I CfOP SECB T National Security Agency Fort George G Meade Maryland 1 MARCH 1973 I• Declassifie d and Approved for Release by NSA on 10-06-2020 purs uant to E O 13526 MDR 107694 I - -· ™™™ · - -·- - - - - 'fOP SFJORlff UMBRA This is V4agon Seecu There is fantasy irony and the bite of reality in the name It speaks of the East And like the East it suggests much says little O agon Seed4 is both Mother China and her neighbors O agon Seed4 is monumental and minuscule It is the past and future It begs for elaboration but gives none In it are echoed softly slurred Mandarin brittle Vietnamese determined Korean In it is the spectre looming over the Thai Lao and Khmer It is frightening and friendly It is uncertain Above all V4agon Seed4 is promise It is fertile with ideas unbounded to be cultivated with creativity and imagination It is challenge It is alive It will be more than it is 04agon Seed4 is yours May it grow with you The Editors 'f0P SFJCRtff UMBlb I I 4'9P SBC UMBRA PL 86-36 50 USC 36 05 1 • DRAGON SEEDS Publisher DONALD E MCCOWN CHIEF B03 Managing Editor Executive Editor Minnie M Kenny Robert S Benjamin Feature Edi tor Biographical Editor • Richard V Curtin Jane Dunn Rewrite Editor Education Editor Victor Tanner Marian L Reed Special Interest Editor Ray F Lynch Composition Composition Helen Ferrone Lorna Selby PRESS CORPS Thomas B11 Carolyn Y Brown B43 Mary Ann Laslo B12 Philip J Gallagher B44 Jack L B2 Dee Ensey B45 John c Uzarek B31 Jack Spencer BS Uancy Fournier B32 Jean Gilligan B61_1_ _ _ B33 Louis Ambrosia B62 Edmond J Guest B34 Thomas L Wood B63 Georges Patterson 841 James w r Schmidt B63 William Eley B42 Peggy Barnhill 'f8P SBOIWf UMBRxA I ----------------------------_ __ --- j I I VOL 2 MARCH 1973 NR 1 JIil£ If CIITEITI The Jack Butcher Case •• William G Flynn 1 • • • • Geoffrey Wood 6 A Gist of the Korean SIGINT Problem • • • • Richard S Chun 12 SIGINT support on the Economic Front William Hunt 18 The Ground Zero Approach to Language Analysis • • • • •• Dan Buckley 22 • Kenneth Miller 25 Rebels in Thailand Exploiting the Bust Once More the TSR •• How About the Oldsmobile M • • • Standardization • Jane Dunn 29 Thomas Wood 32 • •• Russ Myers 33 Seedlings 34 Ask the Dragon Lady 38 contributors 45 'f6P BECltffll UMBlb BAN ' ''I I ·- N A M 'f6P I -------·---- THE JACK BUTCHER CASE by William G Flynn B6 On 24 March 1971 North Vietnamese ground forces shot down a USAF OV-10 twin engine reconnaissance aircraft in the Saravane area of Laos The aircraft was piloted by 1st Lt Jack M Butcher who was believed to have been injured in the crash He was however able to make a voice transmission prior to his capture by enemy troops Communist communications of 25 March reported that an AAA battalion of Binh Tram 34 had shot down an OV-10 aircraft and that they had captured the pilot alive Normally this would have been the end of it for SIGINT reflections of pilot captures were noted frequently over the years But this time it was not the end It was just the beginning of a saga in which SIGH T played a very important role One month later on 26 April a message was intercepted which pertained to Lt Butcher discussing the capture of an American and describing him as an intelligence type a term used for OV-10 pilots indicating visual reconnaissance Butcher had apparently received injuries during the crash This was indicated when a Rear Services element reported that the American POW had fully recovered and preparations were being made to transport him north through the Rear Services system Ilis captors were instructed to send him 11 up 11 quickly so that he could be interrogated Apparently he had not been questioned since his capture because no one in that area spoke English On 7 May a commo-liaison station of Binh Tram 14 was instructed to prepare to receive the pirate POW who was being escorted by two infantry cadre of Binh Tram 34 The stations were cautioned to be extremely vigilant in handling the prisoner because he was a die-hard 11 --apparently meaning that they were having difficulty handling him Sometime during the next two days while being transported north Lt Butcher escaped thus starting a series of events that was unprecedented in the history of SIGINT support to Search and Rescue SAR efforts The message that triggered a massive recovery effort was intercepted on 9 May and revealed that a lieutenant an OV-10 pilot being brought· to the rear had escaped due to our negligence The message described the l 'l'QP ORm UMBRsA lieutenant as a spy and very dangerous and further stipulated that if he was not captured he may cause damage to our entire system When this message was received by the SIGINT Support Group for the Special Operations Group of MACV the Joint Personnel Recovery Center JPRC was notified immediately The JPRC commenced a check of OV-10 pilots known to have been downed in that area and confirmed that the prisoner referred to in the message had to be Lt Butcher Lt Butcher's escape evasion and recovery plan was then reviewed and a determination was made as to his probable direction of travel in his attempt to be rescued The following day another intercepted message gave a description of the escaped POW and notified all units to be on the alert Lt Butcher was described by the Hq 559th Transportation Group as still in uniform and wearing boots Shoes were generally the first thing to be taken from a prisoner This then indicated that he had been giving his captors trouble and had not accepted the fact that he was a prisoner of any permanency It was at this point that NSA became actively involved for the first time in a real-time recovery of a downed pilot In addition to the normal reporting conducted by field elements messages and technical back-up material concerning the plight of the American pilot were being forwarded to NSA via OPSCOMM immediately after intercept This material was then reviewed and retranslated in an attempt to derive any possible additional information I want to stress at this time that this action was not taken because we thought that the field stations were not doing an outstanding job--they were--but to emphasize the importance placed on the recovery of this pilot For the next 20 days NSA had both linguists and technicians available on a 24-hour basis to assist in the recovery attempt The Communist search intensified Binh Tram 33 instructed units to motivate the specialized forces at the district and to send someone down to the hamlets of Du Mong Bang Xang Theng and Hoi Hai to discuss the matter with local force cadre and the troops of the Peoples Army at Tchepone They were directed to search until they find him The fate of Lt Butcher was very much on the minds of the u s military commanders in South Vietnam Captain Bill Coenen USMC chief of the SIGINT Support Group was called upon to give a briefing on the Lt Butcher escape and recovery actions to General Abrams CONUSMACV · 2 '9P -------- -- --- - - - IJMll A 'f8P BtlCRtl'f UMBRA • 0 3 f ' ---- t - 1 r I i ' I I 'i '118P SHCRti'f OMBRA General Abrams ordered that all available assets be placed at the disposal of the Joint Personnel Recovery Center The 7th Air Force made all its resources available and moved helicopters to areas adjacent to the area in which it was believed that Lt Butcher would attempt to reach for recovery In addition daily photo missions were flown over this area for any sign of his whereabouts Communist entities in the Dinh Tram 33 area continued to search for the escaped OV-10 pilot On 13 May it was reported that the Communists had formed two small teams which were searching in the area of High Point 568 High Point 197 and back to Tchepone Upon arrival at Tchepone they were instructed to search in small circles around the Lamu Stream and back to High Point 375 and eventually to an unspecified new storage area Additional teams were ordered to investigate caves and streams in the vicinity of High Point 510 with great care At this point the Communists appeared to be sure that the pilot was still in the area of a new storage facility and concentrated their search in that area The search for Lt Butcher was one week old when on 16 May Communist units reported that on the previous day Allied helicopters had searched area two all day Later the same day another message disclosed that the screeching owl a derogatory term they were using to refer to Lt Butcher was in area one and ordered that a sweep be carried out through that area The search was to focus on streams rocky fields and cultivated fields with particular attention on high trees One main search element was dispatched to the location where the escaped enemy was first seen There was no celebration of Ho Chi Minh's birthday for Communist forces in the Binh Tram 33 area because as of 19 May Lt Butcher was still at large and the search continued Lt Butcher had evaded his captors for about 10 days now and yet with all the Allied assets dedicated to his recovery we still had been unable to rescue him The time had now come to take a calculated risk Aircraft equipped with loudspeakers were flown over the area we knew the Communist forces were searching They attempted to contact Lt Butcher by broadcasting to him using prearranged information contained in his escape evasion and recovery plan in an attempt to establish a rendezvous point for his extraction The question at this 4 point was would this compromise our SIGINT effort or would the Communists merely surmise that Lt Butcher had been able to contact Allied forces Whatever the thoughts of the Communists were we will probably never know But one fact is sure we did not lose our intelligence collection from these units The broadcasting did not go unnoticed by the Communists because on 20 May the Combat Operations Section of Binh Tram 33 reported that an OV-10 had used a loudspeaker to contact the pilot by secret means in areas one and two As a result of this action Communist forces sent out three search teams to form an ambush but their efforts were in vain since a later message revealed that the OV-10 pilot was still loose in the area Another insight into the dilemma of the Communist forces searching for Lt Butcher was their concern expressed by Binh Tram 33 over the possibility that civilians were assisting the pilot It was suggested that a proselyting team be sent into the area to determine if civilians were hiding the POW Lt Butcher was probably recaptured by the Communists on 26 May after about seventeen days of evasion and living off the countryside On 27 May a dispatch from the Military Movement Section contained information concerning the northward movement of an American POW who was very stubborn had escaped once and had to be tied up The report listed the prisoner's height as 1 8 meters and reported his name to be BOOTS SOW an apparent transliteration for Butcher It was also reported that the American was white had three broken teeth and was wearing a black shirt underwear and long military trousers Of interest is that in this instance no mention was made of his high boots Apparently the Communists had learned their lesson A few weeks ago when the names of 10 POWs held in Laos were handed over to Allied authorities Lt Jack M Butcher's name was on that list For a great many of us this news had deep personal meaning Hopefully another chapter in the Jack Butcher case can be written at a later date giving his side of the story 5 '8P SHOIHff UMBlb 'I ll I OP 8 BCftlff UMBRA EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 REBELS IN THAILAND by Geoffrey Wood B12 Since taking up arms against the established government in 1965 Thai insurgents have slowly and steadily grown in number and effectiveness their activity marked by ever expanding use of modern weapons and skillful guerrilla tactics with one puzzling exception I I Communism in Thailand At least as early as 1920 the Bangkok Chinese community was sending funds to support Communist activities in both China and India and agents from those countries were busily soliciting funds and talking of future revolution in Asia as an inevitable consequence of the Soviet revolution Small cells were established chiefly among students and members of the Chinese community in Bangkok In the late 1920s Nguyen Ai Ouoc Ho Chi Minh disguised as a Buddhist monk spent several months in Thailand propagandizing the Vietnamese -colony and establishing a Communist youth organization Later many of these youths became leaders in the Hanoi regime Activity among the Thai themselves was minimal and Communism was generally regarded by Thai officials as a foreign import without much appeal to the generally contented and racially homogeneous Thai In an effort to divest the movement of its foreign--particularly Chinese--flavor the Communist Party of Thailand CPT was founded in 1942 but its failure to dominate the World War II Free Thai anti-Japanese movement as well as its inability to generate an active insurgency at the war's end the only Southeast Asian Communist party that failed to do so attest to the Party's weakness and its lack of appeal to the Thai Foreign influence and support continued with Communist China training exiles who provided leadership in the CPT During the late 1950s and early 1960s North Vietnamese agents active among Vietnamese refugees in Thailand helped to set up the insurgency which was soon to follow Arrangements were probably made at this time for training of Thai Communist recruits in North Vietnam and in Communist-controlled areas of Laos 6 WP CRE'I' UMR - -- __ _ - - -- - -- -- - - - - - - Open rebellion began in 1965 before adequate foundations were fully laid This premature action was probably taken at the urging of the Chinese and North Vietnamese to divert U S attention and resources from Vietnam and Laos and perhaps to discourage the Thai government from more active participation in the Indochina war The insurgents' decision to take up arms was announced from China by both Radio Peking and the Voice of the People of Thailand located near Kunming in Yunnan Province Peking's announcement of Communist plans for Thailand suggests that China had a significant role in formulating the decision Insurgency Now With fewer than 6 500 effectives in a population of 35 million and only about 1 000 CPT members the insurgent movement does not now pose a threat to the regime The government continues however to be troubled by its activities in remote areas where central authority is weak or non-existent The insurgency differs significantly from one region of the country to another In the far South where some 1 400 men are under arms the insurgency is unusual it is neither under the direction of the CPT nor directed against Thailand The insurgents there are mainly ethnic Chinese veterans of the Malayan insurgency of the 1950s and younger recruits Their allegiance is to the Communist Party of Malaysia and they are targeted primarily against Malaysia Although they are not really a part of the Thai insurgent movement they do pose a threat to governmental authority in the area In contrast -to most of the country the northeast the site of the first active insurgency is plagued by drought and a chronically depressed economy There are ethnic differences between the northeasterner and the central Thai the region borders on the Laotian Panhandle and the northeasterner is culturally and linguistically more Lao than central Thai The Communists play upon the cultural differences and on the desire of the villagers for a share in the apparent affluence of the central plain In addition to sheltering about 2 200 insurgents the Northeast is also the location of approximately 40 000 Vietnamese refugees who are ideologically loyal to Hanoi They have not been closely involved in the insurgency but the Thai view cooperation between the refugees and the insurgents as an ever present danger · 7 1'9P SFJOH UMBRA 1 ---------TOP T UMBlb The insurgents in the Northeast are capable of low-level attacks on small Thai government units and installations Poorly armed initially and without an adequate local support base the insurgents were repulsed in early confrontations with the government Since 1967 they have utilized more cautious tactics avoiding direct confrontations with counterinsurgency forces while improving the quality of their organization and the security of their village support bases Recently they have emphasized political indoctrination establishment of village military units and acquisition of more sophisticated small arms They probably have influence over a population base of at least 100 000 people in the Northeast Insurgency in the North which broke out actively in 1967 was marked from the beginning by the participation of hill tribesmen principally Meo reportedly lead by Sino-Thai cadres There has long been ill will between the ethnic Thai who live in the lowlands and the Meo tribesmen who resent efforts by the government to curtail their slash-and-burn agriculture which damages the valuable teak forests Recent attempts by the government to end the cultivation of opium have led to further friction sale of opium being the sole source of cash for most of the hill people Government losses in the North have always been heavier than in the Northeast principally because the Meo had modern small arms and were fighting on their own rugged mountainous terrain The Thai reacted to losses on occasion by indiscriminate bombing of mountain villages which caused great resentment without inflicting any damage on the insurgents Because the insurgents were Meo and not Thai the central government was not overly concerned by events in the North Even the establishment of secure base areas in some of the rugged mountains bordering Laos did not appear to worry Bangkok With evidence of Communist success in recruiting ethnic Thai villagers over the past two years the government began to take a more serious view of the situation Security forces mounted a so far unsuccessful effort to establish a presence in the mountains along the Laotian border The northern insurgents avoiding major contacts except when the odds were in their favor carried out intensive harassment of government operational bases in isolated areas and conducted effective ambushes along principal lines of communication Their tactics included coordinated attacks by groups of 8 'f9P sgJRJR BMBlb -- -- -c ··---- - ··-·-- -··-· 1 EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 6P SBCltffl' UMBRA • •• •• ·groups•• up to one hundred men and well executed ambushes by large employing mines and booby traps They routinely used automatic weapons AK-47 against both personnel and helicopters and •often used rocket launchers M-79 in harassing ground elements Their arsenal included anti-personnel mines especially a plastiaSoviet type and in March 1971 they employed rocket-propelled grenades to destroy an armored personnel carrier APC the first confirmed insurgent use of this weapon At the end of · ·• March an APC detonated an anti-tank mine again the first use or such a weapon in Thailand The insurgents operated effectively • •· in platoon and company sized units Insurgent Communications il The skillful use of sophisticated weapons clearly reflects· · the support given by the Chinese comunists and the North Viet-i namese I I There are numerous reported sightings of insurgent groups carrying radios Interrogations and inspection of captured •• radios show most of these radios to be transistor receivers used·· for listening to Communist propaganda broadcasts No captured rebel has ever admitted to insurgent use of radio communications • although detailed descriptions have been obtained of courier communications A collateral report has furnished a wealth of •· information on training given in North Vietnam and Communist China to six insurgents They trained for four years in the use • of radios for communicating Nevertheless the trainee who defected had not seen or used a transmitter in the two years • between her return to Thailand and her defection in 1968 Other•· collateral and interrogation reports document radio facilities • serving Pathet Lao support bases along the northern Thai border•· with Laos Messages are reportedly passed by courier to these ·· facilities for rela to external address Radio Search Efforts 9 'JQP SiCREI UMBRi i 1 'ft f SEelt ET UMBltA LAOS CAMBODIA BUR MA PRIMARY · AREAS OF INSURGENCY N THAILAND 10 1'QP iCHET UMBRA _ --- - - ----- - - - 1 -- - - - -- - -- -- - EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 •' •• TQP SEORM' UMMA •• ____________________________________ •• •• I • • •• • • • • • I • • I I • I• i •• • There is conclusive evidence that both the Communist • Chinese and the North Vietnamese to include their Laotian clients the Pathet Lao actively support the insurgency in • Thailand The support encompasses training at all levels • material supply the provision of safe havens and high-level •• policy guidance Communications of these countries may well • be involved in'support of the Thai insurgency erha s intelli ence securit art militar and ress l I I The insurgency though small 1•n-g r o w9 i n--g- -s n a--r n-sftu r g eNn t 1-n--a v e 'li become increasingly sophisti- cated in their tactics and emoloyment of weaoons oarticularly in North Thailand oiioiiii - ' - iiooiiii - •-----------iiiioiiio '- i 11 'f8P Clffl'f UMBRA d ·f 1 I I 1 'f6P SBCRH'f UMBRA EO 3 3b 3 EO 3 3b 6 A GIST OF THE KOREAN SIGINT PROBLEM by Richard S Chun B44 - • • •• • • Prior to June 25 1950 when North Korean force ·crossed • the 38th parallel there was virtually no SIGIN'r effbrt on · • North Korean communications A U S Army Se urity -Agency unii ASA Pacific in Tokyo Japan began intercqpting North Korean· • traffic This effort was later augmented 'by a South Korean intercept source ROKN Group M ASA PacifiQ established an • advanced element · in Taegu Korea in September • 1950 and by • • mid-October the 60th Signal Servica Compan · 330th ASA Company from Fort Lewis Washington arriyed in Pusan Tot l • intercept was thus increased to 2b positiBns The increased collectiop-of North torean communications • introduced need for traffic analyst cryptanalysts and • linguists There were nQ Korean li guists assigned to the • Armed Forces Security Af ency NSA • One male civilian who • had studied the langua e while hospitalized and a female • JU U a D g JL Q ll W W Wi ii ll 's z J JIJi o ·employed by NSA I I established the first Korean uni e uni was augmente wen reserve o 1 cers wt previous Korean language background were recalled to active duty and the Army Language School DLI W at Monterey California assisted by accelerating its training of U S military personnel in the Korean language Meanwhile two U S Army officers of Korean ancestry stationed as instructors at the Army Language School were assigned to the Army Security Agency and transferred to ASA Pacific Tokyo They were later joined by several NSA linguists One of the instructors was LTC Youn P Kim-probably the greatest single contributor to the North and South Korean SIGINT effort Complicating the shortage of Korean linguists was the almost total lack of suitable Korean dictionaries and knowledge of North Korean military and technical terminology A file of terminology appearing in North Korean military conununications was compiled Definitions of terms were determined by context and by reference to Japanese and Chinese dictionaries The file was supplemented by data from prisoner of war interrogations conducted by the two ASA officers and by captured North Korean documents obtained through various u s military sources 12 'f8P SHOMH' UMBRA PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 - -- __ ____ _ _-_ _ _ _-_- _-- _ _ - _ _ _ -· 0P st3€H UMBRA EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 Much cryptanalytic success was achieved early n t e war and NSA and field personnel gleaned highly perishable intelligence information from decrypted messages Most orth orean messages at this stage of the war were enciphere with low grade cryptosystems which changed frequently but remained unsophisticated in complexity Voluminous end product translations produced during late 1950 and early 1951 were of great • value to intelligence users Messages emana lng from high echelon North Korean sources revealed significant information concerning the capabilities and intentions -of North Kor an forces Users for the United Nations foraes considered this a valuable source of information It ha1 been estimated that approximately es of the total usable in-telligence information• during this period was furnished by cry ptologic sources Exploitation of North Korean crxptosystems and translation of messages na hampered more DY the sheer volume f messages than by the complexity of the systems themselves Large volumes of significant message decryptions had to be published by a small work force However by the spring of 1951 the cryptosystems became Jll re sophisticated and exploita tion became increasingly diffic it This was often attr buted to the intervention of Soviet advisors who apparently beoame alarmed over the lack of communications security Despi e increased security efforts u s cryptanalysts were successful· until the fall of 1951 whe North Korea first introduced· pad encipherment The percentage of exploitable messages dropped less plaintext was used and the overall intelligence furnished by SIGINT decreased · Traffic analysis posed no problem during the hostilities Most of the callsigns •frequencies identifications and • · locations of North Korean forces were recovered from dec pted messages Followin the truce however traffic analysis was a painstaking P oblem Pro ress was finall made when North Korea be an usin rec ion in ing opera ions were unsuccess u primarily due to the rugged Korean terrains and equipment malfunctions associated with the mobile operation Non-military North Korean communications targets were first intercepted in 1952 Internal civil communications which in many respects resembled our Western Union produced plaintext messages passed among major North Korean cities and 13 'fflP SBORlff UMBRA industrial complexes These messages contained a large variety of subject matter ranging from personal messages to coal lead zinc and other mining statistics In addition order of battle information was derived when these messages were passed among members of the military forces Intercept of South Korean targets was initiated in June 1953 when South Korean President Syngman Rhee released approximately 25 000 prisoners without advising U N authorities South Korean military navy air and police communications were very closely monitored particularly whenever President Rhee threatened to take unilateral action against North Korea This threat action delayed the signing of the truce agreement for at least thirty days until July 1953 Since open hostilities have ceased and the situation has become static North Korea continues her efforts to improve communications security There has been further sophistication of cryptosystems and rigid adherence to communications security procedures The use of radio communications has decreased while the use of landlines and courier services has increased A SIGINT effort which began with North Korean forces crossing the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950 and developed to the point where valuable and useful intelligence resulted has finally with the conclusion of the war reverted to a quiet peacetime problem However despite recent peaceful overtures between North and South Koreans the North Koreans remain a well trained and well equipped military force with Chinese Red volunteers sitting just across the Yalu River Not only does a SIGINT requirement exist today but SIGINT takes on a more significant role during peacetime situations when communications security is at its peak During periods of open hostilities the mobile situation tends to lessen communications security and offers the SIGINT producer a variety of intelligence sources 14 IOP 8 BOHCf UMBRA 'f6P SHCRH'f OMBlh f ¢ w g_' 0 at 11 Of- -f o 0 c 1 r 1 x ' Jt VI HAN-JIK 1111 In il _ o '-i 4 ff o i -a l '- '- ¼t 1 THE HILL OF THE ORIENT 1f THAT MV BONY SHOULDERS ARE SHARP AS IF IN PROTEST 1 PERHAPS IS FROM THAT IMPATIENT 5 A i o q jJ t TEMPER Of MINE I 111 HICH SEES AND MUST ACCUSE I CARRY MEMORIES Of VOLCANIC c 1t 'I x ti i J ' VIOLENCE c FOR THEN I WAS FREE TO BE fURious c i o l 3 ' J -k t 1 i cl '- ·I c MY PLANTS HAD ROOTS IN VAIN c EVERY VEAR 0 AND NEVER GREW TO BE t £ -t ¼ Of Cf 1f tJ A FOREST IS IT BECAUSE I HAVE WALKED THROUGH TOO MANY CRUELTIES THAT I AM IN SUCH QUIETUDE i uf -'t •If 11 -t c i ' r _z l 1• ti 'It t iJ I HAVE NOW NOTHING TO INSIST UPON 7 4- o f 1 -¼ a •I • 1-i f -l o j J L · 71 15 'JQP Rm' UMIIM op SBORti'f UMBRA JLt Ii t i i - k 0 AT THE MOMENT THE HILL-SIDES SHAKE FROM THE f ic BAZOOKAS THE COMMUNISTS RAISE SHOUTING IN ALIEN TONGUES AND THOSE GOOD-WILLED PEOPLE f i- i i lii i t 1 111- of HAVE fALLEN SO EASILY THAT I CAN HARDLY BELIEVE IT 11 BUT NOTHING CAN DISTURB ME OR l 1 t -1- 2I a MY QUIET NOIII ff f i Li 0 -i WITH TIGHT CLOSED EVES THE ICE Of MV EXPRESSION fREEZES t • i • l-f-i t- f -'° ij f 1 et- i-2 i 3 HARD· I WHO EVEN HAVE FORGOTTEN HOW •J ·I 1 ·I a -1- TO SMILE AM THE HILL OF THE ORIENT TRANSLATED ev KIM JONG-GIL Jt l 11 1- i t 'U-¼it fl ii t 2 C4 1 • •i l n_ ' ' t Ul X c 0 z i - 11 c ft 1 it • LL ·l c 16 0P 8' 60Hrf UMBRll - - -- - - - - __ '91 ---- -- - - - - - - - - Transposition is ••••• Our previous example of transposition involved a diagonal and blank cells This is a simpler but still an intriguing version Can you recover the key and the plain text E T N N s CE TA H L I I AA I WR 0 X H E E E E LAA s I C u T E B 0 y R L s u s s H p M T F L L 0 M C D p D M u D R B D I S E T N w R H s V I F TOW M T p s s u AW II I y y V E s F 0 I N G u s 0 E E N I X I C N G E L H TE L E L E S T I R N U I V T L T 0 C E N N X MA B T 0 A N HT M L 0 T A X F B p E N II H E R L 0 p E B LE s E RE E D C E I E N E I 0 N T L S I E N 0 I E RA R I C 0 0 0 TT 0 0 M A N 0 I T 0 X I L T E TO A VE XO A I F E YA E N 0 T 0 L p MA B 0 M XE A E N 0 C E A X A E F E A UX L RT N I 0 0 Q X N RT p I R I R E NE F E X LT X TE 0 N H I T R E H Q 0 0 H 0 RU C G N X E 0 p C 0 H D RC RH D B 0 u I M HOE V T E s H RUT w E T NH I CE DHA F 0 0 I u D R 0 G E MEX I y R N T GS D M M E HH N I 0 u s G K X N C I w RU E p LA T N M L E D E U B I A X L TE TE V E OA F B HS A N N RA M T P T E H E C A RWE C I T C N T W C X D D R MN I R G NW I T N AYE X C EA GA F F EW 0 L XV W L D E S O N s D H MN E Q X A E NAT I R G Solution in the next issue 17 'l'QP SECRB'I' UMBRA TQP 8ECKET UMIIRA EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 THE OPEN DOOR We 6eek to be companion6 along the way The tante n which we ca Ay i6 not ou 6 The 6pi it which we 6ha e l6 contagioU6 thought The knowledge which we gain an illuminating to ch And atl who 6tek may pe ceive and leaAn -The Concept 06 VAagon Seecl 6 SIGINT SUPPORT ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT by William Hunt P2 When I was asked to write an article on SIGINT support t economics it occurred to me that there was a feeling among • certain personnel that the problem in NSA was something new · nest of us know that economic intelligence production in NSA is not new I think it would be useful though to try to anticipate what changes in processing priorities will result from the statements of the United States Government regarding an increased emphasis on our economic posture involving the placement of this country in a more competitive position vis-a-vis other major trading countries of the world and a • still more readily understandable consideration the continued high value of our currency It is true that the emphasis in the past een on military-type economics which includes the production of weapons weapon systems and hardware the testing of new weapons delivery of new weapons and related supplies to their national units and to foreign collaborating countries etc and specifically on the ability of communist Bloc countries to prepare for and sustain hostilities against the United States and its allies It can be readily seen that almost any aspect of a country's economic status would contribute to the knowledge of its military capability It can be concluded therefore that economic information from SIGINT has always been hig on the mission of NSA Priorities from time to time 18 'JQP BEOIHR UMBRA ------ _ --- -- -- T --- --- · 'fflP Sl'JORl3'f O IBRA have changed depending on the requirement for this information and the general resources available Generally speaking priorities affect the scope of collection the depth and detail of analysis and the frequency and timeliness of reporting In August of this year G Group decided to take a look at its readiness to respond to an increased interest in economic SIGINT Since G produces most of the non-military type of economic SIGINT and since this category is the most likely to be affected by an increase in the priority of economic intelligence Chief G Group established an econoMic coordinator as an advisor to look into the whole of the G Group economic SIGINT problem including requirements collection processing and reporting with a view to being in a position to respond to any changes in the 9eneral G Group priorities system A study staff of up to six personnel was envisaged to undertake this project A basic charge to this staff was to study the problem but not to become involved in operations its activity was to be confined to study--to probing the general problem area and reporting on the ideal organization within G Group to cope with the potentially increased emphasis on economic SIGINT if such should be required The writer and one additional intelligence analyst have been studying this problem since August and have just completed an interim report on the status of G Group and some recommendations to irnpro e the G posture to meet the anticipated challenge Considerable progress has also been made in the customer community including the rejuvenation and enlargement of the USIB Economic Intelligence Committee and the establishment of a sub-committee to deal with economic requirements At this writing a new Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs has been named at the State Department Mr Casey and Mr Schultz Secretary of the Treasury has been given responsibility for over-all coordination of U S economic affairs With the exception of piecemeal ad hoc one-time requirements no major SIGINT requirements demanding cor unensurate resources have been levied on NSA beyond the normal and mostly military-type economic requirements discussed above Possibly some reorientation of the priority and or processing of existing requirements will be forthcoming and possibly there will be totally new requirements with emphasis on specifics and on more 19 T-QP iBCRE'f UMBRA 110P SBOMB' UMBRA EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 use 3605 timely reporting It is conceivable that some de-emphasis may occur on the traditional problems and that this will entail a reorienting of scarce skills i e linguists research analysts report writers etc Hour for hour and pound for pound of intercepted traffio diplomatic communications provide the best yield of economic information whether the traffic is encrypted or plaintext It is for this reason that no let-up in the intercept and • processing of diplomatic traffic should be considered in order to increase the output of economic SIGINT ·le must if anything increase the flexibility of processing and reporting such traffic The nature of the economic • problem will be such that we may be required to organize process and or report in many forms with timeliness an extremely important factor Just as tactical support to a military commander must b e t i m e l i 1 11t liLlil WiloUiiM lrili '-li t t liii K lil w 111Miiloo--f hases of the· o erations I promise to yield mass volumes of such data which will require mass machine scanning etc These processing techniques are currently being tested and it is hoped that the increase in hwnan effort can be kept to a minimwn however it would be unrealistic to hope that no increase in linguists analysts or report writers will be required for an increased economic effort I A de-emphasis of traditional military problems because of a relatively relaxed international atmosphere will undoubtedly permit the reassignment of some personnel from these problems to the possibly emphasized economic ones By no standard can we expect an increase in any resources of NSA in these times of stringent budgets We must be looking for better machineprocessing methods machine outputs designed to meet customer 20 ·• ---- - -------------- - ------ op SEOR Srf EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 UMHBl req irements with the minimum of narrative information banks which can be readily q eried etc Only by the adoption of these techniques can we e er hope to cope with the increased volume of material and the'P ossibly increased requirements In addition to providingl Ito the traditional Departments and Agencies all of whom have supporting intelligence produJcion organizations we must consider new members I _organizations that may not have SIGINT analytic support integral to their organizations In these instances we must plan for providing the required support in easily readable forrn devoid of SIGINT jargon and intelligible without recourse to special interpretation NOTE Thi a tlcle appeaked in the Janua y IT73 i66ue 06 Keyword and la epklnted heke with the kind pe4miaa l on 06 the Edita 06 Keyword and the authok In view 06 the changing elationahip between the United State6 and Aai an countkle pa4tlculakly the People6' Republic 06 China one may expect an lnckeaaed lnteke6t ln economic S1G1NT 6kom 8 ta get akeaa Shall I tell you what knowledge is It is to know both what one knows and what one does not know ----Confucius 21 '10P BSORtirt' UMBRA THE GROUND ZERO APPROACH TO LANGUAGE ANALYSIS by Dan Buckley B61 The ground zero approach to language analysis is the mechanical application of language skills at whatever level of competence to a particular target on a day-to-day basis without regard for anything that happened yesterday and without concern for what may happen tomorrow--or beginning each day at ground zero It's easy comfortable and best of all it's safe Like most people linguists have security blankets Among their favorites I know what it says--you figure out what it means This is closely followed by the nonsensical replacement of foreign words with English equivalents more or less For example in Vietnamese this results in dropping 200 pounds sterling bombs for ne m bom 2000 ba ng anh or active activity for hoat dong tich cuc rather than 2000 pounders and positive action Does nground zero then become ma th hong At any rate the ground zero approach is more than safe it is irresponsible and ineffective You can't work traffic successfully with such a method because you can't know what is abnormal reportable if you don't know what is normal and you can't know what is normal if you know only what is happening today You have to know about yesterday and care about tornorrow--and then you have to do something about it Here are some things you might try to cure the ground zero syndrome 1 Constantly improve your language capability Don't use cipher traffic to do this unless you never read it as part of the job If cipher traffic is your field read plaintext for practice Newspapers are even better because while reading traffic won't help your vocabulary and structure problems much newspapers will and the newspapers will help you to read traffic 2 Have your translations checked occasionally especially one that you consider well done It doesn't do much for the ego sometimes but it is an effective learning method Don't be embarrassed if it's not as good a translation as you thought-you really need from three to five years of varied experience to be a highly qualified translator 22 'AW KCRET UMBRA ___ ___ _ --- • z#p' - 3 Don't be lulled self-satisfied into thinking of yourself as a hotshot lingy because of practiced facility with a particular group of traffic Most VE-100 grads could learn to read and work artillery traffic in a week so you might want to ensure that you aren't confusing expertise with familiarity Try not to spend more than a year at the same desk or rather with the same group of traffic You ought to make some effort to expand your qualifications keeping in mind that undeveloped people tend to make a significant contribution to their own undevelopment 4 Practice writing out translations in good English The best translation is one that reads as though it was never in any other language Nha cua anh Tam ought never to come out the house of Mr Tam --why not Tam's house 5 Don't mistranslate anything ever Sooner or later you are going to have to come to grips with a fact of the translator's life there are some things you don't know Socrates had something to say once about the really smart guy knowing the limitations of his knowledge t ' ' 6 Be specifically aware of everything that happens in your traffic and generally aware of what's going on about you The lingy working the traffic is the duty expert--make no mistake about it If you don't know the little things that happen every day and their relationship to one another there is probably no one who does know 7 Keep records That's the answer to the question generated by paragraph 6 Keep records on OB personalities locations and events at least on a system unit basis It helps you to keep track of what's going on helps with cryptsystem identification and in the event of your untimely departure it helps the next guy get snapped in that much faster 8 Learn an effective writing style That really may not equire a major change but something as apparently insignificant as switching from passive to active voice NVA forces in southern Laos will launch a major offensive •• rather than It was noted that a major offensive is to be launched by NVA forces in southern Laos ••• If you need help here get it from ny of the senior language analysts Most of them make at least $15 000 a year and you can help them to 23 earn it Seriously every one of them will be glad to help you and I can honestly say that I don't know a single man or woman among them who would feel that you were imposing 9 Get out of the bubble Language is not an end in itself it is a tool--nothing more nothing less It can be used in breaking crypt-systems and recovering comms nets just as C A T A and reporting are tools which can help the linguist The linguist who operates in the language bubble is almost doomed to mediocrity and a performance at the ground zero level Finally you ought to be asking yourself whether you are any better as a language analyst than you were last year What language contribution have you made to your section branch that was not levied upon you by someone else Are you operating at somewhere near maximW l capacity Is 100 messages a week truly the limit of your capability As resources diminish someone else is likely to ask those questions--and they are legitimate If ground zero is your location there is no better time to move than now 22 C1 ll if j • J The e wa4 a young tady 6 om 1- TI U IJ U U Ban Ban 1b n z b m u u iu Who wo e he 4ki t4 • • 3- Cii'u Cllt Jl U d 2 Cl c§- 211 d 01 cu Who gave he the eye r I • cc n s d ct- ve y 4an 4an She me t a'G i5 u ·mo u And now the y live in 4we e t Vientiane ---Doug Pe it 81Z 24 'f8P SBORlft' UMBRt - __ _ _ _ _ _ _ EC - _ _ __ t i -- • -- -· -· - - f -------EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 • r i I I ' • I EXPLOITING TIIE DUST by Kenneth Miller D43 • 25 IOP SSOR B UMBRA ------ - - -EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 8EOR8' tJMBKA 26 'JQP - - iGCKD' WIRKh --- ---- 111 9$¥ -' 1 1 11111 $WWW U£ ' _ 'P WWW-•·- · ---•-----• - -- - - _ - _ __ - •' - _ _ _ _ -· 4 EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 TQP SCBET UMBRA - ' 27 OP SBOIHff UMBlb ' ' EO 3 3b 3 PL 86- 36 50 USC 3605 TOP BBORE'f UMBRA 28 ' - ----------·----•------- ' -- - I - - - -- --- -- - '8P 8 B0Rtl'f UMBlb ONCE MORE THE TSR by Jane Dunn B45 The TSR or Technical SIGINT Report is according to the pertinent NSA Publication Manual a vehicle for authoritative presentation of significant analytical results which are sufficiently well established to convey a technical conclusion or theory and which may be used as a basis for further analysis and or product reporting I believe that this definition ignores a very important aspect of the TSR--the quality of its writing We have all heard the pleas for technical reports to document analysis so that vital technical and historical information does not leave the organization with the departing analyst High-level concern about deficiencies in our report writing has resulted in an explosion of NSA writing courses and in the requirement for evaluation of English competence in the performance appraisal of employees above a certain grade level Unfortunately the number of well written technical reports does not seem to have increased in proportion to the attention given in recent years to the English problem Although a poor report is probably better than none even if the ultimate reader has to do some textual analysis to discover what the writer is trying to say there is little excuse for poor writing in an agency like ours where the average level of formal education is exceptionally hi h As bad money drives the good out of circulation so poor writing overwhelms the excellent and drives it underground We become so accustomed to the dreary procession of cliche jargon and stereotype that we risk losing our power of discrimination Standards slip lower and lower until what has been described as 11 illiterate garbage 11 becomes the accepted norm and only the occasional appearance of a well organized informative literate piece of technical writing reminds us that we can do better But how Perhaps the first step in the steep climb toward excellence is to take a good look at some of the technical reports we have ourselves produced or read Rarely does a SIGINT target organization send or receive a cipher message encrypted traffic is transmitted by some entity in communications with another Nor does any monitor intercept such a message encrypted traffic is observed being passed by 29 'fOP SEORBCf UMBR subject entities A Polvetzian regiment seldom uses PQMR-127 for daily strength reports a PQ regimental level military entity is presently utilizing cryptosystem PQMR-127 for daily reporting of personnel strength In fact nothing is now used it is presently being utilized Such overblown verbiage is hard to swallow the first time it appears when it is repeated in all appropriate slots in a stereotyped format it becomes downright sickening Is it any wonder such reports pass quickly across the desk and into the burn bag or the darkest corner of a file drawer From the evidence of published TSR the prospect of writing a technical report must terrify many analysts Faced with producing such a report the writer scurries to the files for an earlier document which he can republish after substituting more current dates and adding a handful of new details He thus has a security blanket but does he have a report The published result is not the product of analysis but the regurgitation of an analyst's card file The nadir of technical reporting is to publish a printout of an IBM deck under a TSR number and title Another security blanket for the technical reporter is the check-off list designed as a memory aid but too often used as the incorporated outline for a TSR Relying on such a grocery list leads to the deadly practice of making some entry under each heading even if that entry is Nothing to report or Not applicable Both the update and the check-off list allow the writer to withdraw however ungracefully not only from taking responsibility for analysis but also one is tempted to conclude from thinking Guidelines for effective writing abound They cover the field from correct grammar and punctuation to hints on writing style The analyst who seriously wants to improve his technical reports will find that he gathers dividends from an investment of time and if necessary money in using such aids At the very least the investor will avoid the danger of having his conclusions dismissed as unreliable because the reader equates poor writing with fuzzy thinking 30 11 1 'fOP SBCR B'f UMBRA CRYPTO-SCRAMBLE Ray Titus Unscramble each of the four numbered crypto-scrambles placing one letter in each space to form four words or nanm each of which fits the definition to its right 1 2 0 XO P I ANT I __ TL _ E _Q ____ Q __ Production of information from messages that are encrypted in systems wh01e basic elements are known E NPABS T S OI L 0 Used to determine causal or random repetitions Q_Q _______ Q_ 3 _Q __ Q __ NAKKYBE File of available keys 4 A RQ T M N __ OT _ E __ __E Q Group of 4 digits Now arrm ge the circled letten to form the cryptoanswer suggested by the cartoon at the right -- -- - •r J # -- - Print CRYPTOANSWER here Souncll like 1ht confeqlont of • skyjacker i I first got the idea Answer on page -37 • 31 ' 'FQP OIHR UMBRA EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 HOW ABOUT THE OLDSMOBILE M by Thomas Wood B34 At the start of the air war when the bombing of North Vietnam began in earnest the neighbors to the north were concerned that thev miqht become involved---on the receiving end I Having reached the correct solution albeit incorrectly we saw no reason to advise the customer of any anomaly in the text of the published translation 32 ---- -•- -r• 1- '-- --- ------ _ - •· - -- -- -- - - - - - -·•· 1· 'f0P SBOR 8 MRR A STANDARDIZATION by Russ Myers B12 Three data preparation media to ready messages for insertion into the STRAND drum file are available to bookbreakers using Project TREES on RYE They may punch the messages onto ASR-35 paper tape in ASCII 7-level coding or onto cards via the IBM 029 keypunch in EBCVIC coding or the IBM 026 key punch in FORTRAN-H coding The ASR-35 handles I the translation of ASCII-coded paper tape into inter al • · • _ RYE F1ELVA TA coding however a translation card · 9 9' P- must be provided with card input If you are using a SORBAN card reader without its own internal coding you need only provide · for translation from EBCVIC card coda or FORTRAN-H card code to RYE internal FlELVATA code as approrpiate However if you use a UNIVAC-1004 outstation the translation card will facilitate the conversion from the UNIVAC-1004 oriented XS-3 coding to FlELVATA coding The Project TREES program OLIVE will conveniently copy a RYE FASTRA D message file onto magnetic tape The tape will be BCV coded I suspect something was lost in translation when my sponsor did not recognize the special characters on the message file tape I provided him when he listed it on his Burroughs B300 outstation in BCL coding 7 ft ft ----OR CONFUSION 33 'FOP BHORB'f UMBlb J 'P9P BHJRET UMIIBI ----B GROUP EXPANDS NEW OFFICE ESTABLISHED The Office of Asian Systems Development B7 with Mr Coleman Goldberg as chief came into being 8 February 973 This new addition to B Group will be responsible for initiating coordinating and implementing a comprehensive program for upgrading the PRC collection posture and improving the management of B collection assets ----The revisions in the criteria for professionalization in several career fields are highlighted below for your information If there are any questions please contact your training coordinator or the Executive of the individual panels •Special Research A written Professionalization Qualification Examination was instituted as of 15 January 1973 The oral interview will still be required if an aspirant scores between 70 and 80 on the POE or at the option of the Panel ira score of 81 or above is obtained •Traffic Analysis Effective 1 January 1973 the basic requirements for certification in the Traffic Analysis career field are 1 high school graduation or certificate of equivalency 2 a documentary report acceptable to the Panel and 3 passing the T A PQE which beginning calendar year 1973 will be offered only once a year This year Part I wIIT be offered in May and Part II in December •Signals Analysis The revised criteria published on 26 October 1972 differs in two ways from the old The first is that maximum performance points have been dropped from 500 to 2S0 points the minimum remains at 150 points To obtain points in this category a candidate must submit a technical or methodical report which presents either a signals processing or analytic approach or system conceived by the candidate the results of such an approach or system or the results of a signals or telemetry analysis effort The second difference is that computer and physical science courses have been added to the list of related courses --By the way--the Cryptanalysis Language and Traffic Analysis Career Panels have been relocated to 3C051 34 - i - • ·- _ - ai - --- - - · _ _ - -'-- - - -· -- ·· -- 1 - -------- · ---- - tt a--__ - - i'OP SBCRET UMIIR EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 ----Did U Know There is a Hot Line in the main NSA nuilding YES--a 24-hour recording device is in operation in the office of the Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Director NSA The purpose of this Hot Line is to make available a round-the-clock method of helping the enlisted personnel stationed at NSA with any problems that cannot be resolved through normal channels To use this outstanding service just dial 11 IDEA 4332s ----Ll4 the Transportation Office has been conducting a series of surveys about establishing commuter bus services in various areas such as Columbia Md and Washington o c Personnel willing to support those services or interested in initiating other services should contact the Transportation Officer Ll4 ----BLITZ GOURSE ON RYE • • The Cryptanalysis D artment of the NCSch is offering a new course called 'RYE Operations for Cryptanalytic Applications CA-090 is destgned to give the working cryptanalyst practical experience itt using RYE effectively as an aid in solving cryptanalyttc problems The course lengih is two weeks half-time • It includes detailed discussion and usage of 15 GUPPY programs · Prospective students should ha ve a working knowledge of cryptfnalytic terms and techniques CA-100 level The first class is being offered in March For fu ther information contact the CA Department 8025 0 ----9n 23 January 1973 the Language Career Panel held its fir t formal graduation ceremony in • the Director•s conference Room at which time 23 language interns representing eight languages r ceived letters of completion of the intern program Thirteen of - ---congratulations to Virginia the graduates also received Valaki and her cohorts in GS for Professional Linguist certificates successfully penetratinq an Mr Robert K Hess Chairman of the Language Career Panel opened the ceremony with a capsule report of the Language Intern Program He then introduced the Language Career Panel Members Advisors and - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Staff former Executives and 35 I PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 l 'fOP BSOHrf UMBRA Language Intern POnsors Dr Louis W Tordella Deputy Director addressed t e graduates on the subject of language work at NSA He was assisted by Mr John J Connelly ADP in presenting the certificates ·to the graduates The ceremony wps followed by a brief reception which featured sparkling punch a d petit fours The graduates and the languages they represent are j ani l J 1m anese aro Buse awn French David G Chizum Russian Donald H Deitrick Korean David G Dillard Spanish Portuguese Gerald L Cverett Spanish Linda L Franklin French Richard L Gibson French Marjorie D Hamlett Spanish Margaret K Keirstead Spanish Terry L Lyons German Carole A McGee Arabic Williams Olmsted Russian Veronica J Palk Arabic Michael G Pond Russian Martin J Savalchak Russian Sheila B Singer Portuguese Spanish Susan L Smith Arabic Arlene M Sullivan Japanese Joanne L Urban Spanish Florence E Wagner Shan Georgianne M Weiser Arabic Graduated with Certification 36 ----Would you believe that GS didn't find out until 27 February that Bl had relocated to FANX I I from FANX I I I in October There just ought to be a law ----Papers for The CLA essay contest can be submitted through 31 Harch 1973 Send three copies to Mr c G Pritchard Secretary CLA B5111 FANX III Prizes of $100 $50 and $25 will be awarded at the Annual Banquet date to be announced The criteria for judging the contest are a Relevance to the cryptology of the subject and treatment b Interest of the paper to NSA professionals c Style of writing For security rules consult the Technical Journal Vol XI No 4 1966 Papers that you have written concerning your regular assignment may very well be candidates for submission Don't forget the deadline date-31 March ----Keep 7 and 8 May open dates on your calendar That's when the Institute for Advanced Technology Control Data Corporation is holding its seminar on Data Base Concepts in the Washington o c 'f0P 8 BOR B UMBRA I PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 area This seminar will provide management with a general understanding of data base concepts In particular management's role in the design and implementation of the data base will be addressed Other dates of interest are 25 to 27 April when the same sponsor will hold its local seminar on Advanced Programming Techniques The seminar designed for programmers analysts and their technically oriented supervisors will deal with philosophies and advanced techniques of computer programming Ideas applicable to any machine and any programming language will be discussed Special attention will be given to FORTRAN COBOL PL 1 and assembly languages 1 pencil and is off again to Vietnam his ourth fifth tour formerly of the lress ps enroute to the same destination Solution to puzzle 1 2 3 4 Exploitation Poisson Table Key Bank Tetranome Crypto-answer Plain Text ----The joint eeting of all members past and present of the TA CA LA and SRA Intern Programs scheduled for 14 March in the NSA auditorium will be reviewed in the next issue The guest speaker will be Mr David Y McManis Chief of the White House Situation Room TUNNEL VISION ----As glaucoma can lead to total blindness ignorance of other disciplines can lead to total analytic failure The cryptanalyst who ignores station identification and traffic laning deprives himself of a most valuable tool and can insure smearing of any statistical values which could give ----Smiles and Tears we are happy to announce the recovery of the system away The traffic two members of the V agon Seed analyst who ignores crypt staff Ray Lynch B44 from a discriminants and indicators heart attack and Lorna Selby Bl similarly throws away clues to from an eye operation station ident and callsign sysVictor Tanner our Rewrite tem structure and usage Editor has turned in his red 37 • 'f8P SBORB'f UMBRA ASK THE ORAGON LAOY TO Mr Leon r O'Meara CS Dear Mr O'Meara The following questions were submitted to the Dragon Lady by B Group open-shop programmers We are forwarding them to you with the hope that you and your staff of experts will enhance our enlightenment by supplying the answers 1 For any programming application the maximum result is attained by a Time Sharing Option TSO The programmer sits down programs debugs and executes in what appears to be an on-line one-on-one environment Time Sharing Systems are used to service many programmers at different locations The RYE System is the closest thing NSA offers to a TSO APL is a real TS system but because of restrictive file capacity and lack of resources is not a practical alternative The question then is With all the resources--CPUs ASRs 2260s and APL terminals--and a large debug workload isn't it time for such a service to be made available to open-shop programmers 2 Re-inventing the wheel is a cute phrase around NSA and also a daily occurrence in the programming field Why isn't there a readily available multi-volume set of program machine and system descriptions representing a central repository of information Why isn't there an updating service for technical manuals which incorporates additions and explanations by the technical staff to further the dissemination of information 38 'f8P SHOH'f UMBRA _ _ ______ ---- __- 3 There is more than enough work to go around With that as a basic premise wouldn't it be better to permit the programming staff to attack any problem in the language which suits it best rather than introducing new languages of dubious value Also wouldn't it be logical to standardize languages across several machines i e FORTRAN IBM 370H B6700 RYE etc 4 How is change effected Is a more responsive mechanism than the Suggestion Program needed in the area of data processing Are we afflicted with the not-made-here syndrome You can appreciate our reluctance to tackle these queries and can understand our urgent request for assistance We would like to include both the questions and any rejoinders you may supply in our next issue DRAGON LADY B03 Dear Dragon Lady I hope that the following will be adequate answers for your questions Further clarification can be obtained from appropriate CS representatives 1 IBM defines time sharing as ''the shared conversational and concurrent use of a computing system by a number of users at remote terminals TSO IBM's Time Sharing Option is designed according to available documentation to provide a time sharing environment for terminal-oriented applications It provides the user at a terminal with a command language with which he can develop test and execute programs conveniently it also contains data entry editing and retrieval features Time sharing jobs entered from the terminal foreground jobs share system resources with batch jobs background jobs that are being processed at the same time TSO appears to have numerous advantages for programmers and users in a terminal environment However there are several restrictions involving its use which must be studied No single software package is the answer to everyone's prayers TSO's apparent benefits are not without balancing drawbacks Some OS 39 WP ORBf UMBRA --------- - - - - - J 'f0P SBORR lJMIJRh facilities are unavailable to foreground jobs the execution of all jobs may be seriously affected if TSO is not appropriately tuned for our regular job mix the monitoring of system use and performance becomes a highly complex job and security problems--the needs for adequate data and program protection-are increased C Group is hoping to obtain in early Spring 1973 an IBM 370 155 One of its principal uses will be the test and evaluation of TSO for seat NSA We hope that by careful study and experimentation with different facets of TSO we will be better prepared to calculate its effects on our overall data processing efforts We can then fit TSO into our systems with a minimum of upheaval and discomfort for users 2 we agree that a great need exists for a central library of data processing information Most offices in C Group maintain their own libraries in a more or less haphazard manner The P2 Technical Library maintains several shelves of technical information concerning computer hardware and i s an excellent source of generalized- information on what's available in the marketplace Within C CS and C9 are attempting to create a computerized facility containing information about our own hardware systems Hopefully it will contain current information about the resources of a particular system the locations and types of terminals and the like The problem becomes an obvious one however whenever the word current is used Some decision must be made about who will be responsible for updating the file and how information will be filtered to that individual or organization whenever changes are required It is not a simple matter Technical manuals are a different kind of problem C9 attempts to make available the latest updates to IBM and Burrough' manuals Information is supplemented by User Bulletins published by the C9 offices responsible for the various systems C7 also publishes Technical Bulletins designed to make users aware of any changes which might affect them Beyond this C Group does not at the present time have the human resources to cope with a problem which is admittedly staggering 40 ·- --· --- -- --·· ------- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - ------·--- --- ·--- 3 We believe that for any given programming application there are a variety of factors which should be considered in determining a preferred computer solution Primary factors include the following 1 Accessibility of the data file s as input to the program on the preferred computer 2 Adequacy of the computer resources for the demands of the application 3 The needed type of user access to the computer environment 4 The programming language and associated compiler which best meet the demands of the application 5 Availability of the preferred computer resource for the specific application 6 Priority of the application in relation to other demands for the preferred computer resource Secondary factors which might affect the computer solution include the following 1 The availability of a programmer 2 The programming language repertoire of the available programmer 3 The presence of a computer which is not as heavily loaded as other choices A program for a manager of programmers is to minimize the impact of the secondary factors particularly if they force an undesirable compromise on the primary factors To be more specific on the first part of Question 3 we believe that selecting the best programming language for a given application is a very important process and should be done in light of the above factors Chas a software division c95 the Languages and Compilers Division whose services are available to assist the user in this process In addition this division provides direct customer support for solving problems 41 SBORtlf UMBRA in using a programming language or its associated compiler A telephone call to secure extension 4745 will tap this service We also believe that a programmer with a working knowledge of several programming languages and compilers can do a better job in matching an application with a language than he can if he relies solely on one or two personally favorite compilers Further we think it is desirable for the open-shop programming manager to know which languages and compilers are supported by C Group and equally as important to know why each one is selected for support Briefly C supports those programming languages and compilers which can provide the best production service to the NSA community More specifically C95 currently supplies nine higher-level programming languages and 23 associated compilers on our general purpose computers All of these are proven production grade resources C95 is available to provide information for parties interested in specifics To our knowledge we do not introduce new languages of dubious value C9 employs a careful and critical review process before introducing a new language or a new compiler to the user community for production purposes Part of this review process is to seek and consider the views and requirements of the user community To address the second part of your Question 3 an analysis of FORTRAN on the family of NSA computers was performed in 1967 68 with the objective of standardizing across the board We discovered that the task would have been formidable for two primary reasons 1 As a language FORTRAN is not rich enough to assure compatible meaning on different kinds of computers 2 No two of the FORTRAN compilers used at NSA are built with the same compiler technology Further elaboration can be found in an article P og am T an 6e abllity in the P oceeding6 06 the NSA Netwo k 06 Compute 6 Confte ence 1968 INOC-68 A more recently published report titled C95 Technical Bulletin No 35 FORTRAN COMPARISON March 1972 is also available To respond to the need for a standard programming language we are building the NSA BETA language and compilers that are designed not only to avoid the above FORTRAN problems but also to provide an algorithmic capability well suited to the needs of the open-shop cryptologic programmer 42 TQP 8ECRET UMBRA - - -·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---- - - - ---- 'fOP RR UMIIRh 4 The problems of effecting change vary according to the size and complexity of the applications software system involved If the software is a single purpose application system of moderate size speed of change is mostly dependent on the availability of manpower to make the change If however the software system involved is a large general purpose system such as KAY or GENED there are often extremely difficult technical problems in either modifying or adding to the system For example one of the GENED problems which beset us for many months was the limit on the size of the error file When the allowable file size was exceeded an altogether too frequent occurrence the system could not process any more data A program change to expand the error file size seemed to be a simple solution but detailed investigation by the software specialists who knew the system best showed that this seemingly simple change had cascading effects which would have necessitated a complete rewrite of the system This investigation in addition to studies of alternate solution took weeks to accomplish There was no not invented here syndrome in this problem it was simply a very difficult technical problem that took a long time to resolve This example is indicative of the difficulties of making apparently simple changes to a complex system There are I am sure examples of desirable changes to comparatively simple systems not being made because of the NIH syndrome The best way to resolve this type of situation is for the line manager in the analytic area to discuss the proposals with the line manager at Division level in CS A valid requirement or a worthwhile proposal should not be allowed to die at the analyst-analyst level Managerial review is essential in these cases The V4agon Lady 066e1t4 he humble apologi e6 to P lqued who4e que t lon in the Vecembe i66ue wa6 unan6we1ted ••• a c ompo6it lon e 04 1n c 01t1te c t lo n 6 he 6 u b miu the 6ollow lng Many people have asked 11 Why the TACP does not accept applicants for the T A Intern Program if they have had more than two years cryptologic experience The selection criteria referring to experience states nMust ordinarily have at least one year of T A experience at minimum GGD-07 or E-5 level however must 43 '1'0P SHORiff UMBRA not have more than two years of cryptologic experience at See O M Subject NSA Intern Program Vacancies dated 28 August 1972 I asked the Executive of the T A Career Panel to conunent on this His views are GGD-07 9 levels When people apply for the On-Board T A Intern Program they are asked to submit a complete PQR with the other necessary forms These PQRs are evaluated against the T A Criteria for Professionalization The general rule of thumb applied is that applicants with more than 600 points are considered well on the way toward the certification goal of 1000 points and certification The accumulation of points over 600 is generally due to the experience factor or more than two years T A experience as a GGD-07 or E-5 This is not however a hard and fast rule since the TACP did accept an individual in the past for the program with more than two years T A experience at the GGD-07 and 9 levels and an accumulation of over 700 points The plan in this case was to arrange for an abbreviated program for this man I say wa4 because he was also selected for an overseas position and chose to take that assignment in lieu of the T A Intern Program To sum up--each case is evaluated on its own merits The Panel considers whether or not the applicant shows professional potential and weighs that against what the T A Intern Program offers The Panel is guided by the need to fill professional level positions in P and in the selection process of on-board interns the Panel tries to pick the best Other selection criteria are listed in the announcement mentioned above 16 you a e tandlng up ight don't wo y i6 you hadow l c4ooked ----Fo tune Cook e 44 EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 'f0P StiCREi UMIIR1 i- · • • •• • CONTRIBUTORS • • • 'PAN BUCKLEY 6-lll -fi t ca me to wo 1tk a t NSA a 6 a •MiJ k t · -ln • 196· a6te11 d1tivbtg by the bu -i ldJ ng 117 t-lrMet• h l nk-ln g lt · wa fi a -fihoe 6acto11 y He wa 6 a tangu lgt a haty6t •and • language 6e c t-lon ch-le 6 611 om 1963 t p 1°16e ex cep t wh- e-n he wa6 on TVY to Va Nang 011 Khe s«nW•oi Pnu Ba 011 hu La l He 6olve d the Vietnam TVY p11 cb e m Ln Ap -lt 1916 by 90-i ng PCS to Phu Ba -i whe 1te he Jt« e d u rrt-lt Ap1t i l 1 6 7 On the way back to NSA he 6topp o 6 at Fo Devei6 long enou gh to 6in i 6h 6i u t i i a l11 11 6o tc a na y 6-i 6 · cou11 6e 06 44 atudent6 ln Q to e11 19 b he e 6t thi Ma 11 i ne Coll pa and ca me to wq k c-i p-lt-lan 011 th • Agency He waa ce 11 t-l6-led_-by t t e J anguage pefne t in • Ma 11 ch 1969 and by the SRA p nt l n b11 ua 1ty 1972 fle -i 6 cu 11 11 e ntly fie 11 ving -ln n bve11 4eaa•b-lttet in Sou th£aat 0 • • • • • A1 ia • JANEE BETTYf VUNN'6 c onnect-lon with SIGfNT da tu back o WWII ta g•t• om Japa•••••Milita y to Clf COM w-l th 6top 6 a long the way •6011 wo11 k on I I u ope an Sate tl-lte and V-i etname6e Communiat c yptoayate m6 She holda a 8 E 611 o Vu que6ne Unive11 aity and waa p epa ed to teach F11 e nch in ennaylvan i a h gh achoola be 6011 e 6he wa a detou ed to k l ngton Hall Be tty -l 6 a ce 11 t 6 e d c11 ypta na lyat a tutoi 60 the CA Inte 11 n p og am an E E O counaello11 and he biog11 a ph-lc e d-lto lt 60 Dragon Seeds S-i nce May 1972 • 'ahe ha 6 be en Chie6 06 B45 the PRCI 1Vivi6ion I «• • •r• • • 45 'f8P St3CRl3 UMBR 'ftlP SHORl stt' UMIIRA EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 'I • WILLIAM G FLYNN 6605 ha 6 been with NSA and p1tedece 6 60- agenc le 6 6 lnce 1952 Mo 6t 06 h l 6 mo1te than 20 yea1t c1typtologic 6e1tvice ha6 been 6pent within B G1toup th limited a 64ignment 6 with P and V element 6 A ce1tt il ed Special Re 6ea1tch Analy 6t he i 6 cu1t1tently a 66ignecCt the Intelligence Sta66 601t alt Communi6t G1tound Fo c 6 activity in Southea6t A 6ia He ha 6 6pent the pa 6J•6 ve yea1t 6 a 6 the Special P 1toject 066ice1t 601t 86 and oe oo h l 6 p1tojecu Wa 6 h l 6 involvement in the event 6 06 th Bu tche1t Ca 6 e • • WILLIAM HUNT i 6 a g1taduate o 0 the Ma1tconi Radio 0 00iie 6 school and completed a one-yea1t college cou1t 6e in the u4 6i4n langua ge He ha 6 been c ontinuou6ly employed ii c yptotogic activitie 6 in the U S and ove1t 6ea 6 6 lnc t 1 40 4e1tving in NSA and o the1t c1typtologic 01tganizailon 6 in the 6ignal6 collection TA and SRA p1to6e 66ional ie d 6 He i 6 c u44ently Chal1tman 06 the Signat 6 Cotlecwn a1te 1t Panel Among hi 6 va1tied line and 6ta66 a46i nmeh t 6 ln NSA P1toduction and 6ta66 a 6 6ignment 6 at the gen ey tivet M1t Hunt wa 6 the edlto1t o 0 the NSA Vally SI INT -Summa1ty He i 6 cu1t1tently 6e1tving a 6 a Special A 66i4t4nt to thl Chie6 G developing and coo 1tdinaUng SIGINf fc nomie P 1todu ct lon Ptan 6 and P1toc edu 1tu KEN MILLER c1typtanaty6 l6 technician in 64331 F44 een w th NSA 6ince 1965 wl th time out 601t a toult with the Ma ine 6 1966-1969 Vu t lng hi 6 6 l1t 6t Agency a 6 6 lgpment he • wo1tked in 841 on the PRC catt4ign p1toblem and hen mdved on to 8432 the Re6ea1tch B anch 06 the C yptotogic Re4ea ch Vivi 6ion ffe e he ha6 6 ent 6e e at ea 6 the PRC h lgh-g ade Mitita1ty p oblem 6 to which he ha 6 e•-c -en------- ----1 People 6 Republic 06 Ko1tea ---------- RUSS MYERS 81203 joined the Agency in 1965 a6te 4e ving 6ou1t yealt 6 with the USAFSS Fi teen monthl 06 hi 6 Ai1t Fo ce tou Welte 6pentl one 06 the ga1tden 6po t 6 06 the WO ta ii AZ N A he Xpiih two yealt 6 in A8 a6 a t a66ic anaty6t and Ru 66ian lingui6t and then wa 6 6elected 601t Cla66 10 06 CY100 He moved to 81203 ln 1968 a6 a c yptanaly4 t Mlt Mye1t6 Wa 6 a membe 06 Cla66 24 06 CA-400 and Wa 6 detailed 60 6ix month 6 to 842 unde1t the 8 Inte1tnat Va ta Sy6tem6 T aining P og am He hotd4 46 EO 3 3b 3 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 TOP 88CRlsT UMBRli EO 3 3b 3 EO 3 3b 6 PL 86-36 50 USC 3605 • #• • • • pJto6 6 6-lonal ceJtt-l6-lcat lon ln tJta66-lc ana ly 6i cJtyptanallJ 6 l 6 and compu teJt 6y6tem6 ana ly6i6 a6 w tl a a BA l GoveJtnmen t and Pol i tic 6 6Jtom the Un-lvfJti-lty 06 MaJtyland MJt MyeJt 6 i4 cu JtJtentty lnvotved -- i the evelopment und management 06 6eveJtat data pJtoce4A ig pJtoiect 6 6oJt 8 2 pJtobtem aJtea 6 • _· • • GEOFFREY C WOOV Ch-le6 06 8122 came to NSA_ i _•1955 a6 Vt a numbe 06 yeaJt 6 in the Navy 4eJtv-lng i kbma Jtine6 and in thl Amph lb i ou6 FoJtce He wa 6 a 64-i ine -ln vaJtiou 6 capac1t-le 6 to the otd ACOM oJtganiza tfon 4 had a tou in the NSASCC and JtepJte 6ente d 8 GJtoup•-ln the National lnd-lcition 6 CenteJt He i 6 pJto6e 6 6 onal zed a 6 a Special Re4ea ch Ana ly 6 t and -l6 tJte a 6uJteJt 6 e CJtypto-L-lngui6t-lc A 61 oc l a t lo n • •• THOM WOOV 01' 8341 began h-i 6 caJtee Jt a 6° a c°lt inu e U ngu -l 6 t -ln 1958 when he volu nte eJted to 6tudy h e language hoping 6oJt a hot at MonteJtey 60 he tould tay cto 6e to hi4 happy hunting gJtou nd 6 ISanta •CJtuzf a nd the lady he• happ ll hunted the cuJtJtent Jt4 Voodl A6teJt completing hi tan ua e tJta-i ning--•at Ne» Ha ven--he came to the CH1COM ___- 6hop wh e he •pe mon6tJtate d h-l 6 -limen6e pote nt a y a ng thJtee month to make a 4-lngte eode Jtecove Jty IVi FoJt the ema -ln eJt 06 h-l6 6hoJtt m-llita Jty ca Jtee Jt MJt Wood wa6 a Jack oJ·alt tJtade 6 inte Jtc pt op eJtato IL gJta 6 6 tlLa 11 la to IL 'OF ope Jt ato t and u y Ip-le MJt Wood conve Jtted to•civil l an 6tatu6 -ln the 6-le td 06 hi 6 demon 6tJta te d potintial-fc t yptol-lngu-l 6t-lc6--a nd· the t e he ha 6 Jtema-ln1d He• a pJto6e4 6-lonal lin uf6t who ha 6 6 u ve d and e d 6ouven l1t 6 -ln I __ Ia bottle o 6 Plum 1 the ph1ta 6 e 6 how me t e way to go home and' V-la na and Geo661tey--h l 6 two 6avo lte1 0 f •••• 47 TOP 880Rm' UMBlh STOP I T'S CLASSIFIED I 'ft f SHCftE'f UMBBi'i - - - - - · - -·