v l A LA SlFIED ' ·· l76 S - -- - - NARA nate J 2 ----- ii ORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY MEMORANDUM FOR FROM SUBJECT Brooke Letter After careful consideration on how to process the letter from Senator Brooke to the President concerning first strike Enclosu re 1 it was decided to give him only an interim reply pending completion of his keynote speech at the Republican Convention this week The legislative types felt strongly that the only kind of substantive reply we could give him would tend to irritate him and pose risks in connection with his keynoter role Concurrently we have had some in-house squabbling on the substantive content of a Brook reply Odeen and his people did a lengthy paper for you which is at Enclosure 2 Odeen and his people are obviously very concerned about the implications of first strike and in my view have slanted their argumentation strongly in the direction of assured destruction In my view we must take the middle road but above all in answering Brooke the whole issue should be fuzzed up enough to deprive him of an issue while not committing us to a strategy which thus far has not been national policy At my request Sonnenfeldt rewrote the draft prepared by Odeen in two formats -- one for possible signature by Secretary Laird Enclosure 3 and the other for Presidential signature Enclosure 4 Phil Odeen's package at Enclosure 2 refers to a Defense prepared draft to the Brooke letter Subsequently Defense sent us another redo which is at Enclosure 5 In my view the Sonnenfeldt drafts are the most satisfactory and should be the basis for our substantive reply which should be dispatched immediately after the Republican Convention Because this reply will be made public whether it is signed by the President or Laird and because it will influence the Senate deliberations on the Interim Agreement it should in my view a I Disclaim a first strike strategy in a delicate way and TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY ' ------ TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY -2- b Be signed by Laird so that if it proves to be a point of contention we will have flexibility for further doctrine by the President in a subsequent 110 und Re commendation That you approve my instructing the Secretary of Defense to dispatch the Sonnenfeld at Enc osure 3 7r t Pr _f Approve r-i Disapprove_ _ _ __ Attachments TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY ---- l P bouceo AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES I ' 0 ------- ----------· _ ·oit°CLASSIFIED Authority 0- I J'l5g_ By ARA Dateff- f-·0 2 - - s- -- - ____ - - - • l f 't r 'I ' t · - · l4 il UNITL D STATES SENATE WASHINGTON D C EDWAl1D W O iOOKE MA5SACHU CT f August 7 1972 Dear Mr President The New York Times h is reported th_at there has been a major change in American 1nissile dcvelopm ent-progra1ns looking toward the development of technology capable of destroying hard targets While '7arious types of har targets are cited it seems clear that the rumored capability would threaten h_ardened missile silos If so such a development effort would clearly contravene the longstanding United States policy oI not developing capabilities which the Soviets n ight construe as threatening their deterrent As you will recall from our past co1n1nunications on this subject I have greatly ad1nir d the restraint you have shown in e1nphasizing ·the need to make 1nutual deterrence more stable Your Administration has wisely avoided provocative threats to the Soviet retaliatory forces while guaranb • ing the survivability of our own second strike capability The stress you plac e d on this point in y ur March 14 1969 state1ncr t ren ains one o the most important benchmarks in the evolution of A1ncrican strategic policy When you wr-ote 1ne on Dece1nber 29 1969 stating that there s no current UI ited States · progran1 to develop a so-called 'hard target' MIRV capability 11 you underscored your fui1dam ental position that the purpose of our strateg i c progran 1 is to Jlaintain our deterrent not to threaten any nation with the first strike Secretary Laird subsequently reiterated that po licy by as ·s uring the Senate Anncd Services Com1nittcc that the President has n1 adc it perfectly clear that we do not intend to develop counter force capabilities which the Soviets could construe as having first strike potential In line with that policy the Arn cd Se1'vicc s Com1nittee curtaile l the ABRES progrt1rn restricting it to technology of lower yields and accuracies than required to attack Soviet missile silos And t1griin in Novcm bcx 1970 Secretary Laird reasserted the Govc rnnient' fJ policy 11 Wc have not clevclope l and arc not seeking to develop a weapon syste1n having or which could reasonably be cont l ruc l a having a firi t st rikc potential 11 L -DECLASSiFIBD_ - r Authority GO· I qsg By ARA DateE- f'O i L Pc ·· _ ------·- ___ bnt Two The Administration's rcn1arb 1 bly' ml wclcon1e success in bringi ng lhc slralcgic arn-is _limitallon talks lo the prei cnl ltage J-urn heighlcnecl lhe importan'cc _of rnainl lining- clarity on this cardinal strategic question We have left no doubt that if t hc Sovicl s devise a hard target lviJH V capnbility threatening our Minuteman force we would co11siclcr that i11in1ical lo the principals of 1nutunl c1ete1 1 -ence incorporated in the initial SALT agrcbments SilniJarly should the United States s em to be qualifying its stand against perfecting har l f ar get MIRV the Soviet Union mizht well interpr·ct that development as an attempt to gain a clis '-rming capability against the large sl component of lhcir str ttegic forces Seel ing in good failh to build n1utua l secui'ity on an agrce l basis of strategic restraint we could harclly undertake to clo what we are pressing the Soviet Union_not to do It is evident that should the Soviet Union' launch such a tluc2 teninb development program the United Stat cs would take vhatcver si eps are necessary to insure the survivability and penetration capability 0£ our own deterrent There are a nmnber of options open to us in that cventudity but as Ddcn·sc Deparhnent spoke sn1an have indicated thr y do riot require th at the United States 1novc toward counter fo rce technology to threaten Soviet forces Were either or both sides to 1nove in that lircction the stability of the strategic ba_lance would be con1e less secure as presstn cs built to cornpensate or new vulnerabilities by increasing force levels Of by adopting · Buch hazardous policies as launch on ·warning 11 · Our dedication to an _exclusively second sti·ik e posture serves both our present security and the pro spects for mo1·e substantial arins lin1italions to enhance our future sc curity Gi vcn the current con1motion on this issue I think it is imperative· for you restate the previous firm gllidelincs you ha l enunciated in directing lhe Department_ of Defense not to seek superfluous and provocative hard target technolog '· I hope and trust you will agree that we caimot a ford ambiguity on so grave an i suc to vith warn1c•st pcrson 1-l reGanls I arn B rool c The Pre i dent h c w hit c 11o u c ·r -rr-•---5' D EC LASSiFiE 60- qsg Authority I By ARADate f- f--o _ f --- WL O--- -- - -- - ·- ·· ----- ----- · I Dear Ed A 11 Options In light of the concern expressed in your · August 7 letter I would like to reiterate that our strategic policy remains unchanged It is to maintain a ·· sufficient deterrent to nuclear war and not to thre -1 ten any nation with a first strike I believe these fundamental principles _are· mbodied in the strategic arms agreements which have been submitted to the Congress and form - the necessary basis for further progress in controlling strategic arms At the same time it is necessary that we maintain a sufficient str tegic posture to protect our security in the future our strategic program I can assure you that are directed to this end Option 2 I have asked Mel Laird to respond to some of the specific concerns reflected in your letter ·option 3 An important part of this effort must be to stay in the forefront of modern technology It was our superior technology tJ iat in larg_e measure made the existing agreements possible The programs for improved missile warheads are a part of that effort and are being pursued in the light of similar Soviet developments in this field _ _ _ DECLASSiFIBir · ·1 Authority£CJ ' Sf _ By ARA DateK 9-- · OPC-ll 1 - --·····--··•· J i This is a modest development program and the President has reserved on any deploynient decision which in any event will not become timely £or many years In the interirn we would hope that - the further negotiations on strategic arms control will find an effective way to deal with this question on a mutual basis We are intensively studying this question in preparation for the n xt phase of SALT With warm personal regards - I - -- -- _ _ DECLASSIFIED - Authority GO· I zqsg I By ARA Date -lf - 2 _1 e • ee -r••es • •·• OSD DRAFT Dear Ed I appreciate receiving your letter of August 7 on the important subject of strategic deterrence The pas sage of time and the Strategic Arms Limitation d _iscussions have s rved but to reinforce my position expressed in my letter of December 29 1969 that the purpose of our strategic program is to maintain our deterren t- - - not to threaten any nationa with a first strike 11 I also noted in that letter my belief that advanced research on ballistic missiles is essential if the U S is to have in hand the technology it may need tu preserve strategic sufficiency in the future 11 It is an unfortunate fact that many important second-strike targets though fewer in number are as hard as perhaps even harder than silos because lacking the need for the silo door they can be deeply buried We must develop the ability to successfully attack such targets without squandering large numbers of relatively ineffective warheads upon them In this sense hard target technol gy is not superfluous and provocative but rather a more effective use of resources Thus a capability t effectively attack a limited number of hard targets by no means threatens another nation with a first strike nor 1s completely consistent with my standing policy With warmest personal regards RMN - - - - --- -- · DECLASSIFIED Authority_£Q I _qsg_ By ARA Date -19 ----- I DRAFT Dear Senator Brooke The President has asked me to respond to your letter to him of August 7 on the important subject of our strategic forces I should like to assure you that all programs supported by the Defense Department and the Administration are consistent with the defense policies which the President and I as Secretary of Defense have enunciated in numerous authoritative statements In particular response to your letter I would like to assure you ' I that there will be no decisions by this Adminis tration in regard to o·ur strategic forces that would involve either superfluous or provocative programs and in particular none of a fi_r st strike character The sole goal of the Administration is to ensure that we have a responsible and sufficient defense posture which safeguards our security in the years ahead We are at the same time determined to make the mo st serious effort to build on the strategic arms limitation agreements '· signed in Moscow last May and now before the Congress Our defense policies while taking account of requirements presented by the programs of the other side will be consistent with that effort With warmest personal regards Sincerely The Honorable Edward W Brooke United States Senate Washington D C ---· - -»Ecr ASSIFm»' -1 M- Authority £CJ I iqsg I By ARA Date f CQ-_ I L ·····••e·••······•--'-· DRAFT Dear Ed I appreciated receiving your letter of August 7 on the important subject of our strategic forces You may be certain that all programs supported by the Administration are consistent with the defense policies which we have enunciated in numerous authoritative statements In response to your letter I would like to assure you that there will be no decisions in regard to our strategic forces that ip volve either superfluous or provocative programs and in particular none of a first strike character My sole goal is to ensure that we have a responsible and sufficient defense posture which safeguards our security in the years ahead We will at the same time make the most serious effort to build on the achievements of the strategic arms limitation agreements signed in Mos cow last May and our ·defense policies while taking account of requirements presented by the programs of the other side will be consistent with that effort Sincerely RMN The Honorable Edward W Brooke United States Senate Washington D C - DECLASSIFIED Authority 60· I qsg_ By AnA Date -lf t Dear Ed In light of the concern expressed in your August 7 letter I would ike to reiterate that our strategic policy remains unchanged It is to maintain a suf icient deterrent to nuclear war and not to threaten a y nation with a fi st st ike I believe these fundmental principles are embodied in the strategic arms agreements which have been submitted to the Congress and form the necessary basis for further progress in controlling strategic arms At the same time it is necessary that we maintain a sufficient strategic posture to protect our security in the future I can assure you that our strategic programs are directed to this end An important part of this effort must be to stay in the forefront of modern technology It was our superior technology that in large measure made the existing agreements possible I 1 It should be recognized that in a second-strike situation there would be a potentially significant number of hard targets other than missile silos which would require improved ' re ntry vehicles for effective ta geting I believe prudence dictates that we continue to explore such technology The programs for improved missile warheads are a part of that effort for superior technology and are modest programs for development only I ave reserved judgment on any deployment decision but would point out - that even if taken such deployments would not give us a first strike capability Our future decisions in this regard will depend on the changing world situation including of course progress in our continuing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Our objective remains to assure a continuing credible · »ic Asswiin -- I qsg Authority GO· By ARADateK- f ' - - -- -- ______ d H''-' l uol to acquire a first-strike capability -Ht -a '1 1 personal regards Sincerely • • n ' • •· • t i t _ • _ 1r s - _ _ · _ -- - - ' n d W Brooke --· - f Senate - - Richard M Nixon •· REPROOUCEDATTHENATIONALARCH VES • DECLASSIFIED SlS _ 1 ARADatel1Jf'2 ---- --- -- - a ••-' _ ---· -· Oeu ieutor I weuW lil• to apoloalz• for tu 4-lay 1n rupoua to _ i u of Alipt 7 to the t la t4ddl YOll upna _ canN'ftl ev• r- - -U ff Udial a aajw ahaap 1a U S atn1h d4Welopllellt auociated wit h 4eftlopha tecaattloe' h r UNtapta You Yi will • b'fOUlllt to tM hutdet's attmioa at ce -11 n t y a4 you uy upec to heo in t1ds n ua liftCHely T• c lorOloJu Delmtr Anbt•t '° th• Pnudeat l e Sclwu4 W lrNke OaitA14SUtff _ _ Washlq toa D C 28510 ✓ cc w inc 'to Dr lissinger bee Gerald Wa nen - m TCK RMc P j k 1 1 l l • T REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL AR HIVES • • ' I oECLASSi Fi Ejj ____ l JS5 ' EMOR ARADate f 2 NAi TCJN1n SECURITY TOP SECRET SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM FOR DR KISS FROM SUBJECT Senator Brooke has written the President askin was prompted by news reports that we have changed our are developing hard target counterforce capabilities • These stories have created a considerable stir We understand Brooke plans to amend the Jackson SALT reservation to put the Congress on record against either side developing counterforce capabilities The prospect is for a Senate debate a possible delay on the interim agreements and hence the ABM Treaty and the possibility that this could become an is sue in the campaign The origin of the furor was Laird's preemptory move after the SALT Agreements were signed in requesting $20M additional funding for improved RVs for MM III and Poseidon This was done without asking clearance or even informing the White House Basically these funds are to be used to 11 weaponise 11 300-500 KT warheads for MM III and 100 KT warheads for Poseidon They are now respectively 170 KT and 40 KT AEC has already done the necessary development work on the nuclear device i There are three issues i I I I - - Substantively do we need or want this capability and if so how far do we want to press to get it How will this affect our relationship with the Soviets SALT II etc I I ' - - How should we handle the Brooke letter and the likely Congressional debate · fi'i ' i i _- _ - TOP SECRET SENSITIVE TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 2 Previous U S Policy Statements The Administration is on the public record with several statements on this issue a more comprehensive record is attached at Tab D -- In a letter to Senator Brooke 29 December 1969 the President stated ' There is no current program to develop a so-called hard target MIRV capability -- In a letter to Senator Brooke 5 November 1970 Laird stated We have not developed and are not seeking to develop a weapon system having or which could reasonably be construed as having a first strike potential -- A DOD position paper read by Senator Stennis on the floor of the Senate 5 October 1971 concerning a Buckley amendment to the defense appropriation bill which would have provided more money for improving MM III and Poseidon warheads in connection with providing counterforce capabilities It said The Defense Department cannot support the proposed amendments Itsis the position of the United States to not develop a weapons system whose deployment could be reasonably construed by the Soviets as having a first-strike capability Such a deployment might provide an incentive for the Soviets to strike first Current Public Affairs Line White House press spokesmen have dodged questions based on the press stories However Jerry Freidheim yesterday spent his entire press briefing on this issue His basic line was -- We are accelerating R D on improved accuracies and yield-toweight ratios for our ICBMs and SLBMs in order to maintain our technological superiority in these fields TOP SECRET SENSITIVE I r TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 3 -- We have not decided to deploy these systems We are several years away from a deployment decision but the program would give us the option in the future to deploy a i hard target kill capability -- Our strategy has not changed and we are not planning a first strike force in any sense - - This insures a strong position for SALT II and a hedge against failure of follow-on SALT - - We may need this capability to deal with the enemy's hardened command and control facilities and nuclear storage sites The Reasons for New Warhead Despite the variety of reasons given the main purpose of the program is to develop a silo kill capability The JCS want hard target forces for warfighting purposes - - to fulfill the SIOP which gives first priority under all circumstances to attacking Soviet missile silos In OSD the argument is that Soviet development of a severe threat to Minuteman is likely and we should have the same capability so as to not be in an asymmetrical position that could have adverse political and psychological consequences ·• · a 1 1 r · AT We have never gotten a detailed explanation of DOD proposed program but basically it will -- increase MM III yields from 170 KT to 450-500 KT - - provide for accuracy improvements through hardware and software improvements from the present CEP of 16 nautical mile to • 075 nautical mile 450 feet If these improvements are made on the entire Minuteman force the effect on the 1600 ICBM Soviet force assuming very hard silos will be TOP SECRET SENSITIVE DECLASSIFIEif ----- eistr i NARA DatellJ 2 q - - --- - - -- '• •- - J' • I 4 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE USSR Silos Surviving 1000 MM III with high accuracy O 75 n mi CEP and current 3-170 KT warheads 115 1000 MM III with high accuracy 0 075 n mi CEP and t h e 3-500 KT warheads 35 Without such capabilities today we can destroy more than 50 percent of the Soviet ICBM force and with currently programmed improvements almost 70 percent of the Soviet ICBM force in 1975 As you know I have serious doubts about the value of this program to increase the yield of our RVs I don't see what real value we get beyond that of our current programs to increase accuracy and numbers of RVs A brief summary of the considerations for and _asgainst - are at Tab E In addition there is the need for consideration of the impact on the Soviets how it may affect their programs particularly their counterforce programs how it will impact on SALT whether it will serve as a bargaining chip if there is no practical way to control counterforce and how it will affect the fragile new relationship of mutual restraint we are seeking to hold with the USSR ' Q ur Options At this stage our inunediate problem is how to respond to Senator Brooke in a way that will protect the President minimize debate and avoid repudiating either the President's earlier position or Laird's program We have three alternatives 1 The President can send a bland reply to Senator Brooke reaffirming that our strategyr is unchanged 2 In addition the President can say that he has asked Laird to reply more fully 3 We can ask Laird to reply on behalf of the President Draft texts reflecting these three approaches are attached at Tab B TOP SECRET SENSITIVE REPRODUCEDATTHENATIONAL • • r I ' DECLASSIFIED-------- s - 74 S i Date t f f2 1-- i _ ______ _ _____ j TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 5 If Laird is to play a role we should make sure that he emphasizes that our strategy is unchanged and that his reply on the warhead program is not argumentative so as to avoid stimulating further debate We also have a draft reply for the President prepared by OSD Tab C It appears inappropriate for either the President or Laird Next Steps Prepare memorandum to the President recommending Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Other Sonnenfeldt and Lehman concur TOP SECRE' ilr SENSITIVE _ _ ___ _ DECLASSIFIED Authority GO· I zqsg By NARADate lf - I gr I - e e • e • • • -1 ' - - • l J l 1• f 0 1 · ' 1- H i' • ' ' • I •• W LJ tements Made by U S Offi 1ls Concerning Development of U S Counterforce Hard target kill Capabilities t in chronological order 1 -· Memorandum for the Secretary of the Air Force SUBJECT Hard Target Policy David Packard 19 December 1969 The Air· Force has been considering development of a new RV the MK 19 with higher yield than the MK 12 to provide a hard target kill capability for Minuteman III I feel this is not the time to-initiate such development My concern stems primarily from SALT considerations I do not wish to take any steps or appear to take a d steps which might undermine or jegpardize these talks Additionally the SALT results may have a major impact on our counterforce plans For these reasons please postpone any further serious consideration of any such weapons or hard target capability for US ICMB's until after the outcome of SALT has clarified SECRET 2 In testimony before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee released by Air Force Chief of Staff General Ryan on October 7 1969 it was stated that the US had ·a program which ' e are pushing to increase the yield of our warheads and decrease the circular error probable so that-we have what we call a hard target killer which we do not have in the inventory at the present time This statement caused Senator Javits and Senator Brooke to write letters inquiring about US policy in this area The responses were as follows · --President Nixon in a letter to Senator Brooke 29 December 1969 Your thoughtful letter of Dec 5 prompts me to reiterate my fundamental position that the purpose· of our strategic program is to maintain our deterrent not to threaten any nation with of · ics avb -siJEtd nJ· f- - Top SEl RETi i r tg Eit t r ·'1 ······· · EXEMPTION CA TZSORY AUTC M ATICiULY m cu S IfI - 'D A 1 Ji - J-_ 7- - 6RRODUCED ATTHE NATIONAL A jWdWES DECLASSIFIED------ IZM · _ ___ · ARAiiatel_ f _1 _ -- TOP S CR J - 2 - 'There is no current US program to develop a so-called hard target MIRV capability The particular program to which General Ryan referred did not receive DOD approval for funding in a forthcoming defense budget 'The US does carry on certain programs of advanced research on many aspects of ballistic missile design The highest priority of these programs is assuring that US missiles will be able to penetrate defenses However it is a straightforward fact about technology that some of the methods which are required for penetration might also be applied to increase accuracy and yield I do not believe that this fact makes such research unnecessary On the contrary I believe it is essential if the US is to have in hand the technology it may need to preserve strategic sufficiency in the future Nor do I believe that such research is si ificantly provocative The technological possibilities in the future not any specific program are what may contribute to uncertainty on both sides It is my very strong hope that we will be able---- by agreement with the Soviets if possible and by the prudent calculation of our own programs in any event---- to continue to assure both strategic sufficiency and strategic stability in the future Vnclassified 1 Secretary of the Air Force Robert C Seam0ns Jr in a letter to Senator Javits 8 January 1970 The program Genera 1 Ryan referred to in his statement consists of 1 a proposal for a more accurate and higher yield reentry vehicle and 2 normal evolutionary improvements in accuracy and reliability • • These efforts have no direct funding • consideration of the proposed reentry vehicle is but part of our development planning process in which many possible solutions to existing and potential needs are postulated and examined for feasibility cost and appropriateness Thus the program described by General Ryan is not a reflection rnn rPorr REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ffil' IES DECLASSIFIEif · · zeistS ARADat tr1rz1 ·------- •-•J' TOP- S3fC RfT - of intent to achieve a first strike capability and there is no Air Force program in being or con temp lated directed toward a first strike capability UNCIASSIFIED 3 In a speech to the Air Force Association on September 22 1970 General Ryan stated that qualitative improvements in Minuteman III will make This missile •• will be our best means of destroying time-urgent hard targets like the long-range weapons of the ene my This statement prompted Senator Brooke to ask Secretary Laird whether there had been any changes in US counterforce policy Laird responded in a letter dated 5 November 1970 ''We have not developed and are not seeking to develop a weapon system having or which could reasonably be construed as having a first-strike potential I believe that General Ryan's comment October 7 1969 was made in the context of limiting damage to the United States by second-strike employment ••• You should know that even used in the context described by General Ryan the capability of Minuteman III against hardened silos is relatively low 4 On October 5 1971 the Senate debated two amendments to the Military Procurement Bill proposed by Senator Buckley of New York The amendments would have _·provided R D funds to improve the warheads of Minuteman III and Poseidon in connection with providing counterforce capabilities Senator Stennis of Mississippi opposed the amendments on the grounds that the Defense Department opposed them He quoted the DOD position paper on the amendments The Defense Department cannot support the proposed amendments It is the position of the United States to not develop a weapon system whose deploiment could reasonably be construed by the Soviets as having a first strike capability Such a deployment might provide an incentive for the Soviets to strike first TOP SECRET REPRO CEDATTHENATIONALAR • ' J S • DECLASSIFI Ejf _____ - E 61v se- ·i -- · · NARADatellJt _____________ J OP SECRET - ' - 4 - - Senator Stennis went on to comment That first strike capability essentially means the same as the word 'counterforce' The word 'counterforce' is in the amendment •• It is not often that the Department of Defense comes out against an amendment that- would put more money in a bill • • They say that it is the position of the United States -- that means the position of the United States through its Chief Executive Congressional Record October 5 1971 p Sl5891 5 The Secretary of Befense included the following requirement in his '' Policy and Planning Guidance for FY 72 ' ve should not plan strategic offensive forces for the purpose of limiting damage to the t United States in the event of a large nuclear attack This does not preclude damage limiting war-fighting plans but no forces are to be procured specifically for this TOP SECRET 6 Admiral Moorer's FY 73 Posture Statement prepared 8 February 1972 stated Our ICBMs have only a very modest hard-target kill capability and this is an important point to bear in mind The Titan II has a large warhead but lacks accuracy Our Minuteman missiles have better but carry relatively small warheads As I noted last year the development of a hard-target version of the Minuteman III with a CEP of 0 25 n m and a single 1 5 Ml' warhead was terminated shortly after it was started in the mid 1960 's pp 13 TOP SECRET ''None of our current SLBMs - -t are designed to be launched on a depressed trajectory Neither are they planned for attack against hard targets pp 39 TOP SECRET I I I I PRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL v'ES DECLASSI FlED - ' -5 lfhl ' ARADate ········ TOP StCRfT - 5 - 7 The President's February 9 1972 report to the Congress US Foreign Policy for the 1970's states on page 160 ''We have not provided our missiles with the combined number accuracy and warhead yield necessary to threaten Soviet forces with a disarming strike The Soviets have the technical capability to develop similarly sophisticated systems but with greater warhead yields and consequently greater capability for a disarming strike ''We are approaching a crucial turning point in our strategic arms programs If the Soviet Union continues to expand strategic forces cl llllpensating US programs will be mandatory The preferable alternative would be a combination of mutual restraint and an agreement in sAL'E UNCLASSIFIED 8 In his press conference following the signing of the SALT I agreements June 15 1972 Dr Kissinger said that 'Technological advance -- opens more and more temptions for seeking decisive advantage At premium is put on striking first ---Potentially decisive additions are extremely dangerous and the quest for them is destabilizing 9 In a speech delivered in June 1972 and reperted in Space Business Bai y June 26 1972 p 24 Secretary of the Air Force Robert C Seamans Jr noted that ''We must make the best use of technology to maintain and continually modernize our strategic deterrent forces But in so doing we must also consider such factors as the effect of ·a new program on the prospects for arms control agreements or on the force decisions of other countries The ideal weapon is one that promises a sure capability to retaliate but does not have the characteristics that would seem to threaten a surprise first strike against another nation's forces • 11 UNCIASSIFIED •HIVES DECLASSIFiEif ____ _ - · IZ JS5 ARA Dat Jl b2 · LV t __ _ l ------------ Basic Issues il ' cquiring More U S Hard Tar 1 Counterforce The strategic arguments against acquiring greater capabilities have been threefold - - First a well hedged urban industrial capability provides sufficient forces for most hard targets e g C-3 facilities and weapons storage facilities as well as a considerable capability against silos - - Second there seemed to be little advantage to a silo attack we could not significantly limit damage to the U S should the Soviets retaliate against our cities they will have a major SLBM force by 1975 - - Third causing the Soviet ICBM force to be extremely vulnerable could undermine stability in a severe crisis Other Factors There are several other factors that need to be considered in weighing the requirement for the Laird program -- Our need for a capability to destroy hardened military facilities such as command and control installations and nuclear storage depots In situations other than an all out response it would be desirable not to strike command and control facilities so that we do not provide automatic pre-programmed responses It would be essential that the Soviet Government maintains positive control over their forces if there is to be a chance of deterring escalation to an all out exchange As for attacks on nuclear storage this is an important but not a critical target system - - Is there a need for hard target capability to have adequate · flexible response options While there are hard targets that we may want to include in limited strike options we understand that the OSD targeting study casts considerable doubt on the viability of an attack on Soviet ICBMs as limited strike option It does not support a requirement for major hard target capabilities and as Johnny Foster said in his briefing the real need is for better command and control Under the new policy concept the counterforce task has the lowest priority in retaliation on the sensible ground that we would be largely shooting at empty holes In preemption the concept is to try to avoid escalation and not put either side in a use or loose position with respect to their forces A limited attack on a portion of Soviet ICBM silos which demonstrated a clear U S hard target capability would create such a situation A full scale attack on Soviet silos even if it left only 35 survivors would be a major att_a ck 2000 weapons and would probably invite a Soviet retaliation Even if we could reduce their surviving ICBMs a handful thesurviving Soviet SLBMs and Bombers could inflict unacceptable damage to U S cities and industry as well as provide options to attack a wide variety of other U S military targets 'T' P SECRET -'CHIVES DECLASSIFIED ·-· e 1 ¥5 r· 'B IC ARA DateJl b2 ·-- --- - --- -- 2 There is a large measure of inevitability in the acquisition of counterforce capabilities on both sides particularly as a result of marginal accuracy improvements on our side and large throw weight on their side Thus all that SALT can do is postpone the day that ICBMs become marginally survivable or phase them out on a reciprocal basis - - Does an improved hard target capability provide a hedge against Soviet counterforce capabilities This frankly makes no sense militarily Survivability is the response to counterforce not more counterforce Impact on the Soviets An important part of the problem is the Soviet reaction to this program They are undoubtedly aware that counterforce technology is within our grasp and that accuracy improvements alone will lead to increasing Soviet vulnerability We need to consider three questions 1 Will it spur their counterforce capability certainly won't encourage restraint It may not but it 2 Is it a bargaining chip Will it cause them to negotiate more seriously in SALT The Soviets respond better to the stick than the carrot they are likely to have greater incentive to negotiate limits on counterforce if they preceive a growing counterforce threat on our side However they already will have substantial incentives to try to limit or mitigate the possibility of ICBM vulnerability The problem is that there may not be any negotiable verifiable and acceptable qualitative arms control measures to limit counterforce capabilities ' 3 Most importantly how will this program affect the fragile new relationship of mutual restraint we are seeking to build upon If it raises questions about our intentions it could undermine this relationship On the other hand if the Soviets build such a capability they can hardly expect us to refrain out of concern for their sensitivities TOP SECRET • · -