-'f6P SBalHP National Security Agency Fort George G Meade Maryland DECEMBER 1972 •r ' •I I I • 119 - - I I M l _- 3---··-- -- -- _ __ _ i - _ L - Declassified and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-06-2020 pursuant to E O 13526 MDR 107694 This is V agon SeecU There is fantasy irony and the bite of reality in the name It speaks of the East And like the East it suggests much says little • V 4gon Seecl6 is both Mother China and her neighbors V agon Se d is monumental and minuscule It is the past and future It begs for elaboration but gives none In it are echoed softly slurred Mandarin brittle Vietnamese determined Korean In it is the spectre looming over the Thai Lao and Khmer It is frightening and friendly It is uncertain Above all O agon Seed is promise It is fertile with ideas unbounded to be cultivated with creativity and imagination It is challenge It is alive It will be more than it is V agon Seed is yours May it grow with you The Editors p S CRB UMBRA 'fO -- -- - - 'fOP 8130Rfff UMBR A -- -JL ONE YEAR LATER--DRAGON SEEDS' ANNIVERSARY --A Commentary from the Chief B It doe 6 not 6e e m that tong but Dragon Seeds i 4 now one yeaJt otd Vu«ng iu initial yeaJt it ha4 4hown deve topme nt and an e nviabte 6tandaJt d 06 exce tle nce The publication ha6 in many Jt e6pecu exceeded my highe-6t e xpectaUon6 I continue to be i mpJr U4e d wit' h the va 1tied tt1 te nu 06 the pe 1t-6onnel -in 8 GJr oup and each 6ucceecUng publication magni6ie-6 th-i -6 -i mp e -6-6 i on The wide vaJr i e ty 06 inte Jt e -6t-6 and technical acumen di-6ptayed by the cont«butoJt 6 make -6 me pJt oud 06 ouJr B G1toup pJr o6e 6-6 i onat-6 I -6 i nceJr e ly de -6 i Jr e thi-6 inteJr change 06 e xpeJr -i e nce and ide a-6 to continue I 6eet Dragon Seeds i -6 pJr oving a mo-6t e 66e ctive medium to encou Jr age and -6timutate pJt o6e -6-6ionat i -6m in B GJr oup Some 06 iu aJr ticte -6--1 Jr e catl Things That Go Clank in the Night in the lMt i -6-6ue --ind i cate how impoJr tant and exciting ou Jr Jr e-6ulu can be Thi-6 i-6 a mo-6t U-6e 6ul -6timutant to the many who-6e daily Jte-6ulu do not have the exc ltement 06 vital imme diacy--Jr e ga 1tdle-66 06 the tonge Jr teJt m i mpoJr tance 06 the i Jt woJt k The Jt e i -6 much appJtopJr -i ate empha-6 i -6 on mechanization 06 ouJt pJr obtem--an aJr ea 6u ll 06 development potential and pJt obtem-6 in making complex computeJt ized -6y-6te m-6 woJr k I took oveJr the contenu 06 OU Jt aouJt i44Ue-6-we have Jr anged ac4o46 alt ou4 majoJt di-6cipline4 and included 4ome inte 4e-6ilng Jt e6lecilon 6 on management p4oblem-6 It i4 a delight that 4ome 06 ou4 cont«buto44 have pJr ovided welcome chuckle4--humoJt needed to tighten ou4 4eJr iou-6 endeavo46 Howeve4 ouJt GJr oup coveM -6uch a w i de 4ange 06 inte4e4ting acUvitie4 that ou4 talented peMonnet · have an inexhau -6Ubte 4ange 06 4ubject matte Jr 6oJr 6utuJt e a4Ucle4 16 you a4e excited about what you aJt e doing i 6 you 6e el you a4e doing 4omething impoJt tant i6 you 4e e p4oblem4 needing atte ntion--W4ite about it 4ha4e youJr enthu -6ia-6m 04 conceJt n with me and the 4e4t 06 B G4oup And let'4 4ee ou4 M6'6 and miUtaJt y pe Jr -6onne l pa4ucipate to a laJr geJr degJt ee Happy 8 i 4thday Dragon Seeds and 6ull 4team ahead H CA - ----------------------------------·-------- Ju emorandzim TO Captain Joslin Chief B FROS I ADP StiHJECT Letter of Appreciation from Major General Potts J2 MACV DATE 30 August 19 Prior to his departure Admiral Gayler asked that the attached letter be circulated to appropriate contributors here at NSA particularly B · · I happen to think this letter is one of the finest accolades we have ever received from a senior intelligence officer who has been in a outstandingly unique position to earnestly evaluate the contributions of SIGINT to the allied cause in Vietnam I know of no other crganization within Prod more deserving of receiving and retaining the original copy of this letter than B6 I am mindful of the fact that others have contributed among these Pl P2 C TCOM and many other elements of your fine B Group organization I will see to it that those outside of B Group who are deserving receive copies Please make appropriate distribution of copies within B Group at large You know best who should receive them Please add to the generous comments of General Potts the deep gratitude of Admiral Gayler and of course _ _ Congratulationsl Attachment a s 'fOP SfiORlff UMBRA - -· 'FOP SHClltff UMBlb H F R UNll'EO STATES M1Ll1Aj -- vMMAND VIETNAM APO SA ' I 98222 Oflice of the A n i s of Staff Intelligence 4 August 1972 • Admiral Noel Gaylor USN Director National Security Agency Fort George G Meade Maryland 20755 Qcar Admiral Gaylor During the month of August 1972 I will complete three and one-half yea rs a s Assistant Chief of Staff JZ Intelligence for the Military Assistance Command Vietnam Therefore I wish to take this opportunity to extend my sincere appreciation for your personal interest valuable assistance and timely support in the successful accomplishment of our intelligence mission for OOMUSMA CV Throughout this long and critical period the expertise analytical skill dedication and devotion to duty of The National Security Agency has unfailingly rendered invaluable aid to me OOMUSMACV and his subordinate commanders We are moat greatlul for your many significant contributions to· the Free World miaeion in the Republic of Vietnam Sincerely · JI ' - · '4 1wktqtiM t6 u Major General USA Assistant Chief of Staff Jl 'tffll en UMltltA I PL 86-36 50 DRAGON SEEDS Publisher DONALD E MCCOWN CHIEF B03 Managing Editor Executive Editor Minnie M Kenny Roberts Benjamin Feature Editor Richard v Biographical Editor Curtin Jane Dunn Rewrite Editor Education Editor Victor Tanner Marian L Reed Special Interest Editor Ray F Lynch Composition Helen Ferrone Lorna Selby PRESS CORPS Bll Carolyn Y Brown B42 Peggy Barnhill Bl2 Philip J Gallagher B43 Mary Ann Laslo 82 Dee Ensey 844 Jack L Thomas B31 Jack Spencer B45 John E Uzarek B32 Jean Gilligan BS Maney Fournier B33 Louis Ambrosia B621 B34 Thomas L wood B63 George B41 James w Schmidt r s Patterson B63 William Eley • 'fOP SBORIR UMBRA use 3605 I 'l'OP 88CRE'f UMBRA DECEMBER 1972 Vol l Nr V llllE If CIITEITI Budda Speaks 1 callimahos Jean Gilligan 3 Uncertain Origins••••••••••·········••········••• Tom Glenn 5 The CINCPAC Intelligence Coordination Group Walter D Abbott 16 Remsberg Where Do We Go Now Ph·1 i 22 The Development of a COMINT Translation Course for Vietnamese Linguists ••••••••••• Jack Sharretts 24 The Open Door Louis C Grant 28 Part 3 •••••••••••• Noman Wild 31 The Wade-Giles System•···••·········•·•••· E Leigh Sawyer 35 T A - Math Symposium Reviewed •••••••••••••• David J Tiren 36 Seedlings 40 Ask the Dragon Lady 42 Contributors 48 AG-22 Don't Say MUSSO - Say USSID Machine Aided Translation I I J 'i'0P SHORE'I' UMBRA 'f0P SBCRBf UMBRA _ ___ I 'f6P SHCRfi'f OMB A Edito4'6 note We a4ked the Gu u 06 the Vundee Society to g ant u6 a 6ew wo d4 06 Wi4dom 6 om hi4 enlightened 4tate 06 maha6ambodhi What 6ollow4 i4 a b e6 a4ticte which appea4ed in the Hall Herald A lington Halt Station 60 9 May 1941 lt i4 ep inted he e becau4e 06 iu impact on p e4ent-day technology THE MX-14 A VARIABLE INTEGRATOR A succinct explanation by Lambros D Callimahos An engineering Schrecklichkeit of the first order the MX-14 was unveiled on 23 April before a distinguished gathering at the Arlington Officers' Club The highlights f the principles of this machine which was developed under the greatest of secrecy and unnatural tension may be briefly elucidated as follows The five variables two components of which are continuously variable generate a point through four dimensions by the simple expediency of binary translation of the development of the linear functions of an ellipsoidal plane modulo zero The convocations of the contortion series under the influence of the aberrations of a mellifluous hysteresis induced by partially damped shock waves result in a progression which may be best explained as a modified Fourier agglutination with mutually exclusive coefficients derived from three of Small Numbers • The deviation of the catalytic sums of least squares hardly makes an impression on the generatrices produced by the interaction of factorial deltas in cascade but on the other hand the asymmetrical sohamillac touched off by the misalignment of the cycloidal contusions out of phase play havoc with the formation of Lissajou's • figures Furthermore the recurrence of asymptotes tends to polarize the stronger principles of Bernoulli's theorem1 but this can be almost entirely offset by the 1 'fOP SHORR UMBRA There is a difference of opinion whether it is the Gleichschaltung or the Weltschmerzenumkreisung that retards the bar-sinister effluvium but this point cannot be settled conclusively until all the phenomena of the expansion of differential planimetric clavicles cf Homo Ecce--La Vida Breve Bologna 1947 have been collated and studied Enough has been said here to aive the reader a clear idea of the general theory and purpose behind the MX-14 Further discussion will be continued in a classifi d paper available to personnel who must refer to it in the performance of their official duties The paper will also include an example of the Pyrrhic occlusions generated by the reflexed undulatory motion of the experimental model of the MX-14 The Gu u d tude hi 4h bu Ao in GAeece 1972 2 T-QP 8 JRJR UMBitA CALLIMAHOS ••• by Jean F Gilligan B32 To encapsulate 60 or more years of a varied and full life and at the same time to do a modicum of justice to the subject of an interview is a completely impossible task unless the interviewer finds a kind of universal that will give a single meaning to many aspects Lambros Demetrios Callimahos is assuredly a man of many many parts that can conveniently and honestly be universalized by a reference to Sixteenth Centry Sir Thomas More of whom Robert Whittington a contemporary wrote A man of • •• wit and singular learning ••• a man of marvelous mirth and pastimes •• a man for all seasons Mr Callimahos has contributed articles on cryptology to Wo td Book Encyclopedia Cottle ' Encyclopedia and he has prepared an 11 100-word article for the forthcoming edition of the prestigious Encyclopaedia BJU' tannica As a scientist he has written on such subjects as Cybernetics and Problems of Diagnostics The Parallels between Medicine and Cryptanalysis and Communication with Extraterrestrial Intelligence An accomplished linguist Mr Callimahos retains and further increases his fluency in seven foreign languages by taking his notes in a different language every day of the week Mr Callimahos does not regard his knowledge as a purely personal possession in addition to sharing it with others through his numerous publications he teaches the most advanced course in cryptanalysis given in the Agency Even in his teaching Mr Callimahos exhibits the dynamics of a multitalented individual His own teaching is not a static routine activity it is an ever-alive and changing endeavor as is evidenced by his ability to teach effectively in four months what once required four years According to a Pa 1t i 6 So l1t reviewer Callimahos has proved himself to be one of the greatest flutists in the world The New YoJt k Time stated Mr Callimahos commands the resources of 3 p SECRET UMRRh fOP SBORfi UMBKi his instrument to the services of his artistic will If Mr Callimahos shares his artistry with his audiences he does still further sharing by devoting his time and superb talents to the teaching of advanced students of the flute Mr Callimahos does not limit himself to the admittedly esoteric fields of cryptanalysis and the flute he is a husband and the father of two children a board member of the Prince Georges series of the Baltimore Symphony Orchestra and of the Prince Georges Symphony Orchestra and is actively engaged in work for retarded children It is not surprising that Mr Callimahos is no gourmet of pedestrian tastes He is a member of the Anteaters Association which banquets five times annually on delicacies such as fillets of hippopotamus elephant and whale In his work at the Agency Mr Callimahos is a staunch supporter of professionalization stressing the importance of a thorough theoretical training program and follow-up for technical careers in the Agency In the age of narrow specialties and even narrower specialists it is uniquely refreshing to meet and chat with Mr Callimahos who makes the widest possible range of creative human experiences his own overspecialty • •••• 4 'fOP SfiCRlff UMBRA - - -· - - UNCERTAIN ORIGINS by Tom Glenn B6 In· October 1967 I was the only American civilian within miles of the military complex at Pleiku Vietnam I had just arrived on TOY to work with analysts of the 330th Radio Research Company USM-604 The unit had been there more than a year It was ostensibly a mobile outfit and was expected to be able to move on command It had sat in vans tents and temporary buildings through the winter blasts of red dust and the summer onslaughts of red mud waiting for a command that never came It clUn Jwithout roots to its allotted slope on Engineer Hill all sand bags watch towers outhouses and barbed wire listening intently to the Vietnamese Communist transmitters all around it Only a civilian I thought to myself could really appreciate the profound desolation of a military SIGINT unit mired in Vietnam's western highlands But the analysts I met were anything but desolate Working in a pair of tottering quonset huts at tables they had made themselves and harassed by wind dust and erratic electricity they saw themselves in league against the forces of evil--variously embodied in the VC the weather and NSA They were sustained by an irreverent humor and a passionate devotion to their work Above all they shared a foreboding of uncertain origins that a major enemy action was in the offing They felt it in their blood It's like when I get a new dinomic substitution system in a cryppie told me I can tell what it is sort of by the way it smells The analysts and intercept operators to a man worked as if their lives depended on it Most stayed at it twelve to fourteen hours a day seven days a week working against colossal odds The target defied exploitation Less than one percent of the traffic was readable the signal plans consisted mostly of daily changing calls fregs and skeds and the transmitters the Communists used were low-powered and erratic The traffic volumes were staggering requirements overwhelming and customer need unquestionably urgent Working and living conditions were suited to an infantry unit not a SIGINT one Perhaps most debilitating of all were the ungrateful hungry tactical customers 5 OP 880Rfi UMBRA Every Saturday three or four men would go by jeep down the road to Camp Enari to brief the U S 4th Infantry Division The message they brought back was always the same They want more SIGINT they want it faster they want it in more detail 11 That the analysts produced a steady flow of usable intelligence bore witness to their ingenuity and unflagging determinati to outflank the elements ranged against them But I could not help wondering if the presentiment of a coming attack that ran through the company like an underground river was not in part some kind of an irrational outlet for the pressures they lived with day after day I wanted to know what factual basis there was for their suspicions Having decided to dig into the SIGINT facts I started with the traffic analysts Bruce Andreason was the senior traffic analyst responsible for the NVA North Vietnamese Army BJ Front the Communist command f9r the western highlands He was big blond and blunt The whole ball of wax is coming apart at the seams he told me in his characteristic lingo Look here The front headquarters has sent out a new detache element This new guy talks to Hanoi--that shows you what kind of brass he is--and since 7 October he's been passing and receiving more messages than anybody else on the net He's been getting messages from the highest echelon headquarters in South Vietnam Now this guy is some important cookie Much of this activity he went on to explain took place at night when the Vietnamese Communist transmitters are normally shut down Most unsettling of all the detached element had moved 77 kilometers north in six days and was now operating northwest of us near the tri-border area--the juncture of the Laotian Cambodian and Vietnamese borders--in Vietnam's Kontum Province What were the communications of the known tactical units like Where were they He shrugged and handed me his intercept logs and airborne radio direction-finding ARDF results for late September on I saw that the communications of the NVA 1st Division the largest combat force of the front had been in disarray since 29 September--the day after the new detached element of the front had started communicating with the front headquarters Communications with the subordinate regiments of the division--the 32nd 66th and 174th--were virtually inactive ruling out any possibility of locating them But the division headquarters had been located earlier that day 15 October --in 6 'f0P SBOIMR UMB A LA OS western Kontum Province Its move there had paralleled that of the front's detached element Another Bl Front unit the NVA 24th Regiment had also moved into the area at about the same time It had come south from Quang Ngai as if to rendezvous with the detached element and the headquarters of the NVA 1st Division I began to understand that the forces of the B3 Front were going through some sort of a change and it smelled tactical • • C A • I 0 D A 111 coa s MY • 1 1 flRNJ tit • • • ' ' c I turned to the linguists for more information John Thomas lanky bass-voiced and acid-humored warrant officer in charge of the language shop tapped the map Down here south of us is where it's happening He was pointing at Darlac Province a full two provinces away from the triborder The 33rd Regiment is getting ginned up All kind of tactical talk in his cOmtdS Of ·course he always talks bigger than he hits but he's a·good thermometer of what's in the wind And up here just over the hill from us we've picked up a guy who's reconnoitering the Pleiku area ··ue doesn't say much we can understand or read but the idea is clear enough They're up to something Not just up in Kontum but down here near Pleiku and then on further south in Darlac 7 Davy Dawson the senior enlisted reporter agreed It's not something I can explain to you in any real clear way but just the way they're acting--all these new low-grade systems since September the comms structure changes in the B3 Front th' stuff down in Darlac--it just sort of doesn't sound like a long winter's nap does it It didn't By now it was the 18th of October Sam Berry a new second lieutenant had been put in charge of the reporting shop at my request Sam had been a civilian at NSA working the Vietnamese Communist problem and we needed his know-how Sam Davy and I went to Pop Warner the senior warrant officer in charge of the analysts and ran through the facts we'd assembled Pop who had more SIGINT experience than all of us combined and enough meanness to work us all under the table wa n•t impressed I suppose you think you're telling me something I don't already kno I respectfully suggest sir he said to Sam with a trace of twinkle that you report all this 11 Sam grinned · l Take a look at this Sam handed him a draft spot report summarizing what we had so far The main weakness of our position as Pop was quick to point out was that we were lacking several features that would clinch the evidence that an offensive was coming If we were right we could expect that the NVA 1st Division would soon start collecting detailed reconnaissance information on the prospective target or targets Meticulous fact-gathering was a normal part of the Communist battle preparation pattern But the Military Intelligence Section of the 1st Division had been off the air since August Besides none of the regiments of the 1st Division had resumed communications with the division headquarters It was a good bet that they were on the move--their silence indicated that-but where they were going was anybody's guess We released the report without comment on the implications And we waited One moonless night when we were feeling spooked we got in a fix on a new unit about 20 kilometers from where we were sitting We couldn't identify the man but he was clearly Communist military and the characteristics of his communications made us edgy We wondered for example if he was alone or if other units were with him On of the B3 Front analysts wrote up a quick spot report on the fix and gave it to me for editing To save time I decided to type it for him 8 'f6P SHCltlff UM Bib - - '--- ---•- Then I heard the siren We were under attack Analysts bolted for their combat gear and took off for their positions on the perimeter I hadn't the vaguest idea of what to do I slipped on a flack jacket and helmet and went on typing The GI assigned to guard the quonset watched me in disbelief The lights went out I heard something that sounded like a child screaming distant and indistinct Then came the concussion of the first mortar round impacting ·It brought to mind my earthquake days in San Francisco1 a little dust fell on my face and the quonset creaked All there was to do was sit there in the dark and listen to the incoming rounds my stomach turning inside out and wait Twenty minutes later the lights came back on I heard the all-clear signal The only casualty as I was to learn later was an outhouse I resumed typing I could not have devised a better way to impress the military I never quite got up the nerve to admit that I had stayed put through the attack from sheer witlessness And the way I flinched at the slightest sounds later never seemed to undo my credibility The faint distrust I'd encountered from officers and enlisted men alike disappeared from that day foIWard I was welcomed into both the officers and enlisted clubs I was called into operations at all hours of the day and night just like the military and everybody stopped calling me sir 11 My fatigues showed up with 13's sewn on the collars I was a GG-13 and my cap was decorated with the unit symbol much to the confusion of those personnel who didn't know me and were never sure who if anybody should salute Meanwhile the Vietnamese communists were not sitting idly by Gunships and artillery apparently convinced the attackers that Pleiku was not a lucrative target but action elsewhere continued On 20 October the cryppies and linguists received a message picked up during search They diagnosed the system as a dinornic substitution but it was so short a piece of text they couldn't break it Several more messages came in during the next two days and we broke the system Somebody in the Oak To area of western Kontum Province it seemed was in the middle of urgent operations and was afraid that Allied forces might detect it Finally 9 '8P SHefttff UMBlb through a wideband replay we ot sianatures on a messaqe of 23 October The names were those of- the Military Inteliigence Section of the NVA 1st Division The combat reconnaissance we had been waitina for had started The NVA 1st Division was clearly preparing for an attack--so ewhere in the Oak To area of western Kontum Province From that point on things happened fast Reporters were hard put to pump out the information as they received it We pinned down the calls freqs and skeds of the military intelligence link and identified a fix taken on 21 October as the location of the Military Intelligence Section It was operating near Oak To and like the division headquarters and the detached element of the front it had moved some 70 kilometers north during its silence On the 25th the 32nd Regiment was located in the same area It had moved more than 100 kilometers north since the 16th On the 27th the 66th Regiment was located nearby on the 30th the 174th Regiment appeared in the same area Communications silences on the NVA 1st Division net ended as each unit reached its new position in western Kontum Province At the same time cryppies and translators were breaking out and publishing a growing volume of messages exchanged by the military intelligence units of the NVA 1st Division in the Dak To area On 23 October the Military Intelligence Section· passed reconnaissance instructions to subordinates On 24 October an element expressed alarm at the presence of commandos and fear of discovery A new mission was discussed on the 25th On the 26th the section told a subordinate about the shifting of Communist forces in the area The same message instructed the subordinate on communications changes and foretold of a simplifie• signal plan to be used between 30 October and 4 November The NVA characteristically introduced simplified SOis just before combat was expected to begin 11 11 Finally on 29 October the section cautioned a subordinate about the need to maintain secrecy to avoid trouble before it is time to strike Sam Davy Pop Bruce the linguists and I put together a report It was a summation of everything we had been reporting since the 18th The accumulated evidence ••• strongly suggests that a major tactical thrust is in the offing we said We sug ested the period between 30 October and 4 November as the probable launch time The target was to be in the Oak To area 10 'fflP SECRH'I' UMBlb • #• fl _ I -- - _ _ The next day the final piece of evidence came to us the forward element of the 1st Division activated communications with combat units The pattern was unmistakable command elements move in reconnaissance begins combat forces take their positions a simplified signal plan is introduced for ease of communication during combat and a forward element--a tactical command post--takes control of fighting units The stage was set At this point we hit an unexpected obstacle credibility Although SIGINT had been used with singular effectiveness to detect Vietnamese Communist attack preparations since 1965 customers remained dubious On the one hand there was little or no supporting evidence from collateral sources that the Communists had moved into the Oak To area or that they were planning an offensive of virtually unprecedented scale On the other hand the exotic quality of SIGINT analysis and processing which the customers were in no position to question made them hesitant Besides SIGINT was a new dimension to many of the tactical customers and the stunning accuracy of the SIGINT community's prediction of the TET offensive was still three months in the future customers asked with understandable reasonableness what magic allowed a bunch of shaky Gis distinguished more for their spit than their polish and abetted by an unknown civilian to use a tangle of antennas and funny talk to divine the combat plans of the enemy Nevertheless U S military commanders began to redeploy their forces in the face of the threat On 1 November a B-57 strike launched against ARDF locations of major units in the Oak To area brought large secondary explosions The U S 1st Brigade 4th Infantry Division established its headquarters at the Dak To Special Forces Camp and two small close-support SIGINT collection units scheduled moves to the area On 3 November the U S 3rd Battalion 12th Infantry air-assaulted into a landing zone on Hill 978 six kilometers south of Dak To and encountered a large NVA force The same day the 3rd Battalion 8th Infantry landed on nearby Hill 882 and drew heavy enemy fire The battle for Oak To had begun Before it was over in late November the battle proved to be one of the biggest in the war Nine American battalions from the 4th Infantry Brigade and the 173rd Airborne Brigade were committed Air sorties exceeded 2000 over 1600 NVA were killed in ground combat and another 500 estimated by air - ll 'f6P Wltffl' UMffltA strikes U S dead reached 283 South Vietnamese 61 The figures cannot convey the reality of what was going on at Dak It began to come home to us when couriers delivering the dail traffic from close support units described orderly stacks of American bodies on the Dak To airstrip The SIGINT support u were hit the traffic we worked was sometimes bloodstained ' 'i While the biggest battle was at Oak To it was not the o' one The Communists also mounted attacks at other points thr out the highlands at around the same time In addition to th harassment of Pleiku we had experienced earlier there were probes of varying size throughout Kontum Pleiku and Darlac A rallier who turned himself in on 2 November eventually ' confirmed the SIGINT indications of NVA plans and answered sor of the questions that had puzzled us According to him the M 32nd and 66th Regiments were to attack the Oak To area from th_ southwest while the 24th Regiment acted as a blocking force to the northeast The 174th was to act as a reinforcing element if required it was The original attack date the rallier • was to have been 28 October but coordination problems earlier · had made that impossible From what the rallier said and from other collateral evidence which accumulated later it appears · that the intrusion of U S forces south of Oak To took the NVA ·_ by surprise and forced them into battle before they were reallYJ ready Documents captured toward the middle of the month durin• the heaviest fighting indicated that the objective of the offensive throughout the highlands was the annihilation of two i U S brigades--presumably the 4th Infantry and the 173rd Airbor The enemy may have planned to use the technique he had employed Ia orang some two years before--chewing up battalions one by on as they were committed as reinforcements The tip-off through ' SIGINT precluded that tactic Whether the 1st Division ever recovered completely from the blow is questionable A number of things resulted from the accurate prediction b USM-604 of the Dak To campaign The unit was congratulated by its superiors the 4th Infantry Brigade was pleased the analyst were happy NSA seemed somehow less like a malign uncle and it rumored--although I have never been able to confirm it--that the unit was submitted for Presidential Citation Technically the SIGINT community gained insight into attack preparations communi cations insight which confirmed several key items on the SIGINT 12 'IQP RUT lJIIRRA -- - •- -------- ·-··· • • - - --•· l 'E4lP Si1C RM UMBRA indicators list which in turn contributed to NSA's success in predicting the TET offensive the following January Perhaps most important local customers gained new respect for SIGINT and were somewhat better prepared to accept predictions of country-wide offensives during the next two years oespite--or perhaps because of--the grimness of what was happening at Oak To the strain of the increased volume of intercept and the rising importance speed and number of reports and translations the men of the 330th continued to refine their sensitivity to the ridiculous Pop Warner was named chief of the WOPA Warrant Officers Protective Association to defend the real hard-core against up-and-coming junior commissioned officers Not to be outdone Sam Berry formed SLAP Second Lieutenants Association for Protection and I was forced to establish an organization all for myself CLAP Civilian League for Aid and Protection There were endless dinner table arguments over whether every second lieutenant needed a civilian and a senior warrant officer to keep him out of trouble or whether it was the other way around We used the visit of high-ranking personnel as an excuse for a banana dacquiri party and I was treated to a slamming ride along the perimeter in an armored personnel carrier it ended when Pop drove it over an unexpected rise at top speed and I flew completely out of the carrier My biggest problem was containing exuberant reporters including Sam who went so far as to develop the word of the day --a term taken from the dictionary that they would try to sneak into their reports when I wasn't looking I still remember overweening incipient ambivalence My efforts to communicate with the analysts were sometimes confounded by their lapse into a lunatic language which bore only passing resemblance to English I can't even hear you Don't beg on me Just rap just put it in• ancr- civilian nugs are the worst kind All this was punctuated by the intrusion of barely credible personalities a sergeant who fancied himself Gunner Asch and took to bloodcurdling yells at odd hours during the mid-shift a superb linguist who looked like khenaten and so worried about every outgoing translation that w named him Mama 11 a mortician-turned-traffic analyst named Digger whose brilliant reports on the setbacks of the NVA achieved the poignancy of a good TV serial and a collection of domesticated animals that included a monumental boa constrictor named Clarence and several alcoholic dogs 11 13 ------·- - -- - ·- ·- ·- 'fOP SBORB'f UMBRA I left the 330th in December when the offensive was all bu over There were still occasional attacks by fire one several weeks after I left destroyed my work table but reporting was dominated by indications of withdrawal and regrouping The nigh before I left there was to have been a farewell party but it had to be replaced by a quick get-together in the operations quonset Everybody was too busy to take time out After that I knew the 330th would never change · •••• The BWt me 4e be Li eve that the p044t44 i on 06 a 4ta e which haA be e n duven into the glLound about to be built upon wa1r d6 06 da ngeJr 61r om the po-64 e u oJr when 4 uch g1tound haA been con s ec1ta ted ' the Ile u a -At1t enuou 6 e66oJr t ma de to 4ec ulte thue -Atake-6 16 one u 4U4pe nded 6Jr om the 1Loo6 06 a dwe tt i ng they believe it will keep aJAJay bug4 They a 1r e al 4o 4uppo4ed to aveJr t dangelL4 4uch a-6 6 i Jt e4 etc Bu 1tme 6e doc toM m i x the 4c Jt ap i ng4 06 the 4e 4 taku with theilL mecUc i ne4 44 4 plLeve ntat i ve aga i n4t evil 4p i 1t i t4 • •••• tt I 14 'ft fSfiCBB'fUMBlb ISIP cat - I· j fflP 8Zelt T UMBltA ' 1'11e Mmdl of TnaanptN j IJ u Pr- Qao The Moon has now wax'd full The Scorpio and the Kartikka both for radiance vie And the first spel I_of cold is felt Ahlus kahteins fill the month And the Luff'a too has blossom'd Gay exuberant The month of Tazaungmon is trul1 magnificent Glittering like the golden Meru The north winds have begun to blow Ushering in the silvery mist · And chilly is the weather N • '·· TGGUllffflOlt Kartillo •A Iunar •ttrlsm M1111 Ret111o111 o«erln •· ICoflcelns f -lftl• lllllkln1 charllPle _ when robes are alrered Tl ltel Kewt11•Sela lS 'f0P SBORM UMB A 1 i l i •I THE CINCPAC INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION GROUP AN INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT by Walter D Abbott Jr B614 In the world of statistical analysis concerning the war in South Vietnam the subject of infiltration has long been an enigmatic variable used in a myriad of manners to prove either imminent success or pending disaster as the caprice and motivation of the moment dictate Although a network of manual Morse stations obviously supporting the North Vietnamese infiltration routes through Laos to South Vietnam was isolated in SIGINT as early as 1963 messages passed on this network were not textually exploitable and it was left to the imaginative speculation of the intelligence community to decide whether message volumes related to infiltration flow and to determine what if anything was physically passing through the infiltration system Until mid-1967 the only determinant of personnel infiltration into South Vietnam rested with MACV through interrogations of POWs and Ch eu Hois and evaluation of captured documents This process tedious at best resulted in statistical information on personnel infiltration long after the fact generally nine 1 to twelve months were required to ascertain even partial infiltration for any given period this contributed only historically to the command decisions regarding pursuit of the war It was known that the North Vietnamese used low-VHF RlOO series equipments in their Air and Air Defense communications and these communications were being intercepted on a continuing basis primarily through COMBAT APPLE and COMMANDO LANCE support of u s airstrike activity It was also known that there were messages being passed over these same frequencies which were not Air and Air Defense messages but it was not until the Fall of 1967 that NSA had enough volume of non-Air Air Defense material to determine the im ortance of these in e is i c was identified as representing communica ions tween elements of the North Vietnamese General Directorate 0£ Rear services GDRS the organization responsible for supplying en and materials to South Vietnam EO 3 3 h 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 16 'f6P W UMB 'f8P9tiOfttJ'f UMBRA Particularly significant in this exploitation of GDRS communications was the information appearing on personnel infiltration As the picture developed a complex structure devoted to the transportation of manpower emerged marked by small rest stations approximately one walking day apart in charge of caring for groups of traveling troops as they passed through each area Moreover each station was apparently tasked with providing a daily report to its superiors on the status of the travelers these reports showed how vast and organized the infiltration process really was Every infiltration ••group was assigned a designator first in a three-digit' and later in a four-digit series generally consisted of approximately 570 men and was destined for a specific location within South Vietnam a destination which could be determined at least in part by the initial digit of the group's designator This exploitation of GDRS communications generated several immediate problems for user and producer alike Based on the number of personnel reported in these messages as heading south it became painfully apparent that the accepted MACV infiltration estimates were extremely conservative and did not reflect a true force threat in the war zone As intercept techniques improved and the SIGINT production community geared up to handle this information on a continuing timely basis the mass of data being generated far exceeded the handling capabilities of individual intelligence shops The approach to the problem was rapidly degenerating into an exercise in comparative bookkeeping on group numbers and strength figures without an understanding of the capabilities intentions or vulnerabilities of the GDRS system I -I 'i I T I I ·i I Under the reverse concept of Parkinson's Law so often applied to any problem with substance and meaning the immediate management reaction is that additional personnel are required to deal with this data By early 1968 this lament echoed throughout the intelligence community in regard to GDRS and more than one command took the approach that while the information was valuable it could not be addressed until sufficient people were acquired to properly massage and file the material being received For once however this approach was summarily dismissed CINCPAC taking the position that as 17 I -------- - ------------ overall theater commander it was his responsibility to apprise MACV of imminent threat and realizing that intelligenceoriented manpower resources were already stretched paper-thin decided that a CINCPAC was the logical point at which all GDRS information should be amassed and consolidated and b that this amassment and consolidation would have to be done within the parameters of existing personnel resources In April 1968 the Intelligence Coordination Group was conceived chartered and tasked CINCPAC divided the GDRS problem into two major subject areas In general terms these areas were tactical strategic and political estimative Under these headings Happiness is an the principal intelligence officers from article ••• every major command on Oahu PACAF PACFLT USARPAC FMFPAC as well as Hqand NSAPAC repre_ _ __ __ _ _ __ senting NSA and the SIGINT community were convened and received their tasking CINCPAC's approach to this tasking was simple and direct -- task each command within its area of primary interest put an end to repetitive duplication and therein effectively apply existing capabilities and resources to an over-all attack on the problem Under this concept PACAF and PACFLT as the two commands with airstrike responsibility were to perform correlative analysis on translations photo intelligence OPREP-4 information and any other available data to develop GDRS facility locations for targeting purposes USARPAC was to determine the GDRS order-of-battle and provide a correlation between U S and North Vietnamese designations for various routes primarily used in the infiltration process FMFPAC through the 1st Radio Battalion was tasked with developing and maintaining a file on personalities associated with infiltration NSAPAC undertook the job of communicating in Dragon Seeds · to the SIGINT community the needs and requirements of the ICG for SIGINT data as 18 '8P SHJR8' UMBRA TOP CRH'f UMBRA f L well as functioning in a liaison capacity as the focal point for all queries regarding the SIGINT posture on the problem CINCPAC retained the tasks of providing a monthly infiltration estimate developing a machine capability for storage and rapid retrieval of infiltration data and over-all supervision of the ICG As could be expected the ICG concept was greeted with varying degrees of enthusiasm by the tasked participants Natural suspicion of both the motives and motivations of CINCPAC arose along with fear that command prerogatives and production techniques were being jeopardized if not actually usurped and exploited The result was an extended period of fermentation with only marginal output Internal dissatisfaction with the ICG developed and at one point the whole concept was almost abandoned But breakthroughs did emerge USARPAC compiled a basic order-of-battle study on group activities which with some modification provided the foundation for the initial CINCPAC ICG publication CINCPACFLT through the efforts of FICPACFAC then provided the first comprehensive study on suspect GDRS facility locations Using these as a sounding board other efforts were initiated and the operation began to jell Both DIA and MACV in conference with CINCPAC agreed to accept the CINCPAC estimate as the authoritative statement on infiltration allowing for reasonable exchange between analysis on any point of dispute which might arise CIA through their DODPRO representative modified certain of their operations to attempt to acquire more information which could be used in assessing infiltration MACV became an active participant in the ICG per se and accepted tasking for input of collateral data to be married with other inputs available to the ICG NSA provided technical material to assist the ICG analysts in a better understanding of both the possibilities and limitations of SIGINT information In general after several turbulent months the ICG started to function as conceived and has continued to function even today I Il r ' Two points need to be addressed in this regard While it is an easy trap to fall into CINCPAC did not envision and earnestly avoided creation of the impression that the definitive word on infiltration could come only from CINCPAC The effort was intended as a collective venture with any and il 19 l 'AW iECK1 l1MBBA ---- ---· - I 'fOI stlClfflT UMBltA all opinions considered as contributory to an over-all understanding of the problem In furthering this approach a dialogt among all concerned analysts was initiated under the heading of an ICG analytic exchange 11 so that every party involved in the infiltration problem was at once free to air his views and also privy to the opinions of others Over the months as suspicions gradually diminished these dialogues were openly expanded and have materially contributed to ICG conclusions on the problem without binding the originators either to command opinion or channel violation Further although the problem at hand is still the North Vietnamese infiltration problem the mechanism of the ICG can be modified expanded or otherwise adjusted to deal with any intelligence situation requiring maximum utilization of limited resources against a particular target or subject Through careful direction and judicious integrity the ICG will continue to exist long after the infiltration problem has vanished and will apply its burgeoning expertise to other areas of common interest This is not intended to be an eulogistic endorsement of the' ICG The ICG admittedly has had and continues to have shortcomings But it has proven that dedicated application of available resources can oftentimes be more effective than acquisition of new ones that with proper management the intelligence community can function as an integrated whole rather than as many parallel internally-competitive parts and that through such an effort all agencies and commands can reap a collective beneficial harvest through full participatiort understanding and acceptance of the principals underlying all- source intelligence A hard-fought lesson it merits study for future emulation at all levels To the de 911 e e that people be l i e ve the i lt 4oluu on4 a11 e the only one 4 they beg i n to U m i t the m4 e tve 4 and the i Jt ftU tuJte s '' 20 f -- - - - _______ - 'f0P SfiCRfff UMBftA CRY PTO-SCRAMBLE By Richard Atkinson Untcramble uch of the five numbered crypto-scrambln placing one lettar in each space to form fiwe words or names eac_h of which fits the definition to Its right 1 2 3 4 ____Q_Q____ _ A Y E K I NG P E T E R Orders components ____Q_Q_ FR A I LP A Y System statistically diagnosed by BUST BY RYE program which does the the digraphic I C __ __ _Q ____ remainder test E N DC ONI C I C E A hit 0 -----0 __ 5 CODE I RI P Cyclic ____Q __Q Now arrange the circled letten to form the cryptoanswer suggested by the cartoon at the right Print CRYPTOANSWER here -------- _ v · Answer on page ONE TYPE OF GENERATION 47 • ·I· I 21 TOP ORIJf UMBRA •II I LI ---------------- -- --- --- -- --- - -- AG-22 813CRE'f UMBRA EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 WHERE DO WE GO NOW by Phil Remsberg B41 As a crossbreed or hybrid analyst traffic analysis and data systems I have been directly involved wit ·the planning testing and operational use of the AG-22 system over the past 4 years and have an observation a question and a proposal • From the B Group traffic First the observation analysis standpoint two major milestones have passed n the preceding 6 months The first milestone was the turn-9n of all AG-22 equipped intercept positions directed at People's Republic of China PRC targets and the operational us e of the daily processing cycle GAPS NOOSENECK et al at NSA in April 1972 Why is this significant The primary significance of this milestone is that for the first time the B G oup traffic analyst has becom almost solely dependent on m hine processing to supply_ him with the staff of life raw traffic that is PONETO listings If the AG-22 system becomes fully operational the analyst will no longer do traffic analysis from the blue's and green's nor choose whether to get and use machine aids Now however if someone pulls the plug in C Group the B Group traffic analyst is in real trquble Of equal importance but perhaps unrecognized is the fa t that for the first time almost all of B Group's many and varied target activities are processed tog ther at one time in one place and in one format- even though it may only be for 24 hours after intercept This new method of processing i n t j r ' t may not seem significant but as an analyst steeped in the roblem and the long-range cross service callsign frequency an practice traffic problems I believe this new method is a great leap forward Anyone who in an attempt to process data has had to deal with two or more formats and such statements as That tape is being used to run my monthly now maybe next week will appreciate just how much of a forward step this method really is The many new approache opened up to an analyst when he has a complete data base with which to work are amazing for example the phenomenal success of the reidentification programs in NOOSENEC explained in DRAGON SEEDS Vol 1 t2 The second milestone was reached on 22 September 1972 when virtually the entire PRC data base went on-line for 14 days building to an eventual 6 months to the COPE terminal The fantastic possibilities inherent for TA mechanization in this 22 rdf6P SBCRtff UMBRA r I I i I development are only now being explored Within five years I think we will look back on these two historic events and say that traffic analysis in B Group was revolutionalized for the better in the Summer of ' 72 Unfortunately I have also observed that from the desk analyst all the way to top management an attitude exists that precludes the all-out effort necessary to take advantage of all TA mechanization possibilities A revolution has occurred the •king has been displaced and very few seem to be taking advantage of the opportunity to change the order of the TA world That statement leads me to my question I J l I i If my premise that a revolution has occurred is correct then why is B Group high-level management not actively pursuing a program to consolidate and control all the various old machine programs and to initiate coordinate evaluate and develop the new ones Now is the best time to exercise some strong authority to maximize the machine resources available to B Group in order to take advantage of both the new and sophisticated machines d the new TA mechanization possibilities We can no longer afford the narrow provincial view of every area doing its own thing with machines Consolidation sometimes has its own rewards which in this case would be manifested by more machine time more programmer time better' TA support elimination of duplicate processing etc 11 What am I proposing That a group consisting of B Group traffic analysts data systems analysts and C Group programming support personnel be formed That this group be given the authority to chart systematically the complete data-flow of B Group processing from both the machine and the analytic standpoint That each machine job or process be evaluated as to benefit derived and the input processing and output accomplished in relation to all other B Group jobs or processes That an effort be made to make each analyst aware of what is available to him in the machine area and what his responsibilities and contributions are and why And finally to streamline consolidate and manage a complete B Group processing system designed to serve the best interests of the final user the analyst There is a crying need why can't it be heard 23 - -- ----- -- ·-·-- ' f·- ---- - --- - i10P SBORtl'f UMfJfta THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMINT TRANSLATION COURSE FOR VIETNAMESE LINGUISTS by Jack R Sharretts B6 Like supervisors in other language areas in the Agency those associated with the Vietnamese problem have long discussed the idea of developing a translation course designed to facilitate the transition from the types of texts presented in basic translation courses at the NCSch to the more esoteric material encountered by the COMINT translator on the job A number of objectives were gradually defined through informal discussions on this subject among various individuals and early this summer a preliminary modus operandi and course outline were circulated among several of the senior linguists for their comments and suggestions It was generally agreed that the course should employ current traffic for the translation exercises as much as possible In addition the course was broken into blocs and several senior linguists-supervisors were designated as instructors for these blocs and given the responsibility for assembling material for them The class sessions are scheduled to be held twice weekly in the afternoons in a conference room within B6 This assures that no one senior linguist will be away from operations for an extended period that processing of the morning mail will not be affected and that the student body will also be away from their sections for a minimum amount of time Once those ground rules were established the problem of course content was addressed It was the consensus that a COMINT course should deal with two major problems encountered by the new COMINT translator Of course the first concern was with purely linguistic matters such as specialized vocabulary telegraphic spelling systems telegraphic style 11 corrupt texts unrecovered code groups ad infinitum The other aspect considered equally important was what we shall call the background or intelligence settin _ which the COMINT translator must thoroughly understand before h can operate effectively For purposes of COMINT translation a great deal of target orientation is required in order to place the messages in the proper context for the most accurate transl tion This premise led to a course outline which was devoted about equally to lectures on various intelligence aspects of th 11 24 'PQP SECRfi UMBR A ·1 j I Vietnamese Communist problem and translation exercises For instance the importance of understanding North Vietnam's governmental structure and operations to the translator of messages from the NVN Civil Network can be demonstrated by showing how garbled message addresses can be reconstructed when the translator knows with whom the Ministry of Communications and Transportations usually communicates in son La Province Similarly the applications f T A and C A in identifying military correspondents and placing their messages in the context of their operations will be discussed at length I I ii In addition to stressing the intelligence setting so strongly perhaps the most significant innovation made in developing this course is that of breaking it into blocs paralleling the present operational organization's division of the problem and designating the senior linguist s supervising translation in these elements as instructors for the blocs covering their portion of the problem Thus the instructors of the various blocs are the most skilled and knowledgeable people available and the most acquainted with current developments in their areas The course as it is presently structured runs 20 weeks two 3 1 2 hour sessions per week It is not designed to turn out 11 experts on any one portion of the problem but rather to familiarize the apprentice or journeyman translator with the art of COMINT translation as it is practiced in B6 Since no formal course can possibly prepare a budding COMINT translator to handle all the problems and avoid all the pitfalls encountered on the job this course will stress recognition of types of problems and methods of attack Ultimately this training should benefit the individual translator by making him more effective in his present assignment and improving his ability to shift from one area of the problem to another with a minimum of transitional training This versatility will directly benefit the organization since linguistic resources can be shifted more quickly and smoothly _when it is necessary - ' - The present course outline will no doubt be modified somewhat as operational requirements change but the pilot course will cover subjects in the following order ' 25 'f8P SBORR UMBRA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --·-- - -- l l I - 'FOIC StiUtffl'l' UMtJtt A Introduction - Lecture on the use of working aids dictionaries and other reference material ••• a brief discussion of the SIGINT Publication Manual Bloc l - North Vietnamese governmental organization and standardized nomenclature of the NVN governmental organs ••• NVN civil diplomatic and shipping communications ••• translation exercises using sample texts from these communications Bloc 2 - Provisional Revolutionary Government its organiz tion communications ••• special terminology message formats ••• translation exercises ••• t Bloc 3 - North Vietnamese military organization and operations ••• Ministry of Defense and the High Command ••• background • and history ••• equipment weaponry designators divisional T 0 ••• translation exercises from open source texts on military subjects-••• Bloc 4 - Linguistic applications in low grade cryptanalysis word patterns stereotype beginnings and endings ••• C A working aids ••• briefing on processing in B63 and tour of the operational spaces ••• Bloc 5 - North Vietnamese tactical military traffic •• translation exercises using current tactical traffic from Laos the DMZ and I Corps ••• discussion of problems in dealing with thi material ••• geography 0 B tactics ' Bloc 6 - North Vietnamese Naval and Air-Air Defense Commandt lectures on organization equipment weapons ••• cryptosystems employed message formats •• • Bloc 7 - South Vietnamese Communist military traffic ••• vc military organization ••• dialectical variations and other linguistic peculiarities ••• translation exercises Bloc 8 - The North Vietnamese General Directorate of Rear Services ••• history development organization and current operations ••• specialized terminology message formats ••• translation exercises Bloc 9 - North Vietnamese multichannel communications ••• equipment capabilities and communications procedures •• • special terminology ••• translation exercises using transcripts of NVN military and civilian multichannel material 26 I I TRANSPOSITION T e 8a4ic C yptotogic Glo44a y defines transposition as a cipher in which the elements of plain text undergo some change in their relative positions without a change in their identities 11 The following is an example of this form of encipherment Can you solve it 11 N 0 L I H H X C AT R H H T E E LU R N B L U E I AD C DE E 0 D N D RN D 0 T I E H C p XA RD w E F 0 I A I B D R H N B K E M 0 E T I N 0 L X D p s y y A 0 A I R R N T J A D R s X u I D H E S D 0 RN 0 s B A X H N VRNF V T s u s T u s E V RD N I N N s T RY N H y 0 E I G O U R C E E E C O H E H I A A E E NW 0 S R I E 0 M E M H A E N H u s L F A I RX L 0 A TO AN s F N N X T N s N RAE u L E s s I F p E A D p A E I T T ME R u u X G R E AS F F LW H XE T N G B R H RT E I T X A E S N R E E H I D I TL 0 H 0 D E TW u R 0 I T E F UR s I E RS 0 B D S T C N I H MANN TN u N A A B T 0 F 0 D T X N H I E T U DF T H E 0 E s s B N 0 E S s N 0 I RD E T H N S s u E D I u VM F CE V R F R U S F 0 T TM G s E w 0 H F u N WI I A EA E LAT R B u E I D E T B E I E N D T 0 R N H N A E 0 UN R H E R 0 D E L X p 0 X D H B F E L T T U R w s X MA H E T s A s E s T D AN t E E A E D AN s LA N I N R C X M T E p TA N R E AW G H 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 4 8 7 I I ' s EN G 0 F T tt E G N N H ' i I I • ' Answer on page 46 ' ' ' i f ii W9I' - rI 27 UMBRA ' ·• --· -- I _ - '6P fflCft B'f UMBRA TIE OPEN DOOi - Wt 4ttk to be compan lo along the way The lante n which we ca y i4 not ouu The pilt-lt which we 4haAt i contagiotU thought The knowtedge which we gain an ittuminating toAc And all who 4eek may peAceive and te«An -The Concept o V agon Seed4 DON' T SAY MUSS0--Say USSlV There Is a BIG Difference by Louis C Grant ADPSD Someone once said The field thinks NSA is crazy and they have the papers to prove it He may be right l We don't always do a very good job of getting good instructions to the field Yet those instructions can make or break the Director's control of u s SIGINT operations The need to improve both the instructions and the mechanism for getting them out is why the Director set up the United States Signal Intelligence Directives USSID System Before USSID we had 12 years of MUSSO with its some 600 TECHINS OPINS OPDOCs and TECHDOCs MUSSO was good in that it gave the Director a mechanism for exercising control and instructions were getting out But MUSSO lacked central direction it was over-engineered and it bogged down in its own procedures The Inspector General took a look at the problem in 1969 and found that MUSSO was a mess At best it had become more traditional than functional He stressed the lack of central direction saying One can only surmise how much bette1 the exercise of operational and technical control would be and therefore how much better the product if the established means for exercising them were well managed 11 The need for central direction is why the USSID system must concern all of the means for getting instructions to the field formal messages hard-copy USSID and OPSCOMM That is also why only USSID or issuances authorized in USSID may be used to direct SIGINT operations · 28 iQP SHORB UMBR A 4'0P BEORIR UMBlb The ADP runs the USSID system because he is the Director's agent for day-to-day control of SIGINT operations An element of the AOP's personal staff AOPSD manages the system procedures for him reviews and issues the directives and makes sure that he gets in on USSID decisions This set-up has gone a long way toward wiping out the my document syndrome Elements get into the act depending upon the degree of their responsibility or what they can contribute But no element has absolute authority over a document The ADP or the DIRNSA owns them all As we review the draft USSID we are making good progress with many of the MUSSO problems like textual style clarity presentation etc But there are a couple of deep-rooted problems that are tough to get at One is a lack of understanding about what the field needs The other is what commercial contest writers call aptness of thought Our managers and action people are close enough to the problems to know the issues and answers As a result they often don't push for really good instructions We have to judge our instructions in terms of what they mean to the guy in the field First our instructions are his marching orders Second they are his guidance Third they are all he has He must do what we tell him the way we tell him without a crew of on-call experts around to interpret for him We must say what we mean do what we say and if we change our minds we must change our instructions Aptness of thought translates to does this make sense Before we convert a MUSSO document to a USSID we must take a hard look at what it does to make sure that the directive provides the best way to do the task it doesn't conflict with other directives the task should be done in the field and the field has the resources to do the job We must not continue or issue directives unless they are needed And we must get the tired outdated ones off the street Although there is no USSID of the MONTH Award the quicker we do this the better for the field ADPSD is available to you If you have any doubts or questions talk it over with us before you spend a lot of time writing something We have the people and the experience that can make your job easier 29 0P 880RB'f UMBRA I ·t I' - - -- - - - - - - - - - · - - - - - - - - - - 'fOP BBCRIR' OMR i ussxo is indeed more than a new name for MUSSO ussro is a better mechanism for getting good instructions to the field But you can bet that it will stay that way only as long as we all give it our attention and support We made MUSSO a mess over the past 10 years let's not use the next 10 to make 11 USSID useless f t The Eight Diagtams aud Symbol of Creation These eight combinations of straight Jines are to have been evolved from the markings on the shell f a tortoi by the legendary Emperor Tu Hsi 28 2 C Wm Wang 1231-1135 B C founder of the ChOtF Dynasty appended certain aplanatiom to each His Chou Kung added stiU more and they beame known u the Canon of Changes the most -venerated and least understood of the Chinese Classics These Eiaht Diagrams were the basis of a system of an ancient pbilc s ophy and are supposed to contain the elements ofMetapbysicaJ knowledge and the clue to the scads of aatioo The Yang and the Yin the s mbol of Creation piehired in the center are the positive and negative prin• ciples of Universal life These two male and female principles of nature constitute the eternal principles of Heaven and Earth and are the legendary origin of all things human and divine sail son fI 30 '118P SBCRfi -UMBlb - - - --1'-- 11• --- - - - - -·- - --- ---- - - - - -- I EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 MACHINE AIDED TRANSLATION by Normal Wild B03 Th-i 6 the ta 6 t 06 M1t W-i td' 6 th1t et a1t t i c lu on· ma ch-i ne-a i ded t1ta n 6la t i on e xa m i n e 6 the IL6 e o 6 mac h lne tc-ok-u p ln NSA pa lit and p Le 6 ent lt • may 6 U mu tate 6ome thinking about the adv-i 6ab l -i ty 06 u 6 lng th-i 6 mode Ln tool mp Le widely -i n t e language 6 le ld Automatic Look-up One of the earliest uses of automatic l ok-up in NSA was the printing of bilingual vertical message prints VMP of Japanese military code traffic during the $ cond World War For example if the group 1234 represented•BAKUDAN bomb • the code recovery submitted for the VMP wq s BAKUDAN BOMB The expense of preparing a few more letters for the entry was• trivial and no new techniques were required Isolation of tne lexical entry was accomplished by the code group itself It • was of course possible if unlikely that BAKU was sometimes part of a preceding word and DAN part ot a following one The two extremes were the code group for an entire sentence which could be rendered in English wit minimal loss even if · the Japanese were omitted and the code group for a Japanese syllable where the English equivalent might do more harm than good ' Unquestionably the bilingual qbde group was a great help to the crash-trained scanners and translators who worked under a thinly stretched group of experie iiced linguists Their worK was better and faster than it would otherwise have been and benefitted from the fact that the nglish equivalent could be used to resolve ambiguities of the Roman spelling printout in Japanese script not being practical at that time To some • translators that fringe benefit constituted the sole value of the English li le since WWII bilingual code•groups have bee used f· Batches of Laotian Communist political trafficl • were so processe -- P-w 'i l l ' s-o me-- benefit Only code groups for words and phrases were put into English since it seemed over-ambitious to fit together syllabic I -i J i- i T i 31 I -- ----- -- - _ _ J streams and to find equivalents on a dictionary tape The cool reception given to the bilingual code group can arise either from the lack of neat lexical units in the codes--many Asian codes have a high percentage of syllabic values from which poly-syllabic words are composed--or from fear that the English equivalent will be unnecessary to the experienced linguist and a harmful crutch to the inexperienced But it would be a bit much to say that bilingual code values would not be useful anywhere in NSA Bilingual code groups carry a fringe benefit--economy in data preparation under certain conditions When an entire codebook in encode order is obtained after being abandoned by enemy troops a decode bank for VMP can be prepared by matching the code groups to the file-maintenance numbers of a dictionary tape and picking up the plain value in the language plus at no extra cost its English equivalent It should be faster and more accurate to input a several-digit file-maintenance number than to input the plaintext value especially if the native script requires a cumbersome conventional coding Should such a program be established the senior linguist in an area would control it He might assign English values for the sole purpose of indicating standardized translations It is well to consider that if bilingual code groups might be useful some time under some circumstances now is the time to get t h ready --The only place in NSA where full texts are matched against a dictionary bank--in principle giving English for all the words in the order of their appearance in the text--is the Chinese Communist PRC civil problem Very possibly the balance of pro and con as listed in the second article of this series is more favorable on that problem than elsewhere There are huge volumes of material which would be machineprocessed in any case mainly for categorization and distribution The additional cost of finding and printing an English equivalent is fairly small Much of the material is used for long-term studies so the processing delays are tolerable The average Chinese linguist on the job is slowed down considerably by having to thumb the dictionary He is also troubled by false friends words which do not mean what he thinks they do by problems in breaking the stream of syllables into words and by the need to memorize or to look up the telegraphic code for lack of a printout in Chinese script 32 -- - - - ---- - --- -- - -- ' · r e- --- 'f8P SBOH'f UMBRA The Chinese linguist probably gains somewhat more from an automatic look-up than do workers in other languages The base form of·a Chinese word is not subject to inflection so there is no problem of removing inflections to find the base The stream of Chinese characters is represented in plain text by a stream of four-digit numbers occasionally interrupted by a foreign word or by digits in parent esis used for their true numerical value making it neat for machine handling On the other hand the stream of groups has no indication of word separation and sometimes none of clause and sentence separation and there is little in the shape of the Chinese characters to help There has to be a program to find words in the stream and that program would involve some trial and error Groups of syllables looked up might not turn out to be the true word divisions of the text and even if they were the true word-division may not be in the dictionary and a no match would ensue in either case The PRC Civil progra has been used on two unclassified books as an experiment and as a training aid Since authorized translations of the books are available a translator can try for himself to see how helpful the program is and the person who knows no Chinese can see how well he understood the text with the machine version alone Much the same program would be applicable to other languages such as Vietnamese which are written or transmitted in syllabic units and have little or no inflection Thai and Lao are loosely speaking monosyllabic like Chinese but many words of Indic origin are quite long and would not be caught by a foursyllable cut Korean is poly-syllabic but it is conventionally wrttten one syllable at a time the noun has no inflection but the verb is lavishly inflected The verb inflection does not always change the form of the verb stem which might still be caught Cambodian is poly-syllabic but not inflected if the language is input one syllable at a time it could probably be handled by such a program In fact given a syllabic stream the machine wouldn't know the difference whatever language is used There would be some insurance value in a bilingual code program for rare languages such as some of the minority languages of China for which there is little or no demand at present In an emergency a good linguist would be able to do something with a text given the printout and some hasty study of ·grammar 33 T6P ffleftffl' utlBftl · _____ _ t t ·1 i ' ' i t 1 s •I •'I t 't'tff' t jffltfit'- tJ M HttA Automatic on-call dictionaries have been used in NSA for Spanish CAMINO Vietnamese RICEBOWL and French FRANCOPHONEGLOS Essentially the user types in a word or phrase and gets back a definition either printed out or displayed on a screen Dictionaries being merely a particular type of information file may have to share time with other files but the automatic dictionary has several advantages over a printed book Chief among them is that the file can be updated rapidly and often while a desk dictionary is normally updated once in several years at best Other advantages are speed in some cases it may be possible to put in a number of words at a time and get a rapid printout of all the definitions and various fringe benefits from the availability of the data for machine manipulation The desk dictionary however is always available no time-sharing down-time and rewriting problems and requires no typing for input Possibly the best combination is a printed dictionary for well established information and a machine dictionary as a live file to use between editions and for ephemer l information as well as for the fringe benefits Responses to CAMINO and RICEBOWL as machine systems have been mixed To many people they are only a way of getting a hard-copy dictionary--which is by no means a small benefit Their usefulness as a degarbling and recovery aid depends on whether conditions are optimal or real-life The quality of the file and its timeliness depend on the people who contribute to and manage it Of course the same is true of a card file in a cardboard box it is easy for a passerby to take cards out of a box and lose them or to write anonymous information on a card The computer dictionary in some ways encourages good management Not only is access to the file controlled but several different people can refer to it simultaneously If computer dictionary files do not exist throughout NSA it may be that they were considered and a thoughtful decision made that they were unnecessary But maybe not Tholie who h4ve Jt ee lie au h-l 6 6 -l t 6 t ---Chinese proverb 34 'f'OP r - - SBOH'f UMBIM - - - - - -- --- --- ---- - - -- --- THE WADE-GILES SYSTEM by E Leigh Sawyer B02 Autho '4 note The demand4 06 time have pe mitted tittte oppo tunity to check my mimo y again4t p ma y 4ou ce mate ial6 lending them4elve4 to gto44otogical 4ub4tan Ua t ion6 Mino abbe a t ion4 it i4 hoped may be 6ound exca4able l I •I •• ·i For the p'erson who has had little exp'erience with the Ch'inese lankuache the p'ronouncing of p'lace names p'eop'le's names art'ifak't's and even the inkretient's of Monkolian parpek'ue is often k'onfusing An unterst'anting of at least Wate Chile's ap'ost'rophic usache aft'er cert'ain k'onsonant's chust might enaple one t'o atchust himself t'o this esot'eric linkuist'ic area A little pak'ground on Wate Chiles might pe in orter Wate Chiles was porn in Ch'ik'ako and lat'er moved to Cheorchia At that t'ime his mother atvised him You ought t'o invent something Why ton't you ko t'o Ch'ina Wate and invent the Wate Chiles syst 'em He said Poy oh poy mom puy me a t'ik'et and I will t'ake the first poat leaving p'ort 11 So he t'ook off for K'athay His letters t'o his mother reflek't the choy he felt in t'raveling from p'lace to p'lace He mate reference t'o the many intichenous t'ype nat'ives he had pump'ed int'o and the cheokraphik'al ottit'ies he had seen In any k'ase as may be kauched py it's witesp'read usache t'otay Wate invent'ed his syst'em and it is seen on map's and all k'inds of swell st'uff all over the p'lace On the pasis of the k'arefully kathered tat'a p'rovided apove one k'an easily tecite how t'o p'ronounce that p'art of a Ch'inese p'lace name that has an ap'ost'rophe in it and one which toesn 1 t - also p'rop'er names poys or kirls and telek't'aple Ch'inese tishes such as K'ant'onese st'yle pean k'urd 35 'f0P StJoRBr UMIIRJ - - - - - - - -- - - - - - -- - - -·--· J T A-MATH SYMPOSI UM REVIEWED by David J Tiren B61 The SeptembeJr 1912 Dragon Seeds noted 8 pa1r u c lpa t i on ln a ympo lum on Mathematics and Traffic Analysis Vav ld Tilt en 86 attended the ympo lum and p1t e pa1r ed hi commenu in a 4tJr eam-o6con c lo nu 601t mc1t Beca e 06 the 8 intelle ·t in th-i 4 4ubje ct he 066e 1t e d h l 4 Jr e maJr k to Dragon Seeds He Jr e m lnd U4 that they aJr e 4Ubje ct lve and do not cove Jr all pJr e e ntaUon but aJr e ome 06 the h lghlighu 06 the ympo ium a he Jr e me mbe them 1 attended the T A and Math Symposium held by Pl at FANX II on 24 and 25 May 1972 A hardcopy transcript will be available ultimately however I thought some quick notes and observations might be useful I won't include all the speakers or even all the ideas of those I will use but just some of the highlights as I remember them 0 Robe Jr t P1r e te l spoke of 07 and some of its operations As an example he - used a system for choosing an intercept site against a given target while trying to predict what frequency and schedules the target might use Over-simplified it goes like this Using wave propagation data available through open and other sources an estimate of the optimum combination of receiving frequency perhaps in increments of a tenth of a megahertz and a time 24 hourly increments is made for a given target station All the combinations which meet a certain threshold of probability say 80 are noted The same thing is done for the other end of the target link The intersection of the two sets of data provides all the probable frequency time pairs the target link will use The next step is to estimate these probabilities for each potential intercept site The site whose set of combinations again over the same threshold has the greatest intersection with the set for the target link is the candidate for the task of intercepting the link The last step in the process is setting up a program for systematic search the specifics being based on the technical data provided fo4te Slade 83 gave some practical examples of a desk analyst employing simple arithmetic to recover aircraft type designators using times reflected in navigational air traffic in conjunction with known airfields If a given designator known to represent an aircraft type is observed consistently in the 36 TQP 8ECBBI' UMBRA - - - -- -- - - - -- ---- ---------------------- -oi i i i i -- -- - - - L I PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 1 - - - - I con ext of the amount of time it takes to go a known distanqe i e we know its speed capability then it can be only h s or hat type of aircraft Once ample data is available aJ 1 des gnators should be recovered Conversely if we have a l· des£gnators but certain airfield cover numbers are unrecovered we oan use the same kind of math to compute the distance rem knowp points using known speeds times If computing the dist-ances gives us a point on the map which is near an aiffield we have made a recovery Basic but it is an application-of matc 1 by an analyst • • Ken Cohen 845 talked about recoverv of three-diqitl 1 idemonstrated interesting uses of • computers to solve topological problems One of them involved plotting some towns in England Wales and Scotland The computer was given a list of the towns and the distances between all · pairs of towns much like mileage charts on our road maps • The computer then plotted all the relative locations Since the towns were chosen wisely the resultant dots on the map formed a rough outline of the island of Great Britain A second application was shown by the use of counties A list of the counties of Great Britain plus the number and name of the counties on which each county abutted was given The computer then printed out the name of each county in its relative position The result was a little distorted because of the great variances in size among the counties When the • technique was applied to the departments of France the results were phenomenal as those departments are similar in size • Cate Juno Ga Jto ato P14 I -- -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ I More aoout Gary later 31 'PQP S CBR UMBBi - --- EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 'POP 860R UMII 'I - R-lc ha1td A tki n6on P12 E13 appeared in a film produced by the school The film drew analogies between the Delta Index of Coincidence I C and baseball batting averages It was the clearest explanation of I e and its uses I have ever seen Four Stars rated G Floyd Ta lo1t A1S spoke about spherical geometry and its uses in plotting from radar information Questions from the audience about Why go through all this geometry when the TALL KING radar is line-of-sight gear left this subject sort of up in the air Wi tliam Binney A12 gave a very elementary example of the application of Set Theory in a context where most analysts would consider it an intuitive thing The example assumed complete knowledge of a callsign system so that a given call could be identified as coming from a given book The example showed several Military Regions and their book usage Region I Region I I Region I I I Region IV Region V SET A Book 1 B C 3 4 6 8 5 7 9 10 1 5 7 9 2 3 Sets represent certain date periods Intuitively we say that a callsign from Book 2 is was used only by MR I while B ok 5 is either MR II or III This can be presented in a Venn diagram 38 '110P 98Cftfft' UMBlb ··--- - - -- - - - - - - - - -- - -- - -- - - -- - - ·-···- -· ·- 'fOP B OMJ'P UMBRA EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 Again very basic but an application not usually considered in the realm of math by the layman V Reed Vaw4on P12 Dr Dawson's lecture on Set Theory and Probabilities was addressed to the problem of trying to determine how much of the total traffic transmitted we actually intercept Sorry I can ' t go into more detail because the math was intuitively obvious to the casual observer The last speaker was Gary again This time he gave illustrations of actual Soviet problems of the early 1950s The one I'm most familiar with the technique that is is the diagnosis and Gary concluded with the observation that we have been doing analysis for a long time He wondered if we were dealing with new concepts math applied to analysis or just new names of techniques I guess the real impression I got from the symposium was one of re-emphasis on the idea that not many of the cryptologic disciplines are pure We are always applying whatever talents we have to the job at hand and don't worry too much about names or titles some people apply to the things we do But it is refreshing to find again that many of the disciplines are not steeped in Black Magic but are based on common sense and basic knowledge of how things work I think the next time one of my analysts complains about routine so-called flunky work I'll try to impress upon that analyst all the different ostensibly esoteric techniques that are applied on a routine basis 39 'fOP SHOllfi'f UMBR A -----•-- ---- -· - j l EO 3 3 h 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 t ' i u t SIEDLIH ' 1l bl ----Grids for the new positions of the B forward outpost relocated to FANX II from FANX III on 20 November 1972 are A2540--Bl A2E72-Bll and A2548--Bl2 Operating frequencies are unchanged ----Employee recognition 11 All of you who are supervisors especially take care of your people Recognize their work Let's do all that we can to reward their performance This quotation from Lt Gen Phillips's opening remarks on assuming the Directorship should be noted by all · supervisors regardless of their position in the chain of command The Agency's Incentive Awards Program provides one means of recognizing employee accomplishment For many personnel Employee Suggestions are synonomous with the entire awards program most frequently they are unfamiliar with its many other aspects Visible evidence of the variety of employee awards--cash and honorary--sponsored by NSA was recently on display in the passageway between Gatehouse One and the Operations Building and in the case on the south side of the Operations Building 1st floor escalator All personnel especially supervisors are encouraged to become familiar with the numerous awards which are available to recognize employee accomplishment The NSA Personnel Management Manual Ch pters 503 and 504 identifies these awards outlines eligibility criteria and advises on procedures for initiating and submitting recommendations Information and assistance are also available from the Incentive Awards Branch M362 Room 1Al90 m------m- -J• ·- ----- i I ----Speeders beware MPs at Ft Meade are using a Buck Rogers contrapt on to measure auto speed It is hand-held can operate from a patrol car battery or portable battery pack and is accurate to one-tenth of a mile per hour The radar gun sends a radio signal to the observed car The signal bounces back and the speed is indicated to the MP operator Our membership drive for 1973 will begin the first week in December Since the type of lecturers depends largely on what we can offer as honorarium we are seeking increased participation Dues of $3 per year may be forwarded by check to Mr James Duncan Pl Be sure to include your name organization and both telephone extensions ----The NSA International Affairs Institute is trying to obtain George F Kennan of Princeton to open the 1973 lecture series Other speakers being sought for 1973 are Charles Bohlen Arthur Schlesinger William Buckley one of the Rostow brothers Zbigniew Brzezinski of Columbia K Galbraith and Admiral Kidd ex-Commander of 6th Fleet The final lecturer of the 1972 series will be a U S diplomat speaking on Latin America probably Chile The Institute has started to explore the feasibility of implementing its other objectives i e SIGINT report writing and SIGINT seminars Since the matter is somewhat complicated could we ask the readership of 04agon Seecu for ideas on these two goals Incidentally IAI member Dick Seron of B6 has already presented his views on seminarsi possibly other readers have something to contribute --B Group cryptanalysts should be wary of the STET program included in the IBM 370 RAPIDS package During her recent tour in B1203 Dr Marti Branstad identified serious errors in the polygraphic repeats portion Behold the turtle He makes progress only when he sticks out his neck I ' I V I Ji fl I l 41 I I· ·'9P SBOM'f UMBlb - -------------------- -- - - ·-- -- t- i I 'fflP 'ffleltE'f UMiJRA ASK THE DRAGON LAVY Dear Dragon Lady What are the views of the TACP on changing jobs to benefit from points awarded for experience --An Aspirant Dear Dragon Lady Why does the TACP not accept applications for the TA Intern Program if they have had more than two years cryptologic experience The selection criteria referring to experience states ••• must ordinarily have at least one year of TA experience at minimum GG0-07 or E-5 level however must not have more than two years of cryptologic experience at GGD-07 09 levels See OM Subject NSA Intern Program Vacancies dated 28 August 1972 --Piqued The V agon Lady a4ked the E ecu Uve 06 the TA Ca ee Panet to comment on the above que4tion4 HiA v eW4 6ottow Dear Aspirant The TACP has recognized that there are benefits to be derived from exposure to different types of targets and has specifically organized its PQRS to encourage movement of TA aspirants between different TA problem areas Bonus points are awarded in one lump sum of 140 points for a -second exposure this implies that the first exposure consisted of 42 T oP iKCRET UMIJKA --------------------- ----- - - -- - - - - - - p SBORB'I' UMBRA at least one year at the GGD-07 level or military equivalent or at the GGD-05 E-4 levels where it can be shown that this experience equates to the higher grades Point values for TA experience are allocated at the rate of 15 points per month for the first two years of creditable experience 10 points per month for the third year 5 points per month for the fourth year and 2 points per month for the fifth sixth and seventh years The declining point allocation is intended to prompt rotation to gain diversification on another problem e g if an individual remains on the same problem same category of creditable TA experience for seven full years under the present criteria he can accrue only 612 points of a possible 750 maximum One year in another creditable experience category would gain him the 140 bonus points or maximum in experience A revision to the criteria is currently being typed which allows more points for the fifth sixth and seventh years of TA experience and broadens the exposure areas for bonus awards Watch for the revision which will be on the streets hopefully before the first of the year •••• Dear Dragon Lady I am writing to express my feelings about the various informal prep sessions held prior to the CA PQE As you are probably aware these sessions are given by A B and G to acquaint their personnel with the types of questions contained in the exam When one considers the logistics involved in staging three separate sessions the mind boggles For example regardless of the length of the class less than 30 hours for B and more than 200 hours for A you still have three classroom facilities three sets of study materials and three sets of instructors Enter my theory I would like to suggest a single prep class sponsored by the CA Career Panel This class would be open to all persons eligible to take the PQE regardless of group affiliation One of the benefits of this would be the elimination of two classroom facilities two sets of _study • 43 'f8P SfiCR B'f UMBRA --- - - - - -- -- - - I 'fOP 8801Hff UMBlb materials and two separate sets of instructors Another benefit is that the CA Panel has access to the best qualified instructors for any given phase of problems and knows the material which will be contained in the exam Then personnel in B or G who currently spend less than 50 hours on preparation will not be any less prepared than personnel from A who currently spend more than 200 hours ln preparation Respectfully MORRIS L FERGUSON Dear Morris Mrs Wilma Davis CACP Executive tells us that the Panel views provision of training for non-interns as a proper function of line management The Panel evaluates PQRs submitted by individuals and recommends specific training courses that would be of value in pursuit of professionalization To that extent it provides individual help in preparation for the PQE The CACP does not involve itself in actual teaching but has provided teaching materials and suggested study aids to organizations and individuals as special help in preparing for the exam We asked the same question of three other career panels which include a POE in their certification procedure The Traffic Analysis Panel looks with favor on the offices' providing such training and has supplied material for their use Like its crypt counterpart the TA Panel does not itself engage in teaching The Special Research Panel considered our query a bit premature since the PQE for that field is still being evaluated The SR Panel does intend to provide to individuals preparing to take the POE a study guide which will be available to them about two months before the date of the exam The main concern of the Data Systems Panel is at present its interns but it is considering the possibility of providing special help to non-interns getting ready for the PQE 44 'JQP SBCH'f UMBRl To Virginia and Meech who asked How do you get a job on a career panel or in its executive office Again our source of information is Mrs Wilma Davis CACP Executive who tells us that Panel members and the Panel Executive are appointed by ADPM upon recommendation of the Panel Chairman The two technical assistants to the Executive are appointed by the Panel and serve for two years They like the administrative and clerical assistants are attached for administrative purposes to the organization to which the current Chairman of the Panel is assigned A vacant assistant job may be filled by advertising or by inter-organizational transfer If you are interested you may want to talk to the panel Executive P te 4 6 e le t me -6 e e my a Jt ti c t e ln Dragon Seeds ••• 1 j I I 45 ·1 'fOP SHOBlff UMBRA -- - • •L i • I SOLUTION G L I MP S E S O F T H E S A G E S O F C H I N A 9 15 13 16 20 21 4 C 0 i F U S I 2 2 18 7 2 5 l l 5 23 l 10 6 24 19 8 USM A I N TA I 3 12 14 17 2 N E D T H A T G 0 0 D GQ VE RN ME N T 0 B T A I N E D W H E N T H E R U L E R WAS R U L E RAN D T H E M I N I s T E R M N I S T E R X w H EN T H E F A T H E RW AS FA T H E RAN D T H E S 0 N S 0 N X T H A T S 0 C I - E OF H E AV 0 F F I E T y - VE RE R U L E RAN D N DW I s - s -s N AT - - s s A - s - N s N C AN 0 R D I D W MAD E UP I - 0 B J E C - T s H N A H I p us s XX B AN D A 0 N E L D E R B R AN D y 0 U _GE RA N D F R I E N D XX RU L E S N E E N A A FE F AT H E RAN D 0 T H E R s w s H 0 u L D B E I N R I u G H T E 0 AN D B EN E V 0 E N C E 0 N T H E p ART 0 F T H E F I ION T 0 R U_L E R I G H T E 0 u s X X B E T W E E N LP R 0 M 0 T I s R s T F H 0 0 UR X UL N E s s F R I U B M I s s D B MA R K E D B y AN D s s I N C E R I Ty u A R T U E S' H 0 U L D 1r E N D 0 N 0 F V I s X TH E M u T E T H E G U I D I N G 1 11 I N C I p LEX X 0 F A H E R E i - F T E R X H -E D I D N 0 T TE A£ H X X 46 _ ___ -· 'f9P 86€ UMRR1•l 'fOP SBOR UMe • z Z1 and z0 are non-textuals the first contains the number of unused cells in the matrix and indicates the key column under which the diagonal comprised of the first four groups of cipher was extracted The second non-textual contains the group count of the message Answers 1 2 3 4 5 Repeating key Playfair Stubby Coincidence Periodic Cryptoanswer Fibonacci I 'i i I 47 9P StiORti'f UMBRA --- - - ----------- - - - - - -- - - - ----- --- - - - - EO 3 3 h 3 CONTRIBUTORS PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 · JOE ABBOTT JR 8605 Jte ce-lv J h-l4 8 A -i n EngWh l-i te 1ta tu1te 61tom Ha 1tva 1td Colle9e-i h 1960 a tid e n te1tea the Alt my Se cuJtity Agency 4ho1ttly the Jte 46t£1l Amon hi4 • A1tmy e xpe ltie nce 4 we 1te a ye alt in Monte Jr °e g 4tudying Chinue - Manda Jun and a two-ye all toult in the P ilippine 4 a 4°the Ole· in the PJtoce 44-lng a nd RepoJt ting 4hop to tJie now di6unct USM-9 He joined NSA in 1966 a nd ha q a tou1t in Ha a-li duJt lng which t-lme he w the NSA Pa c -i6i ll tplte 4e nt«tive t the C1NCPAC lGC wo1th in9 91toup A ce1tt-l6l ec Sptcial Re 4ea 1tch Ana ly4t he cu1t1tently the Chie 6 q6 he 1nte lUgenc e Sta66 601t a ll Communi4t Gll ound Fo1tce activity -ln Southea t A4ia WALTER V JEAN F GILLIGAN 832 w g1taduated 61to Vuq e4ne U ive 1t4ify Pitt 6bu11 gh Penn4ylvania and pult4ul d g i a dua te 4tuc Ue 4 a t Catholic Unive Jt-4-i ty W hington P C She nte Jted on duty with NSA in Vece mbell 1968 with the PRC _ __ _ __ Vivi4i n lntelUge nce Sta 66 Mlt4 G i lU a n i4 • ll Ue y U4igned JU the · · Section 06 t e 'RC lll llll 'P l' ll lll' ' 11 ' ' e ll e4 p o nA a 4 le 601t ___________ well u lte 6 ea 11 c h a nd activity P I jb TOM GLENN Chie 6 861 ha 4 a total 06 14 ye alt4 expe ll i ence with ASA a nd NSA on the Vie tna me 6e p1toblem He i 4 a p1to6e 44ional Special Re Ae a 1tc h Ana ly4t a nd Vie tname 4e Ungu-l4t who h a l4o 4tud-le d Chine 4e and F1tench on h-l4 own Mil Glenn ha 4 4e 1tved a 4 the Chaill ma n 06 the Vietname 4e Language PJto6e44ionat i za tion Examination Committee A44igned to Vietnam in 1962-65 196168 and 1969 he h be en involved in -tll a6flc ana ly 6i 6 c1t ypt0Un9ui4ile6 intelUgence analy 6i4 a nd mo4t 4-lgni6ic antly in the management 06 the SIGINT ll e poll ting e66oll t on the Vietnam Walt LOU GRANT i 6 a pJto6e44ionalized Spec -i at Re4ea1tch Ana ly4t with ove1t 22 yea Jt-4 Age nc y expeJt-i enc e He 4pent the 6ilL4t 15 ye all 4 on 8 Gil cup pll oblem-6 woll ing a4 a t1t a66ic analy4t 1t epo1tte1t and 6ta66 066ice1t Since leaving B G1t oup he hcu 6e1t ve d an A 64i4tant Zn4pec tolt GeneJtal Admin-l4t1t at-lve Chie6 601t NSA Eull ope and now an Action 066ic ell -ln AVPSV 48 'fOP Sl lCRtl'f UMHRi 'fOP SHCRtJ'f UMHltA EO 3 3 h 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 PHILIP REMSBERG ·841 Mac hi ne AppUca t-ion A P1t ojec t Te am mo jolLe d in i ndu 6t1Li al ychology at Ge tty4bu1t g College and Penn State Unive Jl4i ty He e nte 11 e d on duty with NSA i n 1966 a6te Jt having compte te d a thie e -ye 0 11 touJt with the A11 my Se cu11 -ity Agency Wi thi n 841 MIL Re m4belt g htU Woll Red tU a tJt a66i c ana ly4t call-6-ign ana lyJt and p11 ac ti ce 4y4te m4 analy4t with 4peci al at ten ti on to mac hi ne appUc ailon4 agai n4t hi s ta11 ge t p11 oble m4 He i b now e nga ge d in i n601Lma ti on de sign 4tudi e s 4peci 6i cally conce 11 ne d wi th the impact 06 AG-22 on 841 ope 11 ation4 • E LEIGH SAWYER Chie 6 06 802 majo1r e d in Romanc e languagu tU an unde 1r 91taduate at Ho 1r va11 d and at tended th·e Chi nu e Language Sc hoot Hua Wtn H sueh H si a 01 at the Unive lL6ity 06 Ca Li 6011 ni a Be 11 eley whi lt in mi Uta 11 y se 1r vi ce He Aub4equentty 4e 11 ve d with a Chi ne 4t Alt my Command in Nanni ng until VJ Vay and le6t Chi no in 1941-6oltowi ng G2 and AAA-i4tant Mi ti ta 11 y At tac he a4Aignment4 i K'unmi ng Shanghai and Nanchi ng JACK SHARRETTS 8603 joined the Agency in 1962 a6 teJt Jt ece i vi ng hi b Bae he loll -06 Mu 6i c de g1te e 611 om the Unive ui ty 06 We 4t Vi Jt gi ni a a nd c ompte ilng a 4-i x-month tou 11 in the All my Re Ae Jt ve in whic h he e 11 ve d 44 a Mu ni ti onA TJr a nAAhipme nt and Stoll age Spe c i aW t Hi Jt e d by the Agency 44 a c lLyptanalyAt on the Sovie ti lpJr obtem he Ahi 6te d wi thi n 4i x mon th4 to 8 G1r ou p and a 0- itname se tJt a nAla ti on c ou lL6e Hi A ten-ye air toult aA Ungu i At cltyptanaly4t and 1te po 1t te1t i n vaJu' ou 6 B6 eteme n t4 ho A be en h lghti ghted by 444ignmen t4 to the NVN Navy pJtobtem Civil and O ptomati c p1r obtem and a TVY to Phu Bai on VC Tadi ca l MiUta1r y and Gene Jr at Vi 1te cto11 ate 06 Re alt Se1tviceA p 1t obtem4 Zn B603 he i 4 pll i maJu' ly c once1tne d with the t1r ai ni ng and a A signment 06 Ung u in B6 and the maintenance 06 RICE BOWL the computell i zed Vi et-Engli bh d l c t lo na1ty VAVZO J T1REN 861 pUed the tlLade 06 ASA inte 1tcept ope1tato1t 601t 4ix ye all 6 He accepted a poAi t lon in the ougi nal NSA C lv Op p1tog1tam Ae Jt vi ng in Kyoto Japan 6011 two yea 1 6 ln the late 6i 6ile 4 Late Jr a6te1t 4-ix yeaJUi 44 a T1ta66i c AnalyA t i n A6 he spent 1964 aA a me mbe1r 06 CttU4 five CY-100 AAAigned to 86 in eo Jtty 1965 MIL T l1ten ho 4 had a va1tie ty 06 e xpo4ull eA and empho Ae 4 He i s cu 1t 1t e ntty Ch le 6 8612 a b11 anch whoAe 1r e 6ponAi biUti u in the Noll th Vi e tnamue non-Moue· communicat lon 6 a It ea include tank-to-tank communicailon4 Aee Septembe1r VRAGON SEEVS 49 'fOP 8SOR B'f UMBRA J I ii 1 I 1 NORMAN WILV 803 i4 one 06 the Agency• 6o4emo t multilingu -i 4U He htU been with NSA and p4edecce44o4 agencie4 4ince Septembe4 1944 wo king mal nty with Fa4 EtUte n tanguage4 lt i4 4eliabty Aepo r ted that he eacu STC like ptal n language M Witd'4 academic backgAound inc tude4 the 8 A 7939 and the M A in Chine4e and Japane4e 1941 64om Columbia UniveMLty He i4 the au tho4 06 nume ou4 lingui4tic Ae6e ence and t4aining a icu within NSA and htU long been conce4ned with the inteApiay 06 computeM and language 50 TOP SECRET UMBRA