- - -· -· - -- ·---- - - - ··-·-- - - - THE WHITE HOU SE ------------ ·-··· - - -- - ----- - ·- WASHINGTON December 24 19 70 Dear Jack It was good to see you at the meeting with the ____ President last week The discussion touched on several of the is sues raised in your letter to the President of Dece1nber 1 I had hoped there would be a chance to talk to you directly about your letter at that time since it had been sent to the President a few days earlier The President would like you and your associates on the Committee to know that he appreciates having your thoughtful appraisal and recommendation To follow up on the MJ RV 9 uestion we still have doubts that the rather lowkey revival of the formal Soviet proposal represents a serious interest in negotiating this issue At least in our probing of the Soviet delegation they have been extremely coy and have given no sign that their proposals were more than proforma In addition of course tp eir __¥IRV P II2 E-a§ progressed and deployment mav have already s ' · i rted In any case you are aware that we are re-examining - _7 p -iorTtybasi- the entire question of US missile This includes an assessment of Soviet warhead development and will provide an early opportunity to assess once more the feasibility and effect of possible MIRV limitations or bans and to consider whether and what kind of new US negotiating approaches are desirable The points m··your letter will you may be certain receive the fullest consideration as part of these studies As I 1nentioned previously I very much hope to join the Committee at one of its sessions A meeting with the President after the demands on his tilne in connection with the convening of the new Congress have lessened will also b€ taken up Warm regards ·- · H_e_n_r_y_A_ z-K-i s sing er The Honorable Joh J Mc Cloy Chairn n General Advisory Committee 011 _Arms Control and Disannament Washington D C 20451 ' dztc z u I t DEPARTMENT OF STATE 163 62 Washington O C 20S20 SECRET December 8 1970 MEMORANDUM TO THROUGH FROM PM - ·Thomas R Pickering SUBJECT 0 -w- S - The Secretary · I S S ilie re L B c v -- Ji· p • ------- Meeting with the GAC ii pecember __2 _ ---- - The General Advisory Committee oµ Arms Control and Di armament GAC will meet with you at 11 a m December 9 in your Conference Room to discuss two repommendations--on the Atlantic Alliance and SALT-which the Committee forwarded to the resident December 1 Committee views are contained in the • l letter that Mr McCloy Chairman of the GAC sent to the Presid nt a copy of which McCloy provided you December 3 Tab A In sum the Commit ee believes it would be in the US security interest to make a our support for Western European unification more manifest and public and b a o h _er_ ffort to reach an acceptable MIRV ban in SALT L - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ With respect to the former the Committee specifically recommends a strong Presidential reaffirmation of US support for a unified Western Europe The GAC suggests further greater effort to treat the European institutions as a government R that we undertake review of our bilateral commitments to European Communities' states so that when Communities' are prepared - to assume the responsibilities involved in su h current bilateral commitments a transf r might be effected I I I · ' ' I ' ' t' 0 SECRET ' • J I •i' 'l SECRET ·' • i 2 - - 1 t - ' I I ' -1 MIRV the Committee suggests seeking to add a flight test ban which Committee studies indicate would provide the US with adequate ability consistent with US security interests to monitor Soviet activities to the Soviet proposal renewed in Helsinki November 13 for a produc tion and deployment ban The GAC points out that the US has never proposed a MIRV flight ·test ban divorced from on-site inspection and therefore in the judgment of the Commi_ttee the US has not yet made a proposal on MIRV that would meet either our or their minimum need for assurance against cheating On j I' J ' I I ·l I· • r ' · · ' · ·- I 0 f • • The GAC has four major reasons for urging such an effort promptly be mad to seek a MIRV ban • _ - ' I ' The adverse impact upon US land-based strategic forces that would be caused by Soviet Mij Vin 1 o The GAC is not convinced that the US need for O eighs th -beiiefits of pre ntinfi oviet i f SovJert A M can -2 A¥et u a • ' • t u_n • nu w 11uu a 1 I ' j ' ·I ·' • ' I ' 'i ' ·1 I' -- The adverse effect upon US and world public opinion that would result from not including a MIRVl ban in a SALT agreement · I I -- The GAC is convinced that during a period of expanding Soviet power the many billions of dollars in cost for Y§ g rnd new strategic weapon systems could be employed more rofitabli to improve US conventional forces ancr noj g jil @ consis ent wi the ixon Dectrine -v • I ' ' -r I ' I• Mr McCloy will provide separately the names of those members of GAC who will attend tomorrow's meeting · RECOMMENDATION The GAC will not expect you to react · in detail to its recommendations- since they have just been forwarded '' · i · SECRET I · ' ·• · I - SECRET 3 to the President The Committee's main interest is to present the recommendations and the basis for reaching them to you- However any preliminary comments you may wish to make would be appreciated by the GAC ' ' I ' · - ' cc · U - The Under Secretary Attachment Tab A - McCloy Letter of 12 3 0 I I I · · t I I 1 i I l ' II · I t ' i I ' 1' 1 ' ' • I ' I I • • I f I I · ' - q ' · ' I f ' •• I ' ' t 1 I • i I -ll I i t r • -I I I Ji • ' · JI ' I l • - lt-i l ' I I •• • J l· l · - 'f L t· - r • I 'I I I I ' ' ii Ji J -· ' I • 'I • PM DCA rtin mym 12 8 70 ' ' SECRET J fl' ' • • I ·r t J I t • I H ' • '· f ' i · h-t · l ·1 r·t J t r -- -- I - GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE N ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT Washington D C 20451 I 1 u- C' 1 - · ·I '1 ' Escablisbc d by the Arms Co trol and Disarmament Act of Sc pt 26 1961 JOHN J McCLOY airman I W ABEL HAROLD BROWN WILLIAM J CASEY C DOUGLAS DILLON WILLIAM C FOSTER KERMIT GORDON JAMES R KILLIAN° TELEPHONE 202 • 632-9528 December 3 1970 LA URIS NORSTAD PETER G PETERSON JACK RUINA DEAN RUSK WILLIAM SCRANTON CYRUS VANCE JOHN ARCHIBALD WHEELER - Dear Mr Secretary I enclose a copy of a letter to the President that conveys two Committee recommendations designed in the Committee's view to contribute to our security We should like to discuss our analysis and recommendations when we meet with you on December 9 I will send you tlie names of those who will be preser t for the Committee when I have a final list I am lookin-g forward to seeing you · next week I f 1' · Sincerely 1 1' l John J Mc Cloy ' Enclosure ' · 1 Copy of Mr McCloy's letter to the President dated ·December 1 1970 SECRET ii · The Honorable William· P ' R gers The Secretary of State Department of State SECRET C I - · dnNERAL A VI-SOR Y COMivUTTffE · N RMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT I I i 1' · ' I • Washington D C 20451 I LAlJlllS NORSTAD · PETER ·G PETERSON JACK IUJINA TELEPHON E 202 · 632-9 2H JOIJN _I McCLOY Chairman I VI AflEI HAHOJ O BROWN · DE N RUSK WILLIAM SCR NTON CYRUS VANCll WILl 11 J CASEY Dec ember · 1 1970 WILLIAM C fOSTER Kl RMIT GORDON_ JAMES R KILLIAN j JOHN AR CHIB LD WHEELER I I Dear Mr President Since our last meeting with you in December 1969 the Co nittee has attempted to work toward a better understanding of the central strategic and political issues that determine the contribution which arms control measures can make to our national security While awaiting the time when you are able to meet with us again I would like to advise you of the Committee's conclusions after this _year of study The Committee is very sensiti i e to the changed situation in which the United States now finds itself While we have heretofore achieved a·very high level of security from the danger · of a Soviet attack because of an overwhelming nuclear retaliatory force we are now faced with ·a large expansion of Soviet nuclear capability as well as an expansion of Soviet strength and influence that cannot be offset by the simple existence of our own nuclear arms There are two considerations which the Committee would like to advance in this connection The first constitutes a general condition which reflects concern over the state of the Atlantic Alliance -and the other a more specific recommendation relating to the SALT negotiations Both we believe relate directly to the security of the United States I For a number of reasons there has arisen a growing feeling that a definite shift in the balance of power t·o our detriment is ·occurring _ 'he · significance · of the increase The President The Whiia HouQe i SECRITT I i 11 dI • I F st iblishcd hy the Arms Control 1110 r isarmamcut Art of Scpl 26 1961 - 1 li u -Li ·· l ' - I • ' • · · ·I ' li L ' l I - 2 - ·i i l I i«j over -t1 e last' fiJe years of Soviet nuclear ·potential· and the extension of ts military and naval presence outside its borders hav e also1 coincided with the growing impression that the United States is withdrawing throughout the world The tendency is perhaps most often referred to i _n connect on with the rcdu6tion of the United States presence in Vietnam and elsewhere in the Far East But the shift in policy is also related to Europe The defection of France from NAT9 the easy acceptance in Western Europe of the Czechoslovakian suppression the emergence of Soviet military and naval strength in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean the tendency of both Bonn and Paris to adjust to Soviet policy all are events which have tended to accent this attitude in regard to Europe The malaise of spirit hich the Vietnam war and ifs attendant disprders have induced throughout the nation is another factor causing the Europeans to doubt our ability to provide world leadership As this skepticism in regard to our power and will grows not only 6ur influ nce but our overall security is affected Our friends and allies throughout the world become less disposed · to cooperate with us and more disposed to -accommodate and adjust themselves to Soviet policy Yet friends and allies abroad remain essecttial to us not only ··'i - for our diplomacy and general prosperity but as our re6ent experiences in the Middle East have revealed for the deployment of our military strength beyond our own territory in time of crisis · What can be done to counteract · this trend in world affairs is not too clear Nor can we reasonably suppose that the trend can be reversed overnight It is very doubtful that such a reversal could be accomplished simply by rebuilding our nuclear superiority even if this alternative were considered practicable or wise ' Any marked increase in our nuclear weaponry would probably be promptly · matched by the Soviets ' I - · l • I I ' · What seems to be needed and what under present circumstances would appear to be more eff ctive would be a deliberate program of P olitical actio to reinvigorate the Atlantic Alliance The cpncept of a united Europe alli d with the United States constituted a vigorous and constructive · policy du ing the 25 year period following the close of the war It was repeatedly · asserted and recognized as a deliberate United States policy Concrete steps were taken to SECREr ·· ' t ' II I SECR'J T - h _ I l i I ' 1 I • I '•l - 3 I ·i · l' i 'l I implement it in iuding the Marsh all Plan NATO and the Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations If probably remains the most effective long-term offset to the growth of Soviet influence in ·the West that can be devised 1· 'f I · I I · ' ' Though the Soviet Union could in all probability match any increases in our nuclear armament there is no way it can counter the combined political economic and military strength of a Uni·ted States allied with a Western Europe which when unified would represent a population of almost 300 million people with a GNP of almost 500 billion dollars ·' l Strengthening· Western Europe and the Alliance depends primarily at this stage in history upon Western Europe's achieving a greater degree of unity and on an increase in the vigor nd activity of · the institutional relationships with our European allies It also depends on a conscious and sustained effort to bring France back ·into the Alliance in a significant manner It demands some special relationship with Japan In theory Europe can of course assume a greater responsibility for the common defense In practice this can only be done if it has a better means of reaching decisions and taking action on a unified -basis than the present organization of Western Europe now permits While it is evident that Western Europe has the resources of men technology and money needed to build a powerful counter to the Soviet Union they can be fully used only if · there is a common will and an institutional means of reaching decisions by which the parts can be transform d into the whole The translation of West European potential into W est European power is not within the reach of the incli vidual states nor even of several of their number _w orking together A greater degree of Western European union would we believe assure the maintenance of Western European indepenoence from Soviet pressure a pressure which is bound to be more dangerous as European interests become fragmented • It would provide the basis for a more effective Western European defense effort It would also present an ever more powerful attraction to the Soviet satellite s tates while diminishing the power of the French and Italian Communist Parties as they were submerged in an overwhelmingly noriCommunist Western Europe And a united Western Europe would be able incr asingly to play a more responsible ·role elsewhere · in the world as well I ' 1 r 1 i r ii I · ' •' rr ' ' 11 ti·- 1i1 · f ' ' ' l • 1 · -rr · · l ' An i c ea secl nvement · t ward such a ·n ew viable center of power al 1gnecl WJ th the Um t irl St it s would materially 1i ' 'i SECRJ r M _ r ' l 'l i1 SECRl '1 ' - 4 - I I i · 'l- I t · - ·· 111 change the climate of ·world thought in ·r sp ct to the shifting balance of power and as a consequence we believe · it could enhance our security I '' ' There are we believe some practical steps that the United States could ind should take to strengthen our ties w i th Western Europe and to assist the proce s of Western European unification ' · Chi'ef among these would be a clear Presidential reaffirmation of support for Western European unification · There has been no major pubfic restatement of the policy of United States support for Western European unification and early enlargement of the European Communities to include Great Britain since the inclusion of a paragraph in _the Fe_bruary 1970 Foreign Policy Report to Congress In th rs form it had little resonance While there was a period during which our open support for West European unification was felt to be a handicap that time we believe has now passed ' t I ' ·- rJ t j ' I 4 ' • I · A public · Presidential statement is particularly important at a moment when Europe is facing the prospect · t n of a European -Security Conference in which its internal '· l ynd external alignment will be test d nd wh n disagree ents • j •• over trade matters strategic negotiations with the Soviet • · ' r·' ' ' Union and - uncertainty about our NATO tro op levels have clearly raised doubts in Western Europe as in the United States about the continued cqmmitment of the United States ' _l to the policy of a united Western Europe Moreover a f public reaffirmation would be propitious now that movement ' i' toward Western European unity has resumed as a result of ' ' the initiative of the Hague meeting of European Heads of Government last December The shape of urope and of ·our i long-term rel tions with it is being determinea in the process - • - • ' 11 - r i' l It would also -provide necessary direction to the numerous executive agencies involved in our foreign affairs · As a concomitant of such a statement we believe that a more conscious effort should e made by the · United States _to treat the European Commu1 1i ties and the Commission as a government with a steadily expanding range of powers We might also undertake a systematic review of our bilateral commitments to individual European Communities' states with the objective of establishing a timetable for their consolidation and transf r to the European Communities as rapidly as that institution-is prepared to assume them r 1 i - ' ' ' ' ' - 'I ' ' r - · I llj·_ · 1 SECRE'l' - r r ' 1ft ' - -i - SECHT I' ---- I d i'l ' I ' - 5 · · ' rl d ' • I Although there are other positive steps which we believe · might be taken there are two from a negative point ·of view which should certainly not be taken One is a reduction of believe that your reported troop levels was essential and to counter the further • f • • l J ' f I r I• I 'I I our force levels in -Europe We decision to maintain existing to avoid weakening our alliance growth of Soviet lnfluence • I I I ·' I 1 The other step to be avoided i convocatibn of a European Security Conferenc before Western Europe has attain d a greater degree oi unity and before we and our allies have strengthened our own ties Unless there - is a more tightly knit Western _European entity we fear that the Alliance may be seriously weakened by the power f ul J ivisive force which the Soviet Union i trying to exert upon both NATO and the process of Western Eur_opean unification Examination should also begin with our allies of means to modernize NATO the OECD the GATT and possibly other international institutions The aim should be to bring France back into the - fold and to establish special ties and a special trilateral relationship among Japan common Western European institutions 'and ourselv s The most effective way to achieve this objective should_ be · ' methodically and purposefully examined with our closest allies q The very process of com on re-e amination of premises and needs could enhance and ieaffirm th u9ity of the West particularly if it· culminated in a· n·ew confer ence of heads of states to cap the modernization of our Alliance relations I · lf ' if q I • • ' t I ti J'i' - ' ' - r ' 1• r ' • ' 1 I'II f Ir J • 1 l II With respect to the· SALT two things have taken place recently which prompt -us to renew our recommendations in respect of MIRV deployment One is the Soviet restatement in Helsinki of a desire for a MIRV ban and the other is the· initiation of Soviet MIRV testing These two developments convince the ·Cammi tte·e that what may well be our last chance to prevent Soviet deployment of an · operational MIRV is rapidly slipping away Unless means can be found within the next few weeks or months to halt · Soviet MIRV development · the Comm t tee believes that the security position of the United Sta tes will be adversely affec t 1 •and the arms race will en t er a new · costly i i ncl potentially lass stable phase We believe therefore that it i r-J itnportr r nt that a prompt effort be made during the ' f t ' • I l' ' ·1 l• I - 6 Helsinki phase of the SALT negotiations to stop Soviet MIRV preparatio_n at its p r esent point of evo·lution We believe and our convictions were reinforced by the recent Soviet reopening of the issue in Helsinki that there is still a chance to negotiate an acceptable MIRV prohibition with the Soviet Union · · - ' I I An agreement to limit ABM deployment such as that proposed by the United States to the Soviet Union at Vienn would also be very valuable to the security of the United States in restraining the Soviet Union As we earlier reported to you and despite recent Soviet acceptance of an NGA level in principle our preferenc·e would be that the level of ABM be agreed ·at zero This would both · minimize the dangers of Soviet SAM upgrading to an ABM capability and diminish the need for our own MIRV deployment However an agreement which also placed limits on the number of ICBM launchers and bombers would in our judgment be much more valuable to our security in restraining the Soviet Union if it were accompanied by an effective prohibition on MIRVing You will recall that in March we urged that a SALT agreement include a proh i bition on MIRV deployment At that -cime we concluded that a prohibition on MIRV should be J ' • In essence our recommendations embodied our concern that Soviet MIRVing would ' compel us to speed - up deployment of costly new deterrent weapons systems the funds for which would be drawn from our general purpose forces This in turn would make us increasingly vulnerable to sub-nuclear encroachment by the Soviet Union · · · · · SECRET • - ' ' · · accompanied by a low or zero level of area ABM together with a MIRV flight test ban Later after a further examination of ABM MIRV and on-site inspection we reported to you on June 27 that on-site inspection would have very · doubtful value in adding to our -6onfidence in Soviet observance of a MIRV ban and would be of limited value in connection with any prohibition on the upgrading of SAM facilities to ABM capacity if SAM upgrading for air defense were permitted We added that a MIRV prohibition would appear to be highly desirable from the point of view of our own security And we pointed out that the United State had not proposed a MIRV ban to the Soviets without on-site inspection nor had we responded to their proposal not to produce or stockpile MIRVs as part of an agr eement t •'j _ ·i '' i j '• 1 ' ' I t ' I 1 r 1 t·1 I-• II r -_- _-_ _ - _-_-_-_-_- - -- ----- _- We believe I l l • 7 - I j • • fhat we under$tand the many considerations which led the Un t d states to the formulation of a limited proposal excluding MIRVs at the close of the Vienna talks We are very conscious of the lack of Soviet receptivity to our original ·proposal for· a MIRV prohibition accompanied by on-site inspection Th recent Soviet SS-9 tests however suggest the beginning of a genuine MIRV development program While the best evidence is still not conclusive on this point we believe that it is not in our security interest to wait to be sure According to the agree intelligence judgment by the end of a year the new Soviet warhead might well be deployable but have no greater accuracy than the present SS-9 triplet By the end of 1972 however the system might be sufficiently improved to provide a hard target capability Nevertheless if the Soviets would agree to stop ·· testing before their program has developed accuracy greater than the present ·ss-9 we believe that our monitoring of Soviet testing could till provide adequate assurance against · clandestine MIRV improvement and therefore of deployment of an accurate MIRV Moreover there would also be advant ge to our security in a ban on· testing which did no more than freeze Soviet MIRV d_evel0pment at· a primitive ' level compared to our own ' There are four major reasons that compel us to the view that it is in our interest to try to prevent Soviet MIRVing ·1 • I · · ·1 i t r rt - ··f I' -I f ' · • · f 1 t tI l · · 1 The adverse impact upon our own land based strategic forces that would be caused by Soviet MIRVing · - j is the most important of these Our entire Minuteman system • J would be put at risk and neutralized more rapidly by · such a development than would otherwise be the case We ' would be faced with an - early choice of · shifting sooner · to new underwater systems land mobile ICBMs to new airbo ne systems or to a hard point ABM each of which or together would cost some tens of billions of dollars • Alternatively we could rely upon only· two deterrent systems air and submarine or fall back on•-a doctrine of launching our land based missiles at ·warning of a Soviet attack to avoid their destruction on the · ground The latter would -seem to the Committee to be fraught with great hazard exceeded only by the likelihood that the Soviet Union ·too might go to a-launch on warning octrine SECRE 'r _ --- __ _ _ _ _ _ _ I I1 - 8 - •' • f 2 We are not co nvi need th at our own ne d for MIRV outweighs tlie benefits of preventing Soviet MIRVing if Soviet ABM capability can be held to the NGA level There is to be sure the danger that Soviet SAMs may be susceptible to improvement to the point that they would deny us an assured d struction capability in- a retaliatory miss i le strike unless we had MIRVed However we have examined this case with considerable care anu conclude that 1 lateral restraints on SAM upgrading could reduce this Y- rgely theoretictlr i sk to a very low level n· J' 11 1t - r 1l The additional use for MIRV as a means of expanding target cove age in a less than full nuclear exchange we do not find adequatc · to justify the vastly greater disadvantage to our security resulting from Soviet MIRVing We are persuaded that the most credible role for nuclear weapons whether tactical or strategic is that of deterrence rather than for fighting a limited nuclear war 3 We _are conviriced that during a period of expanding Soviet power the many billions of dollars that our own MIRVing would cost us directly and indirectly for new strategic weapons systems coul profi be employed in the improvement of our c o n f -forces and those of our allies consistent wftFttne - Nixon Doctrine · 4 The adverse effect upon United States and indeed Norld public opinion hat its exclusion will be apt to have is the final but by no means least · important reason for such a MIRV ban in the SALT A strategic arms control agreement which in fact permits a manyfold increase in the number of Soviet and United States nuclear warheads could be widely criticized ·as cynical and deceptive It is because of these fundamental public policy considerations that we recommend that new efforts should be made to bring MIRV into the SALT negotiaticin- ·even if Soviet MIRV testing may have now begun i I' I l· I We cannot judge ultimate Soviet attitudes but we believe that until a precise and negotiable proposal has been made• to • them no one can know how their highest political lcRdershlp w1ll respond Maqy 0£ the same reasons that lcud us to conclude against MIRVing would seem to apperil to the Soviets _ as we l The Soviet Union too would rapidly find i s l g ased ICBM systems which constitute a lRrger share ot Lt§ clet rrcnt th rn ou r · own obsolcto rnc J tt tno I wcmlrl bn facc cl ·w i th tl lE neecl fcH - the cal' 'ly deployment of enormously costly ilt rnative systems f •• ' SECR r l ' 9 _ I ·i' ' It is also important to note that the Soviets are in so many words clearly on record both in Vienna and Helsinki as f avorable to a MIRV d - ployment and production prohibition 'l'hey have previously implied opposition to a ban on flight testing But they have hot refused to accept a test ban when divorced from on-site inspection and combined with an agreement not to stockpile or to produce MIRVs as they have -asked In short tl1c Un i ted States has not yet mnclc _1 proposal on MIRV that in our judgment would meet either our or their minimum need for assurance against cheating i' I _ I t· I r · This is a matter of sudh national consequence and such urgency tlictt we recommend that this issue be pressed ns of highest priority during the current Helsinki phase of th discussions In our view it would be desirable to propose in response to the Soviets' November 13 statement ori MIRV that an interim standstill be agreed upon to stop the clock for some fixed period of time while the possibilities of a MIRV prohibition are explored by the two governments The standstill would need to include some United States engagement with respect to our MIRV deployment in return for a commitment from the Soviet Union to stop flight ·testing The standstill could take effect immediately upon Soviet assent to this procedure During such a standstill we would maintain a prompt capability to resume the MIRVing of our Minuteman ancl of our Polaris missiles in case f a Soviet resumption of testing And because of our several means of surveillance we would have a very high degree of as urance of knowing of any Sov et testing and therefore of deployment · If our analysis of our security position is sound and if there is little or no receptivity to the proposal for a MIRV ban we believe that you as President of· the United States might press on a higher level for consideration by the Soviet Union of such a proposal The Committee feels that American and world public opinion would respond sympathetically to a direct call upon the Soviet leadership to join with us in finding ways to include a MIRV ban before the Soviet de p loyment takes us past the point of no return This would be so even if such a call were rejected Just as the initiatives recently taken by the President in the Middle East and in Vietnam have won wide approval as helpfu4 qontributions to world peace so we believe would i _ _ r -r- ·- - t • SECRl C ' • ·i ' · · - · '· •· SECREr I· ' ' -ii- ·· _ _ ·• · • I - 10 ' •' 1 • J - - a similar initiative in -regird io the avoidance of the gfeat increase in nuclear warheads which the deployment of MIRVs would almost certainly induce • • • • - • ' ' 1 - _ _ -· r I The Committee hopes that these two recommendations n the Atlantic Alliance and the·SALT designed to improv the security of the United States will be of some assistance to you during this rapidly changing peripd cf our fore gn relations · ' · · · ··· _ · - - •• • ·· • J · - -· • • • ' · • • · •- · • _ · ·_ Ht f espectM Y · _ · ·-• ·• - ' •• I ·_ • ' 1 • -·· · ' - · · ' ' ••• · i ·· ·' ' '1 • • ' • · •· · _ • ' ' - · • ' r • -' · ' ' •· • · · ' • '• ·- ' • • - • • • • _• • • 0 - • • • - ' ·· ' -- ' • t - _·_ _· ' I_·_- __ _ _·· ·- - · • • ' • ' • # ir • • •• '• l '• - • • ·· _ ·- • · • •I_ • - · • • · - · · • I I • ' ' · ' · ' w-6 ' ' I ' - · 0 ' _ _ · ' • • · · _ _ - • • - 1 • • • ·· ··_ • · ' ' 1 -- ·· __ · - • · -- ·_ I - · · ·•·· ' · _ · t # • · ·t • · • ' - · -- · • -· ·t - •' · · •' I I SECRE'r · --- · · ' ' -- · ' '· I · ' f i _ · • • o ' · ' • - ' •1 ' _· • •• • • ___ - ·_ __ · · ' · · ' ' · I ••• • a• ·•••• • • · '· • • ' - · · · · ·· _ - ·_ -·• - -- ··· · ' ·_ • · -· · · · ··· ··· I ' ' ' · · -• - ' • • - _- -- • · - -j - • • - · • • · · _ · • • ·-_ __·_ ·_ - _· - ••• •• • · ' · - -_ -· _ · ·- - · ' ' - · · · · - ·· _ i ' ' • • ' I• ' • ' •' • I ¥ ' ' · ' ''I ' - • · John J - McCloy Chairman ·· ''· ' ' · · · · t _ · ·· • - - - ' - · • • I • ' · - • -1 • · _ ' ·' ' ' ' ·· ' · • ·- ·' - · · · · - __ - t ' ·• •• ' ' - r 11· -• ' l ·- ' 1' • · - · - · • ' · ·· ·· • • r - f ' ··• · • ••