line t hat would make senseo The line was between day and night and this was hard to draw Kissinger apologized for going into so much detaiL But he said the question was a serious one that needed the most detailed scrutiny He emphasized that there was need for a third party like the Soviet Union to help Hanoi see -c he problem in a wider settirig He said tha when you t hink of United States foreign policy you must think of the pulling and hauling that goes on between conflic ting bureaucracies He could recall occasions when an outside voice that could be taken seriously could' t i t the b alance between the conflicting recommendations t hat t e American president receiveso 0 Kissinger said that the fir st step towards a set l e ment should 0e to stop bombing under circumstances that the Uo 2 o could accept and start negotiations He thought that t hi s could be done It was not beyond the wit of man to get it e stablis hed off i cially that if the bombing stopped meaningful negotiation would follow without an increased rate of infiltration from t he north o Kissinger thought the Soviet participants s hould not e that the UoS o had offered to wit hdraw its troops within s i x mont of the time t hat Hanoi withdrew its forces and t h e eve l of v iole n ce had decreased The United States had also said t hat all e e ments in Vi etnam s hould participate in t h e political life of t J e - ount ry o The only t h ing t h e U S insisted on was t hat the NLF s h ou l d not s hoot their way into control of the countryo Kissinger then explai ned what he meant by lack of humiliati on 11 · In his opinion the United States was not i nterested in spending its resou r ces in an attempt to prevent c in all circumstances a Communist government from taking control i n Sout h Vietnam On t h e other hand the UoSo wo uld not withdr w ir circumstances that appeared to involve a military defe to If really free political process could be started the UoSo would withdraw The members of the NLF should participat e in t hat free political process If they cou1d not win in that con ext t hen that should be accepted If they could win r the Uniced St ates would have to accept it - 23- I Kapitsa interrupted to ask whether Kissinger was saying that t he United States could accept any sol utio t e at would not involve a military defeato Ki ssingei ·--said it was more compl ca' ed t _3P at o What we needed was a genuinely free political process ioeo one that did not amount to a trick to cloak a seizu e of power by Lhe NLFo Kapi tsa then referred to President Jo h nson' s • emo · ona 1 speech in San Antonioo ' 'h e Ame r i cans ta l ked of e need to be calm and business-like butt at speech was all purple passiono Wiesner interjected t at t e Presiden I s Sa_ Antonio speec had h a d s orre real business L it w ich t e Soviecs ad not rea i I n fact t h e conditions for de-escalation - - it t e Pres ' de t ad out ined seemed ess stringent han t _ose w · L K'ssinger had outlineda Arbatov said t hac Ba oi ·had r epe a tedly said - at cessation of bombing wold lead to negotiationso Kissinger pointed o t tbat Hanoi always sa · a 1' cm1 l d not ''would n or 'willo IC The word they used was pourra i a This in the opinion of the United Sta es cou d b 'e a tr c - o Arbatov said that in Russian t e distinction co l d no be madeo The wo words meant the same t ingo LrtziI lovic asked w et er cessation o inf· lt r -- · e r was ea ly so terr i bly important in view oft he grea t' o o military predomii 1ance in Sout h Vietnamo Kissing r replied t hat in his op ' n · on som-e var · i o of che limits of infiltration-- n fact v riation w hie rty wide limics--would not upset t e balance int Sout· o - suppose that with a cessation of bombing yo got ma ss ve fi l tration and an · ncrease in UoSa casta t'es Thi s t· fr s i co·uld not allow Wiesner oointed o u t tt t President ohnson was 'r 2 19 c r-iticized in ltmerica for unduly r1 straini ng t he milhary lsade rs If r--e opted for a cessat on of bomb __ g t is cri- 'cism would mount -24- ·1 The President is reminded every day t a t earl er bombing pauses have led to increased infiltrationo Eac_ cessation ha s brought new pressure to escalate Tre Pres i dent was between two f ires But the important thing to rE member was that the II liberals were in a minority and a mu ch larger gro up was urging him to finish it off and win the war Artzimovich said that the Americans seemed to bes ying that the USG was balancing between two sources of pressureo It seemed to him to be a very unstable balancing If a way could not be found to de-escalate then undoubtedly t he war would spread to Laos an d Cambodia Wiesner pointed out that there were substantial differences of opin i on - not only among the Jl merican public bu1 al so in the USG A third party if it really tried to be help£ - might help shapz the outcome of the American debate Doty also stressed the need for third-power intercession He point ed out that che Soviets as re- cha i rmen cf the Geneva Conference could if they wis h ed try to activate the ICC so t h at it could help get the situation in Cambodia and Laos c iarif ied The likel ihood of the war spr e ding c those areas would then be diminis he d C Millionshchikov said that he h oped t e broader questions of international relat ion s and Soviet-U So re at i or s would receive the same detailed analysis that Kissinger a d wad e of the prob l ems of a cessation of bombing It was neces$ar o deal with matters in detail but in the long run we would a to rise above petty questions a d deal wit h t e big i ssues o Vinogra dov said t h at he did not want to be emo io • and wou ld t ry to restrain himself as his Soviet col eag 2es had done but b e ha d to admit t a t Vietnam made is flesh era 7· • He could not understand haw so civilized a country as tle Ped States could do what it is doing to the Vietnamese peop l eo Secondly he ad to admit that wh en he thought abou t t e ht ge United States bases in Vietnam h e had some doubt t· _ac we would ever reiinquis h them o Wiesner replied t h at no one that he knew saw any strategic n eed for the United State s 1 0 maintain bases i n Southeast Asia in the long runa u -25 - Doty said that on the American side Vinogr adov •s horror at the war was widely sharedo We wanted t o r e pa1r he damage that t '1is w s doing to the quality of life in Amer- c and to our relations with the Soviet Union as soon as we couldo Khvostov said parenthetically that he agreed w t a Vinogradov that even if the U S cou l d achieve a military victory it would be extremely difficult for the U S to leave Vietnam He t en went to make his main ·point which W 'S tl- at the war has em ered a critical phase He mentioned he fort coming presiden ial elections in t _e U S and the develcp ng military situation in Vietnam and he saw great dangers in the interaction of these two factors which mig t ead o L e spread of t be war and what he called ''grave sweepi 1g ct c n effect consequ e nces Under these circumstances e ·tho ig t that even thoug the UaSo might entertain some doubt that cessation wou d lead to negotiation t he only thi g tc do wQs to try T e UoSo should try to understand that the re s ida t would gain enormous prestige during the election campa c n if h ' could suc eed in getting negociations startedo 0 _ Long emp t asized that the Soviet participant were looking at a minority group of Americ ns who were no representative of Ameri can opinion The average American was from a small I t own and had a small-town simplistic view of ' e wara His wife 1 s second cousin might be fighting i iet namo T' iis was reason enoug h for the average American to fee l t h a everyt ing necessary to win should be done Long th en referred to a memorandum t ac _e ad - ·r t er- for people that he knows in Washington They had said t er would be glad to receive his v ews but his views were Je k r own and unless he had something ew to add t • e re orn 1r1 n dations that he made would p obably not get ve y far - 0 1 • s first reaction was to resent this He fe t that if one arg ed rightly it ought not to be necess ary to come p wit somet h ng new Teverthe less he wanted to say to is Soviet frie ds that we wer now at a stage where something new could be extreme y h - f ··• l and mig 'rc be necessary if any regress s -e to be made a He th ought this something new mig h t be i r1 je · ea into the situation by a third country t at was respec ed b both sides--the Sov et Union for excmplea Wies _er said he thought it was only fair -co point ot t that the Soviet Union sr£ared some re ponsi bi l i · y for wh - it · J s t J -26- ' going on in Vi etnam--not tha i t bore so eavy a res c or i° · t y as the Uni t ed States but nevert te ess its s iare was ve- y - --iand · important o He referred t o '' hn 1 shc ev' s speech in I ln t 1 ry 1960--the period bet' 'een Ke edy I s election and t e L e it g c ation o The speech r 12d said t at war s of various types wc e out of the quest on but liberation wars were sti 11 ddmi SE- ib le o This had sounded like a chal enge to people in W shing on nd their reaction was not unreaso able The speech h ad ·ad e effect of causing t he UoS t o fee that the c hallenge t_a- i i o be met fiiesr er went or1 to s y t - at re did not fae i - d d 7- _ y gocd to wring our tands We oug t o talk less about tr e pas - i give our atter tio 1 0 t e fut ure an j speak of t ve s st i lt l e things tha t be done CWo ca Mill ionshct i i- ov s ai d that like h is col eaguas e Wes trying to resc ra - n is em o i o o He co uld not re rain howeve r from sa ring t 5 tr e remar s of the l meri can partic · pan-s if you took L em a 1 i n alL seem d to add up to _e sugges 1 or tha t e Scviet Un · o was ha main cu pri t in t e Vietna situationo Re v anted to s ay - r at W esner s and Ki s r ge • s i nterpret a _ior cf -rae ¥ ·u· ' s c e speec _ 0£ 960 I le re wrc• q o he Sovie Uni on ha d ne ver ·rg d c n ers to go to waro _ merely sa d c hat if people on their on initiative -ke fight fo r li be ation it is _ ea· t hy and ought to be ass · s ·_r o Mi llions h c ai kov t he Je t t o say t_ at 00 we a now t t a t · war in Vietnam is hopelesso II T 'i e sooner it is ended - s b - - · for all of us T e fact that t e UoSo has 500 000 me ' - nam is indeed a fa ct r but i-c is not acceptable as a po - of departu e for d ' s _ussing ho t e ar c n b liqu i d tedo $ long as chose troops st a y h ere ch e war may grow and s s z - • -t-3 and this Yould ir1volve great da ger for t he whole woz · Co The 'lloSo ha d to remember wh t Hanoi was -E ovsr q r government in c harge of i t own dest iny o What max es yo u t -l he as ed t hat they w1 ll accep t he conditions that tr e l oS puts on and c t t ey will pro se to negotia-e Milli s kov then re errF d t o KissL ger s remark t _at the U o So e ur · l e H 1 0 J had wcrld1t i de reSE •Onsibi li t j es a Ee a sked o wr o confe r'-7 i - -·e respor sib2lit1 es on t he UaSo s ar s- e4 wast at t1 e 'l1 0So 1- a t k er1 -c _err upor i- self i nd t could not osk fort _e l'rt tJ·· xT of the wor d or t ry t r a t as tf t h s was in -c · e n at - ir-_ c i 3 2 cf thi r g s • t J -27- Khvostov said there was no gett'ng away from the fact that the first need was to st op the bombing He ten observed th at although the American participants were say g that we should think about the future and not dwell on t past Wiesner had pulled out a speech by Khrushc ev wh ic was seven years old and irrelevant to the present situatio o Khvostov also took exception to something heh d head Wiesner say about reducing the level of bo bing gradually insce3d of making an abrupt cessationo There was some discussion s to whether seven bombs were better than ten bombs and K vos ov said that he who had been borr ed during the war did not thin there was any significa d fference that t e so ut ' o i was to go to zero now Wiesner s2 i d t h at he felt that ' f y could not go to zero then seven was netter than ten · Both Wie ner and Lo g aga in emphasized t he hope t h a the Soviet Union would help const n1ctively to make it pcEs i b l e to level off the fighting and gee negotiations star ed Mil l ioshchikcv said c at if we were to w- ' te a mes ags to our governments 1 t ought to ay 1 The new F proc ira m is wel conceived modera e and sensible and no o e cn ujd be hurnil at ed by accepting it and must be respected 2 H noi is a sover ei gn s't ct E Doty said t at we wo··a deliver these views o he American side In return he hoped the Soviet part1 c P n- would remember t e va1uab e service in the cause pe- e which Mr Kosygin had rendered a Tashkent and ttat r e · t rC' 11 d urge their government t o take a similarly statesmanl i ' e rol o in Vietnam Ka pi tsa tl nen reca led t twa t in 190 5 t e 'o S 2d assisted Russia in ending its wa c with Jap in Perl-t 5 ps 1 t w3 s time for t' e Soviets to re-r urr t • e favor now sixty odd yc rs la C er Artz imovi c first in 1905 Vietnam _ said that there b a d been a cease-£ r-e u e sequen e of events in nd t h is p l-to iild be -28 - Third Dax - December 30 v · e-c nam Continued _- _ We start ed the t t r d day O s meeting at 10 a oITio i Y apitsa said t hat alt b ough tl'le agenda ca lle d for discussion of another it em e • oped thac we could ret urn to Vi e-c nam for a few minu t eso Be felt t h at everybody had been too em 't ional on t e precedi g dayo A his orical situation had e ve ve · i _ Asia and i t could be objectively nnalyze do As e saw -e r t ' - o5 o anted a st ing of friendly coun-c ries in the Far EasL and Sout east Z siao He mantioned Tai ar Indonesia Sour Vie • rr E nd oth erso He pointed out t hat loSo political ' nflu e ce had l een establ i s oed in Saigon at a air·ly early stagt' o · hen -c i s fluence began to decline t he o-o tried to shore it up b mili t ary me ns o E u t t h e mor_e t ' e U oSo intervened m · i t ar · 1 -c • e stronger the 1 LF became o here was no doub t at t e 7 o o n had military predominance but i-c s political position wa s 1 possib eo I apitsa insisted t a-c wo elemencs were ne c e ssa-·y for vic tory You • ad - o 3 c i eve a n i l i-c ary predominance o b t you also had t o demonst ' ra e t • e abii it y to control t e aarr in i s tra ti on and t e political l i fe of c e countryo He c i ted t s war of 1 8 2 as an examp e o Napoleon occupied Moscow and wor• a complete military v iccory J bu he was unable LO est b i t politi c a l control among t he pe asan-s etc so wit in f ive or six months he was ou and his defeat was realo Because the peasants failed im h e l o r alt 10 g he won a l he military batt l es o He wrote he Tsar asking fer u c o nd ici o n3l _ eace jus as I residen o nson ha s doneo He did ot realize that h e was beat e n o I t was clear Kapit sa CO 'lt ir ed t ha t t h e·lJoSo __as lost t he Vietnam waro Tt e on l y way not to lose now wou •a be to exterminate -c he ent ire popu·--c on o The UoSo is li ked ar d should know it o ust read ng the UoSo p a pers it was ea s y to see t hat t ' e UoSo had failed to es abli h pol i tica l r o tro despit e e fact t hat it had u rriuc effort in o thi s aspEc and ha d ·eve -1 sert out a pol1 tic •3l commissaro •• Ev e r ir - te city of Saigo UoSo political con rol wa s weako apitsa said e _a d geard fr om peo le in Nort h Vietnam tr a t - ftey a 1 confident t r a t the o So will ave to l eave o Despi e t e great d amage t •• -t the Uoc borr hing was doing e1r wil as unbreakab l e ' -29- c - Kapitsa then referred to C mus' book La Peste to sow He repe te d gain and again that North Vietnam has won the war despit e t e m · lit ary victories of the u s that life goes on despite great catas_rop es -··-- Some of the Soviet part icipants especially Ar zimov'ch smiled and said that Kapitsa did not know his history t at Napoleon had lose $Ome military battles apitsa said no a nd the same thing had happened in Spa n Artzimovic repl ed the British h ad thrown Napoleon out of Sp in K api - sa continued hat t e Pentagon undoub-ed l wo ' d escalate t · e war if it had it s way but whatever vic or i es i t might win would be only technological and not politica L T b ere fore the case· was hopeless Kapitsa t ien ma de a l ong d i gression on t he 1 1 S ecor omic situation quot i ng t s Ne• s a d Wor d Re 2ort tc s t a · t 2 at the falling gold a_ance is seriou s The decline of t _e god balance was a measire of U 2 debts Lo foreig n powers He thought it wo · l d lead inevitably -o t e eras of _ e dc-llar 11 The U S economic position was extreme l y tenseo He rea LZed t h at the gold balance was only a symp tomo T w e root ca use wa s well known and tne Vietnam war w s laroely instrume a 1 e U S economy had recovered we_l from · e depression t ow g -0 the leadership of FDR and t e inte · ectutoo s of y es and had achieved a re ati vely sound conditi on c wit h out any serious crises The inte nal economy o f t e s undoubtedly remained in sound condition he cited t he low rate of unem ·oy ment but the U So externa l economy cons ituting 30% of the entire economy was in b d s a p e Te UoSo was -io 1o r ger self-contained it was dependent on ot ers Kapits fel that tta great crisis is on t e orizon ad int is conL xt he t h ought it would be hard to increase t h e allocaiion of r sources for the Vietnam war Neve rt e less as he saw i '- escalation was probable antl an ecc nomic crisis wo u i - e sue He asked r letorically wh ether t _e So cou d find anot er- -D to save the situationo Arbatov then put t he qu-e s io of wh at a ce seat cn of bombing would be like if i t e o l d be ac d eved o He sa 1d could imagine several diffe nc alternatives 1 an unc ditional cessation of bornbi g witt our any annour cement ' cesc t i on for a limited me 3 c ess-t ion wi t certa i r e o d i - - o - 1 s attached r · 4 cessation acccmpa niad by a U o S st 5 -emer- sa y ng ·I -30- ' in effect that there were no conditions that t e ni ed States was seeking peace and doing everything it cou d to achieve ito - · -Arbatov then turned to Kissinger and referred to Kissinger ' s statement that in Arbatov's rephrasing the United States must save face He said that the American participants should not forget that North Vietnam also must save face Hanoi thinks t hat the merican peace talk is a trick to weaken their morale He said that if t e So·iet Union tried to h elp it would first need to know exactly what the real situation was Worns would not he enoug · - • American deeds would be necessary in order to persuade the Soviet Unlon that t h e U S was serious Arbatov repeated that t h e So iet Union as apprehensive about t e drift of official opinion in the United States tow rd spreading the war to Ca bodia Laos and above the 17t Para lel Vinogradov then asked what was the iog of t _e U • position that the rate of infiltration must not i ere se Re referred to the fact that the un · ced States already J d alf a million men in South Vietnam and that Washi gton '1a saying that the Ameri can forces there could not be defea1 edo 0 Kissinger replied to Vinogradov by citing t e political problem that an Amer ican p es · dent would face if during a cessation of the bombing American troops began to be killed in larger numbers unde r circumstances wh ere t • l could be attributed to an increa ed ra e of infiltration from the Nort h The UoSo military commanders who u der ny circumstances oppose cessation of he bombing wou d s y that the President was very laxo That was why 1 t was essential that the rate not be ncreased Turning t h en to Arbatov s questions Kiss1u9er said would deal with t e second question firsto He conceded t t there was distrust on botn sideso He said he could u n derst and the reasons for H3noi O s distrust The re at icns ip bet 'e- n United Scates diplomatic moves and military moves w s nc a ways wh3t some of us would have wishedo It was not h el fu_ to escalate t e war at a time when peace proposals were b€i g d vanced On t h e ot h er hand he said if the war as not e uded escalation would be inevi able He thoug J t t hat t e m' nim m that a third party could ask wast at the United S ates t ot '_ -31- escalate while the third party was t ra nsmitting America proposalso Regarding Arbatov_'_s first question of what a cess ation of bombing might look like Kissinger said he could not give a definite authoritative answer he could on l y speak in an illustrative way Of the alternatives listed by Arbatov an end of the bombing with conditions wo uld not be acceptable to Hanoi A cess ati on of bombing wit hout conditions would be difficult for the United Stateso He t · ought t h at a way out of the difficulty might be found if an incermedi ary who was trusted by both sides could formulate a pro position t h at according to the intermediary's understand i n g r negotiation would follow a cessation of bombing and t h ere would be no greater rate of infiltration At the same ti roe the lfnit ed tates might say privately to t h e intermed iary that a cessation of bombing was unconditional In t hi s way both sides would save faceo l 0 1 - __ Millionshchikov said that from the remarks of t h e American pa rticipants he understood that the main poin as the searc h for a third party an interrnediaryo I n reply co this his Soviet colleagues were saying that this was not t he · main point but that the United States must first cease i ts aggression and in general take steps to liquidate the con£ icto Millionshc h ikov recalled that attempts at intermediation had been made on a private level and had failed T hen m h e r means h ad been tried and they also had failedo Te record seemed to indicate that no intermediary could succeed a s l onq as the United States did not show a will to solve t h e prob l emo He then referred again to Tashkent and said that t h e Soviets were justly proud of the role that Kosygin had played t h ereo However the key to his _success had been that t h re were demonstrations of good will on both sides Otherwise Sovi et efforts _could not possibly have succeeded-a He asked whet h er in t he present circumstances the American participants cou l d imagine themselves ·serving as an intermediary a He said that t h e United States Government had to go halfway and that this was cruc i alo He concluded by saying that he h3d wanted in his brief remarks to formulai e very precisely the view that was b ing caken on the Soviet side of the table a No· i a s chairman he suggested that we turn to the question of the strategic arms raceo -32Strategic Problems Blagonravov said that the Americans had spoken of · the ·aestabilizing ffect of anti-ballistic missile defenses He - ··-said let me speak for a moment in a speculative way · He sai Imagine· a hypothetical case·where it is possible to establish a I rP al screen I in the atmosphere -- ·one ·that would effectively paralyze the offense 11 Everybody he said would consider _his a good thing But at pr·e sent no defe 'lse is 100 per cent effect ve Therefore we need to analyze thoroughly how ballistic missi e defenses can affect the offense He then listed four aspect o offensive systems 1 -their ran ge 2 their accuracy 3 the i r destructive powerg and 4 their reliability · These wer e all qualitative' aspects The effort to imp r ove and perfect offensive syscem in these respects would gc on with or_ w't hout any improvements in defense and wi th each new scien tific break hrough qualitative improvements would be ma dea In other words he did not thi k that the search for improve quality was in a n y way dependent on what the other s ' de aid in the realm of defense on the other h2 d he conceded that -Lt terms of quantity the offense coutd be affected by defensive mea 3 l res among other f c ors 0 Blagonravov continued tha t he did not think it woul be sufficient to seek a formula for a freeze alone butt a _he object must be o find ways to effect reductions with the 11 ultimate goal Df of GCD He thought that ABM was part of a general problem -- a problem that press ted colossal diff ' culties Be recalled distinctions that had been made in discus sio of he appropriate· level of · a nuclear umbrella Should there be- 50 missiles on each side or 100 What kinds of missiles should be allowed He thought that such discuss ion could go n i _ c cusively for a long time because he criteria of me asuremewwt were vague Therefore what was needed above all was c- _ o wi _l - both sides What were he obsta c les o good will · he rna i ' obstacle was absence of full trust Tha was the crux of h e matter Nevertheless rthe complexi ty of the quest ·o- compe l s us to try to make a complete analysis ime would be eeced t seek basic ways of attacking the pro lem As for he ac or o f trust Blag nravov thought that this was affected on the Soviet side by the Un ite d States' war in Vietnam and by United S a teg procrascination '· on NPT He said The German des i re for nuclear weapo _ te rrifies us Schtukin said that what he had hE ard from the American side abou t t E possibility of discussing simultaneously reducti - ns in offense and defense was new interesting and hopeful Tt e former Arner· ca A desire to separate the two and talk only at ou defense was based o _ an unnatural separation Sch _ukin t herJ repeatad at l ngth the Sovi e t thesis aa to why improvemex e f dEfense WE -rc always ought at eve ry leve l of armaments why t ls was a perfectly moral th· g to de and why the Soviets did ' 'LO -33 understand the American desire to discuss ABM in isolatio o The present' willingness oft he Americans to discuss both sides -·· -- simultaneously he repeated was interesting and hopeful He agreed with Blagonravov that it would be wrong to h old A BM responsible far triggering quali tative improvements in offe s i ve syste s Numbers were another matter and it was · necesa a ry t o consider reduct ons on both sides active and passivev' s · mu taneouslyo o Schtukin continued saying that although the statements from the American side were nte restir g great d ifficul tie• 5 7emained There o 7e it was neces sary t o be cautious and · ot fall into an easy opt1 m1 srn He thought the deadlock over NPT dernvn I1 strated this It was necessary to make a further effort to Y visualize in detail how red ctions in offense · and defense miaht be simultaneo u s-ly brought 3 bouto Schtukin then said he want d • to put a series of questio s 1 Wiesner had referred to the possibility of going to ze roo Th is seemed tc be one of his a ssump ions it a real assumption 1 Wa -s 2 To what extent coul one visualize a cu back cf both offense and defense The Oni ted _S ates had an o unced that i t was goi ng for a limited ABM Would the system remain ·imit d What would be the prop ortion of ' active and _passive weapo s · 3 The '' ques tion of control 1 was difficu t bu unavoi d ableo He thoilght we wo1 1 l d have to give thought t aspect before formulating any final proposals - - Khvoatov said that he had read the rnemo -andum by Wiesner which had been circulated in Russia·n t r-ans atio •• Se1 Appendix l He found i t extreme l y interestingo It was c l ear that the inte ntion wa s to concen tra te on both offense and c1 efe r e s i multaneously with a view to their reduction or eliminatioH He thought thi - was the correct way of posing the p r obl em a _d 0 0 of the ques t 0 ' 5 to be tack l e d He thought -they were comp lex questions and called for a soluti t T is would take time and reflectiono There was how ver 0 no doubt in his mi nd that the Soviet P u9 ' 'ash group would give all these questions very close co 1siderat ono It wa - J hard to reply to them at this stage without further study he welcomed it He r -eferrl d t o WiEsner ' s lis t Khvcsto· r agreed with Wie sne r t'ha t while zero was t he ideal a nd should be the ultirnat e objective it would n be- wi se to concentra_e on zero at t he cut se 1 0 HE recalle d that the Scviet pro p o sals e wi 3a ge d i teri rn measures and he tho ught thi s principle s h ould be · 3 CCE F ec The e ther que stion2 in Wi e- --ner • s paper called for re flect i o_ and di s u siono Wies ler ev d e nt y did not expect f i nal a swcrs no o a i Kt vostcv appr eci a t e-3 i open-ende- wa y of pu t L g the - iu es ions o -34Khvostov then referred to the concluding portion s of Wiesner's paper where four alternatives were stated 1 Let the arms race run its course without interfering wit it Like Wiesner he thought th _would be disastrous 2 the banning cf defensive systems plus a freeze on offe_ sive weapons 3 the banning of defensive systems and reduction of offensive systems 4 simultaneous limitations on defe_se a n d offense Khvostov thought that we should concentrate on th fourth al ternat ive Beyond that we s·hould also consider what the position would be if offensive ystems were reduced to zero 1 'What defense should we have then · Khvostov then callee attention t o one controvers 3- l question In asking at wha stage · of disarmament inspec ic should be introduced Wiesne was clear in saying that there should be _ o i ls pection in stage oneo It was Khvost ov's cr priv - e opinion that t is was the correct approach Inspect ion shou d only come latero In -conclusion he said that the procedure utlined by Wies n er hould be conduc ·ve to advancing our understa di_g of the problemso C Doty asked whether he could s arpe nis understan din g of the Soviet position by asking the Soviets t o reply to a question whicih e then formulated as followso The Un· ted St ates did not make any secret of the size of its offensive forces which cons is'Cs of approximately 220·0 ndeli very vehicles o - e United States had also made clear in the most detailed way what its light ABM sys tem would look like o Doty then put ho _ e-st io_ if United States systems were kept at this level aside from maintenance and qualitative improvements within the c ystam s is there a corresponding stage at which the Soviet Uni on wou d then agree to level off Addi tionally could -che Sovie par i c ipants imagine a dats when their desired level of deplcyme __ would ts accomplished and they could begin to d · scuss reduc i o _s M tll i o nshchikov said he would like 'CO analyze th' ' question from a more general viicwpoint Reductions w re prl mari y a matter of cori fidenceo The Sovie t scient · sts shared the desire of their govern ment for peaceful co-exi s tence a nd d i sa rma me nt which had be e n rep atedly declared and demonst rated i r de ds Referring again to Tashk nt he repeated that they ware i ' ' proud of the- Sovie t role t here It was a tangible demonstra t ion of Soviet h1te rest in the settlement ·of conflicts and a demonstration tha' the S ov · e t Union d i d not seek war and would te ke p ractic3 l stcpf to av i d war On the other hand in d1 scu sai J n of Vietn mu th2 Arr e-r Lcan s de se emed to be saying as Mil lier shchik · in e rc re te d it that scme United States leade· cs w re uct ablE- t cv _ rcome t he tE- dency of the bureaucracy tc g o o i s own ccu Millio shch k v's vi w confidence had two i - ore d i -r - -- S _ 9001 inte tic-ns 2 ability tc• carry t h em J U - v Ylillions ' ' ' i ov t as lr sing r ·nfi6 er c-e in leade rs who n ight h rivE 1 but r c 1t ie l i l ec to t hir k _r at we in our de li' srati - -- •·· ' -35- might be able to help humanity with concrete measures but it was neces s ary to remember that local wars could escalate and involve the entire world Here he said the Soviet view differed from that of the Chinese who 11 indulged in aggressive talk '' Continuing Millionshchikov said that perhaps we needed to analyze the arms race in the same detail in which Kissinger had analyzed the problem of a cessation of bombing But the atmosphere was also important If we discus s ed anns limitations in an atmosphe e of trust that was one thing but if we attempted to do it in an atmosphere of distrust that was something else We must not lose sight of the general con text On the one hand there was the argument that agreeme n ts increase trust This might be But the possibility of fur th e r a greements aft_e r the p artial test ban treaty had bee i l overcane b y Vietnam This was a matter -which could not be ignored Millionshchikov said that he thought relations bet ween t he two coun tries were critical# and he referred to what he called ll u s d i scri mination in bilat eral trade He did net want to discourage his American friends a the table but he did wan t to make a plea for keeping the discussions in cont ext ' Regarding the specific proposals that had been made Million shchikov recalled hearing Ruina in 1964 on the need to ban defensive systems The Soviet side had opposed this propos l They had not even thought it necessary to analyze it They beg an with the ssumpti6n that you could not ban defensive systems without dealing with offensive systems That was a propos ition that 'we could not put to our own public let alone to ourselves 11 The memories of the destruction of World War I I were too vivid Now Millionshchikov saiq it was evident that there had been a certain shift in the views of his American colleagues and he was very satisfied with the change It was good to hear that both offense and defense could be discussed simultaneouslyo Also he welcomed the fact that Wiesner's paper was framEd in the form of questions and not categorical answers • He though t the questions that had been posed merited the most serious consideration and analysis At present ri t would be premature to say that these questions could be placed at governmental level _If he Millionshchikov recommended this to a leader of his government he would be examined as if he were a studen t and he did not like to put himself in a pos ition where he co_uld not answer the questions that wou ld be put to him • However he could say that the questions rai s ed by Wi s ner and others aroused his genuine interes·t and he thought we could put our heads toge t her and find the answers to these questions Perhaps la t er after careful study we would be justified in '' maki n g proposals '· In conclusion Millions hchikov said he though t he door h ad b en opened for p rofi table di s cussion a n d the l a vel r f the umb r e l la would be a goo d pl ce t o s t art -36- · ' - Wiesner took up what Millionshchikov had saidconcerriing the necessity of mutual trust Wiesner said he believed that this wa·s important on - the other hand he did not think it would be realistic to base military security on trnst alone We must ask ourselves how a system might furicticti ' without trusto Otherwise we would be proceeding irre sponsi bly and military leaders would quite rightly insist that the questions be scrutinized more · rigorously It would be wrong ·to get our$elves into the position of saying that the characteristics of rnili tary sy stems are unimportant and that everythi n g should be left to 11 trust 11 because in that event we might design a haphazard system that would be dangerous for both sides • Vinogradov pointed to the need to try to e n sure that any proposals that we might make would a ctually be brought to fruition We should not discuss the matter without thi nking of the further destiny of our proposals ' He recalled that not one Pugwash proposal had been implemented -- not the complete test ban nor the non-proliferation treaty 11 In this room at any rate there was trust on both sides But all Pugwash proposals had failed for technical reasons o We h ad to be persis t ent and exert ourselves i n our respective countri e5 to see that our proposals would see the light t'J · Folla ing a break for coffee Millionshchikov recon vened the meeting and said that we had about one hour mo re of discuss i_on before lunch He thought we ought to concen trate on drawing ·up a detailed list of strategic questions for future consideration Ruina said that the American side would like to hear from their Soviet friends what technical developments worried them on the American side we had tried to say clearly what we found unsettling about ABM multiples mobiles e t co It was important if a strategic balan ce was to be preserved t h at neither side fear that the other had or was developing a first strike capability Ruina thought that we ought to go · down the list and discuss the various strategic systems in detail and hear from one another what our real apprehens i o ns wsre Kapitsa said that it was importan t to talk _about the reliability of systemso He referred to ·the big power fa i lure in the Eastern united States He thought that this de onstrated the vulnerabil ty of a highly devel ped s oci ety to a failure in one key place A bomb in a vital spot like a knife i the heart could have a terrific effect In a io t her spot l i ke a knife in the shoulder or arm t he effect could be quite different This suggested to h i m t hat h ighly developed countri es like the United States we re more vu lnerable t han less develope d countries C r- r Doty said he wou l d like to a n swe r some of t h e questi ons that had been ra_ised on three l evelso -37 l All missile systems were unreliable· to some degree and ABM systems were unreliable in a relat ' ve ly high degree 2 In the popular press nd statements by some government leaders on both sides there was considerable reliance on numbers and weight which by themselves could not be a reliable index of the potentialiti s of missile systems No one could possibly know in advance what the reliab lity of a system would be in an environment of a nuclear exchange About the only thing we could defi nite ly know was the range of weapons otherwise one could not be precise 3 Doty said he fully agreed with Kapitsa that the more industrialized and urbanized a society was the more vul erable it was Certainly the United States with its gr6ater concentrations of population was more vulnerable than the Sov et Union Likewise the larger wart' 3 ds of Soviet ICBM 1 s made numbers alone an unsatisfactory measure Agreemen ts must e•n compass thes e factors in a y concept of parity that was developed Rathjens said that one major difficulty o - the American side was that Americans did not understand t e objectives of the varicus Soviet systems In the United States there was much debate and discussion which rF vealed a lot about bwth the qua litative and quantitative aspects of our systems As a consequen ce of full public ciscussio U S s rategic forces ICBM 1 s a d submarines had leveled off and the level of our bomber forces had actually been reduced Sometimes McNamara had actually said that we have more of certain systems than we need Nod in addressing ourselves to the ABM question the American side had made i t perfectly clea r that the system which would be developed was a thin ayst em which would not be effecti ve against the Soviet Union Ey contrast Rathjens said we were very unclear about the intentions behind the Sovi et dev loPmen t of ABMs He referred to the Tallin line for example Was it designed s a p -otect ior1 a ga i st attack by bombe r s or mi ssiles or both In the a bscnce cf any clear indica-r io n s on the Sovie t side the United States would probably react as if it were both Secondly Ra t hj ens wondered if we could know whe the Soviet build-up of strategi c forces wou ld stop Was the goal equality wi th the United States or a first - strike capa b i lity These quest ion s wo ' 'ried u s hird Ra thjens referred to ·the Soviet d e ve lopment of m ' ssi les to fl y orbital r iject ories What v • a their pur _ C se Pc rhaps there were reasonabj e expl natic ns but on the America i ide we had no means of ki10vJi g it FOEs ooked 1 ike a system desigr ed to s t rike at our air bases o Against c i ie5 t wculd not appear to be mo re af feet ve tha n other So vi et yscemso Therefore i ra is ed again he queEt o - -38of first strikeo Rathjens concluded by ·m king an earnest · plea for more information from the Soviet 'side about their objectiveso Without a full exchange of information ·about · intentions both sides would always fear the worse and overreact o Schtukin said that we should try to say at least approximately to what level ABM should be reduced i n order to ensure that i t did not have a dual potential capabili ½ offens ive as well as a defensiveo Kapitsa said we are in an unequal positiono 11 The Soviet Union is surrounded by bases equipped with rocketso He asked 'whether the United States intended to abandon these bases and rely on long range weaponso If so conditions would be more equal and more manageableo He referred to American rocket bases i Lebanon sic Spain and elsewhereo At this point several on the American side corrected Kapitsa and said that the e were no missiles on our foreign baseso Kapitsa continued by saying well then 0 you have planes there and these planes can carry nuclear weaponso Re recalled the case of the bomb that got lost in Spaino Wiesner said he felt that all these questions would have to be taken into account when officials sat down to discuss precise numbers and systemso Referring to Kapitsa 1 s point about bases he said that planes were the least of our worries we would be lucky if that-was all we had to worry abouto Wiesner went on to recall that he and Rui a had opposed ABM in their advice to their own government as well as to their Soviet friendso Wiesner's Look article had challenged the UoSo decisi on to deploy ABMo Wiesner said that he took this position with a deep technol ogical k nowledge of ABM systems which he had studied closelyo As an e n gineer he wo uld much rather have the job of building up an adequate offense to confuse the defense of the other side · o that of building a effective defenseo He thought that nothing was so conf J ing as ABM wi t hout adding anything real to security of either sideo Wies n er went on to say that he found i t extremely difficult to try to quantify what the strategic balance might be i n the presence of ABMo If his Sov'et colleagues kn w more than he knew he would be glad to hear their commentso is verybody he thought would agree that what we want on both o des is a stable deter reiLt o But suppose we had a n agreement o n equal numbers of lau chers on both sideso With ABM 0 how could either side assure itself that i t had effective qualityo Wi1 s ne r said he simply did not know h one could get such understanding though of cour se i t is essential i f there are to be agreementso He said agai n that he would apprec a e hearing S o viet comments on this point o Millionshchikov s aid that he found this an extremely interes ing matter which raised a great n umber of questions -39- that would take time to considero tte thought we were at he heart of the matter and that perhaps a a second meetin g it could be discussed in more spec fi c deta ilo Discuss· n was possible now that the Americana were willing to n clude b th offens and defense Ruin a s aid that befors trying to frame specific propos a s he t hought long pa ti en- discussion would be necessary to get a common understanding of the character of the pr blern He thought that we should attempt to go right down the line and cover the whole spectrum system by system problem by problem o in the light of the apprehensions felt on both sideso Kapi tsa had mentioned hi E app - -ehension abou- · oS b3 e i - E pai o F i ne We should d i scus s this The American parti cipants had said what their conce rns were abo' lt the Soviet FOB i This al -o should be discussed FerhE ps the present g r up was to largG Ideally we ought to ha ve- a small n mber of people wh o could raally pu t their head s t ogether a nd even work tni as out in deta l on a blackboard 8 Ruina the referree to what Rathjens had said about the nee - to know me re of each o her's i tenti nso He h ugh· this was i mp o r a llit bu · he wante rl to poiltt out tha- it wa also n ecessary to have me a ing fu l dis us s i of th c- 5 i i y of both sides o What wou · d ea h ·s dE be capable o f in a c s t He said he wo u d be iust as worr ' ed if t e US deve- o ed firststrike capabili-cy as-he would be if the So ·iets e v eloped e Above al-o he thought we ough to make a list f e troub lesome issues so that they co lld be explo -e in deta i o Lo g said t at both th U S and the Soviet Union were goi ng for AE M ar d Mi l l ' onshchik v had ra is d t e questio of how o1 le c oulc be IS' ' lre th at t he AB syst e m remc i ed th no Long thought this was indsed a deep and perplexi s prob_em He said h at i i h were a s i c i tizen he wo ld b concor ed to k Xllow the ch a ' 'act er irs ice o f a im t he inte ll'htions behind t he U S ABM ii plc yme1 i 1 0 ri t he 1 rnerica n side WE hac the s arne conce r i1 abo u t the So 1iet ABM If the So•Jiets d id lriiOt te i the wor ld ain d incidentally the U S then our military li aders wou i d h mve a very atteirnti ve audience i n the U S for the argument t 2 t 'e s houl r-sact s rongly on the basis of o ur wo rst fears o 0 1 0 Q Doty sai d hs thought we should add the ques ticn of how the ejd• st e ll'a ce of other nuclear pc we t s would affect the red' cti ns tJ· a t t n • So ar o trie s ov · et Uriion wo uld propCJse f r t'hsrese lveS1 o he ot he rrn c e ar p iwera wou d noc in the fore 2' seable future j - r Hi- sduct icrt f ' r t herefore a n i ir_ t nse pre occupa tio wi tr he - we-st p os i ble · umbre lla w l d n o t be very pra t calo He wa l even m2ke e ical c mment that i did not mu ch m tte _ if t n s ' J re L a c - m E 5t d cf 200 m ' ssiles o b o t h s i lES o 2'JOOa I -t E ithe se b - tt de s ww' lld have th c pabi ity f li ina i»g he o r a - a i bls o cietyo 0 ·- -40Wiesner asked whether Millionshchikov had really meant to say that he would like to have discussion of how to keep ABM thin _ __ Millionshchikov replied yes He believed that some clarification o f this matter would be in order However he observed 00 our informa tion is also too thin so it is difficult to go into de ails at this time Doty said he thought he knew his Soviet colleag es well e nough o aay without being misunderstood that chose who had fir- developed ABM should have given some th0ught to this impo tant question does ABM n ot introduce suffic'ent u certa inty as to make any mi ni muro deterrent or nuclear umbrella antru tw rt -Y a d thereby block move ments t ard arms reductions Artzirnovich responded that the Soviets did not make a distinqtio be b-1een hin and t 11ick Perhaps hose who introduced the di tincti n should have given it some th ught Doty hen read out from the agreed age da the formulation which Millio shc hikov had made of the item about ABM which related o the pr blem of ow to keep ' t th·n We hea adjourned for lunch with Keldish ad resumed at 4 45 p rno Long led • ff by saying that he had writ e out two paragraphs whiLh were not yet availab e so he would describe them He said we face on both sides the technica problem of 11 e qu ivc lence and this needs intensive study He agreed wi h w esner that we ought to keep i t as simple as possi ble Perhaps sheer umbers w uld be the simples • on t e her hand gross wei ght would be almost as simple In ny eve knowledgeable pGcple should analyz the problem ad thi s be an item fQr discussion It -hould also be put n t e lis of matter to b5 discussed at government level Perhaps what was needed was a co nmittee of experts of the kind th t had been so helpful i developing the backgrou d analysis for a test ban Lo lg cone uoed by s aying that the purpose f his paper was merely to cal tten ion to this pr_blemo Doty said he would like to return to the delicate point that was u n der discuss · on before lunch how do you limit ABM and keep · t _h L 7 o rAE Doty though had adequately addressed this qu sti on o Since it was o difficult to f i d a unit of rneasurern6n to q ate offense and defense perhaps the proposal that could b o at si y imagined would be o e where ABM would be k pt sm 1 e oug_ n-t to pset the balance in wh ch case i t could e is· o re fit were rough y equivalent on bo h sides hat s wi_n t same nU ber of ABM miesiles and radars He th ught h i w · ld be c a way of proceeaing o -41- -- Wiesner said he supposed that if ABM systems were really kept quite limited in relation to offensive systems and if it is obvious that this is the case on both sides · Kapitsa interjected to suggest calling this a 1'mi ni-system then it - ould be possible to imagine agreements on ABM and on offens ive systems at a fairly high level The kine of- -ABM he was ta kiu g about would be effective only against small nuclear powers Millionshchikov said he was not prepared at present to discuss the question in detail but he did think that we needed to develop a definition of a thin system An absolutely thick system would be inconceivable so in a certain sense all systems were relatively thino Millionshchikov thought thGit Wiesner's remark about the ratio of offense and defense deserved careful and detailed consideration and he repeated that we would meet again after doing some hO 'l'lework and have such detailed discussiono · S c tukin said that in his opinion the Americans seemed to be saying that a system is thin if it does not affect the ratio of offense and defenseo But such a system would be a cobweb that is i t would not give any defense at all agains t a missile attack and i t would therefore be ineffective and would not get us a n ywhereo On the other hand ABM systems directed against third parties were bound to be ambiguo us and Schtukin agreed that the matter deserved fur_t her study o J Ruin a suggested that we talk about limited ABM instead of thin ABM • ' · Mi lionshchikov said that would n ot help very much that all systems were limited just as all systems were thi no Wiesner said that he agreed absolutelyo R ina then returned to the matter of drawing up a list for future discuss i ono He thought we ought to start w' th Rathjens' list including the n eed for clarification of Soviet intentioniso Wiesner de murred at this and Long suggested instead what a re the components of a st r a te gic balance Doty then emphasized again the importa ce of a secure second-strike capabi i ty o He said that on both s ides we hope that neither will develop a first-stri ke capability and we should discuss how to guarantee this o r Rathj ns Uggest ed diacussion of the extent to which one would p rrnit qu litative i mprovements while limiting or reducing uQ er0 0 urning to h e questi n o f what is a thin ABM he s aid be wanted o in roduce a c plicationo In the Uni ed States _o sideratio had been g ven t l ocal de fe-ns e of missile sites which because its li nited range wo ' lld lot be ··_ J -42capable of protecting citi s would - such a system be permitted That was an important question to consider Doty then attempted to summarize where we stood He began by asking whether it would be acceptable to carry aver · the Wiesner memorandum as part of our task This was agreed Later at Long's suggestion it was agreed that it is 'mpl'ci t in the Wiesner paper that one must look at various systems orbital mob i le etc Further Doty said that it was also implicit in the Wiesner paper that we would discuss what limits can be agreed without any inspection Doty then began to read off the items which had been suggested as followsg 1 How can ABM be limited 2 How are ABM · 1 nits to be equated to offensive missiles limited 3 Is there agreement that systems should be o those serving the purpose of a second strike 4 To what extent would qua litative improvements be allowed wi thin agreed limits of numbers S Is t ermina l hardpoint defense of missile sites to be part o f the agreed limited level of ABM or should it be considered separately and perhaps by unlimited Doty comme ted that defense of missile sites was a prime example of a secondstrike ope rationo Ra th jens said it was not necessarily clear that o e could d istinguis h between hardpoin t and area defense He th ught that there should be discussi on as to whether such a d istinction could irM2 ed be made Doty then s uggested the follow ing substitute wordill'llg SJ Can po nt d fense of miss 'le sites be considered separately from ABMu and hould such point defense be limited Schtukin said g Let us c oins'der b o th ha rdpoint and Hwider defens es Kapitsa suggested 6 How does t he capability of other powers affect what the UoSo a nd the Scviet U ion can d When and if o ther powers can be brought in haw wou ld ne go about it Should there b a l' rni t on research a Ld6eve lopment -43- and testing of new systems or should we merely limit their operational d eployment Mil lionshchikov then raised the question of ·control and further the question of the possible stages of effect ing the operat ono Would it be whole-hog or in pieces He thought the question of control should be thoroughly discussedo There was also the question of the forum in which the matter should be studiedo Doty then tried this formulation control would be appropriate to each stage what system of Mill io shch i k ov said no there were two separate questi ons - - fir st t he quest ion of control and secondly the questi on of stageso D ty then listed the items separately 8 he questio of controlo 9 The ques tion of poss ible stepso Doty asked whether the list should be closedo Kap itsa said that of c ourse each side could add new items and Rui n a said that cert ain ite ms ought to be rephrased with some care • Doty agreed and said that the list he was r e adi n g out was only illustrative The re wa s further the que s tion of trying to rephrase them so tllat they could be accepted by other n uclear powers - or 0 Doty asked was it too earl-y t o go to this Millio sh c hikov then suggested the item 1 0 P ossible forms and scope of agreementso n this connection 0 h e ra ised the question of the cha racter of the aaherent s o 00 What happens he asked i f there is agreement between the Soviet Union and the Unit ed S tates a nd other powe s do not agree He though t this guestion s h ould be g · ven prorn nence Doty s a id he supp osed there was i mplici t agreement that we should als o -assess the que s tion of parity He referred to the m3ny va i able fac tors s uch as popula ti o n dispersion numbers wei ght e tco He thought this question ought to be dealt with o I Lo g s a id he thought all this was covered under the i tern equi va J e nce o ID Schtuki l to start I _ h en suggested the foll owi g Wha t should hs situatio e for such d iscussion n the past he sa'd we have sa d tha t we cannot make -4 4- any progress until we get a better atmosphere o to Vietnam He referred Doty asked whether the Soviet side - could speak further to thiso He recalled that despite Vietnam the two governments had found · i t possible to discuss NPT He wondered whether the ma tters now under discussion were in a different cat egQry If we had to wait for an end to Vietnam ·our time scale would be very differento Af er a _ong pause Milli nshchikov said he was try'ng to run through the l i s t · his mind and to thi k of what ough to be ad e-o He asked have we mentioned the qua ntita t i ve levels at w icb agreement might be reached WieBn er said we were n ot negotiating He wondered whether Milli_o nshchikov did not have in mind the canponents that make up a nuclear balance at different levels » Mi l lionshchikov said of course we are not negotiati g But if wear asked or even if we ask ourselves where we have -got it would be necessary to i_clude some approximate quantificationo He sugges ed 12 What qua t · ative levels can we talk about Vinograd ov sa·a he thought the point was to hink about the method of calculationa We needed to consider the unit of calculating quant itative solutions The list of que stions was later revised by Doy and Millionshchikov - See Appendix 2 UoSo take up t e - Soviet We then adjourned f r coffee and reco v ed to 'tern '1 S viet Union oSo relationso D ty introduced the 'tern by saying ha the Vi tnarn shadow does le gthe n and it has be come so big that psrhaps it is hard t imag i e wha relatio s could be like if it were removed He recalled Kap'tsa's rEfe rence to the problem of trade between the two cou tries a Do y Sa id he was o exper but he had the impress o that here had be-en more progress in the trade area than in disarm i Inenta Million hchikov then said he would like to ·ake the opportunity say a few words o F rs t he emphasize d the pr va te charac er of tr e roce idg a d he- impor a ce of not releas ng -45- ' · ' I anything to the presso He assumed that his UoSo colleagues ould respond to any press inquir es by saying that the American participants are in Moscow on a purely scientific visito Se condly Mi llionshch ikov underline d that this discussion was purely acade mic 0n the level of Pugwash We had had an exchange of views We were not ready to send these questions to the governmental levelo But we h d had a business-like atmosphere and a calm discussiono 11 Third Millionshchikov said that as regards UoS - Soviet relations he felt that some irnes we tended to deviate from the main questions and to concentrate on de ails such as the question of sendin g one ci entist instead of two or sending an exchange scholar for one month instead of three More important were the larger questions that shao d relations between our goverrunentso It is t e o he S3 id tha · Vietnam casts a shadowo The UoSo is behaving recklessly and this could lead to a serious deteriora tiono This ought to be b rne in rnindo · The U S should consider this more impo rtant than merely getting negotiations goingo 0 Milli c shchikov t h 6n turned to the large question of what determined bilateral re ationso First he mentioned trade which he said was l imited to F' e-gl · gible leve 1 becat se of he unacceptable UoSo polic y of d crimir o t io '- •lf c o•n · c - t r e Soviet Uni on could get along wi thout -r 'oSo trade bt th s was a major fact or L determininq r·e lations between the two Second he mentioned the use of ha -bors and the question of shippin- t He referred to •t-1 mprecetlented d · scrimination against Soviet vessels o He th ought tha Ji i 1e analysis c f this and some sharpening of public attention in the United States on such q-qestions would help relationsc He said the improvement of trade would also help the Uni t ed Sta tee 0 and it was up to the Uo s o to try to eliminate obstacles Kapitsa asked whether the American group would say what they considered to be the main obstacleso Wiesner said he ho ed he would not be held respo sible saj1· 0 bi cause he was no expe rt in this fieldo From his W'hi e House experience howevero he coold give some of he h istory -- which he did not necess rily defend himselfo He then offered two commentso First he thought the trade embargo was rela ed to the armaments question It dated from the time when the Co d War was in ense and i t ' Jas perhaps jus ifiable at that ' irr eo Ho ever 0 progress was being made on trade wnen Vist am cast its sha dowo American oppone nts of an increase in trade got good a1Tu unition for their -arguments fr m the S v i et po icy of supplying arms to Hanoi for the details o f what he had to 0 0 ceccr d D W es er said that he had he impres -io that the k ind of trade th t ths Sa••i e Uni on wanted needed ere-di ts -46- • and credits raised all the questions that he had referred to in a very intensive fo rmo He said he knew much less aaout this subject he was speaking of his impressions onlyo Kapitsa asked againg help UoSo-Soviet relations what do you want us to dot Wiesn er mentioned the importance of broadeni g the scienti fic exchange betwee n the two countries o He said that on the American side we had worked on our govern rnent on this matter and we ho ed the Sovi ets would work on theirs Beyond thisa the Soviets could t ry to be helpful on Vietnamo Above a l l 0 he thought they c ould nelp by m2 king more intensive efforts at disarmamen t He thoug_At that both sides shauld be willi ng to take more cha ces on dis2r mame t Both should be bold He said that he said these thi gs p ibl c i y at home and he noped his Soviet f x -iends w uld urge tn1 s ame thing in the Soviet Urxio_ o Lo g t ok up the question of the exchange of people o He said we would like to see he same freedom in this area that we have with for exa rnple Italy a w1 ere we could contact · ndivid0 uals a n d invi te the m without refere n ce to the State Depar men t or t o t he I talian F reign Mi ni 5'-try Khvostov ad Erne-l'yanov then tried to steer the discussion back ·oward rno -e- e 1 e rne_ tary things spec · fically economic mel 0 yanov reca ed that · n 1946 th Soviet U ioin had ·been ae vastate d by the war and eeded help in restori g ' ts scienti fic i nst i tu t e The S ovie ta had sent people to - the oS our ocwar ti me ally ' J to pay hard d llais for badly needed laborato ry equipmen to ' 'here were t errible difficulties He recalled speak ilr g t c t he pre i dsh'11 t cf Westinghouse O who wanted to trade with t h e Sovi et r Iir io 0 but the u s government intervened aP d would n o t a llcw it Kiss i ger responded to· Kapi s as questio of what we on the Ameri can s i de would l i ke c see hes viets do He sai d he would t r f to keep his re marks ge n eral and applicable 9 b oth sides He -a i d h e ws s afraid th ii t o r i b - th sides people end to u s the c oncept of pe i c eful ' oeXi s ence as a tactic to defe a t the o the r side · Both se l arms to third parties a ostensibly fer e pu po eo ut the arms are then u ed f r so e other purposeo He c ited Pakis t a n a s a n exa m le There were o therso He hough t · a- t his practi ce c·J l d ad to very explc siv e si tuaticns a nd t h at this que s t ion Eh• u 1 e be put n _he ageJ da 1'- ' ·z i ovi c h bl E l 'A reverte -c again to the question of trade n a ma ie a le g q i mpa- s i n e d speech about he Sovie sa need for c o m U- e r s f r sc i 1 ti f i e p- irposes a nd heir de sire to obtain C mpu r$ i r t he n ej S oteso • _ Wiesner said this was a gooq' example He recalled that in the government he and others had worked hard to understand the question of computers and that he had favored freer policy but that he realized and no one could deny that such a _policy i volved military disadvantages for the U S The AB sy tem i lustrated this Advanced computers are an essential ingredient of an ABM system and in supplying computer know-how we would be providing assistance for such a development I _t s __on su h s r n'2- _t 1 _ __m z i P€ ople believed tha t the · export of advanced technology ·shoula b'e· restricted · --- · - -- J Brown recalled that the original concept of this Soviet-American D i sarmame nt Study had included the notion oft he long-term exct - qe of re id1 nt re predentative on both si de s This had not g0t-cff the gr u d perha S for good a nd suffici nt reasonso He r 0pe d howeve r r at it would one day be pcs5ible to discus s the matt er again and move forward with it o Scht 1kin then rs e -r e-1 t o what Kissinger h 1d e ai abou'C usin g cc e x i sten ce o defeat ' the other side He sai d t3 t in the Sov · e view the '1 WC s yste ms we re competing syste rns b J t that under c di tior s of peacefu l coexistence the c onroeU -ci on could be shiftc-d t 0 pe aceful grou n ar e war would not be u ea a s a mE ans o • ' Dot y 1 h n circ 1l ated to he Soviet participan · s c - pi e-s of the Gilpa ··· L · a r · i cl rAd McNamara• s San Francisco speech and Warn ecke' a speed o He hen c me e that t he ra t e of ch a r ge in the mili t a ry e· n v i n 1E rt seemed to be faster than any ra e of study cha we c ont mp a edo He regret ed that there had been in rece i'1 years a ' d€ erioration of co tact Do y ecalle d again that J· · ·rJnit Ed S t a t E S had sugges ed talks at the official levelo He- hou n · t hat the re wo u _d be great adva nta ge in gett g them start ed -ool' 'a 0 part i cu larly if this could be duri g he remainin g period o f M c 1 amara ' s se r vi ce as Secret ary of Def n se o r c-ng • s id t ha t with the lis t of que i ons that we had assembled h E h i d nc· 0 1 0t tha we cou d have a g o od n ext aession o Milli t • -ishr n ikcv said h e thought chat the v is · t of his A me · ca £ t iE tr d s n ad - ont ribu · ed to a useful O u niX' h i bi t ed exchange- f view o S e loc kt a forwa r d to fur her acade mi c study of ·he que s ions th t had bE e- 1 lis ed for discuss ion o He S3 id t hat afte r givi g fur' he r thought o these ma tters 0 we c c uld no d oubt use the- '•• s az e cl a rbJ l ' l •t th L is 0 betwe -en Doty and Mi l lionshchik ov Cl a r -a qe a next maeting o He could not e ay when this wou ld be 0 l ca u se te d 'i d not J ' et know how much t ime w 1 J ld be ne eded to gF fl epc red - 1 the que- sti O S which had been liated some of which we e ir e w ano 0xc ra -d i 1 - Zirily challenging o FL'1 a1 ly he s aid we should t h i nk a bout wh 1 re the n e xt m eti ng should be b ld cut - r c t als c e 01 d c m ctero this bi a te ral ma e i -tg had bee far be t 1 e- ri o -e p r- uc _' v e t han larger mee-t · gE o -48- _ Millionshchikov agreed saying that he thought that h e consensuso He concluded by saying we · will not back down on our commitment to have further contact but he repeated that he could not say anything more in detail about that at p esanto that was Wies ner said that we had achieved an open o free discussion that had been conducted on bath sides without fcaro He thought this was a precious thing that ws ough t t o try o exploito Kapit s a s aid t he most scriking thing about t he meeting was t hat neither side h d fe lt it necessary to make complimen s about the othero This proved we were friends Artzirnov·ch s a i d he feared £or a moment that Kapitsa was destroyi ng the ·char-act er o f - he m e t ing by paying a cc mp l imant q but he noted ha it had come a£ter formal adjournrne nt o • -49 Appendix 1 • AMERIC FtN MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION The Limitation of Strategic Weapons This paper is prepared to stimulate discussion at the meeting not as a definitive proposal It is hoped that from the •aiscussion might come agreement to continue consideration of this important subjecto In previous meetings of this kind as well as in official meetings Americans have proposed agreements to prohibit the construction of missile defenses because of the possibility that to do so would stimulate the construction of more offensive weapons etco The U SoSoRo representatives have preferred to consider limit ation s of offensive and defensive weapons together and we agree that this is the practical problem deserving our most serious discussiono It is proposed that t he following issues should be considered during c e course of the discussiono Objective of Any Agreemento • Of course one can say to limit offensive and de ensive wea pons but to what I have always believed the ideal number was zero but this is probably not the thing to focus on in these discussionso Let us assume chat there will be missiles for the next few yea s and possibly even defensive systemso The question is given the desire on both sides to minimize these forces and their costs can we find a technical basis for doing so Can we imagine deployment arrangements for both sides which are mutually reassuring that they do not require continuing growth to achieve confidence In fact can we find sm2ller force levels whi c h provide equal or greater feeling of securi y t ha n the arrangements each country is planning to have in about five yearso Five years is c hcs en because that is about the minimum time required for new systems to be built and installedo IIo Specif ic Issues lo Define basic obJective Possible choices include Arresting t • e g rowth of offensive forces Cutting Back o agreed levels Establishing assured deterrents for bo h sides -50- • II • Specific 1ssues conti Beginning a process of continuing force reductions 2 How can various weapons systems be related to eac h other in defining equivalent forces Can one depend only on numbers How can size and accuracy be taken into account How can mobile vs immobile or hardened vs unprotected delivery systems be equated 3 How can defensive syscems be related to offensive systems Is it possible to define a deterrent if a compa rable defensive system exists • 4 Can limits of a total offensive-defensive syste be established by budgetary control If so n ow wou ld monitoring be done 5 At what point should we consider some form of rnon it cr ing or inspect ion within each country In recent years e h2 ve steered away from plans that required inspection for we found SoU did not like them Is this still the case 6 Is t h ere a role for international co trol and rnonit oring III Specific forms of limitation There are several cases to examine in a search for t e desirable course to follow g 1 Let nature take its courseo Build missiles and defensive systems g costs will provide some limica 2 Ne defenses plus a freeze at some date on offensive weapons 3 No defenses plus cu back in offensive we 9ons 4 Li mit on offensive we2pons plus limi ed deploymenc of defensive systems I Whict of t ese deserve deta'led considera ion -51 pendix 2 • Revised List of Questions for Future Study and Discussion l Can we find mutually acceptable limits on ABM defenses 2 What is the correlation between ABM and Offensive Missiles 3 Can there be agreement that both countries deploy their weapons to the extent of possessing only a second strike capability 4 To what extent are technical improvements compatible wit h the limited le vels that may be agreed upon 5 Is it useful to consider two categories of ABM defenses u-r·b an and missile site If so what would be the correlation 6 What types of control would be necessary and possible What level of limitation could be agreed without involving internal inspec ion problems • 7 What are the appropriate sLages required to reach which cou-d be agreed upon So By what ways and means should the problem be discussed t red ucti on · 9 What forms and scope of the agreement are possible l0o What should the situation be for starting d s uss·ons 11 What approximate quantitative levels could presumably be reached in the agreement What unit could be adopted in calculating the levels to be specified Appendix 1 How does t h e contin1 1ed existence and growth of ot her r uc lear powers affecL what we can agree to