5ECRl Jf D l II ' LA-4350-MS • PROCEEDINGS OF THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYMPOSIUM Held at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory of the University of California Los Alamos New Mexico September 3-5 1969 LO 0 N 0 r-- M en a REDACTED CO·py 0 0 S 9 ' §jg 7 _ IfURLS-fSM3 pm nON ---DOD DT j-RET SF APPLIES GRGEr 1 EXClUded itUiIt aalolliulic 1 I g ding dud neela 31fie alton lCESIRICIED DAiA lIdS dOCdIIlcnt coalain it shiLLed data J defilIEd in the AloInic EUcl Act of 13B4 ItS tJaliSill tal 6£ tit liif l@lesl tf@ t f iii l 'Rt1ii1tq 'Ji1 liRE iii a ner to an d11 talltc iz e I tiLlson iu IB'Bfiis t8Q This Document Consists of IU 406 Pages j f ' '-' ' ' l epies A 3 JFCA Tr'B1I • This Page Intentionally Left Blank e' 4 1 Harold M Agnew Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory J ' ' j FDREWORD It has been felt for several years that the potential role of tactical nuclear weapons has not rec'eived the attention it deserves in formulating our nation's defense capabilities Criticisms of our present capabilities have ranged from having too many weapons to too few from having too large yields to too small from having imprecise employment doctrine to too well defined from having inadequate command and control procedures to having too restrictive procedures and from being too concerned with possible collateral damage to ignoring collateral damage In addition the political credibility of tactical nuclear weapons has been challenged as a result of our emphasis on the importance of a conventional response especially in Europe These and many other factors have pointed to the necessity of attempting to have a frank discussion of the political technical and military aspects of tactical nuclear weapon systems This symposium which was requested by DDR E primarily addressed the military and technical aspects of tactical nuclear weapons However certain important political realities were also discussed This was especially true during the question periods and in the summary session These proceedings should serve as a basis for further discussions and planning in this field and perhaps suggest that before another tactical symposium is held a symposium on strategic weapons be held Following that a symposium covering tactical and strategic weapons and their interdependence might be profitable I wish to e x-press my sincere appreciation to those who appeared on the program to those who handled the logistics for the syrnposium and to those who spent their time in attendance participating as a stimulating audience 'AM dtJe l fIt 'ftES fRIElfee BA FA es ' R trieted eats M tfeffl' 1ft the AtOhiiC Elle Act f 1954 I ftlltitfleFii eEl elsehililol ItIbjeet te tS jll tfatj' e liRa Qlj IFlil iapctiolll SECRET n · j 5 I TABLE OF CONTENTS Page WELCOME - --' ' - -' - - - -- --- -_ - Major General Edward B Giller- USAF fiM A71 EC --- SOVIET AND COMMUNIST CHINESE TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES Dr John A Ord ACSI Army ·--9- - ---- · ----·· -- 11 TACTICAL CONCEPTS IN THEATER OPEMTIONS Colonel Stanley D Fair USA CDC 29 THE DUAL CAPABILITY DILEMMA A SOLUTION Dr Francis E Armbruster Hudson Institute 47 QUALITATIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS FOR ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE General David A Burchinal USAF Deputy CINCEUCOM 65 THE CHANGING CONTEXT Major General Richard A Yudkin USAF DCS P O 85 THE NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP AND THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS Dr Robert G Shreffler NATO IS LASL SHAPE STUDIES OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS Brig General Alvin E Cowan USA 3rd Armored Division CURRENT TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARFARE DOCTRINE AND CDC STUDIES Lt Colonel Robert R Knox USA CDC 97 111 133 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARFARE 1972 - 1978 Colonel James M Page USA USAREUR 151 SANDIA DEVELOPMENTS IN TACTICAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS Mr W C Myre SLA 179 USAF TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND LONG RANGE GOALS Major General Otto J Glasser USAF DACS R D TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE CONVENTIONAL WALLEYE AND CONDOR SYSTEMS Mr Jack A Crawford NWC China Lake 6 ---- 199 I 213 I • TABLE OF CONTENTS continued Page THE IMPACT OF TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND NAVIGATION SYSTEMS ON MISSILES BOMBS AND ARTILLERY OF THE FUTURE Dr Richard L' Garwin IBM 241 US MARINE CORPS TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS Major James B Murtland III USMC 261 NA TIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS FOR DELIBERA TE SELECTIVE CONTROL RESPONSE STRATEGY Dr Richard B Foster SRI 267 OPTIONS IN CONTROL TECHNOLOGY Dr M R Gustavson LRL 283 NUCLEAR PROJECTILES FOR ARTILLERY Dr John E Dougherty LASL 305 CLEAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE RESEARCH APPLICABLE TO TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS SRD Dr Cecil I Hudson Jr • LRL 323 WARHEAD COSTING Colonel Sid C Bruce USAF Ret AECOP 345 AVAILABILITY OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS Colonel H E Shaw USA Ret AECOP 357 PANEL SUMMARY AND AUDIENCE RESPONSE Dr Harold Agnew LASL Representative Craig Hosmer Admiral James S Russell Ret Lt General A W Betts Chief of R D Dept of the Army Dr Albert D Wheelon Hughes Aircraft Co Dr William R Van Cleave OASD ISA 369 ATTENDANCE 391 7 - ' --IE-Crtil flL9 - -- ' J t I --- -- ---- 8 --- ---- ---- -- Maj Gen Edward B Giller USAF Division of Military Application WELCOME Ladies and Gentlemen it is a pleasure on behalf of Chairman Seaborg and the Commissioners of the Atomic Energy Commission also I'll pinch-hit for the Department of Defense-I wear two hats I suppose in a sense to welcome you to this joint AEC-OOD meeting Dr Bradbury Director of Los Alamos is not with us today He is working very hard at Woods Hole studying some problem for the Navy and he asked me to fill in for him Also because DMA is nonpartisan I have to remind you that there is a Brand X laboratory on the west coast which is also represented today Livermore Laboratory As Dr Agnew has pointed out we certainly have a distinguished star-studded audience in and out of uniform today and we are very happy to see so many visitors from overseas Especially in the field of tactical weapons one feels that the actual conditions pertaining in the field are not always taken into account in some of the decisionmaking machinery that deals more with specific hardware characteristics This' large audience indicates either a renewed interest in tactical nuclear weapons or interest in New Mexico's weather at this time of the year As you all know the AEC has worked a long time on tactical nuclear ideas Both laboratories have sponsored various forms of them various specialities that are known to many of you but in the last few years the interest has been mostly verbal Only recently has there been an apparent change of heart or interest in tactical nuclear weapons This means P ·'R SC 3 to us-namely putting your money where your mouth was This has taken two forms in the last six months Each year in the first part of the year January or February AEC gets from the DOD something called development guidance-our marching orders about where to spend our money and where to 'direct our efforts In spite of rumors to the contrary the weapons program has limited resources for its development and therefore we must work and should vrork on things which are important to the Department of Defense 9 '-' '' '' d k'' ' P'' '- £ E '''''' L' ' · ' 'I F R 4 e ' l ' ' SlGAE i D This last development guidance is quite different from that of the previous years In fact there are four Priority 1's their highest priority n the general purpose warfare section In the previous year I don't believe there was a single item in ategory I As you all know Phase 3 has been approved for Condor and Walleye-a full version of Condor and a limited version of Walleye We have sent the Phase 2 study which is the AEC final offer if you like trying to outline the characteristics and the price and cost of building We have sent the final Phase 2 to the Department of Defense on the 155 mm and the 8-inch My spies tell me that it is currently very hot over in the Department of Defense and we are expecting perhaps a Phase 3 order on either or both of these in the next few months We have not senta Phase 2 on the ADM demolition munition It is a much more complicated series of devices and the decision machinery on that I think will be a lot tougher It shows much stronger intere'st in tactical nuclear weapons As I pointed out this advanced development guidance we get is a document from which we take our instructions it contains sections on strategic offense strategic defense general purpose and also you might say a miscellaneous section on special effects and special purpose It is much more than we can work on I have been in DMA for a couple of years now and have come to recognize certain difficulties in trying to convert ideas to production line Although one can usually settle the questions of yield shape' weight and size in a fairly straightforward manner there is still insufficient dialog between the AEC and the DOD concerning some of the peripheral equipment Peripheral equipment includes use equipment packaging permissive action links a subject in themselves and equipment involved in command and control aspects especially for tactical devices which are handled more by people than the strategic devices The AEC has studied some ideas about command and control-a touchy subject to the Department of Defense I know-and you will hear about some of them in the next few days I do urge the Department of Defense folks to think about how to use these things separating that from whether you think they are needed because if we have to put them in a lot of thought in advance will save a lot of retrofit pain and trouble in using them I do hope our speakers from the Department of Defense will try to' bring out this aspect rather than the physical characteristics of nuts bolts weights and shapes One last item dealing with production As you all know AEC also produces these devices and we have a very large production system It is an eight-plant system which is government owned contractor operated It has a fixed overhead of about between 150 and 200 million a year that is provided you are going to leave a plant at its present size Then the incremental build that is the number of weapons you build above that in direct cost is not significant in terms of the base cost and if we are able to adjust our work load in the production system to the capacity of the system we can produce a large number of tactical weapons especially because they are not as complicated as some of the others for production purposes We can adjust the build rates to our production rates We can modernize the nuclear stockpile at a minor incremental cost to the AEC's budget although I must admit from previewing the '70 budget and the '71 budget even small incremental costs are going to be painful to come by because of the tight budget situation 10 cOEeRE i lB • • r - £ - John A Ord Deputy for Technical Operations U S Army Foreign Scientific and Technical Center SOVIET AND COMMUNIST CHINESE TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES The overall classificat j on of this briefing is SECRET jRESTRICTED DATA see Figure 1 Continued emphasis in Soviet literature and the nature of Warsaw Pact war games indicate that the Soviets place great importance on the role of nuclear _ - Y J s in tactical_op_er _ o t T j -' - '--' - 1 - · _1' _ ·' i · · · ' ' '''_-' ' i ' '- f- ''- '' i o ' ' ' ' I ' - ' ' ' ' 'I « r ' t 't L ' ' J TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYMPOSIUM September 3 1969 Soviet and Ch icom Tactical Nuclear Capability Prepared Under the Direction of the Ass'jstant Ch jef- at- Staff for Intelligence Briefer - Dr John A Ord Figure 1 li y 11 lfCcj Accordingly my briefing will cover the techniques employed in estimating the choice of warheads available to the Soviets and the factors considered in assigning these warheads to delivery systems see Figure 2 I will then discuss the delivery systems available to the Soviets including tube artillery rockets and missiles and tactical aviation and will discuss where possible the organization and deployment of these systems in the field r will conclude with a brief assessment of the military aspects of the Communist Chinese nuclear energy program • SCOPE OF BRIEFING 1 ESTIMATING THE AVAILABILITY OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEADS 2 FACTORS ONSID ERED IN ASSIGNMENT OF WARHEADS 3 SOVIET TUBE ARTlLlEJ V 5 SOVIET TACTJCAl AVIA TION 6 ORGANIZATION AND vtPlOYMENT OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS 7 MIL IT ARY ASP ECT S 0 F TH E CHI COM NUCL EAR· ENERGY PROGRAM IEPJ 1969 Figure 2 The choice of warheads available within the- Soviet stockpile has been agreed upon by the Intelligence Corg l'l I1 yJr m analysi s of the oviet testing program 1 -- -- - il ---- -r-- - - - ---- - - - i -u - • - 'i ' - ' - ' ' ' ' ' ' ilJElE1r EO ' ' i ' ' T7 o i' - - - i ' O - - ' P ' ' ' - ' ' '' _ ' ' ' '_ _ ' l'fies • ' f X' ' L' f ' ' r ' ' 1 _ _ _ _ _ Tl ·nlitiitioris dwe ·H Wil1 ' ' 6nsiit1ite an- - - intelligence gap in assessing their nuclear arsenal of the future- In estimating the nuclear yield of a d livery system we flrst consider the nuclear warheads believed to be in the Soviet arsenal Then we analyze the estimated priority characteristics and application of each delivery system to determine the requirement and capability for nuclear warheads 12 ' 8EOttl T CR - Nuclear weapon yields are then assigned to the individual delivery systems giving consideration to the following factors 3 • a What yields are desired for a given system b How do the physical dimensions of the system affect this choice c Will their estimated nuclear technology support such a warhead d Is the fissionable material available e Is the choice considered likely from knowledge of their weapons system chronology The Soviets may have nuclear tube artillery in their inventory as the development of such weapons would bea logical extension of more conventional systems to meet modern military requirements 4 There is no evidence however that the Soviets have developed smali diameter devices even though it is estimated to be within-their' technical capability and we have no indicatton of a nuclear round for the 152 mm gun-howitzer their direct support divisional weapon 5 See Figure 3 They likewise possess the technology to develop nuclear devices with fractional and low kiloton yields for their 203 mm gun-howitzer but there is no evidence of their existence either Two large-bore artillery pieces of 310 mm and 420 mm diameter should also be considered as nuclear capable systems and suitable devices could be postulated for them based on the Soviet nuclear test program however they were produced in very limited numbers and never adopted as standard 6 SOVIET ARMY ARTILLERY MORTAR SYSTEMS ' 'e 3 0 1I1II SId· PAO Il lD GUN Figure 3 SECRETlTiu The Free-Rocket-Over-Ground or FROG see Figure 4 is the Soviets' organic divisional nuclear fire support weapon They consider the FROG a weapon for mass destruction of enemy troops and materiel in all phases of ground combat Flexibility is ensured by its capability for rapid deployment and by its variety of warheads A fundamental principle of the combat use of the FROG system is the surprise delivery of nuclear strikes against accurately located targets in accordance with the tactical situation and operational plan The FROG weapons are included in the Army fire plans for massed nuclear strikes Do - - Since 1957 seven versions of the FROG have been sighted The FROG-1 and -2 are no longer in their inventory The FROG-3 -4 and -5 systems are identical in appearance except for their warheads and have ranges of 36 60 and 61 km respectively Of these three only two have been widely deplo d-- - ROq - _ with a diameter of 535 mm and FROG-5 with a diameter of 400 mm f ' ' - -- '-- 6 l @' ' _ -'----- - - -r _ _-- - - -r - n -- - ' - ' - - ' P I __ - _ _ -T iIii e e i'ses' with FROG-5 have been sighted in several East European countries this system could be used to launch the FROG-3 warhead In view of the availability of FROG-3 and the limited deployment of FROG-4 the latter is believed to be non-nuclear In addition to FROG-3 only the FROG-Twith a diameter of 550 mm mounted on one of a new family of eight-wheeled vehicles is considered to possess a nuclear capability The FROG-7 appeared for the first time in the November 1965 Moscow parade It is expected eventually to replace the FROG- as a more mobile and • Figure 4' I·J ee • • e SECREI lRDefficient syst _j _- -- - ---- ' • t- ' _ f '-j- · 7 T - - -··' - · i' -·' ' - 7 DIE L j l£lr ' ' i ' ' ' ' ' I _ ' r' I Impro ed design and coristru6tio ' f' rie 'l'·tiW'-'l r m ts' In qtif6k r' ' 'and easier wa'rhead-to-rocket assembly rocket component inspection servicing • and repair The eight-wheeled vehicle can transport the launcher system over roads at greater 'speeds for longer distances-up to 400 km per day-yet requires less maintenance than the tracked vehicles carrying the FROG-3 -4 and -5 D0 a The hooded protrusions seen immediately forward of the cylindrical section appear to be related to antenna requirements Such hoods might be used to provide protection and to prevent identification of small dipole antennas b The nose has a probe which could measure both static and dynamic pressure it may be associated with a baro timer system to detonate the warhead c A backup radar fuze is postulated at a position immediately forward of the hoods The nuclear device probably is mounted at the forward separation line e The firing set is assumed to be mounted n a sliding ring aft of the warhead f The batteries and the adaption kit used for mating the warhead to the missile body are probably mounted within the rear cylindrical section This assumed partitioning of components leads to a logical straightforward arrangement which would be relatively easy to assemble and inspect at a forward warhead checkout area An analysis of the FROG-7 nosecone a se Figure 6 has led to these conclusions Pitot tubes are probably used in a safing and arming baro system b A radar fuze is contained in the outer skin section between separation lines at stations 110 and 182 c Slot array antennas protected by plastic covers are located directly behind the nose cap and the cap is removable to permit setting the height of burst of the radar fuze d The nuclear device is probably mounted directly behind the ogive section with its firing set mounted on an aft flange support In this arrangement the adaption kit and batteries would be mounted behind the firing set between stations 10 and 40 which affords easy access from the rear Ib On the basis of defector reports as well as analysis' of the Soviet nuclear testing program the following estimates were made concerning the FROG-3 warhead see Figure 5 d ' ' •• •• 1 -- - - - FROG·3 NOSECONE U -I B 20 10 0 BATIERIES FIRING SET ADAPTION KIT ' ALUMINUM SKIN ANTENNA Q ¥ m GTH lem Figure 5 r SECRET FROG - 1 NOSECONE U NUClEAR DEViCE LOW YIELD SAFING AND ARMING BARO SYSTEM 30 ALUMINUM SKIN 10 20 SLOT ARRAY ANTENNA BOLT FOR ATTACHING INSERTED RADAR FUSE BAND AND SEPARATION JOINI 20 1 40 1 60 80 100 - 120 140 160 180 1 200 LENGTH CM - GP I SECRET SEPT 1969 Figure 6 renpy InD- ' sECRET IftD Although most FROG battalions presently contain only three launchers some have been sighted in the western Soviet Union with four launchers Most FROG battalions are expected to increase their strength to four launchers in the next few years The actual delivery capability would probably be less because a Reliability figures for FROG's have not been considered b Not all warheads would necessarily be nuclear c Lower yields might be employed d Poor target acquisition might limit the number of targets _ - 1 1 ' - ' - '-- -- ' - DELETED ' ' _ 'I ' ' ' • ' i -' '-' ' -- ' 1 -- _ _--- ----- ' -' - - --_______ ___ _ ' I ' • « ' ' ' • _ • '- ' -- - '-- I ' ' ' - J· - · J ' ih ' ' _ -' ' _ '- ' ' '''''-' ' ' -'''J The missile organic to their combined arms Army and front is the SCUD guided missile see Figure 7 SCUD units are probably being converted from the SCUD A which was operational in 1957 to the SCUD B which became operational in 1961 The SCUD A is a single stage short range surface-to-surface ballistic missile capable of delivering a warhead of 1900 to '- 1 ' '--'-T 2400 Ibs to a range of about --- - -- ---- - - - - - ''' '''' ' -'7' r iy 1 iaQFrh E Poii -fh ' i t s iit d l e i il ni 1 l reliable from a modified tank chassis The SCUD B see Figure is believed to be a modification of the SCUD A The physical characteristics and employment of the two syst a t e $jmilar _' r The range of the SCUD B witha nucl a d s 3 0 rn 1_ J L ' 1 ---- D lET 8 ' ' r ' ' ··' ' ' ' ' - ' i ' ' ' _ J • r SECR T IR ' ' I J j J'I SECRETIfRQ · 10 C ------------------------------ ____________ WoH RA -iGE ---- -- ------ ---- - ----- - --- ---- --------160 K l1 TYPE 1 WEIGHT WARHEAD---- ________ NUl' 41lt1 I Jb RELlA BILITY -------- ----------- -- ----- _________ 70 REACTION TIME --- -------------------- _____ 35 MIN C E P ------------------------------- _________ 555 M DEPLOYMENT ------------------ IV RS IV I'ACT G F EMPLOYMENT--- -- ------ -- ---- ---- -- -----TACTICA L Figure 7 SCUD BON WHEElED TRANSPORTATION lAUNCHER· ERECTOR rn I Cl - - - - - - ' ' -_ _ _ Figure 8 IB fIlPfI'AFT Jan ____• _ _ _ Ji SECRETi D While the first SCUD B's were also on tracked vehicles like the SCUD A the November 1965 Moscow parade displayed a SCUD B missile mounted on a· wheeled transporter-erector-launcher The replacement of the tracked transporter with the wheeled vehicle should reduce maintenance requirements and permit elimination of some ancillary equipment associated with the tracked transporters • One SCUD brigade is found at Army level and up to two brigades at front level A combined arms Army has at full strength a total of nine launchers This would give a density of one SCUD launcher for every 6 to 11 km within the frontage of a typical combined arms Army The reaction time from arrival at a presurveyed site to actual firing is about 15 to 30 minutes The refire time is approximately 2 hours if an assembled and checked out missile is ready at the predesignated loading point D---- ---- ··- '-- D '-' r - · - -' -- 4 _ ' - h · f • ___ • • • • __ ' • • ' • t • -' - ••• - _ '_ • __ _ -A j __ ' _ •• -' nuclear tnreat from the SCUD system wOl l ld more than likely be less for the same reasons mentioned for the reduced FROG caRability The overall reliability of the SCUD system is estimated to be about 70% 11 The SS-12 guided missile see Figure 9' which became operational in 1965 was first seen in the 7 November 1967 Moscow parade This missile designated SCALEBOARD is mounted on an eight-wheeled transporter-erector-launcher in a closed container An article in the 11 November 196 7 issue of the RED STAR describes this transporter as a highly mobile strategic launcher The Closed container implies' that the system will be expected to remain on-site exposed to varying climatic conditions for extended periods of time If so the SS-12 may be deployed in a semistrategic or mobile role similar to the present quick-reaction alert mission assigned to the US Pershing in Europe S5-12 Figure 9 Ifl Compared to earlier short range ballistic missiles the 88-12 offers improved range yield accuracy and mobility Jf 7 - - -' - -- - - ' ' - w-- _ 7' •••• J O bp l • '- -_ ' - DELETED · 'The - • •- - • --- --- •• ' delivery capability is approximately 925 km The reaction time is estimated to be 15 to 30 minutes after arrival at'a pre surveyed site and overall reliability is considered to be about 75 0 0 13 ' -'--- ' ' - ' ' ' -- - -'- '--- ' -- ---- - ' f--'---' - r -' -- - ' DELETEO· -·-· · - ' ' - - It is believed that there are two or possibly three battalions of three launchers each operational at the front level With the 88-12 front commanders will be able to engage targets for which tactical aircraft were previously needed The next category of tactical nuclear weapons is cruise missiles· The 8ALI8H cruise missile see Figure 10 operational in 1957 appears to be an accurate short range missile system available for direct support of ground force operattc DsJ -- '-- - - - '''---''''- '·-· '' '' ·---· · · T ·- ' - ' -- -- '-- -- - DELETED' ' ReactioIi time-fs iO mihtites'aiter 'arrival at apresur'veyed site Re'Hahllity'fs a-bout 70% 14 Figure 10 t'crenCT 00 ' the SHADDOCK is likely to be employed against other than front line targets including Army installations depots and reserves 16 • SHADDOCK U Figure 11 ft· i _-- A1 In addition to the ground force weapons just described nuclear delivery systems available to front commanders could include surface-to-air missiles used in a surface-to-surface role in addition to that nuclear ordnance delivered by aircraft organic to the tactical air army of the front The GANEF SA-4 surface-to-air system shown in Figure 12 appears to be a potential candidate for use in a surface -to-surface role but there is no evidence to indicate the existence of such a capability or a nuclear warhead for this missile 17 Tlw US NikC' Hf'r llle bowcvcr i lay bi I H d against sl1rfae · targ ts at ran2 p up to 185 km in addition to its normal role as an air defense system 18 Soviet tactical aviation has the mission 'of securing and maintaining local air superiority supporting local ground operations and providing air defense for ground forces The present Soviet tactical air-to-ground attack capability is represented by the aircraft listed in Figl lre 1 The BEAGLE which is now obsolescent cun carry a bomb load up to 6600 pounds The BREWER can carry a bomb load of 3300 pounds Most of the fighters can carry at least four devices 19 31 Figure 12 • ·_r·- •••• i •••• - _ •• •• ''' • - •• ' I ' ' ' t ' ' f - - DELETED I ' J ' 1 ' ' - ' ' Figure 13 - II -'- - - Soviet publications emphasize the importance of nuclear weapons in tactical operations They state that nuclear fires will be directed against targets to' provide the greatest effect with the least expenditure of nuclear resources to minimize danger to friendly troops and to minimize problems of maintenance and control 20 Approximately 60% of the nuclear weapons under the control of ground force commanders will be used to support the main effort with about 30% used to support exploitation forces and 10% held in reserve 21 • Now a word about the Communist Chinese capabilities in the nuclear weapons fiald Communist China has embarked on a nuclear weapons program which apparently has as its prime objective the development of warheads for strategic delivery systems By concentration of effort on its military nuclear program China apparently has been able to keep moving forward in this fiehL ibe Gountz y s _ _ elatively li I -it d_ str al a nE i E 9 tOgi £ Lr 2 _ r-- -- -- ' '-'7 ' DE ETED ' ' -' i _ f • • • ' • • • • • • - _ • • • • • • _ _ _ _ 0 - _• •• __ ' ' __ _ _ Figure 14 lists some of the characteristics of the Communist Chinese tests IECRfl CHICOM NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS ' TEST DATI -- ' · c -' '''- - · · ··'7 ''· ·7' -'''''''''r - '3 -- - - - ' 1 - ' - ' 3 9 MAY 66 ' i' ' 4 27 OCT 66 ' ' 27 DEC 66 • • ' ' • • 17 JUNE 67 ' 7 24 DEC 67 OF ELETErf' ' • • • ' t' 6 '8 2 ' ' ' ' 27 DEC 68 ' •••• ' ' ' ' ' ' ' -' ' ' ' '0-' ' t _ j i i ' 'L j 1 ' - ' Figure 14 1 I j - - ' - ' ' - - - - - -- - Y ' ' 7-T- ' T --- 7'''' -' -- p- ' f ' r' ' • DELETED '- ' ' ' ' - ' ' ' ' ' ' - ' ' ' ' ' -' - ' i 'f - ' - '7 -' - 1 l - --- 23 1£ ' - ' ' ' ' -' - ' - -- 1 ' • • ' ' I ' • 1 • ' r_ I' I ' • t' DEL£ TED' f O 6j lf l -L ----- r 'i_ I I ' ' ' They have also undertaken a broad based program to develop missiles of all types however since a tactical missile has not been identified an estimate of nuclear capability in this area cannot be made In summary see Figure 15 this briefing pas emphasized the paucity of information available on Soviet and Chinese nuclear capabilities while at the same' time describing the techniques employed in estimating the choke of nuclear warheads available to the Soviets and the factors considered in assigning these warheads to delivery systems I have discussed briefly the delivery systems available to Soviet ground force commanders from division to front level including tube artillery rockets and missileH and tactical aviation Included was information concerning estimated yields weights and ranges as well as an indication of the organization and deployment of nuclear delivery systems Finally I discussed what is known concerning the Communist Chinese nuclear energy and missile programs which indicates that they have as a goal the development of large thermonuclear devices SUMMARY 1 ESTIMATING THE AVAIIARI il Of SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEADS 2 FACTORS CON' lutt tLJ IN ASSIGNMENT OF WARHEADS 3 SOVIET TUBE ARTIlURY 4 SO VIET ROC KH SAN l MI ' IL ' 5 SOVIET TACTI AL AVIATI0 b ORGANIZATIUN AND DEPLOYMENT OF IHlLVERY SYSTEMS 7 MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CHICOM NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM - Figure 15 REFERENCES I National Intelligence'Projections for Planning NIPP 1969 Sect IV 2 National Intelligence Estimates NIE 11-2-69 p 1 3 NIPP 69 Sect IV p IV-I IV-2 4 NIPP 69 Sect IV Table IV-6 5 NIE 11-2-69 pp 10 11 6 Foreign Nuclear Weapons Under the Control of Tactical Ground Forces Commanders DIA FSTC-CS-02-B-68-INT p 2 7 NIPP 69 Sect III Table III A-18 p 1II-35 B FSTC-CS-02-8-68-INT pp 3-10 9 NIPP 69 Sect III Table III A-18 p 1II-35 D 10 NIPP 69 Sect III Table III A-18 p III-35 II FSTC-CS-02-B-6B-INT p 16 12 NIPP 69 Sect III Table III A-lB p I I-35 13 FSTC-CS-02-B-68-INT p 35 14 FSTC-CS-02-B-6B-INT p 35 15 NIPP 69 Sect III Table III A-lB p III-35 16 FSTC-CS-02-B-68-INT p 22 17 FSTC-CS-02-B-6B-INT p 23 lB OFFICE Chief of ORDNANCE TIR 'CD-12 Army Ordnance Corps Programs for Research and Development of Atomic Energy and Special Weapons p 25 19 NIPP 69 Table III B-8 p III-50 20 FSTC-CS-02-B-6B-INT p 32 21 FSTC-CS-02-B-6B-INT p 31 22 The Communist Chinese Nuclear Energy Program DIA ST-CS-02-l-6B-INT p 9 23 NIE 11-2-69 p 7 24 NIE 27 Feb 69 p 6 SECRET JAe- Question and Answer Period CARTER ODDR E I am wondering wuy you did not-mention the ADM capability in this Soviet inventory ORD There is no doubt that they have the capability but 'r have seen no evidence that there is such a 'thing • no you have evidence thaf there is I think there is a good chance to find out some thi gs that possibly haven't come to our attention CARTER I thought there had been some pretty good evidence that they were exercising and training with ADM's but perhaps it is a subject we had better pursue separately SQUIRE LRL Would you like to comme'nt on the Soviet de-emphasis of tube artillery since World War IT and its apparent replacement by the nuclear missiles ORD Possibly they have de-emphasized tube artillery as far as carrying nuclear weapons is concerned but there is no de-emphasis-ontube artillery They still use it for anti-aircraft work and very successfully so We are the ones who have de-emphasized tube artillery for AA SQUIRE Have they not retired most of their artillery above the 152 mm size ORD There are soft guns apparently but they have some very accurate new 122 and 130 mm tube artillery and are still using the 152 mm In fact the Israelis now use the gift from the Arabs the 130 mm and are doing very well with it LAUREYNS General Dynamics Can you give me an estunate of delivery accuracies for some of the systems you have discussed a ORD Yes I have some figures here The FROG-3 has CEP of about 500 meters the FROG-7 about 490 meters essentially the same For SCUD A and SCUD B they listed 935 meters also the SS-12 The SALISH which you recall had a range of 110 kilometers and was mentioned as' an accurate cruise missile has a CEP of 100 to 160 meters SHADDOCK with a 550 range 9 35 meters GANEF - remember that is normally a surface-to-air missile-they give O to 30 meters r have these figures if you wish to jot them down _' ' MOTT AnalytiC Services Inc Do 'you have any idea or-Soviet doctrine or release procedures for this rather impressive- array of weaponry-' How do they control it Do they have incremental release ideas'or-what' ORD From what I have been able to read they controri at_a'hfgh level until they determine that it is required Then the authority is givep fo the combined arms army or front commanders to make use o t it ·O-ut 'Qt a ecent d wnent that I read last Saturday I picked up some informa ion w ch ay h eJp to answer your 26 '- - SSEtAE 'Rb question it concerns a 19 1 large cale exerc'ise where they simulated 226 nuclear missiles and 277 tactical rockets and missiles with chemical warheads In the first strike their mix was 63 nuclear and 24 chemical the second strike 101 quclear and 124 chemical the third strike 49 nuclear and 70 chemical The other strikes took up the rest of the mix In recent years apparently they have been qecreasing their chemical in favor of nuclear Does that give you some indication of what you wanted to know ARMBRUSTER Hudson Inst You gave the CEP for GANEF at 20 to 30 metersis this in a surface-to-surface mode of operation or surface-to-air ORD They didn't mark it but my guess would be surface-to-air BEA TON LTV Aerospace Corp Can you give me some ratio figure as to the relative strength deployment in Europe of our nuclear forces versus the Soviet perhaps a ratio figure ORD That is something which is out of my field Is Colonel Spry here SPRY ACSI We could not make a comparison between US and foreign from the work that Dr Ord and I do We would have to go to some other source for this information We don't have the data to do it ORD Perhaps I should indicate that this was prepared for the Assistant Chief of Staff of Intelligence I am actually from the Foreign Science and Technology Center and our field is S T or Scientific and Technical Intelligence we do not normally get into comparative issues or order of battle DIA usually handles the order of battle and anything we need we get from them GETZINGER eHg DSCONARC Is there a Soviet philosophy in partition of energy or emphasis on enhanced or suppressed radiation Is there any indication of a trend in Soviet tactical weapons going to enhanced radiation or suppressed radiation What are their capabilities in that area ORD I have nothing definite on that I cannot answer it GIM RD Research Analysis Corp Regarding control of these weapons you indicated a high level Can you indicate whether the rocket and missile organizations are part of the regular artillery troops or are they KGB detachments ORD You mean whether they have political detachments GIRARD detachments In fact are the firing units Red Army artillery or are they KGB ORD I have no evidence that they are KGB detachments We have taken this from a combined arms army with four motorized and one tank division typical and three of those combined armies two tank armies and a tactical air army forming a front The units I mentioned are organic to those elements S'GA ' 1R 27 JANTZEN Lockheed Cal Can you comment on tactical weapons in the surface-to-air role particularly with regard to use of fractional nuclear warheads versus conventional This is the surface-to-air role against aircraft ORD We have no direct evidence that either the SA-2 -guideline or the SA-4 GANEF has a nuclear warhead 28 p Ii GA 1 b Ii SSECRET 0· Colonel Stanley D Fair U S Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies -- - TACTICAL CONCEPTS IN THEATER OPERATIONS I want to express the appreciation of the Institute of Advanced Studies for this opportunity to present the TACTO study to the symposium see Figure 1 TACTO was completed just last week and has not yet been coordinated Therefore the study reflects only the views of the Institute of Advanced Studies and the findings must be considered tentative It repr sents a one-year effort by five members of the Institute supported by three contract analysts and from three to five military personnel on temporary duty with the Institute for varying periods of time The study when published will appear as a main report with two supporting volumes TACTICAL CONCEPTS IN THEATER OPERATIONS TACTO Figure 1 The purpose of the TACTO study is shown in Figure 2 TACTO PURPOSE TO EVALUATE THE TACTI CAL NUCLEAR OPTION AS AN ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER IN THE 1975 TIME FRAME ' Figure 2 SECRElJiiti The need for such a study may not be obvious because of the many past studies on tactical nuclear warfare However l since 1964 1 with the pUblication of the first draft presidential memorandum on theater nuclear forces l the value of tactical nuclear weapons has been a major item of contention between OSD and the services The strongly divergent opinions center on military requirements and concepts versus political cost The resulting decisions have produced a consistent deterioration of our tactical nuclear capability The TACTO study is an attempt to examine the tactical nuclear option from the national level in order to address the subjective issues that underlie the disagreement The TACTO study has the following objective Figure 3 GO FI 0ENTLAl TACTO OBJECTIVE TO DETERM I NE WHETHER IT I SIN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO DEVELOP TACTI CAL NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS AND MAINTAIN THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES CAPABLE OF SUSTAINED COMBAT AT ALL LEVELS OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT IN 1975 88PJfI BENT I' Figure 3 The TACTO study presents the need for the tactical nuclear option as it supports the national military strategy of deterrence collective security and flexible response It then examines the military and political implications that detract from the ability of the tactical nuclear option to discourage aggression and to be executed in the best interests of the United States • FinallYI the TACTO study develops the utility of the tactical nuclear option by outlining a nuclear strategy for limited war The tactical nuclear option supports deterrence as a principle of national strategy Figure 4 Theater nuclear forces supplement the deterrent posture of US and allied conventional forces and complement the deterrent value of strategic nuclear forces The deterrent value of theater nuclear forces in turn is enhanced by strategic nuclear forces especially when the opponent has a strategic nuclear capability In a similar manner the presence of US conventional forces adds to the deterrent value of theater nuclear forces because preservation of US force integrity could be an important mission for the tactical nuclear option Thus the tactical nuclear option is a necessary component of the total military deterrent capability of the United States '10 SECRET j1«O SECRET Ro· TACTO DETERRENCE Figure 4 However the utility of US theater nuclear forces as a deterrent depends on their credibility to potential enemies of the Umted States Figure 5 TACTO CREDIBILITY DETERRENCE Figure 5 The Soviet Union considers that its strategic attack forces have attained parity with US strategic nuclear forces and have cancelled any advantage that the United States held previously In Europe Warsaw Pact forces are supported by Soviet theater nuclear forces and the Soviet Union has located nuclear weapon 'storage sites in Eastern Europe Soviet theater nuclear capabilities f re being expanded by increasing the number of FROG's and SCUD's available in combat units and by adding the SS-12 missile system The continued modernization of ground and air delivery systems will also improve Soviet theater nuclear capabilities Their strategic 2 SECRET RD 31 SECRETJIBD attack forces include MRBM IRBM's which are targeted against NATO Thus Soviet theater nuclear capabilities in Europe may exceed those of the United States or at least approximate parity by 1975 The condition of mutual deterrence for the tactical nuclear capability will detract from the credibility of the tactical nuclear option as it has for the strategic nuclear option The Chinese Communists are not expected to have an organic tactical nuclear capability by 1975 but land operations could be supported by nuclear-capable light and medium bombers In addition the PRC could employ MRBM's against US and Allied Forces as well as strike countervalue targets However so long as the PRC nuclear capability remains small and vulnerable she is expected' to abstain from the use of nuclear weapons in Asian conflicts because of the risk of retaliation in the combat area and on her homeland The tactical nuclear option supports collective security as a principle of national strategy Figure 6 TACTO COLLECTIVE SECURITY CREDIBILITY DETERRENCE Figure 6 Volume I of the TACTO study consists of six scenarios which consider the need of the tactical nuclear option in collective security arrangements Each scenario depicts nonnuclear aggression against a US ally and each situation is analyzed from the viewpoim of the theater commander and is re-examined from the national level The need for the tactical nuclear option was most obvious in those situations that portrayed such numerically superior enemy strength that US and Allied Forces were inadequate to achieve 8 favorable outcome In addition the scenarios suggest that a tactical nuclear capability is needed to terminate conventional aggression before the conflict can expand to involve other areas or other combatants and to avoid a prolonged nonnuclear war Most importantly the scenarios point out the need for theater nuclear weapons early in conflicts when favorable results appear more probable than later when friendly force capabilities are deg-raded by conventional operations and reserves 32 d SECREl at - SECRET JAB are uno vailable to exploit the effects of weapon employment Military and political control should be less diff cult and more positive early in the military campaign than later when communications may be uncertain and when large numbers of nuclear weapons may be required in an effort to salvage the military situation Collateral damage and civilian casualties will be less than if first use is delayed Early first use adds to the credibility of the tactical nuclear option by re-establishing the deterrent Delayed use implies desperation and a 'lack of political resolve as well as increasing the possibility of nuclear retaliation or escalation The scenarios of Volume I are limited to the enemy's nonnuclear option Appendix VIII continues the consideration of the need for the tactical nuclear option in response to other enemy options These options involve the tactical use of nuclear weapons in a theater of operations and strategic nuclear attack in conjunction with a nonnuclear attack or with the tactical use of nuclear weapons The need for the tactical nuclear option in collective security arrangements in these situations is to counter the tactical nuclear capability of the enemy with theater resources in an attempt to limit the conflict and to support the SlOP if necessary Countering the MRBM launchers of th Soviet Union and Communist China is a vexing problem in these situations If these launchers are moved out of the enemy homeland theater nuclear forces need the capability to neutralize them Except for aircraft and perhaps Pershing in Europe this capability is not now available see Figure 6 Utility of the tactical nuclear option in collective security arrangements is affected by the reaction of US Allies and hostile public opinion see Figure 7 TACTO COLLECTIVE SECURITY CREDIBILITY DETERRENCE REACTION OF ALLIES AND PUBLIC OPINION Figure 7 33 The individual defense strategies of NATO allies stress the deterrent value of nuclear weapons but their concepts of employment if deterrence fails do not include a major nuclear war limited to Europe They do not view US theater nuclear forces as a US commitment independent of US strategic nuclear forces Our NATO allies continually seek assurances that US nuclear weapons will be used in the defense of Europe ahd prefer that definite guidelines be established for their use The United States has r sisted a precise formula for contingencies that would demand a nuclear response and has insisted that each form of aggression should be evaluated as it occu s to determine an appropriate defense To date NATO has deferred to the US position but maintains that the US is obligated to consult within the North Atlantic Council before nuclear weapons are used The Athens guidelines of 1962 provide for such consulting but only if time permits Of greater significance is the exchange of national views since 1965 in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group In 1968 the discussions produced an agreement-inprinciple on consulting which holds that special weigpt c m decision making is to be accorded the host country the owner of the weapons and tiieo--Wner-·of the delivery systems While a US decision to use nuclear weapons cannot be vetoed by other allies and they cannot override a US veto those allies with special weight will have an influenc e on the US decision Another aspect that may affect US use of nuclear weapons for mutual defense is the attitude of the general public in Western Europe and Japan toward nuclear weapons There is a marked difference between the view of political leaders and of the general public in Western Europe on the use of nuclear weapons A majority of the public in Western Europe is strongly opposed to the use of nuclear weapons against front line troops in the event of nonnuclear aggression by the Warsaw Pact Most of the people interviewed were against such use even if it were the only way to stop the enemy The major factor in their thinking was the feeling that the tactical use of nuclear weapons would inevitably escalate to attack of popUlation centers This Western European public opinion considered in conjunction with similar Dani h and Norwegian attitudes would seem to indicate serious reservations among the general public about plans for the nuclear defense of NATO In Japan the hostility of the people toward nuclear weapons is historic The significance of Japanese public opinion lies in its influence on the Japanese government in assuming a larger role in Asia and in negotiations on the return of Okinawa to Japan Public opinion might dictate the official position of Japan on the tactical use of nuclear weapons in Korea and deny the United States any staging areas for conventional forces The last principle of national strategy is flexible response see Figure 8 34 ' TACTO • COLLECTIVE SECURITY CREDIBILITY' flEXIBLE RESPONSE DETERRENCE ' - REACTION OF ALLIES AND PUBLIC OPINION Figure 8 The US tactical nuclear capability provides the President a flexible nuclear option in the application of combat power to meet enemy threats below the level of general war The tactical nuclear option represents a lesser alternative than the employment of strategic nuclear forces thereby reducing the risk of strategIc exchange The US tactical nuclear option is needed to provide a flexible range of nuclear capabilities from within theater resources The most restrictive least violent level of nuclear weapons employment is a tactical demonstration This controlled and selective use of one or a few nuclear weapons has the objective of warning the enemy that the US and her allies are willing to take risks greater than nonnuclear conflict Because of the risk of retaliation the military must be alert for an enemy nuclear response and political authorities must be aware of the possibility of nuclear war The next level of nuclear weapons employment is in responding to conventional aggression This capability is needed to preserve the integrity of US and Allied Forces to gain time for friendly forces to improve defenses and obtain additional reserves and to stop the forward momentum of the attackO-c US theater forces need the capability to respond to -enemy use of theater nuclear weapons This capability is needed to counter the theater nuclear power of the enemy to cause an enemy to consider the wider risks and uncertainties of con inuing his course of action and to establish limitations on the'use of-nuCIear-weapons US forces must be capable of continuing theater- nuclear operations beyond an initial exchange if it is necessary to achieve politicaL and military objectives This capability is needed to force the aggressor to de-escalate or'accept the risk of a strategic attack The capability to fight a theater nu lear war might deter general war - ' 35 - ' In a general war situation the tactical nuclear option is needed to reduce or eliminate enemy capabilities for effective tactical operations Theater nuclear forces can attack ClNCEUR ClNCP AC-identified strategic targets that are not included in SlOP targeting They can also participate in SlOP operations by engaging time-sensitive targets Utility of the tactical nuclear option in flexible response is questioned because of doubts about our command and control capabilities and the p'ossibility of escalation see Figure 9a TACTO COLLECTIVE SECURITY CREDII3IL1TY FLEX IDLE RESPONSE DETERRENCE REACTION OF ALLIES AND PUBLIC OPINION CONTROL AND ESCALATION Figure 9a The United States has deployed thousands of nuclear weapons to overseas areas and concern has been expressed by some US officials over the possibility of nuclear accidents or incidents and inadvertent or unauthorized use resulting in an unwanted nuclear war Control procedures in peacetime generally alleviate these fears but command and control concepts for nuclear war do not appear to be sufficiently responsive or flexible for full utilization of the tactical nuclear option Transmission of a selective release request involves decoding evaluation amendment encoding and dispatch at each intermediate headquarters a cumbersome and time consuming procedure If selective release authority is approved by the President the Joint Chiefs of Staff require the theater commander to report within four hours on the detonation of each weapon and include time of detonation target type and l cation yield employed height of burst delivery means and estimated results This procedure would be suitable for initial use of a few theater nuclear weapons that might be employed in a demonstration but not for the use of a few hundred weapons which might be required to respond to nonnuclear aggression There are no known procedures for requesting general release of theater nuclear weapons independent of executing the SlOP While the theater commander might request selective release of all available nuclear weapons the reporting requirements would have to be relaxed to the daily summary required under general release 36 SECRE ••IRO SECRE R D In addition to these shortcomings of our own ability to use nuclear weapons is the possibility that the limited use of theater nuclear weapons might lead to unlimited theater nuclear warfare or to a strategic exchange The probability of nuclear escalation however is not certain but is determined by a complex set of relationships between the nuclear powers and the specific circumstances of the use of theater nuclear weapons The highest escalatory potential of all hostile acts would be the threat to or attack of the homeland of a major nuclear power Theater nuclear weapons must be used in such a way that the homeland of the Soviet Union or the PRe is not threatened The enemy can distinguish on a timely basis between the tactical application of nuclear force and a thre'at to his homeland by the choice of delivery system Restraint in the number of theater nuclear weapons used initially and restrictions on yields would have a bearing on the escalatory potential of the tactical nuclear option The weapons chosen and the targets selected must be consistent with and reinforce verbal declarations communicated to the enemy as to the objectives of the attack The objectives should be limited and must be adhered to even if the initial use of nuclear weapons appears to offer an opportunity to achieve a greater objective The condition of parity in strategic nuclear forces between the United States and the Soviet Union tends to inhibit escalation The awareness of national leaders of the consequences of a strategic exchange should tend to deter escalation after theater nuclear operations have been initiated Therefore the tactical use of nuclear weapons will not necessarily lead to strategic attack because the deterrent value of strategic forces which maintained stability prior to hostilities will still inhibit escalation see Figure 9b TACTO COLlECTIVE SECURITY CREDIBILITY FLEXIBLE RESPONSE DETERRENCE CONTROL AND ESCALATION UTI LlTY REACTION OF ALLIES AND PUBLIC OPINION Figure 9b SECRET RD 37 ------- --_ __ WEiR I I ' j Thus the need for a tactical nuclear capability is convincing but the military and political implications associated with the tactical nuclear option detract from utility Utility cannot be demonstrated unless the uncertainties and risks are re- solved or minimized to the satisfaction of political authorities see Figure 9c TACTO COLLECTIVE SECURITY CRED I BI L1TY FLEX I elE RESPONSE IJLI I LI L U ILl REACTION OF ALLIES AND PUBLIC OPINION CONTROL AND ESCALATION Figure 9c A national decision to develop maintain and use theater nuclear weapons will be easier to obtain if political authorities have confidence in the military concept for theater nuclear operations We might be able to overcome our tradition of non-use if we have a nuclear strategy for limited war one that rejects the current preoccupation of nuclear strategy with general war The TACTO study outlines a nuclear strategy for limited war that consists of five principles see Figure 10 NUCLEAR STRATEGY FOR LIMITED WAR 1 CRED I BLE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE DIFFERENT DETERRENT MISSIONS FOR ASIA AND EUROPE 2 TWO NUCLEAR THRESHOLDS EARLY USE OF TACTICAL WEAPONS PLANNED 3 LIMITED OBJECTIVES A DIFFERENT CONCEPT OF 'WINNING 4 LIMITED CAPABILITIES FOR THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES MUST NOT THREATEN OR ENGAGE HOMELAND TARGETS 5 SELECTIVE USE OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES PREVENTS SANCTUARY WAR Figure 10 38 9E eRl T J flit To achieve a credible deterrent posture for theater nuclear forces it is necessary to recognize the differing capabilities of our potential enemies In Asia the United States can maintain superiority over the PRe i tactical nuclear capabilities in 1975 and the deterrent utilityof theater nuclearforces is-their ability to discourage nonnuclear aggression by the massive land forces of the PRe In Europe the Soviet Union has achieved a formidable tactical nuclear capability and is enlarging and improving it The deterrent utility of theater nuclear forces in Europe is their ability to dissuade Soviet first use The test of sufficiency is the enemy's awareness that our theater nuclear forces can survive his attack nuclear or nonnuclear and cause him extensive damage The national security interests of the United States demand that a nuclear war Therefore our plans should accommodate a concept of two nuclear thresholds a tactical threshold and a strategic threshold This concept parallels that part of West German strategy which calls for early use of theater nuclear weapons US plans for early use if made known to NA'rD should satisfy the Allied insistence on guidelines However that would be the limit of US concessions to her NATO allies because the rationale for early use is ultimate benefit for the United States Early use-aside from the advantages I pointed out previously-constitutes a low tactical threshold Early use of theater nuclear weapons raises the strategic threshold because of the range of capabilities available with the tactical nuclear option and the opportunities for negotiation or otherwise ending the conflict before we must resort to strategic nuclear forces if it occurs must be kept limited When theater nuclear weapons are used acceptance of limited objectives is essential The objective in theater nuclear operations might not be the absolute defeat of enemy forces or capitulation of enemy governments but a lesser form of victory We must allow the enemy alternatives other than general war or unnecessary expansion of the conflict The purpose of using theater nuclear weapons is to convince the enemy that he will lose more from continued aggression than he could possibly gain This concept of winning seeks to achieve conditions that will result in ending the conflict under conditions acceptable to the United States and her allies The risk of escalation can be reduced further by limiting the means available to theater nuclear forces The intentions of the United States to limit a nuclear war should be understood if theater nuclear forces are incapable of threatening or engaging targets in the Soviet or PRe homelands The use of ADM and nuclear artillery in response to a nonnuclear attack would indicate clearly that the enemy homeland is not threatened The additional use of nucleaJ ' missiles in response to a nuclear attack if employed in the counterbattery role would be a signal to the enemy of US intentions to limit the nuclear war Other constraints that must be accepted to minimize the risk of escalation may include restricting the initial employment of theater nuclear weapons to the territory of allied nations and the use of nuclear yields that produce less than the desired effects The strategic nuclear option used selectively has a role in the nuclear strategy for limited war but the complete SIOP should be reserved as the deterrent to attack of the United States and its execution ordered only when there is no other feasible course of action The selective and co nt rqJled use pf strategic nuclear forces would be appropriate if the Soviet Union or the PRe is launching MRBM IRBM cEf CRET ir'D 39 from the sanctuary of their homeland If these missile systems are moved out of sanctuary to the territory of a buffer state theater nuclear forces should have the capability of engaging them The conclusions of the TACTO study are shown in Figure 11 CONCLUS IONS 1 THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR OPTION IS A NECESSARY AND POTENTIALLY USEFUL ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1975 TIME FRAME 2 THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES DffiR ENEMY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUPPLEMENT THE DETERRENT POSTURE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND COMPLEMENT THE DETERRENT VALUE OF STRATEG I C FORCES 3 IF DETERRENCE FAILS THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR OPTION PROVI DES THE PRES I DENT A RANGE OF THEATER NUCLEAR CAPABI L1T1ES TO Mm ENEMY THREATS BELOW THE LEVEL OF GENERAL WAR 4 THE DEC I SION TO USE THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY POLITICAL CONFIDENCE IN THE MILITARY ABILITY TO CONDUCT A LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR 5 THE DECISION TO USE THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE INTERESTS OF ALLIES AND THE PERCEIVED RISK OF ESCALATION 6 ESCALATION IS NOT INEVITABLE I'FTHEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE USED WITH DISCRETION TO ACHIEVE LIMITED OBJECTIVES 7 THE EMPLOYMENT OF THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SUPPORT OF US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS MAY CONFLICT WITH ALLIED INTERESTS 8 THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF THE POLITICAL DEC I SION I S MADE TO AUTHOR I ZE EARLY EMPLOYMENT Figure 11 40 SECRET lRD The recommendations of the TACTO study are shown in Figure 12 RECOMMENDATIONS 1 I DELETED 2 THAT THE RES PONS IVENESS AND FLEX I BI LlTY OF US COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES FOR THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS BE IMPROVED 3 THAT THE OUTLINE OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY FOR LIMITED WAR PRESENTED IN THIS STUDY BE CONSIDERED IN THE FORMULATION OF A CONCEPT FOR THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS Figure 12 That completes my presentation Are there any questions or comments - ---- SECRET •IRO 41 SECRET JRD - Question and Answer Period GARWIN IBM Clearly from your presentation the side which does not use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear assault is at a big disadvantage but is there an advantage to the United States in the first use of nuclear weapons against a massive conventional Soviet attack FAIR In Volume I of our study we went through for several months what you could consider as political military games We developed scenarios for hypothetical conflicts over Berlin Korea Iran Turkish Thrace Central Europe and even Norway It is our feeling that where you are obviously outnumbered where the conventional defense is doomed to failure nuclear weapons can be useful not only in destruction of enemy forces which really is a secondary purpose but primarily to re-establish deterrent which has been lost by the conventional aggression to give them this final warning before you do continue with the nuclear weapons We felt it has use from both aspects-as a deterrent and as a destruction force GARWIN Why at that time should the enemy stop and be further deterred once he makes the decision to move conventionally Believing that he can win he is likely to carry through with nuclear weapons on his side and if your posture is more vulnerable to nuclear weapon attack then he is likely to win at that level also From the point of view of the local commander or even the theater commander one might imagine that anything would go to prevent defeat but that is not necessarily in the national interest or in the interest of the ally on whose territory we might be fighting FAIR The only thing I can say is that no one knows how a nuclear war might go We don't know that they don't have secret instructions to the effect that when the first nuclear weapons are used in defense that stops everything and they go back home and think about it some more This gets back to what I emphasized repeatedly throughout this study the necessity for early use If you catch the enemy at the border where there is no big loss of face where comparatively less loss of forces is involved where he can reconsider his course of action where he is not deeply committed to his battle plan and he isn't half way to the Rhine when you suddenly use nuclear weapons at this point we think that if you do use nuclear weapons the possibility of ending the war at that time is as likely as his counter-use of nuclear weapons Anything could happen • GlRA RD RAC I believe you discussed this in a setting of strategic parity between the respective homelands and if this is so I am struck by the fact that apparently they are expected to be deterred rather strongly from taking nuclear risks whereas the whole point of this study is tha we are not inhibited by this to any great extent Would you develop your thoughts on that please 42 SECREJ • SECREl mD I FAIR What we have said is that the stability which has been promoted by the strategic forces has actually permitted or caused instability in lesser forms of combat As you approach parity in theater nuclear forces which I believe is about to happen or has happened with the Soviet Union then you produce an imbalance in lesser forms of combat which would be the conventional aggression We feel that we can't win in Europe We don't plan not to win but we don't believe if they have parity in theater nuclear forces and superiority in ready combat power of nonnuclear forces that we can win But we can cause the enemy a lot of damage We can get in there and make him consider what he has started and the ultimate consequences-our strategic punch held in reserve-of continuing this course of action That is all we can hope to do-to cause him unacceptable damage just as we do now in our strategic deterrent GIRARD You are really assuming a situation in which we have strategic superiority between homelands in the time frame you are talking about FAIR If I understand your question it has to do with PRC GIRARD No I am talking about Russia I am just asking you if you embed your concept in a US strategic superiority advantage over Russia You assume the other parity is coming along rather quickly but you are not assuming that we are losing our homeland superiority FAIR We have lost that GIRARD You are saying that we have lost that FAIR May I extend that I am saying that in th Soviet view we have lost it They consider their strategic attack forces to be at a parity with ours They can do us unacceptable damage-that's the point Parity superiority what does it mean It means that we can't accept being attacked by the Soviet strategic forces GIRARD This makes my bewilderment more acute in that we appear to have a one-way parity operator here in the study they are damped and we aren't We take nuclear initiatives but we expect the parity situation to squelch their responses FAIR We expect the strategic parity to stop it from going all the way yes DAYE Air War College You addressed your study primarily to Europe as a vital area of interest Did you address any portion of it to using tactical nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear power for example in going to the defense of Thailand Cambodia or Laos If you eliminated it why did you do so FAIR We did consider this in the study of Korea The way we structured the study was to permit North Korea by accident or by design to invade South Korea with the objective of uniting the country without obligation of the PRC You may question the validity of such assumed invasion due to the inequity of combat forcesit would appear that South Korea could stand alone and defeat North Korea and that US assistance would even make the balance more in our favoDELETEO- 1 - - In looking at this situation-in which you have the use o f JJIJg lec r weapon aguinst a nonnuclear capable·power such as· · _ SECRET He 43 North Korea-we felt that the military need was m rg al at most but that the political advantages were fairly high For example -'you can deter the ERC from entering into the conflict-in other words enlarging the conflict you might be able to terminate the conflict quicldy thus eliminating the domestic problems of a prolonged nonnuclear war ' DAYE Your conclusions however were the' same in both aspects when you considered using it against a nonnuclear as compared to a nuclear power-or did you come out with a separate set of conclusions FAIR No the conclusions were broad applied to the entire study and I'must epeat again tentative COON Hq USSTRICOM On the mechanics of_'the· study why don't you expect coordination and possible release time framewise FAIR We were to submit the coordination' draft on the 15th we will actually beat that by a week it will be on the 8th of September _ We anticipate that we will get comments back within four weeks from our overseas friends and from USAREUR Pact in five weeks A week will be allowed'far'revision on the basis of comments and it will be out for distribution on October 2 8' ' BURCHINAL USEURCOM There is one point' that is a little difficult for 'me to step over on this one-although I can see it from a US national point of view-and that is the introduction of the pieces of limited nuclear 'cpriflict 20ssibility in Europe and still keeping the Europeans with us Any nuclearuse IL·Eh rope in their view doesn't lend itself to limited war because it is their survival which is at issue and they have always insisted on an indivisibility in the nuclear deterrent from the use of tactical nuclear weapons right through to the SlOP • We don't have enough forces to implement such a strategy or such capability on a national onl y basis so 1 would think the study should look for more solid props in this partlcul lr area $J - I tr FAIR We reco ze that problem It is a' very difficult one Q ' '5 ' Jb l Ly r' i '- ' ' s' · ··O·· i l£le· ' D1 X Y i · XK r f Jl It itif 6J ·i U C ' 1J' · 0 It' di' h b- _- -- 'I 1 c _ ' · J '- ' L r' -· - I I t' tTh _ n i i ·' 4 d 'iL ey won ev n scuss' t e pO SSl llity that a theater nuclear war could be limited just in- rope without in olving us Their strategy envisions a few weapons a demonstration perhaps as a deterrent and then implementation of the SlOP I believe they' could go' along with responding to enemy first use but on No 4 Figure 11 we recognize thatfu the NATO Nuclear Planning Group or discussions among military thi's pos s bllitY ir' never recognize·d _ AGNEW LASL As a comment you with you on that migh i it c uld not go along T'''' ' _ 'T ' WRIGHT RAND Corp You mentioned two thiesholos Lwondered iryou used Minute Man in a counter-battery role' against SS4rs c wh t threshold yo u'd be at WRIGHT FAIR • ' -- ' '' ' • ' - • i ' - l ' - '- 0 ' FOWLER DDR E You mentioned favorably the early use of nuclear weapons Could you say what release time you are thinking of or you assumed in your study What if any improvements would that require over the present control procedures FAIR Within the present selective release request is the possibility of conditionalrelease authority It is our feeling that it is not beyond the realm of possibility that SACEUR should have conditional release authority on ADM's and nuclear authority-Condition I release and authority contingent on massive invasion of Europe So by early I mean before the war starts For other parts of the world ·we have talked mainly about D-day assessment during D-day as to what the effects might be and so on but in Europe we are talking about predelegation FOWLER Then your assumptions did not require any significant improvement in the present control procedure-just a change in defiIiition and delegation FAIR No What we are saying is that the selective release authority as the military has imposed it on itself is too stringent not responsive If I have got to report all those details on the use of each single weapon if the request must go through every channel and be voted on there and held up until they agree that there is an emergency it is too slow If there is no general release authority other than implementing the SlOP we have defeated ourselves before we start because there is no way that a field commander for example could wage a nuclear warwhich is No 4 on the chart-without having th e SlOP going along with it SALET US Mission to NATO I don't have a question but a comment I believe it was in your Recommendation No 2 that you were discussing greater flexibility in US command and control procedures This is more or less a follow-up to General Burchinal's comment I would suggest that perhaps you would want to think more in terms of greater flexibility of NATO command and control procedures I would add that in discussing early use for example of tac nucs particularly in this political time frame it is vital that the credibility of the· tactical nuclear deterrent insofar as European thinking is concerned not be diminished As General Burchinal says we are going to continue to carry the Europeans along with us I do think it is vital that we think of these problems not in terms of a US unilateral war in Europe but of a NATO situation GARWIN In the case of a massive conventional attack by a strong government like that of North Korea or North Vietnam against their neighbors South Korea or South Vietnam why could one not use a demonstration and then strategic weapons to gain limited goals on our s'ide namely to have the other guy pull back to the status quo before the war Do you exclude such a use of nuclear weapons FAIR No we do not In our scen ios we did disc uss a demonstration against a nonnuclear capable power-a nonpunitive demonstration-in other words no damage to its forces but merely ffLook fellows I have this power stop go back and think it over We also considered the use of strategic forces-in other words selective applications of strategic forces in laying down a belt across North Koreathis sort of thing We feel however that you must view this from Soviet eyes or PRC eyes consider what are they thinking if you use this· kind of force-force that came from the US and attacked a puppet state or buffer state if you will Whereas if you have this force within your resources and they know it is there and can be used we feel that the chances of escalation are much less For this sort of thing you could use for example a carrier off shore or land forces who have organic capabilities 45 ' - - ' --'# _- r _·· _ ' GARWIN That is not rea1ly so clear to me as a1l that I can't imCl-gine since a1l we want is for the other man to pull back that we could in fact attack his cities or his homeland so long as he is a nonnuclear power himself F_ uR But he has nuclear capable friends behind every nonnuclear power there is someone with a nuclear weapon GARWIN they want FAIR That's right and they would start a war any time if that's what That's right I agree • 46 Francis E Armbruster Hudson Institute THE DUAL CAPABILITY DILEMMA A SOLUTION Editor's Note Due to technical difficulties Dr Armbruster's talk was not recorded Since we were unsuccessful in obtaining a copy of his talk for inclusion in these Proceedings only the material used on his slides and the discussion following the talk are included in this document Abbitt II CONVENTIONAL NON-REINFORCED HARSA oJ PACT THREAT DEFEN E TACTICAL NUCLEAR DEFENSE RE 1NFORCED HARSAIt' PACT THREAT Figure 2 Figure 1 BALANCE OF FORCES UNITED EIRE zI l I MOROCCO ALGERIA Figure 3 48 SEeRI i 0 SECRE j'Rt TOTAL LAt D FORCES CENTRAL FRONT • WARSA I PACT 35 wARSAW PACT DIVISIONS WITHOUT S U 20 SOVIET FORCES GERHANY 2 SOVIET FORCES POLAND -2 SOVIET FORCES CZECHOSLOVAKIA 63 TOTAL DIVISIONS NATO 26 NATO DIVISIONS 2 BAOR 6 FRENCH DIVISIONS AMERICAN 7TH ARHY 31 3 TOTAL DIVISIONS I Figure 4 EAST GERHAN FORCES ARMY--6 DIVIS IONS SOVIET EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 2 TANK DIVISIONS 10 SIZE OF DIVISIONS--9 OOO HEN ARMORED 4 MOTORIZED TOTAL STRENGTH 85 000 MEN NUMBER OF TANKS--350 AIR FORCE MECHANIZED DIVISIONS SIZE OF DIVISIONS--IO 500 MEN NUMBER OF TANKS--190 10 18 FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR SQUADRONS ' 16 AIRCRAFT I N COMBAT SQUADRON AIRCRAFT TOTAL TANKS 5 400 Figure 5 MiG-19 MiG-21 MiG-17 Figure 6 49 8EGAET zt1' ARpY--15 DIVISIONS CZECH FORCES 5 MHORED 8 I I MOTORIZED f RH' --lL DIV I S IONS Aln60i i AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT TOTAL STRENGTJ- 5 J85 000 1'lEN 9 TANK MOTORIZED 175 000 t' EN TOTAL STRENGTH 6 45 J4 LI GHT 80 'lGER sQUADRmls I NTERCEPTOf SQU DfWNS GROUIlD-SUPPORT ANi RECQ W I SSANCE SQUADRONS 5 4 I NTERCEPTGR REG I HENTS GROU ID-ATTACK REG I HENTS AIRCRAfT AI RCRAFT MiG-17 MiG-19 MiG-21 IL-28 MiG-17 MiG-i9 MiG-ZI MiG-IS Figure 8 Figure 7 AME 3 1 CAN SEVENTH ARMY 2 ARMORED DIVISIONS PANZER DIVISIONS 3 Z MECHANIZED DIVISIONS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISIONS 7 MECHANIZED DIVISION LESS TWO BRIGADES MOUNTAIN DIVISIONS ARMORED CAVALRY REGlt1ENTS AIRBORNE DIVISIONS BRIGADE IN BERLIN MEN PER DIVISION 2 TOTAL STRENGTH 215 000 MEN Figure 9 50 15 000 - 16 000 2 900 TOTAL TANKS Figure 10 • - - ' --'Y •• ' - _ t ' '' -_ ' ' ''_ j - _ ''-- _ ' _' -f o_ ' - _' _ · ' -' ' ' T'-O·- HE NORHALLY PLAYS LONG SHOTS ONLY WHEN LITTLE IS RISKED AND MUCH CAN BE GAINED FISHING EXPEDITIONS A l' 2 ·HE WOULD LIKE NUHERICAL IICERTAINLYII OF SUCCESS BEFORE HE COMMITS HIS FORCES 3 HE MAY HAVE SOHEWHAT OF A COHPLEX ABOUT SOVIET llBAD LUCK II IN INITIAL PHASES OF WARS FROM THE PAST 4 HE RECOGNIZES THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD Figure 11 AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION I PROBLEM OF DEFENSE AGAINST UNREINFORCED SOVIET EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 2 PROBLEM OF DEFENSE AGAINST FULL SOV lET ARt'lY A EINFORCEMENT THRESHOLD Figure 12 I TO CREATE A NEvi LI NE OF DETERRENCE 2 DETERRENCE OF REINFORCEMENT VS DETERRENCE OF ATTACK Figure 13 1892 GENERAL BOISDEFFRE TO TSAR NICHOLAS liTHE MOBILIZATION IS THE DECLARATION OF WAR TO MOBILIZE IS TO OBLIGE ONE'S NEIGHBOR TO DO THE SAME •••• OTHERWISE 'TO LEAVE A ·MILLION MEN ON ONE'S FRONTIER Figure 14 ' - ' - SOVIET PLANNERIS NATURE I - WITHOUT DOING THE SAME SIMULTANEOUSLY IS TO DEPRIVE ONESELF OF ALL POSSIBILITY OF MOVING LATER IT IS PLACING ONESELF IN A SITUATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL WHO WITH A PISTOL IN·HIS POCKET SHOULD LET HIS NEIGHBOR PUT A WEAPON TO HIS FOREHEAD WITHOUT ·DRAWING HIS OWN ••• 1' 51 - -- - -' - MIRIST lRI DtTERRENCE TO REINFORCEMENT IMPLICIT DANGERS OF REINFORCEMENT POLISH DIPLOI'1lICY DEPENDING mJ THE ISSUES UNITED COMMUNiST GERMANY VS POLISH G RRISON STATE ETC DANGER OF UPRISINGS Figure 15 THE DUAL CAPABILITY PROBLEM A B 2 3 11ASS·iVE SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ATTACK SOVIET NUCLEAR STRIKE MI L1TARY A DUAL MISSION I DEFENSIVE 2 OFFENSIVE 8 DUAL CAPABILITY 1 CONVENTIONAL 2 NUCLEAR PO IJJl CAl- A B C REQUIRE IENT FOR NUCLEAR · EAPONS RELEASE THE LINE DIVIDING GERMANY MONEY Figure 16 SUGGESTED SOLUTI --------O IS 1 MLU TA 'L A C DISPERSION MOB I LI TY DISPERSION AND MOBILITY A NO BORDER ISSUE B Figure 17 UDSON 1 • THREl T Ao Bo 2• INSTITUTE SOLUTIONS MASSIVE- SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ATTACK SOVIET NUCLEAR STRIKE tlli-ll ARY A A B C SHIELDING EMPHASIS DEPLOYMENT 1 LITTLE LOSS OF COflVENrJONAL CAPABILITY OFFENS VE AND DEFENSIVE 2 SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR CAPABILITY 3 CREDIBLE DETERRENT POSTURE Figure 18 NO REQU I REt'IENT TO COHN IT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS RELEASE EARLY I N THE BATTLE NO PRECRISIS BORDER ISSUE NO EXPENSIVE OR DRASTIC CHANGES IN TO E OF CURRENT NATO FORCES Figure 19 1 PREPOSITIONING 2 CARRY-ALONG KITS 3 SPECIAL EQUIP IENT FOR EACH COHPANY-SIZE UNIT 8-Ton Whee 1- Loade r It so @ e t 2 ·--T CY Bucket 1 I 1 ' I y - 1 --1---- I --- d b -- I I · s· ' ' ' i- 8'10 2692 mm CAB • - ' 7 'MAX SI' t f-26W· 679 mm I --r l1'2W I 3423 mm I l I 8'7 2616 mm I 9'1'1 ' 2781 mm ---------------Figure 20 9EonET llt6 53 CORRUGATED PIPE BUNKER SCHEMATIC CROSS SECTIONS -- 8' ---_ o4 -- EQUAL CUT FILL - - ----- 63 T 81 I -__ 1-- 66 I _ --i 1 END VIEW COMBINATIO -' BLAST COOR VALVE __ - - --- rT'J ' -----------rr -- - - '-- _p - Il' EOUAL CUT FILL ______ -- 8'_ 20 i4' LONGlTycr AL VIEW HALf' SCALE Figure 21 54 O ' - -' _ ·' ' - '- EXCAVATION FOR BUNKER ANP - A- _ ··· - - - ' ' - '- 3- •• ' VEHICLE PIT LONGITUDINAL CROSS SECTION T VEHICLE PIT 12' BUNKER 8' I - - 24' - - i AREA 1- _0-- --i - - _ - 1___ 16' 32' i I PLAN VIEW T 8 BUNKER RAMP AREA lL-________ ------__ - i 46' 32' Figure 22 CROSS SECTION OF INTERIOR OF SAMPLE BUNKER LENGTH IS 40' PLUS ENTRANCE-EXIT PASSAGES 76 69' • I I I U I i II ' I t --- -- -r· ------48 f 10' 01 Figure 23 8UNKER I NSTALLAT ION FACTORS I T I lE OF I NSTALLAT ION 2 PROTECT ION 3 COSTS Figure 24 SAMPLE EMPLACEMENT TIME SINGl E BUNKER W L HRS MAN HRS EXCAVATION BACKFILL INCL VEHICLE PIT 8-9 BUNKER ASSEM8LY INSTALLATION OTHEK FORTIFICATICNS PREPARATIONS FOXHOLES - MACHINE GUN PITS BARBED WIRE AND MINE FIELDS CLEARED FIELDS OF FIRE 50-100 200-250 200-250 CONSEC HRS 0' 8-9 36 72 WHOLE COMPANY EIGHT BUNKER§ 72-78 'd 4000-4800 TOTAL EMPLACEMENT TIME 72-78 ' 0' ' Time Available Allowing for Patrolling and Other Functions ' 12-Hour Shifts heel-Loader on 24-Hours-a-Day Basis 'd lncludes Travel Within Company Position '''''- 'Since the Wheel-Loader Works on Only One Bunker at a Time the Consecutive Hours Required for the Company is Greater Than the Consecutive Hours Required for Any One Bunker Figure 25 THEORETICAL BUNKER VULNERABILITY SEPARATION 1200 METERS 80 PSI 2200 P F YIELD UNDER 100 KT 100-250 KT 250-2500 KT OVER 2500 KT 56 NUMBER OF BUNKERS KILLED Figure 26 I 2 4 9 SEC • - '_- '-' _ ' -' _o ALTERNATIVE AII IING POINTS TO KI LL TWO BUNKERS TO KILL FOUR BUNKERS o o o o o TO KILL NINE BUNKERS o o o o o o o o o KILL DISTANCE AT LEAST k SEPARATION BETWEEN BUNKERS KILL DISTANCE AT LEAST 7 TI t'IES SEPARATION BEn EEN BUNKERS I KILL DISTANCE AT LEAST 1 4 TI MES SEPARATION BETWEEN BUNKERS Figure 27 CORRUGATED PIPE BUNKERS 80 P F 2200 COST ESTIMATE PI PE--LfO FEET ENTRANCES--2 INCLUDING BLAST VALVES COST FOJLsrrWCTURE $1500 1000 $2500 BUTTON-UP 02-C02 SYSTEN GD ¢10 PERSON 250 VENT BLOWER HAND MOTOR 50 GENERATOR 350 HABITABILITY ITENS 650 MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS TOOLS EXPLOSIVES PHON ES I NSTRUN ENTAT JON I PER ISCOPE DRA I NAGE tQQ 1700 DIGGING EQUIPI-1ENT 1 8 OF AN 8-TON 1 5-CY WHEEL LOADER APPROXINATE TOTAL - EIGHT--8000 LBS FOR SEVENTH ARMY--2500-3000 BUNKERS @ $6000-8000 - TOTAL--$ 15 000 000-24 000 000 t Figure 28 57 rfi VI SI ON FRONT APPROXIMATELY THAT CURRENTLY A DESIGNATED 'BY NATO FOR DISPERSED DIVISION B SURVIVABILITY UNDER TACTICAL NUCLEAR ATTACK Figure 29 BRIGADE ZONE - Of DIYI IOH AREA 28 8 km - - - - - 1 22 8 km SAMPLE SHIELDING-EMPHASIS DEPLOYMENT 456 bunkers DIVISION SCHEMATIC ilbou t i l 000 men _ 28 8 KILOMETERS _ 18 MILES 1 BRIGADE AREA -BATTALIONS IN RESERVE -ARTILLERY a OTHER COMBAT SUPParr ELEMENTS OF DMSION a CORPS 456 BUNKERS -BRIGADE COMMAND POSTS -DIVISION COMMAND POST -OTHER ELEMENTS OF DIVISION 8 CORPS DIVISION REAR 120 BUNKERS 600m ----- I I I 60Om I I Figure 31 Figure 30 58 «onE' ifa 28 8 KILOMETERS 18 MlLES I • BAl'TAIJON POSITION Dense Deployment • 7200 Meters Company Front Company Front I E Rifle Annbred Sections I 0 0 7 1200-0 I 0 ¥eters 1200 0 M ters Weapons ' Support Sections ore 00' 0 6 0 00 i2 Mortar eserve Platoons I 0 0 cr 0 0 E 0 i2 0 I I 0 0 0 ----- I 0 C- O I -1 - --- --- 0 0 Reserve Company 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Q 00 Figure 32 FORWARD PIATooN POSmONS Forward Rifle Armored Sections 8 a-- 0 o 400 Meters - 0 - f3c1'Ueters--ilil I'-- Spread Bact-lito 600 Meters FaUbacJc Conventional Position a o o o C o o o o o o o o C- a D o c o o· o o o O o o o Weapons Support Sections o o o Figure 33 59 FORWARD SECTION POSITION 1600 METERS 1200 METERS e- MG POSITION LISTENING POST MG POSITION LISTENING POST MG POSITION • • o • • • GUN CREW BUNKER CONVENTIONAL GUN CREW BUNKER CONVENTIONAL SECTION SHWER VEHICLE PIT SPREAD BACK DENSE Figure 34 COMBAT OPERATIONS 1 KNOWN LOCATION OF ONE'S OWN TROOPS 2 SUPER lOR COt1t1AND AND COtHROL NVI RONI iENT 3 CONTINUOUS CONVENTIONAL FRONT OR NUCLEAR PICKET LI NE 4 SECTIONS RETAIN THEIR NOR lAL NOBILITY AND FIRE- Po ER 5 UNITS CLOSE AT HAND FOR t1ASS I NG FOR EITHER LOvJOR HIGH-LEVEL CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE OR OFFENSE 6 LESS REQU I RGIENT FOR NUCl EAR WEAPONS AT LOW LEVELS OF COj-1BAT AND WH I LE BATTLE I S DEVELOP I NG 7 HI NI i'lLJH EXPOSURE TO ENnlY NUCLEAR THREAT BEFORE AND DURING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE DE LOYHENT AGAINST CONVENTIONAL THREAT Figure 35 60 o • ' ' ' ' g t f '' ' ' ' - -- • Question and Answer Period COWAN 3rd Armo'red Div For the past two years it has been my job at SHAPE Headquarters to assess the capabilities of NA TO forces versus those of the Warsaw Pact I realize Mr Armbruster that the info mation which may be available to you at this particular time is not current but Lam afraid I must take issue with you on your assessment of the Warsaw Pact forces and the US forces I would suggest that you read MC161 69 vyhich is the current agreed NA TO intelligence for the Warsaw Pact Even MC161 68 would have given the Soviets a greater capability than you have given them For example in the '68 studies we at SHAPE 'assessed the Soviet forces at about 145 divisions we deployed these divisions throughout the Soviet Union based on what one could consider their war plans and it indicated a considerably greater concentration of troops in the central region than you have given Secondly with regard to US forces the 7th Army no longer exists We have five divisions in Europe organized into two corps under the command of the US Commanding General US Army Europe Since r am now the Assistant Division Commander of one of the armored divisions which you have on that chart I can say that we are not at full strength eit4er and we are short of officers as well as enlisted men We have in my division at the present time about 50 percent of the officers authorized and the important fact is that we do not have the mature field grade officer-in a battalion we go from a lieutenant ' colonel down to a lieutenant both on the staff we have one or two officers per company and if a man is promoted to captain he immediately goes to Vietnam The third point I'd like to make is this With regard to the dual capability dilemma I want to use the Air Forces as an example In NA TO we are using a family of aircraft developed over the years The principal aircraft being used is the 104G We have talked about changing our conv entional strategy and have politically said that we can do this Resources required to convert a force which was organized in the 1950's and continued primarily as a nuclear capable force to a conventional arms force requires much more than either our NA TO Allies and I am afraid ' the United States are putting forth in Europe today To convert for example the F104G to a conventional delivery capability requires a considerable amouut of money At the present time our NA TO Allies consider the cost too great I am afraid you will find that in NA TO the United States is the only country that has a dual capability Air For ce ' In summary I would like to say the following Gentlemen in Europe within the last few years there have been significant political economic and military changes I am afraid that we in the United States who are involved in planning and study have failed to realize these changes and we are' being unfair to ourselves by not making a greater attempt to get the facts 61 ARMBRUSTER Thank you General Cowan Are you taking issue with the number of Soviet divisions that I put in Western USSR and in European USSR And you say there are more than 75 Soviet Divisions in Western USSR COWAN Yes the figures run about 85 as I recall them I am sorry I don't have my own papers here Actually by deploying them in the military districts and utilizing them Categories I II and III as they are categorized in the MC161 68 and 69 you will find that they run a po ut 85 divisions that he could move in and MC161 69 raises the overall capability from 145 divisions to about 161 ARMBRUSTER Not within a 600-mile rim though territory as far east as the Urals You are speaking of 'COWAN I am talking about the employment of Soviet divisions out of the western portion of the USSR that can be deployed in a central attack against NA TO This also includes and commits some 14 divisions against Norway some 13 divisions against Italy some 17 against the Bulgarian front and another 17 in Eastern Turkey ARMBRUSTER I see I think the Generalis point is well taken because in my statement for Western USSR I was talking about Belorussia and the area as far east as the Moscow line to the Yasinovataya not the divisions east of the Moscow line or the northern units These are more than 600 miles away It takes a longer time to get them in RUSSELL Rg Dept of the Army Skipping the first portion where you developed the holding forces and so forth and into the second I believe your study was directed mainly at developing a rationale for having a rapid emplacement capability for fortified bunkers or similar emplacements I'd just like to point out that for several years we have been investigating this type of structure and I believe your figures are some hat conservative that we can put them in faster and cheaper and have a much wider range of possible material already evaluated I can come up with designs which could be used on very short notice ARMBRUSTER I don't doubt that As I said before what I was doing was taking stuff from corporations which I am sure you could do a lot better RUSSELL I am just saying that I believe your figures of $56 000 apiece and several days to put them in are conservative You should be able to put them in with hand shovels and readily available explosives ARMBRUSTER I defer to the engineer SQUIRES LRL I wonder if you'd like to extend your comments about vulnerability to a nuclear strike to the vulnerability of our present posture in the peacetime casernes This kind of idea might be extended to protecting them ARMBRUSTER SQUIRES 62 Protecting them in the casernes Yes in our present peace time postm'e ' • Je' ' • ARMBRUSTER Again we haven't looked into this so I can't give you a definite answer but actually the concentration of troops is so heavy there that it might be worthwhile to fire at these casernes even if they are hardened I don't know how you could harden them sufficiently to withstand direct fire I may be wrong on this but the forces are really concentrated heavily in some of these areas-I would not want to try to make shelters for them particularly since I would assume they would have to I e deployed if they are going to be useful in a time of crisis SEeRE - ' - - - Q 1 2 t 'i 7 ' ' ' ' - • - ' V' ' - - -1 _' '- _' -' --- - - General David A Burchinal Hq US European Command QUALITATIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS FOR ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE It is a real pleasure for roe to attend this symposium renew old friendships and further to share with you some personal views concerning tactical nuclear weapons This symposium comes at a particularly opportune time actually it's long overdue During the last several years we have made almost no progress toward satisfying our real and pressing requirements for improved tactical nuclear weapons In the last five years only one improved tactical weapon the Mk 61 bomb has entered the stockpile We who are concerned with trying to make deterrence continue to work for us and for Allied Command Europe have noted a steady erosion in tactical nuclear capabilities and there are now serious qualitative deficiencies in our stocks of weapons I will talk about these qualitative requirements a bit later but I would first like to focus briefly on the threat environment we work in our capability to counter this threat and in this context what is on the books as NATO strategy and some of our options see Figure 1 ' Contrary to the public statements and euphoric daydreams of some US and European theorists the threat to ACE has in no way abated over the past years and we see no signs that point toward a reduced threat in the future Just the reverse is true The Warsaw Pact military threat to ACE is composed of strong flexible well-balanced ground air and naval forces These are deployed well forward and are particularly concentrated against the central region of Europe As a result of this forward stationing on or near NA TO borders the Pact is today in a position to attack with little or no warning The Soviets might choose 'of course to deploy additional forces first under cover of exercises or they might even mobilize they did both last summer in preparation for C7 ech t lovalda ' - -' S CREI mg w y l- - 1 t El EUL H Figure 1 Pact theater forces located and probably earmarked for operation against the critical central region of ACE constitute about 60% of the total Pact forces see Figure 2 _ Figure 2 nG • The Soviets have made significant improvements in their general-purpose forces over the past five years among hese are the introduction of new and improved weapon systems such as the FROG 7• a new wheeled vehicle for SCUD B improved FISH BED aircraft F H ·and guided missile equipped helicopter ships see Figure 3 _ Figure 3 The Soviets have paraded and apparently initiated deployment of a road mobile mis sile system which we call SCALEBOARD see Figure 4 • SCALEBOARD 1 T Figure 4 67 SECRET JRD At present the missile associated with the SCALE BOARD the liquid fuel SS-12 has an estimated range of about 500 nm and thus would be considered as a' short-range tactical support system However the Soviets have stated that this miss-ile has a range of thousands of kilometers and units of this type missile are sub- - ordinate to the strategic rocket troops Therefore there is a possibility that the SCALEBOARD or a version of it is an MRBM While the Soviets continue to recognize the essentiality of strategic attack and defense forces and are investing heavily in them they now show increasing interest in improving the capabilities of their general-purpose forces to meet contingencies short of general nuclear war This interest seems to bein part a response to past developments in US and NATO capabilities to US advocacy of'flexible response to some restiveness on the part of their East European partners in the Warsaw Pact as well as persistent Chinese hostility • The Soviets formerly assumed that any general war with NATO would begin with a massive nuclear exchange and planned that in the aftermath of such an exchange their forces would advance rapidly' to seize critical objectives before NATO forces could recover from the destruction and disorganization caused by nuclear strikes In recent years however Warsaw Pact military exercises have been using a significantly different scenario based on the assumption that war with NA TO would be preceded by a period of high tension providing sufficient warning to permit the mobilization and deployment of Pact forces The war would begin with a NA TO conventional attack Warsaw Pact conventional forces would defeat this attack causing NATO to resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons Then the Pact forces reinforced from the USSR and using nuclear weapons would launch counteroffensive that would ove rrun NATO Europe It is particularly notable that no strategic nuclear exchange is taken into account in this scenario We believe that these recent exercises are indicative of Soviet emphasis on developing capabilities to wage war in Europe using conventional weapons to the maximum extent Soviet doctrine concerning conventional wars has recently been modified Until the early 1960's they dismissed the possibility of such wars between major powers holding that nonnuclear wars would almost certainly escalate In a cTuly 1967 article Marshal Ivan Yakubovskiy-Soviet First Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander of Warsaw Pact forces-confirmed that flexible response is now accepted Soviet military doctrine The article does not appear to be a call for more conventional forces rather it confirms the Soviet position on a balance of nuclear and conventional forces to meet the requirements for both nuclear and nonnuclear war This then is in general terms the doctrine which places the nuclear threat to ACE in a perspective particularly as it affects the central region This threat has not moderated over the last 20 years but rather has become more varied and more intensive as the Soviets come to grips with some of the same problems as those that concern us in ACE Now let's consider our strategy and capabilities to respond to this threat • 68 • Following the formation of NATO in 1949 the military strategy of the Alliance relied heavily on the nuclear weapon deterrent power of the United States and the United Kingdom This was called by some the Trip-Wire II philosophy' and it embodied the concept of immediate NATO nuclear retaliation to major SOviet Warsaw Pact aggression This strategy was formally set out in a NATO Military Committee document MC 14 2 issued in 1957 In May 1967 the NA TO defense ministers in defense planning committee session that is without France 'or what is sometimes called The Fourteen adopted at the urging of the United States a new Political Guidance directive lor NATO • This 1967 decision was a k y one sinc e it is now the basic political guidance for the development of all NATO military plans This revised guidance adopted by the defense ministers highlighted several significant propositions for military planning The defense ministers did not ignore the possibility of major indicated that the threat was moderated aggression but Secondly the ministers gave the military authorities planning guidance to the effect that political tension of several weeks if not months would precede aggression-and give us warning of attack It is fair to say that the military in Europe accepted this judgment reluctantly and there is now growing concern in political circles with the validity of trying to use political indicators which everyone agrees may exist in any situation as a substitute for usable military warning or as a reliable motivation for timely political d cision Thirdly the ministers told the NATO military authorities to base their force planning on level or declining defense budgets and this at a time when all Pact nations were showing significant increases in their defense budgets In effect ' the defense ministers were directing SACEUR and SACLANT to do md're with less and to do it in a political enVironment of detente and declining defense budgets One of the centerpieces of the defense ministers' meeting in Brussels four months ago was a re-examination of this 1967' guidance in the perspective of the Czech invasion and other political-military developments By and large we think the results of that session somewhat more realistic at least the agreed words and papers point in the right direction ' In discussing the threat last May the ministers' did take note of increased Warsaw Pact capabilities The notion of political warning was affirmed although the dangers of too heavy reliance on it were acknowledged This was' a welcome shift in emphasis The key operative passage addressed in· this review of the 1 967 guidance-at least as far as we were concerned-was the question of defense resources The Allies resisted acceptance of a 4-percent figure as_ stated goal for real increases in defense budgets in the 1971-75 period They did' agree however that force proposals for the period should be based on the assumpUort'of a moderate overall ' Regarding strategy the need for flexibility in military reaffirmed r sponses was soundly ­ While the political guidance of two years ago has thus been modified the' ' changes do not alter NATO's current strategic doctrine This st r ategic concept derives from the attempt to provide the flexibility of -military response which the ministers called for in 1967 and reaffirmed just last May It was-formalized by·the military committee in a document called MC 14 3 approved in December 1967 To carry out that newly enunciated strategic guidance SACEUR last year made ex- tensive revisions in his emergency defense plan Some of the key elements of the directed strategy are a Its emphasis on deterrence to any level of aggression b Its incorporation of the notion of political warning time and c Its formal adoption of a doctrine popularly-if somewhat inaccuratelY-Galled flexible response Incidentally General Lemnitzer did not like the description of NATO's strategy as flexible response saying it connotes gradualism and he would not use the phrase - ' - _ The 1967 concept envisions three types listed in Figure 5 - - e - ' - 70 - - • - - - One or more of these courses could be used to tlE _e any sRecific contingency The strategy requires that the dir-ect defense response be appropriate to defeat aggression on the level at which the enemy chooses to fight with deliberate escalation an option if an attack cannot be contained through direct defense Direct defense as used here is substituted for forward defense and while NATO planners insist that it will occur as far forward as possible there is some inference that geography may have to be traded for time It is important to note that nuclear' weapons are not ruled out and might be used in executing any of the responses listed here While not ruling out the use of nuclear weapons implementation of the revised strategy does require improved conventional means • To implement the appropriate response feature of the NATO strategy it is obvious that competent and sufficient conventional forces are required and almost equally obvious that they are not now in being The analysis of how competent and what is sufficient obviously involves some highly subjective value judgments When we look at ACE strategy and the forces available to execute this strategy then compare these with Warsaw Pact fo ces and capabilities we find little comfort In o'rder to successfully execute this strategy in the face of superior odds the use of tactical nuclear weapons might have to be considered very early in the conflict As General Lemnitzer stated to the NATO military comlnittee in one of his final appearances as SACEUR Conventional combat for more than a short period would not be possible We are faced with hard concrete serious logistics deficiencies which will prevent a sustained conventional defense not just limit it If I Various nuclear options are open to ACE which in turn dictate the types of nuclear weapons that we require As I discuss these options keep in mind the basic and a l-important fact that SACEUR's mission and strategy are defensfv In demonstrative use of nuclear weapons which is incidentally a popular subject today for study by the NATO nations political objectives would clearly dominate the military ones The aim would be to demonstrate NA TO's willingness and determinatio to resort to nuclear weapons if necessary and thereby dissuade the Soviets from further military actions - The target for a demonstration might be selected to eliminate or minimiz'e risk to enemy or friendly forces or civilian populations or·to destroy a military target The military or tactical effect of the strike however• is likely to b a secondary consideration ' ' -- '_ ' ' - ' ' 'By selective release I refer to the use of nuclear weapons-one or a few' 'in a given situation to respond to a specific threat ' In terms' of current Alliance· strategy the selective release option might well he the first one that' NA TO would have to face in a real war and it's precisely the first'-use situation that could be the most difficult from a political point of view ' ' ' ' ' The political judgments of' course • involve verY ubstantiar issues and' aren't made any easier by the fact that in NA TO the ItS elective' Release ' consideration and decision may well be discussed in multilateraLfbrnms-this was established in the famous Athens Guidelines of 1962 and reviewecrbi the NATO Nuclear Planning 7 Group earlier this year in London As y can agfue the Scandinavians· might '- f· DERHI lI T1 ' ' 9 _f ' ' well take a different view than would the Greeks or Turks of whether' a deterio rating military position in the Thrace area for example required selective nuclear release The option of using nuclear weapons under a set of limitations or political restraints doesn't fit the demonstrative option It ref rs as an option to a more advanced stage of tactical nuclear warfare where weapons might be used with constraints or limitations by kinds of weapons classes qf targets or geographic ' 11 -' areas I think there are some' advantages and 'some dangers in these 'kinds of restraints One can by setting up nuclear rules of engagement perhaps facilitate the timely release of certain kinds of nuclear weapons'to enhance their military value Atomic demolitions and antisubmarine and air defense weapons come to mind in this regard Their characteristics and method of employment make them pretty clearly distinguishable from say strikes by artillery shells and aerial bombs On the ot her hand limitations on kilotonnage to be applied or on the kinds of hostile installations that may be struck probably have value only in a very gross way We certainly can't go much beyond the nucl ar threshold with any assurance that the enemy can get the message we are trying·to convey or to make refined readings of the pattern Of our nuclear attackS or for that matter that he can recognize that our strikes are limited to warheads of less than a certain kt or that we're minimizing damage to population centers These kinds of criteria may' have important humanitarian psychological and political justification on our side it could be fatal however to believe that the enemy can be relied on to reciprocate with corresponding r e s t r a i n t s ' ' ' - '- - 'I - - • ' - ' • • _ ' It might be feasible to gain some political advantag from geographical constraints Here I refer to such possibilities as withhoi g stl -ikes against selected Warsaw Pact satellites to achieve the political and IDilitary aim of 'their getting out or staying out of the fight Determining the utilitj'of exerc'ising this kind of restraint requires a first-class crystal ball much better thanour-current model and achieving the desired aim would require a coordinated'political-psychologicalmilitary campaign Some carefully drawn and reliabre counteractions must be planned to reduce the possibility of a disastrous mistaRe by the Eact if they should use the initiative we've passed to them in such an acti n c ounteraction game • - -' 0'- ' y - • _ - The general-use tactical nuclear option-that is _ the unlimited theater nuclear option-is a difficult one in which to find a consensus ··Some might d fine it as a brief moment on the way to a full-scale strategic nUCleareWar• a way'that we destined by the first selective release Others might' argue that- general use of tactical weapons without political approval in each case cll -class' of cases would never be allowed and thus there is no II general-use toption• Athl rd'group might argue that widespread tactical use of weapons represEmts' 'a possible alternative to full-scale nuclear warfare and as such is a distinct controllable step on the ladder of escalation Finally one could argue persuasively 'that this option is no longer available to us with our existing tactical weapon systerPS' an that this escalatory option is one where ACE is at a disadvantage ' i ' d l ' ' JE -- IJ If7r7 I I t ' ' - r'·' ' J· ' 'f ' '- ' ' '- - y t i ' i ' 'fA i J i lf Q JJ' ' ' ' Ii ' lk ' 'CUj I ' _I 72 ' ' - I' ELf r Q · t ' '- ti' t ·· I t I I ' -l- •- i ' -Jf fi t · l i ' ' ii J 'e - ' i 'l '2 C 'i ' ' O ' i ' ' ·' - ' ' j r rI ti t t $t t t ¥ l 3 f ji f t d J ' t il _ ' ' ' 1 ' ' I ' ''' 'lJ i ¥ r nJhqs'· 'I- ' ' lJ t1 h ' v ' _ I _ _ _ 'I _ ' ' JJjVr fJ ' l Ti t i tDi f iH yc·'f _ ' _ ' I· ••• ' J • The use of nuclear air defense weapons to defend naval forces provides a good illustrative example To allow for imely reaction by a carrier task forc to a major air attack the commander migJ lt be authorized to resort to nuclear air defense means under specific and prescribed conditions if the survival of his force is at issue and in his judgment the prescribed'conditions are met Summing up these nuclear options I'd stress these characteristics of the nuclear policy environment in which we live a The multilateral politicaides 1 r e for involV ement in the nuclear decision-making pr ocess is very great and will remain so b Military and political considerations in the use or non-use of tactical nuclear weapons more often tend to contradict each other than to coincide c The' political impact of our-nuClear options depends on what the enemy thinks arid we must be careful that we're not substituting our attitudes' for his when we assess' our options ' « d Finally there is a large risk of deluding ourselves and or paralyzing our capability to act by overstructuring and excessively refining the nuclear decision process ' With this backg r ound let us now turn to the types of tactical weapons systems we feel are required to support SACEUR's mission - - -e First let's consider field army support systems There fs no question in our minds that the area most needing improvement in ACE is support of the land battle Over half of the weapons currently allocated to USCINCEUR are over a 'decade old and represent at best the technology of the mid-1950's They- are rapidly becoming antiquated and obsolescent These w'eapoiis 'incllide the H 0 n est J 0 h n Ni ke Her c u Ie s and 8-inch howitzer all of which are used by both US and non US forces We question how long our NATO Allies' will be willing to' support weapons systems which obviously do not represent the curr ent state of ' the art In fact we have already seen signs that they will not supp r t hem Last April ' the FRG re' ' duced by 25% the number of Honest fohn launchers intheir'force structure Among the reasons cited for this action was the soIescenceo fthe system Nike Her cuI e s falls 'into the same category ' it was1ntroduced'into the US inventory about 12 years ago yet our program in ACE is still incomplete ' for various reasons and 'may never be complete As the types and capabilities of Pact forces' increase the N ike He r cuI e s will become mO ' l l ndmore ineffective and yet there is no nuclear surface-to-air munition in Ia ei tages of development to replace it SAM-D is mentioned as a- replacement J ut e see no'action to make us believe it will be available in the next five years -' ' We 'camiot effectively counter today's threat let alone the future threat with yesterday's weapons F a I con the' only'nuc lear- c apable- air to' air-rnfs-s i llir''in k iS -pnis-ing' oufas -F- 4 'alrc'raff ' replace the F-I02 '- w#t cS - We need impr oved air defense systems b oth urfack'and i launched 't o better our defensive pasture see Figure 6 • We need t o m ove · out· indevel oping SAM-D or a c omparable system and at the me time devel op an' air-t o-air missile t o replace Falc on We als o need a replacemeIltforTe rrie and Tal os which I'll discuss later cZ · · ' '- -- Figure 6· The 8-inch h owitzer see Figure h is 8 n c urate esp onsive Ca nd necessary system but it presently has warhead limitati ons' The curr ent warh ad re ui 'Do C extensive pr p rati on ch qbvj o sl y_ e uces· its res-E onsiv s ' · r n n ' ' t1 11 ' • ' ' r 1 ' '1' i r ·' · ·I71 AT trf t'R V x i 'i fi'ill' · t · r J - f r' n a e a et ¥ 'W f lf f ttri£ useless in an emergency We als o need a chealrr ound whic admittedly is s omewhat of a parad ox It is h owever a fact of'life that fiiture qualitative impr ovements will have t o be achieved with ec on omy in rDihd ' onetheles's if we really mean t o impr ove our capabilities t o c ounter tlie threat henw ffi ust e willing t o pay the price ' ' ' ' ' 'I f i l i% i · ' We als o believe that impr ovement iii th 15 ' rom h owitze Jsee Figure 8 nuclear r ound is required The 155 is an extremely valuable system because of its m obility resp onsiveness and ability t o pr ovide accurate cl os e -innuclear supp ort It is the backb one of our divisi on fire supp ort 'It has _ h owev e r a yield limitati on ' at theJ r sen _ f4 £ _0 - 1 VJ S 9i l t t·c an a cr ' ' E e _ I' l¥ i '· t 't • • ' I l r · 1 · 1· t fJV t · Of 'Jr- ' J ' '''h'''·e 1 I ' 1 H • oi%'i f- '' ' 'k ' ' ' ' ·D · 'E'I 'I '''Pe 'f J 0 1 'q ' ' q 01' 1 ' '1 1 · 'V ' 'i' Y -i ' f' il '1iiiiI ' i ' i' ' ili' __ _____ ' L _ j 1 · Jj£1r jf t 'c T ' o t Z - ' l ' • t· ' ' ' ' • l - r 9 ' ' 0' I Jr - I j f j j · i- f S' l ' · Jh ' JV f f 4 t I'll 1 Y1 #Y' p th r -i ·· t a A l i 1·h J • f If• l'tr 1·t 1 1f 'f f f· r j J - - t · t fr if · f ' 1 _ ' 74 rl · $· Y ·41'f f 1· i i · · t ' f ' • J u' J f ' • ' - 't _ GEGRET In• •• _- • ' y - E - l ' 'T • ' _ N _ • Figure 7 j fi j 'l ' l '''rl Figure 8 75 I think it is apparent that the success of ACE's defensive strategy is dependent upon being able to delay and contain a Warsaw Pact attack as far to the east as possible until such time as ACE can reinforc its engaged forces In large measure this delay will be dependent upon the successful implementation of barrier plans Present barrier planning envisions the use of great- masses of materials For example the Seventh Army barrier plan alone requires 535 000 antitank mines over 2 million antipersonnel mines 1 3 million feet of detonating cord and many tons of miscellaneous other material including almost 60 000 km of barbed wire This material must be moved by train from depots west of the Rhine River to the vicinity of emergency defense positions which requires the use of up to 16 trains and will take about 90 hours Barrier planning also envisions the use of ADM's see Figure 9 but sufficient conventional barriers must be maintained to accomplish the mission should ADM use not be approved The logistics of this requirement are staggering Present ADM planning is limited by the character of available ADM's Today's ADM's possess no rapid burial means thus surface bursts must be employed since insufficient time would be available to prepare holes for ADM's True optional employment is lost-or could be Surface use of ADM's is undesirable as it results in unwanted collateral effects provides less than optimum obstacles and necessitates the use of a higher yield- than would be required if burial were possible We need some rapid means of buryingADM s and along with that _ ADM's designed to withstand optimum burial ' - • Figure 9 We need a better ADM one which accurately reflects the current state of the art one which eliminates the present undesirable- features It should have selectable yields with the higher yields incorporating suppressed radiation It must be lightweight and man-transportable It must be capable of deep buria l for extended periods of time Further it must possess'-a remote wi r eless command and control capability responsive to direction-by surface or-airborne commands - 76 - - -- • • at extended distances This same command and control capability must extend to the permissive action link device Finally the ADM should contain antitampering devices and a nonnuclear self-destruct capability While a barrier planned around the use of ADM's would measurably lessen the cost of an effective barrier in terms of material manpower and time we must plan for conventional barriers because of the uncertainties associated with the present ADM's However we believe that many of these uncertainties both military and political could be overcome by the development of advanced munitions possessing the features previously indicated This covers the ground systems needed in direct support of the field army Lan c e the replacement for H 0 n est J 0 h nand S erg e ant is in development and if fielded in sufficient quantity should provide a major improvement in our capabilities In a tactical nuclear war in Europe SACEUR and his major subordinate commanders will depend heavily upon tactical air for extended attack and interdiction-both to counter the longer-range nuclear threat facing them and to isolate the battlefield through rear-area disruption and interdiction Armed or st r'ike reconnaissance will be required to locate and destroy mobile or imprecisely located nuclear targets and to strike at direct supporting targets beyond the range or capability of the ground command_ers' organiG delivery systems We presently have a fairly wide range of air-delivered weapons and yields available to accomplish the preplanned interdiction and scheduled strike programs but we lack highly-accurate all-weather air-delivered weapons an essential requirement for today and the future for closer support for specific interdiction targets and for armed strike reconnaissance Because of delivery CEP's associated with today's systems it is necessary to program multiple or repetitive strikes and higher yields in order to assure the desired degree of damage We need to develop highly accurate all-weather systems which will per mit the successful nuclear attack of targets utilizing fewer weapons and lower yields Limitation of damage or damage control must be an important aspect of nuclear planning since much of the area of tactical employment is NATO territory To accomplish these ends several types o'f weapons are required We need an earth penetrator see Figure 10 designed for both internal and external carriage for delivery at subsonic or supersonic speeds Such a system should achieve a combat CEP of 100 feet or less have a dial-a-yield capability and be capable of penetration to optimum depth for cratering based on yield Such a weapon would be very effective against land or underground point targets requiring severe earth shock or cratering such as bridges missile silos and runways It would also be very effectiye employed against targets near populous areas where collateral effects must be minimized We are also interested in penetrator offshoots such as Bayonet see Figure 11 which offer highly accurate CEP's With such a system we could attack point targets currently suitable only for ADM's In fact an all-weather Bayonet could be employed to assist in denial operations should an ADM barrier for some reason not be completed SiSBE R6 77 - ·· '·-- t'L Figure 10 ' 4 i --V I· ·- t t J lll' ' Figure -' 78 SEeR ' tift ' - • In order to reduce attrition rates of tactical aircraft employed against heavily defended targets there is a real need for all-weather stand-off weapons see Figure 12 sufficiently reli ble to permit the probability of launch with an escape capability Such a system should have a range of greater than 40 nmafter release should provide a dial-a-yield capability and achieve a combat CEP of 100 feet or less Eveh a modest reduction in attrition rates would provide large dividends in the form of additional sorties Further it would reduce critical time over target conflicts in the nuclear strike plan and reduce pilot and aircraft exposure to nuclear fallout Figure 12 On the naval side we need an advanced surface missile system see Figure 13 to update the capabilities of the fleet and replace the Terrier Talos This improved surface-to-air surface missile system should have selectable yields up to 10 kt It would be launched by surface units destroyer or larger against naval surface combatants aircraft and missiles There is one final long-standing ACE requirement that 1 wish to rD Emtion A requirement for a European-based NATO missile system to counter the consequential and modernizing Soviet IR MRBM threat to the' theater These factors have caused the emergence of a probable adverse asymmetry in our overall NATO strategic nuclear posture vis-a -vis the Pact which poses a grave threat to NATO Europe i e a growing capability for the Soviets to exploit their strategic nuclear parity-or even superiority-by If decoupling their m MRBM forces from their intercontinental nuclear forces for use as a· separate' and viable nuclear'threat to ACE We in NATo Europe have no comparable weapon system physically located in Europe with which to counter this threat Only our external 79 Polaris and Minuteman missiles and a very fe -- b i t 'V-bombers and SAC's B-52's can attack these Soviet IR MRBM's and their coverage 'of this threat to Western Europe is spotty incomplete 'and in some instance untimely of 'Europe based The Soviets obviously recognize the inability nuclear systems to attack their IR MRBM1s If the Soviets come't ·b e tiev e that they have effectively matched the US at the ICBM SLBM lever 'they may think that they can use their IR MRBM capability to threaten or' stri e We tern Europe without a genuine risk of response by US external forces Iii the lace lo f such a threat and with no comparable or credible deterrent capabi1itY'on ourside WestePl Europeans are clearly exposed to and might succumb to IR M RBMbl c Khi il W e continue to think it wise to develop and position in ACE a comparabre' I 'improved weapon system capable of countering'this Soviet MR IRBM'threat to Western Europe This system should be nominally under the operationalcommand-of SACEUR though of course subject to the President's release authority · Wed hink this 'is needed to improve the credibility of our European commitment ' l his 'system must convince' the Soviet planners and equally'important our' EUropean-Killes that Russia will not be a sanctuary in a nuclear attack on Western ' rope eyen iLexternal US forces are for any reason not invoked in a countf irattac K E c »- ' l ' ' f' ' ' f· i' ' We see the characteristics of this system g Emerally as 'follows it would be carried by a highly mobile system fully transportabie 'witt1 mfssile ranges up to 2000 miles The weapons yield would range from ln to' WOkt' using' multiple warheads It would be launched from a transporter er cto veliiCle containing its·own command post directly responsive to directives from the major'commarider and with an integrated arming system directly respOIlsiye o rElmote enabllngauthority · · 5· 0 _ 80 ' ' o• -•• e In summary gentlemen I have outlined'the threat as rsee it our capability to respond to this threat and our weapons requirements to increase the fle xibility of our response Our nuclear commitment to NATOis clear and unequivocal and has not changed since first enunciated in Deceniber'1957 As you may recall at that time a communique of NATO heads of state established stocks of D uclear weapons in Europe which would be readily available for the defense of the Alliance r I ' 2 7 z r S i · 0 -1Wi ' 1 i fW1 SJ ' t l DeJ E f 'llj t ' ·i 'lli I ''i 'I t'1'' ·A I • -i' t t ' i ' ' ' « ' ' I '''''' 'ls' · I y 't f i t ii j' t '6 iln L H rii ' l t' '·- r · t 1'j $lil f t£Z ' fi d' ·l1 t1 ' ' i lr 1 ' ' ''''i ' h ' ' I' '•• - _ _ - - - I _ - 1 • ' J ' - I'J ' ' 1 _ - •• t Jj _ j·J · u · J _ J i J t ' - ' ' L J - • I' - ' ' While our commitment to NATO has not changed weapons technology has changed-the Soviet nuclear posture has changed dramatically-and we must make better use of our US technical capabilities to provide us with increased flexibility greater options improved'weapons capability and'better response potential This is not the whole of our job of course for we need better concepts strategies and control systems-but the starting point r want to emphasize to this audience is the need for better newer weapons ' ' r am convinced that tactical nuclear optioils are oOmeairlngful only so long as the United States is superior at each succeeding stage of possible escalation that is no matter how the escalation goes the US and N A TO come out better than the Soviets and the Pact Our capabilities relative to the Pact's ' have declined so steadily that any superiority beyond the battlefield is'extreme y doubt ul I I firmly believe that the ACE nuclear 'program has played-and will continue to play-a major if not the dominant role in tJ ie maintenance of' relative peace in Europe Although it has involved a major exPenditure' f 'US resources for the past 20 years it has been a significant highly visible part of a credible US nuclear deterrent Also in my view at least this tacticaI nuclear ·program in US ACE remains the single most unifying element in NATO Butour'ability to underwrite the security of NA TO Europe or our own security for- that matter ' with our external nuclear forc s and our aging tactical deliveq capabilities 'is' r apidly diminishing if not already inadequate through obsolescence and required capability ' lack o f _ If we are to ensure that the Alliance remaihs 'Viable and·th ·US nt clear deterrent remains credible we must reverse oui-apathy towardmiclear impr9vements we must launch a determined program ih 'wea 1ons developmeD ts and weapons improvement to meet our present and futurereq iirements ' 'We caruiet rest' on the laurels of 20 years of relative calm in NA TO Europe ' and we 'c mriotcontinue to ' face today's or tomorrow's tasks and threats with y ste rdayi c ipabilities • -'-- - - - ' - •• - ' -T ' - ' - -' • - -- ' - '- ' - - -- ' - - Question and Answer Period McDONALD LRL I was curious about your mobile missile system for Europe Of course that has come up off and on over the last 10 or 15 years and usually it gets short-circuited How do you feel the Europeans would respond to the installation of such a system BURCHINAL There are a couple of comments we might make One the French are putting in a ballistic missile system not mobile but in hard silos Second we should bring the Europeans face to face with the hard relationship that exists today between strategic forces recalling Mr MacNamara's statement in San Francisco two years ago that strategic nuclear forces can be depended upon to deter only their own employment and they don't go much beyond that--and that their employment is in fact an incredible action and you can't build a credible strategy on an incredible action You point out too the real possibility of a decoupling of the IR MRBM which we always said we would underwrite with external forces and it doesn't take a mathematician to tell you that we aren't doing that today I think you would receive a reasonable degree of acceptance In the past when we were told it was politically not acceptable to NATO Europe we were told this in the context of our own people going to them and saying You wouldn't want a horrible weapon system like that deployed on your land would you And they'd say No no of course we wouldn't I think with a positive approach this could be an acceptable system Particularly attractive L think would be that part of the proposal which puts it under SACEUR's operational command as a European system and takes the Soviet out of the sanCtuary category as far as the European war is concerned I think that is essential McDONA LD I was curious to know if the implementation of that plan might almost demand that the European nations desire or require- an antiballistic missile system since they are now more attractive targets than before BURCHINAL Not necessarily The worrisome things in the equations are their asymmetries If you have an asymmetry in let's say our external forces SAC and Polaris and the Soviets' ICBM's and subs and you_have a total asymmetry at the IR MRBM level and you have a substantial superiority in favor of the Soviets at the tactical ballistic missile level and at the longer range rocket level and then a total superiority of US-NATO in the battlefield tube delivered type weapons it's these asymmetries that create instabilities and make the course of a possible conflict difficult to determine and reduces the decision makers to indecisiveness What I am looking for is a missile system that will counter and stand-down the Soviet option to decouple and use his IR MRBM I want to_ work under that level of violence in terms of military forces that NA TO Europe builds to--inalntam its deterrent and stability against the Pact forces and we can do it below that level COTTER SLA Could you tell me what the attitude of the West Germans might be to the ADM and in particular to preemplaced ADM's T ta · 82 __ f ri • BURCHINAL Yes I think we may be able to get a better answer to that in another presentation The Germans are not enthusiastic about the present ADM it is so constrained and limited that I don't blame them I think they would 'be much more likely to accept an effective ADM barrier plan let's say with the kind of ADM that I talked about and most of which I think is moving into the design phase now It doesn't necessaJ 'ily require preemplacement it might require some preparation of emplacement sites or holes but not even that necessarily because we can dig holes pretty fast these days The new ADM could be reserved for forward employment or deployment during a period of some tension or some warning At the present time as you may know we can't even move the ADM's out of the rear areas without specific guidance and approval from back home So they are almost in an unusable category at the present time I know at the German military level we would get substantial acceptance of this ADM level employment and concept It would have to follow through on the FRG side that they also develop evacuation plans to move the civilian population out of the barrier zones though they may be heading for the rear pretty fast anyhow Lo rRY RAe Is it a military or a political consideration that requires a mobile rather than a hard fixed ballistic missile or a mix of both to attack the Soviet missiles BURCHINAL Both ETHRIDGE Aberdeen You have described the large imbalance of forces Because of the time required to develop weapon systems this imbalance may become even worse Do you feel that this situation provides a very strong temptation for the Soviets to consider invasion now or within the next few years BURCHINAL No not now nor for the next one or two years I think that before we see the Soviets venturing into the center they will be more active on the flanks I think they are pretty afraid of the center today the balance there is a very delicate one Depending on how that adventurism goes we may well see an increased appetite to begin to probe a bit in the central part of Europe I might add that I am not very encouraged about our ability to do much about that at the moment either Their capability for operations far from their own homeland is growing their presence in the Mediterranean today is really impressive I see that as a forerunner to their branching out creating peripheral issues not directly confronting NATO not directly confronting the US but working through a proxy Then depending on how that goes they perhaps will develop a greater appetite So I think we have time GIRARD RAC From the two graphs you showed us of ICBM and SLBM trends I draw the conclusion that in effect the Soviets did not accept the offer of parity If this is true then I at least understand a little better the current craze for some kind of arms limitation agreement negotiated essentially this calendar year or we will be faced with very unpleasant alternatives for programming Do you agree with this sir BlTRCHINAL Totally 83 This Page -rntentionally Left Blank 84 '- Iaj General Richard A Yudkin USA F DCS P O THE CHANGING CONTEXT The theme for my sermon here today is that there is always a changing context with which we must contend and for each generation of contenders the past looks attractively simple the present unpleasantly difficult and the future dangerous or impossible or even impossibly dangerous Despite any inborn hostility man's evolution reflects adapting to contextual change National evolution is necessarily similarly conditioned My purpose today is to identify a context within which the use of tactical nuclear weapons-or the kinds of operations usually associated with such weaponsmight become more obviously relevant to the environment within which we find ourselves and therefore more demonstrably rational to decision makers at national level To do this I must-as I view the problem-start by s tying that the power relationships around which we constructed our concepts of strategic and tactical nuclear operations are drastically changed from what they used to be Thus the established understandings of these operations demand as a minimum review and more likely-if we decide the terms continue to be useful-significant adjustment vvl1ile I do not mean to call into question the framework which structures our symposium I am suggesting that we need to examine very carefully what we mean by tacticalfJ nuclear weapons and the continuing relevance of what we have understood when we used this description We might recall that strategic bombers and tacticalfJ fighters have effectively performed seemingly reversed roles in South East Asia Perhaps it is not or should not be restraints on hardware • target or geography which are given importance as criteria perhaps constraint on objective is more properly the determinant The very nature of nuclear weapons necessarily gives their employment a strategic significance this employment may concurrently have tactical value 85 - Hence while I will talk most about nuclear weapons that fit within the category we have called tactical I suggest that in talking about them I must necessarily give primary attention to a role and impact that are essentially strategic Such latitude of discussion seems essential since such weapons may find important applicability beyond the battlefield itself-in what I would term selective nuclear operations 11 By selective nuclear operations I am referring at this stage very generally to operations of strategic value conducted at levels below all-out effort In this sense selective can refer to targeting mode of delivery purpose or desired effects-in short taking full advantage of every option technology affords us The important distinction here is that such operations are specifically on­ ceived of developed and carried out so as to achieve strategic but limited objectives The concept grows from an attempt to recognize that simple solutions like total defeat and unconditional surrender may not be rational goals if the opponent has a true assured destruction capability That recognition makes it a matter of utmost concern to find ways of fighting which exhibit a better trade-off between the degree of influence upon the enemy and the degree of risk involved in exerting that influence I must emphasize that the concept of selective nuclear operations is not intended as a replacement for other nuclear options but rather as a complement to them Considering our nuclear capabilities in terms of strategy options-or broad mission and employment categories-it has been the practice in recent years to identify three main options These are Assured Destruction Damage Limitation and Theater Operations I regard I1selective nuclear operations as a fourth major strategic option which sits well alongside these other three employment groupings It will be apparent from my subsequent remarks that I do not regard these groupings as mutually exclusive Rather they are overlapping and ought to be mutually sup- portive certainly the last two of the four options must include an important portion of what we have called tactical With these basic characteristics of selective nuclear operations in mind we can examine the case for the relevance of this strategy option to the realities of the present international environment In order to delineate the need for a ·distinct alternative which has developed in response to the political and military realities of the postwar world I would like to trace the development of our strategic policy through the postwar years A major factor in the determination of postwar strategic postures was the growing desire to limit the Communist threat geographically Known popularly as the IIpolicy of containment this concept fit nobly into the traditional American mold for defensive nonaggressive strategy Armed with a nuclear monopoly that was to be surprisingly short-lived American planners revolutionized strategy by finding an effective defensive role for a weapon which seemingly was made expressly for the offensive strategist If you will permit such a simplification nuclear deterrence was thus born of status quo goals and moral preferences The ultimate weaponl1 has served well in this essentially defensive role yet it has paradoxically produced needs for complementary strategies of a quite different nature The conflict in Korea '1as but one indication that the extreme character of massive retaliation might prove incompatible with the often-undefined line of containment Although the line remains relatively well defined in Europe its nature and location have proven less obvious in the Middle East Southern Asia and the Caribbean The threat of Communist aspirations has taken on the more subtle 36 ex-pressions of ideological and political expansion The contemporary deterioration of the monolithic nature once a characteristic of'the Communist Bloc is bound to produce future changes in our own policies Political independence and economic development have joined forces to produce nationalistic complexities within a political world once simply and accurately described as bipolar Strategic advantages onc e enjoyed by the US have been modified if not overcome by Soviet advances while years of effort dedicated to achieving some system of nuclear arms control continue to be frustrated by understandable preoccupations based on national security interests These realities are complicating and will continue to complicate the effort to construct meaningful military policies and capabilities while they make it more urgent but more difficult to find ways to bring the great dangers of the nuclear era under some form of workable control The 1960's saw one obvious effort aimed at overcoming the strategic shortcomings of overdependence on massive retaliation The doctrine of flexible response ll has attempted to provide a nonnuclear answer to major aggression In practice however it has yielded some other perhaps unforeseen results Flexible response ll has come to mean almost excluSively conventional response Merely by having the obvious intent and capabilities to meet allless-than-ultimate threats in a conventional manner we have isolated our nuclear capability at the top of the conflict spectrum and it has lost much of its applicability to anything less than total effort Simply categorizing some of it as IItactical does not seem meaningful In other words flexibility has been equated or limited to conventional action to an extent that ultimately inhibits flexibility This seemingly counterproductive outcome has been accompanied-even accelerated-by developments in the military force relationships between the US and the Soviet Union here the most salient fact is the changed strategic nuclear balance Both the US and the USSR now possess secure second strike or Assured Destruction capabilities The Soviet leaders are fully aware of this condition which they have sought so hard to achieve They are likely to have drawn a fundamental inference from the changed strategic relationship that the United States might thus be deterred from escalating to high intensity nuclear war in response to a Soviet nonnuclear attack or limited nuclear attack We ought also to ask how the Soviets might view the impact of the changed strategic balance on our allies especially in the critical European theater The member nations of NA TO-ourselves included-have been unwilling to maintain sufficient nonnuclear forces to insure the defeat of an all-out conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact Hence the threat of deliberate nuclear escalation plays a key role in NATO strategy We have been at some pains over the years to make sure that the Russians were aware that should a conventional defense prove inadequate NA TO could reasonably choose to turn to nuclear weapons • But what made a NATO nuclear response reasonable was that it was backed by the strategic nuclear forces of the United States In the face of that US deterrent • the Sovi et Union was unlikely to respond to a NATO nuclear initiative in a way that would result in the nuclear devastation of Western Europe A large scale Soviet nuclear attack on Europe · according to US declaratory policy could bring full US nuclear retaliation directly against the Soviet homeland But in today's context a full retaliatory assault would pose a high risk of the consequent destruction of the A7 United States In other words in a decision that never really could be made in advance in a decision seriously conditioned by the moment the US may think twice about making a full SlOP response to even a serious Soviet move in Europe The Europeans sense this so do the Russians This leaves the NATO nuclear option as it is structured today with a less certain foundation and hence with inevitably reduced credibility in Soviet eyes The Soviet assessment of the situation in sum could be that not only is there reduced probability of massive US retaliation to less-than-all-out aggression but that there is also a lessened likelihood of a deliberate nuclear scalation on the part of NATO The Soviet conclusion then might be that while there remain obvious and extremely great risks to any military aggression against NATO or other areas those risks are substantially less than they have been in the past I want to be very clear that I am not suggesting that the changed strategic relationship and the presumably changed Soviet assessment of risks mean that Soviet leaders are now more likely to initiate aggression or have a greater incentive to do so We are all aware that there are a number of influences which affect Soviet behavior and taken all together it would appear that the USSR has little to gain and a great deal to lose from rocking the boat to this extreme However deterrence is a structure that should be designed to hold up not only on a fair summer day but in rough weather as well No one can forecast with certainty what the future may hold in the way of incentives for Soviet action or in the way of- Russian perceptions of threats against which the USSR might wish to intervene We have recently been reminded of that basic uncertainty by the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia the Brezhnev doctrine the assertion of a right to intervene in West Germany If we shift our attention to other areas-to the Far East for example-we can find that there too the changed strategic balance implies important shifts in the deterrence equation It seems clear that over the next few years some modification of our forward defense strategy in the Asian Pacific area is inevitable With the likely adjustment of forward deployed US combat elements and some shifting of defense responsibility in forward areas to national or regional securityforces the deterrent and backup role of US forces will take on new significance _ Although our strategic forces can continue to deter direct attacks on the US in Asia as in Europe the nature of this deterrent becomes uncertain as Soviet and Chinese Communist nuclear forces improve and increase It is probably apparent to the USSR to Communist China to Japan Australia other allies and to neutral states as well that we-' would enter into an all- out nuclear war only as a last resort when the most vital American interests were threatened Therefore against the backdrop of our more massive strategic response options forces designed for application to theater problems of deterrence or war fighting must have a range of nonnuelear and nuclear capabilities to include a capacity for selective nuclear operations Moreover in the future US national authority may wish to have the option to decouple theater threats from intercontinental threats-and this may- apply of course to Europe as well as other theaters This would seem to require forces capable of significant nuclear response but whose use clearly signals the intent to hold objectives limited Given the growing independence of regions such as Western Europe and of a state like Japan it is conceivable that our allies themselves may desire some form of decoupling although their reasons and ours may be anything but identical 88 SEeR These evolving problems both political and military illustrate to some extent the pressures for change the need to rethink our strategic alternatives For while ssured Destruction remains the cornerstone of national military strategy it is not nor can it be the entire structure Because our nuclear retaliatory capability in the past has deterred a far broader range of opponent actions than we can now be sure it vill there is a tendency to persist in attributing to Assured Destruction a far wider deterrent role than it can in fact perform If we accept that mutual Assured Destruction abilities tend to counterbalance one another in the overall deterrence equation we must then recognize other possibilities options and forces which must be dealt with In an environment approaching mutual deterrence at the ultimate level there may be more risk-taking and greater instability at a number of lower levels But it is precisely the military component of deterrence to these less-thanall-out threats and the means to deal with them which has not been adequately developed To retain control in such an environment requires concepts-and forcesthat go beyond earlier views of deterrence It will require a superiority in exploitable politically relevant usable military power It will require military force that can be credibly threatened because it can be credibly committed to action In a sense it requires capabilities such that the National Authority can judge that the risks of the nuclear action would be less than those of the various military and nonmilitary alternatives My remarks thus far have been focused upon an examination of the needs to which our nuclear strategy must respond and upon the role within that larger framework of a proposed new nuclear opHvn I should now go one step further and ask the questions IIHow must such an option be constructed and in what ways should the strategy be adjusted if we are to satisfy those needs Let me outline the criteria which I think must be met To begin with we must recognize that selective nuclear operations refer to methods of nuclear employment designed to influence the enemy to terminate the conflict on favorable terms before the conflict reaches the most destructive levels Such operations should offer some prospect that they will decrease rather than increase the risk that the conflict will expand to high intensity nuclear war They must offer the National Authority opportunity for tight control over the conflict and especially limit the possibilities for uncontrolled escalation A second requirement of the nuclear options which we devise is that they be able to achieve their intended effect against an opponent who will retain significant residual military power In one soense it is just this condition which makes selective nuclear operations a feasible option-the fact that the opponent possesses relatively invulnerable second-strike forces eliminates the case for preemption by him For such options to appear reasonable to the National Command Authority they must promise more than a competition in resolve by way of a war of nuclear attrition or than a simple matching of attacks without strategic purpose The effectiveness of selective nuclear operations as an element of US deterrence depends ultimately on Soviet belief in our capability to maintain a relative advantage in an escalatory war of attrition Should any exchange of limited nuclear attacks occur the effectiveness of US forces in achieving their missions and the failure of Soviet forces to do so would be the most convincing deterrent to any further suqh attacks by the USSR Foreknowledge on the part of Soviet leaders of the qualitative superiority of US forces in selective nuclear operations would be likely to deter the USSR from initiating a limited attack competition FlQ ' -' ' '- '- - - - - ' - -- ' - ' ' ' Finally these operations must imply or embody a reasonable and believable strategy or theory of victory which explains what the opponent can be expected to do and why and also provides verifiable checkpoints for confirming whether the strategy is working as expected These criteria suggest that at essential characteristic of selective nuclear options is that they couple persuasive military actions to political objectives They would be paced as much by diplomatic and political events as by military considerations-their effectiveness being related to roles of allies international and domestic opinion and national objectives These operations would requir the coordination of military plans and action with political and diplomatic effort to achj eve a set of objectives far broader than strictly military ones These coordinated activities seek to reduce the opponent's perceived national interest in the crisis versus the risks and possible losses at the same time they increase his awareness of the depth of US interest and commitment to employ effective force they seek to gain domestic and international support for US action and develop such pressures against the opponent they seek to insure for the United States and deny to the opponent critical military support from other nations they emphasize to the opponent that he is vulnerable to our operations arid that continuing hostilities will be increasingly to his disadvantage and they communicate to the opponent what we desire him to do while signalling both the intent to limit actions and the readiness to terminate on reasonable terms ' To achieve these objectives implies on the military side the discriminate and controlled application of force to communicate demands and intentions clearly and to achieve precisely specified effects-effects reflecting and supporting the objectives of the National Authority This means the development of a range of forces and weapons usable for controlled selective and discriminating nuclear attacks to demonstrate both resolve and the ability to coerce without pressuring the adversary to launch massive attacks Compared especially with forces for the Assured Destruction mission the functional orientation of forces for selective nuclear operations would require significant design differences Mobility penetration effectiveness delivery precision yield and limitation on collateral damage are examples of areas in which sharp differences would be discerned These considerations suggest that the success of such operations in terms of achievement of their essentially political objectives would be in large part dependent on the availability of what we might call focused-effect nuclear weapons They require delivery systems providing extreme precision and reliability in target identification as well as delivery accuracy Closely associated is the need for nearcertain target kill probabilities with minimal required sorties Some of the aspects of developing a selective nuclear option have been examined in a study effort bearing the name NU-OPTS and conducted within Air Force headquarters with extensive assistance from our major field commands and the RAND Corporation The first part of the study completed early in 1968 was concerned with the impact of limited nuclear operations on the residual capacity for performing the Assured Destruction mission In the second phase of the study just recently completed the objective was to determine whether it was indeed feasible within certain rather stringent limits on collateral damage and political and military sensitivity of targets attacked to achieve precisely specified objectives with limited numbers of attackers The study systematically examined an arbitrary selection 90 of representative targets attacked with a range of up to 75 weapons with the focus on technical or purely military feasibility of target destruction The finding was that such operations are feasible in other words that we could attack point X in the Soviet Union for instance without causing collateral damage or involving US losses beyond the bounds set for the problem Another part of the most recent NU-OPTS study examined the political problems and requirements and I will comment on those a bit later So far we have only made a start on the problem but we have established to -our satisfaction two crucial points which make it possible to go on-that with forces now on hand or planned for the next three years selective nuclear operations would be operationally feasible and that within levels foreseen they could be conducted without jeopardizing the US Assured Destruction capability We need a greater effort to determine what the most suitable sets of targets would be for such operations and if necessary to design weapons tailored to such targets IN e may also conclude that the delivery systems and the nature of the operations and the weapons would have to be uniquely and rather obviously discriminable by the enemy from those used for Assured Destruction or all-out counterforce attacks Guidance systems command and control highly accurate and reliable intelligenc e flexible and timely planning and decision-making and penetration against undamaged defenses are some of the other areas which obviously present great problems Finally I want to underscore this point The selective nuclear operations I have discussed would not be intended as a substitute for existing battlefield nuclear capability Instead selective nuclear operations provide a necessary back-up to lower level escalatory options and to their effectiveness as deterrents They could provide a possible alternative to battlefield engagement My remarks so far today have been directed toward considerations which might make some types of nuclear employment relevant in the military context of 'a particular crisis But we all recognize that the ultimate test of the relevancy of a nuclear option lies in its acceptability to the President Such acceptability in turn depends upon more than the criterion of military relevance The President must be sensitive and responsive as well to political moral economic and other considerations and pressures which may be associated with any nuclear employment decision It seems clear that among such pressures the impact of attitudes and opinion-and questions of domestic and foreign support-will have an important influence on Presidential decision-making It seems equally evident that the relationship between opinion and political decision-making is extremely complex and its precise nature is unpredictable and is likely to vary according to the nature of the crisis situation But if military men have a responsibility to present the President relevant and therefore reasonable alternatives it seems necessary to have some feeling for the nature of the problem he confronts Consider for exampl both the complexity and importance of problems involving the attitudes of allies toward our use of nuclear weapons in different contingencies Let me raise just a few questions that point to some of the most obvious issues in this regard In the context of combined defense as in NA TO for example is consensual agreement among allies regarding the necessity of nuclear 91 employment an absolute requirement for our considering such employment What would be the political effects of employment without consensual or even unanimous agreement Would such effects be more harmful than the threat we are seeking to neutralize What are the effects upon allies of unilateral employment Do we care about such effects and in this context do we really care about allies These are the kind of provocative issues which must be faced up to in considering nuclear alternatives The President as an elected officer is likely to be especially attuned to US domestic opinion Particularly if success in a prospective conflict will call for great sacrifice or long endurance by the nation the President is likely tOo give very careful attention to public attitudes to avoid actions which conflict strongly with public expectations and to attempt in all his moves- including military ones-to build public support How might we view the impact of US public opinion in a situation involving nuclear issues The impact of opinion is likely to be greatest in a slowly building crisis and probably of least immediate influence when a conflict arises abruptly and is swiftly terminated In this respect we must recognize the crucial role of adequate defenses in any limited nuclear war or in any nuclear crisis The presence or absence of such defenses could well be the key variable both in mobilizing public support and in sustaining the resolve of the decision-maker What attitudes characterize US public opinion toward nuclear issues The first thing to be noted is that public opinion perceives-in fact public opinion has been conditioned to perceive-a nuclear act as a qualitative change in the level of hostilities a change involving the highest degree of international political significance A closely related attitude is that any nuclear use is somehow automatically linked to an all-out thermonuclear holocaust The second attitude is • in great part the result of a national security policy of near-exclusive emphasis on Assured Destruction This declared strategy has suggested to many a high probability that any nuclear use would produce consequences compared with which almost any condition would be preferable Let me say that I find it difficult to make a serious or convinCing argument against that view within the contextual limits of that strategy As I mentioned earlier today what I feel is required as an alternative is a strategy-and supporting capabilities-which offers something more positive and which at least offers a plausible possibility of excluding holocaust or anything close to it as a risk attendant on effective action Such improvements are essential if the credibility and hence the effectiveness of deterrence is to be sustained To recapitulate briefly then US nuclear strategy since WW II has attempted to structure a defensive and retaliatory-deterrent posture which conforms very closely to the public conception of the immediate leap from first use to holocaust And I think it is clear that this strategy has proven successful up to now In Europe for example it was presumably the awareness that local aggression carried with it the risk of initiating a chain of reactions leading eventually to wholly unacceptable damage that at least in part deterred the Soviet Union from launching such aggression I believe it is still obviously to the advantage of the United Stafes to preserve the notion that there is no assured discontinuity between least· and greatest nuclear employment 02 __ o _ ' -_ -' • _ ' h ' _ '- - However in an environment of mutual Assured Destruction the risk or threat of holocaust is no longer enough by itself for deterrence Other more relevant and more credible threats are required for deterrence and they must be supported by usable and relevant capabilities Consequently while the Assured Destruction option must be maintained at all costs it cannot be viewed as a panacea deterring and usable in all lesser intensity situations Should circumstances propel the US and USSR into a low intensity nuclear war or should US national interests be threatened to the extent that nuclear force is required to renormalize the situation National Command Authorities may prefer to exercise restraint in the use of weapons limit target categories of attack and discourage further escalation to higher value targets Such controlled and deliberate operations can provide an additional option short of fullscale nuclear attack and can make more politically credible our international commitments which are not directly related to our national survival A question which relates in part to the subject of opinion has to do with the stability of deterrence once any nuclear weapons use had occurred It has been suggested that pressures for or against the use of the Assured Destruction forces will intensify greatly once a nuclear conflict has begun It is implied that however stable the structural relationships between the opposing strategic forces this stability may somehow be overwhelmed by emotional reactions of leaders or by the demands of public opinion I think this is unlikely to be the case although obviously no one can offer answers on this matter with any feeling of certainty The pressures against the launching of the Assured Destruction force will not change following the use of a nuclear weapon because that opposition pressure is already at its ceiling already fully generated On the other hand I would agree that pressures in favor of executing the Assured Destruction capability would become more vocal and more strongly heard after the outbreak of a nuclear conflict Those pressures for use however will not reach the same magnitude as the pressures against-which include not only emotions but hard calculations of self-interest And I believe this resistance to the launching of Assured Destruction will hold up on both sides in the USSR as well as the US Thus at the highest levels we can anticipate that a x-elative stability of deterrence can be maintained a stability which can be of an enduring nature It is a stability which does two things It makes a concept for selective nuclear operations feasible and at the same time it requires such an option if we are to deal effectively with likely threats Within Air Force headquarters the NU-OPTS study effort has examined some aspects of the problem While its conclusions are both partial and tentative one conclusion strikes home with great force Limited nuclear war is a possibility inherent in the logic of the nuclear environment Our strategic posture at present appears to be deficient with regard to options appropriate to such warfare At the same time there appears to be no convincing analytical argument which demonstrates on political-strategic grounds that not having such options sustained by requisite preplanning is better than having them I would like to conclude my comments with a brief summary in an attempt to refocus and correlate some of the points which we have covered 93 At the outset I noted that our current strategic nuclear posture has been the result of an evolutionary process in which perceived threats public opinion and defense policy in general have all played central parts The political and power realities of the earlier postwar years gave such posture real meaning applicability and effectiveness as evidenced by over twenty years of successful deterrence However recent changes in the world situation in the superpower strategic balance and in our own priorities have combined to weaken the military component of our deterrent posture The tremendous power we can generate is compromised by its reduced credibility at lower-than ultimate levels of conflict The opportunities that such inflexibility might offer Soviet planners are alarming It seems clear that if the changing international context has narrowed the relevance of Assured Destruction to the point at which other- kinds of warfighting take on increased significance then it becomes our duty to develop the operations and hardware to cope with such changes My comments today have been directed towards showing that precisely such a challenge exists today The wide range of conflict possibilities that presently exists between the levels of battlefield nuclear exchange and full SlOP warfare suggests two things to me first • a requirement for strategy options designed to deal with such possibilities and second a requirement for the forces and types of weapons to make such options a reality This second point seems worth reemphasis in ligpt of the orientation of this· symposium Work in the development of tactical nuclear weapons is likely to bear the greatest future significance through its contribution to the range of alternatives within the conflict limits I have just described-that is in terms of its contribution to a strategy option of selective nuclear operations I would like to close by seeking the support of a somewhat familiar authority the British strategist Liddell-Hart Analyzing the fa1l of France in 1940 he concluded that the defeat of France started from a failure or-military doctrine to keep pace with changing conditions It was due above all to obsolete habits of thought and the perpetuation of the slow-motion methods o fWW L II The message strikes home for me with great impact In our era of unprecedented risk the modern equivalent of the much precedented error of being one war·behind becomes an unacceptable alternative 94 Question and Answer Period vVALSKE DOD I am under the impression that the President does have some options of the type that you were describing I wouldn't say they are up to what they might be but if it were appropriate to put 75 weapons in some theater that could be reached by an aircraft carrier that option would be there for example The Air Force can do other things I wondered what specifically in the way of hardware or delivery systems you had in mind that need to be added in order to have the capability or the option that you envision YUDKIN In the two phases of the NU-OPTS study we concluded that the capability did' exist today to accomplish certain ranges of activity with weapons now available But it also became apparent to ul that there were areas of qualitative improvements and I stress qualitative improvement in particular I am not prepared today beyond the general descriptions that I offered to specify the new recommendations we are going to submit for forces or weapons Those are still under study As a matter of fact we briefed the Secretary of the Air Force on part of this study as recently as last week #e are not yet in a position to forward recommendations with specific proposals for change in force posture specific proposals for design and change in characteristics of weapons I might add that part of our proposal in the briefing of the Secretary the other day was to launch NU -OPTS 3 which is a further development of NU-OPTS 1 and 2 this represents an effort to achieve even greater definition in areas leading to the kind of action that you are understandably interested in We do need to do more work particularly to define and refine in the context of posture and capability and not in respect to concept There doesn't seem to be much argument in that area at the present time THURSTON LASL It seems to me that the whole basis of tactical weapons serving as deterrent is relying upon the adversary to be a reasonable chap and not to escalate any further I recall that the military leaders of another nation Japan counted on the United States to be reasonable in peace by mid 1942 however we weren't reasonable in their view and things turned out differently What options do we have if our adversaries are not reasonable YUDKIN I don't know that I can really answer that I guess we are counting on our being considerably more perceptive than the individuals you cite who made mistakes I realize that is open to a certain amount of challenge too because we haven't always been perceptive Undoubtedly we won't always be but certainly this is an area in which the best judgment we have is going to be applied the most intense stUdy the most careful consideration This is not an area in which rash moves are going to be undertaken What the options are in case the enemy turns out to be irrational I suppose is another area for further excursions I can't answer you effectively today 95 I • Robert G Shreffler' ' NATO IS THE NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP AND THE TA CTlCAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS My intention this afternoon is to review the political activities in NA TO relative to the ltactical use of nuclear weapons and to pass on some thoughts in this regard based on two years of close association with NATO's nuclear activities During this period I was dealing predominantly with the views and ideas of NA TO member countries and also with those of the NA TO Military Authorities I had a close working relationship with Europeans many of whom spend much of their time on these nuclear problems It is with this background of experience that I am making my comments which however are frequently personal ones--a point which I want to emphasize since a number of the issues are controversial I want to stress the political as opposed to the military aspect of the problem though the two are so closely associated and complementary that it is probably meaningless in any general discussion to concentrate totally on one to the exclusion of the other I should like to commence by describing briefly the organization and activity of the Nuclear Planning Group or the NPG This is the principal political organi- zation within NATO commissioned to deal with nuclear matters Then I want to turn to our major topic namely the tactical use of nuclear weapons and discuss the development of this subject within the NPG So let me talk a bit about the formation structure and activities of the Nuclear Planning Group At the outset I think I should point out that the NPG was established to meet a fundamental requirement that results directly from the ' Now at LASL special nature of nuclear weapons and their treatment in the North Atlantic Alliance You will appreciate this if you recall that our European allies have placed their defense by nuclear weapons ·and thus their security almost entirely in the hands of the President of the United States The European Governments have thus delegated essential parts of their responsibility for the security of their nations and hence a most vital component of their national sovereignty to another government--a serious step indeed Out of this delegation to the President of the United States resulted quite n turally the increasing desire on the part of the European countries to be associated with and have a say in nuclear planning upon which their national survival may well depend As far as the description of the NPG is concerned I think I need only say that it is a group composed of Defense Ministers representing ·seven member countries Four of the members--Germany Italy United Kingdom and United States--are permanent The remaining three seats rotate among the other members of this 15-country Alliance who wish to participate These Defense Ministers meet roughly every six months to discuss a wide variety of nuclear matters under the chairmanship of the Secretary General The Ministers are supported by a staff in their capitals and by their Ambassadors with their staffs at NATO Headquarters in Brussels The Group may discuss any topic having to do with nuclear weapons even in the area of weapon design the Nuclear Planning Group Charter invites suggestions for improving our stockpile Topics of interest are worked on by the entire group under the discussion leadership of one or sometimes two of the Ministers who will give it particular attention The obvious objective of the NPG is to address such topics as strategic and tactical use of nuclear weapons the consultative process that occurs prior to their release and methods for increasing the role of nonnuclear powers in nuclear planning However in my opinion a major success of the Nuclear Planning Group has been the education of its members There are now centers admittedly often small in the NATO capitals and in Brussels which have at least a speaking acquaintance with the subject of nuclear weapons as they would be used in the defense of the Alliance The importance of this educated block of people is obvious when one comes to grips with the complicated problems with which this nuclear field abounds Because political control is essential in any use of nuclear weapons it is also important for the political decision-makers to be educated to a point where they can effectively exercise their political responsibilities Finally the education of the political decision-makers is assuming an expanding importance in regard to such essential political issues as the Nor t-Proliferation Treaty and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Now for the remainder of my time I should like to explore what the Nuclear Planning Group has done vis-a -vis the problem of tactical use of nuclear weapons In order to do this with any perspective it is necessary to talk a bit about NATO strategy and the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact First let me talk about NATO strategy Prior to the end of 1967 this strategy might be considered as one of massive retaliation in December of that year documents were adopted by the Ministers describing a new strategy of flexibility in response Although the documents which spell out these two strategies allow wide latitude of interpretation-particularly the one on flexible response- 9B the differences are dramatic With regard to the tactical use of nuclear weapons it is fair to say that the old strategy of massive retaliation recognized nq tactical use before the strategic exchange II that is to say before the United States had released its strategic force Under the new strategy of flexibility in response tactical use before the strategic exchange was stressed as a very likely option From this follows an important consequence according to the old strategy one could be reasonably indifferent to the collateral damage in the light of the chaos produced by the all-out nuclear exchange However with the new strategy the situation is quite different Release of nuclear weapons for use in situations less than general nuclear war could be highly contingent upon the collateral effects produced There are many other aspects of the new strategy that are worthy of note for example it is important for NATO to have the capability of meeting a conventional attack by a conventional defense In my opinion however this does not imply that all forces have to be deployed conventionally Further the new strategy states that it is important to be able to escalate the war deliberately having at one J s disposal a wide selection of options which permit the aggression to be met and contained close to the border and at the lowest required level of escalation Along with the evolution in strategy we lso have a comparable change in the threat posed to NATO Europe by the Warsaw Pact In particular the Warsaw Pact has developed a tactical nuclear capability comparable to our own in strength but of curiously different structure Most important is a comparison of the relative conventional force capabilities of NATO versus the Pact With some exceptions most would agree that this balance is significantly in the favor of the Warsaw Pact-though it is quite difficult to make a meaningful comparison Further the prospects for the future could lead to an even more dismal picture As a consequence of these changes in strategy and threat one would naturally expect changes in the way we carry out our military task Indeed particularly in the light of the specific points I have just discussed one would expect at least a major investigation of the tactical use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield SACEUR has given assurance of the existence of plans and procedures consistent vith the requirements of the new strategy However to my knowledge these plans have never been exposed to the political authorities from whom the release of the nuclear weapons will have to come and I see a real danger in that the NATO Military Authorities and the political authorities do not see eye to eye in this respect In practice it appears to me that heavy emphasis is being given to the conventional battlefield posture and that tactical nuclear warfare is relegated to a secondary and somewhat nebulous role It is difficult to quantify this suspected preference for conventional defense and the de-emphasis of the tactical use of nuclear weapons Certainly it is rooted in the firebreak philosophy and the associated concern over the escalation of any nuclear war no matter how constrained or limited It also stems from the conviction documented in the new strategy that the most probable conflict with the Warsaw Pact will involve conventional forces engaged on a limited front - - - --- 99 - - o i ' t '· - - - The conventional preference has also been promoted by a concern over the use of relatively high-yield weapons on the battlefield Unfortunately the devastating consequences of such use receive wide advertisement by certain delegations and by such organizations as the United Nations and the Western European Union As a consequence in the minds of most Europeans there is no significant difference as far as destruction of su bstantial parts of NATO Europe is concerned between the effects produced by general tactical use on the battlefield and all-out strategic war This orientation toward conventional force is also motivated by the concern on the part of the United States that if one emphasizes the widespread dependence upon the use of tactical nuclear weapons the Europeans may react by reducing their conventional forces This may be so but the converse may also be true It may just be possible that some Europeans may look upon a well considered defense based upon the tactical use of nuclear weapons as the meaningful solution to the problem and be more willing to contribute their fair share Now a final point A conventional initial posture might be acceptable if all NA TO forces were well trained to fight a tactical nuclear war and were able to rapidly deploy to a nuclear configuration If they do not have this ability and I would suggest that they might not we are faced with possibly violating a fundamental military rule-namely we are basing a military posture upon our expectations of what the enemy might do not upon what he is capable of' doing Moreover I would also question that the NATO Military Authorities just like the political authorities have any clear concept of how a tactical nuclear war would be fought despite the fact that we all know that we have been making plans for 20 years What I have just described to you is background to support· a description of the efforts of the Nuclear Planning Group on the problem of tactical use Let me develop this subject chronologically The first discussion really predates the Nuclear Planning Group to its formative period in 1966 A number of papers were presented at that time Subsequently in April 1967 at the first meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in Washington the Ministers stressed the need to develop a concept for the use of thea ter nuclear weapons At that time however it was recognized that work on this commission should await the outcome of studies on the tactical use of nuclear weapons in various contingencies A number of these studies were completed over the next year The results in my opinion were meagre in analysis though rich in supposition although a SHAPE study of the use of ADM's in Turkey showed great promise for a special problem General Cowan wilL dis cuss this work in some depth so I will not say more on this subject Among other things all of this work indicated that a satisfactory resolution--or even significant contribution -to any of these problems regarding the use of nuclear weapons was most difficult to achieve However on the basis of what had been done it was decided to proceed on specific studies leading to the development of political guidelines to the military on the initial phase of the tactical use of nuclear weappns Before we discuss this specific study to which will hereafter refer by the term guidelines may I first say a few words about an alternative approach proposed by the United States They were keen on setting up further studies leading -----100 _ M --- - 1 - to the development of a broad concept from which as it evolved would be derived specific guidelines to the military This United States proposal included studies in depth on many of the fundamental aspects of the problem target acquisition command and control release procedures etc In my opinion it was unfortunate that this proposal was rejected by the Nuclear Planning Group for reasons which I don't think are interesting to you At least it might have been carried along in parallel with the guidelines study To get on with the guidelines study it was decided a year ago last April that Italy United Kingdom United States and Germany should carry out four preliminary studies Let me say a few words about these studies all of which you may bear in mind were dealing with the initial use of nuclear weapons The Italians put forward a paper on atomic demolition munitions This Italian paper is still incomplete and though some of its views have been incorporated into the guidelines paper that was written subsequently considerable work remains to be done I might add that studies on the ADM problem throughout Allied Command Europe are continuing This is the only weapon system that has received detailed attention by the NPG and for various reasons it will probably receive much more The British submitted a paper on the use of nuclear weapons at sea This is an important topic though somewhat peripheral to the main thrust of the effort however it brought up among other things a controversial point namely preconditioned release f which is understood to mean delegation in time of crisis of authority to use nuclear weapons if certain predetermined conditions are fulfilled Since time is of critical importance for the use of ADM's similar release arrangements have been proposed for them Obviously this issue will come up again in any consideration of the tactical use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield where time is of the essence The United States submitted a paper on demonstrative use which discusses the pros and cons of the initial use of one or a few nuclear weapons with the intention of showing political resolve The German paper was entitled Selective Use of Nuclear Weapons Against Battlefield Targets in a Limited Conflict It had the most direct application to the development of the guidelines These four preliminary documents were discussed by the Ministers at their fourth meeting in Bonn in the fall of 1968 and they commissioned the British and Germans to draft together a tentative guideline document The initial draft was presented to the Ministers at their last meeting in London three months ago The Ministers of two of the largest countries in NA TO personally devoted many hours to the preparation of this document and I would like to say a few words about it Broadly this initial draft presents a collation of Alliance views on the initial use of nuclear weapons by NA TO in order to develop appropriate guidance for the NA TO Military Authorities In my opinion these are some of its more salient features 101 - - -i - A most important conclusion is that the fundamental objective of initial use will always be political and that it would represent a basic qualitative change in warfare The emphasis accorded to military objectives is recognized as secondary and variable with the situation I think that there is a general political acceptance of this point though one expects the military to strongly urge for a careful consideration of the implications of this use from their point of view A second point has to do with criteria for determining the time for initial employment The document recognizes two conditions One might follow the initial use of nuclear weapons by the Warsaw Pact and r doubt that this condition will provoke much argument the second might result following a period of conventional fighting Now in my opinion the paper begs the basic point which is that we have no policy on when we should introduce nuclear' weapons in the course of this conventional engagement Let me dwell on this for a moment If we take forward defense and the sanctity of our border seriously as given in the current NA TO strategy we probably have no choice but to go nuclear almost immediately We optimize our possibility of success within reasonable constraints but assume the risk of escalation In the second extreme we make every effort to resolve the issue conventionally with the risk of losing territory which we might never regain and of sacrificing forces to a degree that might leave them incapable of using nuclear weapons in any case Possibly the· only realistic solution lies somewhere in between so that there would be time for both military and political appraisal of the situation prior to the release of nuclear weapons • The subject of demonstrative use was dealt with at some length You will recall that I defined such use as one usually involving a single or a few nuclear weapons with the intention of showing political resolve There is also a general requirement to minimize the risk of escalation The types of targets considered vary over the extreme range from no target at all showing little more than a willingness to detonate a weapon to the destruction of a significant military target The guidelines document deals at length with operational initiai use of nuclear weapons In this regard a statement-three times repeatect-- -is that the most serious problem connected with the tactical use of nuclear weapons is to employ them in a way that is at once militarily effective which avoids unacceptable damage and which limits to the minimum the dangers of uncontrolled escalation The document returns repeatedly to the point that--particularly in a defensive Alliance--one can expect the detonation of an unreasonable share of the nuclear weapons on NA TO soil Depending on the extent of initial use intensified use of nuclear weapons in the land air combat area could entail the destruction rather than the defense of much of what NA TO is aiming to pre'serve The reason I stress this point is that I am afraid there is a general t ndency to either ignore or minimize the importance of undesirable collateral damage ' This point also leads to my final comment on the substance of this guidelines document In that part in which the subject of subsequent tactical use was treated the subject of escalation was considered The document warned against escalation leading to intensified use limited to a particular area which could result in unacceptable devastation To prevent this it suggested the possibility of extending the use of nuclear weapons to a wider ge-ographical area and deeper into Warsaw Pact territory This demonstrated NATO's evide nt readiness should aggression 102 • • continue to escalate the conflict eventually to all-out nuclear war if necessary The concern of some of the Ministers at London was that such an approach allowed for too few steps or options along the escalation path Unquestionably this was an issue of fundamental importance In any case it possibly awakened the Alliance particularly the United States to a dilemma On the one hand they were faced by a rapid escalation which could require an early commitment of strategic forces on the other hand to expose meaningful options they were faced with a more serious consideration of the tactical use of nuclear weapons This could represent a substantial departure from the present conventional thinki g lViay I add a personal comment on the one alternativ e namely the escalation to all-out nuclear war In my opinion in the context of an engagement on the nuclear battlefield it is not realistic to consider the release of our worldwide strategic capability as a meaningful planning option It is just not within my comprehension to imagine a situation where the President might give such orders as the result of any battlefield engagement The fact that this option is maintained permits both military and political planners to too quickly adopt it as a solution and consequently not face up to the complex task of how one would engage in a nuclear war on the battlefield The guideline paper offers a good example in point Let me hasten to add that this is not to detract in any way from the essential importance of this strategic capability to deter the Soviet Union from precipitating a strategic exchange This guidelines document was reviewed by the Defen se- Mfui5ters Tri London They invited the British and Germans to refine it in light of their discussion and taking into account the written comment to be supplied by the other governments and the military authorities This process is now nearly finished in preparation for the November meeting of the NPG in Washington It is of course not known how this document will be further elaborated and evaluated However with something like certainty one can say that it will at some time be approved in some form or other by the Alliance as an extension of our NATO strategy The draft guideline document has forced people to think very hard about the real issues involved in the tactical use of nuclear weapons in Europe My hope is that a substantial and constructive document will ultimately result It is quite important to NATO that such an objective be achieved In an effort to ensure the ultimate success in these matters the Ministers in London commissioned the elaboration of terms of reference for a longer-range program which in my mind would follow the approach of the one envisaged in the United States concept proposal that I have already described This program would constitute the major thrust of future Nuclear Planning Group activity Work on these terms of reference is under way It may include a broad study program with a specific mandate for the initial steps Now let me add a few words about certain efforts of the Secretary General He has written two documents which go to the very heart of the guideline problem In fact they were written in an effort to circumvent possible problems posed by a premature publication of the guidelines o 103 The first document was published some time ago and had to do with modernizing our nuclear weapon stockpile The $ecretary General's grave concern was that our present weapons were described to be of such high yield and were to be' used in such fashion as to produce collateral effects unacceptable to the Europeans The ultimate consequen'ce could be the conclusion that there was only limited utility for nuclear weapons in the European theater and the rejection of the NATO tactical nuclear capability which in his opinion was politically unacceptable The document proposed that we investigate new accurately delivered weapons with substantially lower yields It outlined a simple work program one understandable to the NATO political decision-maker It argued that such an improved capability which would meet the demands of a constraints policy' acceptable to the Europeans would add a new dimension to the exercise Somewhat later a second paper by the Secretary General considered the events which might take place following a conventional Warsaw P tct attack of such magnitude that we would be forced to resort to the taCtical use of 'nuclear weapons With our present force the result recorded by the British and Germans in their draft guidelines was anticipated namely 'a rapid escalation of the nuclear war primarily because the use of more than a few weapons could result in unacceptable collateral damage ' It was proposed that an imp-roveg NA O force c'apable of fighting with nuclear weapons of lower yield within acceptable constraInts ancfcapable 'of Gontalnlng any conventional attack would have several additional advantages In the first place the enemy would be reluctant to mass his force as a' target for a NATO force that had been structured and trained to fight a nuclear engagement Secondly were the conventional attack to take place this improved force would offer a greater range of options to meet any escalation of the engagement All of these advantages can be summarized in the fact that NATO's deterrent would be substantially improved These proposals of the Secretary General which may now hopefully be encompassed within the follow-on study which I have just mentioned lead to some difficult questions-questions such as How should our forces be structured and deployed in both peace and various stages of war ro more drastic words should not at least part of our forces be structured and deployed for' a nuclear war from the outset What would be the consequent optimum mix and number of nuclear weapons What is the trade-off in investment between nuclear force and conventional force and what are their relative advantages Hopefully the Nucl ar Planning Group will face and resolve questions of this kind in due course In the last half hour I have attempted to present my impression 'of how the NPG is attempting to come to grips with the problem of 'tactical' use of nuclear weapons in Europe In the process I hope that I have not been overly optimistic in leading you to the conclusion that everything is proceeding in'the best possible manner and that given sufficient time these problems will be resolved Frankly I seriously consider this as a possibility but I would be less than candid if I were to conclude on such a gay note There is another p ssibility--unfortunately it may be the more realistic one It may be that the British and Ger mans will revise their paper to their own satisfaction to the satisfac tion ofcthe United States and to the general agreement of all concerned The tJna sIo u _ 1t J ay be quickly 104 • agreed to by the NATO authorities and the matter may come to rest at that point There may be no more than a tok n evaluation or implementation of the document there may be no serious follow-on investigation and the ADM exercise may be allowed to fizzle along to a bland conclusion Such a dismal solution could also be narrated for the other NATO nuclear problems which I have not discussed The conclusion would be that we would end up in the general region of where we started In my opinion this would be a tragedy 105 ' ' z h - C t ' it' 'h ' ' _ ' Question and Answer' Period COGGAN North Am Rockwell One part of this review disturbs me r don't detect in the NPG background any deep study of the motivations of the USSR From such a study one might make a more realistic' deduction as to what methodology they may employ in creating or implementing a r eal threat Has that been addressed to any depth in this operation ' SHREFFLER Yes This might be for example a Warsaw Pact first use of nuclear weapons Such an exercise has been carried out COOGAN Perhaps I am not making myself clear For instance here are various countries like Germany Italy etc preparing papers There are some very knotty problems in th backgrounds of those 2apers -Lam sure I think to most people who have studied the history of the situation 'it-iS- obvious that Russia does not want a reunited Germany and that is a thorny point in itself for the ' Germans to face Is that particular item for example reaily addressed in a constructive manner in the light of how it might influence the actions of the Pact countries ' ' -' SHREFFLER I think the answer is N'o That might well distu b you You might have another example but the answer to that s c rtainly No i pressed by'yo 't ein l ncl't fhers abo t McDONALD LRL I am today political impacts of trying to deal with the NA TQA_llianc - ' When 'j ese things are discussed with them are they made aware of the possibilities for new - -eapon '- - - technologies that might present them with more acceptable weapons_than the classes that they are presently told they mus-t dearwith For' example the thing that comes immediately to mind is the possibility or suppi'essed radiation systems or things like this Are they made aware orthese 'things- oZ ' are' they only told ' about the class of weapons that already exist in the stockpile - I '- ' t t SHREFFLER I don't think there is an attempt-to completely expose all the technology I think some fraction of it is exposed For 'example General Burchinal spelled out the details of what we might'expect-fbra newADM That kind of detail r think it is fair to say is not speUea out in the' Nuclear Planning - Group ' - McDONALD What I am trying to address' h'erei is 'the' p'oIitical acceptability to the Europeans of actually using nuclear'weapons on their 'territory It has been pointed out to us two or three times today'that t is'aivery strategj c war to them when the bombs are going off on their own terI itorY i _ E'am ihte ested • particularly as a weapons designer in learning how we mfg ht make weapons 'that are more politically acceptable to these people Have th y rIY t rri ' fie en a pprised of these tg f ffi 4 1 § it fi-' possibilities - ' - - E ·' -I t - 't 106 - iii - - - •• __ _ - • - - ' • - ' SHREFFLER I think there is no Yes o '''No'' ansV r to your q estion General Cowan is going to address the ADM problem in a moment r think the constraints he faced in his exercise were to us the existing stockpile I think this was a great mistake myself Clearly one of the advantages doing the study that he carried out would have been to'make recommendations on-precisely the point you are talking about Such recommendations to 'my recollection were not made There is now a frame of reference being outlined for other ADM studies It again will address the ADM's currently in stockpile but the door is left open I think to consider the kinds of things you are talking abou t ' ' WALSKE DOD I think Ldisagree with your implication that the US government has a positive restriction on passing to our allies any advanced technology that hasn't reached a certain stage of development Until we make the decision that we are ready to develop something we withhold it-for a very good reasonwe are not interested in exciting our allies about it so they will come knocking on our door and'help us make the d tcision Secondly I d like to be sure that you agree that we give no internal nucl-ear design details to our allies The information they do get is about external characteris ics weight shape yield fission yield perhaps and this sort of thing SHREFFLER Yes I'd certainly confirm what you are saying REP HOLIFIELD JCAE I believe you said we have been working at this NATO thing for 20 years--and I have been supporting it politically for 20 years You said that in 1966 we started talking with our allies about possible ways in which we might use nuclear weapons My first questiof l would be Why did we wait 17 years to talk about the fundamental poHcy' of utilization of nuclear weapons by NATO SHREFFLER I think there certainly have been attempts on the part of the United States to work our NATO allies into the 'nuclear exercise but clearly nothing like the Nuclear Planning Group was' ever on before REP HOLIFIELD I am aware of that'fact because- was one of those who advocated the forming of the Nuclear Planning Group along with some of my colleagues on the Joint Committee The basic purpose in forming the Planning Group as I understood it was to find out under what conditions our allies in NA TO would be willing to call down nuclear' fice Rower upon themselves in ' defending their country It is apparent thaL ere_ is 'agreat eluctance on their part--and I can understand it--to predetermine any situation in which they would agree to the use of atomic weapons either by N-A TO or by the United States Is that not true ' - c ' '- ' SHREFFLER Yes clearly that is the point Dot ' bt J f 107 - - - - - 0 SHREFFLER I think that is the problem we are agonizing over at the present time One of the tasks facing the Nuclear Planning Group is to educate our nuclear allies to realize the kind of devastation that is really associated with nuclear weapons REP HOLIFIELD The more we educate them the less stomach they have for it SHREFFLER I don't think that is necessarily so I think we should wait and see the results of the guideline document It will be interesting to see how it evolves REP HOLIFIELD I have been waiting 20 years I don't see why I should wait another year or two SHREFFLER I trust that you will I would only say that our NATO allies didn't have the opportunity of working with the Nuclear Planning Group until you among others decided it should be formed Hopefully as time goes on and they are forced to face up to these issues more intelligently the conclusion that you drew may well change I sincerely hope it does This gets you back to the thrust of the Secretary General's memorandum on this point He was concerned that nuclear weapons were incorrectly represented in Europe--not that the military necessarily used them that way This along with a number of other points I think must be corrected REP HOLIFIELD We have discussed why we do not give our NATO allies some of the advanced capabilities of advanced weapons I would say that even though we might have a suppressed radiation type of weapon to use upon the enemy that would not in any way insure that the enemy would use a suppressed radiation type of weapon on us Therefore the fact that we might have such a weapon should have no bearing upon any decision that the Europeans might make because we II II • would have no way of guaranteeing them that a pleasant type of weapon would be sent to us in return HAMPTON OSD ISA We are closely involved in the work of the Nuclear Planning Group May I say that the Europeans do not oppose the use of nuclear v eapons they advocate the very early use of nuclear weapons far more than we do from a national standpoint Their chief concern is that we as the US will want to use these weapons only on NATO territory As a result of the discussions in May where Secretary Laird made some points very clearly we have a greater understanding on the part of the Europeans and we think more willing cooperation We are very hopeful that we will be able to reach some sort of agreement with them either this fall or next spring SHREFFLER remarks Thank you General Hampton I would agree with your SALET US Mission to NATO I think there has beena distinct impression that the new strategy indicates a conventional strategy to the end--and this is not what the new strategy says by any means The US position in the NPG has been partly to impress on our NATO allies that they have much more in the way of a conventional capability than would initially appear I think the problem is that the 108 • Europeans have been advocating early use whereas the US has been advocating much later use tI -e hopes that t e cOl ventional_c a 2 g t _ Jbaj do existru _e fully exploited DEL'E- T-E' D'-· T' G ·r '· · ' i - ' - - - --- - -- U C -- - t1iat we will find - - ' _ - i result of th pr i hi 'ar ' if r J ' t -' JkFRG I U l ii ' · 1 - · - - --- -- as a paper a considerable shift in European attitudes particularly among the Germans There may be some disappointment in the use ormini-nucs because it is going to take many more mini-nucs with resultant collateral damage SHREFFLER I guess the only point rwould argue is that I am in love with mlUl-nucs I don't think that is necessarily so I think that it is quite important that we explore every possibility to find out how we- solve the problem I don't think we have explored all the possibilities SALET There is one other aspect that I think lends credence to your statement and that is we are preparing to brief-the NATO Ministers and the military committee on our improved conventional munitions as an example To answer the question that was posed earlier we are bringing them into this sort of thing so that they have a greater understanding of what is available from a technological point of view ARMBRUSTER HudsonInst May 1 point out that the Warsaw Pact nations have this problem also concerning tactical nuclear wars to be fought in East Germany and West Germany I would like to ask whether the speaker has any feeling for what conversations if any are going on in regard to the use of nuclear weapons on the other side of the Curtain SHREFFLER I have no information on that at all HOERLIN LASL In case of a new serious conflict in the Middle East which may well involve NATO countries or part of the NATO forces is there any formal planning on the part of NATO so far as strategic forces are concerned SHREFFLER None to my knowledge HOERLIN Is it of concern to NATO SHREFFLER Clearly the Mediterranean area is of vital interest to NATO but I have never heard this subject discussed in the context- of nu'clear weapons SCHNEIDER Dept of Navy I believe you commented that the President would be in your mind hard pressed to use any or all of his strategic capabilities in case there was a battle War I think always takes place in theaters and battles take place in theaters I a m not just sure what you meant by that-losing the battle might lose the theater and losing the theater might losethe war Are we to lose the war because the President would not use this capability that he might have left in reserve 109 -- '- SHREFFLER The strategic capability You appreciate that I said I didn't think it was a good idea to consider the strategic capability as one of the options in planning the nuclear war on the battlefield This is a personal feeling SCHNEIDER That is what I wanted to know if that was really what you had in mind It is a personal feeling leading to the logical conclusion that you might lose that battle you might lose that theater--and then what You just accept it SHREFFLER Yes I think that is a possibility I think it is an issue you have to face later But the thing that bothers me about the strategic umbrella problem is the problem we face in the guidelines-the very rapid rush from an initial engagement to the strategic exchange to me that does not make good sense We do not address fully the problem of what we might be able to do on the tactical nuclear ba ttlefield ' 110 • • Brig General Alvin E Cowan USA 3rd Armored Division SHAPE STUDIES OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS Good morning gentlemen During the next 45 minutes I will briefly discuss current concepts relating to the role of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize you with some of the more recent studies and plans on the tactical employment of nuclear weapons in Allied Command Europe and to outline briefly SHAPE see Figure 1 requirements for new and improved tactical nuclear weapons Weapons requirements have been developed in conjunction with some of these recent studies During this briefing I will discuss key points of the following plans and studies 1 The operational plan for a defensive obstacle· system for Eastern Turkey 2 The USEURCOM study of atomic demolition muniti ms 3 Plans for the assessment of ACE tactical nuclear capabilities using SATAN during Phase III of the ACE capabilities analysis study ' 4 Recent SHAPE stUdies and recommendations pertaining to tactical air delivered weapons 5 Future trends affecting tactical nuclear weapons requirements I would like to begin with one of the most recent plans relating to the use of tactical nuclear ADM weapons 111 Figure 1 The ADM Plan for Eastern Turkey is the short title for the operational plan for a defensive obstacle system for Eastern Turkey This plan was completed on 15 January 1968 The purpose of this plan was to prepare a defensive obstacle system utilizing conventional and nuclear explosives to obstruct and delay an attack on the eastern frontier of Turkey and in relation to the planned defensive obstacle syste to develop specific ADM weapons requirements Tl1e methodology used in developing the defensive obstacle plan was as follows 1 An analysis was made of weather and terrain conditions in the Third Turkish Army Area which includes all of Eastern Turkey 112 • 2 An assessment was made of the Soviet forces which could be expected to move against the Third Turkish Army 3 An assessment was made of Soviet capabilities to attack in Eastern Turkey 4 An assessment was made of the forces available to the Third Turkish Army 5 Analyses were made of Third Turkish Army operational plans of conventional obstacle plans within the Third Turkish Army 6 Upon completion of these assessments and analyses a compilation of ADM targets recommended in previous Landsoutheast and Turkish proposals was prepared 7 To insure validity a reconnaissance of the Third Turkish Army Area was conducted to evaluate each ·target selected and to determine if additional targets were required 8 Subsequently a revised ADM target list-was prepared based on the reconnaissance of the area to be defended 9 As a final step war games were conducted to assess the effectiveness of various plans evel ped The following plans were evaluated for effectiveness during the exercise 1 The present 250 0 conventional obstacle capability of the Third Turkish Army 2 An assumed 1000 0 conventional obstacle· capability 3 The present 250 0 conventional obstacle capability with ADM weapons integrated into the plan• 4 An assumed 1000 0 conventional obstacle capability with ADM weapons integrated into th e plan Warning conditions assumed during development of the plan included 1 attack without warning 2 three days warning 3 seven days warning The effectiveness of each plan was then evaluated assuming release authorization was received to use ADM's at H-hour beginning of hostilities H 8 hours H 24 hours H 72 hours or D 7 days Figure 2 will geographically orient you on the area- of the Third Turkish Army it includes the area bounded on the north by the Black Sea the entire Turkish-USSR frontier and the Turkish-Iranian frontier The area is characterized by rough and high mountains interspersed with steep gorges _ Four mountain ranges extend in an east-west direction at an average altitude or2500 meters Figure 3 shows the six avenues of approach for enemy combat forces from the Russian border into the Third Turkish Army· Area• The movement of armor motorized units and large scale infantry is possible along each approach route QFCRllr fl1 113 3 - - - - - t iH SECRET lep ' ' tr' ''' ' 3 115 - - Four avenues will support two divisions the central approach route will support four divisions and the northern approach will support only a regimental sized attack The terrain along each avenue of approach contains ideal sites for creatip g obstacles and delaying the advances of an attacker - --- Figure 4 Figure 4 shows a typical approach highway through the mountains in Eastern Turkey It should be noted that in numerous locations these roads are carved out of the sides of steep mountains In addition Eastern Turkey has a severe winter climate There is snowfall from October to May and many of the roads will be impassable to wheeled and tracked vehicles during winter months see Figure 5 It was assumed that the USSR forces in the Transcaucasus area have the capability to rnount a surprise attack on Eastern Turkey with four motorized rifle divisions and one tank division see Figure 6 With 72 hours preparation this force could be increased to five motorized rifle divisions and one tank division After seven days the Soviets could attack with six motorized rifle divisions and two tank divisions ions and after 30 days could attack with ten motorized rifle divisions two tank div is and one airborne division In addition two naval brigades could make amphibious landings on the Black Sea coast 1f' 1 f f§ C - l ertiiiP -- ----- - --- -- • Figure 5 Approximately 400 USSR aircraft were assumed to have been available to support an attack on Eastern Turkey This included 145' tactical fighters 60 light bombers and 90 medium bombers The Third Turkish Army which is responsible for defense of Eastern Turkey consists of three corps and two separate armored brigades Two of the corps contain two infantry divisions and one armored cavalry brigade each The third corps contains one division one border regiment and one infantry brigade see Figure 7 • When deployed for defense of the eastern border the Third Turkish Army employs two armored cavalry brigades th e border regiment and six battalions of infantry as screening forces in the vicinity of'the'border see Figure 8 The infantry divisions are deployed in main defensive positions apprOximately 100 km from the border and the two armored brigades are held in reserve • The three corps of the Third Turkish Army have obstacle plans which include Theseobstacles consist of wire entanglements combined antipersonnel and antitank mine fields road craters destroyed bridges destroyed sections of roads along mountain gorges and collapsed highway and railroad tunnels 510 separate conventional obstacles 117 ---- -- - ·1 - il 1 1 co C1 H So '1 ''1 1 1 111 1 - -- 111 'J --- - --f -f -1 _ • --f - f -- - I 1 l - -- -- • IHl - - CO _ •• - - - -- - - - - - e 1 --1 co Il - __ H -7 ' - l ··· --- -' ' ' - ' - - - 1 J - • The concept or-employment of ADM wE a loIlLs development of the Tt tr sh obstacle plan was as follows -' - c - _ #_ ' l C c o'---- ' -' _ 1 2 ' 3 - ADM's ere used to supplemeitterlstingconventional obstacles by integrating them into existing defense plans ADM s were targeted to the maximum extent in the area forward of the main battle position to gain maximum delay For troop safety and to' rnl ize fall ut risk small yield ADM's were targeted within the main d'efensive position to the maximum extent possible ' - ' ' - L· Analysis of total ADM requirements for Eastern Turkey ' using the concepts previously outlined see Figure 9 indicatedt at · 29 ADM weapons of all types were required in the covering force area 30 weapons were required for protection of the main defensive area anp 13 reserve weapons were required to be held in the I rear area for contingency purposes for a total requirement of 72 ADM's i - - Figure 10 shows a comparisop f the effectiveness of ADM's and conventional explosives developed through war gaming of the obstacle plan for Eastern Turkey The chart depicts the manhours and materiaL in kilograms required for the creation of major delay obstacles for roads on hillsides roads through narrow defiles and roads through broad defiles The advantage irtdelay of ADM's over conventional explosives in terms of manpower and material varied from 8 to 1 in difficult terrain to 2 6 to 1 in rolling terrain - -- --- - 0 A cost comparison of the effectiveness of- strafght qonventional obstacle plans and integrated conventional and ADM obstacies -for eac day of delay gained during defensive op rations is shown in Figure tf - - The days delay i'igures were obtained from war gaming The 'cost per day of delay-was Based on initial and 5 year operating costs The advantage' gained over conventioriarobstacles through the use of ADM's per day of delay varies from 3 4 to t for' the assumed lOO% conventional capability with ADM augmentation to 4 to 1 for the _250 0 conven i9nar capability with ADM augmentation ' ' - - i i i i f - - The number of days of delay achieved along eE l c li of' pe six routes of approach considered in the study are' shown in FigurEt i2 ' The' lowest- section of the bars ' shows delay achieved without the use of any obstaCIes ' i nie next' section indicates additional days delay achieved using 25% conyent oiia I obstacI s-• ' The next section indicates additional delay achieved using Ib01 's n gt b I obstacles 'and the top' section' indicates additional delay achieve d b y _ u g iIl ting the s acle system with ADM's ' -j' l i i i l l j ' - ' ' __ As a matter of interest the effect of'delayed' llse or receipt 0f authorization' to use ADM's was also evaluated during w ga ll h or e plap The average loss' of time in delay and the average percentage of effectiveness orADM's lost through delay is shown in Figure 13 Note that 24 h0'l rs clerai ih r eceipt of· ADM release authority could result in the loss of 2 days deIay an tapprdXimately 18% of the effectiveness of ADlVPs A delay of 7 daYI3 ' ' relay capability and reduce the effectiveness of ADM' 1JY ' 0- -- - --- - 12-1 '_ oj •_ o • I1-- - _ - ' ' I _ -i-r ' - 7 ' · · o ' T · F· ' '11 '1 r i N ' ' - - ·' 'q J ' ' ' ' ' f ' I 'M J ' ' iI' ' ' ' J i j ilt fjf §i i flIIi i ' ' ' • ' 'i ·k ' ' ·- l ''''''-'' i 'i ' ' «' ' ' '' J J t I i N J ' I' ' ' ' i' ' ' ' l i ii j ' · r ' ' ' • i I i ' ' 'i '0 ' l'l ' 't ·· i ' t ' I' ·1·- ' ' i ' · 1 j ' J ··i l t j r 'J lJ' b t - I l r l 'I I' ' • ' J r ' I ' ' 1 ' F t 'c' • ' t h · ·' 'i l·· J I h i· f ' i f jJ f sr t 1iit f if f 1g f' • ' ' •• • ' • 'b · I ' _ I lj L ' t t - i ···· · li L l' '1 j l i -df f' ' ' i' • ' ' f ' t ' 'j 1 d 'N ' i1t 'j l 'v l ' ' ' i ' - ' ' J rr 1 ' i ' ' ' i -'j ' ·· i ' tj Jt ' A' ' h W 'i i j _ ·_ _ iLt i i 1i 1 t 1ilt 1L COST EFFECTIVENESS FOR OBSTACLE CONDITIONS' - -- OBSTACLE CONDITION $ 25% CONV 2343 43' lOOVo CONV 9379 'L5 · 15436' lOOVo CONV ADM 22472 ' '- ' C oSTPER DAY OF DELAY AVERAGE $THOUSANDS DAYS DELAY THOUSANDS 25% CONV ADM - 5'449 ' ' 11 60 Figure 11 1763' • - -- - -- - - - DELAY ACHIEVED BY CONVENTIONAL OBSTACLES AND ADM 72 Hours Warning 31 9 • 27 8 27 7 24 8 1 2 3 c' 'o ' 4 c-c c' ' ' -'-c5' AVENUE OF APPROACH- '- illl Wi hout Obstacles h ADM o 6 25% Conventional Capability Increase for 100% Conventional Capability -' -- • -_ Figure 12 EFFECT OF DELAYED RELEASE OF ADM 25% CONV ADM _ 0 - - TIME OF EXECUTION AVERAGE DELAY - ' ' %OFADM ' - '- H 8 • H 24 Q '2 0 - ' - H 72 D 7 ' 17 9 6 83 ' 1 4 92 48 10 33 Figure'I3' ' - - L -_ _ _ _ _ - ' -- _ _ _ 123 From the ADM plan developed for suitecffor--ADM ' 1 The area in Eastern Tlirkey is ideally 2 employment -- g i t '· c - ''- The ADM would provide significant' delay against- a ' ' USSR advance into Eastern Turkey'which cQulcinot'lle' ' achieved by conventional obstac1 e · ' ' ' ' ' The most efficient combination of't'lkfb r obstacle ' systems studied in terms of costart r etay'is' 2 50 0' conventional augmented ith A Y5 ' l ' JV 1 r Seventy-two ADM's would be required'to proVide aIt' effective obstacle plan for Easterri T U key ' ' 3 4 ' ' - - ' _ - Insufficient warning time to conduct Civilian evacuatipn could inhibit the use of ADM's because 'o'f'fallout risk - 6 The successful execution of the complete obstaCle plim is dependent upon timely receipt of authorization to employ ADM's ' • ' ' C-' Finally# an integrated ADM-conventional' obst d elan ' ' provides more effective delay# per' dollar spent' 'than ' entirely conventional obstacle systems or en tirely'ADM obstacle systems c- _ ' _r j ' c __ conduct cihy us E 2 t r J i t ng f ' t The purpose of the USEUCOMstudy was l fi h t i 1 t '7 i G· the cll rent ADM family of ' 1 To examine inadequacies in 2 weapons ' J f ' i #f fi iff irT £' ' To examine the causes and effectsof current'o Qerational ' restrictions on t e use of ADM c 3 E i ' t i ' ' f - r To develop and recommendimproved'ADlV rw a H on design 4 characteristics ' T- ' ' ' g p ift i Jf To recommend improved operation remp'lo ent concepts for ADM's ' i'i lJiiA ' tl t • ADM weapons presently available to NA TO forces ' withili Allie l Command Europe include the MADM and SADM Th se' li ns ci'iice e ti 'li custody or US units and no non-US forces presently have t aiD sitl ai ed b tI i n lI lacement preparation# and deto ation of' ADM' 'f 2 -- 1tN J% · 'r ' i ' k The current farp ily of ADM weapons hava # tis Jll riita lq hiclireduce the effectiveness of their use in the tactical nucfe 2roi 2 S7 8i th fuy tliE se limitations include - t t 124 ' - -' r would next'like to discuss a study 'to diffi- culties in the tactical employmentof ADM weaporis within NA'IP g-This' study was completed and sub tted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 'on 12 'Jtlne- r968 ' ' ' - ' c' 'i ·f tf · A 'f ' ' 3 'F ' t c ' i' ' - - 7 - - 5 ' - I -411 ____ _ _ - 2• Emplacement and Preparation Time Burial to sufficient depth to ninimize fallout is liighly time consuming and when preemplacement cannot be onsidered this becomes a criti al factor P r eparation time for firing is equally ritical From a packaged configuration the MADM'requires approximately 2 'lours and 45 minutes preparation time The SADM provides a more realistic 12 ninutes preparation time 3 Radiation and Fallout Hazards These result from the tactical use of particularly in the hasty emplacement role and present a major Jroblem of civilian evacuation This problem further intensifies political objections '· 0 the use of ADM's urrent ADM's 4 Firing Options Although the MADM can be detonated using timer re note wire or remote wireless methods the SADM is limited to timer detonation mly In addition those MADM weapons positioned for support of non- US forces lre limited to the timer option only Size and weight pose an additional logistical '1 nd emplacement problem with current ADM weapons The present MADM packLged with equipment weighs 994 pounds an unpackaged configuration it still 'V'eighs 226 pounds The present SADM weighs a more realistic 132 pounds in a Jackaged configuration and 60 pounds when unpackaged 5 Safety and Reliability Specifically the present PAL locking devices and reapons arming devices are not tamperproof Also it would appear that relia Iility of the warhead in the environment of a tactical nuclear exchange can be ffected Because of these limitations and because of political considerations severe c'perational restrictions have been applied to the tactical use of ADM's These 2 estrictions require that there be no pre delegation of' authority to utilize ADM 'eapons no preemplacement of ADM yeapons and no movement of ADM's forward · ·f the main battle position until authority to release and expend those weapons has f ' ' en received However the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently recommended to the Secre - ry of Defense a revised operational concept' which would permit forward tactical' 'l sitioning of current ADM weapons and preemplacement of the improved ADM f 'lrrently under development Based upon'the USEUCOM study and recommendations of US and NA TO ' Qmmanders numerous recommendations for an improved ADM weapon were s 1 lmitted It J int Chief of Staff Th o st' _i nt re omme dations were $ - 2 3 o • _ i Q 'J t i jl iiii iC E 2 Increased reliability with no degradation due to battlefield environment SEOnET iit 125 D t 4 3 Improved safety and arming features with nuclear yield precluded prior to intentional firing 4 Simplicity of design and operation requiring minimum time for emplacement and preparatipn for firing 5 Size reduction to dimensions not greater than 22 x 48 inches and unpackaged weight not to exceed 75 pounds 6 Suppressed radiation with minimized fallout effects 7 Multiple firing options to include remote wireless control capability up to 900 nautical miles with mUltiple simultaneous detonation capability 8 Improved rapid burial capability underground or underwater to a depth of 60 meters A 7 day burial capability with power on and an indefinite burial capability with power off is desired coupled with a remote self-destruct capability In addition to improved weapons characteristics the study recommended nUmerous improvements in concepts of operations involving the employment of ADM's The conditions and concepts recommended were 1 That political agreement and acceptance of the feasibility of using ADM weapons should be sought and secured 2 Acceptance that ADM's properly integrated with conventional demolitions and used in a timely manner provide the most effective defensive obstacle system and should be included in defense planning 3 That preemplacement of selected ADM weapons during peacetime is feasible should be authorized and would greatly facilitate their timely use 4 That pre delegation of authority to use ADM weapons under specific conditions should not be precluded 5 That a program of cooperation giving non-US forces an ADM capability should be approved and implemented within Allied Command Europe Another study which contained a unique approach to planning was the USAREUR Study of Tactical Nuclear Weapons Requirements for 1972 to 1978 This study developed by USAREUR to determine Central Army Group Requirements employed the Warsaw Pact division in a building block concept for analyzing weapons requirements As this study will be presented in detail by the USAREUR representative during the symposium I will not discuss it in detail Portions of the USAREURstudy were used in determining SHAPE requirements submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 January 1969 however the concept used by USAREUR is still being evaluated at SHAPE 126 6E8RET I would like now to turn to the ACE Capabilities Analysis Study What has been termed Phase II of this study is now nearing completion This is a study of conventional forces only The present Ad Hoc Study Group may be replaced by a permanent group to provide a computerized analytical capability for further SHAPE studies If SACEUR so decides one of the top candidates for Phase III of the study is an assessment of ACE tactical nuclear capabilities using SATAN SATAN is an acronym for Simulation for the Assessment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons and is designed for use on the IBM 7090 7094 computer SATAN consists of a set of programs that when presented with two opposing force structures will automatically select targets select weapons to fire on those targets and assess the effects of nuclear fires The capabilities of SA TAN include the following 1 The ability to analyze weapons effects on forces varying in size from 2 divisions to a maximum capability of programming for 255 divisions 80 corps or 20 armies • 2 Forces may be deployed in any area on a map divided into 10 meter squares The maximum deployment area is 2621 kilometers square Targets include groups of men or equipment which are assumed to occupy an area of specific size 3 Any nuclear weapon system whose operation can be described in terms of yield range CEP height of burst probable error time to fire and abort· rate can be programmed in the computer 4 SA TAN simulation can be used to program up to 45 days of consecutive war however simulation can be broken into segments of simulated time called cycles Limitations of SA TAN include the following e 1 The use and effects of conventional chemical and biological weapons cannot be simulated by the computer 2 Localized terrain features and vegetation can not be considered 3 Procedures for computing radioactive fallout from surface bursts are not included 4 Air offense and air defense conflict can not be simulated by the computer 5 Within simulation cycles units maintain static deployment except for movement as a result of counter battery fire 6 The model considers only military troop formations and tanks APC's or artillery pieces 7 And finally operations and intelligence processes can not be simulated with SA TAN 127 '«ORElan 2 Phase m# if conducted# should provide SACEUR with a useful assessment of current ACE tactical nuclear capabilities within the scope of the foregoing limitations To broaden the spectrum of my discussion of tactical nuclear weapons requirements within Allied Command Europe#I would like briefly to discuss studies and r equirements for air delivered weapons systems Recent studies conducted by SHAPE relating to air delivered weapons concluded that requirements existed for a low drag bomb# an air-to-surface missile and a standoff air-to-surface missile The purpose of the low drag bomb is to increase the range and supersonic capability of strike aircraft through reduced drag effects The desired yields would be selectable 20-30 kt or 100-130 kt The bomb is required for the conduct of longer range strikes against hardened Warsaw Pact airfields close air support of the land battle# air superiority# and air interdiction purposes An air-to-surface nuclear capable missile has also been stated as a requirement by SHAPE One of the main purposes of this system would be to provide highly accurate close air support of the land battle A low yield of 10-100 tons is desired for this weapon to conform to its proposed employment in the proximity of the FEBA to permit aircraft to conduct effective strikes against highly mobile targets during conduct of the land battle and to minimize collateral damage in attacking- targets near popUlation centers particularly in the satellites In addition# a standoff air-to-surface nuclear capable missile has been submitted as a requirement The purpose of the standoff ASM is to enhance the survivability of strike aircraft A selectable yield of 10-100 kt with a range capability of 500 nautical miles is desired in this weapon The standoff ASM is required to permit effective long range strikes against radars SAM sites antiaircraft complexes • and ABM sites Future requirements for tactical nuclear weapons within NATO will of necessity be influenced by political and military considerations For example there has been evidence of increasing interest in very low yield tactical nuclear weapons within NATO however# no definite conclusions have been drawn regarding the desirability or effects of increasing the ratio of low yield tactical weapons in the ACE nuclear stockpile and no positive action to modify the weapons mix has been initiated The NATO Nuclear 'Planning Group has suggested that tactical nuclear weapons be identified by the following categories 128 1 Low yield weapons including those with a nominal yield of 10 tons equivalent and those up to 100 tons equivalent 2 Medium yield weapons having a nominal yield between 100 tons and 10 kt equivalent 3 High yield weapons including all yields above 10 kt • Contributing to this increased interest in lower yield nuclear weapons has been fear by the Federal Republic of Germany of collateral damage in the event of tactical nuclear war and the concept that increasing the accuracy of new weapons systems would permit effective strikes against tactical targets using smaller nuclear yields Although these factors can be expected to influence political thinking the NPG has not stated a precise suggestion for the composition of a revised tactical nuclear weapons stockpile for Allied Command Europe o The most significant military considerations affecting the tactical employment of nuclear weapons in NATO relate to current constraints on the use of weapons rather than on weapon yield and design specifically 1 There is no preconditioned release authority for the use of any tactical nuclear weapons 2 There is no authority to pre-position defensive tactical nuclear weapons such as ADM's While it would undoubtedly facilitate military operations to have preconditioned release authority there have never been any indications that obtaining such authority would be politically feasible However • pre-positioning of ADM weapons is desirable and should be politically feasible if a new type ADM were developed with characteristics that would permit remote controlled operations in a buried configuration Military arguments for the pre-positioning of ADM weapons are based on 1 the time required to move ADM's from present storage sites or field storage locations to selected target sites and 2 the time required to bury and emplace ADM's to minimize fallout and achieve maximum tactical results from the weapon explosion Considerations which oppose the concept of preemplacementinclude 1 the design limitations of current ADM weapons 2 the cost associated with prechambering selected sites and 3 the psychological impact on the civilian population in those areas selected for prechambering Certain members of the Alliance have quite properly shown an increasing interest in low yield tactical nuclear weapons and this could develop into an increased demand for low yield weapons in NATO Surely any military commander would favor a low yield weapon over one of high yield so long as the combination of yield and delivery accuracy are sufficient to accomplish the task for which the weapons are earmarked Such weapons would give him more flexibility in the application of his available firepower However this does not mean that he would favor such a trade· off across the board To do so could lead to the very dangerous circum·stance of being badly outgunned-and the implications of such a situation are quite obvious 129 • Question and Answer Period REP HOSMER JCAE It has been rumored that the Turkish ADM deal was turned 9 ff when th 3 Soviets informed the Turks that they would not sit still for it Is there anythingtQ that COWAN 1 am sorry sir I don't know if that is the case I have heard the speculation butI dori't have any concrete evidence within NATO to substantiate this WALSKE DOD Regarding the 900 mile remote control capability on ADM's people who have been working on the Phase IT will recognize that that was not requested by DDR E That wasn't strictly a civilian decision Some of those even in the Army -weren't enthusiastic about it in quite the same way as EUCOM That is just a comment With regard to the question of release authority on ADM's your information was correct up until the first of the year and was certainly correct during the Turkish ADM study About that time though new US guidance came out on ADM's and I might just mention it so that people will have the right idea It does affe'ct weapon design under some circumstances perhaps The first point is that ADM's may be positioned upon military decisi m C'positioned ll means moved out of theater storage moved any place in the theater so long as proper security and _ custody-by the US is maintained That means if release authority to use the ADM's is not'given itmust be possible to withdraw the ADM's without losing them to the opposing forces So positioning may be done on a military decision Emplacement requires the consent of the National Command Authority Emplacement by implication means putting the ADM's in the ground so you don't necessarily have the capability of getting them out in time if the enemy comes and you have not decided to use them Finally release of them for use again must be approved by the Nat onal Command Authority and the' policy also says that it may be possible to get emplacement authority from the National Command Authority prior to getting release authority This means that in developing crisis the President could if he chose exercise the option of actually emplacing an ADM and then h a v e the authority to either use it or sacrifice it to he enemy Either way it would have t Qe a Presidential decision a COWAN Let's clear this up we held this in US channels Have we released this to our NATO allies or have __ _ _ ___ WALSKE _I was released in the NATO circles a few months after it was generated and not actu liyinc porate- fird 'ATO ADM studies We have made 'some progress in that area COWAN 1 am delighted to hear it I am sorry the staff didn't know it also say we have a communication gap on this 9QO mile requirement I would FOWLER DDR E In the Turkey scenario you limited the invasion possibilities to the six overland passes through the mountains How practical is it to invade Turkey by way of the Black Se 9130REI 1'P' k • COWAN I don't know nor do I recall from the Intelligence exactly what the enemy's amphibious capability via the Black Sea would be However my recollection is that it was extremely limited and that he would be most vulnerable if he attempted it by that route There are several reasons for this one the logistics problems· are great secondly the terrain is difficult the mountains generally rise right out of the Black Sea and the invader is immediately confronted with scaling those and trying to establish himself in that area The Turks are excellent mountain fighters and I'd say they would give him a good run for his money under any circumstances We didn't dismiss' this possibility but we thought of it as a possible reinforcing capability for this small force that might elect to proceed down the beach so to speak as I showed you on Invasion Route 1 FOWLER My other question has to do with the proposed new weapon It wasn't clear to me what value a low drag bomb had for attacking air fields compared with a lot of other possibilities And why would you want such a large yield for a Close support weapon particularly when we have precision weapons like Maverick coming up COWAN In answer to your first question on the low drag bomb on many of the aircraft that we are talking about this weapon will have to be carried as an external store We want to make sure it has the low drag essential for its carrier With regard to the second portion of the question I don't think we considered things like Maverick--and this goes into the release of things that are in development so to speak to our NATO allies To this extent our studies have perhaps a serious limitation ROWNTREE NWC China Lake On your requirement for the air launch standoff weapon what is the basis for th _500 miles and what kind of·CEP's do you require -associated with that COWAN The basis for it was the antiaircraft capability which exists immediately on the other side of the Iron Curtain This becomes very evident if you just examine the situation-thus the standoff capability The CEP was to be quite accurate for us to attack hopefully airfields and shelters They have at the present time a very active shelter program on all of their airfields ROWNTREE So the airfield is really the primary target there rather than the SAM sites and radars COWAN I think the most vulnerable thing we have in NATO today is the Allied Tactical Air Force We are confined to a relatively small number of bases-20-odd I believe-in which we have airplanes for example at the US base at Bitburg wingtip to wing-tip There is a limited dispersion that we can do even on that airfield You think about vertical di ersi Q LQr_ o theL concepts but it gets down to the point --- wherEdhE Unite rStates- s asked NATO for shelter capabilities of its own We have got to solve the tactical air problem immediately in any war or else we are going to get pounded to beat sixty Opposing us in the Northern Army Groups there are some 93 airfields just facing NORTAG for example So if we tried to put airplanes against each airfield in his dispersal pattern it gets down to the point that we hardly have enough for one or two per airfield 131 ·«ORE 1 Bps ROWNTREE Can't something like the mobile missile that the general talked about this morning equally well satisfy that requirement-because the hostile airfields are well known You don't have to strike an airfield from an airplane COWAN Very true but we haven't been able to get that MRBM for years We might be able to get the standoff capability on airplanes CARTER DDR E You asked again for a suppressed radiation capability which has been discussed a lot How clean or how suppressed does it have to be before it really buys you a new capability DELETED For example when you talk to the Germans about placing ADM's along the Fulda Gap you run up against a sizeable city like Kassel or the town of Fulda itself The logical place for these things it so happens is in many cases around these cities or other populated areas so that fallout might be a problem Further the German usually knows the family living on the land where he places an ADM It gets to be a highly personal affair So anything that will minimize fallout and reduce the danger to the population we would like to have We have not I am afraid indicated specifically what we want in this because we really don't know what your state of the art is or what you could obtain for us We would like to take as much as we could get GLASSER R D USAF Agreeing with you in regard to the relative vulnerabilities of the Allied and Pact Air Forces what is the SHAPE interest in the V STOL Tactical Air Force COWAN I'd hate to make a commitment for SACEUR because I have not discussed this problem with the new SACEUR I will say this The British as you knowj are going to the Harrier From our own studies of this we think V STOL capability would give us the dispersion characteristics hat we desire for survivability However I am of the opinion that the cost both for the aircraft and its supporting materiel and personnel to make it work would be much higher than for other more economical means which might achieve the same results GARWIN IBM I didn't understand your answer to Mr Rowntree you said you had been trying for years to get the MRBM and thought that you might have a chance for an air launch standoff weapon What has held up th MRBM Is it just difficult to get an agreement that one wants to have a long range land based missile Or does it have to do with the civilian management or the NATO countries COWAN I'll have to bow to General Burchinal who discussed that a little bit this morning Do you want to answer that one sir BURCHINAL USEURCOM To my knowledge the last time a military requirement was forwarded to the office of the Secretary of Defense the Secretary of Defense ruled that there was no requirement for an lVIRBlVI COWAN I think that has been rather consistent - 132 - ----- -- _'Brr S • Lt Colonel Robert R Knox USA CDC-ICAS CURRE-NT kcTrCAL-- NUCLEAR--WAEfFARE-DOCTRINE ------ ­ AND CDC STUDIES Gentlemen this is an information briefing classified SECRET The purpose is to acquaint you with a Combat Developments Command Project to improve tactical nuclear warfare doctrine In essence this project is an investigation into how the Army will fight on the nuclear battlefield and how it should be organized and equipped to accomplish its mission in this environment The short title of this project is NUWAR Presented during this briefing will be a brief review of the current Army doctrine on nuclear operations a discussion of earlier studies in this field and a description of the scope methodology and progress of the NUWAR project • Shortly after the end of World War II considerations of the impact of nuclear weapons on military operations started to appear in the Army doctrinal manuals This process has continued until virtually all current doctrinal manuals--except those -whose subject is clearly inappropriate such as counterinsurgency operations--a ddress the problems of nuclear conflict Typically these manuals have near the beginning a short paragraph or section which states that the doctrine outlit 1ed is applicable to all levels of combat and explanatory remarks are inserted t4r9ugDQut _the manuaLwher-e-ne ces sary--tomodify -conventional uoctrirre--fm -tmc1e- ' r-· operations _ Fig_ll r ' _JJ1 1JJ tr j iLthe_br_eadtlLoLthe manuals- that address nuclear doctrine ------- This is a very abbreviated list of titles Of all these manuals only the first is exclusively orientated by title toward nuclear weapons employment Yet within the other manuals which deal-with combat operations from theater through division brigade and battalion level with the attendant combat service support activities are doctrinal statements on miijtary operations in a uclear environment - - _ - -'c -- 133 -' -L - ' 1 _ _ - __ Found throughout these manuals is a philosophy that the conduct of both nuclear and nonnuclear operations is based on the application of combat power in accordance with the same principles of war T ' differences in technique described in each arise from the increased vulnerability of troops and instanations in the nuclear environment and from the measures required to counteract this increased vulnerability EXAMPLES OF DOCTR I NAL MANUALS FM 101-31-1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES FM 100-5 OPERATIONS OF ARMY FORCES IN THE FIELD FM 61-100 FM 7-30 THE DIVISION INFANTRY AIRBORNE INFANTRY AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY BRIGADES FM 7-20 INFANTRY AIRBORNE INFANTRY AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALIONS FM 17-30 THE ARMORED DIVISION BRIGADE FM 17-1 ARMOR OPERATIONS FM 54-2 THE DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND FM 54-3 THE FIELD ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND IlIE SUPPORT BRIGADE FM 54-4 FM 54-5-1 TEST THE SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE COMMAND Figure 1 In our investigation of the se manuals and others we found doctrinal statements in an of the areas shown in Figure 2 In truth an major activities of the army in the field have been addressed in light of the impact of nuclear weapons on the battlefield Yet throughout the manuals there is a noticeable lack of specifics We win have a porous fluid battlefield forces win be dispersed they must be highly mobile and they must be capable of acting independently It is to the elimination of this lack of specifics that current studies are addressed DOCTRINAL AREAS CONSI DERED 1 OFFENSE 2 DEFENSE 3 FI RE SU PPORT 4 COMMAND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS 5 TARGET ACQUISITION 6 INTELLIGENCE DATA PROCESSING 7 MOB ILiTY 8 COMBAT SUPPORT 9 COMBAT SERVI CE SUPPORT Figure 2 134 • • An earlier study and a subsequent troop test are'the immediate forebears of the current NUWAR Program The Army in 1963 undertook a comprehensive and deiiberate study known as Oregon Trail of the uses of nuclear weapons in land warfare Oregon Trail was completed in February 1965 and recommended new organizations new equipment and a doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons in land warfare unlike previous ideas This system of organizations weapons and doctrine was geared for attainment in the period 1968-1972 It relied heavily on battlefield dispersion of self-contained' units It emphasized the attrition nature ortwo-sidednuclear warfare It stressed firepower 'both nuclear and nonnuclear and target- acquisition and tended to subordinate maneuver so long as the enemy retained a nuclear capability It proposed great depth to the defensive position and did not seek to avoid enemy penetration of the spaces between dispersed units Enemy elements acquired in these spaces were promptly taken under fire--either nuclear or nonnuClear Great reliance was placed upon the 107 mm mortar improved fragmentation munitions a conceptual rocket delivery system forward area air defense systems having passive acquisition means and an effective antitactical mi$sile and aircraft system The Department of the Army in reviewing this study determined that the revolutionary change in organization was not feasible by the time period 1968-1972 nor did it consider that the conceptual weapons upon whicH the-concept relied were reasonably attainable in that period On the other' hand the Department of the Army endorsed the concepts of widespread dispersion great depth a' battle of attrition ' during two-sided nuclear conflicts and postponement of decisive maneuver action until the enemy nuclear capability was substantially reduced The Chief of Staff Army directed that these approved concepts be incorporated into a doctrine adaptable to the existing ROAD organization and equipment and that the doctrine be tested in the field ' -- _ ' Troop Test Frontier Shield was conducted in Europe in the winter of 1966-67 While its findings were not decisive they indicated that the postulated doctrine was not workable with the equipment available and that a major command and control problem exists in implementing the conceptual ideas of Oregpn Trail within the Frontier Shield postulated doctrine After a review of the findings of Troop Test-Frontier-Shield the Department of the Army directed CDC to revise and improve the doctrine of Frontier Shield and to conduct a troop test of the revised doc trine This direction'has led to the development of the current CDC NUWAR pr01ect As shown in Figure 3 the project con ists ofsome 'seven tasks -The SIDC Study which is a- synthesis of the data information and postuiations written on nuclear conflict plus an extensive bibliography the MTR Study an asse sment of the comparative utility of nuclear conventional and improved conventional weapons against a variety of targets the development of an e'xhaustive- specific doctrine for nuclear operations the evaluation of this doCtrine by both a war game and a troop test the modification of the original doctrine ih ligntof the results of the war game and troop test and finally the promulgation oLtnis doctrine to the field The first three tasks have been completed and thewar'game 'is currently in progress ' ' ' __ ' 135 Neither the proposed doctrine nor the tentative war game results that I will discuss should be considered as reflecting either CDC or Department of the Army· approval In both cases they represent the current thinking at the working level and both are certainly subject to change as the NUWAR project develops NUWAR PROJECT RELATIONSHI PS SYNTHESIS OF HIGH INTENSITY CONFLICT PROMULGATION 1 NUCLEAR NUWAR WARFARE- WAR OPNS 70-75 GAME FRONTIER SHIELD II 1 EVOLUTION 1 MUNITION TARGET RELATIONSHI PS Figure 3 Army 75 is a just completed CDC study that will form the basis of the organizational and operational concepts for the Army in the 70-75 time frame From this study we chose the heavy division as the model unit for the NUWAR Study This division is roughly equivalent to the current armored division Each of its' maneuver battalions four mechanized five armored has four letter companies During war games three defensive and two offensive alternatives are being investigated In each of the concepts for defense the division commander plans for enemy penetrations in the forward defense area--and attempts to canalize enemy forces into either-preselected or expedient nuclear killing zones It is expected that a division frontage will range from 35-50 kilometers as shown on Figure 4 Areas for the brigade and battalion are also illustrated Associated with the three forms of defense is the concept of imposing an unacceptable level of attrition against enemy units and establishing a redundancy of defensive effort to inflict the desired attrition Defensively a modified mobile defense with a brigade or larger reserve is to be tested Lateral dispersal of units is greater than in the standard formation Figure 5 shows a typical dispersion of units across the division front and portrays a division size penetration Also to be tested is the area defense with certain modifications--one of which is no designated reserve force In this concept uncommitted units may be deployed to blunt enemy penetrations as shown in Figure 6 or several units may be massed to mount a counterattack if the tactical situation dictates 136 -- • _ ____ 0 - _ _ - TYPI CAL FRONTAGES • BATTALION FRONT 9 13 KMI DEPTH 12KM - BRIGADE FRONT 18-25 KM DEPTH 25-30 KM -- - x --- X -----' X X X X DIVISION FRONT 35-50 KM DEPTH 60-80 KM -------------XX-------- ________ Figure 4- 137 MOBILE DEFENSE WITH PENETRATION • 20 KM WIDE 20 KM DEEP DIV SIZE CSS AREA xx-------------- • Figure 5 138 _ _t_ · ·8 ORE 11 Ii o C X I l p° 0 X FWD ELEMENTS OF I BN II 0 XO X aA xxo Q a -0 II 0 bl X X X oX JJ J J II 0 X CSS AREA ------------------XX------__________ Figure 6 SICA 139 P rhaps the most radical departure from established defensive doctrine is a concept identified as the dynamic defense see Figure 7 It is a form of mobile defense with units widely dispersed both laterally and in depth The battlefield is characterized by a high degree of elasticity in which small units will freely maneuver depending on enemy pressure-but they will maintain contact and will not voluntarily relinquish previously occupied positions Accepted is the fact that forward units are vulnerable to temporary isolation from other units In this concept it is expected that friendly and enemy forces will be greatly intermingl d thus limiting the size of nuclear weapons employed by both sides Uncommitted units may be deployed to contain one or more enemy penetrations as depicted or massed--to counterattack if warranted by the tactical situation Offensively two diametrically opposed concepts are to be examined The first is one in which the employment of nuclear weapons dictates the scheme of maneuver considerations A nuclear fire plan is developed to destroy the maximum number of acquired targets and the force is 'maneuvered to exploit the re'sults of the destructive power of the nuclear fires This concept embraces increased nuclear preparatory fires with a concomitant decrease in use of on-call fires At the other end of the spectrum is a tactical concept which incorporates nuclear fires exclusively to support a scheme of maneuver The commander will pursue a maneuver plan which he feels offers the greatest degree of success and employs nuclear weapons to support that plan As the attacking force develops new targets on-call fires are employed fewer preparatory fires are employed This second concept is essentially the same as current doctrine Within these three defensive and two offensive alternatives we are investigating the utility of company versus battalion sized granules Granule is a term which comes from the Frontier Shield Troop Test and is defined as a tactical unit capable of operating independently for extended periods of time while separated from its parent unit Actually it is nothing more than a cross-reinforced company or battalion level unit Using the company and battalion sized granules we are trying to define the geometry of the battlefield We are attempting to discern the most protective disposition that still retains enough employable combat power to accomplish its mission Comba t Operations A Frontages and Depths The company is the lowest maneuver unit level for which specific frontages and depths were developed Under favorable circumstances of terrain and observation it has been previously determined that a company can occupy and defend a position with a front of 1400 meters and a depth of 1000 meters lCAS has accepted this as a reasonable area for a company to operate on in a nuclear situation In considering the company frontage it is accepted that a single enemy nuclear weapon detonated over the center of a company position will make that unit combat ineffective 140 c _• - - DYNAMIC DEFENSE WITH PENETRATION 0 0 P P 0 II t I X X o 0 P II 0p p II I xxP P I X X X X C S X X • X 0 X q f PTAC 0 0 II £2 CSS AREA - - - - - - - - - XX MULTI PLE PENETRATI ONS POSS I BLE AND ACCEPTABLE Figure 7 141 Appropriate distances between companies were determined in light of assuring employment of a 155 mm nuclear weapon in the gap between companies with a negligible risk to warned protected personnel The minimum distance companies can be separated using this criterion is 3600 meters Another advantage of using the 3600meter interval is that it minimizes nuclear vulnerability Figure 8 e g • a 30kiloton weapon detonated at the center of the 3600-meter interval would probably affect no more than one platoon in each company This estimate is based on radii of vulnerability RV - 30 kt protected 2100 meters which are somewhat greater than actual radii of damage Using this approach a battalion with four maneuver companies-two of which are deployed forward-would occupy a position with a 9200-meter front The battalion together with DS artillery and other support elements would require a minimum depth of 9400 meters if no maneuver space is allowed for in the rear Considering the combat support type units likely to be in a battalion area the depth has been increased to 12 kilometers to provide the commander some flexibility in organizing his area Another consideration in selecting these distances for examination is the criticism directed at the restrictive aspects of the 9 by 5 kilometer battalion area tested in Frontier Shield UNIT VULNERAB ILITY 30 KT AI RBURST T 1000m 1 ---- 3600m ---- PROTECTED PERSONNEL Figure 8 142 B Artillery Following Oregon Trail and Frontier Shield findings it was determined that the concept of fragmenting artillery and frequent displacement of units should be further studied In the NUWAR concept the battery is the lowest level of dispersion to be considered under normal high intensity conflict circumstances but the likelihood of single gun employment or even fragmentation into platoons will not be ignored as a possibility Initial investigations have nevertheless focused on the battery One factor against the fragmentation of batteries is the fact that in the at'ea of an Army 75 heavy division there are from 9 to 11 tube artillery battalions including supporting corps artillery and extensive fragmentation while attempting to maintain adequate dispersion greatly complicates space management It has been suggested that frequent displacement might enhance the survivability of artillery Accurate survey is the greatest obstacle to such a concept Two possible solutions to this problem exist The first involves the use of laser range finding equipment expected to be available in the 1970-75 time frame The other is employment of the self-contained navigational system in selected aerial vehicles C Logistics In the defensive posture division and brigade logistical elements will be collocated to the rear of the forward brigades in the three forward support areas FSA IS A fourth forward support area will be formed from elements of the division supply and transport battalion Supply of food and petroleum products will be accomplished by the unit distribution method from the forward support area to the forward units Repair parts will be provided by the maintenance battalion and ammunition will be picked up by the units from the supply points Maintenance for the forward maneuver units will be accomplished by contact teams Emphasis will be placed on maintaining a flow of supplies to the forward units rather than on building stocks in the forward areas In the division area aerial resupply will be used as extensively as aircraft availability and the tactical situation will permit with semiarmored surface vehicles bearing the majority of the movement effort Concerning medical operations the division and battalion elements will be examined to determine whether the widely dispersed maneuver and support units can be satisfactorily supported The combat support hospital is to be situated near the division rear boundary and a forward medical company will be in each of the three forward support areas Self-help must be stressed Battalion and company medics treat minor wounds and if the situation permits casualties will be evacuated out of the division area The principal MEDEVAC means for seriously wounded is to be the helicopter while personnel with serious but nonfatal wounds will be stabilized in the forward units and probably evacuated overland by armored supply vehicles or in equipment being returned to maintenance units to the rear It is expected that mass casualties sustained in a unit under attack will not be treated--except superficially-until the enemy threat diminishes War Gaming As we examined ways in which this postulated doctrine could be evaluated and further developed we found that probably the easiest and quickest method would be 420RET-- 143 through the use of a war game to the war gaming activity Figure 9 shows some of the key factors which apply WAR GAMES FACTORS FORCES ir ARMY--75 HEAVY DIVISION SOV I ET TANK ARMY NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACTUAL YIELDS AND INVENTORY PROJECTED FOR 1970-1975 RESTRAINTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS LIMITED TO MI LlTARY TARGETS MINIMIZING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES RESTRICTING WEAPONS YIELDS RESTR ICTING TYPES OF BURSTS AVOI D ATIACKING POPULATION CENTERS OVER 25 000 NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROHIBITED OUTSIDE BATTLE AREA Figure 9 Combatants for the dynamic play are the Army 75 heavy division as part of a corps in a US field army and elements of a Soviet tank army of 20 regiments Two Soviet divisions with a total of eight regiments are the immediate antagonists of the US division Incidentally the actions of the Soviet Forces in dynamic play are based on actual Soviet doctrine compiled from the latest and most authoritative sources that we could find Since the NUWAR Study is aimed at developing doctrine within the limits of organizations and materiel available during the 1970-75 period projected nuclear weapons inventories for that period with realistic theater and subordinate unit allocations are being used To place the NUWAR effort in the proper perspective it should be noted that unfortunately no commonly accepted definition exists for tactical nuclear warfare Theoretically it can range from a minimal one or two weapons a week to an almost unlimited daily expenditure of nuclear weapons in the area forward of the field army rear boundary Therefore since we cannot define specifically what tactical nuclear war is or will be we have chosen to postulate some restraints-drawn from the synthesis of high intensity conflict and designed to keep the warfare within credible tactical parameters To describe limited nuclear warfare we have assumed that the combatants will practice some degree of arms control and will also refrain from actions that encourage escalation Limits and restraints are essential if a nuclear war is to be confined to the tactical battlefield Hence the course of the war will depend largely on which of the many possible restraints opposing forces observe Using the general category of restraints discussed above specific restraints for the war game were developed as shown in Figure 10 144 90EORET DJIJ I WAR GAMES RESTRAINTS • NUCLEAR ATTACKS ARE LIMITED TO 150 KI LOMETERS' fACH SIDE'OF THE FEBA • it-TARGETS LOCATED BEYOND THE BATTLE AREA WILL BE ATTACKED ONLY BY CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS • • NUCLEAR STRIKES IN VICINITY OFCITIES OVER 25 000 PEOPLE WILL HAVE AT LEAST 9 ASSURANCE THAT NO MORE THAN lox OFTHE POPULACE WILL BE EXPOSED TO AS MUCH AS 50 RAD • • SURFACE BURSTS WILL NOT BE USED EXCEPT FOR ADM • WEAPON YIELDS FOR BOTH COMBATANTS ARE LIMITED TO 50 KILOTON OR LESS Figure 10 The rationale for the 150 kilometer factor is that it approximates the size of an area occupied by both the Army 75 corps and Soviei tank army with combat service support for both combatants Soviet tank army depth is 100 km front units supporting army will be in the next 50 km Related to the war games restraints is the assumption that each combatant has certain facilities or resources that it does not want destroyed--or similar facilities belonging to enemy forces which it will not attack In other words population centers industrial areas or politically significant locations are not likely to be 'attacked by nuclear weapons unless 1 such action decisively affects the battle or 2 the areas contain resources vitaL to both combatants ' '-' ' ' ' - ·- · f F T · 1 j H iFTft 1 1I 7 1 j r DTr '• i ' ' W f it Yt V ¥ i lv i f r lY Btlt gr E r ' O··'l'''t · 'S · '·1 • ' 't ' ' r··· · ' ' J ' 1 ' t · lot ' t A f ff I · · i t c J J t$ ' ' l ft ' · · · 1 J '· 'I 'il ''l t''''' ' '' t ' ' ' • I ''' '' ' • r ' l '_ ' · ' ·· li· ' • ' • • '1' ' ' c i i'j' Vi i qt lf J t ii f't j i J fj r -c' H e '- - - - '- ser a '0 1 res s nd a ' -1- - is at best a speculative matter Assurance that escalation can be prevented is not possible on the basis of military considerations alone However ·the NUWAR Study assumes that geographical restrictions apply and that no strategic exchange of ' nuclear weapons will occur One point to be emphasized is that during wargames 3 if certain tactics or doctrine are unsuccessful and will ultimately-lead to the defea tof US forces the dynamic play will be redirected and alternative solutions sought The intent here is to avoid wasting time on obviously unworkable concepts and to make maximum use of dynamic playas a medium for developing f a sible alternatives _ _ _ • _ _o _ _ ' - • • iii _i_IMi The war game portion of the NUWAR project has been contracted to the Institute of Comb ned Arms and Support-Research Organization a division of Booze-Allen Applied Research Incorporated Figure 11 shows the time phasing for the war game activity The preparatory phase included identification of data sources development of the data base and static and sensitivity analysis As its principal tool in addition to more than 40 personnel to conduct the war game ICAS-RO developed the DIVTAG II model DIVTAG is an acronym for DIVision Through Army Group DIVTAG II is a combat simulation model designed to assist in the evaluation of organizational and tactical doctrine for large units Low mid and high intensity warfare can be simulated without model alternation All doctrine is externally controlled so there exists no fixed doctrine within the model Activities of the Navy and Air Force can be played in support of Army activities NUWAR WAR GAME PREPARATION 1 OCT 68 OR WAR GAME DYNAM I CPLA Y 15 MAY 69 15 SEP 69 EVALUATION 15 NOV 69 Figure 11 DIVTAG II simulates an extremely broad spectrum of military activity which includes ground operations air operations close combat engagements and special weapon assessments DIVTAG II is formally describe 1 as a computerized two-sided symmetric combat simulation In application in war games it can be open semiopen or closed It is basically rigid but can be operated with semirigid intelligence and special weapons assessment Unit time and space resolution can be as small as platoon centiminute 0 01 minute and meter As a maximum DIVTAG II can play units up to army length of period in a single run up to approximately 7 days and size of battlefield up to 8000 km square As many as 1000 units of varying types and sizes can be played discretely in a Single game Using DIVTAG II and the postulated doctrinal concepts furnished ICAS-RO is now conducting the defensive phases of the war games The data produced in each of the offensive and defensive phases will when analyzed and evaluated indicate the comparative utility of the several competing alternatives The dynamic play of two defensive games has been completed Analysis and evaluation of the data produced in these games is currently in progress and at the same time other games are being played One of the games completed utilized the area type defense with the US forces in company s zed granules The other 146 _ ' A D game employed the mobile defense with battalion sized granules Both of these games and thos e that follow are fought over the same terrain with both antagonists always starting at the beginning of the war We are trying to eliminate any gene·ration of comparative data that is due to accidental or artificial game differences In both games played the US forces reached predetermined defeat criteria within 3 hours after the start of dynamic play The Soviet forces reached the predetermined defeat criteria almost simultaneously with the US forces in the company granule-area defense While not quite reaching defeat criteria in the battalion granule-mobile defense game the Soviet forces were incapable of continuing their mission without substantial reinforcement These facts must be tempered with the realization that the defeat criteria are artificial game criteria and that we have not completed our evaluation as to why events occurred as they did In both games the Soviet forces fired about 85 nuclear weapons while the US forces fired about 55 weapons A consistent aspect of both games was that dispersion did not prevent targeting Most targets acquired by both sides were company sized Once acquired these company targets were rapidly attacked with nuclear weapons by both sides The findings of the war game will be further evaluated as previously indicated in Troop Test Frontier Shield n This troop test is tentatively scheduled for January 1971 in Europe The tentative concept of test calls for the use of an Army 75 brigade with its slice of division and corps support and opposed by appropriate enemy units The friendly force will conduct defensive operations for four days and offensive operations for one day Summary In summary the NUWAR study will lead us to an answer to the question How do you fight and win a tactical nuclear battle Gentlemen this concludes the briefing Are there any questions 147 Question and Answer Period GA RWIN IBM As I understand it it I s the Soviet doctrine to use a chemi aI agent in conjunction with their nuclear weapons Is this taken into account in your war games and in your troop tests KNOX No we are not going to play chemical agents in either the war game or the troop test We have considered it in the doctrine but we are not going to play it We are attempting to keep the program within manageable limits GARWIN So far as I remember it Dr Ord yesterday said that in some of the Soviet exercises about equal numbers of FROG's with chemical_ warheads and with nuclear warheads were employed It seems to me that this doesn't model the situation properly if one neglects the chemical ag ent KNOX I believe in recent years the proportion of nuclear weapons has gone up in their exercise I am not sure about that point However I do know you can prepare for chemical operations with equipment ratner than with new tactical doc-· trine I don't believe it would invalidate our findings to concentrate on the nuclear aspects without at this time considering the hemicaI aspects - - DOUGHERTY SLA What kill criterion do you use In your game or exercises do you check the sensitivity of the assumptions for example what's killing people KNOX Most of the casualties in these first two games have been from the effects of nuclear weapons DOUGHERTY tation What rad level for instance do you use as kill or incapaci- KNOX The generally accepted 650 plus or minus 150 rad • is the kill criterion-LD50 Neither this information or any other information available was precise enough for war games So we assigned killing doses ·of radiation going-all the way up to 3000 rad exposure For instance someone getting a3000 rad exposure was expected to be of no more use to the forces involved from that instant on Those with lesser amounts of radiation were not expected to be of anyuse in a few hours We have documented the assigned radiation levels that we used to put people in an ineffective category but we are not claiming that we reflect objective truth since there are no figures to reflect this truth McDONALD LRL You said that Oregon Trail was not accepted because from a paper study it was apparent that the equipment to carry· out this deployment was not available in the '68 to '72 time scale and also apparently there was serious concern about command and control aspects r gather your field test of this more or less proved this point in the '66- '67 operation that you spoke about What would you say is the most significant change that your new study projects for that system over the things that the Oregon Trail study itself proposed Is it j lst that you are now looking at '75 technology 148 • • KNOX We are looking at '75 technology We are attempting to make s re that all the material we use is actually in being or we have some strong reason to expect it to be in being For in tance we are not using y nuclear weapons that have not reached at least Phase III I suppose this is one of the biggest differences in the stUdy We are trying to get a reasonable balance between eing able to fight in a nuclear configuration and maintaining a large or acceptable conventional capability for each individual unit McDONALD I would suggest that if you' are using only weapons that have already reached Phase III and you are looking in the '75 time frame you may be denying yourself weapons that are under very active study at this time and this may not give you the right kind of answers It-certainly won't assist you in trying to find out what weapons yould like to see developed in that sort of time frame That might bias the study in a rather unfortunate way KNOX We recognize this problem but we gave more weight to the possibility of having our study appear to turn on the appearance of new weapons We hope that we are going to create doctrine that is not so dependent on an'individual weapon that comes up in the future McDONALD Let me ask you a specific question about a new weapon system I lmow Oregon Trail was quite dependent on the AD-70 concept or I guess we call it SAM-D now and will call it something different'next year Is there some such air defense field army error and short range missile defense system postulated in your study or not KNOX Not SAM-D KING AFXPD On what premise do you employ nuclear weapons as a people killer I am curious as to why you would fire- a nuclear weapon What causes you to fire it KNOX We came up with some criteria for the gamers based on threat to the units they are playing that they are representing Essentially a company or larger element immediately opposing some American element is worth a nuclear weapon Then we put some restraints into the gamers' instructions-they are not to deliberately over-kill there are prohibitions against area fire and we try t make them use it reasonably KING Are you using improved fragmentation KNOX Yes sir we are-conventional improved fragmentation • p - SQUIRE LRL One surprise of Oregon Trail is the apparent requirement for some 30 OOO or so nuclear weapons Lwonder-if you would extrapolate the level of the battle that you were talking about in NUWAR to say NATO-what does the quantitative requirement in nuclear weapons turn out to be -- - KNOX So far we have not addressed the problem of maki g this arequir '- ment study We are trying to keep it in a doctrinal area _ We have attempted to - use as the inventory available to the Air Forces-in both ar eas what we believe may become available in the time fr ame But as far as requirements are ·stURE 149 concerned this study really doesn't address that problem 'in the best manner it wasn't intended to We are going to investigate what would happen if the US force had 25 percent-or 50 percent-as many we pons as it· does But this study is really not a requirement study • LAUREYNS General Dynamics What was the principal means of gaining intelligence for the use of your nuclear weapons and are the results very sensitive to that means of locating and identifying units to be attacked KNOX All the sensor elements that are available to the· division either organic or at services are played in the game including Air FOI 'ce RECCE Army Aviation acoustical devices seismic devices patrols and listening post radar We have attempted at great length to get accurate factors 'for their capabilities ground into the machine and I believe we have after severalfalse starts LAUREYNS You couldn't identify certain of those elements as being the most frequently used or most effective KNOX In the early stages there was a four-hour period when the opposing force the Soviet force was across the border and moving toward our FEBA During that period the Air Force RECCE was most effective After that period which stopped at about 1200 or 1130 in the morning the ground combat started around noon after that time I don't know just who go the most targets 150 • SECRET lRO Colonel James M Page USA USAREUR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARFARE 1972 - 1978 The nuclear capability of US Army Forces Europe has grown from a single gun battalion first introduced in June 1953 to the present capability which ranges in size from the 155 mm howitzer with a range of about 14 km to the Pershing missile with a maximum range of approximately 740 km As our capability has increased we have also seen the capability of the Warsaw Pact forces increase and today we have nuclear giants facing each other in Europe both sides having a capability to engage in strategic and tactical nuclear warfare The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize you with USAREUR's concepts and weapons requirements to fight a tactical nuclear war A USAREUR study on tactical nuclear weapons requirements Central Europe 1972-1978 was completed in October of last year The study had a twofold purpose 1 to postulate USAREUR's concepts and requirements and 2 to stimulate discussion about these concepts between and among the national forces comprised in the Central Army Group Europe The study was forwarded to selected NATO and US Headquarters for review and consideration in the computation of nuclear weapons requirements for Central Europe The information presented tOday represents approved USAREUR concepts and at the present time stated requirements remain under consideration at various higher headquarters You will notice that this study concentrates upon the requirements and justification for ground tactical weapons oecause they are our business We recognize the essential nature of Air Force requirements and do not intend by our study to reflect otherwise 151 The briefing will cover the following aspects of tactical nuclear war 1 Concept 2 Threat 3 Weapon requirement CINCUSAREUR's tactical nuclear concepts are 1 Avoiding strategic exchange 2 Battle area deployment 3 Phases of operation Stabiliz ation Nuclear dominance Exploitation Tactical nuclear weapons as a deterrent are only as effective as our ability and willingness to employ them coupled with the enemy's knowledge of our winingness The requirement to utilize tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe could arise in any of several ways It could arise as a result of conventional attack and escalate to a-tactical nuclear war or it could be caused by a surprise nuclear attack In any case the basic requirement would probably arise from a miscalculation on the part of the Warsaw Pact If a conventional attack were made against Central Europe by the Warsaw Pact the Warsaw Pact authorities must have considered that there was a good chance that NATO would either risk defeat and not use nuclear weapons at an or would not use them either in time or in such a way as to prevent the Warsaw Pact from attaining its objectives On this basis the inference would be that either the Warsaw Pact had a reason to doubt NATO's will to go nuclear or had set itself a geographically limited objective capable of early attainment or had launched an aggression whose scope could be modified according to NATO's response It is not NATO's desire to initiate a nuclear war however the choice may be forced upqn us as a matter of survival We must at that time be prepared to use our weapons In the event a nuclear war starts it is reasonable to believe that both the United States and the Soviets win try to avoid a strategic nuclear exchange because of the mutual devastation and casualties that would be inflicted Consequently in a NA TO- Warsaw Pact confrontation the employment of nuclear weapons would probably be restricted to the battle area or would be restricted by other mutually advantageous constraints Both NA TO and the Warsaw Pact possess the forces and the tactical nuclear weapons to mount such a war Therefore a tactical nuclear war is expressed as a realistic option that may occur on the European continent 152 ti' f nIT 1 '7 In conjunction with this is the concept of the initial employment of nuclear weapons The initial employment would certainly demonstrate our willingness to use our weapons and the 'strike if used with precision could well cause the enemy to reconsider halt his aggression and retire behind his borders The initial weapons employment could be limited to a small strip of territory on the eastern border of the Federal Republic and the western border of the Pact to minimize civilian casualties This border strip is thinly populated so the effects on the population would be minimized The longer the release of weapons is delayed the farther the enemy will advance and the greater will be the likelihood of increasing the number of friendly civilian casualties see Figure 1 The first option to be employed could be atomic demolition munitions utilized to enhance natural barriers and create obstacles to enemy movement These weapons are essentially defensive in nature noncasualty producing and if buried would produce relatively little fallout ADM employment coupled with appropriate warning to the Warsaw Pact would certainly provide unmistakable evidence of NA TO intentions while restricting effect to NATO territory In the event the Warsaw Pact forces breached the barrier and continued to advance then the next step would be a simultaneous attack with small yield tactical nuclear weapons employed across the central front see Figure 2 This selected nuclear response must provide for employment of sufficient weapons to render an enemy incapable of immediately continuing the attack Small yield weapons airburst with small delivery errors would be used both for precision and to minimize civilian casualties The weapons should be delivered as nearly simultaneously as possible along the entire central front The numbers of weapons and the simultaneous strike are both necessary 1 to illustrate to the aggressor the penalty of his aggression 2 to illustrate that no part of the battlefield is a sanctuary and 3 to demonstrate NATO's unity of purpose in defense of NA TO territory Counterattacks in conjunction with this nuclear strike would be characterized by sbort sharp small unit actions This initial blow should face the enemy with the extremely difficult problem of what to do next-quit the attack respond in kind or escalate If he responds in kind or escalates we then need a concept to fight this escalated but still limited war This expanded tactical nuclear conflict has been called a sanctuary war by some a sanctuary because neither the US nor Soviet homelands would be struck Our concept to fight the expanded or theater nuclear war-which is still localizedis identified in three phases Phase 1 Stabilization -- The initial phase would be characterized by NATO ground elements seeking out and destroying as first priority the Warsaw Pact nuclear delivery means Friendly ground forces would be assisted where possible by air elements that could be diverted from the air battle The second priority efforts would be the destruction of his maneuver units and control elements NATO units particularly nuclear delivery units would move frequently under cover of darkness in order not to be targeted and destroyed Command and control would be tenuous at best because communication would be disrupted by electromagnetic effects Logistical support would be disrupted In the tactical units survivability would be paramount and would be in direct ratio to the state of training of the unit and the caliber of leadership at the middle and lower levels During this period 153 PR Jil1uf ---- Figure 1 Figure 2 154 the bulk of the friendly air effort would be directed to winning the air battle At the end of Phase I USAREUR anticipates a force disposition characterized by small maneuver units and scattered nuclear delivery means Phase II Nuclear Dominance -- The aim of surviving fighting units must be completion of the destruction of the Warsaw Pact nuclear delivery means At the same time the capability to recover and reform maneuver elements and residual nuclear delivery capabilities must be maintained Nuclear supremacy can be achieved by a combination of actions 1 Destroying or causing the enemy to exhaust his supply of nuclear warheads 2 Destroying the enemy's delivery vehicles 3 Rendering his launcher crews and assembly teams casualties During this period surviving NA TO combat elements would consolidate into battalion size formations Disrupted command and control would be re- established and nuclear delivery fire units incorporated into these task forces so that residual nuclear weapons would be available to support the next phase Maintaining contact with surviving air elements would be critical to continued air support and target acquisition operations Logistic support would be re-established by 1 Locating surviving supply dumps and indigenous resources 2 Initiating recovery operations to place serviceable equipment back into operation 3 Aerial resupply Phase III Exploitation - - NA TO forces at this point would conduct comparatively small scale military operations against a weakened disorganized and demoralized enemy The NA TO task forces would continue the process of reconstituting units probably as national groupings Thus combat forces responsive to a command and control organization would continue to grow and would ultimately destroy or eject surviving Warsaw Pact forces remaining on NA TO territory After determining the concept of phasing the war it becomes necessary to examine the threat see Figure 3 The Soviet ground forces will remain the largest element of the Soviet establishment Their availability supports the concept of large numbers of divisions advancing rapidly along the avenues of approach through NATO defenses in the aftermath of a nuclear exchange Virtually all of their divisions are either tank or motorized rifle divisions They have been streamlined and with nuclear fire support are designed conceptually to advance as rapidly as 100 km per day Their equipment is rugged simple and standardized and should continue to function for long periods of time without breakdown The logistical system is designed to support this rate of advance Any POL problems would be largely solved if the Soviets acquired even a small part of the POL stored in the Federal Republic of Germany near the Warsaw Pact border The Warsaw Pact would mount a combat ready force of 79 divisions 61 immediately available and 18 more within six days 155 - 4 - -- Figure 3 This force is supported by tactical nuclear delivery systems Soviet tactical nuclear delivery systems will consist of the free rocket over ground or FROG which is organic to Warsaw Pact divisions a follow-on or SCUD guided missile with capabilities similar to NATO'sPershing and a longer range SS-12 guided missile in support of the front organization see Figure 4 Current launcher estimates show 237 - 316 FROG's and 190 SCUD's and SS-12's available to support the force Approximately 3800 tactical aircraft would be available and 580 of these would be light bomber or RECCE aircraft see Figure 5 For comparison purposes the approximate number of ground delivery systems in Central Europe for both NA TO and Warsaw Pact forces are shown on Figure 6 The weapons are categorized as cannon artillery rockets and short range ballistic missiles As you can see at this time we have an absolute advantage in cannon artillery In order to make the delivery comparison more meaningful the medium range ballistic capabilities of both forces are shown You will note that in this field the Soviets have an absolute advantage vis-a -vis NATO A study was made of this threat to develop the target array wit-hin a division slice of the combined arms army Hi6 Figure 4 Both fixed and mobile targets will be attacked by NA TO forces in a nuclear war in the Central Europe region Typical fixed targets are airfields rail centers communications centers critical road intersections bridges supply installations and nuclear weapons storage sites Weapons for these fixed targets are in SACEUR's nuclear strike plan and were not considered in our study of requirements for a tactical nuclear war Mobile targets are normally tactical force locations that move at random periods of time and they are addressed Fixed targets are described in three dimensions-map coordinates and altitude mobile targets in four dimensions-map coordinates altitude and the time the target is at these coordinates Rarely can the fourth dimension be accurately forecast so an estimated time must be used Numerous war games have been conducted to establish a realistic number of mobile targets Conclusions from these studies indicate that a division slice of targets in a Warsaw Pact front is the best methodology This division slice of targets includes division maneuver elements control headquarters fire support and logistic facilities as well as the nuclear delivery units in a combined arms army back to 60 km in the rear of the area's forward edge These war games have indicated that in an area of 60 km beyond the battle area's forward edge on a division front there were 79 targets categorized as shown in Figure 7 1 17 h _' _ i ' i t l_ _ Figure 5 Category I Targets -- Nuclear delivery units surface-to-air missile units and their control headquarters The threat represented by this type of target is serious enough to warrant 900 0 assurance of 1000 0 destruction Figure 8 represents a schematic of a division slice extending from the FEBA to a depth of 60 km into the enemy rear zone You wi1l note that there are 10 Category I targets located at various distances from the forward edge of the battle area The distances are measured in kilometers with the 10 targets located in an ar ea between 4 and 60 km A1l must be successfu1ly attacked Category II Targets -- Aviation artillery infantry and tank units of company size or larger and regimental size headquarters see Figure 9 The threat of this category of targets is considered to require a 900 0 assurance of 500 0 destruction There are 60 Category II targets and at least 500 0 destruction must be reached here Category III Targets -- Engineer signal and combat service support units or activities see Figure 10 These targets do not represent an immediate direct threat This threat requires only a 900 0 assurance of 33% destruction There are 9 of this category and 3 must be successfu1ly attacked 158 Note that airfields are not listed in the target categories for as mentioned previously they are programmed for attack in SACEUR's scheduled program I wish to emphasize that we do not program for destruction of every target in the division slice but rather only the minimum number of targets necessary to insure their defeat Of the targets to be attacked you will note that the level of assurance of destruction is commensurate with the threat of the individual target Our study reveals that 43 of the 79 targets in the Warsaw Pact division slice must be successfully attacked in order to defeat the division see Figure 11 COMPARI SON OF DELIVERY MEANS CANNON ARTY NATO WARSAW PACT 600 plus 055 8 0 ROCKETS 125 plus HJ 237 -316 FROG's SRBM 50 plus SGTIPERSH 190 MRBM 0 600 plus SCU D's-SS -12 Figure 6 TARGETS CATEGORY I - NUCLEAR DELIVERY UNITS SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE UNITS CONTROL HEADQUARTERS 9 1fo ASSURANCE OF lO Ifo DESTRUCTION CATEGORY II - AVIATION ARTILLERY INFANTRY AND TANK UNITS CO AND LARGER REGT'L SIZE HEADQUARTERS 9 1fo ASSURANCE OF 5 1fo DESTRUCTION CATEGORY 111- ENGINEER SIGNAL AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS 9 1fo ASSURANCE OF 33% DESTRUCTION Figure 7 159 -- _ ' - -- - - -- - - DIVISION SLICE TARGETS FEBA - - - - j X X - j j - 2 KM - j j - 4 KM X X - 12 KM - - - - - - CAT I 24KM - IJ - - It j - j It jJ 60KM Figure 8 DIVISION SLICE TARGETS FEBA • • • • 2 KM • - -• - -• • - -• - - • 4 KM 0 J X • • • • X • • • 1• • • • • • • X X • • • • •- •- -• -• - - • 12 KM • • IiJ • • • • • • 24KM 00 • • • • • • - - - - - • • • • • •- - - • - -• 60KM - CAT I 160 Figure 9 • CAT II ' I DIVISION SLICE TARGETS • • • • • • • • • • - J X • • 0 • • • X • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • •0 •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 0 • • • • • • e FEBA 2 KM 4 KM X X 12 KM 24KM • CAT I 0 • CAT II CAT III 60KM Figure 10 DIVISION SLICE TARGETS TOTAL 79 ATTACK 43 FEBA • • •• • - • 2 KM • • • • • J 4 KM X • 0 • • • X • • • • • • • • • •• XX • • • • 0 • • • • J • • • 0 - • • 12 KM • • • • 0 • j • • 24KM • •0 • • J • • • • • 60KM CAT I 0 CAT II CAT III • 0 e Figure 11 OEO E' Jal 161 II- -- - Based on the distance of the targets from the forward edge of the battle area and the ranges of our weapons systems the following weapons will be utilized 1 The 155 mm howitzer for targets from 0 - 12 km from the FEBA see Figure 12 2 The 8 inch howitzer for targets from 2 - 12 km from the FEBA see Figure 13 3 The Hone s t Jo h n for targets from 12 - 24 kID see Figure 14 4 5 6 The S erg e an t for targets out to 60 km see Figure 15 The Lan c e missile system which although not in current army inventory is scheduled for introduction into USAREUR in 1972 and was included as one of the weapons systems It will cover the same range of targets a the S erg e ant and Honest John Tactical air see Figure 16 which will range throughout the battle area Operational factors that impact on the types and numbers of weapons required are shown in Figure 17 Most of these operational factors have been utilized in previous nuclear weapons requirements studies However the operational factor of target mobility was utilized for the first time in this weapons requirement study This factor represents the probability that a target will remain in place from time of discovery until a nuclear strike occurs After consideration of these factors it is evident that more than one weapon must be programmed per target to achieve the level of destruction necessary yet we have presented the worst case to ourselves We have not programmed weapons for all 79 targets in the division slice nor have we overkilled those targets that did not require a higher level of destruction Figure 18 shows a requirement for approximately 125 nuclear weapons to defeat 43 of the 79 targets in a division slice Cannon refers to weapons such as the 155 mm and 8 inch howitzer Ro c ke t to the Hone s t Jo hn and SRBM or short range ballistic missile to the S erg e ant or L anc e Strike RECCE aircraft may be used to restrike targets and to attack mobile targets DELETED Ad-dlT10l lafweapons se'e -£i1 gure 18 J -must be provIded to -aIhick-Ehe--mooite-mlss fle units and other front targets more than 60 km in the rear of the FEBA The figure 900 represents the approximate total for defeat of all such targets in the central region As a result of our study we find that we need approximately 12 000 weapons to fight a successful tactical nuclear war in Central Europe In Figure 20 AD refers to air defense specifically the Nike Hercules system to provide nuclear defense against airborne targets The number of Air Force weapons required is more than present allocations 162 _ J _ • Hr- r't -' - jf rr - I IG5 it t j • • I Figure 15 lf5fi • IG7 OPERATIONAL FACTORS • • DELIVERY UNIT SURVIVAL -WEAPON READINESS _ ABill TY TO PENETRATE _ LAUNCH PROBAB I L1TY _ IN FLIGHT RELIABILITY • ACCURACY OF TARGET LOCATIONS AND TARGET MOB I L1TY Figure 17 WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS APPROX DIVIS ION SLICE WEAPONS SYSTEM CANNON 85 l2 ' ROCKET 15 5 SRBM 20 125 STR I KE -RECCE TOTAL RESTRIKE OF CAT I TO INSURE DESTRUCTION AS REQUIRED Figure 18 FRONT TARGETS APPROX TARGETS WEAPONS SRBM 150 300 PERSHING 122 330 STR I KE-RECCE 272 270' ' WEAPON SYSTEM TOTAL 900 RESTRIKE OF CAT I TO INSURE DESTRUCTION AS REQU IRED Figure 19 ___ - iii - If _ - ---- -_ -_ a - WEAPONS REQU IREMENTS ALLOCATIONS DELETED Figure 20 Considering the threat that opposes us we feel our study reflects the minimum number of _e pons ecessary to do the job and we feel this requirement is an attainable goal '11If6 i rfJC'J 'I 6 - ' '''' ·DELETED I In postulating our requirements we studied weapons systems that are not current 1y in our inventory Examples are the Lance and the 175 mm nuclear round It ars that the Lance is a virtual certainty but we will not receive the 175 mm nUL ear round in the foreseeable future Because of these and other changes the USAREUR study is being updated this year One item of major concern which is recognized by our study is the imbalance between weapons mix requirements and assets physically on hand The imbalance is _ ost apparent in cannon artillery and Honest John see Figure 21 ' - I f 0 DELETED WEAPONS MIX IMBALANCE STUDY REQUIREMENTS CANNON 7000 HJ 1100 CURRENT ALLOCATION DI FFERENCE DELETED Figure 21 - J A1 169 DVt DELETED G J l As mentioned earlier this study was presented to selected NA TO Headquarters and so far it appears that their response has been favorable They have agreed with the concept and methodology used Some of CINCENT's comments as they were passed to SACEUR are as follows The AFCENT contribution closely parallels the USAREUR study in several areas and in particular with the percentage of targets engaged and the factors in computing the numbers of weapons per target It is suggested that the nuclear concept of operations should be examined in detail by SHAPE and that future studies consider the concept proposed by USAREUR CINCENT is the Commander in Chief Allied Forces Central Europe He commands both the Northern and Central Army Groups USAREUR and 7th Army are a part of the Central Army Group Another of the Headquarters receiving the study was SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and it is evident that the USAREUR study had an influence on SHAPE thinking because in computing their latest weapons requirements SHAPE for the first time used the target mobility factor as did the USAREUR study In summary we have presented to you USAREUR's concept of fighting and winning a tactical nuclear war together with a determination of the number of weapons required to support the concept The successful defense of NATO Europe must include the option of a tactical nuclear war 170 Question and Answer Period CARNE RAND Corp The previous speaker and you also commented on the importance of command and control You were going to use a responsive command and control system to tie all this together The question is how are you planning to do it PAGE This could develop into quite a discussion I assume you would be interested in the step-by-step sequence as well as the overall command and control CARNE For this discussion concentrate on the question of what basic means of survivable command and control you are going to have I assume you are going to keep all this under control tie in the various scattered elements and so on at a very high level of nuclear violence PAGE This is going to be quite difficult because of the problems that we might run into in using radio equipment which is what we are heavily dependent upon at this time I don't have an answer for a very high level command and control We anticipate that the shorter range radio communicatioIi will not be knocked out for a considerable period of time Long range systems may be CARNE Could you make any assumptions regarding the availability of mallard or tactical concept PAGE Not in this study I might point out that in this year's study command and control target acquisition and atomic demolitions will be addressed much more deeply than they were in last year's study FOWLER DDR E Referring to the previous talk are there some generalizations that one can make concerning the need for a different troop or battle deployment for nuclear war and whether those deployments are more vulnerable to the other kind of war That is if you are in a nonnuclear deployment are you more vulnerable to nuclear attack and vice versa If so that must be quite a transitior problem both from a communication and a decision point of view I am wondering if that problem was addressed in either your or the previous speaker's study PAGE I think we all recognize the transition problem and the fact that if you are fighting a conventional war your posture on the ground is much more concentrated the same on the other side In the conventional posture the linear distance occupied on the ground is about two-thirds that occupied by a nuclear spread formation Therefore if you are in a conventional posture when the enemy hits you you present a much more concentrated lucrative target This is one reason that we considered a simultaneous strike across the front as one of our early options with the purpose of bringing the enemy lead echelons to a halt We postulated that they would be in a conventional posture at that time presenting more lucrative targets We would concentrate on the maneuver battalions and we would only use divisional size weapons-that means up through the Honest John-with the purpose primarily 171 1EO of stopping the lead divisions for one to three days while they considered what they were going to do This gives us an opportunity to transition to a nuclear posture deliver the nuclear str-ike and be less vulnerable to any counterr leaSUres or reaction by the enemy FOWLER Am I correct that you are more vulnerable to a nonnuclear attack if you are in a nuclear disposition PAGE You have trouble massing to oppose the enemy's massed attack-that isco WALSKE DOD In your simultaneous strike about how many weapons would be used PAGE This depends on the threat Taking into consideration the changes that have occurred since Czechoslovakia in the upgrading in the readiness of the Warsaw Pact forces the additional divisions that are in Category I we postulated in the central region 20 Warsaw Pact divisions as the lead elements of the first echelon We would go after the maneuver battalions only in these 20 lead divisions The depth of the attack would not exceed 25 or 26 km from the FEBA and we would visualize us ng bE tween 247 and 260 small yield weapons 10 kt or less in most DoE instances 10 1 0- ' DELETED' PAGE We would use those primarily close to the forward edge of the battle area FEBA which is where we utilize most of our weapons by the way I might point out that in those 125 weapons we have provisions for restrike strike RECCE aircraft The weapons may never be fired In this consideration the weapon requirement may drop from 125 down to 90 or so and the same with the mobility factor I can't really answer your question on how much we could reduce the number of weapons if we had the longer range improved tube weapons ORR USARPAC You said you'd start with the ADM as your threshold-what happened to the Hercules I can see the Russians coming to the border but they are going to send their air ahead of them and your threshold is going to be at the Hercules PAGE Let me say as far as the air defense is concerned the use of the Hercules could occur before during or after use of the ADM it would depend strictly on the air threat what kind of a massive attack they launched and the effect on or threat to the maintenance of our nuclear capability in aircraft Although I didn't mention it here Nike Hercules air defense weapons may well be utilized long before ADM They are again essentially defensive ORR This brings out the need for quick release of nuclear weapons because you ha Yean immediate decision when you see them coming 172 PAGE Selective release procedures yes REP HOLIFIELD Why was the Davy Crockett scrapped PAGE I am sorry I am not in a position to answer that question REP HOLIFIELD On the theory that you need maneuverability--and this involved only two men in a jeep and you had between 2000 and 3000 of them in Europe-I just wondered why they were withdrawn particularly when you say you have 5700 deficit in the tubular units That is a simple question and someone ought 'to be able to answer it COWAN 3rd Armored Division I think I can answer Davy Crockett was brought into the inventory and was actually used the last time I guess in the Berlin crisis of 1961 The problems with Davy Crockett were twofold 1 Since it was essentially a platoon weapon command and control was a problem and there apparently was great fear that some sergeant would start a nuclear war 2 the resources that the Army had to provide to actually keep Davy Crockett in the field were a higher price than the net worth of the weapon at that particular time In fairness to this weapon it did represent a significant advance in the technical state of the art both from the design and the production viewpoint and I think the laboratory responsible for the design and production deserves a great deal of credit It is unfortunate that we were not able to fit it into our command and control and manpower system more effectively I think it was a little bit ahead of its time HOERLIN LASL I wonder to what extent weather conditions are a parameter in your studies It seems probable that during the normally prevailing westerly winds in Europe the result will be one thing but with easterly winds-and there are long periods of easterly winds-the result could be different PAGE This was primarily a weapons requirement study and consideration of weather was not specifically addressed in this study You realize that constraints are placed by SACEUR on our use of weapons as to the number types of yields size of yields and what weapons if any can be burst on the surface Primarily the weapons utilized would be airburst HOERLIN In case of first engagement of the size you described what is the integrated fallout dose for unprotected populations PAGE By integrated you mean the total over the whole battle area ' HOERLIN No the integrated over time for a particular location PAGE I don't know NEWHOUSE TRW You postulate a high attrition environment How do you intend to implement your RECCE strike concept that you talked about PAGE You mean the strike RECCE going out to check whether or not the targets have in fact been struck 173 - p SEDRIT IA NEWHOUSE I would assume when you talk about RECCE strike you are talking about target acquisition and also the strike I am concerned about how you intend to implement the target acquisition feature in particular PAGE Again I can merely say that this subject is receiving additional emphasis in the up-date study this year ' ' GARBLIK McDo ell Douglas · ' I tv O DELETED PAGE f Will these be phased out of the stockpile 0l LffEDtems range up to the Pershing of course «- They were available as they were available here In other words this was a limitation placed on the just game and not a limitation on the delivery capability that exists I NELSON LRL In your operation plan you had great emphasis on knocking out the enemy's ability to deliver his weapons on you Considering the range of FROG and SCUD and the range of the weapons that you have available how do you intend to knock him out PAGE We considered the use of the Lance as well as the Pershing for the greater ranges Location of the FROG and some of the others was quite difficult You would have to use aircraft on some of these targets at the ranges you are talking about DILLAWAY AMC In you presentation you have three categories of targets in l3 very tight area you selected low yield weapons for particular targets with high kill probability but you also assumed you had good RECCE and command control on this This to me assumes they aren't hitting you and the r8sult is that you have a mismatch of weapons Assuming that you do have a condition where the UCM and command and control are not favorable to you is your new study going to look at using higher yield weapons to approach an area destruction which might result in a more favorable mix PAGE This is one of the things we will look at Of course we are interested in discrete targeting because we are working in a multinational arena and we are interested in limiting destruction primarily to military targets This presents a problem when you are fighting in an industrialized heavily populated area In most instances we try to use the lowest yield and if necessary two small weapons rather than one NELSON LRL This requires that you have good RECCE and good electronics also your model assumes that you have a great number of targets in a rather constrained area pAGE This is fairly typical as you will see if you look at the Soviet combined army and their disposition either in conventional or high intensity posture This is one thing that really affects requirement studies because you can go into quite a discussion about whether you should base your requirements on what you think you will find or whether you should base your requirements on the actual number of targets that ar·e there This makes a difference in your results arms 174 - _ -- _ ---_ _ --- r_ FOSTER SRI I had the opportunity to do a similar study in 1963-1964 in Europe and two things bothered me The first was the general strategic concept advanced under the McNamara strategy of conventional emphasis in the pause Obviously this hinges on the option of the German concept of no deep penetration being allowable on the MC 14 2 strategy and on the political directive of '56 which did not include the concept of a limited war prolonged in scope and in time in Europe Is that correct Is this founded on the graduated deterrent concept which accepts the original political directive PAGE We can consider the direct defense the forward defense if you will postulated in the MC 14 3 as a requirement Initially we would start fighting the battle conventionally However in this particular instance we feel that we must apply nuclear weapons early within the first one to three days or risk a serious breakthrough Remember I am not speaking for NA TO at this time- this is the feeling at USAREUR Headquarters FOWLER One to three days looks like more than one to three hours or minutes That is the reason I am asking the question That is not a one to three day operation you had there when you had those ADM's going off right along the political border PAGE No but this is basically what we feel within one to three days Of course it may well occur earlier than that particularly with air defense weapons If you have a massive air attack that is going to threaten the survivability of your entire force and your restrike or your strike capability particularly in nuclear weapons you might require nuclea weapons a lot earlier WHITE Lovelace In the tactical context what do you think is the ideal distribution behyeen artillery and rockets and missiles PAGE You are looking for a percentage WHITE The distribution between artillery and rockets in the Soviets was different from ours and I wondered if you considered it healthy for us to go ahead and maintain the preponderance of artillery There is either an advantage or a disadvantage in doing it and what is it PAGE We would like of course to maintain our artillery preponderance capability We would like to see it extended We would like to be able to reach out farther with tube artillery weapons accurately say 30 km because a lot of the targets we find are in that range We would also like to be able to counter this MRBM IRBM threat which we cannot do right now HOYT Lovelace Vhy don't the Soviets have tubular weapons then PAGE I don't know Perhaps they could There is no evidence they do have as you heard Dr Ord state but they have a capability Perhaps they are not interested in discrete targeting maybe they are interested in area concepts 175 sGEOftE' tRB COWAN I'd like to refer to the question before the last one with regard to MC 14 2 versus 14 3 General Burchinal pointed out yesterday that there is a significant change in the strategy which NATO plans to employ in 14 3 as compared with the trip-wire concept of 14 2 He brought out the three points-direct defense deliberate escalation and general nuclear response No one has placed a time limit as to when you would go from one to the other or whether you would ever start with direct defense Therefore you will see that m ilitary assessments of the situation we face in Europe vary in the scenarios depending upon the specific aspect of the situation which we are attempting to analyze and study HAMPTON- OSD-ISA As I understood your concept you intend to employ the 12 000 weapons in a band roughly 60 km wide 30 km on either side of the FEBA PAGE No the total of 12 000 weapons included those that would be utilized in the division slice in the first 60 km of F EBA It also included some 900 weapo s that would be utilized to attack front targets particularly the nuclear delivery means that are deeper than 60 km from the forward edge of the battle area In other words we would after the whole threat not just the 60 km band immediately opposite us This is if we got into the big battle which would require the 12 000 weapons HAMPTON It is apparent though that the major portion of the battle would be fought on NATO territory This is the thing that's politically unacceptable to our European allies and yet this is what you base your strategy on PAGE The area of the battle if we fought a tactical nuclear war would be just to NATO territory but also to the Warsaw Pact territory It would not involve the Soviet Union That is correct restri ot HAMPTON But when you speak of 900 weapons out of 12 000 and say that you would use these in the front area I still have to feel that most of your weapons are going to be actually fired on NATO territory PAGE That would depend upon the depth of penetration that you permitted before yoU started using them GIRARD RAC jJD b- DELETED If your own resources cannot make' 'a 'sigriificarit contri6ufioii'in getfingtire 8upenority over the enemy's nuclear threat against you why do you not direct them primarily against his maneuver eleiuents-in other words make those your Category I targets for the resources you were talking about PAGE Of course initially or at some time in the engagement the thing that can hurt us the worst is nuclear delivery means Next if you can knock out his command and control clcm nts for those things you have made a big step forward in enhancing your O'Nn survivability I'd like to point out that in our simultaneouS initial strike we do go after maneuver elements primarily because we want to halt the enemy right then The things that could hurt us the worst a e listed Category I items 176 GIRARD PAGE i Yes but they are outside your range of capability aren't they Not the FROG COGGAN North Am Rockwell Your study was predicated on simultaneous initial effort using AD VI's and going after front targets and it appears that at least in today's environment this is politically unacceptable to NATO Suppose you had to wait a day before you could get release from Washington or wherever to launch this simultaneous attack-how much impact does that have on the total number of weapons you should have at your disposal to win PAGE None whatsoever The ADM option as a possible first option and the simultaneous strike are possIbilities for initial use within our concept The number of weapons stated in the requirement is based on the total available targets in the threat that is postulated for the study Therefore the number of targets does not change There are 12 to 13 maneuver battalions for instance in each division There is a FROG battalion in each division Whether we use our step-bystep philosophy or hit all across the front in a simultaneous strike against the maneuver elements in lead divisions the total number of weapons required to attack these targets won't change COGGAN Then your total weapon requirement and its mix would stand the test of the decision-time-debate as far as working its way through NATO and back into our own country's stockpile PAGE The requirements for this study were based on what targets could be presented by the combined arms army so that remains fairly c nstant In this year's stUdy this would not bother the mix although it might bother the total number of requirements We are taking a hard look to see whether you need to hit say the 79th division as hard as you would the first division 177 This Page Intentionally Left Blank 178 w C Myre Sandia Laboratories Albuquerque SANDIA DEVELOPMENTS IN TACTICAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS Introduction A new class of tactical nuclear weapons has been shown to be feasible in exploratory development programs conducted at Sandia Laboratories and in other defense laboratories These programs envision a family of nuclear weapon systems designed to hold collateral damage to low levels by means of highly accurate delivery of subkiloton warheads These new systems can provide high probability of target destruction with weapon yields that are factors of 10 to 1000 lower than yields required in presently deployed tactical systems The new tactical systems could provide a variety of presently unavailable use options that would tend to make the US tactical deterrent posture more credible and therefore more effective Recent technology advances particularly in the areas of sophisticated terminal guidance systems and earth-penetration techniques provide the keys to the feasibility of these new tactical weapons The Sandia Laboratories' objectives have been to explore the implications these technologies could have for ordnance design investigate the technical feasibility of new weapons concepts examine the relative merits of these new systems and where warranted conclusively demonstrate these new options by full system design assembly and proof tests In 8 review of the current tactical nuclear stockpile see To ble I and Figure 1 one must be impressed with the diversity of delivery options and yield selections available to the tactical comm nder DELETED SOl1 8 of the choices that could be ma de for a parficul 1r to rget - 17 representative of a thermal electric power plant are shown in Figure 2 In this review of present capabilities however several other pertinent points become apparent Because the delivery accuracies CEP' s that can be achieved with these systems are large the warhead yields required for an acceptable target kill prob'ability are large of the order of 1 to 100 kt Weapon yields of this magnitude result in considerable collateral damage which in many cases is not desirable Affected areas of 5 to 100 square miles are typical Our willingness to use weapons of this size in close proximity to friendly troops or to defend allied territory is debatable However interesting observations can be made about the yield CEP combinations in Figure 2 as the delivery system CEP is decreased below 200 feet the yield required to destroy this target is dramatically reduced and there is a corresponding reduction in the off-target area affected Some more specific advantages of accurate systems are pointed out in Figure 3 As can be seen a significantly smaller yield can be used for successful attack of a given target as the CEP is improved This chart was prepared for a target vulnerability of 10 psi harder targets which require increased yield demonstrate more dramatically the effects of system CEP Sandia's efforts have been centered in the area of accurately delivered systems this paper discusses the effectiveness of three of the new weapon systems that could provide these characteristics an earth-penetrating nuclear bomb Bayonet an air-carried rearward-fired IR seeking missile Beckett a new capability fa ' an existing weapon system Nike Hercules Earth - Penetra ting Weapon TABLE I Some Current Tactical Nuclear Systems nob _ l9 ---- S J y- s te m ----- Range km Accuracy CEP in ft Cannon 8-inch 16 800 Honest John 38 1000 140 660 Sergeant 300 Laydown LADD Aircraft LABS 1200 7 F I I DELETED • 8EORE'I - --- -- -- '1A -- LAYDOW DELETED n I -- Ir ---- ----O LABS OVER THE SHOULDER Figure 1 Existing delivery modes 10 000 IO-PSI TARGET VULNERABILITY OPTiMUM AIR BURST 5 000 2 000 Vl Cl or 1 000 '- or I- 500 200 500' 100 80 N 3 0 ' 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ' N 0 0 0 1000' '--- - S2 0 ' § VI ELD tkt Figu 1'e 3 Target radius versus yield 1'equi1'c d for expecl ed fractional damage 0 9 lBI The potential advantages of these systems however can better be realized by understanding the effects that burst options have upon collateral damage levels The two most interesting options are subsurface burst at optimum burst depth for the yield in question and airburst at optimum altitude for the yield in question Subsurface Nuclear Bursts There has long been an interest in earth-penetrating weapons However in past efforts the penetration data acquired were scanty and the characteristics of both the projectile and the soil were inadequately described In late 1960 studies were initiated at Sandia to investigate high-speed soil penetration phenomena These were later broadened to include penetration of water concrete and a wide spectrum of soil types This program has grown into a new science called terradynamics which is defined as that branch of dynamics which deals with the motion of soil and other solid materials and with the forces acting on bodies in motion relative to those materials In Sandia's efforts over 1000 field penetration tests have been conducted in earth materials including rock glacial ice soils bay muds and water a broad spectrum of vehicles shapes launching and impact velocities have been tested Analytical results are now available which allow reliable prediction of penetration performance The penetration nomogram see Figure 4 is based on the results of this effort Typical penetrators see Figure 5 are characterized by a high length-to-diameter ratio 10 or greater high frontal loading 10 psi or greater and pointed nose The terradynamics program has provided a firm technical base from which vehicles capable of penetrating the earth to depths of 200 feet can be confidently designed A low-yield nuclear weapon capable of penetrating the earth a few tens of feet before detonation offers the following major advantages 1 The prompt effects of thermal and nuclear radiation associated with atmospheric nuclear detonations are eliminated 2 The fallout resulting from an underground detonation is localized within a few crater radii As an example the area of 10 Rjhr at 1 hour may be reduced by factors of from 25 to 100 over comparable-yield surface-burst weapons 3 A given-size crater can be formed by 2 to 4 percent of the yield required for the same size crater from a surface-burst weapon The improvements that can be made in yield and fallout reduction are shown in Figures 6 and 7 Figure 6 depicts the weapon yields required to produce three constant-size craters 131- 77- or 48-foot radius as a function of detonation depth As can be seen for a crater radius of 77 feet a surface burst of 2 kt is required The same size crater can be provided by only 40 tons buried to a depth of 50 feet The combination of this yield reduction plus the radiation containment provided by burial will result in the fallout area reduction shown in Figure 7 For the previous example the fallout area is reduced from 10 square miles for surface burst to 0 1 square mile for bursts at 50-foot depths 182 VELOCITY V SOIL CONSTANT S ' 4 ' t u J 6 40 60 0z « - « 8 80 tw 20 c 0 0 u J u J 10 WEIGHT Ib NOSE Figure 4 0 Earth penetration nomogram Figur 5 Typical REB vehicle --- 183 R 77 It - Q R 48 It I 20 40 I 1 60 80 100 140 120 BURIAL DEPTH Iftl Figure 6 Yield required to create a crater of given radius versus depth of burial 100 10 I 0 01 I 100 120 140 SLRIA DEPTh n Figure 7 Area enclosed by the 10 R hr fallout contour at H 1 versus depth of burst for constant crater radius The target spectrum for accurately delivered penetrating systems includes very hard targets such as bridge abutments buried command posts buried POL dumps runways railyards caves bunkers or any target that can be defeated by cratering In summary it appears that major improvements can be made in the efficiency of the stockpile and in reducing collateral effects by providing accurate low-yield earth-penetrating options I Nuclear Airburst In this investigation airburst is defined as a detonation at sufficient altitude above terrain to prevent the weapon fireball from touching the ground Under this condition three weapon effects are optimized from the standpoint of maximum area covered for a particular yield prompt radiation thermal radiation and air blast At the same time fallout for this burst condition is minimal A comparison of the effects of airburst and surface burst against the softer targets indicates that the area covered by a given blast pressure level is approximately doubled for airburst over the same yield surface burst The fallout zone on the other hand is essentially reduced to zero by airburst Although many existing systems have an airburst option certain deficiencies are apparent In particular present bomb delivery accuracies are not compatible with low yields Furthermore LADD and LABS delivery techniques increase aircraft vulnerability in a heavy defense environment Low-yield airburst weapons might be directed toward such targets as buildings radars hangars missiles POL dumps revetted aircraft SA-2 sites and personnel New Systems Although a number of new tactical nuclear systems studies have been undertaken by Sandia and others over the past several years this has been a period in which new strategic systems have received the preponderance of national effort no new tactical nuclear system has entered the stockpile Of the new tactical systems described here Bayonet and Beckett are examples of air-to-surface systems and the Nike Hercules EPW is an example of a surface-to-surface system These were selected because collectively they demonstrate many of the improvements that could be made in a tactical capability Bayonet Bayonet is an ·earth-penetration low-yield nuclear bomb designed for lowlevel high-speed delivery The Bayonet system see Figure 8 is composed of an earth-penetrating body housing the warhead and the fuzing system combined with an aerodynamic surface which provides lift and trim stability for a dive maneuver The vehicle is designed to permit wings and tail to shear from the penetration body at impact so that penetration is achieved by a cylindrical vehicle with good terradynamic characteristics A shaped charge which fires at impact is included in the nose to enhance vehicle performance at low-impact angles into hard materials such 185 as concrete When the vehicle is on the aircraft see Figure 9 its wings are positioned at zero-degree incidence to the airstream to minimize drag At release the wing is explosively driven to an incidence angle of -16 degrees with respect to the airstream and the Bayonet dives in a 900 foot radius arc into the target This trajectory is independent of release velocity The Bayonet system was' successfully demonstrated in an extensive advanced development program conducted jointly by Sandia Laboratories and the Air Force Weapons Laboratory Three successful full-scale prototype air drops were conducted at Sandia's Tonopah Test Range in March and April of 1966 In August of 1966 simulated weapon release tests made at White Sands Missile Range by TAC pilots indicated that a range error probable REP of less than 100 feet can be obtained with this system In late 1966 additional air drops of Bayonet centerbodies with shaped charges demonstrated the capability for penetrating concrete runways at incidence angles as low as 20 degrees to the target surface Bayonet possesses many of the desirable characteristics previously discussed System CEP of 80 feet can be met Earth penetration depths of 10 to 70 feet can be achieved types of soil release velocities and altitude determine the specific penetra tion capability Beckett Beckett was an exploratory development program that demonstrated the feasibility of a rearward-fired tactica1 missile capable of delivering a sub kiloton warhead with a CEP of 50 feet The general system concept is shown in Figure 10 As the delivery aircraft passes directly over the target two infrared IR flares integral to the bomb are fired rearward with sufficient velocityto cancel the forward velocity of the aircraft and downward thus marking the target Typical flare trajectories are vertical with a downward velocity of 100 to 200 feet per second A fraction of a second after the flares are fired the bomb is automatically released from the delivery aircraft and a small parachute is deployed After sufficient bomb-to-aircraft separation distance is achieved the parachute and aft vehicle section are jettisoned and an IR seeker head is exposed Simultaneously a solid-propellant rocket motor which accelerates the bomb back to the marked target is ignited The seeker head provides steering control to jet vanes in the rocket exhaust The primary fuzing mode is a down-looking IR sensor for either airburst or near-surface burst although timer and contact backup fuzing are also provided The bomb which can be delivered from altitudes between 35 and 200 feet is programmed to return to the target at an altitude of 40 feet the nominalairburst altitude for yields of 20 to 100 tons The complete Beckett weapon is shown in Figure 11 The Beckett concept was demonstrated in an exploratory development program that culminated in a successful full-scale pro totype flight test from an F-4 aircraft at Tonopah Test Range A major variable in the concept was the ability of a pilot to fire the targetmarking flare guns directly over the target A large number of flight tests were conducted with combat-qualified pilots to test their ability It was determined that with minimal training pilots could probably be expected to perform this task while flying low level and to achieve CEP's of 50 feet or less 186 - --- - ---- - --- 1 J 4 -- - ' ------J Figure 8 Bayone t configuration· Fi c ul C ' - B r -o lnc-t - RD 16al DETONATION lAIR OR SUBSURFACE BURSTl Ibbi - ---- - -- 'l TAR r u_ 3' _ _- 5GTe 250 FEET '- _______----- --------------------- -------r --- 5 --FLARE-1 41- 'l-' T oSEC 1 FLARE GUNS FI RED X OFT 0 53 SEC 424 FT 3 PARACHUTE FULLY OPEN 0 88 SEC 702 FT 4 PARACHUTE JETTISONED 1 53 1038 FT 5 MAX BOMB RANGE FROM TAR 1 13 1177 FT 4 18 OFT 4 18 3 440 FT 2 BOMB RELEASED 6a DETONATION OVER TARGET SAFE ESCAPE DI STANCE 6b TERRAIt- TIMES DISTANCE ARE FOR A RELEASE SPEED OF 800 FEET SECOND Figure 10 Typical Beckett trajectory diagram -- - - ' t_ - I M t - -- s -Figure 11 IB3 Beckett Since the conclusion of the Beckett feasibility study follow-on studies have shown that a retrocede system based on Beckett can be built to deliver an earthpenetrating system in addition to the airburst system that was tested It now seems feasible to provide both an earth-penetration option or airburst option in a single low-level delivered bomb A Beckett-like system should provide a valuable complementary delivery option to nuclear standoff systems now in development since it appears that there is a continuing need for low-level delivered over-the-target systems Nike Hercules Earth- Penetrating Weapon The Nike Hercules system although primarily an air defense system has an accurate CEP 150 meters surface-to-surface mode The Hercules is deployed in the United States Europe and Asia in large numbers and present plans call for phasing some of the missiles out of the inventory At a meeting early in 1969 with the Army's Combat Development Command Institute of Nuclear Studies Sandia Laboratories was asked to consider the technical feasibility of providing an earthpenetrating option for the Hercules missile Although no hardware could be made available for a feasibility demonstration a quick systems study showed the feasibility of this concept In the surface-to-surface mode the Hercules system performs as shown in Figure 12 The target coordinates are stored in the target-tracking radar the computer flies the missile to a point in space directly over these coordinates and the missile dives directly into the target Prior to passing below the radar horizon the control surfaces are trimmed up and the guidance system is turned off The missile continues on into the target from that point The system modifications studied are shown in Figure 13 The replacement of the existing warhead by an earth-penetrating weapon EPW is a relatively straightforward modification The Hercules guidance unit would be moved aft to provide the required length and a terminal guidance system would be added The target would be marked with a small x-band beacon that could be emplaced in a number of ways The missile would generate terminal steering commands from the beacon as shown in Figure 14 A number of existing guidance systems could be modified for this application and the Sandia study indicates that it is feasible to make these systems compatible with the Hercules control system It appears possible to achieve a 20-foot CEP referenced to the beacon with this technique where at impact the earth penetrator would separate from the Hercules missile enter the earth and detonate at depth If the beacon were preemplaced tqis system could attack targets which now require atomic demolition munitions ADM's In that all major sUbcomponents of this system are in existence this seems to be a relatively inexpensive way to achieve a rapid earth-penetrating surface-to-surface missile capability 189 --- - --a ·-a EARTH'S CURVATURE Figure 12 Surface-to -surface m·ISSlon STA 147 STA 87 5 1 8 X 80 EPW MUSHROOM GUIDANCE UNIT I GU I DMJCE TERMINAL S I DEWI NDE FALCON A R AIM-9C OR IM-26 CONTROL MECHANISM System rnod llcatlOns T Figure 13 1 nn MOTOR - --- -- - _ ------ --_ llifiRI I Mi iilliII Ia _ _ _ _ _ V -ATBURSTORDER JO ooofli 1 GU I DANCE CUT OFF 2 BEACON SEEKER ON J l DRAG BRAKES ON t I I AT D-looo tL BEACON SEEKER OFF TRIM ELEVON AT DEPTH WARHEAD DETONATES Figure 14 Hercules Effectiveness of Accurate Systems An extensive Beckett system target analysis which indicates the' yield required for various targets and the associated collateral damage levels that could be expected for these yields has been completed The yield required for a comparable kill probability with existing over-the-target bombs is included for comparison Three example targets from the analysis are presented The collateral effects levels that were used are shown in Table ll Total collateral damage area for surface burst optimum airburst and subsurface burst 30-foot depth of burst versus yield is shown in Figure 15 The predominant effect is indicated on the appropriate portion of each curve Although this analysis was done for Beckett it should be kept in mind that it applies to any system that offers CEP's of 50 feet or less with the appropriate burst options Figure 16 depicts the yield required as a function of target kill probability for attack on a thermal electric power plant A power plant would represent a small soft target It can be seen tha t a Beckett system with a yield of 20 tons provides a P k of I whereas other bombs require yields ranging from 1 to 10 kt for comparable Pk'S For this class of target Beckett allows a yield reduction over existing bombs of 10 to 500 If the maximum allowable collateral damage limits are set as shown in Table II the Beckett yield reduction 'orresponds to a reduction in collateral area affected of from 5 to 60 square miles with existing systems to less than 1 square mile with Beckett j t 191 eECFtE i illD 1000 TOTAL COLLATERAL DAMAGE 100 SURFACE x Xl xix AIR optimum I X SUBSURFACE X 130 ft lobi 0 1 xl X I X 0 01 L- --- L ---- ---- ------ -±- Qm QI ill 100 YIELD Iktl Figure 15 Total collateral damage P VS YIELD k THERMAL ELECTR I C PLANT U l O -------- -- -------- --- ---------­ BECKm 0 8 0 6 0 4 0 2 0 05 0 1 0 5 0 2 1 0 2 0 5 0 YIELD kt Figure 16 1 n ' Thermal electric power plant Pk versus yield £ II 2 'If $ 10 0 TABLE II Collateral Damage Limits Maximum allowable effects levels I Overpressure 2 psi Thermal 2 cal cm 2 Initial Radiation 50 rads relative air density P Fallout Radiation 100 rads - dose downwind 20 knot effective wind 0 8 A second target considered is an SA- 2 site an example of an area target Figure 17 depicts weapon yield as a function of the fraction of the target covered A Beckett yield of 100 tons is adequate for complete target destruction whereas other bombing techniques require yields of 1 to 10 kt The area affected by collateral damage is reduced an order of magnitude Another type of target considered in the analysis is an extremely hard target that must be within the burst crater to be destroyed Yields around 1 kt are adequate with an accurate earth-penetrating delivery system The yields increase to about 10 kt for an accurate surface burst system whereas yields in excess of 1 megaton are required with other delivery techniques to achieve comparable kill probabilities Collateral effects of course increase by several orders of magnitude with the increased yields This target is shown in Figure 18 Conclusions Weapon systems in our present stockpile require high-yield warheads to achieve acceptable target kill probabilities resulting in large areas affected by undesired collateral effects Technological progress made in the recent past can now provide deli very system accuracies with burst options that were not possible at the time the current stockpile was required As has been shown exploratory development programs conducted at Sandia and at other laboratories throughout the country have demonstrated that a new class of tactical weapons is now feasible These new systems can provide a high probability of target destruction with weapon yields that are factors of 10 to 1000 less than yields required by deployed tactical systems The corresponding reduction in undesired collateral effects that accompanies these low-yield weapons is even more impressive Collateral effects can typically be reduced to areas less than 1 square mile compared to areas of tens to thousands of square miles for existing tactical systems If developed the new systems would make available to our military planners a new set of options for responding to possible enemy action This would make available a more responsive effective and credible nuclear force which could provide a capability for using nuclear weapons under battlefield conditions or for discrete applications of force EX 'ECTED FRACTIONAL DAMAGE II VS YIELD SA -2 SITE U BECKm-- O i O 6 I I 0 4 I -LABS 0 2 -l ol ----- J'------- J-----'J'----- J------ I------' 0 02 0 05 0 1 0 2 0 5 1 0 2 0 5 0 10 0 YIELD ktl Figure 17 Expected fractional damage f versus yield SA-2 site 1 0 0 8 0 6 0 4 0 2 o L __ J-_ L_ - b ± r - r _____ L ___ LI___LI_ _ -1 1_---'1 0 02 0 05 O 1 0 2 0 5 2 5 10 20 YIELD ktl Figure 18 194 Hard-point target P k versus yield 50 100 Question and Answer Period GARWIN IBM If you considered not 50 foot CEP but a hitting missile what fraction of the targets can be attacked by nonnuclear ordnance MYRE We didn't look at that to get that particular number Of course a great number of targets that are fairly small or soft you can kill with conventional HE but I don't know what the fraction of available targets would be ROWNTREE NWC China' Lake We have some Vietnam combat experienced Air Force pilots and able aviators in the crowd 1'd like one or more of them to comment on the delivery profiles that seem to be required for Beckett and Bayonet MYRE We started the Bayonet and Beckett program before Vietnam and low level delivery was a good option In Vietnam if you have to go on repeated sorties it is not considered very good However we talked to people in Europe and it is considered the way to fight there GLASSER R D USAF I can comment on the Air Force opinion regarding this sort of delivery tactic It is a good thing that the weapon is ejected 1 10 second after you cross over the target because that way you might get the weapon off the airplane FOWLER DDR E Could you comment on the accuracy of the flare delivery being affected by the variable speed of the aircraft-that is' the need to hold a particular speed to get the flare dropped to the accuracy that your system required MYRE Yes the downward velocity is so great that we can stand a fair range of speeds but not the total range Essentially you have to come in with a canned mission and hit that within 50 knots or so and it doesn't degrade The big problem is the pilot being able to hit the button when he is directly over the target We did look at a system and found it is possible to build in a velocity measuring device that would decide how hard to kick out the flare but we decided that it wasn't worth the effort We should be able to can the mission to 50 knots or so OVERBY North Am Rockwell I didn't understand how you fuzed that weapon for your airburst Could you give us a little insight into that lVIYRE It was fuzed for airburst -ith a downward-looking narrow beam IR seeker As you went directly over the target the IR seeker was looking qtraight down when it saw the flare it would be the firing signal OVERBY Have you done enough analysis on that technique to know whether it will give you the accuracy you are looking for ·Jlr ea-FT SflA 101 wiOEGRiT WP MYRE Yes the beam-width I think was something like two or three degrees and when you are 20 or 30 feet up in the air that hardly affects the accuracy COGGAN North Am Rockwell Would the missile use this IR seeker to home in MYRE No two different IR seekers one for guidance to home in HOERLIN LASL How far is it from the flare to the turn-around point MYRE How far down range does the Beckett go It is something less than 1000 feet The airplane is 4000 or 5000 feet down range at that detonation time HOUSE When you talked about the statistic for the target or the airplane coming over the target I don't recall that you described the kind of targets or terrain you used for those statistics Could you repeat that MYRE The National Guard pilots trying to find the target It was flat New Mexico land Obviously more study of this kind of thing would have to be done McCARTHY CINCLANT What are the chances of other IR sources in the target area setting the weapon off MYRE The flare is very bright McCARTHY I mean IR sources that possibly your infrared system would come across before it reached the flare itself MYRE The system is fairly insensitive and the only thing we felt we would have any trouble with was the sun or somebody trying to set off another flare somewhere else McCARTHY How would that affect your airburst capability MYRE If the seeker head sees the sun it will try to guide toward the sun but in general it has a fairly narrow beam that it is looking into and so long as you are not flying directly away from the sun at close to sunset I don't think there would be any problem ETHRIDGE Aberdeen I didn't understand General Glasser's comment on the release time of the weapon after the aircraft passes over the target Do you mean that the Air Force considers the lifetime of the vehicle only fractions of a second after it passes over such a target GLASSER Concurred with Mr Ethridge's comment Speaker Unidentified We seem to test in the flat and fight in the mountains What degradation do you get in a differential altitude as far as marking the target is concerned Say you have to mark 200 feet how much effect will that have on identifying the target In other words there are targets in the mountains that you can't get within 50 feet of and you have to release say 300 feet above the target What effect does this have on your IR marking flares --- - --- 196 lVIYRE On the flare itself it would have very little effect It will degrade the pilot's ability to know when he is directly over the target at 300 feet it is not quite as good as it is at 50 feet So the CEP of his ability to know exactly where he is would be degraded slightly but it would hardly change the flare at all NELSON LRL I noted that the delivery velocity was in excess of Mach I so my first question is have you looked at the problems of carrying external stores at that speed I believe currently there are no such stores except possibly the B58 pod Secondly in laydown accuracies the most significant factor is altitude and it is the most difficult problem I would comment that in excess of Mach 1 at 50 feet maneuvering in combat conditions would be very difficult and I wonder if you have looked at the sensitivities of the various parameters involved MYRE I think in general we plan not to deliver in excess of Mach 1 I think the point made was that we built the thing with enough thrust in the rocket motor to stand velocities that high I don't think in actual practice it really matters what your velocity is NELSON You previously mentioned a 50 knot band or something like this MYRE Sorry it was in the delivery of the flare system that you had to know before the mission what your planned velocity was within 50 knots Then if you stayed within 50 knots the accuracy in placing the flare would not be degraded 197 -- '----- -- 1 lil ------ - - •__ 11 - - f iliiiiii iif _ Maj General Otto J Glasser Assistant DCS R D USAF TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND LONG RANGE GOALS While the rigid bipolar confrontation of East versus West has lessened over the past several years and many predict that it will continue to do so as third countries exercise greater independence the fact'remains that the ideologies of Soviet communism and US democracy remain in competition As we have heard earlier our national interest and potentially the freedom of lesser powers are opposed by the significant military capabilities not only of the Soviet Union and Red China but also a number of other countries within their spheres of influence and to whom they supply modern weapons In the most general sense US security policy has sought to develop a world community of free and independent nations each secure from the threat of aggression and each respecting basic human rights and the rule of law We in the military while supporting these goals completely also recognize the importance of retaining a strong military posture I think it is generally agreed that our strategic nuclear deterrent has provided the umbrella under which we have been able to pursue normal avenues of negotiation and diplomacy in resolving our differences A part of this capability has been provided by our tactical forces in their support of the single integrated operations plan SlOP Additionally however these tadical forces also provide us with the capability of responding at varying lower levels of conflict I would like to review with you the tactical nuclear portion of this overall spectrum of capability-touching briefly on desired delivery and weapon system improvements and current work on several hardware development programs and concluding with a summary of our long range goals Currently our USA F tactical fighter force is deployed with 17 squadrons in the US 22 squadrons in USA FE and 42 squadrons in PACAF for a total of 81 squadrons 19D ' Excluding the imbalance due to the war in Southeast Asia our concept is to station that portion of our forces overseas necpssary to respond to immediate contingencies while maintaining the remainder in the CONUS ready for rapid world wide deployment To arm this fleet of aircraft stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons are positioned and strategically located Alert procedures have been established and as you know depending upon the current international political situation a certain number of aircraft stand ready to respond within minutes of any aggression USAF nuclear capable fighters are as shown in Figure 1 While the bulk of the force is composed of the F4 both the Fl05 and Fll1 have advanced radar delivery systems and the Flll has an automatic terrain following flight control feature which permits target penetration at 200 feet AGL and up to 600 knots at night and in all weather Traditionally we think of these fighters as being employed against interdiction type targets with tactical nuclear weapons but they also can be employed in the close support role over a wide range of targets and with considerable strike weapon flexibility Employing ground beacons the F4 and to a greater degree the Fll1 can perform this support function around the clock and in all weather As will be shown later both systems have good range capabilities and this can be converted into longer loiter times if desired CURRENT DELIVERY SYSTEMS System FlOO FI05 F4 FIll Ca ability Mach 1 4 Day Night Visual Mach 2 Day Night Visual Radar All-Weather Mach 2 Day Night Visual Radar All-Weather Mach 2 Day Night Visual Radar AII-Weath er Figure 1 Figure 2 shows several typical missions overlaid on Western Europe Radii depicted here are for aircraft not air-to-air refueled and cruising at optimum altitude with penetration to the target at low altitude for approximately 250-300 nautical miles Most significant is the f9-ct that both weapons and delivery systems can be based outside of the immediate battle area thus enhancing survivability while still being responsive to immediate combat needs Because of the aircraft's speed and range capabilities en-route diversion is possible to higher priority targets or those posing a more immediate threat Our reaction times can be measured in only a few minutes Additionally command and control techniques permit the highest state of readiness including airborne alert should advance intelligence indicate the need 200 I OI IAN t TYPICAL RANGf RfOUIREMENTS 9 V • j • ENGlAND - y ·i ' 1 - t I C·· I ' J n ' Figure 2 As the enemy has improved his defensive capability the tactical fighter has also been provided with new equipment to defeat or counter these enemy systems see Figure 3 Radar homing and warning equipment has become a standard piece of hardware electronic counter measure pods has been built for each of the fighters and the FIll comes equipped with several additional aids such as chaff-flare dispensers and tail warning devices While operations in SEA have shown this equipment to be extremely effective experience has also demonstrated the dynamic and everchanging nature of electronic warfare We cannot afford to rest on our laurels in this field PENETRATION AIDS FlOD RHAW ECM Pods FI05 RHAW ECM Pods Mini-Jammers Terrain Avoidance Radar F4 RHAW ECM Pods Mini-Jammers FIll RHAW I nternal Jammers Chaff-Flare Dispensers I R Tail Warning Terrain Avoidance Radar Figure 3 201 Our delivery systems are capable of carrying all available tactical air deliverable weapons in the stockpile including the lVIk 28 Mk 43 Mk 57 and 'lk 61 see Figure 4 Do ' UC J DELETED Figure 4 As a maximum load the Fl05 could carry and deliver as many as four Mk 57 weapons on a single sortie the F4 three and the Flll six Actually a more realistic load would be two weapons and three tanks for the F4 for example and four weapons and two tanks for the Flll These configurations will provide the penetration ranges as previously shown or the corresponding loiter time In-flight refueling capability will permit loaded aircraft to take off and hold during periods of extreme tension or during a critical decision period thus reducing vulnerability and minimum response time currently none of the available tactical weapons have terminal guidance or more than a very limited standoff delivery capability Obtaining these two items constitutes the major portion of our future requirements Optional yields currently available appear to adequately satisfy requirements when coupled with today's CEP's however as a higher degree of accuracy is obtained these yields can be reduced and thus the potential for collateral damage can also be reduced High value tactical targets can be expecoted to be heavily defended against nil' attacks in the 1970-77 time period Defense weapons will in all probability consist of SA VI's AAA small individually served missiles similar to Redeye and manned interceptor aircraft with both guns and air-to-air missiles Figure 5 depicts a recent intelligence estimate of the extent of these defenses in several potential trouble spots around the world Again experience in Vietnam has shown that providing such defenses can be extremely profitable for the Communists in term s of drain on US r sources versus defensive investment The mobility of these systems provides the defender 'lith the potential of shifting and concentrating his equipment almost at will to the most vl 1lnerable highest value or most probable target ENEMY AI R DEFENSES 1968 Country AAA Weapons SAM Batteries North Vietnam 7400 32 150 850 29 434 Cuba 1450 25 155 China 3900 37 2800 840 38 175 North Korea UAR Manned Interceptors Figure 5 New delivery options must be provided which can offset improved defenses One way of minimizing attri tion is to avoid the defenses in the immediate target area by launching weapons from standoff distances greater than the defense's effective range This requirement for a standoff capability is a function of the estimated performance of improved US countermeasures the enemy's determination to defend and or the importance assigned to a specific target and our determination to attack that target While improvements are certain in both offensive and defensive systems the offensive advantage at any given time is problematic and thus argues for a standoff capability Figure 6 indicates the average circular error probable CEP for the delivery mode and maneuver considered Safe separation distances are provided by utilizing high and low angle release times in conjunction with free fall ballistic shapes or parachute retarded weapons Fuzing devices in the weapons may be set for either air or ground detonation s can be seen our best bombing accuracies are presently obtained by low altitude drogue-retarded laydown deliveries where we can expect a 300 foot CEP under visual conditions and a 1500 foot CEP under all-weather conditions When toss bombing delivery techniques are used these CEP's can be expected to increase to 900 feet for visual and 2000 feet all-weather JSTPS Planning vlanual Tab B App II Chapter 8 The significance of delivery accuracy and its direct effect on required weapon yield can be seen in Figure 7 Thus we see that if toss bombing could be eliminated as a delivery mode or the CEP's could be brought into line with laydown deliveries there would be little need for yields in excess of approximately 10 kt to destroy point targets with the exception perhaps of underground command centers Certainly yields of the order of 350 kt should be adequate for most area targets struck during tactical operations in limited wars LIMITATIONS ON ACCURACY Average CEP Free Fall 500 ft Retarded Del ivery 800 ft 1500 ft Toss 300 ft Laydown Subject to wi ndage and del ivery system inputs altitude airspeed G-loading Figure 6 REQUIRED YIELDS VERSUS CEP CEP 3000 Tanks Steel Bridge MSL Dir Radar SAM Site 2 7 mt 900 kt 160 kt 145 kt 2000 630 kt 260 kt 55 kt 28 kt 1500 350 kt 240 kt 23 kt 14 kt 300 2 kt 125 25 0 5 kt 0 2 kt 0 2 kt 0 2 kt o 1 o 1 kt 0 01 kt 0 01 kt 0 01 kt 0 05 kt 0 01 kt kt CEP IS are for Pd - - 0 9 Figure 7 In selecting tanks as a point target it was not my intent to suggest that tanks are worthwhile tactical nuclear targets but rather they were picked to illustrate a very hard above-surface target From this brief review we can conclude that most important in our development activities is the requirement to increase the delivery accuracy of our weapons systems Further we need to expand our delivery capabilities to include night a11weather operations as 'Nell as a standoff delivery capability so that the delivery vehicles can remain clear of enemy point defenses To aid in responsiveness and flexibility we should continue to investigate earth penetration weapons As we all know crater size for a given yield is essentially a function of the depth of burial at the time of detonation A penetration weapon can be particularly effective against hardened or underground facilities as a result of the ground shock produced Air delivered deep penetration weapons could be used in establishing physical barriers rapidly and accurately Although there is today no air delivered nuclear weapon capable of deep earth penetration the AEC has tested prototype systems and is capable of building warheads and fuzing systems which can withstand the high impact forces Furthermore it may be possible to add a short delay to the fuzing options proposed in the full fuzing option bomb FUFO which the jOint chiefs have requested as a replacement for the older Mk 28 and Mk 43 weapons currently in the inventory If this new weapon could be designed to withstand moderate earth penetration perhaps only to the length of the weapon itself without an excessive weight penalty its utility might be significantly increased Since 1967 the Air Force has been pursuing the development of a terminal guidance capability for us e with conventional bombs Ultimately we may find these systems also have application to tactical nuclear weapons as well These development activities have involved not only electro-optical techniques but laser infrared LORAN DME and radar systems as well Each of course possesses particular characteristics which tend to either limit or recommend them for weapon terminal guidance application as can be seen in Figure 8 SUMMARY OF GU I DANCE TECHNIQUES Laser Contrast EO IR DME LORAN Steer Area Correlation Radar EO Exact Target Fix Radar Imagery From Previous Data Active Limits Ilium Daylight VFR VFR Semi- Launch active Leave Radiation Contrast Advantages Strap Pass ive on Kit Form I nexpens Ive Passive Long Night Day or Range AII-WX AIINight Attack WX NonRDR Targets Previous Recon Data Very Accurate Figure 8 nr Very quickly we might re-cap the more important items on Figure 8 Current laser systems require that the target be illuminated which in turn requires an aircraft to remain in the target area In addition to the increased exposure to enemy defenses this requirement also poses significant problems as related to flash blindness when the system is used to guide a nuclear weapon While solutions to these problems are not impossible they may Significantly increase complexity and cost The fact that the system is semiactive may also prove to be a limitation In strap onl kit form this could possibly be the cheapest of the systems however such a scheme has not proved to be feasible to date for existing tactical nuclear bombs Present electro-optical systems require daylight VFR and good contrast They also possess the advantage of a launch and leave capability along with passive operation Infrared equipment requires a radiating source or contrast in IR energy level between the object and its background Target identification and discrimination as well as information necessary to reach a judgment for final arming is to date extremely limited with this sensor Radio grid systems such as LORAN and DME steer require prestrike target reconnaissance data These are perhaps the least accurate of the systems listed They are all-weather and offer potentially the longest standoff ranges Current proposals retain the signal processing and computer functions within the launch aircraft with the weapon carrying only a retransmitter thus cost and complexity are reduced Finally area correlation devices are being investigated using both radar and EO sensors Electro-optical correlation guidance systems have in tests demonstrated 2-3 foot accuracies making them perhaps the most accurate They are subject to the same delivery restrictions as straight EO and radar devices Incorporation of inertial guidance for midcourseguidance will permit longer standoff ranges Radar correlation can provide night all-weather guidance To a varying degree work is being accomplished in all of the guidance areas I have just mentioned However for terminal guidance of nuclear weapons electrooptical and area correlation techniques appear to be most suitable and offer the greatest number of advantages In each case the principle involved is to compare the object or real time sensed ground scene with either a prestored reference of the desired target area prepared from prior reconnaissance or a snapshot reference obtained just prior to missile launch Within the reference scene the desired target aimpoint is designated and correlation is obtained when the reference and live images are aligned Once correlation has been obtained the missile is given steering commands to achieve and maintain a terminal trajectory Worthy of note is the fact that since the technique makes use of the total informational content of the area scene surrounding a target the target itself need not actually be visible That is a totally camouflaged target with no inherent contrast can be designated as the desired aimpoint and the missile still guides to that desired point on the ground using the remainder of the scene to correlate on Goodyear Aerospace Corporation has produced a unique electronic tube which performs these comparison functions almost instantaneously and with a high degree 206 of accuracy This system also compensates for the blooming and magnification of the image as the vehicle and'sensing device approach the target at steep angles The system memori z es its last view of the target just prior to changing magnification and ' then uses this as a new reference for comparison A slit scan area correlator has been developed which shows promise in providing terminal guidance Aligned with the gunsight in a tactical aircraft is a slit scanner which records the varying intensities of light from a target area and places them on a memory drum A similar target scanner operates in the nose of the weapon on board the aircraft and may be slaved to the sight scanner by movement of an acquisition switch in the cockpit At any time after this correlation has been 'achieved which is indicated by a light the pilot may acquire a target instantaneously in his sight picture and initiate weapon launch Subsequent to weapon launch aircraft tracking is not required and the weapon will guide on the memory scan recorded on the drum at the instant of firing Actual launches show a tracking accuracy CEP of 2 9 mils which was recorded during 13 test launches at an average slant range of 40 000 feet As most of you are aware with the exception of the nuclear versions of Walleye and Condor both of which were approved in 1969 no air delivered tactical nuclear weapons project has been initiated since the Mk 61 bomb entered engineering development in 1962 Thus such guidance and control work as has been going on has been in conjunction with conventional munitions and delivery systems The conventional Walleye which is an 'air-to-ground glide weapon employing an edge tracking TV guidance control system has been combat tested in Vietnam t f' 't£ with very acceptable results J5e ' DELETED A video uplink to the airc raft to monitor guidance system performance and a command arm downlink are to be incorporated into the system Thus it will be possible to arm the weapon after it has been determiried that it is locked onto the desired target and all systems are functioning satisfactorily The video uplink and command downlink equipment is to be pod-mounted so that it can be carried on an inboard wing pylon station of the F4 The weapon will initially be adapted to the F4D aircraft having the improved scan converter displays Within the constraints of range contrast and visibility requirements inherent within the guidance system the 15 foot design CEP of this weapon will provide a significant improvement in repeatable accuracy This represents the first step in our long range plans to improve our tactical nuclear capability Potentially a follow-on to the nuclear Walleye might be the AGM-X-3 which is currently in the concept formulation phase of development see Figure 10 This 3000 pound missile would provide the desired increase in standoff ranges- 50 nautical miles when launched at sea level and over 100 miles when launched at 40 000 feet It would also be capable of incorporating in its modular design a radar area correlator for all-weather guidance as well as the EO guidance system Targets against which this missile could be employed are not only the normal interdiction and counter-air ones but also enemy defenses T JECR ' IRg NUCLEAR WALLEYE • Program Approved - April 1969 • AF Designated as Cognizant DOD Development Agency • • Video Uplink • Command Arm Downlink I O C -April 1970 Figure 9 To date neither our own studies nor those of either the Joint Chiefs or the Unified Commanders have shown valid reasoning or justification to support reducing our air delivered tactical nuclear weapons inventory below its present level The future requirement for an improved tactical nuclear capability is considered essential We believe a portion of that inventory should consist of a medium to long range highly accurate all-weather air-to-ground nuclear armed missile Without addressing specific numbers you will note that today our inventory contains only bombs see Figure 11 With the introduction of the nuclear Walleye we will have a terminal guidance capability and from there I would hope we can go on to achieving an all-weather night capabiltty and marry this to a long range standoff missile The recent decision to build additional Mk 61 bombs I feel is a good one Hopefully AEC production capacity can be adjusted to permit the tactical weapons to be produced immediately following those designated for the strategic forces We in the Air Force are pursuing priority development testing and procurement of the command and control equipment required for the nuclear Walleye Finally as I have indicated before we will continue our efforts to develop an accurate all-weather terminal guidance system which initially perhaps would be used on a short range air-to-surface weapon as early as FY 74 and later on a longer range standoff weapon 208 SECRET t AGM-X-3 MISSILE Launch Altitude ft Missile Standoff Range Velocity Mach Range nmi 500 0 8 70 40 000 0 8 150 40 000 1 8 250 Description I Total Weight 3 000 Ibs Candidate Modular Warheads 1 000 Ibs BlastiFrag Penetration Bomblet Low Yield Nuclear Candidate Modular Guidance Radio Triangulation DME LORAN CEP Less Than 100 Ft EO Area Correlator CEP 10 Ft Radar Area Correlator CEP 35 Ft Standoff Range S l Launch Greater Than 50 nm 40 000 Ft Launch Greater Than 100 nm Trajectory Semiballistic With Solid Propulsion Low Level With Pop-Up if Ramjet Used Figure 10 STOCKPILE MODERNIZATION 1970 MK 28 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 8 ' 1 MK 43 MK 57 MK 61 f· · ·· · · • • • • • • ' 1I FUFO WALLEYE • SHORT RNG VISUAL I ' J J t··· SHORT RNG ALL -WX 1 LONG RNG ALL-I vX Figure 11 208 Question and Answer Period KUPFER NWEF ave they solved the problem that they ran into in Southeast Asia with the Walleye where the North Vietnamese were setting off white smoke generators to confuse the guidance system GLASSER I don't know Perhaps vIr Crawford will be addressing that CRAWFORP NWC China Lake There are serious problems in attempting to use smoke generators and we haven't had any reports that this technique has been very effective COGGAN North Am Rockwell Corp Recognizing that there are limitations inherent in any particular type of guidance sensor IR or EO or whatever do you not see the possibility of a dual sensor capability in some of our future missileshaving more than one guidance capability that can be integrated GLASSER No question that that would be an ideal solution to the problem We have approached this on the Pave Way series which has a laser an IR and an EO head that are interchangeable They use the same steering system but you can change the sensor on the front Conceivably you could do that on missiles I think however you are suggesting that you have all these capabilities at once and here you run into a cost problem COGGAN We have to find some way to accomplish a true all-weather capability we don't have it as I see it today GLASSER We do not have it and the nearest hope for this is the radar correlator and that of course gets degraded CEP again GARWIN IBM You noted as a liability for some of those guidance methods that one had to determine location of the target before the flight In many of the others you have to determine the aspect or make the decision to attack I just wonder in practice what fraction of the targets attacked are essentially prebdefed and located GLASSER I think essentially all of them are prebriefed in current experience Whether this would be true in Western Europe is problematical I think that if we were operating in support of land armies as we would be in Western Europe quite differently from what we are doing in Southeast Asia there would be a lot more particularly in the armored category and in troop concentrations APC's and this sort of thing where they would not have been prebriefed GARWIN Why do you prefer the correlator to a bomb which is released and guided by a remote TV like Walleye 210 • GLASSER I am not sure this is the right answer My own view is that I like the notion that the missile is now on its own and no longer needs any connection with the airplane at all OLIVER I VEF Do Air Force long range plans include air-to-air missiies GLASSER Yes The fact that I didn't comment on them is perhaps an oversight from the standpoint that I didn't include the air-to-air portion of the tactical program The so-called dog-fight missile is on the books now for what it sometimes called the short range missile SRM which is to go with the F15 as a new weapon I believe this also is to be 'used by the Navy McDONALD LRL I was sorry to hear that the AGlVIX is suffering the pains of several of our other systems certainly we shouldn't leave the impression that that is going to be the end of it It seems to many of us that these standoff missiles have a tremendous future for you and I hope we will see them come back in We do have the nuclear Condor coming along which Gan have some Air Force application as well I suppose one might even consider some future systems normally categorized as strategic as having some interest in these areas -under the right circumstances for example the SRAM or SCAM or SCAD or things of this kind GLASSER Yes you are quite right I thought I said that this was a postponement It was a cancellation for this year but certainly without prejudice and we anticipate being allowed to reinstate the program when money comes back in style SCHRIBEL In response to your long range goals it appeared to be restricted to the 1970-1977 time frame The Army and Navy publish a long range technological forecast I am wondering if the Air Force is also planning to undertake such an effort GLASSER Yes we do put one out We have a personal bias towards those We have gone back through the years and read some of the long range forecasts-you have probably done it too Remember Bush's famous statements on ballistic missiles and so forth Very interesting reading Anything beyond about five years we find rather difficult to make use of 211 This Page Intentionally Left Blank 12 CUP --------IEER_' JIlL • Jack A Crawford Naval Weapons Center China Lake 0 TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE CONVENTIONAL WALLEYE AND CONDOR SYSTEMS Introduction Good afternoon In my talk I will discuss the Walleye and Condor weapon systems as they currently exist with conventional high explosive warheads In a way these weapons are out of place in a tactical nuclear weapons symposium for though they are tactical they are not as yet nuclear In another sense however o discussing them is quite appropriate for application of these weapons or the technology they employ to the tactical nuclear field will allow a precision of warhead delivery and control not previously possible This precise control may in turn affect the acceptability of using the weapons by allowing the use of lower yield warheads and minimizing the damage to other than the desired target Walleye I will describe Walleye first since it is the simpler of the two weapons and is now in service use by both Navy and Air Force Figure 1 shows two Walleyes on the wing racks of an A4 aircraft while Figure 2 lists the prime targets for Walleye The common characteristic of all these targets is that they tend to be point rather than area targets That is the targets have one or a few points at which detonation of bigoh explosive warheads will destroy a large percentage of the targets' value Figure 3 showing a railway bridge in North Vietnam immediately after being severed by a Walleye illustrates a typical target This figure also shows the prime reason for the development of Walleye Note the large number of bomb craters spread around the target the result of previous attacks with unguided ordnance These craters represent many costly yet futile sorties into enemy territory Indeed the general indiscriminate damage caused by these attacks is likely to increase the enc my resolv to resist rather than reducing his effectiveness I In this connection I should remark that the studies of nuclear warheads for Walleye and Condor have concentrated on determining the size needed to assure target kill without considering to any extent the subsidiary damage inflicted upon adjacent areas or populace I believe that a further look which takes into account the desirability of minimizing undesired damage would result in a choice of warheads substantially smaller than now specified As pointed out by other speakers at this symposium this factor becomes doubly important when considering the use of weapons on one's own or friendly areas Returning now to Walleye its development resulted from recognition of the need for precise delivery of a high-explosive warhead from ranges compatible with the pilot's ability to acquire and identify tactical targets The weapon itself shown in Figures 4 and 5 is a cruciform design The two metallic clamp rings visible in these photos are field breaks joining the forward guidance section and aft control and power section to the middle warhead section Four fixed quick attach wings with trailing edge control surfaces complete the cruciform design Figure 6 shows a cutaway of the weapon The forward guidance section contains a gyro stabilized television camera and camera and tracker electronics The center section which forms the main body of the missile is the warhead with its associated fuze safety and arming device The air scoop contained in this section is a pop-up device released by a lanyard at launch to sense ram air pressure as an input to the arming sequence Finally the aft section contains the control electronics a hydraulic servo and a wind driven generator which supplies 3 phase 400 cycle primary power to the missile Note the roll gyro which provides an input to the control section maintaining the missile roll stabilized during flight An additional fixed trim input to the control section causes the missile to fly at approximately 1 g lift in the absence of a guidance signal In operation the pilot visually acquires and identifies the target and maneuvers to place his fixed sight on target He then transfers attention to his TV monitor which shows the target as seen by the missile's TV camera The double crosshairs define a small region of the TV picture which is gated into the guidance circuitry to generate tracking signals The pilot maneuvers to place the target within the gated area and switches to automatic track If the tracker is tracking properly the displayed picture will remain on target independent of aircraft motion This lock-on sequence can be accomplished in 5 or 6 seconds At pilot option the weapon is released and the aircraft is free to break away At release all connection to the missile is severed and the automatic tracker guides the weapon to impact As the target is approached the tracker will refine its aim always seeking the point of highest visual contrast within the original gated area Figure 7 shows that the missile seeks part of the bridge structure as it approaches the target Figure 8 shows the glide range of the missile as a function of launch speed Because the glide range will usually exceed the range at which the pilot can acquire the target it was not necessary to use a propulsion unit on Walleye The 1 g trim signal mentioned earlier causes Walleye to fly an approximately straight line from the launch point to the target Note that the missile has as much as 5 nm range when launched at the same altitude as the target The missile simply glides trading speed for lift 2-14 Returning now to the seeker section Figure 9 shows the seeker in its external housing The lens part of the gimbal system and the large flywheel gyro are visible through the nose window in this view Figure 10 shows the seeker with its forward housing removed In this view the gyro wheel with its balancing marks is visible along with the lens and gimbal system Figure 11 summarizes the characteristics of the current Walleye tracker The camera is conventional and operates on essentially US commercial TV standards Although the current camera has a 50 mr field of view with a 3 mr gate a new camera and tracker are being designed which will have a 35 mr field of view and a 1 5 mr tracking gate potentially doubling the tracking range on any given target Figure 12 shows ranges achieved with the present unmodified seeker in captive tests under conditions of good visibility Operational ranges are reduced from these figures by haze or smoke or the desire to hit a specific point on the target rather than accepting a hit anywhere on the target Turning now to the warhead Figure 13 shows the warhead in the present Walleye It is an 8 jet linear shaped charge carrying 430 0 0002 kt pounds of HE in an 825 pound warhead Figure 14 shows a test firing in an arena with witness plates spaced 20 and 50 feet from the warhead The jets are clearly visible Note also the vaporific effects where the jet strikes the witness plates Finally Figure 15 summarizes Walleye's combat record in the Navy and Air Force launches To be fair I should mention that Air Force launches were made at somewhat longer average range than Navy launches This fact probably accounts for the poorer Air Force hit percentage On this chart success means a weapon which functions properly and guides to a point within the gated area at the time of launch while hit refers to weapons which actually hit the desired target Since over 50% of the weapons launched impact on the desired target Walleye can be said to have a CEP of zero I will now show some film illustrating Walleye in operation The first sequence shows Walleye being launched from an A4 Next is a film made from video tape of the telemetered picture as a Walleye flew from launch to impact against a B29 test target and a film showing impact of a live warhead Walleye against the same B29 N ext is a film made in combat of a strike against the Tam Da Bridge finally a film of a Walleye test drop using an experimental data link The missile was launched at the target area from a range 10 nm beyond visual acquisition range of the specific target As the missile nears the target the operator in an aircraft 10 miles behind the launch aircraft refines the lock-an point to achieve a direct hit on the bridge target Condor Condor shown in Figure 16 on the wing of an A6A is being developed to extend the accurate delivery provided by Walleye to longer ranges The Condor mission Figure 17 is to attack targets of the same t ypes as Walleye but from launch ranges beyond the lethal range of SAM defenses located in the vicinity of the target An analysis of Vietnamese experience shows that although overall loss rates were low the attrition against selected targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas was high enough to justify the cost of a Condor on a purely economic basis 215 The Condor weapons system Figure 18 consists of the missile a data link pod and the aircraft internal system composed of TV display control panel and control stick The missile Figure 19 consists of a seeker and autopilot section a warhead solid propellant rocket motor and a control power and data link section The guidance and autopilot section are similar tb the Walleye guidance section but with several important differences The seeker has a switchable lens providing wide 30° and narrow 6° fields of view at the operator's option and can be slewed by the operator independent of missile motion The autopilot section provides midcourse trajectory programming with a variety of glide climb and altitude hold options available both preset before launch and by operator command after launch Also the autopilot can program a turn of up to 90° after launch to permit offset launches The warhead Figure 20 is similar to the Walley e design but is somewhat smaller because of the weight and space occupied by the propulsion section The propulsion section Figure 21 was recently switched from a liquid design to the end burning solid design This motor provides a single 3 minute burn at a thrust level of 880 pounds to produce a range from high altitude launch in excess of 55 nm The data link and control section Figure 22 contains the data link unit control actuators a silver-zinc battery and a power conversion unit The data link transmits the TV picture from the missile to the launch aircraft and receives commands from the aircraft The aircraft pod Figure 23 carries the matching TV receiver and command transmitter which with forward and aft antennas has a usable range in excess of 100 nm The computer provides several functions It performs a built-in test before launch indicates range to go to launch and computes missile position after launch Missile position is computed by combining range and bearing of the missile derived from the data link with aircraft position from the aircraft navigation system This missile position is then compared with the track from preset launch coordinates to the target coordinates and if an error exists commands are automatically sent to correct the missile's midcourse track While the initial aircraft for which Condor is configured the A6 has an adequate navigation system provisions are left in the pod for adding an inertial platform if it is desired to put the system on aircraft not so equipped The mission recorder makes a film record of the mission from launch to impact providing a permanent record for damage assessment and en-route recon Finally the environmental control system is simply an air conditioner to maintain desired operating temperatures in the pod Figure 24 illustrates the antenna coverage available from the pod The two antennas provide 360° azimuth coverage so that the aircraft has substantial freedom to maneuver after launch without interrupting data link communication Figures 25 through 28 -illustrate a typical mission sequence starting with selection of a launch point navigation route and checkpoints En route to the launch p int an in-flight check is run by the built-in test system and target and launch coordinates are set into the computer In addition missile cruising altitude is set into the missile At launch the aircraft turns away from the target the missile and pod antennas begin tracking each other and the missile autopilot commands the preset rnidcoursE program The operator uncages the seeker and can sIc v the camera looking for chcch -points on the way to the target Should cloud cover or other conditions be different from predicted the operator can override the preset program and command the missile to climb glide hold altitude and turn right or left as needed As the missile nears the target the operator locates the target area then the target and switches to terminal mode At this point the midcourse program is canceled and the missile now responds to seeker inputs to fly toward the designated aimpoint The operator has the option of allowing the missile to track automatically in the same manner as Walleye or he can retain manual control of the seeker to either update the aimpoint or guide manually to impact Figure 29 lists the important features other than basic standoff range provided by Condor Of these the last-aimpoint selection and correction-is probably most significant The operator is in control of the missile to the moment of impact He can change aimpoint even change target within limits and abort the mission or destruct the missile if the circumstances dictate I In addition to the basic TV seeker an alternate radar seeker Figure 30 has been designed for Condor to extend operation to all weather This seeker has been captive flight tested for over two years against a variety of land and sea targets and has demonstrated the ability to map land areas and track targets as needed for Condor guidance The system is ready for free flight demonstration but has not been funded for this program extension Studies of the feasibility of surface launching Condor have shown that surface to surface ranges of 30 to 70 miles can be achieved depending upon the booster size used The launcher can be a simple fixed rail and the control pod can be located near the launcher or at a remote vantage point To conclude I will show a film made from a video tape of the most recent Condor launch This missile was complete except for a motor and was launched in a glide mode from an altitude of 29 000 feet above the target and a range of over 14 nm The missile was deliberately launched with a 2 mile offset from the direction to the target to simulate a tactical situation with errors in midcourse navigation and target location Performance was excellent with impact on the predesignated trailer in a group of trailers which formed ·the target complex 217 Figure 1 PRIME TARGETS FOR WALLEYE FIXED LARGE STRONG STRUCTURES FIXED SMALL OR VULNERABLE TARGETS SHIPPING • AIRFIELDS PROTECTED FUEL TANKS HANGARS AND RUNWAY • PORT FACILITIES • RAIL AND ROAD INTERSECTIONS • BR I DGES OF ALL TY PES • TUNNELS • PARKED AI RCRAFT • MAJOR GUN AND SAM INSTALLATIONS • SUPPLY FUEL AND AMMUNITION DUMPS • RADAR INSTALLATIONS • LIGHTLY ARMORED COMBAT VESSELS • MERCHANT SH I PS • SMALL CRAFT Figure 2 1 'Figure v Figure 1 -- ·· n __ r 219 -- - - J• Figul'e WALLEYE - I LENGTH 00 I D'' '' -AETE R I 'v v 1i' JG SPA i I TCTAL ' VEI· 'r- T 'APf-'Fe I 'NARHEAO 'NEIGHT r- q '' ' '- -- GL DE RA 0 00 I ACCURACY 'OES G'I GOAL S - -- -E ' ·J· n 0 r Pili Walleye Operational Diagrarn I PII 0 I I l ' I I C l IHI 1 l IDI IIIIlS I HCI I IIUN I 'II III I II IIJ I t ' I II til I ''' 1'''' '1t'II I I 1 I II 1 1 I I f I ' III I I 1 I I ll I I 111 1 I i 11 h I 1 ' I' IP l'i I I II I f I I In If '11 I 11 1 11 l I I 3 1 II I I I I jI j II 11 I I I U f I I I '- f 11111 llt ll ' Figure 7 i c· Iii t i 21 ·SECREi o 9EBRETJR9 TRACKER CHARACTER I STI CS FOR WALLEYE CAMERA TUBE TYPE ELECTROSTATIC VIDICON FIELD OF VIEW 50 MILLIRADIANS TRACKING GATES 3 MILLIRADIANS SQUARE INTERLACE 2 1 LINES 525 FIELD RATE 60 PER SECOND ASPECT RATIO 1 1 BANDWIDTH 5 me GIMBAL ANGULAR COVERAGE 30 DEG OFF AXIS IN ANY DIRECTION PRECESSION RATE 4 DEG SEC MAXIMUM LIGHT RANGE FULL SUNLIGHT TO 100 FOOT LAMBERTS AND TRACK A CONTRAST 18% LENS 8 75 IN FOCAL LENGTH f 4 5 CATADIOPTRIC SPECTRAL FILTERING DEEP RED OR NONE PILOT OPTION Figure 11 WALLEYE TRACKING RANGES RANGE MILES TARGETS SHIPS DESTROYER 15 TO 20 TANKER 20 BARGE 10 BRI DGES 300' X 40' 4 PIERS 60' X 20' 6 4 AIR BASE INSTALLATIONS 20 HANGARS RUNWAYS 8 TO 9 PARKED AIRCRAFT 4 Figure 12 ·m e lllif Jh6 15 IN GUIDED MISSILE WARHEAD I Figure 13 f - '- -_-41 - __ • - WALLEYE COMBAT RECORD TO 27 MARCH 190Q US USAF T' T L EXPENDED 301' i2 1 l O' WEAPON SUCCESS 271 114 385 HIT 206 74 28G ' - SUCCESS 40 0 8 4 39 2 ' ' HIT 08 4 57 4 65 0 73 ADDITIONAL USN ROUNDS EXPENDED O'J WHICH ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS NOT YET RECEIVED - J '' ' 'V Launch Point • r PG 102956 BS2¥ aP' Scope Presentation j 5' e Figure 17 COMPATIBLE WITH A-7 GUIDANCE ELECTRO-OPTICAL WALLEYE AIRCRAFT COMPATIBILITY- A-6A HE TAA O oc arget Acquisition WARHEAD -630 POUNDS 55NMI c ----IJUntl i Ui VELOCITY -HIGH SUBSONIC f Data Link WEIGHT-2130 POUNDS RANGE-55NMI CEP- 10 FEET sr REQUIREMENTS Initial Point I I - I' Lethal Envelope for Aircraft GENERAL-PURPOSE ATTACK AGAINST HEAVILY • DEFENDED TARGETS CONDOR MISSION e e Uo'lq li POD MISSILE QA IF' 'I I • Ii ' j I 'il ry 'Me t '''' e 'I' sa ' Q e CONTROLLER CONTROL PANEl DUAlMOOE DISPLAY AIRCRAF INSlALLATION CONDOR WEAPON SYSTEM COj· · f'tTIAt 1 LENGTH e DIAMETER WING SPAN LAUNCH WEIGHT W ARHEAO WElr HT 166 INCHES 17 INCHES 53 INCHES 2130 POUNDS 630 POUNDS Figure 19 v Ie i pc 104587 e -- 1-- --------- - Figure 21 I e Pyrographite Throat 41·RPD Insulation Grap -I-Title G- 90 Aft of Throat -- I ozzle Carbon Phenolic MX-4926 Graph-I-Tite G Liner 41-RPD Insulator Aft Closure - 4130 Steel with R-154 Insulation ISM Pyromesh Igniter Aft Attach Skirt Closure Retainer Pins 0 Ring Seal RDS-543 Propellant 8Shf WSsj J _1i- -------105 92 -- Stress Relieving Liner SRL Case Cylinder and Forward Dome Case - 4130 Steel Forward Attach Skirt Detachable Hardback SOLID ROCKET MOTOR 1 - tuttI 1 AIRCRAFT POD lENGTH 115 IN DIAMETER 17 IN WEIGHT 460 lBS Environmental Control System Inertial Meosuring Unit Provisions for - - - - ' Radome Figure 2 3 • PLANAR ARRAY FULL TRACKING • GAIN 32 db - TRACKING MODE 16 5' db - ACQUISITION MODE • BEAMWIDTH - VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL 4 20 TRACKING 27 0 ACQUISITION • TRACKING ACCURACY - 0 15 0 Figure 2·1 UP 1 LI I U Z J 1 ' z 0 en - tit 1 1 NAV GATION TO LAUNCH L 4 T ' Y S T Et A H • 0 ' ' P • c lj - hi H E K 5 R S E- T J P r'ptPARA TI r· j • l I -t' IN fllGHT • IliR ' PtlFl NAv ' l T·CiN 1 Eq' ' l' f' j • CHECKS R t i N L CHI S 'y MID-COURSE CRUISE -' - ENGINE ' NITiON A R C R AFT DATA L AU N C H LINK ie CRUISE WISS E IV GiN E 8 LEA I Tracklfig Initiated Conilnues JeS-t'e to ALT T E 10' 1 I TI 0 IV at C R ' SEA L T ' T U C E Operai r Uric'oyes Seeker Establishes Ortenta lon o 7d Figure 27 ' ' R tAO i w' Pc dOIH ' f L 1 85'i i Target Area Acqu IsitlOn f au - r -- Figure 28 Target Acqulslt on d ' - c '''_- - _ Pre·program Cruls e Altitude r i l - f -' we LOCK ON Checkpoint TARGET ACQUISITION AND LOCK-ON e - e UNIQUE QUALITIES OF CONDOR • FOR THE FIRST TIME IN AIR·LAUNCHED ORDNANCE HISTORY THE FLIGHT PATH REQUIREMENTS OF THE AIRCRAFT ARE DIVORCED FROM THE FLIGHT PATH OF THE MISSILE • Tactical Freedom in Selecting Approach to Target • Missile Maneuvering After Launch • Operator Functions Separate from Pilot Functions • Aircraft Maneuvering Independent • INFORMATION FROM MISSILE AND COMMANDS TO THE MISSILE PROVIDED UP TO IMPACT • Real Time Reconnaissance • Strike Assessment • Aimpoint Selection and Correction Figure 2 1 9 OREli'Rg Question and Answer Period LA 0JDA UER LRL What is the vulnerability of Wal1eye after it's launched And does that account for some of the unsuccessful flights CRA WFORD No we have no reports of any missiles having been hit after launch I know of-one missile that was hit on the airplane but that's the only case we had The missile potential1y could be shot down since it flies in a modest high subsonic region but in general we think that the aircraft itself is a much more profitable target than the missile The missile is quite smal1 we have at home some films taken from the target of a missile approaching and you just don't see anything at al1 until the last couple of seconds and then bang it's there And so optical systems won't do it it would have to be a radar-directed system McDONALD LRL What about the jamming problems of Condor and Condorlike systems after they've actual1y been launched from the aircraft CRAWFORD That's a good question Certainly they can be jammed no question that you can't make a data link system which is good enough to be completely immune to jamming The present system is relatively unsophisticated it was made that way deliberately because we wanted to keep the complexity and the cost low in initial versions and our indications are that the jamming capability is not presently there on the Soviet side They could certainly build jammers There are several things that work against the jammer however One is the fact that the beam width on the antennas is fairly narrow The beam width on the pod antenna is 4 2 degrees So his jammer has to be located within a fairly narrow region to be able to jam the system Furthermore there are 10 channels' available to operate the system on As a result he's got to determine which channel you're on before he can jam you That means he's got to pick up the transmission and if he picks up the transmission from the aircraft that's not the same frequency as the transmission from the missile Likewise if the picks up the missile it's not the same frequency as the transmission from the aircraft so if he's using a directional jammer-which he pretty much has to do in order to get enough power into you-then he's got to pick up the signal say from the missile and then jam in the aircraft direction with that signal So he has a substantial problem In addition if the launch aircraft descends below radar horizon for the target area then a jammer located in the target area can't get into the receiver in the aircraft but the aircraft can still communicate to the missile because it's up in the l ir and above radar horizon So there are several lA ys to play this Eventual1y if jammers were developed that were bad enough we'd have to go to a sophisticnted coding scheme to try to beat them DOUGHERTY SLA I don't think you told here the pilot was driving from in that last I -al1eyc sequence Can you tell us what the capabilities are on the rcrnote control 237 SCtnE Iftll CRA WFORD Some of those have been run from a ground van but more recently it's from a second A4 We have the missile captive on one A4 making the test run the operator follows on a TA4 at a range of some 10 to 20 miles and he does the controlling after the pilot in the aircraft with the missile initially locks it on the target BYERS R D Dept of AF In your combat experience statistics on Valleye you've given its success and hit probabilities which do not reflect the accomplishment of the mission I wQnder if you also have probabilities for successfully demolishing the bridge or whatever the target is in one round CRA WFORD I don't have the figures with me on that It has depended rather strongly on the target itself On some of the targets particularly the harder bridges we've hit them but they have not been dropped On the softer bridges we have dropped them I don't know what the percentage is there In that connection there's been a request for a larger version of Walleye and Walleye II is currently under design It's basically the same as the existing missile in fact it uses the same guidance and control sections It looks quite a loi like the basic bird except for the bigger warhead section we're up over 1000 pounds of explosive now and the overall weight of the m issile is 2300 pounds KING AFXPD I must challenge you on the point about uniqueness Condor is not the first air launch missile which has a flight path independent of the aircraft Maybe the first tactical but not the first air launch missile We've had a number of them operating on strategic aircraft for years The question I really have concerns the range of your data link equipment and the relative position between aircraft and target from a long range release If you use your advertised range of some 55 miles from a high altitude launch and turn your aircraft around and get out it looks as if you're going to be up against the outer limits of your so-called laO-mile range data link Is that not true CRA WFORD Right The 100 miles was selected on the basis of being able to turn 180 degrees and retreat from the target area and we do reach approximately 100 miles at that point Now that won't be true if you're running a supersonic aircraft but we're not on any supersonic aircraft COTTER SLA You said that there's an interest in our larger yield Walleye and at the same time it looks as if we're cutting down the yield of the Condor This doesn't seem to be too sensible That's an observation CRA WFORD Yes you've touched a point that's been commented on by many people before We'd like to have a bigger warhead in Condor in fact we've got some versions designed where if you're willing to trade some range you can get more warhead but if you need the range and you're constrained to the missile size that we presently have then you have to put in a certain amount of propulsion and the remainder is the warhead When the studies were initially made on this system everyone was saying 500 pounds is enough to kill any target we are going to have In fact they were criticizing Walleye as being too big a warhea d We now realize that's not right The one thing we have in our favor is being able to update the aimpoint We're quite sure that in some of the cases where Walleye has not killed the target it could have if we had refined the aim to a more vulnerable point on the target Condor can do that That makes up for the warhead a little bit 238 COTTER Is that true for heavy bridges CRA WFORD Heavy bridges will be the worst case of course and you're probably still stuck there but refining aim still helps You may have to put in two or three missiles instead of just one COTTER Perhaps you're not the right person to answer this question but I would be interested in observation or comment from the audience Why hasn't the Navy established a requirement for the nuclear Walleye CRA WFORD I think I have to pass on that one AGNEW LASL Would Captain Whiteaker like to answer that I iHITEAKER Office of CNO I might just say that the JCS has established a requirement for the nuclear Walleye I think that is sufficient GARWIN IBM Does Condor in fact have an inflight destruct command-destruct CRAWFORD It does not presently have it the contractor has been requested to provide an ECP on this because CNO has requested that that be added to the system It's quite easy to provide because there are spare channels in the data link It's just a matter of hooking them up AGNEW Is it possible to have the pod or the control in a separate airplane and then send out other aircraft which have not been modified-just drop things in some sort of glide basket and then control them from another aircraft CRA WFORD Yes you certainly could We've even looked at things like putting the control pod on the ground and launching the missiles from the airplane There are a lot of ways you can play that game and it's just a matter of whether anybody is interested in the usability of that sort of thing AGNEW That would really make it hard to jam CRAWFORD Yes MANEY ASD AF I would like to ask if you have any idea what the unit cost of this system is CRAWFORD Yes it's too high lVIANEY In particular you said for certain hard bridges it might take two or three to knock them down so I'm asking how much it costs to kill a bridge of this sort CRA WFORD The best figure I could give you at the moment is that the missile is in the vicinity of $100 000 It's strongly dependent on how you contract for them and how many you buy If we follow present plans we're currently set up to buy about 2000 missiles in a series of relatively small buys over a period of 5 years From a budgeting standpoint this is a nice way of doing it because you don't have to 8EORET IPi commit a large number of dollars at anyone point but it's a very inefficient way 01' buying the missiles Also there are a number of features in the system which are really more expensive than they should be For instance vValleye costs on the order of $15 000 and there's a big difference between that and $100 000 We're working now to apply the advanced Walleye technology to Condor to try to reduce this cost and I would expect with some reasonable engineering the cost will come down to perhaps half the present figure 40 -' Richard L Garwin IBlVI THE IMPACT OF TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND NA VIGA TION SYSTEMS ON MISSILES BOMBS AND ARTILLERY OF THE FUTURE I First of all 1'd like to agree with the assessment by General Burchinal and the comments by General Cowan and General Yudkin on the changing balance and the changing context of the use of tactical nuclear weapons I recognize the importance of the general trend and the emphasis on accurate delivery means I welcome such evaluations of our present capability because I think it is vital to know our present as well as potential capability Too often one has to deduce the present from the improvement which is claimed when one signs the contract for a Q ew weapon system But it's not sufficient for each person just to do his best Beyond that we have to know what our capability is at any time We have to know if we start a war whether we Ire sure to win whether we have some chance of winning or whether we have no chance at all In general we have to know what is the range of consequences of any of our actions One conclusion of these assessments it seems to me is the extreme vulnerability of our basing posture of our theater nuclear forces in Europe not only to nuclear attack but to conventional attack In addition people have noted the asymmetry in the air defense postures of the Warsaw Pact and the NATO forces the asymmetry in ·our vulnerability to sabotage So while I agree with the assessment that things are pretty bad on balance I doubt that the relatively minor fixers that have been proposed will in fnet improve ' JUl· rdntive status weI' the years as the Warsaw PRct Rlso improves Our present posture It seems to me is tied to long runways and to main operating bnses in Europe It's highly vulnerable to destruction and pindown with runway cr8 tering devices with nuclear weapons or with nerve gas attacks delivered by aircraft or by rockets In the tactical conventional role as opposed to nuclear against moderate defenses we are dependent on large numbers of support airc raft jammers migcap defense suppression and rescue as our experience in Vietnam sh'Jws In fact there have been periods of a month or more during which 4 strike aircraft were accompanied by 12 or 16 support aircraft each of which had some vulnerability of its own Further we have an extensive force with a long replacement and training time If one has an average attrition of 1 20 or 10 G or 20 it takes a long time to train the pilots and it takes a large support force of training aircraft to produce the pilots who will fly the missions the next year Our force is inaccurate The CEP of weapons delivered in North Vietnam can be embarassingly well determined from pictures of the distribution of craters around bridges In one case it turns out to be something more than 700 to 900 feet But there are some glimmers of hope Walleye is one of them Condor another and the Air Force Pave Way bomb one of my favorites I expected to have to explain Walleye and Pave Way but I think I don't have to at the moment Now what do we need It seems to me we need a more rapid delivery of ordnance in response to a request We have a one to three day response' cycle except in the case of close air support That's too much for many targets We need better accuracy with nuclear weapons and with conventional weapons Why should we accept 700 feet CEP when we could get something better 100 feet 20 feet or zero We need to reduce the vulnerability of our bases of our men and of our delivery vehicles We need a lower investment cost it seems to me even at the expense of higher expendable cost when war comes In that way we could have a greater capability and we could move to the traditional high production posture which has characterized the US during war time And we need less degradation of capability against heavy defenses In Vietnam when the air defense system took a jump in capability we were thrown into disarray-in some cases transferred our attention from important targets to less important targets because we could not tolerate the losses in flying against the ones we really wanted to hit Now in achieving these goals we can look at the changing technology of which you've just had a view We can look ' for example at a modern force-not one which has grown incrementally and traditionally as has that of the US but one that was built up essentially from nothing after the war that's the USSR's and it is quite different from ours They have as you've heard no verified nuclear capable tube artillery they have emphasized long range and short range missiles for the delivery of conventional warheads nuclear warheads and chemical warheads They have no aircraft carriers Recently they've been building helicopter carriers They have placed a great deal of emphasis on flexible cruise missile systems and I'm going to talk a lot more about that later And finally in addition to technology and the Russian force we can look at the experience in Vietnam where we spent a great deal of money against a not very promising target array-not knowing that all we needed to do was to kill certain particular targets It's traditional in improving our force structure to identify a single weak point and work on it It seems to me that we're at the end of that road it takes just too long and after we eliminate a weak point another weak point shows up One example is the problem of truck interdiction in Laos This was characterized three years ago as an inability to find the target We knew there were North Vietnamese trucks operating in Laos We had critical agreement whereby we c ould attack them 242 8EO RE from the air but we just couldn't find the trucks Well that probl em was solved by the use of night vision devices and by air-emplaced sensors but this only revealed an equally severe deficiency namely we couldn't hit the targets after we had found them we couldn't hit even a few of them That problem in turn was solved qualitatively over a period of a year or two in various ways by the AC130 gunship a very effective truck killer by the M36 incendiary cluster bomblet delivered by Al or B57 aircraft by the Pave Way laser guided bomb delivered from two F4's or by one C130 forward air controller aircraft with the Pave Way laser guided bomb delivered by another against the truck illuminated by the FA-C But the problem still wasn't solved quantitatively We had insufficient effective aircraft We had one AC130 gunship now I think there are six We had Pave Way bombs produced at 200 a month most of therp destined for North Vietnam and not for defense suppression or for truck killing in Laos We had M36 incendiary bombs the procurement of which was terminated so there has been a whole year's gap in that capability So even though we knew how to kill trucks somehow we could not make the administrative and operational decisions to do this job The lesson I want to draw here is that attacking the weak points allows one to move only sequentially toward a better capability with each step taking several years With a development cycle ranging anywhere from 8 to 18 years in our normal peacetime procedure it's important that we build new systems only when they are major improvements But it's also important to fix up the old ones quickly when we can make a major functional improvement without changing the entire system One example is adding the demonstrated capability of LORAN line bombing to the F4 fleet Experience in Vietnam and Laos has shown that by LORAN line bombing one can deliver weapons from level flight at 10 000 feet with an accuracy of 50 meters CEP in all weather That's a lot better than visual bombing with an F4 and about a factor 3 better than the MSQ77 or 95 radar controlled bombing Now I'm going to talk about a system which seems to me to solve a great many of the current problems all at once The system has had extensive discussion and review and its technical feasibility is not questioned There's considerable dispute over costs but this to my mind does not change the desirability of the system The key to this approach is to provide certain services over an entire war theater so that the individual vehicles using these services in flight can be made as inexpensively as possible There's a lot of precedence for this for instance in civil aviation There's the VOR or the Decca navigation aids for aircraft which represent a substantial ground investment but allow the aircraft to operate with very little in the way of on-board equipment I want to discuss how to fulfill one of the major purposes of military forces which is to fight to destroy and to kill targets-that is to deliver weapons Now to deliver weapons on targets takes more than accurate delivery it takes intelligence so that one knows the relative importance of targets reconnaissance and surveillance I'm not going to emphasi7 c here how this can and should be done it is Fl very difficult problem In the Walleye Condor presento tiol1 you heard that one can sometimes do reconnaissance during the strike In fact that seems to be a very good way and the system I propose has some of those same characteristics But here I want to stress the advantages to be obtained from using theater services as a basis for weapon delivery systems and not just as a convenience My 243 observation is that almost all of the strikes are upon targets determined by prior reconnaissance When the target itself is not determined by reconnoiss3 nce the point of attack is determined by reconnaissance That is one knows that there will be a train at a certain point perhaps approximately at a certain time and one can arrange to attack that point-if not precisely at a certain time then with a mine which can be actuated by the train when it comes along So here I will emphasize prebriefed attacks on fixed targets Figure 1 illustrates an elevated relay an elevated line of sight which aroused the coml1luni ations center over on the left which I've mounted for mobility in a van to cGmmunic 'lte with all kinds of vehicles in the field These are over on the right supersonic aircraft bombs falling from aircraft toward a target drones of various kinds In general what I want to do here is have a wide band theater communication capability which allows not only higher authority but real-time command instructions from the center on the left to the vehicles on the right So the elements of this system are a the delivery vehicles as inexpensive as possible b the relay and c the control and direction center which after the planning of a mission operates in large part automatically I'll discuss later the possibilities for the relay to extend the line of sight see Figure 2 We have a time-shared directional communication and control system It turns out that one doesn't need to send commands at every instant to every vehicle as you can see something like a 10 second command period is adequate for midcourse and perhaps a 10 per second comm md rate for final attack After the planning target identification proposed time on target choice of weapon and so on the proposed flight plans would be stored in a computer and made good automatically by the controls which are sent to the vehicles c _ j tedRel Y Figuru 1 -_ o' Elevated Relay Operation - III THE SYSTEM Elevated re'lay to extend line of sight Time-shared directional command and control Accurate multiple-user low-cost theater navigation and location 20 feet Remote-guided weapons bombs artillery ground-launched cruise missiles Advanced mines and target-actuated munitions Figure 2 The elevated relay is much used now in Vietnam and Laos in the Igloo White system in which one has orbiting aircraft either manned or droned which communicate via VHF with the UHF command link and an S band composite link to the direction center The communication system in Igloo White is time-shared but it is not directional It could be made directional by the use of a phased array antenna on the aircraft and in case of enemy jamming presumably it would be The accurate multiple-user 'low-cost theater navigation and location system with 20 foot accuracy doesn't quite exist either We are just about to try in the Fourth Corps of Vietnam such a system with about 100 foot accuracy namely a LORAN retransmission system in which the 100 kilocycle LORAN signals are remodulated onto a UHF radio and fed into a standard LORAN computer back at a direction center However that's the kind of system I'm talking about-one in which the onboard or in this case patrol-borne equipment costs may be a few hundred dollars and which gives location accuracy equal to that obtainable from a $20 000 t $100 000 system In the remote-guided weapons-in bomb category we have Bullpup and Walleye and we have Condor coming up We have no remote-guided artillery shells to my knowledge but there's absolutely no reason why a 16 inch shell or for that matter an 8 inch shell cannot be fitted with the same homing or guidance device that one Puts on a b mb thereby providing a very rapid response high fire power capability to deliver support over a limited area And finally we dC P't have any ground launched cruise missiles we have Ma ' e but that is not remote guided The Russians have ground launched air launched and submarine launched cruise missiles 1Nith ovhich they communicR te in flight and these pose a very severe threat to the S Advanced mines and target actuated munitions are to Yill a deficiency in the pr'JposeJ y stem s well as in our present system namely to make a rendezvous ·8 OAm fAI BEORrT QR with an uncooperative target which isn't there when you get to the proper point The best thing in such cases I think is to deposit a munition which waits until the target comes along With inaccurate delivery that has a further advantage that the ratio of the kill radius to the CEP enters only as the first power instead of the second power as it does with a bomb which explodes on contact Figure 3 explains position fixing by microwave ranging The LORA N system uses three fixed transmitters in the 100 kHz band and with a signal-to-noise ratio typically less than 1 determines location to very good accuracy d' t tl 1 't ntl l· L' o ' t G rnund Red' ' 11- Figure 3 The prompt system allows less expensive onboard equipment for filtering over a long period The direction center communicates with a couple of aircraft or elevated platforms-they could be balloons satellites whatever you like Down on the ground are two low-cost beacons they weigh a few tens of pounds and cost a few thousand dollars there's another one of those in the vehicle that is being guided on a peculiar trajectory Every once in a while one of these aircraft or the direction center sends a pulse which then runs around the whole system Its time over each leg is individually measured and the time to the vehicle and back is measured That allows one for instance with this time to determine that the aircraft is on a sphere of a certain radius from beacon A and on a sphere of a known radius from beacon B the intersection of these two spheres is a cLi-cle If one knows also the aircraft altitude-which for these long range cases is al1 that's necessary--ihen one has aircraft 1 fixed in space in plan to an accuracy of a few feet relative accuracy anyhow and the same 'for aircraft 2 The baseline up in the air is used to determine the po ition of one vehicle or hundreds of vehicles The QRC334 system under development and test does this so far as I know it has not been tried with ground beacons 246 Tpr E88ET 'Be Now the elevated relay if it's not to be a satellite has a horizon limitation probably of the order of 200 miles from 40 000 feet altitude One isn't limited to 40 000 feet one could have aircraft at 80 000 feet or balloons at 100 000 feet The relay cost is amortized over a very large number of vehicles and over a very large expenditure of vehicles in this proposed system One doesn't need very much transmitter po ver because the relay communicates wide band over a very directional antenna to the direction center at short range whereas it communicates at long range only a few commands in appropriate time slots to the vehicles Now antijam capability is needed eventually A system like this in my opinion can grow so that one fields it initially without much capability against jamming and then as the need arises fits the expendable vehicles with antijam featUres The duty cycle is very low as I said hundreds of vehicles in flight need to have command updates only every 10 seconds and one needs only a single elevated platform for the relay but two or more for time of arrival position fixing In addition of course one might want to have several more elevated platforms and switch the control from one to another in order to reduce the susceptibility to attack by homing missiles on the other side So at the bottom of all this is a computer see Figure 5 The computer can be way back it can be 200 miles behind or 400 or 1000 miles from the elevated relay It can be in the most secure location in the theater if we can't find a single secure location in the theater then gentlemen we have a very difficult problem But there's no reason for the computer to be up there in the van CHARACTERISTICS OF ELEVATED RELAY Line of sight from 40 000 feet 200 miles Communicates to and from hundreds of vehicles Little transmitter power needed Low duty cycle on most links Single platform for relay two for time-of-arrival position fixing Figure -l The computer manages the communications it knows when each vehicle requires to be commanded it knows when each vehicle is receiving the distance measuring pulse and it listens to that vehicle with appropriate directivity at that time It can also implement a schedule of frequency-hopping or other kind of encoding in order to reduce the susceptibility to jamming The computer updates the position information for each of the vehicles it knows where the vehicle WR S it can ' 1'7 EGRET ltl extrapolate where it is and it need make only very small corrections to this l'xtrapnlated position so that the program is quite a simple one The computer man lges the flight for the missiles bombs and artillery shells in principle it can pick them up at any point There is no reason for a missile to be launched from the computer 10ca'tion It can be launched from a field supply depot or merchant ship anywhere in the area It's best for communication to be established with it before it's launched but not absolutely necessary Finally with midcourse navigation being taken care of by the computer if the vehicles particularly he cruise missiles have some kind of drag modulation which might be easier than th ust modubtion one can implement very accurately the precise time on target and get the misaile there within a second or so of the desired time and within midcourse navigation accuracy at least for target acquisition That means that the manager of the system the person who happens to be flying the missile at the target end need only seek the target within a region of 200 to 500 foot diameter He doesn't have to look all over a several mile acquisition window for the target and so he has an easy job We can use the US commercial standards degraded as they win inevitably be in combat 200 line TV is good enough for this particular job Well to reiterate what I would hope to achieve is a midcourse navigation accu'racy of the order of 200 feet and that's compatible with a 10 second command and position interval with onboard auto-pilots with angular errors of the order of 1 degree and accelerometer errors of the order of 0 01 g see Figure 6 COMPUTER ROLE Computer -managed comm unications Compu er -der ived pos ition data Computer-managed flight for missiles bombs and artillery shells Computer-managed target acquisition Figure 5 For unmanned vehicles the computer ordinarily would not bother with the air traffic control problem if there were two drones lying in the same neighborhood it would just regard the probability of their collision as low and fly them anyhow After all this is a war and the other guy is going to be shooting at them if occrrsionally we lose two by midair collision that's just too bad In the terminal phase with these same onboard instruments o 0 01 g and 1 degree accuracy and a 10 foot command interval one can realize in principle about a 2 foot error This is not important I only asked for a 20 foot error here because there are systematic errors in the system There is the variation of relative humidity of the air there is the variation of temperature and barometric -243 pressure and unless I ne has some kind of c8 librcttion near the target area such 8 micr wave rG nging system is unlikely to be more accurate than about 10 feet And 20 feet is not necessarily a conservative estimate for the absolute error in flying an artillery shell or a missile into a target One has various options If the target altitude is not known very accurately one might want to fly the missile over and then vertically downward as is the case with -J ike Her c u e s for instance But the chief importance to my mind of midcourse navigation accuracy of this magnitude is to all v one to do target acquisition with very moderate use of the necessarily rather wide band TV link so that a single elevated platform could devote its fairly scarce direction band width product to listening to or loobng 1 t me missile for a periOd of the order of 5 seconds At that time the operator could designate the target in the field of view from a pre distorted reconnaissance photograph which he has next to him And at that time either the computer could take over Walleye type tracking and fly the missile into the target or in case one has to worry about screening of the line of sight by ground obstacles an onboard tracker could be implemented as has been done so successfully in Walleye and Condor SOME SYSTEM PARAMETERS Midcourse navigation accuracy 200 teet On-board instruments 0 01 g 10 error 10 second pos ition and command interval Term ina I phase - 20 toot error 0 1 second position and command period I Target acquisition by 5 seconds ot TV Sing Ie time-ot-arrival navigation system 100 drones in midcourse 10 vehicles in terminal phase Pulse-jet 500 mile cruise missile 1000 pound payload Perhaps $25K at 3000 per month Figure 6 Early looks at the time-of-ar i ival navigation systems-from the standpOint of which could be implemented more expensively with LORAN retransmission and which less expensively with pulse microwave distance measuring--indicate that a moderate size computer could handle 100 vehicles in midcourse at the 10 second period and at the same time some 10 vehicles in the terminal phase The miSsile I would like to use with this system is just 1S inexpensive as possible Now you all remember the 249 VI which was a pulse jet missile of 150 miles range and low subsonic speed There has been some work recently on French pulse jets with a specific fuel consumption of about 2 pounds of fuel per hour per pound of thrust It turns out one can sketch a reasonable missile weighing about 3000 pounds and having a 1000 pound payload 1000 pounds of structure and avionics and 1000 pounds of fuel which would travel 500 miles at Mach 7 or 8 Then the real question in all this is suppose that you really relied on such a missile how little could you buy it for Remember that it doesn't have to be compatible with aircraft it doesn't necessarily have to be safe for aircraft carriers it's going to be shot at anyhow so the reliability of 70 or 80% is probably adequate if it doesn't work you just push it overboard from the launching site if you happen to be a merchant ship or you fire it away in a field someplace you don't repair it From the fundamental as opposed to the technical point of view as you say in the stock market it seems that one could make such a thing for $25 000 Comparing Walleye at $15 000 the tactical telemetry for Walleye at something between $1000 and $3000 rocket assisted takeoff for ground launch which is about $400 it just seems that $25 000 would be a reasonable amount If one goes at it from the other end and asks how much it costs to modify a Ryan Fire Bee of which the airframe plus engine costs I think about $45 000 it looks as if one could buy such a system for $65 000 without the remote TV and about $80 000 with the remote TV One could also approach it from the point of view of Condor except that many of the expensive parts of Condor are already built in and it's going to be hard to engineer them out So this is a super VI which flies' in very high class theater services With such remote guided weapons I would hope to get 25 foot CEP by navigation alone see Figure 7 REMOTE -GU I DED WEAPONS 25 foot CEP by navigation alone 200 foot midcourse guidance for penetration and terrain avoidancefeases target acquisition and TV needs For attack on moving targets designated by remote sensors or designators For accurate delivery of mines For high assurance of timely strike For greater capabi Iity aga inst heavy defenses Figure 7 2 0 These are conventional veapons for the most part When one flies one of them into an area one has done a calibration of the area and so the day's work might begin with flying a TV -equipped remote-guided weapon into a target area calibrating several square miles--i n that way introducing into the computer a bias which then takes out propagation anomalies--and for the rest of the day flying less expensive missiles without TV The 200 foot midcourse guidance can be used to implement terrain avoidance without any onboard radars You know that the FIll has two onboard terrain avoidance radars these present the pilot with continually confusing pictures but the system is automatic so he doesn't have to look at them The FIll terrain avoidance system works extremely well but'it is expensive it adds weight and it is also a means by which the FIll can be detected Now there's a different way to do terrain avoidance We know very well what the elevation of the ground is at many points over the world including many in the Soviet Union certainly all over North Vietnam And so if we know where the vehicle is we know at what altitude it ought to fly to be 200 feet 500 feet or 1000 feet above the ground And by the combination of a barometric altimeter and an accurate navigation system one can do very good terrain avoidance One would like to be able to reset the barometric altimeter every once in a while and that can be done by introducing a downward looking radar altimeter which is used to update the barometric altimeter while over terrain known to be flat and not confusing If one has moving targets for example trucks in Laos close support targets where there's somebody in the neighborhood of the target to do a better job than one can do by navigation one can have there a pulsed laser say the one which is used with the Pave Way bomb a 10 per second 1 06 micron laser which designates the target to be picked up by a laser guidance unit instead of a remote-viewed TV In this way one can have the vehicle the artillery shell the bomb or the cruise missile actually strike the target I have already pointed out that in some cases one wants to deliver mines onto a road to impede travel or to destroy vehicles Therejs a concept known as strike mining You know that a train is coming along you can see it in the distance and so one or two minutes ahead of the train you put mines on the track or in the track if that's more convenient to you than striking the train itself There was a train which used to go nightly between Hanoi and the Chinese border round trip It used to be in China at the beginning of dark it was back in China at the end of dark and for the most part there wasn't a thing we could do to interdict that railroad track There were occasional periods when the track was severely broken for a few days But we never had the capability when bombing North Vietnam of striking the track with assurance ahead of the train and behind the train so that the train would be there during the daylight hours Now we could do tha with a system like this Finally as the intensity of defense increases it gets vastly more expensive to conduct manned bombing operations through these heavy defenses With a $3 million airplane if one takes four Walleyes and adds $40 000 cost per sortie aside from the munitions that's about $100 000 to deliver four weapons on the taI'get We know they only strike the target with 80% or 70% accuracy but I hope you'll be as generous to my cruise missiles And that turns out to be about $25 000 expended plus some imponderables per target struck with Walleye Going into the target lining up maybe on two three or four different targets and coming out the attrition on the support aircraft can be estimated as of the order of 2% on a $3 million aircraft and that adds about $60 000 more to the cost o the sortie the cost 251 per target then rises to something like $40 000 Actually it's worse because me hesitates to send aircraft into regions where the attrition is of the order 0 ' 1' I ' the attrition is 5C o as was the case n some parts of North Vietnam at some times the attrition of the aircraft may contribute from $150 000 to $200 000 actually even more because one puts a lot of E eM equipment on the aircraft and one has a lot more support equipment And so somewhere between zero percent attrition at $25 000 per cruise missile and 5'ro attrition at $80 000 per cruise missile it oecomes cheaper and I think more effective to use c'ruise missiles rather than aircraft Of course nothing forces you to ground launch these cruise missiles They could be launched from airplanes too but it seems to me that's the way to 2 ssure their being very expensive I think you'd probably get cheaper missiles by making th m ground launched and adapting them later to aircraft Just to summarize how far we are from these remote-guided weapons you heard all about Walleye and the Walleye with the data link and the Pave Way bomb with· an adaption kit on its nose and some fixed wings added to its tail see Figure 8 The 750 pound and the 2000 pound bomb have been extensively used in Vietnam The price of the current Pave Way kit is about $5000 in any quantity at the rate of 1000 or 600 per month they will be $3500 each It turns out to be very desirable to use 500 pound bombs because then a single aircraft--even a light aircraft like the A37 or the AI-can carry a goodly number of them and the per sortie cost for delivering Pave Way bombs onto targets goes down I don't share the enthusiasm of General Glasser for the electro-optical or the IR guided Pave Way I think one ought to concentrate on the laser guided bomb SOME PRESENT HOMING OR GUI DED WEAPONS WALLEYE -- 1000 pound electro-optical tracking glide bomb $15K PAVE WAY --750-pound and 2000-pound 500 pound laser-gu ided bomb 5K ARM SHR I KE Standard ARM etc Soviet Cruise Missiles STYX SS -N -3 etc Figure 3 2' r ' We have so-called antiradiation missiles whose purpose is to go against radars These are the S h r ike and now the Standard AR M which is much fancier and can be launched in other directions than straight at the radar and has a b coader spectrum against a threat as well as a bigger warhead The only trouble with these is that the radars typically see them coming and they shut down so that the antiradiation missile doesn't have anything to home on In my opinion it's much better to locate the radars accurately to within 50 feet or 100 feet and then send one of the standard weapons that we have been talking about after it Radars being typically fairly soft they can be killed by a Walleye with 1000 pounds of explosive at some tens of feet The same time-of-arrival distance measuring system which I propose to use for flying these missiles bombs and artillery shells can be used in fact its original purpose' was to locate radars very accurately Now of course the Soviets are away ahead of us on these things They've sunk the destroyer Elath with the STYX missile actually fired by the Egyptians I think They have longer range 'cruise missiles the SSM3 for instance and they believe that cruise missiles are a very good way to do business They have not a single aircraft carrier Not only are the cruise missiles in competition with aircraft for attacking land targets they're also very useful for attacking seaborne targets like aircraft carriers They're a threat that worries the Navy and me very much these days I propose to concentrate on a very few weapons The Pave Way bomb for instance can us e the same kind of servo that it has now and have the laser guidance taken off and replaced by a time-of-arrival beacon so that the time-of-arrival navigation system can determine where the Pave Way bomb is at every time and can guide it all the way down to the target This means that the most accurate delivery could be obtained by flying an attack aircraft F4 or whatever at 25 000 feet delivering the Pave Way bomb into a basket of several miles in diameter and then guiding it to the predetermined target location by navigation and command Rocket assisted artillery shells and even wings are sometimes talked about The only trouble is that the accuracy of the artillery is typically degraded not only by the longer range but by the uncertainty in the lift or ocket propulsion One can guide the shell too to an accuracy of the order of 20 feet especially if there's some kind of observed fire so that one can correct for later rounds And for the cruise missile if one can build the pulsed jets for a few hundred dollars instead of the turbojets or turbofans for $10 000 we already know how to do the remote terminal television which has been demonstrated on the Walleye with data link We know how to do remote command of midcourse which has been demonstrated on the Condor The navigation and terrain avoidance I think one can work out for oneself So in my opinion there are three very useful weapons which could be used with such a system '1 nd then finally one gets down to the difficult questions since there's more than one kind of relay platform to use see Figure 10 How do you choose In Vietnam we've used slow manned aircraft EC121's We have a slow drone aircraft a Beech Debonair which does somewhat better than the EC121 These have endurance of the order of 10 to 15 hours or so but are limited in altitude to 20 000 or 25 000 feet One could imagine doing development on high altitude helicopters to ease the problem of having directional antennas which could then be hung from the • q J eftET lA 1 ' ' helicopter But since the directional antenna has to be a phased array in any case to switch from one vehicle to another the helicopter doesn't really help When I try to sell people tethered balloons at high altitude all the pilots explain what a hazard it is and I think that's probably true--although in the siege of Britain they provided tether warnings by running current up the cable to tell the pilots where the tethers were From a more fundamental point of view it turns out that if you have to design against a wind of about 100 knots in order to keep position either with a tether or a powered balloon you're better off to obtain the lift from wings And so probably a slow drone aircraft will win out PROPOSED WEAPONS Pave Way time-of-arrival- commanded navigation Artillery time-of-arrival commanded navigation pi us rocket ass ist pi us laser seeker Cruise missile pulse jet plus remote terminal TV plus remote-commanded midcourse navigation and terrain avoidance Figure 9 CHO I CE OF RELAY Balloons tethered or powered Slow manned aircraft Slow drone aircraft High-altitude helicopter Satell ite Figure 10 254 -GE8AIT t ft Pb lE8RfillRtJ RESULT Reduced basing vulnerability--little value exposed Small investmentlh igh production system Cost rises slowly with intensity of defense Provides improved close support Can reduce peripheral damage Radar location with strike by normal weapons Figure 11 After you do all this what do you have See Figure 11 Well it seems to me that you've reduced the basing vulnerability to the extent that you rely on such a system for attack of fixed targets and not on aircraft You've reduced the basing vulnerability you no longer have in this combat area large aircraft carriers with a billion dollars or more of embarked worth and surrounded by another billion dollars of task force you don't have long runways to be cratered You have several redundant elevated platforms and-someplace back where it's safe---a computer You have vehicles which cost fro m a few thousand dollars for the bombs and artillery shells to $20 000 to $100 000 for the drones A very interesting thing happens if you can get the strike vehicle cost down to $20 000 or $50 000 because that's the range of cost for the guideline missile which the Soviets use with their SA2 radar system and once it cost them as much to fire a missile at one of your drones as it does for you to send the drone over Then you can send drones freely and every missile they shoot is part of a production race with the US which we can run very well In fact if they start shooting these things down one can send cheaper drones whose only purpose is to attract SA2 missiles Only a small investment would be requiredthat for developing the elevated platform if it is needed for proving out the high accuracy navigation system for continued work on antija m techniques Satellites especially synchronous satellites are very good for communication but they're not really ideal for control in this case because the round trip time from the vehicle through the satellite back to the ground to the direction center back to the satellite and to the vehicle again is about a half second For some purposes that's all right Clearly it's all right for midcourse command It's also all right for designating in a picture the portion which the onboard tracker is supposed to home on but it's probably not good enough although that remains to be seen for manual flying of the missile The cost of the system that I propose rises only slowly with the intensity of defense If instead of 1 % attrition on the missiles the attrition rises to 30% well that's just too bad The cost of the system per target destroyed rises by a factor of 1 4 If it was $30 000 it's now $42 000 But when you have a defensive system with 30% C1ttrition on manned aircraft you just stop attacking those targets C1t least with conventional we8pons One can provide improved close support in this way by giving sitkEI ira a greater range and a greater accuracy to corps artillery or to Naval gunfire for that matter And as the previous speaker noted one can reduce peripheral damage because at least in the case in which one sees the target through the remote TV or in the case when one has accurate navigation one can dud or blow up the warhead in flight And finally the system provides a means for striking radars v -ithout having expensive and special purpose antiradiation missiles tI e8EJ • Question md iell Ans ver Period IcDON_-'l LD LRL Tl el'e's a study that the Army rnade fairly J'ecently I bL'lieVet he Navy has asimilar one as does the Air Force in which they wanted to have the onboard seekers essentially a TV system on a missile which would fly over tl e target area The operator back Clt his bClse looking at the output of this system would cause the missile to fly into the target As I remember this study the operators even after a great deal of training had great difficulty in recognizing the part of the target they Ranted to home in on unless the missiles were at high altitude and the targets could be watched for a long time It seems to me that an important part of your plan here is to be able to identify the target in some reasonably brief period of time particularly if you're time-sharing What do you comment on this GARWIN I think such proposals have always been evaluated without a very accurate midcourse navigation system and the key here is that the field of view when the TV goes on will be from a known direction and will have a 200 to 500 foot diameter I think probably we're in shape now with the Con d l r to put such a concept to the test because the pilot of the Con cJ n r- bearing aircraft can line it up roughly and then somebody on the ground can see whether he can designate a 1 foot area or a 2 foot area within the 200 to 500 foot field of view It also has something to do with the design of the cruise missile because in any kind of wind the missile crabs and you would like to have a system in which the TV can be bore-sighted and not gimballed so you would like a cruise missile with direct lift control and not airplane type elevator control McDONALD My memory of the main problem they were having with these had to do with optical contrast They made very large differences according to whether or not the target actually was standing out in the background II GARWIN Usually people talk about flying and observing essentially without accurate navigation Here if the TV goes on 5 seconds before impact and one has a missile of the order of 700 foot per second speed the range is only about 3000 feet 'Nith normal visibility even at night there's a possibility of illuminating a 200 to GOO foot diameter region with an onboard light or with an ahead fired flare I l aven't seen the particular studies you refer to I've seen others and they lack the aCC lrate navigation which allows one to reduce the field of view Spea kcr Cnidcntifiecl Two things concern moe in regard to pcltting the control devices on Clrtillery First I think we're buying ourselves some trouble here at an increasf d cost I think the beauty of artillery is the fact that it can b firl d in 8 n cnvironmc'nt where communicationG are bad Second I'm concerned about the effect of the degradation of communications on the nuclear battlefield on all these control devices ' d 8 1 1 4SEeftE'i GAR VIN These would be line-of-sight communications to the v-ehicles probably -CUF or L-band and there wouldn't be degradation unless one had a fireball in the line of sight If you've ever tried to kill an enemy gun with artillery you know you have to shoot an awful lot and you don't know whether or not you've got him They're very hard targets for artillery-on which an improv-ement in accuracy from the 30 meters or so vhich one gets at maximum range to just a few meters would be well worthwhile We don't have to change all of the artillery shells SpcakL r Cnidentified My second question was prompted by the study that was presented on tactical nuclear warfare '72to '78 They had a section in there on the effect of high altitude bursts on communications and on electronic systems it just strikes me that this would defeat a lot of the utility of nuclear artillery GARWIN One has to look at these things in great detail The effect on electronic systems is large when you have cables etc and small when you have essentially shielded microwave communication systems Now there are effects on the ionosphere varying the path length which would somewhat change the biases in a microwave location system WHEELON Hughes Aircraft Co I think that Dr Garwin has helped us to understand at least in part why the Soviets favor and have bothered to inventory over these years a system that looks surprisingly like the one described However I'd like to comment that by throwing the burden away from carriers and runways and expensive manned aircraft it seems to me you've put the burden back on several of the elevated relays Why aren't those good targets to knob but the whole bombing capability GARWIN They are good targets but they are also very low cost targets They are relays they are unmanned and the Beech Debonair costs about $300 000 fully equipped If one has a number of them and of course they can be protected they're way up there they can be seen by the enemy for a long distance but from a ground station you can also see threats approaching from a long distance you can turn them off and still maintain the capability by having a round robin among emplaced or embarked elevated relays WHEELON I would have thought that if they are in fact servicing a fleet of 100 of these vehicles or shells and they're pretty busy electromagnetically and it would be hard to turn them off for very long and why doesn't an A RM working against these constantly radiating sources work pretty well GAR VIN If I need two operating in order to obtain not only relay but navigation capability then I'll hav-e three or four up at any time When I actually see a threat a missile approaching one of them I will turn it off because I have a computer on the ground and I Imow the location of the other aircraft-or I will have that location within a tenth of a second-and I can transfer the system entirely to different elevated rebys Of course you can say Suppose they use semiactive radar hom-ing or something instead of just home-on-jam or home-on-el ctronic emission' II Well I'll have a lot of these and maybe I'll have to stand dO' vn once in a while but that's not going to be a cheap missile either ow if I have to use high performance U2's or something like that then they become much rnore desirable targ ets than if I can vork 'Nith cheaper aircraft And I think probably one of the objects of such a system in growth 'Nould be to have lower cost very high altitude relay platforms 2GB WEeKiT 'BTl • 1 ---- - 1i111 1 ' - --------- Ii Speai l'J' Fnirl 'ntifit d I believe lVe've slcppecl fonHlrd in 1 cnuple of thin'Do here butt-ll -accurat ·-n 1Vi-gation of destructive agents into most of the land warfare targets isn't really the problem I wonder if this system couldn't be bent to solve the precision target location problem which at the current time runs greater than 300 meters 20 foot rniss distance against a target of some un ertainty of the order 0 1' 1500 feet surely is not what is being sought GARWIN In answer to that question I guess I ought to say somet1 ing about intelligence reconnaissance and surveillance It would be very nice to be able to deliver in this case not a destructiv e a ent but a parachute-borne TV whose position and orientation are accurately known To illustrate Around Khe Sanh we really had no good idea of the location and pattern of the trenches Ve had no way to tell what was happening there for some days it was too dangerous to fly in the neighborhood and we didn't have any photo coverage available to the Commander If one were satisfied with fairly low resolution television or with a scanning device of some kind not a real-time frame TV one could get very nice pictures at the cost of some tens of thousands of dollars per picture Now that sounds like a lot but you waste a lot more than that if you don't have the picture when firing artillery all over the area You don't need this system to obtain parachute- borne balloon-borne or missile-borne TV but it's a lot easier to do it in the context of such a system PAYNE VIartin Ylarietta If we implement your proposal what do you do with all the tactical aviators ' GARWIN I expect some of them will be worn out in a battle I'll have after this meeting The ones that are left we'll have to put to work somehow GIRA RD RAC I'd like to comment with regard to history The Soviets came out of World War II with at least as much tube artillery as we did and then they saw fit to completely re-equip to an extent that perhaps we have not There are many anomalies in Soviet force structure-their fixation on assault guns for example when right after the war we said there's just no future for this kind of thing I think that some of the asymmetries in force structure that tend to be pointed at with alarm are a function of strategic and mission asymmetry and not dull-wittedness on the part of one side or the other Now another point it also seems to me that in 1944 the British put together an extremely effective defense against the last cruise missile that was operationally employed the VI Perhaps you'd comment on that My other comment is maybe I misunderstood something but I heard a lot about navigation and I didn't hear much about what I would call tactical communications Maybe there's a definition here that would help me out because particularly in supporting troops the communications and coordination issues are very large and it reaUy isn't completely dominated by navigation GA RWIN I can only agree with your first and third points I didn't really discuss all the tactical communications I don't know very much about it I'm sure it ought to be done better with digital communication and autornatic receipt The British defense against the VI was very effective and I saw the figures recentlysomething like 40% of the VI's never got anywhere near their target because they aborted or they were pointed wrong or they failed in flight Only a few percent of the last VI IS fired actually struck in the intended area but that's because those aircraft flew slow and straight and level When I say the computer provides midcourse guidance I should add that it doesn't fly straight it does terrain avoidance when desirable otherwise it's flying 1-1 2 g turns at reasonable altitude and that just plays hob with the effectiveness of artiller y 59 ·9E8 2' rrQ CRAWFCiRD 0 WC Chill L lkv I kn w tli 5 second intl'i al as ilL' 'n subjec tto qu'cstfon su -ci f timcs 'and it occurs to me that Korth American and Iartin and several others have excellent tE 'rrain tnodels on which this could b simulated so that we could get a positive anS'Ner to that part of the question Second I hesitate to neeelle on this subject because I happen to think that the long range missile's a pretty good idea but on its use for things like trucks you b ve to 18 1mch the missile an hour before the truck gets to where tl e observer is and that concerns me a little GA RWIN That's right and in that case one would have biO choices You would have a supply of missiles loitering and why not bo ve an aircraft loitering with a guided bomb-tbat's even better wben the air defenses will allo' v it That's a case when aircraft are in fact better than lTlissiles You eould have missiles loitering which would be diverted to secondary targets just as Vie do aircraft when they don't have targets of opportunity But even better you could use the missiles to deliver mines very accurately It sounds like a waste to' spe nd $25 000 or more to implant a mine in a road but one doesn't have to be content with a single mine the missile can run down the road for a piece and drop a VLM antlvehicLllar land mine or whatever is the current rage at the time and potentially kill a nmnber of vehicles Another use for such a thing would be to suppress triple - and to allow aircraft in the normal way to deliver munitions preferably guided not free fall which are then very cost effective against trucks But you're right moving targets are very hard to get with aircraft or missiles for that matter 1 I Major James B Murtland III US IC US MARINE CORPS TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS The Marine Corps is not unilaterally developing any nuclear weapons or delivery systems in this respect it is similar to the CINC's We state our requirements and attempt to influence the development programs of the other services to accommodate our requirements We look to the Army for our ground systems and to the Navy for the air delivered systems USMC Philosophy The Marine Corps is a general purpose force organized and trained to conduct amphibious operations in any environment to include active nuclear warfare Our primary interest is in tactical nuclear weapons although we have had limited involvement in the SlOP In the past we have relied on dual-capable delivery systems and are not a ware of any developments which would cause us to change this policy in the future There are differences between the Marine Corps' operational environment and that of the Army The first is in the area of command and control We do not envision Marine forces being deployed in cold war barrier operations such as the Army encounters in Europe and Korea This type of situation requires forward deployment of nuclear weapons and increased readiness These forces must be prepared to respond quickly to massive surprise attacks Deployed Marine forces are normally committed after a period of increased tension or open hostilities The command and control problems concerning release of nuclear weapons during these periods should be less severe than those associated with responding to surprise aggression in Europe or Korea Another area of difference is the security of nuclear weapons In addition we are not responsible for providing nuclear weapons for DELETED e SO sS M-' 7 $ 261 Sf a a T IAIi' delivery by lllied forces This reduces the problem of providing security fOi' nuclear weapons stored on foreign soil Nuclear weapons will be deployed with Marine units when required If weapons are not deployed J increased readiness can be achieved by off-shore storage in aircraft carriers and ammunition ships I covered this background information in order to provide a better appreciation of our requirements This philosophy influences Marine Corps nuclear weapon development requirements in areas such as yield J complexitYJ etc With this in mind J I will discuss these requirements • Development Requirements As we see itJ the primary requirement is for modernization of the tactical nuclear weapons stockpile Current technology will allow significant improvements in the capabilities of these weapons Nuclear artillery projectiles for the 155 mm and the 8 inch howitzer ballistically matched to a conventional HE round are required In addition the projectiles should have selectable yields for better flexibility and should not require field assembly DELETED ThePhase rrFeasibility Study has beenconductedJ sothiSTs' well on the way The Marine Corps has completed an evaluation of the various proposals and the results ar being sent to the appropriate Army and OSD offices There is little difference between Marine Corps and Army requirements in the matter of desired yields for the improved 8 inch howitzer projectile - 1 t 6' v Cf- I DELETED The additional flexibility provided by this yield is desirable and the increase in cost should be very slight DELETED As with the ISS we have evaluated the Phase II proposals nnd the results are also being sent to the rtrmy Qnd OSD There is no current Naval gunfire nucle 1r capability The Navy has recently expressed an interest in an 8 inch nuclear projectile and is eXRmining the feasibility of utilizing the improved 8 inch howitzer projectile in a new lightweight P inch weapon system The Marine Corps supports this program A nuclear Naval gunfire capability would provide a DELETED I l'e ponsive o ncl accurate direct support weapon without the in-country storo ge problCl1 JS 1sSociatecl with artillery weapons prior to first release It would 81so complement air-delivered nuclear 1 veapons in support of amphibious assaults conducted in an active nuclear environment The difference between Army and Marine requirements for ADM's is primarily due to the operational environment We are not faced with critical releRse times and do not envision pre chambering in cold war situations or deep burial Both of the current A DM's have significant shortcomings which reduce their effectiveness A single ADM should be developed to replace the current ones This new ADM should 1 weigh a maximum of 60 pounds 40 pounds desired 2 have neutral buoyance in salt water 3 have a remote option 4 not be complex 5 be capable of burial to a minimum of 15 meters 6 have a capability for multiple Simultaneous detonation DELETED Assignment to an ADM team is not a primary duty in the Marine Corps In addition we will probably employ AD¥'s in moving situations with very little time to prepare the emplacement site Therefore a Single Simple lightweight ADM that is one-man portable offers significant advantages There is a requirement to improve the accuracy of air-delivered nuclear weapons for close support of tactical operations and engaging point targets An air-to-surface guided missile with a standoff capability similar to that of the Condor appears to be the best option to provide this capability DELETED Future Technological Goals As for the future the Marine Corps continues to pupport research leading towRrd reduced weight of nuclear warheads clean weapon technology very low yields 20 tons directed effects and elimination of limited life components DELETED t 14 6 j Question and Answer Period COGGAN North American Rockwell How much tactical study work have the Marines done re l' ardin different beach tactics using nucs----particularly as regards the dispersion of the attacking force and so forth which might then relate back to technology as far as landing craft are concerned l IURTLAND As far as I know we have done very little study on that in fact probably none We have worked with the Navy at NRDL and they were doing some research studies on the effects of the various beaches for example the composition of the sand residual radiation and things like that As far as I know we haven't really correlated this with landing craft COTTER SLA Do you have any opinion on the amphibious operations when the opposing forces have tactical nuclear weapons MURTLAND We would be required to have greater disperSion of course Say we have a division 1anding--our current thinking now is to have two of our regimental landing teams go in by helicopter and one to make the sea assault Of course this would be critical with the helicopters because we don't want a helicopter in the air when a nuclear burst goes off CARNE RAND Corp My question has to do with your point about the use of ADM's in moving situations I believe all the prior discussions had to do with the use of ADM's to create barriers or obstacles Could you expand on that a bit as to how this would work and who would use them how and for what purpose MURTLAND Our ADM's are with our Engineer units We have what we call Force Engineer Units the equivalent of the Army Corps of Engineers and they have the ADM capability They might use it for example for blocking a pass to create an obstacle to the enemy If we ourselves encounter such barriers or if we are making an amphibious landing we rely on our Navy friends the UDT people to blowout obstacles that can't be removed with conventional explosives The UDT people use a small device-Saturn is what we have now--to accomplish this WHITTAKER lYSEURCOM I seem to recall a propo8 ll for Lance whereby it would be used in some kind of LST load to support the Marines You didn't mention Lance Is there no interest flny more in it IlJRTLA D The Army version of Lance which the f'lrmy is iJIanning t use on land is definitely of no interest to the Marine Corps But we do have 8 n interest in 8 landing force support weapon--they call it Sea Lance tnd I have to let my 8VY friends discuss that because right now I don't know the status of the progr 1TI 2G-l I SPEAKER UNIDENTIFIED Since the Marines have occasionally been in a position of defending islands rather than taking them I would like to ask if they have examined the role that sea-borne ADM's might play in defense against a shore landing MURTLAND Well that's a good point but I can't answer that question don't know what tactical p18nning they have done along these lines I REP HOSlVIER Is there anything with a particular characteristic or for a particular purpose that you as a man in the field would like to see developed and put in the stockpile MURTLl ND You mean from the viewpoint of a ground Marine anything we would like to have that we don't have now HOSMER That's correct Most of the ideas come from the laboratory and then have to be sold to the services perhaps the services might have an idea of their own MURTLAND I think we need something with a smaller yield that can be used in a tactical situation-for example to eliminate bunkers caves etc without blowing up the whole countryside If we could have a very low yield weapon that we could launch like a bazooka we would really be interested in that type of weapon TATE OASA With regard to your comments about an improved 155 mm shell would you expand on your comments about the XM179 and 19B MU TLAND At the development center where I work the artillery people have informed me that the parameters of these new howitzers that they are developing out at Weapons Command Rock Island will be too strict for the XM4'54 Now I don't have the parameters at my finger tips but that is what I have been told Somebody from Picatinny or WECOM might have additional information BURKE AMC Your answer is 'correct the acceleration levels in the 179 are much higher than in the M109 The XM454 will not take it however the new 517 projectile is being designed to live in both environments AGNEW I believe the g-level he's talking about is about 14 100 isn't it ceAlf Ril jG Richard B Foster Stanford Research Institute NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL REQ UIREMENTS FOR DELIBERATE SELECTIVE CONTROL RESPONSE STRATEGY I think I have the distinction of having the talk with the longest title on the program I'm going to review today some old studies and some of their findings and conclusions some were done in 1960 1962 and 1963 They might be instructive because the problems are the same in some ways they've gotten worse and yet the technology has not been the critical factor The problem seems to lie somewhere else I'm suggesting that it might lie in our strategic thinking in our lack of a strategic concept of operations that's both coherent and can be agreed upon by our allies and ourselves When I mention deliberate selective and controlled response policy I mean deliberate in the sense that we deliberate But you don't have to deliberate after an event you can deliberate ahead of time We do too little of the latter And I mean selective in the sense of selective response to agg ession Again much of the selectivity can be thought through ahead of time in an attempt to control events in a military or semimilitary operation or an operation that might go from a crisis to a limited military operation The attempt to control by personal intervention---as say controlling specific destroyers on this and that in order to limit the risk of escalation-is an impossible task That's completely and finally self-de eating Many people advocated the pulling out of tn ctical nuclear weapons from Europe I was there in 1963 and some of our people felt that they should be pulled out as rapidly as possible in the conventional emphasis strategy But lacking that the policy was chrtnged The conventional emphasis strategy was pro mulga ted and hecame a territorial attitude not only to our allies but toward the Russians and even though the number of weapons increased in absolute numbers the ability to use them selectively declined dramatically In other 1 vords the tactical deterrent e 'feci ' tactical nuclear weapons began I think to be degr' lded In this sense 'c6E68ET ft control meant to lock up the weapons as in a PAL I use control in a very different way not as control through doctrine but a concept of operations to control an opponent's behavior DELETED More likely about three or four hours later the SACEUR would be getting messages that some event had happened somewhere His counterpart in Russia 'Nould be hearing about the same thing Both of them would wonder who's doing what to whom and SACEUR would attempt to obtain more information and pass it on to the President Both commanders would be quite concerned as to who had the accident if that's what it was As Herman Cohen said the problem of getting a president to push a button to go to general war or to get someone in Russia to do the same thing is quite a difficult one it's just unlikely that you would go around pushing buttons that would doom your nation to suicide There's a lot more stability than we give credit for in this situation The nq me of the game I think is the question of strategic thinking of deterrent policies and objectives and the control of the enemy's behavior The idea that an assured destruction only strategy in retaliating to direct attack on the US by striking the other's cities would provide a basis for stability of mutual deterrence and eventual reduction of arms for the Russians is not working The Russians' strategic thinking is going in quite the opposite direction They are increasing their options they added counterforce capability step by step the y found holes in this mutual suicide pact and they are not about to sign it they have not given up their civil defense program nor their air defense and ballistic missile defense program nor have they given up the whole concept of nuclearization of their force Secondly the notiol of the firebreak and the concern with automatic escalation is optimistic The Soviets' strategic doctrine their tactical doctrine and their political-military doctrine all stress the continuity force One won't find a firebreak theory here They have no concept of automatic escalation they have a great 'concern of how to control escalation in their interest There is also the notion that no political power derives from nuclear weapons in a state of nuclear parity The Soviets' strategic doctrine states that all political power derives from nuclear weapons and forces and that parity is probably a transient state between inferiority and superiority and rather than being stable is highly unstable and is perhaps dangerous rather than safe And besides they take into account the real world complexities of the definition of parity How does one take into account the asymmetries of geopolitical position-the closed line of communication with the Soviets' armies in Europe and in ASia the asymmetries in the ways of allocating resources and their controlled economy in which they also control their population Their debates apparently take place in a much smaller and less public arena with far fewer people involved How does one in that state of affairs define a stable state of parity Some say th tt there's no meaningful definition of strategic nuclear superiority In a sense strategic superiority is that which gives you one or more degrees of freedom over your opponent It has nothing to do with absolute superiority The argument here is that these are relative things nnd the degree of freedom is important In a sense the Soviets have not given up the idea of increasing their degree of freedom in 'the full spectrum of conflict in a concept of continuity force and hence the reasoning that nuclearization therefore is not in the opposite direction 2GB JiZDR21iBP sren IAi' One of my former c lleagues who became an official said that we couLdn't improve our relative posture with an addition of $10 billion-that we were buying all that money could buy Well the Russians didn't quite believe that either On an average they've increased their total national security budget 5 o per year their strategic nuclear forces budget offensive and defensive forces 8% per year and their science and technology budget over 10% per year The Communist Party nonmilitary hierarchy must consider very peculiar our statement that we can reduce the risk of escalation by a conventional emphasis Well it is true we've deterred major wars nuclear wars between Russia and the US and local wars in Europe We now declare the just wars-national liberation revolutionary wars and class wars The Russians accommodated us in Vietnam and this accommodation led in part to making it very difficult for a president to get reelected So I doubt if this particular strategy is going to be adopted by a president in the future it means he gets into wars he doesn't know how to stop he's accommodated by the Russians Another part of the optimism is that a detente occurred ana this detente was such that they would help us out of Vietnam at a 25 to 1 exchange ratio I happen to have a pessimistic view of the Soviet behavior I'm much more concerned about their long range trends and their expenditures which we have traced back to the 50's We have noted their long range commitment to political and military strategic goals their long range patience in overcoming handicaps of technology due to a poor economy They have created three economies economy 1 is the agricultural the poor one economy 2 is a consumer goods economy slightly more prosperous and economy 3 is a first class military and industrial complex Scientifically and technologically based I bring this up because before we can talk about a deliberate selective control response policy we should know where we stand Some predictions were made some 6 to 8 years ago that the US would suffer certain consequences of not rethinking its fundamental strategy and doctrine in deliberating selected control response policy The first consequence was that we gave up any attempt to challenge local Soviet strategic superiority in Europe We have nothing to counter the MRBM IRBM combination They have the capability of disarming seizing and occupying a relatively intact Western Europe using a policy of restraining and minimizing collateral damage and fallout We have updated our 1960 calculations and they still run about the same They can launch such an attack at 200 to 600 aiming points and-depending again on the criteria used for kill requirements insurance levels and assumptions of CEP and accuracy of fuzing-we get a range of uncertainty of popUlation fat alities of 3 to 100 0 of collateral heavy damage to industry of not greater than 9t o ll1d light damage not greater than 10% That's a relatively intact Western Europe When I was in Europe in 1963 arguing the case f r and against the iVIRBM the principnl 8rgument against it was the fear that it might be seized There's Qr good in'expensive way f protecting it from seizure This was a political discu8 lion of the problem that had nothing to do with the usefulness of this type of weapon One of the reasons the MLF was looked upon with f l Vor wasn't so much its survivability 18 th 1t it was harder to leize and occupy ann use 2GO Now if the Soviets have that superiority one of the holes in our doctrine ancl one that concerns the initial use of tactical nuclear weapons is the following Suppose the Russians do not think that we have decoupled our strategic' deterrent from the umbrella protection of Europe but instead attack simultaneously Europe and the US counterforce avoiding cities and holding a large strategic reserve They have simultaneously evacuated their cities since they 'know that if we do retaliate they are going to get a considerable amount of damage Their recovery from attack could be assisted by the European economy which they have disarmed seized and occupied The US has so configured its force that it loses more and more degrees of freedom of retaliation it can only retaliate on Soviet cities it can't retaliate with second strike counterforce Thus a very interesting thing comes up They leave the president alive say Russia says Your cities are alive because mine are and the moment you retaliate on mine you lose yours and you haven't evacuated and I have Europe Now I'm asking you would you retaliate I suggest that the Russians are outthinking us They have clear guidance with respect to their goalit's to get meaningful superiority that gives them a greater degree of freedom than we will have Another way of getting conventional emphasis is by proxies against your proxies for example the Arabs against the Israelis After a while the nuclear umbrella doesn't seem to work that is the Israelis may lose confidence in our guaranteeing their survival and have a lot more interest in getting a nuclear weapon of their own We can't have it both ways We can't have a doctrine a strategy which in effect says that there's little if any strategic utility in nuclear weapons and then expect the nonproliferation treaty to work The strategic utility of nucle8 r weapons has to be positive for anyone to have confidence in your nuclear guarantee against nuclear coercion and blackmail by the other side Now the Russians understand this they write about it very well One of the concerns in Europe is really not just the massive overrunning of Europe but the problem of a quick penetration for limited objectives as say 'in the Turkish-Thracian peninsula We have an excellent example in the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia of the limited aggression for limited objectives with rapid envelopment both vertical and on the ground Apparently one of the reasons it was unopposed was that the Czech military estimated that they would probably not be very effective agains't that force that poured in so rapidly I doubt very much if these limited aggressions for limited objectives would fit the optimistic assessment of Soviet policy and behavior I've outlined before So I think that before we can get a clear set of guidelines to develop a doctrine for the initial use of tactical nuclear weapons we have the fundamental problem of overhauling our strategic thinking from top to bottom taking into account the fact that the Russians are doing a very effective job I commend to you the first second and third editions of Sokoloski's Military Strategy and the writings of Rimkin and V-on Rinc o from the Lenin Institute In these writings you will find no suggesti l1 o ' discontinuity force but rather stress on continuity of We have some advantages left We have certainly in my vie v and that of Dr J0hn Foster and others considerable advantage in certain areas technologically but we are not exactly using it-for example the possibilities of controlled usc of 2'10 bctical nuclear weapons inherent in the WISP Program the possibilities of quick use through predesignation not pre delegation the possibility of a tactical concept in which the initial use of tactical nuclear weapons is broadcast widely If the conditions under vhich they would be used were spelled ouf to the Russians it is still possible that this would have a decisive deterrent effect on his tactics If you have a graduated deterrent from the strategic nuclear down to the 1 kt tactical nuclear weapon at the FEBA it has to be known before it will deter An unknown doesn't deter very well It's not too complicated to figure 'out that the optimum tactics for a successful peQetration by a land army is to mass to break through the defenses by surprise in one or more areas and move fast with close air support In one to three days the Russians would be in England So let's talk about 1 to 3 minutes and 1 to 3 hours Now we can have a decisive coercive effect on Soviet tactics by saying If you give me a target over my political border that's worthy of a nuclear weapon I'll hit it and here's a list and array of the kinds of targets 1'm talking about II Tha t' s all you have to tell him It wouldn't be a bad idea to have sergeants with weapons that couldn't hit Moscow but could hit a target like that It would have a more decisive deterrent effect By doing the opposite we are giving up the deterrent effect and inviting risks that the opposition will take thus inviting additional risl s This notion that we are being self-deterred because of the risk of escalation that a defender will use a nuclear weapon initially against an aggressor assumes that there is asymmetry and parity between aggression and defense It assumes secondly that the risk of escalation should be removed from an aggressor Well the whole point of stable mutual deterrent posture is that the aggressor will be met with the risk of escalation If you don't escalate and he adduces it to be a low risk he'll move as the Soviets did in support of Hanoi A low risk alternative to nuclear war of any kind and a very good one in terms of the trade-off it has had all kinds of interesting side effects and benefits from the Soviet point of view In addition to getting presidents diselected it tends to cause a considerable amount of disruption within our country in the students' rebellion and the work of the SDS for example ' The Russians aren't in any rush I don't'think to enter the SALT talks until they find out from what floor we'll negotiate and we haven't hit our floor yet You see I don't think that last $3 billion cut is the final one So why start negotiating until your opponent has put his price of entry into the game We are lowering our price so that he doesn't have to pony up as much on the table I suggest that this might be one of the reasons that they're not quite ready I don't think that this behavior is so mysterious They're people who are interested in their power and in extending their power ' Now I'm suggesting we have a bit of a problem in deliberate selective control response We can't readily undo the fact that the Soviets have in fact gone ahead with over a thousand ICBM's including the SS9 SS11 mixture and they have increased hea vily their investment in both the attack submarine and the Polaris type I'm suggesting that it is going to take some time for the US to rethink its posture and to get back a concept of continuity not discontinuity of force to get back an idea of what risk of escalation shsmld really mean that you want the aggressor to risk it If he doesn't risk it then he'll exploit local superiority conventional or otherwise And 71 so I say tlk'lt's the first job A second job is to investigate what can be done with predesignated situations for initial use of weapons A third is to viork out a notion of the deterrent's coercive effect on tactics What is the deterrent effect of an ADM I remember talking to a Turk in 1963 and he had a very good idea of the deterrent effect of an ADM I said That's your own territory and it might get kind of messy I He replied That's true but it will make it messy for the Bulgarians Rumanians Russians or whoever else comes over that area Well I understood that Turk better than I understand this optimistic appreciation of the Russians And finally we should reconsider the question of what command control really means What is command Well to a large extent it is simply thinking things through Figure 1 suggests one possible meaning of command control We certainly want to centralize command Command is that which initiates prescribes the extent of limits assesses the direction of a military operation Command is at the top level largely political Much of this can be accomplished through prethinking predeliberation preselectivity and prenotions of limiting and controlling You set control here by doctrine to a large extent National command retains its control center control of our offenses in general nuclear war and I think that's only sensible But the control problem should be delegated as far down as possible to supervise regulate and coordinate so as not to try to run the war from Washington COMMAN D CONTROL N -l 1 COMMAND INITIATES PRESCRIBES EXTENT LIMITS SETS DIRECTION u BUT COMMAND MUST RETAIN CENTRAL CONTROL OVER OFFENSIVE FORCES IN GNWAR AND BE ABLE TO PREEMPT CONTROL IN ALL SITUATIONS N -l 1 CONTROL SU PERV I SES REGULATES COOR DI NATES Q Figure 1 £EIA- T ft J Our national goal is of course national survival but we equate national survival with not letting the Russians have Western Europe So you provide for civilian command of forces eliminating mechanical doctrinal response to any kind of offense and providing for maximum flexibility of choice of action by decision makers But the civilian command means also the possibility that we can reach an agreement with our principal allies as I believe Mr Shreffler pointed out yesterday Flexibility of choice of action doesn't mean a conventional emphasis or a nuclear emphasis It means precisely what it says-you have worked through your doctrine and your understanding of the situations and are keeping them up to date You keep thinking them through so that those choices are truly open choices without an emphasis This leads to adaptability to unforeseen contingencies anywhere in the world Many of these contingencies have been blown up way out of proportion as if somehow they will blow up into a general nuclear war Well perhaps but in most cases they seem to stretch out for quite a while as Vietnam has Let's take a look at one of the concerns of the President of the US as he is thinking about initial release of tactical nuclear weapons-the vulnerability of this country I made a chart back in 1961 and it's still true in 1969 Figure 2 This happened to be President Kennedy and his successors subjected to a 10 megaton or a 2 megaton burst and the middle is 100 psi This is one weapon These people tend to be vulnerable the President has to be out there in front he can't abandon the leadership of the country and go underground It's not unthinkable that command itself would be attacked in an attempt to get a cheap victory by beheading the command of a natioq l History shows that it's been tried before and the Chinese tend to be quite interesting historians There are other reasons why national command migh-fbe attacked but I'm pointing this out because of the vulnerability question Vulnerability of Presidential Successors A E N DAY • • DAy TIME NIGHT TIME _ Sl BWAY I I VIT Figure 2 273 'SECkEl iRD One of our problems is almost a complete lack of a doctrine for the continuity of the office of the President There is much better doctrine for continuity for the Commander of a Division than for the President as Commander in Chief One of the possibilities suggested in Figure 3 is the little model presidential party You have a small party of ten with a few personal staff for continuity of command and a second group forming the support party This whole party could be trained in some doctrine or other But what doctrine dQ we train them in What is our doctrine As I mentioned thyre is one under development in the Soviet Union and it's a very helpful thing to haVe Figure 4 shows how such a concept might work for increasing survivability and it has some interesting points in the tactical situation or in the situation in Europe In this case we have the model presidential parties going to several different occasions the circles and the needlines are intermitted to find out who's on first whose man is president and who's the highest living ranking successor You have another set that ties them together with Europe UK CINCLANT CINCEUR unified commands and finally the groups equivalent to the FREE's the recoordination centers in Europe and in the Pacific But such a concept for survivability is based on a sort of relocation and it requires a considerable amount of preliminary thought PRES I DENT OR DES I GNATEl REPRESENTATIVES OF Main Party lst Echelon a I State Dept CIA c OEP d Defense Dept e JCS --Ch ief Staff -J-2 -J-3 b l l l 1 5 -J-4 -J-6 No More Than 18 REPRESENTATIVE OF a Treasury Attorney General c Interior d Agriculture e Commerce f Labor 9 HEW hI AEC il FBI b Support Party 2nd Ech elan 1 1 l 1 l l OJ l 1 9 Figure 3 J1 - tv ' N r r' j f 1 # 5 O AEC ' - -' 8 j' t' K 1 ' I -I - 's I J' f 7 tL i ' ' _£ Z ANO CIA 'f NtA' 2 ' i 9 - t C'r 'DAVID ' f ' i ' f S C I N - 13c J' elN NORAO 1' -- 1 - -'' I 2 10 ' WH ' l I 6 ' ' 1 i_ ' ' ' ' AJCC 3 5 ' ' '- ' -- 4 4 18 26 Ot or 8 tc 5e t 52 etc 403 or 806 NE lDLn ' s TOTALS-500 or 1000 etc -jl I'P l JH 11 • CiNC Elm U f' r CINe ' J lA c '---' 12 t ''' II f ' f FR MINiMUM ESSENTIAL NEEDLlN S TC 1965 CUR RENT 0 NeE VI 0 FOP £Rt 1 t ' ' EXTENDED BY SRI FOR PRESIDENTIAL FUNCTION Of NATIONAL COMMAND l A 5 E DON Figure 4 L PARTY-RECEIVES INFO IIORIGINATfS INFO ASSESSMENTS ANO OR MAKE S AND TRANSMITS DECISIONS ARE IN COMMAND CHAIN SlCflH j' RECEIVES DECISIONS ONLY NOT INCLUDED LINES TO ENEMV AND AT e e DI GHEE OF FLEXIBILITY OF CHOICE 1 GEN -IT C W R lC001j RELIABILITY 0 z Z 0 - r E- v z t Z 0 0 1 Cz f E Z 0 3 v z i- --- II p INCRE -'lSI 'iG E i DL RA - CE REQURED 1 1 WEAPONS COMlVL4 1D COMl 1 FOR DECREASI 1G CHOICES Ii'i DECISIO 'l l O ________-L____ HOCRS - O -1 0 DECISION L- SlOP ____ - __________ ________ ________ l l DE CISlOi' DECISION DECISIO ' lUO 1000 DECISro' --- - --- PREEMPTIVE f ----- ------ -----' REACTIVE SELECTIVE' FLEXIBLE' ' ' U 'TROLLED WAR Figure 5 Figure 5 shows how this might look as a function of needline requirements on the national scene Here on the ordinate is the number of needlines required and along the bottom is a zero point which is SIOP---in this case a first detonation and to the left of that first detonation are decisions made ahead of time You might have a preemptive decision made 10 hours ahead of time and then other decisions made sequentially and yet I have shown here two doctrinal responses requiring the least information One is based on a sort of fire on warning you see enemy missiles coming on your radar scope and you fire your missiles before they hit The other is fire on bomb alarm ll with no assessment but it's an automatic assessment system through a computer and your retaliation then becomes doctrinal This carries things too far You need a minimum needline-we estimate about 10-for that But as you get more and more responses and more and more reserves if you attempt to fight a control war out to the hundreds or thousands of hours you have an increasing value to command that is the commander himself and his ability to control forces increasing requirement for survivable intent restorable needlines and communications and ability to control the conduct of the war termination One of the things that is lacking in our current doctrine to a large extent is the probJem of war termination Those who were eager about getting the var started in Vietnam didn't seem to have a clear idea of how to stop it If you are going to start a war you had better figure out how to get out or it especially in the event of a general nuclear 'Nar Because it might escalate to that if you put the 276 Jj·Ft i LJiil9 risk 0 1' c lcalation in the other fellow's way He might take you up on it and himself preempt But generally speaking the more prethinking that is done the less need there is to have 'an enormous amount of information at the presidential level for initial release of a tactical nuclear -eapon Figure 6 shows the command control requirements in the theater First there would have to be consensus among the political leaders and the military commanders as to the strategic concept the deterrent effect you are striving for with commonly understood rules of engagement There would have to be a command center for CINCE DR since he has a continual responsib lity in the selective release a warning and alerting system specifically designed for recognition of the situations in which you might want a first nuclear detonation say a 2 kt weapon and an independent timely adequate presentation of the situation with an independent means of verifying it In the event that presentation of the situation was by an allied force you would want a US pilot to fly over and verify it for CINCEUR A most useful concept for such verification is a common theater reporting system between Army Navy and Air Force We don't have that now worse than that we don't have a common system between the US and its allies An automatic data processing system with an adequate data base is required I put that in more to satisfy some of my colleagues who are very happy with computers but I remind them that if you don't have a very clear conception of what you want to do an enormous amount of data being ground in and out of a computer is just confusing But this would leave CINCE UR in the theater in communication with JCS and the President and the Secretary of Defense with a positive control of all weapons with the selective release proceduring system selective enabling and communication COMMAND - CONTROL REQU IREMENTS 1 CONSENSUS AMONG POLITICAL LEADERS AND MILITARY COMMANDERS 2 COMMONLY UNDERSTOOD RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 3 USCINCEUR COMMAND CENTER 4 WARNING AND ALERTING SYSTEM 5 TIMELY AND OPERATIONALLY ADEQUATE PRESENTATION OF SITUATIONS 6 INDErE JDE jH1EANS 7 ADEQUATE COf ·lMU 'IJICATIONS 8 CO 1f11mJ TLJEATER EPORTING SYSTEM 9 ADPS 'iITH ADEQUATE DATA BASE 10 POSITIVE CO JTR JL OFVERIFYING SITUATION OF ALL ' EAPO JS BY USCINCEUR • SELEr T1 ' IE RELE SE PROCEDURES AN D SYSTEM ·SELECTI' E f Af W G P I U ·USCI JCE R II I'l DIRr cr CO l i J'lICATIO JS ADEQUATE SUWJIVA81L1TY Figure 6 ' 77 Adequate survivability does not have to be against a 100 megaton weapon The Soviets are unlikely to use large yield ground burst because prevailing westerlies would bring radioactivity back on them They would be very likely to have a policy of restraint and they increasingl y talk about it So adequate survivability in my opinion involves minimizing collateral damage This policy of restraint is achievable Figure 7 shows the levels of force application Level zero is the period of mounting tension warning alerting Levell armed conflict brings initial conventional defensive response now that might be within one minute not one or two days You don't try to contain an attack that is obviously beyond your resources to contain There should be no concept of a prolonged war in scope and time between NATO and Russia in Europe but rather we're talking about a deterrent situation in terms of trying to get the opposing force to realize that he does risk a series of escalations if he persists the defensive use of tactical nuclear weapons in his own political territory initially then here would be the predesignated cases of the eyeball type weapons that can't be delivered on Moscow localized battlefields beyond the political border as discussed this morning by Colonel Page operations in the satellite countries and finally the controlled strategic nuclear operations in a general war One of the things that's interesting about technology is that some of the controlled strategic nuclear operations could be put into a level 6 and level 5 would become strategic nuclear forces engaged in support of the theater The technology permits it with the MIRV on the Minute Man 3 or an advanced ICBM or Poseidon LEVELS OF FORCE APPLICATION Level 0 Period of Mounting Tension - Warning and Alerting Level I Armed Conflict Begins I nitial Conventional Defensive Response Level II Defens ive Use of Battlefield Tactical Nuclear Weapons on NATO's Own Political Territory Level III Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Localized Battlefield Beyond the Pol itical Border Level IV Tactical Nuclear Operations in Satellite Countries Level V Controlled Strategic Nuclear Operations in General War Figure 7 §kE I22i lDir ' 7 SEOrtET JOP · TYPE SITUATIONS • To EI im inate a Penetration -Seal Off the Penetration -Prevent or I mpede Enemy Reinforcements -Provide Adequate Fire Support for Mobile Reserves in Counterattack Role ·To Hold Critical Terrain -Destroy Enemy Forces in the Attack Particularly when Friendly Reserves Are Not Immediately Availa lIe -Prevent Enemy Reinforcement -Deny Use of the Terrain to the Enemy in the Event that the Enemy Has Already Captured Critical Terrain Features -Deny Enemy Use of High Speed Avenues of Approach Passes Defiles Corridors etc into Defended Areas ·To Minimize or Preclude Air Attack Figure 8 Figure 8 shows the types of situations that might be of interest These can be much more carefully worked out We found even in 1963 with just a few officers and civilians working on a scientific military team that there was a great deal of information that needs organizing around some concept If you don't have a concept you have an infinite amount of data to pull together and it doesn't do you any good The types of situations as indicated in Figure 9 will also help you set basic limits for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons policy and of with a levels I have where In summary I suggest that a national deliberate selective control response is a feasible one but it will take a fundamental review of st ategic concepts our apprr ciation of the Russians some balanced conventional nuclear forces nuclear emphasis in areas of high political value like Europe and preselected of force application skipping those where the opposition has the advantage to skip for sODle indeterminate time the theater strategic nuclear exchange the enemy has the advantage with the MRBlVI or IRBlVI but again I mention 270 that that might be overcome with a new advanced technology inherent in the MIRV and very good accuracy and selective use We will also have to decide on distribution of classified tactical nuclear weapons rules of engagement and criteria for use particularly for first use-distribution throughout the ACE force with selective release procedures based on a concept of predesignation Now with this having been thought through and a great deal of this becoming embodied in doctrine the command control system becomes a problem that is possible of solution insuring timely and controlled employment of tactical nuclear weapons when necessary to supplement or to execute the strategy In the present melee of concepts I do not believe we have a possibility of a command control system that will work in Europe for the selective release of tactical nuclear weapons But I do believe it's possible to think the thing through We will have to work hard to overcome the deterioration of our deterrent position through at least 1975 or beyond because we have lost the cutting edge of some degree of strategic nuclear superiority over the Russians BAS I C LI MITS FOR EMPLOYMENT OF TN WPNS -Geography by level and relation to political boundary -Classes and Yields of Weapons -Nu mbers of Weapons Released -Types and Classes of Targets -Constraints as to Collateral Damage and Fallout -Political Constraints of Host Country Figure 9 The Russians did not behave the way we expected them to and the danger inherent in this can be described as follows An aggressive expansionist nation tho t's increasingly well armed gets more and more convinced of the correctness of its strategic concept It begins to think that it's winning and that the opposition is losing and tends to get somewhat reckless This nation will take political risks that were unthought of several years ago---witness the strategic risk of the Khrushchev missiles in Cubrt The Russians did not sympatheticnJly parnlleJ us going clnwn in str ltegic force cnpability in the ' ure destruction only strategy they ' vent the r ppn ite WflY they went up The danger of Soviet aggressiun or Soviet cggression by proxy in the early 70's might actuo lly increose if they thought that the risk of escalation ho d been radically reduced or removed for many 1ctinns If they thought that our unilateral arms limitation policy would have R destabilizing e ect rather than stabilizing at lower levels and reducing costs they might be tempted to take unprer edentetl risks Question and Answer Period COGGAX North Am Rockwell I detect a great deal of emphasis on what we bee in the writings of Soviet military leaders regarding their strategy and doctrine ' I would suggest that their military structure is probably influenced by the nonmilitary features of their government structure much more than ours is and therefore c msider 'lble attention should be given to that feature in determining what they might do What I'm saying is that the military leaders of the USSR will not playas important a role as ours do in deciding on a course of action FOSTER Well at best that's a disputable statement I think sir The Russians are a very interesting people Obviously they are different from us and they ha'lie a somewhat different way of organizing their business They think of Marxism and Leninism not just as idealogies but also as sources of political guidance and scientific insight into history And so they have a Lenin Military _' cademy as a part of the Ministry of Defense but run by the Communist Party This ties together the Party's concepts and the military They also have the Fremzo Military Academy where they study tactical doctrine and strategic doctrine closely supervised by their policy makers It's also interesting to note that many members of the Politburo and the secretariat of the Party are also reserve military officers The first priority of the Party has been and is still the power of the state-not the welfare of its citizens as we think of it The power of the state is expressed not only by the KG B that helps order the people through secret police repression but also by how they order their affairs in the outside world As we look back at the decisions they have made we find a very high correlation between the weapon development decisions deployment decisions and the development of their strategic doctrine This can't be entirely by chance Besides the military does rather well their budget keeps going up at 5% per year among other things TRYBUL AlVICA John Foster recently predicted a technological superiority for the Russians but he did mention that the US will maintain technological superiority in the areas of nuclear energy and space he does however foresee technological surprises in the new weapons development in the very near future Am I correct in assuming that your remarks tend to confirm or support these statements Ie FOSTER The ansvv-er is not onl y 'IYes'1 to that but ii the Soviets do keep on increasing at the current rate for their RDT E 8 to 100 per year they will exceed us by 187 in our military and space program by a factor f 2 annually Somehow the idea thClt they're only half or a third as cost effective as we Clre so that we don't have to worry about the relative expenditure doesn't lppeal to me Some of the uptimist I quoted claim we'll maintain technologil al superinrit ' by unclerspendi ng tJ-wm but I u'Jn't Fhink this is going to hnppen LOVE USAF You imply that Russi l has a rather pat doctrine and aU the freedoms 0 choice to employ that doctrine I would submit that China is a se l-ere strain on that doctrine at this time and I would submit that when Russia had to inv 1Cle one o her Pact mernber nations things weren't very weJJ there either 8EGAiT i rep SI I would say that her doctrine may be under severe strain ann tho Russicl t1 really isn't ten reet tall FOSTER Iay I suggest first that I didn't want to make him ten feet tall I simply said that he had developed a coherent military doctrine with guidelines to both strategic concepts of operation as well as allocation of resources The way he conducts his foreign policy related to that is a somewhat different matter Obviously Khrushchev made an error when he gave the Chinese a lot of knowledge about nuclear matters they turned around and bit him But the point I was making is that they have developed a coherent strategic dodrine and they keep at it and they have a way of conducting an orderly debate within their society They see the evolution of doctrine and they adapt to changes in the international scene and in technology It is a doctrine that everybody can read and be guided by at any given time It is coherent and consistent whereas I would characterize ours as incoherent and inconsistent I think that having such a doctrine gives the Russian a strategic advantage even if it doesn It make him ten feet tall - Iff ltl UCli# M R Gustavson La wrence Radiation Laboratory OPTIONS IN CONTROL TECHNOLOGY Introduction If tactical nuclear weapons are to playa more effective role in supporting national policy new options in force posture plans and policy will be required This in turn will require enhancement of our iommanders' capabilities to control nuclear weapons This paper is an attempt to describe some of the technology which is being developed for that purpose Control technology is however a very broad subject It is like a chain with many links To discuss this topic in any detail it is necessary to limit the number of links included This paper focuses on this subject as it affects nuclear weapons and more specifically on the control link at or in the nuclear weapon The options available and utilized here help to determine the nature of the other links in the control chain all of which are of course important in forming the complete system Figure 1 helps to further delimit and define the subject to be discussed This paper is concerned with intentional nuclear detonations i e where at least one person i not surprised This is defined as the control issue The unintentional 1 1 J ear detonation case in which everyone is surprised is defined as an issue of S l 'ety rather th 1n control This issue will not be discussed further Tw dassc8 Jf intentionel 1 nuclear detonations are of concern unauthorized 'Juthorizcd This is necessary because both are important in effecting any change in our tactical nuclear po ture It is assumed in this paper that obtaining and reta ining a posture which permits the effective use of nuclear weapons is dependent in part upon our ability to convincingly demonstrate that only the designated use will ·' ccur th8 t misuse is improbable The analogy with sat'ety reqllire111unt - ce iYlS 'lbvi Jus rille ' 11' - Bti M ' I NTENT I ONA L Contro UN INTENTIONAL Safety -- _------ UNAUTHOR I ZED -- 1----- AUTHORIZED ---- f--- ---------------POLICY HARDWARE ADMINISTRATIVE CAPAB I LlTI ES Command Destructs Combination Switches - I fel stems -' J REQUIREMENTS Figure 1 Of the several approaches to this problem--administrative hardware and policy--only hardware is discussed This is the aspect most appropriately addressed by the AEC This of course is not meant to deny the importance of administrative procedures such as two-man-rule nor of policy decisions such as where the US will position weapons overseas Further this paper is directed towards describing capability options an area in which we have special information At the end are a few personal comments about requirements These may be helpful in focusing attention on the decisions which are most needed to maximize the usefulness of further hardware development Under capabilities in Figure 1 are listed four categories of systems These represent an approximate hierarchy They are ordered roughly with respect to chrono ogical development and also in the sense that the later or more advanced systems frequently contain the earlier items as subsystems One way of understanding a system is in terms of the task it is designed to accomplish Therefore before describing these systems it is useful to posit a specific situation which can be referred tn in explaining some of the challenges and opportunities offered by these systems A useful scenario is that of a field commander in a frontline situation who has as a part of his assets tactical nuclear weapons Assume that he is facing the forces of a technically gifted but nonnuclear power His problem then is one of insuring control over his weapons so that they can be used to support US objectives but cannot be overrun and utilized by enemy forces -- 284 - _ _ _111_ - riltiitilii ' SECRET AI Even with these restrictions the wealth of available infurmation on hardware optil J1s is such that its full coverage is beyond the scope of this paper Therefore what f· llowt is illustrative of opportunities rather than comprehensive Many worthy contributions are slighted Classes of Hardware Command Destructs In considering command destruct systems a number of qualities are of importance Three are of very special concern Figure 2 Each deserves a few words Destructiveness is best measured in terms of the ease of repair by the enemy One can consider anything from a bent pin connector through total disruption of the nuclear assembly Safety in this context refers to the collateral effects of the destruct system on our own personnel their transport and any collocated systems Timeliness must consider installation triggering and completion of the destruct action QUALITIES OF COMMAND DESTRUCTS Destructiveness Safety Timeliness Weight Vol ume Cost Vu Inerabil ity Reliability Covertness Figure 2 Veight volume and cost as well as vulnerability to enemy action have hvious Rdiability must encompass both assurance thnt the system will function when triggered as weH ClS assurnnce that it will not function prior tn triggering 1 Veri l1ess in a sitUAtion of potential military I verrun refers to the p 1ssibility that -me may wit 1l to remove nuc1enr capability from the field without enemy knowledge imIXlr1 811o Cnl11mand destructs can be designed in many different f8shil l1s Figure 3 prrJVides l gener81outline 1' the prinr ipol claSSes A variety f units can be tdcled exteI'rwlj v to cle troy nuclear weapuns General purpose military munitions helVe 8 en T fAi frequently been allocated for this contingency Special externally mountable munitions Figure 4 have also been developed for this purpose The latter have size and designed adaptability in their favor If properly positioned they can also be used with a high certainty that no secondary chemical explosions will result and with selectivity as to the nonnuclear components which will be destroyed This latter is tmportant when one evaluates destructiveness in terms of repair or replacement by an enemy CLASSES OF COMMAND DESTRUCTS External Separable General Purpose Special Purpose I nternal Nonseparable Nonnuclear Assembly Nuclear Assembly Special Dual Purpose Figure 3 As for systems internal to the nuclear warhead a wide variety of concepts have been considered Figure 5 These include a substantial range in terms of destructiveness and violence and involve a wide variety of components and techniques What one would prefer of course is a quick acting highly destructive system which is completely safe in the sense that there i s no effect external to the weapon skin DELETED DELETED 46EbAt i IRl DELETED Good progress is being made despite the three -dimensionality involved in treating these problems Certainly the system can be adapted to some but not necessarily all weapon designs DELETED Thu there are nU111erous desi gns wbir b eRn be considered for command de truct e lch having certain unique properties It is important to note ho vcvr r r that the 8 jcliti ln of internal systems on a retrnfit basis limits one's ·hoiccs drClmCltically Command destruct caprtbility is best not added as 8 n afterthought 3E8ftV -sfii DELETED Figure 5 C0mbina ti n S witches This L pic i s f8 miliar to the services under the l cronym P L or PrC's ri1Jcd Acti'Jn Link Tlw qUDJ itics gfmer lJly sought in such systems lrc shown in r'i -slln 3 IVIR ny paths an be nllo'Ned in this area ns the tcchniques or uLectr lmecl1 lllic -d o and dectronic design are applied Figure 9 indicates snme of the maj'H' opti'lI1 which can be c nsiderecl for future generations nf such hardwa re Switches '8 Xl bie qt storing sever8 cudes or of doing limited in ernal data processing c tl1 rn d pOo sihle n8' ' lltL rnati es in s01ective release nde ch wging anci c xercising • __ i 1ll1iiiIII ____ me I It'll DELETED • J IE CfbEIJRI QUALITIES OF COMBINATION SWITCHES Security Speed Flexibi Iity Cou ntermeasure Res istance Weig htlVolu me Cost Reliability Figure 8 DELETED MAJOR OPTIONS IN COMBINATION SWITCHES Multiple Codes Hierarchy Systems Remote Code Change Exercisable Systems Micromin iaturization Try Limiting Features Figure 9 nnl1 6EGne i Sito DELETED Try limiting techniques which are designed to provide quick operation with a short correct code while decreasing the effectiveness of trial-and-error methods of gaining control also offer a fertile field The limited try feature now being utilized for some new systems is a first start in this field ---- - - DELETED Multiple codes microminiaturization and new try limiting features can all contribute to strengthening our posture in this area DELETED 1 EO 1111' tIE -- _0 I 291 S t i f'RO DELETED Figure 11 qSSRFTsfR The quo liti s which one seeks in such a system Figure 12 are first of all • counterme sure resistance and environmental insensitivity DELETED Figure 12 DELETED Roth extremes the middle ground as well can onL y be i nvestig· ttecl and the system must be '- -l icbted hy 1 J ing teams dedicated tq cirCllmventlcJl1 working ' 0 real hardware D ncl DELETED rn nwny ways the solutions b this pr' hlcrn p J L' ' I f t hnse whi h hove been rlppliud in the l1ucle -tr 'safety aru8-high jlJ IFty C' lrlpliIW lt atld or i r uitry and detailed ystum test ing DELETED - iFnn Ii' SEOPlEr AD DELETED They can be utilized with the command destructs previously described or with less destructive penalty modes The several options available in combination switch technology can also be incorporated DELETED DELETED Figure 14 Intelligent Systems This section should perhaps be labeled Advanced Systems for many of those systems previnusly described exhibited a type of intelligence only qucmtitatively different from that discussed here Basically that is an ability to sense discriminate and act Certainly a combination switch which recogni7 S 8 number uf codes and gives 1ppropriately different responses exhibits these fe8 tl lres In f8 ct it is the control protection which can be offered by PAL lnd PAPS systems whi ch in some en ses is 1 l gicn prerequisite for adding t'urther w rherrd subsystems Another important factor is uur enhfll1ced ability to build more than one outcome into D given v arhead CFi- kasE 8 81ftEl -l 9§ j DELETED Thus one can add further subsystems to improve warhead safety effectiveness or control Of the many possibilities which can be envisioned in this area only one will be discussed This system is based on making warhead response dependent 1m a crucial question-namely where is the warhead In terms of the posited scenario such a system might be used to preclude the use of captured nuclear weapons against US forces Figure 17 The primary objectives which one would like to achieve in developing such 8 system are shown in Figure 18 Navigation without external inputs cnn only be achieved with inertial systems However there are no such systems avail blc today which meet the other objectives adequately In particular the r-lvailable ys­ tems even in prohibitively heavy and large volume configurations are based m m re frequent updatings and adjustments than would be logistically feasible ' r w trhead 3 pplien tions 1 ' the type being considered To 3ucceed one rnust change those existing systf l1ls A change might hI effected by taking advantage' of s me I the peCUliiJr 'e8turl S eli the lpplicati lll W 11 se in mind One of these will serve as an exumple 0' a numher f' nO'le k J j - Pments b which this prngra m has given rise It shl uld be l10tecl that the AEC i8 c nducting this prt gr m _1intl i wirh RP Liberal use has been made of the inertial guicl ltlce technology Pi'8Viuu ric vl'l pc-rl under the Sp' l1sorship or both the Air Force ond 8 vy - I DELETED L Figure 16 o GEOGRAPHIC POSITION LOCATOR CONCEPT 'lc C ' 0 C ' Fig urI ' 17 n PRIMARY OBJECTIVES eField Operation with I nfrequent Updating eNavigation and Comparison Response without External Inputs eLong Term Accuracy eB road Environmental Tolerance eMinimal Size Weight and Power eReliability Figure 18 Figure 19 shows the performance typical of a good quality inertial guidance system Note that the RMS position error increases at an ever accelerating rate and that longitude errors being unbounded are much greater than latitude errors For a typical small high quality system today the unnormalized error would amount to several tens of nautical miles in ten days with no updating or adjustment If one takes note of the fact however that land based nuclear weapons are at rest with respect to the earth's surface most of the time one can do two things which markedly improve long-term accuracy First one can so arrange the system that it senses relative rest and automatically ceases to accumulate position error during periods of no motion In this way the time scale is lengthened in that it is made to apply to time in motion rather than elapsed time The relationship is not directly linear of course if one does this alone But one can take a second step This is based on noting the ever accelerating rate of error buildup Namely one can attempt to reconfigure the system so that it uses periods of no relative motion for internal recalibration If one does only this and computes the effect of one recalibration cycle per day the result is to decrease the normalized RMS error by a factor of more than 5 as shown in Figure 20 This requires that one develop techniques for automatically changing gyroscope damping without imparting large oscillations and a number of other unusual features These techniques have now been studied in some depth Experimental checks u ing recrm igured currently 1vailable equipment nre now under way To date design studies Gnd experimental data indic J te that the tentative bjectives sh wn in Figure 21 can be l chieved It should be pointed out that the current progrom does not encompass the creation of an experimental bread-board 0 ' such a system but only analysis and the supporting experimental studies which C 1n be accomplished with existing hard' y·are NO CALIBRATION Figure 19 PARTIAL CALIBRATION once dayj - - -1 - - - ' 1 LATITUDE i I 1 -- - - - ----' _-_ 'i '1 Figure 20 I '- _ t_ - I -- TENTATIVE GPL OBJECTIVES Weight SO pounds Volume 0 6 cubic feet Accuracy 2 nm in 24 hours 100 % d c 10 nm in 10 days 8S% d c 1 nm in 100 days 1S% d c Temperatu re High 160°F Low -6SoF Vibration 1 to 5g at various frequencies to 2000 Hz Acceleration 109 Mechan ical Shock 439 17 msec Power External 200-400 watts Internal 125 watts for 15 minutes Figure 21 There are numerous other concepts for building more intelligent warheads which could also contribute to safety effectiveness and control and which are to date largely unexplored Requirements Control systems can only be judged in terms of their ability to meet requirements The k ey to 'rc ming requirements relevant to the prevention of unauthorized intentional nuclear detonations is the specification of the threat Figure 22 lists tht principal threat qualities r'- quiring specification Time refers t the period which b' gins with the first overt unauthorized action ' n the nuclear system Pre -ious periods spent in preparati'll1 i jny H'e presumed to be re 'lecterl in cnhanccci equipment knowlC dge etc It i p rh lps ' ' 'Jrtil il 'ting th t in pr cticc tbe pparently furmid tbl 3JJ ci ·ying 'l I C iJ eh 'J ' thusl' paLt i s b rO'i Y not t O cli ' icult Tni - rtc' - l ts 'rJ T the let that l relatively C Xlrse 3cr' ' ning i in ulequ te critC rion T hus ' r C quipmC nt the ' i· wing catcg·- ries h ve 'rcquently ix'on used tv ti18 ble on citc sUlTC ptitiously-carriC d 1-10 pounds one-man portable 10-100 pound in portable 100-10 1 0 pounds - nd 1vailable at 8 natLmal i2borat ry Fur time di '- cr­ entiation l1llnutc s hours Inc q y ' w lJ Prequentjy l f uncl rrdc'_ILw te - 00 In developing requirements other fRctors besides the threat must be considered Figure 23 The outcome which is desired must be determined For the positeri cnsc of a military overrun does one wish the command destruct to destroy a portion of the nuclear assembly or the SUpporting electronics Is this to be accomplished with minimal external violence or is complete breakup and scattering of the weapon desirable Is this to occur promptly or after some prescribed time THREAT QUALITIES Time Knowledge Equipment Goals Probabil ity IMPORTANT ASPECTS Threat Analysis Desired Outcome System Compatibility Figure 22 Figure 23 For coded switches is it desirable that an attempt to pick the lock by successive tries be met by the jamming of the lock the destruction of the code a switch to another more complex code or does one simply want the switch to be so configured Vi that picking will usually take a very long time 1 DELETED 1 0 D 6 controlled Perhaps there should be several options with code selectability For navigator systems what types of map selection or formating would prove most useful For excluded positions should the response be simple inoperability unresponsiveness some level of internal disruption of the warhead or destruction of the warhead as an entity Some of these outcomes will be influenced by the posited threat Many will reflect the circumstances under which deployment is planned and the relationship I f a given nuclear weapon to our total posture Finally the hardware requirements governing control equipment must reflect the requirements of the system taken as a whole Clearly the control subsystem requirements must be cl nsistent with and achievable within the total system req1lirements One final comme'lt seems Rppropriate in the requirements area This rel8 tes to the initial lSSUl1lption that in changing our tactical nucleo r posture it will be w·r essnr nt ' cb step tu convincingly demonstrate that only the designRtcd use can c' ur thnt mbusc is improbable For this purpose it may well be necessary to e' nluate situ8tions other than military wen'un Figure 24 VOl tT J TYPES OF OVERRUNS Administrative Military Pol itica I Figure 24 Thus one should consider what might be called administrative overrun--a situation in which orders issued to our own personnel are not executed in the field as intended in headquarters Also of possible importance are situations arising out of political shifts within other nations or in their relationship to the United States-shifts which might result in political overruns Summary Obviously the field of control technology is rich in possibilities and there are many capabilities which could be developed Not all of these are mutually compatible The most beneficial level and the directio of researc4 and development activities in this field are not clear A broader awareness of the options available and a thoughtful comparison of these potential capabilities and future national requirements are required Question and Answer Period ROWNTREE mvc China Lake You made the basic distinction between authorized and unauthorized detonations I realize that this may be a rather picayune point but from a standpoint of requirement one might also wish to distinguish between authorized and unauthorized maintenance opening up investigation etc Do you understand my point GUSTA VSON I understand your point In fact one frequently asks the question as to how we should relatively rate a giving or losing to somebody else the ability to create a nuciear detonation b the loss of fissile material or c the loss of design data It is my personal feeling that the first of these is overwhelmingly important although the others cannot be ignored and we certainly will not willingly give away nuclear design information nor fissile material It is true however that there are alternative routes to getting fissile material and design information other than stealing a US nuclear weapon or subverting its use ROWNTREE Yes I think the distinction between the alternate routes is a point which you made several times that of timeliness GUSTA VSON Right FOSTER SRI Do you believe that control technology is available to allow say time-limited selective nuclear transfer to an ally of a certain type of weapon such as an ADM or an air defense weapon GUSTA VSON As long as you don't make any more restrictions than that the answer is definitely yes I' Now if you ask me to do it in too little weight or to make it operate for too long then I mayor may not be able to fulfill your detailed requirements But there is an unused capability which can be brought into existence today COGGAN North Am Rockwell Because of the nature of our company I'm intrigued by your position location interest Could you elaborate a little Would it be necessary to have such Position location information available at the site of the nuclear device or do you want it available at some remote point GUSTA VSON Our tendency has been to look upon this in terms of whether or not the system could be misused When we separate site location from the actual nuclear warhead we have a very difficult question to answer and that is Is it possible sl mchow to interfere 'Nith the system which locates where we are and the nucle r warhead Therefore we've been attempting to shorten that link to the point where they were both in the same container and thereby get around the question of how do we protect data links running from some remote site at l llJl r LI 8 John E Dougherty Alamos Sci mtific Lnboratory NUCLEAR PROJECTILES FOR ARTILLERY Introduction This morning I will present various aspects of nuclear systems designed for tube artillery The projectiles now stockpiled will be briefly reviewed I will remind you of some of the limitations or undesirable features of these projectiles then we will look at designs which are feasible using current nuclear weapon technology finally I will point out some of the directions that future development might take I think it is worth noting right away that the constraints on the design of nuclear warheads for tube artillery s ee Figure 1 put unusual demands upon the weapon developers-almost every characteristic required for gun launched systems is exactly what you shouldn't have in an efficient weapon The first problem is diameter DELETEn Veight is mother are l as IS Yl d in which the demands of the delivery systerh and of the nuclear designs would dictate opposing courses of action The structure of a projectile which is subjected to 15 000 g's represents a considerable challenge especially when there are things to be held together or apart by weightless supports Pr t ctill'S t v in Stockpile I et's lonk at our current stockpiled designs the 8 inch and i5 mm projectiles Fig'ure 2 The 8 inch has been in stockpile since January 1957 and the 155 mm sinct October 1963 almost 13 years and 6 years respectively Sl' C I _ _ L li _ 7 - Figure 1 DELETED lI·g tRtj b O · SEGAll sr -_ CHARACTERISTICS GP-l OF 8 INCH PROJECTILES M-422 DIAMETER 8 INCH STANDARD M-IOS I 8 INCH - - - - - - - - - - t - - - - - - - - - - -___- --_ LENGTH WEIGHT _ S 75 CH _ _ _35 1 244 Ib I 200 Ib -- ----------i---- _ _AT ____- --8_ 000 INC ______ g DELETED t_ O _______ Figure ·'HIRIT 16 9 UNDESIRABLE I PROPERTIES OF M-422 NOT A BALLISTIC MATCH TO M - 106 DELETED i L 1j 3 MUST ASSEMBLE IN FIELD 4 EXPENSIVE IN ACTIVE MATERIAL 5 MECHANICAL TIME FUZE Figure Now what thing about this device would one try to change for a better design see Figure 5 - - __0 0 __ ---- -0c 'b tl6- DELETED One property not realized until recently is that it is pretty hard to qUletly OlsGole one of these DELETED - lia EM 1 121 • 8Eonof1 me Thr' characteristics of the - V1k 48 are shown in Figure 7 Againj there are properties of the NIk 48 which one wishes it did not have Some are shown in Figure 8 CHARACTERISTICS OF 155 mm PROJECTILES DIAMETER MK- 48 STANDARD 6 1 INCH 6 1 INCH M-107 -------1 - - - - - - - - - - LENGTH 34 INCH - - - - - - _ - - - -1---- 27 5 INCH WEIGHT 120 Ib 95 Ib 8 800 9 9 900 9 Figure 7 - SETBACK ACCELERATION -- --- DELETED vf '617 - UNDESIRABLE PROPERTIES OF MK -48 I NOT A BALLISTIC MATCH DELETED New Developments ' ow let's discus_s what the AEC laboratories have been doing that is pertinent to nucle8r artillery Jf I fJ - DELETED I would like lo digress just long enough to give you an appreciation of these advances I'm sure tl- at thl' effect of these developments will be increasingly notice'able in future 'Neapon pro -r l -I s DELETED SESRET RfIIL 1 - 7 DELETED DELETED 310 Figure 9 Considerable work has been done in a second area that is important to nuclear projectiles-structural design Ways to make structures lighter yet sufficiently strong to do the job have been studied New materials are being used and new ways to use old lTlaterials are undergoing investigation 'vVe must also include advances made in the understanding of how the design of two-dimensional nuclear assemblies can be optimized Experimental checks are of course made but to save having to make an impossibly large number of experimental observations one relies heavily on calculations The better they are the more likely one is to arrive at good pit and high explosive designs DELETED Figure 10 l OIJAI' Sa 1 1 ±5 t CAElq Rl A second approach to the 155 mm de gn was begun in 1965 DELETED The first two tests of this iesign were only partially successful the third in November 1968 was successful I DELETED Figure 11 New Projectile Designs I want to describe now the applications of the new systems to current nuclear projectile requirements Figure 12 summarizes some of the principal requirements which have been stated as the basis for Phase II studies held in December 1968 and February 1969 Let's look at the 8 inch first Quite a few 'Nays were proposed for doin the 8 inch job but let n1 e limit my discussion to a few of the more interesting ones DELETI D The basic nuclear assembly shown in Figure ' 138 c'an be burrt mto either the standard high explosive shell vIlOG Figurc 13b 01' iL can fit into the longer shell profile of the proposed rocket boosted projcctilt' '-' Ir3 'iO Figure 13c There is not much room left for rocket propdlanl in the X G O I' NEW PROJECTILE DIAMETER REQUIREMENTS 8 INCH 155 mm 175 mm - ---- WEIGHT _----_ _ _- - OO ---L_ 96_ _ _ _L _'_b_ i SETBACK ACCELERATION 11 10 0 0 BALLISTIC MATCH REQUIRED M-r06 XM-650 14 100 0 1 15 000 --------------·--l------T--' --- ---- i I XM-549 M-I07 --I- I M-437 I DELETED Figure 12 DELETED Figure 13a 9E8Ft£T -Jftl' -11 1 ryE g E'r tA8 DELETED Figure 13b DELETED Figure 13c S CREI ift DELETED Fig'ure 14 DELETED ndoes give you an appreciation for the kind of technology that can be called upon for current and future systems Ther are other possibilities in this size Perhaps one more special case is of interest If there is a strong interest in using all the rocket fuel that you can get in an 8 incll R P thE'n the shortest nuclear system would be desirable DELETED - 1 l HERR ' lRS DELETED Figure 15 DELETED 'J 1 E9RE' tittJ SEtR-ll ALF DELETED Remember that the requirements Hgure 12 ask for a ballistic match to either the XM549 or the ivll 07 the choice to be t11 ade later The XM549 however seems to be favored There mQy be yet a new shape but until w know what it is we use these two DELETED Figure 17 This projectile also me'ets the principal requirements defined by the Phase II information There is no activity at present on warheads for the 175 mm DELETED Fi Tlrt 1 J sllmtnarizl S pl rhaps in ·an oversimplified wa - tlw possibil iti s for's rlll'ads in the rro i ctile sizes just discussed DELETED I ' DELETED Figure 18 DELETED FiQUre 19 lB SEtWE-PJRJic iECktP-z AfL The FuturL' • The question of guidance alvi lys comes up when one tries to see what kind of devices may be of interest in the future It probably boils down to who is guiding WhOlT1 At any rate extrapolating from the past I have collected SOtTle thoughts on ' ' hat might happen in programs to develop projectiles for small diameter high- g delivC'l'Y s - stcms DELETED Figure 20 DELETED SEBIilE1JRP DELETED Advances in this area would allow savings of active material or the achievement of higher yields for a given amount of nuclear material Development and applications for very low yield devices have not received much attention in the past There are ideas for making devices not necessarily projectiles with yields of a few tons that would be relatively cheap small and light see Figure 22 We don't know about applications but the po ssibilities are interesting DELETED OEBAET fA ·Question and Answer Period COWAN 3rd Armored Division Has Formaggio been fired DOUGHERTY No sir DELETED COWAN If this thing works at all it would be an ideal candidate for an atomic demolition munition wouldn't it OOUGHERTY Well it's not s 1 Lppressed radiation for example It all depends on how hard people beat on certain requirements in that area I think it's interesting o - DELETED J - -- _ _ - - 1 -- DOUGHERTY Yes I said Draw the simplest gadget you can think of no complicated electronics and things like that Just let me pull the plug out and then set a timer and it'll go I would think if you could keep things simple it might have a certain attraction seCAe tzHll i I '4' 1 ' ' t J '''' ti o '#' I l- il l If 'r- t It l 0 c c ' 1 IF i iof i I • 1 j ' ' 1-·' - lIi' ' _ T I 'Il I t - - - I i -- C il I Hudson Jr University of California Lawrence Radiation Laboratory I 1 ' CLEAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE RESEARCH APPLICABLE TO TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS Introduction DELETED During the past eight years we have succeeded in developing nuclear devices which can tailor the output in a number of different ways Two such devices are described in this paper a clean suppressed neutron output device and a clean enhanced neutron output device Both have potential applications as tactical nuclear weapons Figure 1 lists some of the features of these two types of weapons The clean suppressed neutron output weapon is glled to kill primarily by blast while pro _ducing a minimum amount of fallout _ DEL ErS Q A The user of a tactical nuclear weapon is generally interested in producing a ghen effect such as achieving a desired kill probability on a target or over a given areCi while reducing collateral effects especially fallout which is subject to variation depending on the wind A number of methods may be used to reduce local fallout such as airbursts or burial A combination 'of very accurate delivery and very low yield may also be l ls c1 to reduce local fallout These methods are summarized '1 - S II ET _fflft in Figure 2 Figure 3 shows the yield and CEP combination necessary to kill overpressure targets of different hardness Inherent weapon cleanliness or weapons with special effects may also be used to reduce fallout This is particularly true in cases where a surface burst is desired or l'equil'ed where very accurate delivery cannot be achieved or where a very large yield is needed to produce the desired effect CLEAN SUPPRESSED NEUTRON OUTPUT WEAPONS DELETEDLow neutron output per unit yield Can be used with a modular warhead concept DELE 'fEf CLEAN ENHANCED NEUTRON OUTPUT WEAPONS High neutron output per unit yield DELETED Figure 1 Fallout can be reduced by using 1 Airbursts 2 3 4 5 Underground bursts Very low yield combined with accurate delivery I nherently clean weapons Special effects weapons Figure 2 -_' IiIPr J l SE kEf iL It might be worth digressing to mention that the dialog which took place between the AEC md DOD on the utility of clean nuclear weapons led to an improved understanding of the utility of the hitting mi'ssile and of burial of demolition munitions Both of these applications are now generally well understood However our currently programmed tactical nuclear force has severe limitations due to radioactive fallout when considered in conjunction with current targeting plans In several cases if actual US target arrclys from previous years are considered the fallout due to using ADM's or laydown bombs is sufficient to cover a lq rge portion of the area with a dangerous dose level DELETED DELETED ESTIMATED IMPACT CEP F91l 300 IT LAYDOI N 100' I • ti z o ---- -- -------------J ---------4----------__-4____________ W APON YIELD Figure 3 DELETED Even if all the fission could be eliminated there woUld stHl be 8 SUOstantial amount of radioactivity due to neutron activation Figure 5 shows the equivalent fission yield as a function of total yield for different values of neutron output per kt The surface burst values are smaller because most of the neutrons escape into the atmosphere without being absorbed in the soil Different soils result in different degrees of neutron activation Figure 6 gives the fission equivalent for neutron activation of five of the soils listed in TM 23-200 Note that there is an enormous variation among the various soils -D'O rJr b ' DELETED Note that the downwind distance is much less variable with the clean weapon This is shown more clearly in Figure 8 which shows the downwind distance as a function of wind speed SOURCES OF RADIOACTIVITY -Fiss ion products -I nduced activity I nternal in weapon materials External in soil water or other materials NEUTRON INDUCED SOIL RADIOACTIVITY DELETED A typical soil Nevada alluvium Type 2 when irradiated by a mole of neutrons has the same integrated gamma dose between 5 and 4 5 hours or the fiss ion product from 250 tons of fiss ion DELETED Figure -I DELETED i2'i 4ECRI I j DELETED Figure 7 DELETED I b 1 _ _ _ _ bl _- 0----- Figure 11 comp8 res the radiation kill effectiveness of several difi'ertmt weapons Since there is some disagreement on the rn din ti n dose required for kill both 1000 rad and 10 000 rad contours are shown One ncivanbge with enhanced neutron output devices is that the veapon has more of a cO lkie c UU tI c_ 'YI ct t-km a standard fission weapon of the same yield The figures along the bottonl of Figure 11 give a measure of the crust I' or ratio 0 ' safe separation radi us to kill radius Enhanced neutron output weapons may also have radiation kill ranges which exceed the blast kill range allowing some degree 0 ' separrrtion of effects Figure 8 History of Development of Clean Weapons DELETED Figure 9 5everal types of clean devices were successfully tested DELETED in this field was very actlve tram 1862 to 1965 Work Figure 12 lists the number ot tests in these programs It is interesting to note that testing of suppressed neutron output devices stopped in 1967 though some additional work in this area has continued under the Plowshare program This reflects a program that was carried to a certain degree of design maturity and then put on the shelf because there was no application available at the time Enhanced neutron output devices would be in a similar state if they were not being developed as antimissile defensive warheads The AEC laboratories CRn carry new concepts in advanced weapons only so far If there is no evidence of DOD interest over an extended period o time higher priority programs inva riably displace the unwanted concepts Whnt hnve we nccomolished to date DELETED Ve hrl ve rllso demonstrated the feasibility I f enhanced ncutron output weapons One of these was under developmcnt as the W63 warhead for the Lance missile until it 'was cancelled BllIIFAC OOBAGi lI'aI 1 X'l' 1'1 81011 IUR8T H 101l'l' • 150 10 1 -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - 105 -_ _ _ _- r_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _----l 10 4 -_ _ _ _ _ _ _--- --_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - i 8 103 -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--'' -_ _ _ _ _ _ _----l 1 10 -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 102 -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -----i 6 2 GIIOOIII RIJIG TBOIJSJJIl 6 Oi' nBT 75 70 55 45 0 20 lIJ tJ'I'IIOJ llOSAGE TO'UL DOSAGE Figure 0 DELETED However it is very large and heavy compared to a typicRl nuclear weapon Figure 13 compares a cleGn suppressed radiation weapon which might be used as a nuclear demolition munition and a clean Plowshare-like explosive which might be used for military construction purposes such as constructing harbors or dams or other large scale earth moving projects - - _-- - A DELETED Figure 11 Characteristics of Cl anJSuppressed Neutron Output Weapons DELETED Figures IS ' ll1cl 16 gi' e the size and 'vVeight as 0 lunction ' yield of n farnily of clean suppressed neutron output We8p0l1s The current Pluwshnre explosive are shown for comparison An cdtimate is a 80 made of the size ll1d veight t r ' possible I'uture clean suppresse·i neutron output device vith a reduced fi ssion yield Figure 11 1·'Jrnpo rcs Lhe faliol lt Cr'-ll two 'Lean suppresser Ill'utrl il UlltPLlt devil'us witlJ the fnl ui 1' n an 111 ls i t1 dcvit' l This dcnl' ll - trn ' L o IJln or thl tradeoff pt1s iblt IJY tl' 11i ng i e 1' weight 'or elt ' tn1iness DELETED 3a 9n5 DELETED As I mentioned earlier it is possible to reduce radioactive fallout by burial of a munition However experience in the Plowshare program has shown that the burial must be done with great care that the media must be well characterized and that the stemming must be done in a mann r to match the hydrodynamic characteristics of the medium in whi h the explosion takes place If not only a small reduction in fallout is possible Figure 18 shows the experimental results of the fractional radioactivity released as a function of scaled depth of burst from all of the cratering shots which we have conducted The two extremes indicate what may be expected if great care can be take'n in emplacing the explosive or what might happen if the medium is J lot well understood or if the explosive is not properly emplaced and stemmed The message from this curve is that you can't count on getting the reduction in radioactivity shown by the lower curve unless a great deal of time is available to study the emplacement geology and to carefully calculate the stemming and containment Figure 19 gives the fallout area as a function of yield for a buried fission device nother case where burial may be difficult is in hard rock Figure 20 shows crater dimension in hard rock as a function of yield It is possible to obtain the same crater diameter with one tenth the yield if the explosive can be buried at near the optimum burial depth For craters of 300 feet a 1 kt explosive must be buried deeper than 100 feet Characteristics of Clean Enhanced -Ieutron Output We tpons DELETED DELETED 1 igure 13 DELETED Figure 14 DELETED DELETED Figure 16 e DELETED Figure 1'1 Jd A JAI 8 POSSIBLE WITH UNFAVORJJlLE MEDIA OR IKPROP R IHPLACEH1 NT AHD S'I MKIHG ---- 1D • • Figure 13 z LIMIT POSSIBLE IN sO H1 DIA WITH PiOPIlR IHPLAC Hl NT AHD STlHIII HG u z ' ' u 1 'WlOAcTiViTY R l EA5 D AS A ruNCTI H OF SCALED DIPTH 0 BURST BASED ell NUCLEAR UST 14- 4- - - - 1- - - 2 O - o IQ 80 DEPTH uF aVoST UD 'oFT n ln • 160 e I 10 ' TntATEO ORST CASE FALLOUT FROM BURIED DEVICE r 1 I C •• • AVeRAGE FROM SURFACE NUCLEAR TESTS SURFACE DATA • CTRCL S NUl ' l ' 1 I• • REASONABLE ROUGH ESTIMATE OF MINIH1 IM FALLOUT FROM CAREFULLY gMPLOYED DEVICE BURIED AT OPTIMUM CRATERING DEPTH ITH ELL KNOWN fAVORABLE SOIL CONDITIONS ---------- -------- -----------± I •• • 1 I II 10 I • II ' •• 100 YIELD KT Figure 19 DELETED Posolble ' pplications Cle m snppressed neutron output weapons may be used as demolition munitions laydowl1 bnmbs tactical missile warheads or ASW warheads Figure 23 shows the totn i g mmn d sl rate 8S a f mction of time for a clean suppressed neutron output weapon surfnce burst in n typicai soil Rnd Figure 24 shows the gilmmG do e r8 te as a function of time fl r an underwater burst of the senne v venpon In the latter case the dose rate is dominated by fission so that for ASW application low t'issioD is 11 10re important than a suppressed neutron output C1 ean enhanced neutron output weapons may be used as bombs or tactical missile warheads using a design similar to the W63 which was the' initial warhead design chosen for the L mce missile 100 600 IlNS - - i'l I RATER JlMEN5 VS YIELD F0R H AR' DRY RDr ¥ i - 300 200 100 --- ---- o • • • • • 1'1 • 1 II 1 fOR 'rlH1J'1 seR 1 AI 1EPTH •• I _ C ATER l ' ETER I It- ' PTlHUM BUR Al DEPTH 140 y ln • 4 --f-- CRATER DI 1ETER FOR URr'AGE BLaST • It • 10 II I 100 Y YIELD ¥T Figure 20 In cases where a dua 1 capability is required the nude r w8rhead wc ight Rncl size are not of major imporbnce T 1jo obvious exemptions are de molition munitions and artillery shells This is because the conventional wa rhead may weigh several hundred to a thou 3ancl pounds Suf 'ici cnt size and weight are available to enable clt 8n weap lns to be used in almost rill U 1 ctical missiles Qnd in many tactical bombs This wuuld 1liow 1 rJegrcl of flexibility that we do not now have at the same tim reducing I ol iatt rrtl L· 'feds especi ally rn Il -mt A tactical nuclt ar f l'c cont linin r such weapons combined wi th hitting mis - iles 'sitb very low yieid ' veClpnns ' voulcl provide U i ' 'lith a credible flt xible w dic 11 iludertr orce There is a c1 001 of tl1nllght h' ith some apparent in7'luence in J'l C 'n1 ' t e lr -- which holds th lt the 18S1 thing 'Ie liclllt is I credible tactical nuclear forcc---thn t ill incredible rce reduces tIw chance oj' our initiating a limited nuclear Vial' 1ncl thus DELETED Figure 21 DELETED Figure 22 helps maintain the nucleflr firebreak Perhaps this is ' ' But i va hflve Dll in credible tactical nuclear corce-one vhich' ie do not believe in tnd cannot use either on technical grounds or because of lack of proper command end controlthen if our enemies chaoae to start a limited nuclear war we may fi nd ourselves hamstrung or unable to respond other than with a massiv-e degree y' escalation I would like to see a credible tactical nuclear force It seems to me th et sucb 3 force would have increased value as a cieterrunt buc eu e it L' usable flexihle tnd capable of a controlled response DELETED Fig1 rc 23 e· DELETED Question and Answer Period DELETED HUDSON I don't think I have it with me MORSE SRI I think you said or implied that after twelve years of laboratory effort there is still no military requirement for either enhanced or suppressed radiation Is that correct HUDSON There is a stated desire in the current ADM Phase II for a suppressed radiation module With the exception of the use as an antimissile warhead there are no other applications for an enhanced neutron weapon It would be quite useful as an antipersonnel weapon but there are no current requirements for it MORSE I don't suppose you would want to guess why HUDSON I have some opinions but I'm not sure they are accurate I think one problem is that they were new a number of years back in addition people don't quite have the intuitive feel for radiation as a kill mechanism as they do for blast they feel that it is probably much better to bang somebody than zap them LA WLER CDC With respect to the ADM problem if you tailor your device to the size of obstacle needed and you judge your needs per yield against what you can get and it turns out to be less than what the SR driver needs there would be little utility to go to the SR device except for those requiring large obstacles HUDSON If the required yield is less than the fission yield you have there is no point in using a suppressed radiation device 07 t· r_RU INEY sl lJ ---l 6' ' HuDSON It is possible I think you could get some idea from the curve showing the gamma dose rate as a function of time To deliberately enhance the gamma output during a given time period by perhaps an order of magnitude over that of a 'Neapon with the same fission yield during that same time period we looked at this just in a cursory fashion We haven1t actually taken a given design and seen if the materials with the desired neutronic properties also are things from vhich you can build devices We haven't tried to weaponize anything of that sort ItIs actually pretty hard to beat fission You can beat it with gammas but not with betas --------- ­ RUMNEY ' DELETED When you consider using this type of weapon in Europe it may find greater long range acceptability This is the reason I asked the question over the fission Ed note The following comment was subsequently added by Mr Rumney for inclusion in the Proceedings Fallout is often a dominant consideration in nuclear weapons policy and politics Consequently its elimination or reduction is often assumed to be automatically desirable wherever possible and the use or enhancement of fallout is not a subject for current rational political debate Politics however can vary rapidly in response to pressures and perceptions Crises and pain tend to accelerate these responses and it is therefore prudent to base predictions of future policy and subordinate long-range technological developments on an expectation that reality will be perceived rather than on current prevalent distortions and misconceptions Thus today words like IIfalloutll and II ra diation ll cause automatic and allinclusive negative political reactions and mention of a salted weapon can be expected to cause downright hysteria In the future however the ability to discriminate where there are real and substantial differences must be prepared for In the case of fallout it is the long-term danger of poisoning ll the earth w ich is the principal cause of fear The real basis of this fear is the presence of isotopes which are significant internal radiation hazards-those with both a long biological half-life and significant radiation emission particularly those with genetic implications Cesium strontium and iodine are usually dominant internal hazards Military fallout effectiveness as a barrier is not dependent on the internal radiation qose and can be achieved through isotopes which are compara tively insignificant from an internal viewpoint provided fission energy release is minimized Thus militarily effective fallout from salted fusion weapons could be 'aade to avoid the most significant political consequences of fissi Jr1 weap'Jn t' tliout R 1Cli J8ctive half-lives can be either long or short as long as the internal biological balf-ii 'e is short This possibility may not cause immediate enthusiasm since the creation of radiation barriers may not achieve its greatest significance in the cLmtext · r confrontations between major powers However in situations where stabili ing influences are required and major troop deployments are undesirable particularly in conflicts between client nations of the third world such options can be expected to become more desirable In many cases proliferation may have introduced nuclear weapuns into such crises regardless of cS restraints in that area The ability to separate opponents impede maneuver destroy momentum and prodde selective denial of critical areas may be the most stabilizing influence available as the permissible level of violence rises from below the umbrella of mutual strategic deterrence As perception grows that blocking halting denying capabilities can be the ' lost stabilizing of influences once conflict is joined it will be important that we understand that more politically acceptable fallout options can be made available The question was raised in order to point out this technological option Colonel Sid C Bruce CSAF Ret AECOP I WARHEAD COSTING AECOP is a multicontractor group located at Oak Ridge Tennessee which does analysis and combined planning studies for the Division of Military Application and Division of Production AEC Headquarters One of the tasks that we have been involved in is the development of methods for proper economic evaluation of warhead alternatives This can be simply stated as rt 'Narhead costing II and that is what I will be talking about Colonel Shaw will follow me and pick up the subject of availability of special nuclear materials 0 '1 with regard to flwarhead costing II please note that I am not using the term lcost of warheads II as shovm on the agenda What I am not going to talk about ic the cost of specific warheads or design proposals Preparing cost estimates for various v '3rhead alternatives is the responsibility of Veapons Development Division at 4 lbuquerque Operations Office not of AECOP ' Ve in AECOP only assist j LO h y devc1opini basic concepts for meaningful evaluation of w''l rhead alternatives I will therefore limit m y discussion to the basic principles currently in use for warhead c stinf ' 'lith special emphasis on costing of special nuclear materials see FL urr 1 In this portion of our brif fing I will cover the following' areas F'irst I want 1 0 revi · ' 'lith you the r8tionall that was used in developing the per grrrrn dollar co ts for oralloy plutonium md tritium 'ihich are currently in use within the L ' tomic Ener Cnmnds8ion nELETED l i ' IE CMtifs4ftB j WARHEAD COSTI NG -Proper Unit Costs SNM Oralloy Plutonium Tritium -Application - Net Warhead Costs -Resu Its - Comparison Figure 1 Second I want to show you how we apply these unit values in deriving an overall net warhead cost which is used in economic comparison of alternative warhead proposals Third I would like to show you what happens when you use this method of costing by comparing it to other methods that have been used in the past However before talking about unit costs for special nuclear materials I feel that we should put this matter of warhead costing into proper perspective-to avoid the misconception that net cost is our only thing at AECOP Let me see if I can make this point with Figure 2 Shown here are some of the key elements in the decision making process To be sure it is not a complete list the point is however that costs are only one of the many elements in the decision rnaking process and must be considered in that context Further you will note that the subject of costing can involve many subelements one for instance is budget costs another is net warhead investment still another is total cost-bow the cost of the various warhead alternatives impacts on the total cost of the 'Neapon system Now I'm only g'oing to be talking about one of these namelv net 'Narhead investment v • Net 'Narhead investn1 nt for purposes of this discussion includes all direct co ts ' 'ihich can reasonably bc' associated with a decision to build the nuclear warhead or bomh It include not only the required additi onal bud 'ct dollars but abo all funds whicll 111 ay be alread llloc lit d but wLich have to be diverted from SO 11 other project or objc'ctive An example of diverted funds might be those for r search and development ' vllicl i 3 normally funded in AEC on a level-of-effort basis While additional funds may not be required to develop and test a ne'N Pbase III warhead projects 'Nill have to be reoriented md funds 1 11 probabl havE to be diverted in order to accept tl is additional requirement • _ __ • J ----- -- III - 1 - ELEMENTS - DECISION MAKING PROCESS -Benefits Kill Effectiveness Availability - Ease of Delivery Ease of Maintenance etc -Costs Budjet Consequence Net Warhead Investment Total Costs etc - Pol itica I Cons iderations -Etc Figure 2 i -ith these thoughts in mind let us turn to unit costs for special nuclear materials the first of which is oralloy By definition oralloy is 93 15% U235 enriched uranium Other degrees of enriched uranium will of course have different unit costs Such unit costs however can easily be calculated from this basic oralloy cost by considering the relative amounts of contained U235 As most of you know and as Colonel Shaw will reaffirm in a moment we do have sufficient oralloy reserve on hand to meet all projected demands with the possible exception of the JCS recommended stockpile as presently configured in Annex C to JSOP Because we do have a rather large reserve of oralloy it is no longer being produced for military weapons Let us look however to the total AEC picture not jllst to the weapons customc 'I' Fi0re 3 serves to make the point thai the large demand for enriched uranium in the 70's is in the civilian power reactor market As a matter of fact all studies 31 ow th8t by about 1980 just 10 years from now the demand for civilian power fud · vill exceed AEC capacity to produce Jew gaseous diffusion plants will have to bc· built by that time unless some other sourc of supply is found Clearly an 2 lternativc to building new plants is to use surplus o -alloy from our weapon re serve One kilo r un of oralloy at its high enrichment can be blended with natural ur nium to make approximately 36 kilograms of low enriched fuel for power reactors Thu it can be seen that ora11oy can be used either in weapons or in an alternative market to delay the time of building new gaseous diffusion plants 1 • 11 - a '-1 OELETEfii ' 1 1 I FORECAST - ENR I CHED U235 DEMAND By customer 1970 through 1980 10 000 Civi lian Power Fuel 740 Government ' De E E 740 Figure 3 The question then becomes How much is oranoy worth to this alternative market II The answer is that at the time of new plant construction estimated to be about 1980 oranoy will be worth about $ 8-1 2 per gram That is for every gram of oranoy used in 1980 to delay the building of new plants there will be a net saving to the government of $ 8 -1 i 2- To be consistent any oralloy used in 1980 for a militaT'j weapon in place of being used to produce reactor fuel should be assessed a charge of $ 3-1 1 2 per gram Shovin in Fi '1lrc 4 is this $ 8-1 i 2- value corresponding' to the as sumed new plant date of 1980 Corresponding dl' cenctint' values are shown prior to 1980 roV' ' the reason that the values prior to 1930 are less than $ 8-1 2 is that the actual effect of deferring new plant construction will not be realized until 1980 Something that can be sold in 1880 for $ 8-1 2 could be sold t' a private investor today for about S 4 00 if ttat investor is 'Hilling to make approximately 7-1 2 on his mane ' If he ' ants to Ai sHtke ta'iry-J DOLLARS ASSIGNABLE TO ORALLOY 12 ----'-----'------r-----r-----r-----r--__- __ 10 ---- --- ___ -____ --_ $8 --l 8 ---- ------ ------ ----- ----- t-- -- -BLEN o DOWN-j VALUE FOR RETURNS I 13 ex u J ' ex I 6 ---- -----4- ---r----- ____-r o o 2 -----f--------- 't o L----- -----L---- --__ 1968 1970 1972 1974 _L _ L _ _ _ _ _ L_ _ _ _ _ 1 _ _ _ _ 1970 1978 1980 1982 FISCAL YEARS Figure 4 make 10% he would be willing to pay only about $ 3-1 3 per gram As you can see we have plotted the discount curves for 5% 7-1 2% and 10% from the $ 8-1 2 value at the assumed new plant date of 1980 Depending upon the desired discount rate for a particular analysis the appropriate cost of oralloy can be determined for any intervening year between now and 1980 Phase II cost studies are currently being made by AEC using a 7-1 2% discount with senEitivity analyses being made at 5% and 10% I might say in passing that in order to defer all costs for new plant construction scheduled to be needed in 1980 it is necessary to make commitments to release material ahead of that time Shown here is a 6-year commitment lead time-the amount of time required to contract and build new gaseous diffusion plants and procure power Having established appropriate costs for oralloy let us now turn to plutonium ond tritium By way of introduction let me state two facts One plutonium and tritium unlike oralloy are not in surplus but are currently in production to meet f lh re requirements for military -enpons and two approximately 25'' of the cost of producins- plutOnium and tritiUm comes from fuel burnup The fuel being burned up in production reactors is U235 at some degree of enrichment Savannah Rivervs reactors r tE' a mntter of fact currently are using mostly oralloy Since the cost of -lraniulTI i - time dependent so must the cost of producing plutonium and tritium be time dependent This is shown in Figure 5 You will note here that again we have plotted on the vertical scale marginal costs in $ gram for plutonium equivalent Again on the horizontal we have plotted-¥me in fiscal years I e I This is the marginal cost of producing plutonium ih''r'9 3 YLth oralloy valued at $ 8-1 2 Prior to 1980 the production costs will be less because the oralloy fuel costs are less as was indicated in the previous figure v ' i' s I previously mentioned Phase II cost studies are currently being made using a 7 -1 20 0 discount rate rather than a time average value Sensitivity analyses are being made for both 5' and 10' discount rates DELETED You will recall that i n this discussion of warhead costing we wanted to cover not only the appropriate costs for special nuclear materials but also the application of these values in the determination of the net warhead costs To apply these unit dollar costs for oralloy plutonium and tritium in conjunction with the other costs such as R D test fabrication and assembly a few basic principles must be established see Figure 6 BASES FOR NET WARHEAD COSTS Consider Total Market SNM Not Consumed II Time-Value' of Money Figure 6 With regard to the fIrst principle we all know that with the exception of tritium decay special nuclear materials can be and have been used over and over again For example it is quite possible that material reclaimed from the Mk 5 bomb was used in the Mk 25 air-to-air rocket and is now reentering the stockpile in the Mk 61 bomb In the absence of an all-out nuclear war these materials are tied up not consumed The economic dislocations that will result from an all-out nuclear war will render such analyses as net warhead costing meaningless Therefore since these materials do have a residual value the decision of whether to build or not to build a particular warhead must take into cohsideration the fact that these materials will be recovered at the end of their useful stockpile life This is accomplished by including credits in the economic analysis for all materials returned at retirement For illustrative purposes it will be assumed that the stockpile life for a warhead entering the inventory at the end of 1973 is ten years Materials will be available for reuse in about 1984 if an additional year's delay is assumed for pipeline With these principles in mind let's look at a typical cash flow profile for a nuclear warhead see Figure 7 Let me first point out the fact that all cash flows are time oriented All expenditures are shown below the horizontal line and credits are shown above the line at the time they are expected to occur Cash flows are expressed in millions of dollars Also please note that the initial operational capability d8tc is identified by an arrow above the line at the beginning of FY 1974 A three-year delivery prog'ram is assumed with hbrication and assembly eC -pc nditures for the total production occurring in 1973 1974 and 1975 Othe expenditures include development test maintenance and plutonium and tritium 5 IIilE i I hB CASH FLOW PROFILE OF A WARHEAD ALTERNATIVE DELETED Figure 7 Initial retirement as shown by the arrow below the line is assumed to start in FY 1984 A two-year retirement period is assumed in FY 1984 and 1985 with credits for plutonium and tritium occurring one year later in FY 1985 and 1986 DELETED Next we want to convert these annual cash flows to a common base so that the overall warhead cost of this alternative can be compared to other alternatives The common base that we use is the present value of all cash flows that is expenditures and credits are expressed in terms of present year dollars by discounting annual cash flows to the present year see Figure 8 All n t annual expenditure undiscounted is represented by the total length of the bar below the horizontal line All net credits undiscounted are shown by the total length of the bar above the line Also shown are the am1ual cash flows ' vhen discounted at 7 -1 2C o to the present value Note in particular that the credits ' -hich are occurring 15 and 16 years from the decision year have been red· lced by more than fjO% The reason of course that these credits must be reduced is that if tb amount of money sho'hTI were rrvailablc todrry it could be invested It 7-1 ' ' an 1 eeturn an amount l'qurrl to the totallen th of the bar You will note thnt expl'nditurcs ' vhich occur only a few yerrrs from now have been reduced only sli htl • e· DELETED ' j I oj i '1 _ PRESENT VALUE COST PROFILE 1 DELETED Figure 8 I would like to make one additional point This particular cost profile is related to a decision to either build 0 ' not to build a new warhead S nce this system has not yet been 'ieveloped R D test construction alld equipment expenditure nust all be inclUd d If the d -cision were related to a system already in prodnctioCl and the question was 'What would an Cldditioiltll q lantity of warheads cost --the anSNer would be Consid rably less II The reason is thtlt many of the early-year xpenditure3 010Ul ll'we already ueen _uade e g •• R D test cons ructioCl and egx p nenl The po nt is that an additional build will cost less per weapon that the first increment This point will be bro' lght out more clearly Figure 9 shows the difference between the net present costs of a warhead altern8tive and the net cost of the s trnc alternative obtained by one-time chargi ng DELETED This is 'Jbta n d by adding all expenditures takin · no credits for materials returned ulc1 igmring Lh_' time value of moncy iL' IJ l' @ 't fcc lis C tn be 3een most or this difference comc rom th C03t as iatcd 01ith nuclear materials DELETED Finally I would like to invite your attention to the fact that thE ' unit nd v 'arhead costs can be significantly different-depending upon vhen the question is lsked To make this point I would ike to show two example2 of costing on the Spartan Narhead Both of these unit costs we consid'2r to be correct DELETED Figure 9 The first example Figure 10 involves th2 question What is the estimated unit cost 0 a Spa ctan -Narhea l befo e d velopment began when the S ntinel decision was announced in 1967' II Note that this deci sion is concerned Nitb e XlJenditures for development test includin J the cost of the supplemental teat site capj tal equip_Tleni etc ' DELETED Now letts loo r' th -3a lle system but at a later peri od 0 time Fignr e 11 In this exampl the qu stion 5 s iNhat 18 tbe estimated unit cost of additiorl3 l Sp utan ' varh l ds in 1970 You will note tbat this d cisiorl i s conc rned only Witll cxpcnclitu ' - of fabrIcation a scmbly main en i llc and 3pecial nuclear n1 utf 'cials-re8C'arch c1evdopm'_nt trJ 3t cotlstraction and equipment expenditures b tbis ti me 1 J csscnti ally co n pleted DELETED WHAT IS THE QUESTION • DELETED Figure 10 WHAT I S THE QUESTION DELETED Figur 11 In conclusion I would like to summarize four main points • The appropriate dollars to be assigned to special nuclear materials are all time dependent 1 2 4 In the application of these dollar values in net warhead costing for economic comparison between alternatives it is appropria e'to consider credits for material returned at retirement and the time value of money as well as the more familiar expenditures The unit C03t of the warhead depends upon wben the question is bein6' asked Thank you for your attention I will nOON turn the podium over to Colone1 Shaw for his presentation of the Availability of Special Nuclear Materials Que tion qn Ans vlier Period S2e the cornbincd qUe - tiOll l nd 3 ns' ver period followin6' the talk by Colonel H E S'qaw ' -- - - '- -- • Colonel H E Shaw 1 's - Ret AECOP A VAILABILITY OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS Now that Colonel Bruce has discussed the economic aspects of nuclear weapons production I would like to open another door to the planning world with a short discussion of special nuclear materials availability illustrated by a few comparisons of tbis availability with some currently projected demand schedules Planning of both nuclear materials production and weapons production is based upon input from the Department of Defense This input consists primarily of two projections of the desired nuclear posture-that which is presented in the Draft Presidential Memorandum called the DPM Base Case on the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile and that which is contained in Annex C to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan referred to in this talk as the JCS Case Figure 1 portrays the demands in terms of weapons-grade plutonium over the next nine years These demands would result from a translation of the stockpiles in these two projections into requirements for special nuclear materials This figure shows only the plutonium demand but similar demand pictures would exist for tritium and oralloy As you can see a spectrurn of demands is portrayed-one relatively low resulting from the Base Case and a considerably higher demand OYVY' the ame period for the JCS Case Because of the existence of this broad j -' ct rum additional pbnning cases are developed and utilized in a similar mc mner This figure also sho' vs thv AEC Reference Case 'Nhich repres 'nt dC'J1lancl whch would r ' I Jt from tllE Base Cas plus contingencies listed in the DP VI as po -i 'iblc oV Jr tIl period of the- projection This is an attempt then to rdlvct a warhf aci production f'cherluLc including these contingencies Planning i normaLly bas cl on 1l1Ony C lSC'I Tho2e shown are only three of thE ' many but they reprcs llt a re lson3hl - spt ctrum of demand Let me make very clear hOINever that tlw2e cases ar ' only pbnning lm es thc y do not represent comm ittecl progrom ClE '-'uch • DELETED Figure 1 'Demands such as these may be balanced against special nuclear materials availability To do this however we need a starting point Figure 2 portrays the various special nuclear materials on hand at the end of Fiscal Year 1969 for the weapons program The amounts shown are held in reserve for future programs and are in addition to materials allocated for the Finished Weapons Stockpile Build and Retirement Pipelines Working Inventory and Test and R D Programs Because the amounts of other SNM on hand are so' small only oralloy plutonium and tritium will be considered further in this presentation Since the en d of the fiscal year there has been one significant change in the amounts shown ' DELETED This illustrates a point quite well-that the weapons programs are no longer the sole users of special nuclear materials in large amounts and in fact the civilian power program is projected to be the larger user of enriched uranium 0Jow I want to present some comparisons of demand and availability-first for reactor products Lnd then for oralloy In planning for production of reactor products one mLlst b t1ancc the production of tritium and plutonium as they compete for neutrons in the reactors Because tritium decays significantly and plutonium does not production planning is normally optimized on the tritium rcquiren1 cnts to avoid an overproduction of this material Then the resulting plutonium production is 2 DELETED Figure 2 compared with the plutonium demands Because tritium demands vary from case to case optimizing on tritium will produce a different production schedule for each demand projection To illustrate Figure 3 shows the tritium availability picture that would result from basing production upon the Reference Case utilizing the six reactors that are currently in operation On the bottom of the chart you can see that the fiscal '69 reserve because of the decay of tritium would drop off in amount over the period of interest To this reserve would be added the new production that would be scheduled to meet the total demands resulting in the cumulative availability line shown as the upper line Let us now compare this availability with some of the demands Since the production portrayed on this chart was based upon the Reference Case it should certainly provide ample material to satisfy any case in which there is a lesser demand As we can see it does this very nicely Next is the demand for the Reference Case After the initial reserve is used uP the cumulative availability and the demands are in balance through the latter part of the period Vhat would happen nO'N if we were to compare this avai1o bility curve with the demnnds of the JCS Case As you can sce there would be a significant shortage of tritium starting sometime in Fiscal Year 1973 and continuing from therf- This illustrntes what would happen if the materials production wen' plann rj for the Reference Case but actual weapons builds approximated the JCS C lse As you see we would run out of material fairly early in the period ' - DELETED Figure 3 As I mentioned earlier we m 1st now compare the plutonium that would result from this production schedule with the plutonium demands Figure 4 does this This availabiHty picture for plutonium is similar to that which you just saw for tritium with the exception that the reserve does not decay as tritium did so it remains essentially a horizontal line throughout the period Again we add scheduled new production to this to account for the cumulative availability shown Let us compare this with the Base Case We see again that there is no problem of sufficient availability to meet these requirements If we make just the right amount of tritium to satisfy the demands of the Reference Case we end up with sufficient plutonium and rdain some reserve Let us compare now with the JCS dem mds l gain we see that we fall short this time about a year earlier a nd we would have a considerable deficiency of plutonium for the demands of the rCS Case gain tboug'b let me emphasi ze that the production was scheduled on the basi8 of tlle Rcferencl Ca e and it is not surprising that we are unable to m 'et the d mands of the JCS Case Ld 11 nON look 1t the lvailability picture if the special nuclE ar materi l1 - production ' vere b d cci upon the dem md of the JC Caf'1 ' r tti E r tbnn ll ' E 'Iel't'ncc Ca JC A ain ' ve'll utilize the six production reactor tLat we currently i n 'jJ'- ration Figure sLow the tritium production that l ould n sult under ChC condition A ain tbe rE 'scrve I vben added to ·the new production would re ult in the cUlllul ltiv availability shown in the figure Ld us compar ' again first witb the tritium ck1113ncls of the' Base Ca c and tbcn witb the tritium demands of the Ref l'cncf Case Hi • DELETED Figure 4 DELETED Figl lrC G - r 1 IK There would be ample availability to meet either of these two cases Then comparing with the demands of the JCS Case we see that we have achieved the desired balance starting about 1973 and can maintain this balance throughout the rest of the period X nat happens though if we look at the plutonium picture that goes with this case In Figure 6 yoU see the cumulative availability of plutonium based upon meeting the tritium demands of the JCS Case The plutonium production has not dropped off significantly from the case you looked at earlier the Reference Case-even though one would e l 'Pect it to with the higher tritium production This is because all nonweapons production was assum ed stopped after Fiscal Year 1970 because of the very high demands of this case An all-out effort was rnade on plutonium production after the tritium demands were satisfied to attem pt to satisfy the plutonium requirements for this case If we compare this availability with the demands of the different cases we see first with the Base Case and then with the RefeJ ence Case that we can meet these demands DELETED n lETe Figure 6 • itt In Figure 7 lie sec the availability picture for oralloy The format is somewhat different in this case-primarily because oralloy is no longer in production In fact some would prefer that we not only not ask for any more oralloy but that we return what we already have because of the projected requirements of the power industry As you see on the left of the chart there is a significant reserve at present The base line running across the center of the chart designates that level at which production must be reinstituted in order to satisfy demands Along the bottom of the chart the Base Case is presented and as you see there is no problem whatsoever in meeting oralloy demands for this case In fact the reserve increases generally throughout the period However the JCS Case represents a completely different picture DELETED Figure 7 There will be a large demand for new oralloy production starting almost immediately and continuing for several years An interesting point which might be noted is that after Fiscal Year 1973 as the oralloy demands drop off in this case we c 'eate a new reserve as shown in the upper right hand corner of the figure DELETED If we compare the demands of the Reference Case we see that after an initial low demand period most of the current reserve is utilized but some reserve is retained and new production is not required -- -- ihiiij 1 G i In summary then we can draw several conclusions from the information we have just looked at First significant amounts of special nilclear materials are potentially available We can also conclude that commitments are required in advance early enough to reserve specific quantities of projected production to obtain additional production or to maintain flexibility in the future In some cases as we saw sufficient amounts cannot be mad available under current operatinJ conditions We must remember that some things can be done with increased dollar levels but others need time regardless of the dollar level of the funding that rnay be authorized Certainly a significant lead time is required for example to reschedule reactor operations to meet changes in req irements or to reinstitute separation of oranoy Although the law as currently stated certainly gives first priority to defena8 requirements ·for special nuclear materials things are occurring particularly in the power industry which will result in increasinJ requirements for some of these materials As these programs proceed and'more and more en'lphasis is placed ujJon them commitments may be made which will be difficult to brea for unforeseen defense req- irements 3G- HERRET JAB Question and Answer Period Questions directed to both Colonel Sha and Colonel Bruce Rl SSELL USN Ret You haven't said anything about the supply of raw material J remel11 ber that at one time all our uranium came out of the Belgian Congo What's the status of the supply of raw material BRUCE To my knowledge explorations have revealed that reserves of natural uranium have been increasing and at the present time there apparently is no problem in meeting the high demand for the Power Reactor Program The numbers that we were using are based upon acquiring the feed at $ 8 00 per pound there is some indication that the price may go up a little but the availability apparently is there ETHRIDGE Aberdeen Have you estimated the number of new reactors that would be required and the approximate cost to meet the JCS requirements ' SHA W No we haven't gotten that far yet The work that generated the numbers you saw in the figures was done only last week We haven't had a chance to get at reactors yet It 'lill be a sizable figure though ROWNTREE NWC China Lake While I appreciate the ground rules you stated your arguments for crediting the cost of materials for strategic systems I'm afraid I must argue that that is not valid for the kinds of systems that we are discussing at this symposium What we have been primarily discussing here is projected use of relatively small numbers of nuclear weapons in a context where we would not expect the economy of 'the United States follo' ving their use to be significantly disrupted That was the dominant justification for your argument on the cost of the strategic systems We would like to use the cost data that you supply for cost effectiveness comparisons For example I might wish to look at the comparative cost of destroying the targeted bridges in East Germany using lk 61 bombs nuclear V al1eYE or conventional v'ralleye In every case I 'auld use up the materials in those ' eapons so that for my cost COlTLjJ lrison I cUclld not use C08t on tl e C- ­ sumption that I would turn those back BRDCE I think you have R ver good point This subjt ct was - iven 1 lot of cOJlsirlera ion lS a matter of fact Dt AECOP nnd the prublem is I ttink l o' v mnny ' 'capons 'to' 1 lxpect tc xpencl If YO v ant to economic 1lly L vcdliaf tlUcl'nal h'c ' un f h_ i 'suillption tl at the weapon ill in fact be detonated and mftl rial I -ill bC ' conSdlnVC1 it is inappropriate to c l l1siclcr credit 1'1'0 11 retired SyStel 1S On the ot1 'r h nd if onl i'U' 'i of tlJe ' vr apon arc detonated an economic analysis for ttc tot 11 pictL re j ake o sense a3Eu nin 2 that clderrents 'ill prevail BRliCE Well I can only agree with you If you liant to compure blo weapon systems that you cx-pect to expend then taking credits is not appropriate DOUGHERTY LASL DELETED BRCCE This is predicated on an indifference value to the gOyer l en t DELETeD It's an indifference cost DOUGHERTY What happens if you try to figure out what it really costs you to make it Take people's salaries and the cost of the plants amortized and so forth BRUCE Well as you lmow what it costs to produce enriched uranium is a function of the power level at which you operate your gaseous diffusion plants e 6 ' v II -DELETED -' This is the penalty that you pay in enriching material and then blending it back to lower enrkhme r - - ' 'I DELETED f DG ' 6 z 1-' SHAW Let me explain why it will level out after 1980 The costs we are talking about are concerned with using uranium now on hand not with the production of new uranium If you build new plants then the cost after 1980 must change with this ' i ----- DELETED HICKS Northrop Commenting on Mr Rowntree's point-if you take a 'Nf apOn to obsolesc0 ncc in your consideration of cost effectivity your answer is still corr ect because the vValleye becomes worth zero when it becomes obsolete and tben the next wpapon has to be costed differently This weapon still has some plutonium left that's worth money GIRARD RAC Has any thought been given to billing the civilian power consumers to fund increased production facilities so we really don't get into an oraUoy bind- mo kin this a real business than can develop its own Investment' l BRUCE The answer to that is Yes II As a matter of fact if the gaseous diffusion plantE are not sold to private industry and if the governmc nt baE to produce this they will produce it at a cost and charge it at a cost that will accommodate all of tbe cost including the investment of the ne'N plants t I i j S26Rti t· • CHL'lRD Wl'll I gd the picture that the military 118CT of oralloy v n' ciwciullJd to bL' pl'o ·r lll1med out in order to accommodate these powC'r rc Cjuiremcnts BRuCE Xo we don't - -ant to leavt ' that irnpression What we're saying is trat it mo y be more economical to use oralloy Over a certain period of timl o nd to de1ci - the l milding of ne'vV gaseous diffusion plants indeed thi s is being· considered in tIle' plo nning for the Div-ision of Production at the 111 0ment LO VRY RAC - - - - - Iy qllCstion is prompted by the very high current interest rates may change the trade-offs between fossil fud and nuclear plants and therefore reduce that demand DEIL E rEOtey continue BRCCE A very good point The evaluation that we 111 ade on the cost of building new plants whenever they are needed was conducted on the basis of 7 -1 2% interest money for new plant construction If that is increased to 10 or 12% then the value of oro lloy will accordingly bE ' increased LO VRY DELETED CRAWFORD N VC China Lake How do you treat inflation in your analysis·' BRCC'E We gave this a lot of consideration To those of us who have to buy groceries it's clearly evident that they are costing more and more as a result of the inflationary process This however is not true for all types of expenditures Specifically I think you'll agree that the cost to the government of producing electrical power is less today than it was previously The same thing ve feel applies to the production or the separation process in the gaseous diffusion plant This results from increased efficiency because of improved technology and we in our study assumed thiOtt such advancements would offset the inflationary cost of labor and so on · CRAWFORD You're assuming then that the plants which are involved here ' vill become more efficient in the time you're talking about BRliCE Tl1at is correct J 1COEY LASL Have you considered the nse of a centrifuge instead of gas diffusion process for separating li235 ' 8 ERe CE Yes we have Thi is being thoroughl y investigatl rI- 18 YOl know The resuUs ohtained to dc-lte sU ·gcst thn t b8SC cl on the yalues 'N 're using and the way these r8tl1Ur lat'p ' demands will klVC to lJt met c'imp l rbon 'Nith the g' lSC'OIlS diffusion plant indl Ccl i the appl'opri tt h8SiC' it'E hio hly cbs ific'd UP l I'm cunsidering your costing md the cost t f fl Narhc'aci tel tI ' ovL'rnmc nt It eC1118 tho t vhn t is important L how Illllch the ' overlllJ1ent kls to Jrmropri ltl' in the next couple of fiscal year for this hypotlwtic l 'Nrtrh ad cost Y0U tvp- to con id 'r th 'lt thl amolmt of oriilloy or plutnni 1llJ1 i n Ihf ' obsolete ' varl1 ' ld · ' ill c o l ow 1rd reclue·in · the cost of the present ' v8rheacl teSEIJRi BRCCE What you're saying is that th decision making process is associated not only with the building of a particular new weapon system but also 'i th tliL' l'l'tit' ­ ment of some other system n1ile this mayor may not be the case it's quite difficult to associate each new build requirement with an associated one in retirement Therefore we found it more appropriate to consider each weapon system by itself rather than try to correlate it with another system SRA V Let 1'118 a dd one thought to that Keep in mind that th se fi- '11'es and these procedures are used primarily for the comparison of weapons-build alter natives so that if you're cornparing two or three builds the input price is tlll' same for any of the alternatives regardless of what you're getting out of the previously retired system It's still the same material going into each of these alternatives so on that basis it really makes no difference OEonl Ron Cr 1j g' Hosmer Adm James Dr Harold Agnew Russell Dr Albert D Vheelon Lt Gen 4 ' v Betts Di H rnld gnew LASL Represcntative Cr - i ' Hosmer' imj rn i J me S RlI - l'll R ilrecl U Gei1l'i' 1i W Betts CILC ' Dr jj l rt D 1 1' R Dept l tlk' rtny ' ' ' -111 l-l1J 'lwt- - ir Tc ft e Dr illiam R VCll1 Cleave 0 ' 5D 1SA Dr IV R Van Cleo ve --DR AG E V Ve bave here some distinguished guests whu h8 ve v lttm ered lL' '-l'- -1 i - summary pnnel to gi I their own personal opinions of vhc t they h8 ve learned having listened the 18 st two and a haE days R nd perhaps contribute to tile -ubjcct based on personal rc lections which they had before they came to the meeting I wish to give a couple of words of introduction Representative Craig Hosmer deserves a great deal of c redit for really making this symposium possibie He has during the past couple of years been in the forefront on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for questioning our position today with regard to tactical nuclear weapons He took the initiative We all owe him a great deal not only for this but for his continued contributions to our Atomic Energy program Next we have Admiral James Russell retired of whom most of you have certainly heard even if you haven't had an opportunity to meet him--a naval aviator a graduate of Cal Tech holder of a position of responsibility in the early days of the Division of Military Applications in the AEC and most recently as CINC South holder of a vital NA TO command General Betts in a way is responsible for many of the facilities we have here at Los Alamos and facilities we had many years ago He was here in the early days of the Manhattan Project and throughout his career has continued to be a solid keystone for the defense establishment in the field of research and development Bud Wheelon is somewhat of a newcomer to this particular field and we are especially happy that he could be here Before he took his present position he was Deputy Director Technical Intelligence of the CIA I would say that he is one of those who have been very effective in melding technology into the intelligence community It is a special treat to have Bill Van Cleave here with us Bill is on leave from the 'Cniversity of California working in the Office of the Secretary of Defense ISA His is a clear new voice in the councils of OSD I have great hopes for progress in our subject field with Bill Van Cleave on board The ' vay we plan to operate is that each panel member will make an i nitial st J tcment then r II give eRch a second chance Flt it and fin -llly ' ve will open up to t he audience for questions and discu lsion REPRESENTATTIv-E HOS IER F r the p·j3sible l ack of n ther opportunity I r rerncmbi r ng t d· I' 'j 'i- I J to express on lny own behal 8nd I 1111 sure r n beha 1' e'reryly cly herc adn1ira ti n 3 nei grCl titude t'l Har ld Agne' v 'or being St e 'c' tiv8 - ' viz 1rd c $ to l ut ·n cssi' ' j e this '_t t t'l pr· ve that flattL ry gets ni ' vhcre I 1m going to state h8t I ' '1cu ' In 1 C'd ' 'lI C' l '1e tartotl jilt 'ill Vudnesrby 1Ylrning nd I 11 - ' on't 112 1 8 1 i npr vemont 11 my itiirlti'll1 inc ' t 1 I1 As r r l 'lttrJr ' r·t I tlllnj th nr 'It pl flnne l cii 'us i I1s W I'e pL rh tp designed to leave us witl some v 'll1ciers and some cl'JUbt p _'rh 1ps sume rcsoluti'lns toward de tring up n sittlathm that is at best ragged W0 lwve ouncl Jut over tht' perj tJd f the three days that there really may not be much po itical credibility to the so-called tactical nuclear arsenal that we now possess In addit on to that a suspicion has been aroused that there is no clear existing military doctrine for use 'J ' the arsenal that we have When we get to those ll two points we get to the Ilchicken and egg category-the weapons first or the cinCll ncnts first and npply tlle weapons to them In 1ny case unless ye felt that a 12 to 15 year old arsenal is n· t up-to-d 1te that the ubsolesencc which has occurred dI lring the period 0 ' existence is a factor to be reckoned with I think that the situation nmy be escaping us As fnr as the military doctrine goes I think that if at four a' clock this afternoon the President were to give an order to fire nuclear ' veapCJ 1s of a tactical n 'lture in Europe there would be the wildest confusion you have ever seen There are so many questions left unanswered by the doctrine that has been described to us not only in the military sense but in the political sense as well For instance we heard one of the speakers describe the difficulties in A TO We had this business of 13 or 14 fingers on the safety catch at one time then we worked around to a few selected fingers on the trigger Right now I don't think anybody really can define just what the situation is with regard to command nd control in this area I am sorry that most of our concentration has been on NA TO because there are other parts of the world in which there could be trouble But if we seriously regarded some of the problems of our European allies over the use of nuc lear weapons on their territory I thinl our doctrines and our preparations would have gone a lot further than merely scrubbing the stockpile and r ­ furbishing it with something that probably would be more suitable Not only do we have to worry about the fallout but we have to worry about the long term aftereffects When I see nuclear warheads zooming down into a bridge abutment on a river I think not only about the explosion but about the longer life isotopes that are going to be sitting down there and the distributions thereof by water and I recall that just a few weeks ago a lot 'of fish were killed in the Rhine River and that the municipal water supply of much of Holland was involved We would have to think not only about preserving our own allies' territory for use afterwards but we should be thinking about the enemy territory Assuming we won we wouldn't want to pick up the territory in parts and pieces that would be unusable for decades ahead In addition to that we have heard about defilCiendes in target acquisition and damage assessment on these division area size fields and we have heard about vulnerability of our own forces and vulnerability of our logistics strength-th wks to Don Cotter who has carefully put these together 111d In one of my questions I asked why the Turks suddenly went negatJve on Was that something politically internal or was it something by vay of pressurf from the outside If ve got serio-us about ADM's their proper deployment nd so on what -'Julcl be the resp'Jnse of the other side Would they SCly they were lot g i ng to tuler 'tte that Qne lay down the hw then and there Furtherm re i we get '3 3trll'l pi 1E th 1 t is uSQble there is still thE questi m uf making it rccfible not 'l'oll11 the still1cipoint of its h 1r deristics but fr lm the stQndp'Jint 0 J ur intenti'll1s bei w Jw wn If the nther side is going to orry about Y Jur capabilities he hns Jt t have 111 ideQ thRt they could be used against him therwise he wr n't be dc terred If ' 'Ie are serious about a nuclear tactic ll capability particularly i 11 Europe I thin we 6hould take that long list of things that we really get upset tbaut and talk 3 bnut theIn in obvious tern1S A Dl I' s 'j' I Ve hRvcnlt br ught up the onpr iifeI' 1 Unn Trc t Y' 'i U l'L l i e 'H' n trouble recovering a 'ter the hanclcu 'fs Vcre put on us by the L l' U d r l E c T ' ' 1 bLit by spending enough money ' ' e have been able in the last l oupIe of years t get a great deal 0 in ormation 'Cnder the uclear onpr· li 'erati l1 Treaty vou 13 ' O ' two separate pr blems to worry about in c' nnecti n with tactical nuclear ' vcr' JI ns Despite all tIll P ' L Sy 3t l1lS y U Celn put int these i ' the treaty 's obst rved Y' 1 still h8 ve t keep them under yO'_lr wn cLlst 1dy and L ntruL s ' ve h lVe L' b L 1 1 t of things into these weapons that Y'JU 'iouldn't have to build in othcl' 'i 3e 'When you do tho t however you put yourself in the position of not being 1ble t l'l pond i the lonproli 'eration Treaty aHs apart It wonlt be vcry l'Jng be orL' there i 3 n new proliferee II and there yill be another one after th8t Whether the ' ' 1proliferation Treaty is going to be able to survive this recurrenc e o ' pr' i rati on is a serious matter If it doesnlt then V'ie are free to proliferate and we -tre -'re8 to decouple if you want to put it that way either in the F3 1' E Lt't in connection vith Japan or in connection with NA TO Circumstances might dictate that ve sbould decouple or the treaty might go down the drain and we would have to m ake 'Jther arrangements I don It know how quickly we could respond in the form ot' ha I' 1 0'8 re to such situations with the constraints that we have to build in to live with these things I just bring that out as a further possibility for the designers to have in mind ADMIRAL RUSSELL vVhen I joined the Commission as No 2'1 to General McCormack in the Division of Military Applications in June 1947 we were in the transiti l1 from 8 wartime endeavor under General Groves to a civilian commission vVe had two weapons They were known as the Fat 1 1an and the Little Boy We did our best at that time to visualize everything that might come in the particular form of nuelear energy and Jim McCormack Paul Price and I made a great thrust to get tactical nuclear weapons developed This was 22 years ago I come back now and find that we do have tactical nuclear weapons and there are some good ones but their design is about 15 years old I am proud of this progress but I really think it should have been greater The Atomic Energy Commission split away from the military completely which I am sure was the correct thing to do It was the will of the people and expressed in Congress but I think that the AEC Los Alamos Laboratory Livermore Laboratory Sandia and othe1 elements of the Sandia Commission mllst live as closely as p ssible to thu re tEties 0 ' military planning and trainingmilitary 'ighting i Yell pl ease fi1at i s vhy I am so pleased that Harold inv tcd me here to this c on 'erence It hr s given me 8 chanc e to see vihere 1 ve sbnd perhr lps rna e a e' ' 3 i lgges i'Jns on where ' 1 e might g fr 111 here Yesterd8 Y our gr f i host sRi a ' ' -hl I'e is the avy' The l bsencc a 'orIl1aj pr' gram n the P8rt n 1 h r1 V cn J ' hl ta -cl n 111 t' ' 'J ' vnys-one i s that they h ve 'ihnt they 1 lnt and the ltI1Cl' that l'J 1 be t w ' lo I1't rd·I ' 111 1 11 'lbnut 1 h s I h n'l l11 1cle l itt e per ' 111 1 rl se lt' 'h in this iJ'j 'c I ' 111 o rod' I tc i' the I I k b u ' mi · a'ln $ 11 - • 1 O 'C l a ' C tl Tech ru c I ind the ' Ilnir lry s the tl'llth--tht y 1' ' r l11u h intl 'l'l tc 'i ' 1 I n1' ' ery intereste b t 1 i ttlc ' ar' l ti1 d 1 'l seru set 1 nt l nL-- 'NL' q 1 - ppiie i to var O rc at e t mi 'ht l l ta en ' 'ny r l1 them I E 1 y tel th s G l ' l' 1 'I As Y' 1 1 ' 10W i hr O vy e 1rric 3' rl l 1 Or n'J ear rseno1 in t heir · i r T'l t ' Irr_l'rs but thO t 18 just thl beginnil1g 1' 1 - 'r vy i1 l S 8 very 1- riO IS pr b I 11 -r ' ol' V - 1- dnt ' 1't h -tv 2 hC1 JPpt r 1 - lid in pj '' t r l son ti - 1J 111y re · rts 1 81 -titln' In·jcL'' Ult 1 -IJr· j'2U Till' C rln ln h tv j· ne tj- _ in q 'l ' t 'Jr j·i r1r ' ll1ci tnd B 7c -5i ·t ·1 1i t 'ry • l't' 'cntl Y h lVe d JIlC this ols 0 Gny submarine warfare is I grL'at _' 111cern to the We have as you lmow what used to be called Lulu and ndW is called Little Lulu n atomic depth charge Also we have Subrock and Asrock antisubmarine ru'c ets vith a nuclear warher ci and a few others or the antisubmarine game Then in the antiaircraCt locker we have Terrier and Talos m clear warheads In o'J r attack weapons we have Valleye and Condor ivy I U11 glad to see that Walleye is getting supP'Jrt from the Air Force 'vVe got -upp Jrt while 8 go 11 the F4' s too We got support on a 'cw ·Jt11er weapon system to devf lop out here at what is now called the Naval Veapons Center C'ormerly called NOTS China Lake These are weapons with atomic tips If a ' val' starts and the other side uses tactical atomic weapons can you imagine the disadvantage to our fighting men if they don't have them to o This may be poor ogic but I feel that we must have them S' 111e I am very much concerned about the command and control I have seen this in a cEon It is a little stale now but I was honored by being Commander in Chief or the Allied Forces in Southern Europe of the NA TO Command I had three countries to defend-Italy Greece and Turkey--and three more different countries you'd never find Their people are quite different in characteristics and in religion they don't like one another But their dislike for one another is not as great as their dislike for the great Bear up to the north I don't understand what General Cowan said about the ADM being suddenly cut ofr by the Turks Having been out in that country and knowing the temperament of the Turk I cannot be'lieve it was because of any threat from Russia Remember the i Iontreux Convention for the control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles was signed in 1936 At the end of World War II the Russians said this treaty was outmoded and they were going to revise it and just take over The Turks said in effect You'll do no such thing We are going to observe the terms of that treaty and we strongly recommend to you that you do likewise 1I This is the language the Russian understands The Montreux Convention is still in effect controlling the waters of the Black Sea the Bosporus and the Sea of Marmara The Turks are among the best soldiers in the world in spite of the fact that as many 8S 50% of the draftees require instruction in reading and writing They have 24 months of active duty I observed them driving tanks 'iring 105 mm hO vitz rs and doi ng all the other things that a soldier should -iot only that but a ' l - tht r in Turkey is extremely proud when she has a son i n the armed services QJ t · n the country roa ds if a military jeep goes by the inhabitant 1sually stands at - tte -l -m ond S - ji lte He is not militD ry but he is very proud his country - iF J ' j ji ' rm d 'orc s I remember 'sh t Dr 7o' ster aai d yeC'Ler by lbout the _· crn l -itl'u1 j ' ' d- 1 el1 wns t 1- c' greater enenl ' '- j' th American 'pcop e the miJ i t lry j' l' L 1 ' Ji 'L'X H' tile R I sians H ' v P l l't ql lte -I U· ' hi l ' 1 0' 1 the c ttlenwl1i ' ' 0 1 ' I 2'0 I -I hope tnut thl' 1 1 1el tin rs i c t hi d the miJit lr y can be r t cr ' 1 1' -·j ' IC ' n· i peril ps e TCg Jj ll re j cci I hal I bcc n rer1tj'y prh'i c - ' _ '-i n thc - t t· o yU l ' tl ' be rcc 'J led u cti 't cil d Y i'· i ic On 'c I V lS callt ri l Jp l '' ' r c' v saf'ety nl aEurc alter 1 't VI c1t 'c -l 't t i1' - nd l 1st ' l J II' 111e lx · · L e ' ie r Jr i 1 DC c e l1bC t· b 11 811 Eva LlH ion Cummittee a n g with Dici- G rwin_ I ' v tr me 1do ly mpre o seci liith ' vh l1 the Amcric tn Yol th c n d I I was mighty proud of the soldiers in Vietnam I was proud too of our ir Fllrce operating in Vietnam and from the sanctuary of Thailand--God bless thc stout tllico I was proud of our pilots who were leaving the deck of the carrier and going over and taking about half of the raids which were made against the extreme north in Vietnam There is one point I'd like to bring out stemming from my experience during the Carrier Safety Committee That is when you design weapons plea e remember that there are advantages aboard ship--storage for example-but the weapons are terrifically concentrated where they are stowed In the old days ve used to park an airplane on the flight deck bring up a bomb put it on the wing Rnd then insert a booster and then a fuze Those days appear to be gone forever We now have an all-Up round that has not only the explosive the booster and the fuze within it but also a rocket motor and an igniter So it is that the Navy requirements for weapons are just a shade different from those of our brother services who have dispersion ashore and an explosion means only one airplane perhaps We had one rather bad fire after the formation of my Safety Committee It was on the flight deck of the Enterprise and was caused by a seaman backing an air-start cart with turbine exhaust to within 24 inches of a 5 inch rocket nose Witnesses saw the paint on the warhead of the rocket change color before it blew I do hope that I can convert everyone of you to the necessity for keeping forces at sea I explained to Dick Garwin last night that the system which he's advancing would never get to a theater of action unless it were in Canada or Mexico or unless we had control of the surface of the sea That is the Navy's mission and tactical weapons assist in that mission To conclude I would like to express strong support for this sort of conference GENERAL BETTS My overall impression is that I have been here before It goes all the way back to the early 1950's when as a light Colonel on the Army Staff I did some of the first back of the envelope sort of analyses to try to persuade the army that nuclear weapons had a role to play on the battlefield Hearing about the kind of employment studies that are now being made we must recognize that we have come a long way in 20 years in terms of learning more about capability limitations of these weapons Not only has the technology of the weapons advanced tremendously but we now can play these games by the hundreds on a computer m del and have a lot better feeling for what can or cannot be done There have been many optimists on the platform and I think I am going to add a note of pessimism At the conclusion of Colonel Fair's description of CDC's TA CTO study General Bur-chinal commented that he felt there wasn't a chance f getting the Europeans to· accept the possibility of fighting a limited war in which nuclear weapons are used I have bcen involved in or acqua inted with all of the studies on the use of tactical weapons that have gone on in the Depnrtm ent t f the Army and in mQny CaSl S in the othor services DELETED '- DELETED That's slightly reminiscent of some iJ the things Colonel Fair was suggesting in the TA CTO study The word we got back 'rom the Command elements of the Army Staff was that they just couldn't afford to use these weapons over there they needed to hold all they had in reserve in case the Russians started something an'd they needed them for strategic purposes It wa also very clear although I cannot document it that it was not politically acceptable So from then on the studies that were done were pointed at showing all the reasons why we couldn't find targets why we couldn't get the authority to release quickly enough after having pinned down a target and in sum why we would not be able to make effective use of these weapons I submit that this accounts for my pessimism at the moment We have created the model that describes how we will use these weapons and over many years of detailed analysis we have considerably improved that model This model is completely hypothetical until we get the political leadership to say that we will indeed use nuclear weapons _' s you are all a ware from your own familiarity with the scientific method when we have these great unknowns we create a model we plug in all the data we can find and sooner or later do some experiments to prove or disprove the model we have created I am not proposing that we go out and try to prove or disprove these models but until the situation arises when we can plug in the kind of data necessary to validate or invalidate the models we have made all we can do is go ahead as we have in the past We must do our level best to establish capabilities and limitations and show logically that tactical nuclear weapons have a very important role to play We cannot possibly face a potential enemy like the Soviet Union with their nuclear power unless we are equally well or better equipped About all I can say in summary is let's -keep driving ahead the way we are going trying to do better all the time We will never really convince ourselves that we know what we are doing until the' model is either validated or invalidated DR WHEELON I am really not a tactical nuclear buff--as a matter of fact I am not even a nuclear buff I have learned a good bit about this field from the meeting here and I'd simply like to say it has been very well done Maybe since I haven't been here before you'd be interested in my impression of what this field is all about First of all it is pretty clear to me that we ha ve an impressive technology available for creating a new and far more acceptable tactical arsenal The ingredients are really weapons the way in which their effects can be modulated or shaped the delivery means that are now becoming available the accuracy of those delivery means anci the production capability both in weapons and fissile material I don't think there is much point in belaboring that except to say it is there for the using It is also prett Y cleRr to me that policy d0cisions have ef eci ively precluded seri us nsidcr ltinn of these opti''Jns for yuite n yhile both in the initiation of we tpons IH·'lgr 1m and their delivery Rnd in the kind of th ughtful m-g ing planning r r their uti lization I h we the impression that this planning has just begun in 8 cri'ius 'IVa in the la st Y 8r 8 nd a half I think this affects the completeness of th tory th t we have to present I ' lias lnterested yesterday to hear about the pl il1ning 0 how ve might initiate a first strike using tactical nuclear weapons I rJid n'lt he2r 8 discussion of the recipr'Jcal problem 0 what happens if they strike ·ir 't n l that is a mighty important issue What happens i it begin in a ragged way That is part of the maturennalysis that it t 1kc time to t ievcl p fUlt r h' J ' that the present studies mature along those lines One of the m'J t clistrc ss 'ng things about this formal policy is that it has precluded a frank dis 'u 3s on o tbt possibilities with our XA TO allies We are unwilling to tell them 's11at might be and on the basis Of what they don't know they are quite unwilling to encourage us to proceed There is something else that hits an outsider or the irst time lcl that is the marked asymmetry reported in the Russian tactic l nuclear p sture and our own The results of our war games indicated that we needed 2 ' 1 ll re artillery shells and a lot fewer missiles and yet they have apparently JrS 1 cn artillery completely and have gone over to extensive rocket delivery mt ans I guess it is important to know what that means Does it really mean that they arc going for an offense rather than a defense Does it mean that they intend to strike first rather than respond I don't pretend to know but I submit that S'Jmeone ought to worry hard and long about this matter l Iaybe it also means that ve don't fully understand the problem Now the final impression I have is that the tactical nuclear policy is not likely to be clarified very soon and that is too bad I think the uncertainty as to how we would use our weapons in time of need is going to be an uncertainty for both US and Soviet commanders and I think it complicates their lives quite a lot We have to try to find ways to use that uncertainty to our advantage rather than our disadvantage That sounds like a contradiction so I'll come back to it and give you a for instance as to how it might be done General impressions aside I'd like to talk about ADM's because that seems like an interesting proposition I would have thought that a defensive use of ADM's in one's own land against an invading enemy would be about the most acceptable utilization of these weapons and yet I find just the reverse It seems to me that our present policy of nonimplacement just about guarantees that they will not be used in case of attack Secondly concentration of most of them in rear stockpiles really invites a preemptive attack by the long-range missiles-MRBM's IRBM's -from the Soviet Union or from satellites therefore I don't think they are going to be with us when they are needed Another issue is what about the loss if they are overrun and not used I just think that is a red herring I think the design information the Soviets would gain from capturing some mines would be very small potatoes compared to the political loss that we would suffer if v -est Germany were successfully overrun I don't think we are weighing these on the same scales It is time for me to come back to my previous assignment 'Jf trying to turn our uncertainty to an advantage and to do this 1'd like tn steal from a field tha t I think I kno v something about the strategic game that Fred Payne and T have worried on a lot This is the idea of using dummy holes to play the shell ga me with ADM's the way we have talked about playing the shell game -itl1 ICB I' having more holes and more silos than missiles To facilitate this cYsc is ion I'll put 8 cartoon on the board that dotted line up there is something that the rmy fellows call FEBA-that is supposed to be the fr'Jnt-that they are g'ling to -1ttn 'i ej'Jwnw lrcl ' Vcr The general idea is to h ve a seri es of predrilled -h - '1 s P 'l ­ ments or whEltever you put an A 0 1 in fairly uniformly distric i eci wcr ' le lr' ZI y' U wanted to defend Then you put at random honest-tn-gc t l ne3E lFlt c - r demolitirms into only a fraction of those holes and put old 'asi1i · nc i HE mint_' into the rest of them This is a ballistic match pr hlem they have to ' t n the same hole but I bet we Cfln solve that problem The rest 0 the st' 1ry r w thosc o you who 1ren't strategic boss is to know that these implacements the thini s's • tl1 i' • II j'k cirdpPccf ill till UleO l ok l'xadly lli c At' a l1l ltter ' '0 '1 tIl l'l'e' V till' rcpJ lcenwnt don't Know whethl'l' they have a real 1e 1' n _ t because 11' L 1 ' lll' ' ' ·ol'k thruugh 2 1 '1 38-thr Jl lgh wind'YN over in Cl building They IkC ' a trucK e P io a pass-through window a nd a crew 'hici1 is cleared passes through real mes or HE vers ns at random One would rotate the shells 1' 11 1 time to time r1 nd Y J have the pti n ' changing the pattern regubrly TI ere are some fairly · Y-ious advantages First 0 ' all it all ws you t e'JnCentr8 te these things long particubr routes tney 10n't have to be scattered unif rmly Second it reduces local anxiety t least it should After dl only 'Jne in ten halos oc1 ually has 8 I1licIl sr warhead nd the fnrmer mght to be worri ed only tbout n8-tentl1 0 the time 'inc maybe that could be exploited in some useful way_ It 8isa allows you to actually pull them all out in secret wiLhout the Russians really being sure they are all out and you can put them all back in without his necessarily kno'il ing it It also has 8 kind of attractive eature to me in that it precludes the Pueblo procedure kind of action against a single pre-emplaced ADM The special advantage to the American commander is that he doesn't have a discontinuity in his warfare he doesn't have both a nuclear and a nonnuclear capability If he doesn't get permission to fire the fraction F say the 10 percent of all the holes then he can still fire the other 90 percent and they are in about the right areas If he does get the go II then that other 10 percent has 3 lot more effectiveness So it isn't an either or it becomes an add-on or increment to the existing capability I had one other suggestion and that is that you could go from just plain old buried mines to pop-up mines I guess those of us in the strategic game know how to make missiles that only rise about 100 feet in the air and it might just be that if you want to have an enhanced antipersonnel radiation device as a warhead That might be a better way of doing it rather than having it go off under ground I don't pretend that this is a very military attractive scheme it simply gives you an example if you will of a way in which the uncertainty of our policy applications might be turned to advantage Certainly looking at it from the other side of that dotted line you have a severe probleul Having looked a little bit at ADM's I asked myself a second question Why do the trigger and the warhead have to be collocated II And I guess I told myself that they really don't As 8 ma ter of fact you could bring the weapon in by a number of means You could shoot it in with an artillery piece you could bring it in witb an airplane and drop it on the point you could shoot it in with a cruise missile You could do quite a fe' l things to all these presurveyed points The trick is to know when to put it in and wil 'n to have it go off There is a classical way to do this and that is people and radios There is nothing wrong' with that system The on1 trouble is that they get Tollt d up pretty fast paTticularl if you want to withhold until the first wave has gone by So the next thing I'd like to dra v is some of the work that was done on behalf of 01 it Vi etnan1 and tbat is the DC'PG progr lln-it is mown hy lots of names The b l d · idea is to have battlefield scn80rS- 1 beries of acoustic md scisrnic detectors of VE 'l'y om -tll izc vith r ldio means that could in f lct indicate the presence If a point of trLlck or irmorerl column dc 'Evl rybody knows somctliing NO wrong' 'Nil the SYSU J11 t c way it 'Aorkcd lS it bar-riel' sysl em in South Vic tnarn but I don't lhink thaI bas an ythin rt 1 0 do 'Nith I liis discussion I think that thc e baU ldidd sensors J- ave a rE al relevanc e to the problem at hand I think they can provide the when at the XYZ coordinat e for delivery and I subm it that we have some hornework to clo on this subjec 377 Iy lnst comments approach the p'Jlitical I just have to s y th lt I thinl- it is unlikely that our SlOP will be discharged in resp'Jnse to t2ctical operations _ I think that for tW 1 reaS'Jns 1 our strategic 'orce is pretty well checkmated i not dominated by the Soviets or at least very soon will be and 2 the Russians are going to be very careful not to trigger our SlOP so as to escalate it I think they will ccmtinue to conduct themscives in su ch wr y as to keep their arcU lns belo v r threshold or Clscribe them to someone else If that is reall Y true it seems to me that we are deceiving ourselves and our allies I think that · ur S C Polaris 'orce is unlikely t· affect the course of to ctical events I think it is chcckmc tecl Hrtving given that gloom y outlook I'd like to say it would be nice if we had the lR KVI IR B I force cbeeklTl lted I think that one is a flexible element in their force and it seems t J provide an effective unilateral threat to the survival f 0JA TO I thi nk it would be most encouraging i 'JATO had a counterb tlance of her own to ttat threat mc which would leave our SlOP capability free to deal with the threat to our country nainely the Soviet lCB 1 force That is not a plug for MRBM it is a plea to be honest with ourselves about the extent to which our SlOP is really prepared to be committed against two targets the sum of which is bigger than we can handle DR VAN CLEA VE I too have a certain sense of having been here before I recall oymposia fuur to five years ago on Tactical Nuclear Weaponry Virtually the same opportunities and technology were presented I do however detect one change and that seems to be a change in receptivity towards modernization of tactical nuclear posture in the l'nited States I don't really know to ·be honest whether this is because there is a new appreciation of the possibilities and opportunities coupled ith a new concern over some political and military problems which these types of forces might solve or whether it is primarily a matter of the different composition of the audience I don't know whether this was deliberate or not but I recall a series of symposia held at Sandia in 1965 that seemed to me speaking as a political scientist to have been badly overloaded with political scientists and to have been greatly dominated by a pronounced firebreak philosophy_ My remarks today are going to reflect a transition period I have been an outside student and therefore a critic of OSD policies i n nuclear weapons and now that I am a member of the OSD ISA that I have so often criticized I still have not passed the transition zone l'vly remarks theref'Jre should be taken as personal ones and not ones that reflect in any sense OSD ISA views Rnd certainl v not OSD views On the IJther hand I am not going to dilute my own views 8S a student o · the problem simply because I am now a member of OSD ISA Vhy hasn't sl rii Us consideratLm really been giv en to the Jpti _ms we have been tnlking dxmt - oclo y The prt blem is that we have had a circular type 0 ' sitl atinn c ertain pi1i1 lSllphy tee v 1 policy whi ' 'h maintained certflin types 'J t8ct ical nuclear weaptJ11S in the art- enal which pr'JClured certain collateral cia mage 'igureti '1ihich rL'inr rced tlw phil' l i'Jphy tlmt produced the p iicy that kept the wl ap'Jl1s in etc etc ' 111e' hore in there the circle simply has to he br· kel1 H tnere i t be any chance e f imprnvement in the tactical nuclear orce situatiun T·' e nIYlrate just a ittle in my ' Wl1 view analyses orten served mainly tr rati nali e the existing onclusi -ms The policy then ll'd tf a deliberate reten1 ion ' ' 'Jid weo p'Jns and in essr nce 'roze 1850's technolt gy in the labor8tory-high yield r battlefield 'Jmbat purp' lEeS vl ry dirty 'J-C1'Y ind c riminate vl ry infl xiblc ot re dly wh 1t one COlJld 81 '1 tn dicn l nU 1eClr ' 'leap'lI1 but rrtthcr l ni lclear WC '1 p' 11 clt si gnnted r r J Ai ' APt iPQ 8EOR 1AD t lct ' Jl use 11 ' tllesU l ' J 's ' WC· lp' l1S' Si lllply bec tuse the il'eiJre d philucophers w 1l1t 'd Lilem There was str lt1g belier' that clny type nuclear bang WGS Zlbout the same lS i1ny other type an to quote Gilpatrick 1I0 nce you start using 1ny dnd 'J ' 1ue ear bang I jlist d n't know how you can build any limit into it • Tl- us one didn't ' -ant to see a nuclear ' veapon usable and this was rationalized by claiming that after all this is the best deterrent and the deterrence is the name of the gGme But is this really the ' vay to provide tlle deterrent ' Is it the way to meet some of the military and political pJ'ob1ems thot we are encountering with dismally increasing l'apiciity' In my view it isn't the way vIy own feeling was vely 'A't'll expressed by Dr Hudson on this this morning in the statement tbat a useful force at least I'll say below the strategic general thermonuclear warfare level is the best deterrent e 'h ent beyond that I think i e worked hard to reinforce the incredibility by continually emphasizing non-use -1S Bernard Brodey once said if we are not going to use them the least we can do is shut up about them rather than continually advertise them The theater nuclear force posture certainly didn't deter or help deter anything in Vietnam In Europe yes we h8 re had deterrents but I rather doubt it was because of the obsolescent tactical nuclear weapons of the firebreak philosophy forced upon us but because of our numerical superiority in both tactical nuclear forces and strateO'ic offensive forces Now the question is how good a deterrent will this tac nuc ' posture provide if we no longer have parity and perhaps are inferior in tactical and strategic weapons It might cause a checkmate only Even with parity based on assured destruction which boils down to mutual vulnerability how credible really is our current tactical nuclear force and QUI' current deteTrent The weapons then resulted in these calculations of intolerable or at least unacceptable I think one ought to distinguish between the two a little more carefUlly than one tends to collateral dam age as we kept telling the Europeans This reinforced the incredibility and the difficulty of use of any of these weapons which in turn led to problems of policy and strategy Views in this area public and otherwise respond to the information given and to the weapons given I don't agree that the problem of European views about tactical nuclear warfare is an unsurmountable thing-European views have largely been a mirror image of our own Moreover tbe throes of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group seem to me a reflection of concern over deterrents Further I think views change with perception of requirements and of alternatives available Views aren't static in this sense It's a trite thing to say but I think the world is changing in relevant ways that have a bearing upon ou r tactical nuclear policy I have heard here statemel1ts about tactical nuclear requirement s and about necessary tTlOdernization of the stockpile I think General BurchinaJ 's statem ent was eloquent General Cowan and Dr Shreffler pointed out new vic' v3 of requirements of new flexible low yield discriminate and as some people claim nuclear 'v'j japon s I think the problem is one of getting both the civilian and military persOYll1cl in DOD to be imaginative and progressive enough to tackle these p oblem s I am not sugg'e8ting that this is easy and I am not even suggesting there is necessarily 8ny solution vIy limitc·d experience tells me that it is g'oing to be -ery difficult I think one of tbe problems if one of gettirig a really thoroug'h objective up-f o-daV rcvi w of tactical nuclear opportunities and requirements l l1d I person lny 11 '1 ' ' 111 ul1c t y cclin''' I heil 1 l1e DP VI and the NSf VI processes aren't oing to provide it I 1 iH ·L'folT ' vE lc' omc any su gcstions from the audience of I ' vill sa y tliat I believe the climate 1188 changed not -only in tbe I think no' v is the time to discuss the subject again to be heard lJf'c au e ol l er' I ise th rc could well be another Ion dry spell what might provide it - v-orIel but in OSD and and to -et moving You mi tht be surprised at the way yOll J' l'c comm ndl'c l'eqllil'l'mlmts al'l J'l'Cl'ivec1 in UK' lWW o n al 1 ' 1 1 in onl' pelr I think I c m promi 'v a new tprroach and n n clpt·ivit -- I 1'1i' I I l - puint cut tho t U years age two elltt bors in quite wdll·CCE iVl ti Ll 1UJ- S 'I' I lc·d htl there is no' tin inh 'cnt in the vide l'elnge of nuclear 'ieapons that t' ndE'l's th_' 1 _ incornpatible witl linlited war or tactical combat operations They sug eeted that the adaptation of these weapons to limited yo r and to credible flexible 'lli1 'tal' ' operatione was tb most crucial task facing policy planners One C2cn ma ke be sam c'tatuncnt 'n 1969 Thosl' autl or8 are now on the 'SC staff kt l S l ope U i s reflects a chan l' in receptivity to thdr ideas I'd like to go back to what Representative Hosmer said about OtiY ' bc ' what you might call rules of engagement or rules of the roac I thin tne 3 Y· i' 1 s have such rules I think we understand them 'They have made it very de r th2 t if any aircraft for example trespasses over any of their airspace they shoot ii down Such incidents have not escalated into an 8 11-out nuclear WRr I ha -e - 11e feeling that even if they were required to use the nuclear warhead 'or this 1t WOUld not have escalated into an all-out nudear war What they are essentially doing ii applying whatever force is necessary to implement · -hatever conditions they have imposed on anybody I think that tactical weapons could indeed be employed this way with the vastly superior delivery systems which are becoming available using very low yields and limiting the use of these particular weapons wit 1 regard to geography and political and military objectives In the past we have enJoyed 8 great superiority certainly in strategic forces tactical forces and technology I think Vietnam has made it clear that just a little technology goes a long way but I thinl we will no longer be able to refrain from using all of our technology If our political leaders want certain objectives to be pursued ir a certain ' 'ay it behooves them to be fully a ware of the tec hnologies which our Armed F rces are going to have to employ I don't think they should essentially tell the military establishment what they want done and how they want it done the time has come for them to state what political objectives are desired and then let the military say whether or not they can do it under given conditions Then if it turns out that the objective can only be attained by using certain types of technology the political leaders must decide whether they want to continue the attempt Passing on to vhat Dr Wheelon was talking about ' n _ D vI's there is ne point that 1 think he didn't mention As you are aW8re ' vith our allies in NA TO systt ms such as Honest John Pershing the 8-inch howitzer and tactical bombs on aircraft C8n be delivered and utilized by JUr allies They tben1 seh-es eRn deliver these once the President of the United Stah s has 3uthorized them to elo SI However i n ti e case of ADM's we have a unique situation only the LS can emplace and detonate them I would submii that i n the case o this oar·tic1 llar 'Ne2 pl n the in ividua 'Nh pres 0s the button f h t d be c n8ti·ji1 81 0 ' the r 'j _ ntry where the det· i1o tlon ta ' C's pi8 e I thinl th CS l·' ul cl be in rei 'il'ry lX1 d p· sit i ll1 even 3 ter a mi lit ry succe s i ' 'He c'luld be blamed 'll' sp'lil illg the bnds • 'spc In cQll ng lti 'r prnbJ cm - 1 s ' l J 'eti ily Hepresentativc ITn '1l 1' I W l 1 ·1 I -e lr l' t ' i thli ill tho di' 'l i t- i n f tj e s ll'vi -nbilit ' '0'11' t t c J air r'Jrce 111 · me l-im Jl d '1 1 · ie ·8nd tht - STOL or'lgr iGi m'Jrc' 'ii gi r _ - y 1 thini f Jr the air nen '1l r'f ' U1e '-Y b rine - 1c1 ir F' T O the V STOL _ ' 1-' the 5 uti»n ' r ppropri 'tte ll_ rvi' al ·'orc I 2m l app'y t '- tilCI t 11 lS 3 ter 3 lqn ' b l1 tie the Ir r n Jj 'Ic 3 pr' r rn t J L rt i 1 h n n l_ grl 'olp ·ll 1 l tl • llECAITiilfF • Harrier V STOL aircraft to see just what advantages will accrue tel them frtJlll this type f -'pc ra tit 1 REPRESE L fIVE HOSl IER Vell I ha ve been in disagreement with General Betts' pessimism a b ut a p'JsslbEity u ' r furbishjong the stockpile and in Rgreement with Bill Van Clenve's optimism etbout it We have heard about the nuclear Walleye and the nuclear Cf ndor nnd I think Carl Walske may have some other interesting items for us one 0 ' th0se day ic are iipparently starting to refurbish the tacticaJ nuclear stockpile biJt the question Ls with what and how fast We find we need st mething to improve target acquisition and accuracy Then we need tactical nuclear weapons which will carry out certain specialized activities without the collateral effects that spread across the continent vVe want cleanliness we want earth penetration and we want reduc ed or enhanced radiation and in some cases-not mentioned so far -we would like enhanced thermal In other areas you'd like enhanced blasts because the enemy might be roving around in a forest and you'd like to confront them ' 'lith nothing but big sticks to try to crawl throu'gh Then in other areas you might like a tremendous light release blind the opposing forces for awhile assuming that you get good enough control of your own troops first There are any number of specialized features that you might work on I think in any case you have to hold the collateral effects down and that means holding the yield clown I just don't like to think in terms of using tactical weapons of more than 50 kilotons except under certain circumstances That gets us down now to an rea of e1iscreteness into an arsenal of weapons that you have some particular uses for and you can start to develop doctrine for use You can anticipate the areas in which you might be using weapons and start to acquire data on the geology the soil composition etc Although I agree with Harold Agnew's theory that you have to have the host's as well as the guest's finger on the trigger perhaps you can't do this with very limited effect weapons Yesterday I asked a leading question of Major Murtland more or less to build up to this what would he like to have that he hadn't heard talked about lately And he described something that we hadn't discarded the Davy Crockett 'Nhen you get down to those ranges I don't Suppose that you would take this host trigger philosophy as seriously as you would f r Some other type that might do more damage ° A DMIRA L RCSSELL I w· uld like to supplement something I said on the design of a nuclear weapon - I hope you u'nderstand that vhen we use nuclear weapons in the fie Lei they have to be re ' nabl'y simple In Korea a national emergency was dec1nrecl and those in Sen-ice stayed on until the end of the war But in Vietnam we are 'ig'hting a ' vnr i nr h T p acetime concUtions and if you trnin Cor example In ordnnncc man in the a' y r e c ompleies his enlistment say in ft ur ye trs and hel gnilCo You Lrnin nn tlwr m ' 11 ThL i s q1lite t urclen So I think we hould reCt' c nize Llil nd th li ' OUClp m t mpJ yt_'d b y- militnr'y pC t plc should be atl simple ns pus ible I'd like it gt do jJj hi2toryo DELETED @ flEI- _ ' EaPt ' lAB a Polaris submarine deployed in the Mediterrf-tncan was llffered a a sub titute t 2ca S f0r the Jupiter missiles -' 1 DEl ETED OD b' La I wish I could share the enthusiasm for V STOL I wish the Marines well and I hope it works Perhaps we have now come to packaging the amount of power it takes to get off the ground vertically but I don't know GENERAL BETTS To paraphrase a remark-my pessimism was greatly exaggerated I fully share Congressman Hosmer's belief that the atmosphere has changed that indeed we can refurbish the tactical nuclear stockpile That was confirmed by the remark that we are to have approved or have had approved Phase III for a couple of nuclear projectiles The point of my pessimism was that I don't see the likelihood of our being able to change the political leadership attitudes toward whether or not there is a clearly definable difference between using a low yield tactical nuclear weapon and using a large yield strategic weapon This in spite of study after study clearly demonstrating that there are definable differences and one can indeed build weapons with reasonable accuracy very low yield or suppressed radiation for the appropriate application Nevertheless I go back again to the one time when I thought we had a clear and defendable application in the Korean war but the political hurdle getting somebody to face up to that first nuclear weapon was absolutely insurmountable Perhaps it is best illustrated by a story told by Mr Flood in the hearings of the House Appropriation Committee telling about a couple of his colleagues discussing the vote on the ballistic missile defense One had voted for it even though he had been rumored to be against it So his colleague asked him Did you finally see the light He replied 11 'No I finally felt the heat I am afraid that is the practical fact of the matter with respect to the question of tactical nuclear weapons Yet I would not change what we are doing I still believe that to have the right force properly structured with modern weapons with the evident intent to use them amounts to a great deterrent force and we should do our best to maximize that capability DR WHEELON I have nothing to add except to agree with your addendum to my AD 'I remarks I think our A DM policy is just upside down Just a couple 0 remarks I agree with General Betts on the problem changing the political cader's view on the firebreak and I grce ti- nt ther· s a distinction between using very discriminate low yield nuclear Vieap'Jns and · ther nuclear' weapons I don't want to minimize that difficulty at all I 3 i _ think that there is nO reason t l refuse to· modernize the stockpile • • want to address just one thing that disturbed me It was the statement that it doesn't make much sense for us to have low yield clean discriminate weapons when the Soviet Cnion doesn't have them because the destruction will be the same when we get int6 this type of tactical nuclear trade-off This smacks to me 0 the argument that symmetry equals stability equals advantage for both sides I think it neglects badly l A TO's political advantage in having usable weaponswhich seems to be translatable into a better deterrent a more credible one because one can and therefore probably will use the weapons more effectively I think it n lso neglects possible military advantages that these might give even in a confrontation or conflict in Europe That depends upon your own scenario and I am not going to get into an argument on that You build your own scenarios from your own assumptions I don't think that ·one can simply assume that a certain scenario will be obtained I think that there are great differences between these and the postulated Soviet types of tactical nuclear weapons This might in itself work strongly to our advantage because it might mean that the clear decision to escalate this qualitatively different type of nuclear exchange is left up to the Soviet Union and it is not always advantageous to have this type of initiative To make that clear you might turn it around and ask what we would do if in a military conflict with the Soviet Union we were offered that choice because the Soviet Union had presented us with a very effective and discriminate clean counterforce tactical nuclear strike and we had nothing but 30 to 50 kiloton dirty weapons It would be a very difficult decision to make Furthermore I am not sure what the Soviet Union is or is not developing in this area and I don't think anybody else is either I don't think we have any persuasive evidence that the Soviet Union isn't interested in this family of weapons Lastly I think the symmetry equals stability argument ignores the case in which the opponent is not the Soviet Union I think we are hung up a bit on the model of the tactical nuclear war taking place in Central Europe with the Soviet Union as the opponent I think we have 'overemphasized almost to the point of preoccupation the tactical nuclear roles in Europe rather than elsewhere in the world perhaps this reflects some feeling of fair play that one ought not to use these things against someone who is inferior I find that very curious Audience Questions and Discussion GARWIN IBM It seems to me that modernizing the stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons is not a great emotional or financial problem If we spend money on that it is just money we won't be spending on something else and we will have a better more responsive better controlled stockpile However it won't help the situation in Europe very much Our bases there are extremely vulnerable so that we could be put out of operation very quickly as an effective force before using our weapons re would have to have a different basing structure the Air Force requires dispersion of som kind or at least the possibility of dispersion I certainly agree w·ith Harold Agnew that for the nuclear delivery role the V STOL aircraft as the Germans see it also is the answer On the other hand if one delivers a weapon once in this sernistrategic manner one might also ask whether their missile is not more appropriate and here too I can't get very excited about the possibility or dangers of the midrange ballistic missile force I think that it would help NA TO to grow up if they had a force like that of their own which threatened at least the Western Soviet Union and would make a deterrent very much more credible than the one which we claim to supply for the Western Europeans 8i8 AfiToRW- l'eI like tL tnke issue with General Beth a bit-'-I ileiieve General I th lim m lde the CRse t lr nuclear weapons and that the plllitic d k ldersl ip i s cl - t in lrrears for not recognizing this But I think that whnt we heard · n the p s sib e application of tacticRl nuclear weapons in the 1972-1978 period doesnl make that case at all except by assumption and repetition I think it is ridiculous t J J S 3Ul '1e that the Soviet forces vhen they meet the first nuclear veapons are going t fl l back in dis8 rr ty and think for one to three days What is going to happen is th - t the will have a plan even if they don't plan to use nuc1enr weapons at th b inn ng' Tt1t ­ will h lve plan A and plan B--plan A in C3se they don't meet nuclear we pt1ns 1 1 plan B in case they do One last point-I personally don't see Hny undl sirabJ i features in the use of one or more strategic missiles from the LJnited Stntes to deliver a nuclear weapon for tactical purposes I think that if we can ha ve an expl'ditionary force of strategic missiles of this type it is more accepts blE to our potenti31 enemies and allies and spectators than if we deploy these things widely all over the world I wonder whether we are not deceiving ourselves in expecting that the Soviet Union would not use remote delivered nuclear weapons of this type by long range rockets to accomplish limited goals t h lve ROWNTREE NWC China Lake This is mostly for Dr Van Cleave I'd like to express my appreciation to you and Mr Hosmer for noting what I believe to be the overemphasis on the European situation in this meeting But I'd also like to point out that some of the problems we have been discussing aren't restricted to the nuclear weapons community They are equally relevant to the conventional weapons community in that our primary problem is to so structure and arm our military forces that we can apply them in conflict situations to bring a solution acceptable to us vhich the opponent will abide by too We weren't very successful in doing this in Korea and we haven't been very successful in Vietnam We were fairly successful in the Cuban situation and you can find other examples I think we need to get some better understanding of how we can use military forces either conventional or nuclear to achieve the ends of the political decision-maker If we once have that information then I would suggest that we in both the conventional and nuclear weapons community can with our military colleagues set out to produce the military forces that we need VA CLEAVE If that is directed to me I can only agree but I have no solutions for it I have never been a fan of the graduated deterrents or the condign response type of strategy and I think the first order of business is to try and work out something that combines conventional and tactical nuclear weapons i n a useful md effective military'force because I don't believe that we are really going to see the end of the commitment of American military forces even to Southe2st Asia much less to Northern sia GIRARD RAe Some people here have indicated 0 gener21 gTeemt2nt t 1 - t iil Europe 3t least it would be a gre8t icIeR to attempt to get some up0ri'lrit i n fle other nuclear c apClbi litics lncl give the NATO Allies some crcdib'Ll j - 'llr n e 'dl S ll1lC l11otivati ll Llr h lping thernsclves Tlwt's fine On the ntlll r h '·nd t 'J HIl in ns I1nve le itimc te i ntl ·rest in the EUrOpe 111 l t sti' ' ' Thi lJt - ' ' d ''' 11 t the qlj stion 0 111 ' '1 the Russian is going to renct t - m ls i 'c i'l' 'l'f in t 1' tilt ' nucie r cop - oility J1 rh 'J s making use of the terr 't ry of ' 'l' -t G r - n 'i ' ' nr rl ln I'll only ay th8 t in addition to havin g u en errll JegitilY otc i Jtere t i l F r r r the Hussion have 2 Un iq1' C bOI i '1 Of ilistrJric tl experi0nce in this e lh ry that ' ' oj' ' J • I 'l' ' • ' ll' 1 m v J1 1Lol1 l xb' 1 1l'l jumpy ab ut -ouch n dc ' 1I 'pm '1It Perbaps tl c ' ' 'itwn is1 to deploy en lhl ' Ibnks On tl other band thE ' situa icn of tl l' SCVGl1t 1' 1Y in t cc ntcr l ' 'ion c ' e8 at least a sig'nific nt slice of dcploym ent in tl mEl' an ttrCtctivL- pl m I ender if 80 'ne of the p nelist ' ' ant tc respond to t at HOS I E R Tl cre is one point on ' Iihich I tliink YOLI have to disc 3 'l'ee ' itJ Dr be-clon 'hen rc aic1 liThE ' R'lfO'si2 ns don't ' 'cmt to tri 0 g'l i' thing's up no r I asked j' '1I GOclt to' 1orrovv I Tl ey a ' very pragmatic about the CurrLnt situ tion-thc n' l' in trOll ll' 1 1' 'er Gn tbe l'Clst and l'iwy want to kecp things quid on tl c European idc 11 e 3 they b lve to dra' v son divisions over to the eastern 2idc SO IV have rm j de t period in which We can 1'10' '1 this stuff in because they can't do too mt ch jbO 'lt it ior do I think that Ci en 'kitbout th t irritant 1l1 tl eiI' other border would they be inclined to go into a preemption iust because ve built up these forces That is my vie'v I do want to emphasize the idea that so long as their trouble with the Chin se lasts we have this period during which' we will have a g'reat freedom of action VAN CLBA VE I agree with that statement I disagree with the proposition that we ought not to improve our tactical nuclear posture in Europe because the Soviet Cnion might somehow respond in a manner to offset that I think this exaggerates the de 'ree to which the Soviet Union reacts to specific things we do They have a host of other factors that influence their policy I think it also exaggerates somewhat the technical and econom ic constraints on the Soviet Union Indeed what we have here is a strin6' of arguments against modernizing our tactical nuclear posture in Europe because tbe Soviet Gnion will respond somehow to offset it We ought not to employ an AB I because the Soviet Union will react somehow to offset it We ought not to make improvements in strategic offensive forces because the Soviet Union will somehow 1'e2ct to offset it I think that is nonsense I think we worry so much about the Soviet 'Union's response to our actions that we have perhaps forgotten that we ought to ' 'iorr about our response to the Soviet Union's actions OS'VIER If you want to have another sCE'nario to keep you awake at night just think of the situation in the 'vliddle East when the Israelis finally screw together tl e r bomb and b unch it Over on Cail'o and then the E yptions come back with one that tl e Chinr sE had given to them NOAr what is evecyboc y 'oing to do FOSTER SRI I'd like to address a question to Mr Hosl11 eI' Yesterday I 'Has cornmenting on the p'Js iibility of thinkin thI't u 'l tlle problem well enoug'h so t J t f 'President would h v some options of prl dele ' 'ating so tl at the reque'st ' oould not omc 'lP fTom l' i bottom You commented that WI could give him a list of prob1' n s 321ri _ I' 1 it n s 10 12 2S yc r 11'111 tha t 'liOiild '2 e1 IS quite excited erl' ' 011 ' ' 1' 1 e ' th po -3sibHit of nwrrying thcEC two conclo'pts I thinj e o ld in ' 'I_'r 'U' ' J'dl' 'bilj 1 y I f tl c cur ' mt dctcrl'f nt 1'01'0 ' posl Ul'l h v Pj't cL ' ' i i 11 1f II lS ' E I F TF EL it LC' i I 1 tl at you comml ntC'cJ that if th Pr jdc'nt V 'lhllcl cd VI ' h tot d c' nfusion I said if 'Nr thon ht the problem tl j'OLI ' C'J i p J ni ' 'IL ' ti C ' il I ti 'n NET ' sp£ 'Jlc rj out tl c PrE 'siclent co d d n ake a selc- ctiv '1 1 -1 - ' CLass f ' ' ' pUI'lS in 1 10 fac ' Of l cu t lin i tu ltion I -' 1 d vJ t '0 1 WC'I'r 'I l' 'l jn' ' to t1ic ' i'r n ' ' it o ' ' hild HOS IER les I think Bill Van Cleavc cssentially 0 n Vl'l'l'd this l l'n 1 ' s0icl 1 tr at at the present tinle d do have an incredible stockpile and dc ibel' te y so because of the desire to make tl e use of thcse weapons incredible II ve gct c c 'cdiblc stockpile one allowing OU1' President to make a l'aUonal decisien to U 3C it in a lirnitt d wa ' vet in a way that would prove effective in the overall effort then it is '7oine to be casie'r fOl' him to make suc a cl -cision bL'cause it is no lon zcr an incrf'd bll let Also wh 'n yo' have to an cxtent publicized in advance that if cei'tclin thngs 1 J ppC'r you are going to respond in cL'rlain disc ccte nuclcar ways tl en the' ' is no quc stion tllat he 'Nill n1 ake the decision be has practically done so in aclvanc ' Tds resernb l' ' the way the Soviets and the Comm unists wodz according to doctrines It sirnplifies the situation to a great extent and it does not lcave Clreas of doubt ' 'h 'n the oU er side is tempted to make a probe that might get out of hand SQUIRE LRL I'd like to address a comment to Gen Betts which rests on the idea that the concept of stockpile and modernizing the stockpile-wbich has been one of the chief concerns of this afternoon's session if not of tbe '0 -hole meetini -might not be all-inclusive It is conceptually possible that we might get into a war with China and need a number of weapons far beyond anything that we can politically stockpile in peacetime ·some perl aps of a type suitable for large scale production And we might not be able to withdraw any from Europe BETTS I couldn't quarrel with that thesis although there are designs available rloWthat one could produce in large numbers and low yields Again it is a matter of adjusting our priorities I don't quarrel with the thesis that it is very helpful to have 'designs of weapons available that you don't necessarily go ahead and produce The same thing is true about weapon systems v'ie don't seem to get much support for that thesis AGNEW I think it is extremely important that the people in the Army CDC Naval Operations and Air Staff not be inhibited in their planning of doctrine by existing Phase Ill's If they can conceive of certain doctrines that they would like to implement but need certain hardware they should be encouraged to formulate plans and turn to the laboratories for prototype development If it eventually turns out to be something extremely worthwhile they should go into production on it I believe this sort of thinking has reCllly been stifled during the last six or eight years There were times when people from the laboratories made trips to the fields saw what was going on encouraged the people there to think of ne' ' types of 'NC'apons and ne ' typE'c of employrnent but that sort of thing got turned of I think this business ll having to go by the existing laundry list is a very bad way to operate BETTS I'd like to add one though to thClt There is n l ong ho I'd p th ithin tl l rn0ital -rl'om I e 8v lihbilil 0 ' a capilbility just proved in R - D to it actual cl' 1 b tl ' 1 -' 1 cli T in f 11l' fidd' it i - ln k up 1' ell1 thr businc f tI'Ctinirq inrioc l'in lti 11 - 'Ippl' - pad in tl c sysf 'Ill lncl I lain unallCf' cap lbiliL ' in I ' s ' stem In 1 hl ' ' • ' IT ' ti ln ' ad b tCI' be 'vaii d j il' nl ll lhc'l' ' llc1 di tl'ibuf r l't be 'inn l1' If 0' 1 i'ave tli ' time '- l l l ui in 3' ltl 1I -'1 'i l you can ilV ' l 'rl · i l- rl c · l l'in' intI tl- e c Stf' l - • etIlE§§lI i HCSSELL 1 wonder hOIN many of you have the same thoug'ht that I hav -that ' ' live inaD pen society and ' 'C' are in competition with a closed society The 'Nay to stay ahead is to exercise the power of thought that we have over here thanks to o r freedom ' vhich Las put a man on the moon which has brought out and used the atomic veapon and made many other advances I just 'offer the thought that the way to sta v atead is to keep going --' G2'JE Y General B -tts perhrtps a8 a comment on your vvorry and certainly bringing us face to face with reality I would like to point out that the few times-that nuclear wpapons have heen used they were used by a sort of special group that went 2nd did the job It is not inconceivable to me that rather than using the present technique of all soldiers knowing how to clean a gun and all essentially knowing how to fire an atomic weapon perhap$ for new systems and nev concepts we should do what Harr y Kinard did and train a small outfit-call it a special strike command or special airborne outfit special company brigade diviSion or whatever is required If you consider a limited concept like this perhaps some of the technology which may become available can be put in the field a lot quicker than if you go through the normal 20 year army cycle BETTS I think that is exactly right and that is what the DCPG did with the sensor picture-they structured a special force As that same collection of sensors is now made available in larger numbers we find a real di fference in how they are used among the many divisions in Vietnam because they have had no chance to beCome indocfrinated become trained in all of the maintenance aspects put supplies in the channel learn the concept of operations and everything that goes with it I fUlly agree that it is possible to do these things on a specialized basis I was stating the fact that you have to have some things in being if it is going to be a short war You can't count on suddenly producing them and haVing the capability just because they come out at the end of a production line WHEELON Some of us would say that is what is wrong with DCPG-no adequate training or provisions for the operation The other thing is I am not sure it is a bad thing to have DCPG sensors in the hands of untrained or at least unindoctrinated divisions because I think by their experimentation they will find better ways to use them than we physicists' could imagine when we were doing the technology part COTTER SLA I would like to comment on the modernization of the stockpile in terms of improving it qualitatively rather than quantitatively Certainly there may be a need for more of a certain kind of weapon And I am sure the JCS figures which don't agree with some of the OSD figures on what is needed in the way of nuclear vcapons reflect the concern for attrition of some of these weapons during either 8 conventional engagement in Europe or in a tactical nuclear engagement However I think maybe the most important thing we could do right off is to make at least two qualitative improvements One is in the mObility of the weapons-and people can talk about cither long or short range mobile missiles or certainly about the 1ircraft putting them into a ViSTOL mode and alb wing the possibility of dispersing fc' vcr aircraft but still having greater survivability of a significant forCE The other is a question of immediately trying to seize upon the opportunities in accurate low yield weapons and here I think the name of the game is trying to measure 'BEOREr tCl8' 387 t lr l'1 s rie i l'oyl'c1 ' it minimUlll colbtC'l'al bma l V1T -'U - t'iC I' ' Kil ' d i ·Ll hayc that arc inaccur 1tc and have lligll cL'1 ht 'l'al bl'la e lnL' c lllld ' -'u i lj l J' l' qualit3tiyC'ly pel'haps by c d -lCinp thL nUl lllC C of ' ' ' 1pons thDt 'Sl b 'tv ' in E ll' p ' to S8YC money Tl e cost of the ' ' capons I think I n inol' Lln cCinp u' i ' ' it- ' th' cost of cl DloY - 1- 11J nd ttl' pecialized people he arc 'lssocicl 'cd w tL mh 'lj' ' '1' I11S 1_ I'd lik 1 0 COUll' bo ck to the' q1 lc o tion of LlCCl l'atc o'v yicl d ' c ' pon - T -e ' we rl' prOi Osals for weapons tbal could givr ' '-Ou a 0 fcot CEP '1' tit tin aC' l' IC but tl- cy require 1l1 ircraft for exarnplc' to n over the t H' 'ct or in vcr ' c c c ' prc xinlity to it EYE'n the vValleYE stand ff r ngl- is only guing to be oi l 1 J noo feet or even les s itll Bayonet and Bec kct 'if ' I pons wh rc you f1y 0' 1' th teLl' cl c1estroyr c1 311cl I Ll ink 01 1 d l littlc' d fJ'u' 'nt y u me - sure in terms of targets fi0Y VH ' b DELETED In cithcrcase no l1lcl tteJ' lww you ernploy these ' capons it l'equh-es thE' 11rplanc to fly OVCt' tile t lt' ' d In urne casea this will be higher than 300 feet Even in the so-caned lAD pOp-l lp naneu' cr the man goes oyer the target at auout 2300 feet So we e s nth H y haye no C lp bility in 8i r delivered ordnance at the t11 omcnt because of the fact th3i you do have to fly over the target That is very serion and if indeed the AG 'IX3 mi iJi iE 3uch 8 good thing I think it is tragic that it h8 s been postponed for a y al' 01' two bec3lU C of some cut in the Defense Department budget Perh lE the LlOC tiOll of lU D m ne T or development money has to be looked at again to get us out of this situ -ltion AGNE I am g1ad i lr Cotter brought up collat ral damage because when you realize that v e have used over t'vo willion tom of convpntionDl ordnDncc delivered by air and over five million tons of conventional ordnance deliv rccl by ground forces in South Vietnam I find it a little hard to sympathize with the obsession with collateral damage It seems to be aU right to have collateral dan1 age with conventional wf- apons bu it is a no-no for nuclear weapons IK J My group looks at the f8asibility of eloine lluclcClr b 'sts as part of the readiness program-operational system tests and troop tests Ve continue to b - 1pp ill d at how difficult it is to c10 this kind of thing under peacetime safety rules Some of theE e problems should be bced by an operational system as it is being dev'eloped lost of our problemI ' have to do with things like -fanout retinal burn sy'stem ma1functioll l l1d- l he thing ' vhic'h Gen - 1'al Betts brought uppolitical problems and public acceptance Some f tbcse will go 3 'iay in timl of war presmnabl but one worries about hO I the public particularly i he Gc-cm Lns ' viH react to a nuclenr ' ' a1' Y81'S' lS a c lnvcntio118l 'N8l' givet1 1 chance ti1Dt the ' mi ht possibl v win conventional 'liar In i'ievach j e can onl ' fil'e 2 kt presu nably unc cl' l'ulcs- t baL is 'i -it' - nn lfct y factors It to 1 - e that there QLli t to be' n evaluation of the O' l'a11 _ t l 1 in onlf ' · -b lt grC ltcl' deptl- ti1an i bcin clone -It Lhc present inn I have h Ll'cl 110 mention at lU of t w I'dina but'll probl l'i11 - uch thin as 10n ' term t'a1 oIJl l 1'i bll'l -'f jl diap' -b ' llcl be addressed b d ' c 1ojl rs L xi8ting of the s vstein secm • DOc-GHEFCry LASL I h8VL' it cOllj lc of ol scrvation8 on the subject of n' cJ cur 1rtillL'r If I rCC1c nbcr correctly Dr Ord stated that tbTe is no doubt tbat i he Russi illS rv crqable of building nuclear artillery but there is no evidence r tut tl- e - i- ave clone- it I don't kno' v ' yhat tl e ch lnces are of their doing som etbing t t vp don't l- o ve any evidence of but I 'l ould hate to jump to the conclusion ttat th '- don't in fact l- ave nuclear artillery On the other hand we vorry 'hcn ' -e are l'--f n IT c1 lr S lpcriority in certain 2lrcdS and et if they don't naH' nuclear 'ar -iller he r'L' is one place that we bave nuclear superiority and ' 'ie are worrying abo theet too • This Page Intentionally Left Blank • DY IS Richard E GencrcLl D vnamics Ft Worth P O Box 748 Mail Zone 2640 0 401A Forth vorth Tex 76101 -1GNE V Dr Harold M 'Cniversity of California Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory P O Box 1663 Los Alamos N VI 87544 2 401A - KERS Captain Frank H Jr _-1ide- de-Camp to DCG USA Combat Developments Command Ft Belvoir Va 22060 3 401A A IES John R Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 Albuquerque N M 87115 4 401A ANDERSON Colonel Clarence E Deputy Director for General Purpose Forces '1 FRDQ HQ USAF The Pentagon Room 5D-462 Washington D C 20301 5 401A A DERSON LTC Robert S Air Force Weapons Laboratory Kirtland A FE N vI 87117 6 401A RB CTHXOT G L 1 S A rmy Eng'ineer A · tC l 'ii 'YS Experiment Station P O Box 63J Vick burg iVIiss 391 30 7 401A f IBRnn'ER F'I' mC'is E Ill til u f E' Q tkcr Hid 'e Itoacl Crob m-on-T-bdson Y 10520 8 401A Tl 1 1 3 0 n RONSO J C J lJ S Naval Ordnance Laboratory Code 240 White Oak Silver Spring vId 20910 9 40 1A ARTHUR Bryan E Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 Albuquerque N vI 87115 l0 401A AULL LTC Luther B Nuclear Programs Office ODDR E Room 3E1071 The Pentagon Washington ·D C 20301 1l 401A BAIRD Major Richard J Directorate of Doctrine HQ USA Combat Developments Command Ft Belvoir Va 22060 12 40 lA BAKLINI Edward SWTVA Air Force Special Weapons Center Kirtland AFE N M 87117 13 401A BARHAM James F Jr Sandia Laboratories P O Box 969 Livermore Calif 94550 14 401A BA RRY iVIajor - rthur HQ CSCON ARC DCSOPS- T G- TS - Ft Monro Va 23351 15 -101A B USER Captain Edward J Executive Director Joint COlUm ittee on Atomic Energy Congress of the Cnitcd States Rooin AE-1 The Capitol V 8 shington D C 20510 I 6 40 LA l 1 _Ill BE TO Hugh VIis siles Spac e Di Yision LTV A erospace Corporation P O Box 909 Warren Iich J 8090 17 J OL BE SO T Kenneth Defense Intelligence gency 'lttn DIAST-2C Pomp Plaza 'v ashington D C 20301 18 401A BERG Brig General Russell A Joint Chiefs of Staff OJCS J-5 R D Division Room 2E982 The Pentagon Washington D C 20301 19 401A BERRIER LTC Jerry - Nuclear Chemical Biological Div Office Chief Research Development Washington D C 20310 20 401A BETTS Lt General W Chief of Research Development Department of the Army Room 3D-442 The Pentagon Washington D C 20310 21 401A BICE R A Org 7000 Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 Albuquerque N M 87115 22 401A BICHER Major William N ADC Special Weapons Office ADSWO Kirtland AFB N IVI 87117 23 401 BILD Charles F Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5 300 'I lbuqucrqllc VI 3'i115 24 401A HL CK Donald V IcDonncll DO· l l J a - - tl'ol1a' lf ic o Co Wct5tcrn DiYisiol1 5 301 Bolsa vcnuc Huntington Beach C J lif 82647 25 401A ROCLGER Colonel J L S i rmy Com t DCYl·lop'1U 'nt Coml11 and Institute of - d -anced Studies Carlisle Barracks Pa 1i013 26'40L ' BOYD Colonel Russell R Director Tucl Engr Dircctcir tc· Picatinny rsenal Dover N J 07801 27 40 P BRE IBERRY Colonel Vi O HQ DASA Vashington D C 20305 28 40U BRDIl'vIER Herbert H Lockheed Missiles Space Company Organization 80-67 Bldg 541 P O Box 504 Sunnyvale Calif 94088 29j401A BRODIE Major Richard ' Air Force Weapons Laboratory Kirtland AFB N 1 1 87117 30 401A BRUCE Colonel Sidney C US AF RET AECOP P O Box S Oak Ridge Tenn 37830 31 401A BRYANT Edward J Attn NXRD- R' D Director of Ballistic ReseGrch Laboratory Aberdeen Proving Ground 'Jrd 21005 32 40 U BUCHSBXC'vI Solomon J Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 lbuquerque X 8ill 33 -1 01 0 BLRCHI L General Dc vid oj • Deputy ConED ' nder iIl Cl ief lI S Europcc n C01I1 m md PO Te' v YOl'k Y n' n I Hi BL'HhE GU ' Llci D uclc Jr Brancl- J CB Di 'i inn RD ' E Dire ctoratc HQ L S r 1 ' Ltc-l'ie Co ll i I ' 'sl ington D C 0315 J ' 'OP l • BYERS Colonel Ed tarcl P A FRDQ Research a nd Devplopm ent Department of tte Ui' Force -ashington D C 20330 36 4011 CAREY Colonel James P Jr Director Systems Analysis Deputy Chief of Staff Plans Dcv HQ C S rm v Ajr Defense COInmand Ent FB Colo 80912 37 401A C-lRLI 'IT John J '1ir Force vYeapons Laboratory Kirtland AFB N M 87117 38 401A CARLSON Carl R Org 100 Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 - lbuquerque N M 87115 39 401A CARLSON Colonel John H USAEC Division of Military Application Washington D C 20545 40 401A II CARNE John B The Rand Corporation 1700 Main Street Santa Manica Calif 90406 41 401A CARPENTER Captain Harold L Office of the Secretary of Defense ODDR E WSEG Washington D C 20301 42 401A CARSON Colonel Charles R FC DASA Sandia Base -Ubllquerque N M 87115 43 401A CARTER Dr vVilliam W Assistant Director Nuclear Programs ODDR E Room 3EI071 The Pentagon V 8 shington D C 20301 44 401A CHAI' vrERS Wiiliam J TRW Systems Group Bldg E2 9042 One Space Park Redondo Beach Calif 90278 45 401A CI-L- IBERLI i John C S Army vlateriel Command Special Assistant to Commanding General vVashington D C 20315 J 6 401A CATA N ACH CDR 'mthony H FC DASA Sandia Base Albuquerque N M 87115 47 401A CHAPMAN Captain J H USN Strategic Operations Division J-3 Joints Chiefs of Staff The Pentagon Washington D C 20301 48 401A CH - VARRIE Colonel Edgar P P Division SHAPE Belgium APO New York N Y 09055 49 401A CLAASSEN Richard S Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 Albuquerque N M 87115 50 401A CLARK Albert General Electric Company 888 E Mill Street P O Box 5217 San Bernardino Calif 92506 51 401A CLARK Thomas R D S Atomic Energy Commission Division of Military Application Washington D C 20545 52 401A COGGAN Bernard F North American Rockwell 1700 E Imperial Highway El Segundo Calif 90245 5 401A COHEN Samuel T TRW Systems 3700 Freeman Avenue Redondo Beach CQlif 90278 54 'lOlA COON LTC Firman A USA F HQ USSTRICOM J2- P MacDill AFB Fla 33608 55 40 1A 393 RE C tpt l n Tefl'l ll- l FC'D S Sandb Base lbuquerque S I 'r ll i 61 · OL DEL CORLEY CG1 Olwl rtl1ul' - C BR ewei Suclear Opet'ations Director te Office of the Assist nt CUe ' St ff for Force Development Dep i rtment of the -'lrmy shington D C 0310 56 cl OlA DELI TRA Tr Jo n Cllivers2xy of Ca i or1 l 'a L iwrcncc Rd di' i 'ul1 Lc cr t J ' '-P o BH 80 l Livcrmcrc C lii ' ii 68 4CIA COTTER Donald R Or OO Sandia Laboratories P O Bo · 5800 Ubuquerque 1 1 37113 51 401 DILLA -V Y Dr Roben B Deputy for Labor3 toriE·s L S _- rmy Io tE riel Com mand Room '2744 Bldg 1'7 Washington D C 203l 'i 6 j '401A COW AS Brig General Alvin E Assistant Division Comm ander 3D -1 rrnored Division Spearhead PO New' York J Y 09165 58 401A DION E John B S'WLPL Air Force vVeapolls Laboratory Kirtland - FB N vI 87117 70 -101A COZBY Scott D U S Army vIissile Command ttn 1VIS II- RN Redstone Arsenal • la 3 809 59 401A DOR Dr David W Cniver3ity of Cr t lifornia Lawrence Radiation Laboratory P O Box 808 Livermore Calif 94550 71 401A CRAWFORD Jack A Code 351 Naval Weapons Center China Lake CaUf 93555 60 401A DOTSON J T USA CDC Institute of Land Combat B offman Building 2461 Eisenhower Avenue Alexandria Va 22314 '72i 401A CROSSCOPE Colonel John A USACDC IS80 Fort Bragg N C 28307 61 401A DANIEL Colonel Charles D Jr Department of the rmy Office Chief of Research Development Washington D C 20310 62 '101A DOUGHERTY Robert C Org 2611 Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 lbuquerque N 1 87115 73 401 ' DAuGHERTY LTC William L Lawrence Radiation Laboratory P O Box 808 Livermore Calif 94550 63 401A DOUGLASS Joseph D Jr Serendipity Inc 2001 Jefferson Davis Higl 'Nay rlington Va 22202 '74 ' lOlA D ' -IS LTC Carl F 'IiI' Force Vcapon r abor ctory Kirtland F'R S 'VI 8711- - Gel ·lOU E ' Sf C B The RA lO Corporation 1700 ain Street S nta Ionica Calif D0406 7 ·fOP DXYE Colonel T - G l L ir 'vI ar r'ol1e- - e I lx' ycn FB 1 3611 63 -1-01A EBY Frank S T niversity of C tlifornia La'HrE nce R tcliaticn Labor t ·ry P O Box R08 LivermoI'E C Ef 8-1- 0 16 '·to 1 DE i'i I i r Richard C FC D S 'I ' tl1clb R'J 't lbuquc ·rqt c 1 nl1 66 'tOP - ------ ---- I it - • LLEPS l John R ill' ' ' 17U mdi L boratnriclS P O Box j 300 _ iJ b1 iql ·Tque 1 87 13 77 40L- ELLETSOX Rcbe -t c1 Centr L IntelligenCE A f ncy i -_ U i tnn D C 20505 'TS taL- EXGL 1 XDER Sidney SavL I ir Systems Comrn md J e J dquHrters Llstington D C 20360 79 401A ETHRIDGE oel H - ttn ANXRD- BTL Dir of Ballistics Research Laboratory dJerdeen Proving Ground 'Id 21005 80 401A F -UR Colonel Stanley D 1 7 S --'lrmy Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies Carlisle Barracks Pa 17013 81 401A PARRELL Colonel Norman V-S - CDC Institute of Land Combat Hoffman Building 2461 Eisenhower Avenue -Uexandria Va 22314 82 401A PISCHER LTC Harold E A FXDOC HQ lJSAF The Pentagon Room 4C1083 Vv-ashington D C 20301 83 401A FITCHETT Major Donald J U S Army Engineer uclear CrateX'ing Group La'l rence Radiation Laboratory P O Box 808 Lh-erm'Jre CaliL 9 15 i0 34j401A • FT ' GER LD bjor Toe • ir Force 'VVc lPon L lborator · i i i tnd ' 'B X 1 37t17 85 401A FLETCHER Dr Erl ' lrd R I ovel tce Foundation 3200 GibdGn Blvd S E b _ qi i rq 10 ' VI 371003 8B 101A - ' - --- fi'OG RTY ' rajar John J Ur ForcL' vVeapons Laboratory Kirtlcmd -' FB X vI 87117 87 401A FOSTER Dr RicJ- ard B Director Strategic Studies Center Stanford Researct Institute 1611 ortb Kent Street A rlington Va 2209 88 401A FOULKE R E Carlisle Research Office Operations Research Inc Carlisle Barracks Pa 17013 89 401A FOWLER Dr Charles _-1 Deputy Director Tactical Warfare Programs DDR E Washington D C 20301 90 401A FOXWELL Dave Kaman Nuclear Garden of the Gods Road Colorado Springs Colo 80907 91 401A FRANZAK Edmund G Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 Albuquerque N M 87115 92 401A GARBLIK A M McDonnell Douglas -1stronautics Co Western Division 3000 Ocean Park Blvd Santa Monica Calif 90406 93 401A G 1RDNER William Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 Albuquerque N 1 87115 94 401A G -'1RVVTN Dr Ricl ard L IB VI 'v at oon L boratol' ' 612 West 115th Street e i York Y 100 5 1 40L'I GELLING Colonel Louis Director of Doctrine HQ CSi' Combat Dcvelopments Command Ft BC'Iv-oir l 22060 06 '-WIA GETZE GER Philip L HC l SC00J - RC DCSOPS- TKG- TS '-J Fort Ionroe Va 33351 87 J OIA GR Y LTC Tl oma -' Concepts Division Aerospace Studie InstiLltl' C Iax vell FB la 36112 10 -t01A GILL LTC Rolland T 'CSAF DIAAP-8cU _- rlington Hall Station -' t 20301 98 '-lOL- GREEX CDR John L'SX Office of the Chief of Xaval Oper OP-752C Kav ' Departrnent Vashington D C 20 330 l08 - 01 - GILLER Iaj General Edward B c ssistant 1anager for vlilitary pplic ations U S Atomic Energy Commission Vashington D C 20545 99 401A GREGSON Donald E Sandia Corporation P O Box 969 Livermore Calif 94550 GILLESPIE Kenneth L Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 Albuquerque N vI 87115 100 401A Ioe '401-- ' GREWIS Eugene G ' Naval _· l ir Systems Command Washington D C 20360 l10 401A GIRARD E W Research Analysis Corporation vIc Lean Va 22101 101 401A GUSTAVSON Dr vlarvin R University of California Lawrence Radiation Laboratory P O Box 808 Livermore Calif 94550 111 401M GLASSER Maj General Otto J Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff Research Development Department of the Air Force Washington D C 20330 102 401A GUTIERREZ Leo Sandia Corporation P O Box 969 Livermore Calif 94550 l12 401A GLOSS BRENNER LTC John CINCPACF Director of Requirements APO San Francisco Calif 96553 103 401A GMELCH LTC Joseph C U S A rmy Combat Developments Command lCAS Ft Leavenworth Kans 66027 104 401A GOLD Theodore S Sandia Lflboratories P O Box 5800 lbllqucrquc 0f 1 8i11S 105 -UJIA GYGAX Captain Rex USN Office of the Chief of Naval Oper OP-752C Navy·- Department Washington D C 20350 113 401A H LLO -VES Dr J Post Chief Scientist U S• rmy Missile CO lJ mand Redstone Arsenal Ala 35309 114 401 - GOLDBERG Erne t Raytheon Comp ln y Iissiles Systems Division H arbvcll Road Bedford 'vIas 01730 l06 401 • H - iVIPTON Brig General Rex H OSD-ISA The Penta on Roo lJ 40800 YCJ shington D C 20 '01 115 '401 H FC D Cc l mel l 'r on C C S F 3 · C HQ I ' L R Offutt F'8 - l Jll lHi ''' '· PI H RDI Lutr r r f __ ttn ' ' XHD- XD Director of BaEbtics RL'sl l rc - La bcrclu n Pr 'fin Gnhncl Iei 21 00 11 7 ·11 11 • H FUJT LCDR 11 1 0 ' - y DC'p3 rt nL'nt av ll il' S ' tL'ms • Cummand _ UR-3S0P RO J ll '3810 Iunitions Bldg ' sl ington D C 20360 118 -l OL- H RRISO Joe C KED OSI DDS T Centr 'll Intellig'encl Agellcy Washington D C 20505 l1B -WL- H -- fiT Colonel Freclt'rick F CSAF' Plans Pollcy Directorate J-5 Joint Chiefs of StaJi Vashington D C 20301 120 401 0 HEBEL Louis C Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 i- lbuquerque K I 87115 121 401A HERLINGER LTC Harry V Jr HQ 'C S Army Munitions Command ttn XVISMU- RE-N Dover N I 07801 122 40L4 HICKS Dr Donald A Northrop Corporation 3401 W BroadlV'ay Hawthorne Calif 80250 123 40 1A HINES William C Org 1733 Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 Albuquerque N VI 87115 024 401A HIRSCH Dr Frederick Lovelac e 'Foundation 5200 Gibson Blvd S E UhLlqur rqlle N l'vI 87108 125 10 1A HOl CO 'vIBE J'ln1 es V 1730 K Street ' 'vV Suite 905 ortJ rop Corporation Vas il1 ton D c 0006 126 401 HOI IFIEI D Honol' ble Chet HOi 1Sl' Offk ' Building Con p ' 3S of tb Cnib d Stutr s - r 'If WCl l inc'ton D C O J15 127 101 0 HOLL D Y Richard 8 'l F'S'v 'C S'vV TV Kirtland AFB M 87117 l28 lOL HOM - LTC H A DPLPOC Tactical 'l ir Command Langley -- FB Va 23365 l29 4 01A HORN Herbl'rt O Institute for Defense nalY8es PAD 400 l- rmy Navy Drive -1rlingt6n Va 22202 130 4 OLII HORNBECK Dr I A President Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 -- lbuquerque N M 87115 131 401A HOSMER Honorable Craig Congress of the United States House of Representatives Washington D C 20515 132 401A HOWARD 'vV- J Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 Albuquerque N M 87115 133 401A HUDSON Dr Cecil I University of California Lawrence Radiation Laboratory P O Box 808 Livermore Calif 94550 134 401A JANSEN Colonel Joseph A Office Chief of Engineers Department of the 11 rmy Washington D C 20315 135 401A J NTZEN 'vIilton D Lockheed- California Company Dept 72-71 Burbank Calif 91503 I36 401A JOHNSON Dr Gerald W Gulf General Uomic Inc P O Box 608 S n Diego Calif 92112 I 37 i W1A JONES James W Or 4' 2350 Sandiu Laboratories P O Box 5800 lbuqw rqw Ir 3711 13 ' 101A fl7 JOXES Dr Robert K Lovelace Foundation 5200 Gibson Blvd S E •-- lbuquerque X 1 87108 139 J 01A KORBITZ Freck'rick K -- ERICHER Colonel K C SAEC Div-ision of VIilitary Application ashington D C 20545 140 40LI KOZACZK F The RAXD Corporation 1700 bin Street Santa Ionica Calif 90406 1 1 '401A KAL IS William Raytheon Company Hartwell Road Bedford 1ass 01730 141 401A KANARO YSKI Major Stanley National Security Council Rm 483 Executive Office Building Yashington D C 20506 142 401A KAUFMAN Dr J V Richard U S Army Materiel Command Bldg T-7 Room 2748 Washington D C 20315 143 401A KEA THLEY LCDR James W Naval War College Code 43K Newport R I 02840 144 401A KEARNEY Colonel Lester T • Jr HQ USEUCOM APO New York N Y 09128 145 401A KELLY John P ir Force Weapons Laboratory Kirtland AFB N M 87117 146 401A KING LTC Bruce F AFXPD The Pentagon Room 5C470 Washington D C 20301 147 40 1A KIRTLEY Robert Serc ndipity Inc 2001' J i'fCl' 'on n vi s Highwa ' Ko 701 rlinO'ton -a 22 202 14 3 L- '' • rW K OX LTC Robert LS CDC-ICAS Ft Leavcmiorth Kans 66027 H9 'J01A FClDAS Sandia Base lbuquerque 1 87115 150 -l 01A • KUPFER Donald 1 Naval Weapons Ev-aluation Facility Kirtland -- FB N 1 87117 132 401 LAMB William vI USAEC Albuquerque Operations Office P O Box 5400 -- lbuquerque N 1 87115 153 401A LANDAGER Dr Joseph K University of California Lawrence Radiation Laboratory P O Box 808 Livermore Calif 94550 154 401A L -- UREYNS George - General Dynamic s P O Box 748 Fort Worth Tex 76116 155 401A LAWLER v1ajor Francis C HQ u S Army Combat Developments Command Attn CDC tlR - U Ft Belvoir Va 22060 156 401A LEON ARD Rear Admiral William N USN - ssistant Deputy Chief of Kaval Operations Developm ent OP- 07B avy Department Washingtori D C 203 0 157 '401--1 LE 7I E Ibyid av- ll Urdnance L t x ' 'atol' ' 'hitc Oak Silv r '3prin '2 ' I' l O lO L'13 l-OlA LIEBER 'ndre' v Sandici Laboratoric s P O Box 5800 lbuquerquL 1 8'7113 lS J -lOlA • • LL D H I TllSqlh Uf 'icl' Llf tI l Dl'put l for LalJOLltoril'S IICDL HQ L 3 ·l 1' n - - LI l 'l'iel C0111mand L 3l ington D C 20 315 I60 401A LBELL Iajor John HQ FSAF l FRDC cLshingwn D C 20 330 161 40L LI TXGSTO R D vI illiam H US · FC'DASA Sandia Rlse - lbuquerque ' 1 87115 162 401A LOVE Colonel TholTI8 s I I HQ liS - ir Forces in Europe - PO 'Ne'N York N Y 09633 163 401A LO VRY Philip H Research - nalysis Corporation VIc Lean Va 22101 164 401A LUTHER Captain Alexander HQ SAC Offutt AFB Nebr 68113 I65 401A LYNN Colonel George A HQ US Arm y Munitions Command A vrSMU - RE- N Dover N J 07801 166 401A iV c L LISTER Michael HQ SAC Offutt 'l FB Nebr 68113 167 401A vIcCA VIPBELL Carroll B Sandia Laboratories Dept 2310 P O Boy SOO lbuquerque S VI 37115 168 401A IcC c RTHY CDR Paul F Jr J - 542 ·crfolk I 23511 I69j401A CI C LX T fcCJ 1' 1 1 ' Dr Rogel' O Luvc l ' -'uund ltion i no ib l1 BL-cl S E J bllqi Il Tque 'i • vI 137108 170 -1 01A rcD8 'IOTT Cnlonl'l illLttll T PLUlS Directorate ODCSLOG Dep rtcll'nt of the _ rl11 ' Washington D C 20310 171 401A IcDO ' LD C - 3 rJ es Jr Lniversity of Californi8 La'Nrcnce RadhUon Labordory p O BOx 808 Livermore Calif 9· 550 172 401A l tIcDON - LD John E Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 Albuquerque N 1 87115 173 40 1A McNA iIA R - VIajor- Vlichael F TAC Lio ison Office - FSWC Kirtland - FB N vI 87117 l74 401A MADSON Captain Richard O Office of the Chief of Naval Opel' Head Strategic Forces Nuclear Warfare Branch OP-604 Navy Department Washington D C 20350 175 401A MANDELL Albert R The leing Company P O lx 3999 Seattle Wash 98124 176 401A MANEY C Thomas Aeronautical Systems Division ASBM Wright-Patterson AFB Ohio 45433 177 401A MATTHEWS Captain Valter L USN Joint Chiefs of Staff J-5 The Pentagon Rm 2D958 Vashing'ton D C 20301 178 401 4 VL- UNEY C Herman Org 1516 Sandia Laboratories Po O Box 5800 lbuqucrquc T vI DillS 179 10L VIA YO LTC WaIter Office - ssistant to the Secretary of Defense Atomic Enersy Department of Defense Washin ton D C 20301 180 401A ' lfl L Z K LTC Ecb'arcl P Jr FC D S - Sandia Base Ubuquerque T I 87115 181 --1 01 Il'RTL - KD bjor J unes B Fire Support Division Development Center ICDEC Quantico Va 2213 1 181 '40L-' MEYER H N Jr V capons Devdopll1 cnt U S Atomic Energy Commission lbuquerque Operations Office P O Box 5400 Albuquerque 1 87115 182 40L- CSTI T VAD I Lloyd ' 1 HQ D S W tshington D C 20 105 U 2 -- l 0L MOE Gordon O Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 Albuquerque N Vr 87115 l83 401A MORAN LTC Charles E -1 ir Force Weapons Laboratory Kirtland AFB N I 871n 184 401A IYRE William C Org 1210 SQnciia Laboratories P O Box 5800 lbuquerque N I 87115 193 '40 1A NELSON William E University of California Lawrence Radiation Laboratory P O Box 808 Liverm ore Calif 945 10 194 401A MORRIS Phillip J DRS Research Co 1811 Trousdale Drive Burlingame Calif 94010 185 401A NEWHOUSE Herman TR V Systems Group Bldg R4 2120 One Space Park Redondo Beach Calif MORSE John H Stanford Research Institute 333 Ravenwood A venue Menlo Park C lif 94025 186 40 1A NEWSOM M 1 Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 lbuquerque N M 87115 196 401A MOSS -1 lan M -1 cting Deputy Director Nuclear Engr Directorate Picatinny Arsenal Dover N J 07801 187 401A MOTT Charles D nalytic Service Inc 5613 Leesburg Pike Falls Church -8 22041 188 '·1-01A MOULTHROP Dr Peter 11 l ruvL l'C'ity of C 1 Lifonli l' 1 l'Nl'l'nCC Radiatiun L lburator v P n Box 3013 L ·c'rmorc C lif 0-1550 Hl9i·fOL ILRR Y LC'DR 5 L t S · ' '3 v Ll -t pon - EV I J uation P3 cilit I i otbncl FB ' L 37117080 11J1A IO • 90278 195 ·1 01A NOE Colonel Herbert A DS -1 CDC Medical Service -1 gency Fort Sam Houston Tex 78234 197 401A O'DONNELL Lawrence F Special A ssistant to Commissioner Johnson IT S tomic Energv Comn1 ission 'ashington D C ·· Z0545 198 401A OEL Colonel illiam C ' 'SA C S - 1·ll1 · btedcl Command OLIVEH Laurence R Taval c apons EV3 Llation F' cilit Kirtl8 nc1 FB '1'1 3711 7 200 '-If 1 - • SEG o LSE J • LTC Ed1l11111cl J Jr X'iC'll' ll' Pulic Gr ll1ch Stl' tl 't 'ic Forces Division Ofricc_ i' tile Deputy Cbief of Staff for Iilitary Oper3 tions D'-- ishington D C 20310 201 '-±OlA C LSOX Delfrl cl I r ' 1510 Ild cl I iJuratori - p O Box j800 lbuquerquc' ' I 87115 202i 40 1A ORD Dr John A S F'or ig-n Science Technology CentE r Rm 4547 Vlunitions Building 'lshington D C 20315 203 401A ORR Colonel La VrenCL' E Jr HQ C SARP C G 3 --'l PO San Francisco Calif 96558 204rWIA OVERBEY James T North merican Rockwell Corporation Columbus Division 4300 E Fifth A venue Columbus Ohio 43216 205 401A OVER TON Daniel Weapons Development Division U S Uomic Energy Commission Ubuquergue Operations Office Ubuquerque ·N iVI 87115 206 401A OWEL LTC william R liS - sst for Nuclear Planning Affairs European Region Office of the ' s istant Secretary of Defeo'nse W Lshing'ton D C 20301 207 f W1A P G E Colonel J tme s 1 1 D 1' 1 i'tment of the Arm HQ Y SAI El R 7th rm v P ' -Y'o1'l • IJ Il 'ITlt I- ' -J l jnn nld' ' i hl'I''''' y 00· 0 1 208 401 ' - 'n d 1 J J P L L TIFI Col md Fl'anel L Dd'en l' Intt'IJi 'l'lll'L' l'IlCy t hin toll D C O Q I U llo'4UIA P 'SCH ALL Colonel J 11es E Cornl1l tnder Air Force Specbl c 1pon CentE 'l' I-' irtlancl --'lFR 1 L 87117 212 -l OlA P ' NE 'reel -'I Iartin i 1 'lril'tt 1 CnJ 'j or ttioll P O Box 5837 Orlando Fla 32805 213 401A PAYNE V Scott Institute for Ddt'nse nal yses 400 rmy NaV ' Drive rlington Va 22202 214 401A PECKH - vr Major George 1 Air Force vVcapons Laboratory Kirtland FB N VI 87117 215 401A PERLMAN Theodore University of California Lawrence Radiation Laboratory P O Box 808 Livermore Calif 94550 216 401A PETERSON Benjamin Limited vl ar Analysis G500 Brooks Lan Washington D C 20315 217 401A POBST LTC Wallace WLF 'iiI' Force Wl apons Laboratory Kirtland ' FB 'N Vr 87117 218 401A PORELL Iajor ir univecsity Institute Cor Pr JCc ional D vt l npmC'nt 'LtxwclJ FB 1 t 3Gl12 219 401A PR TER Colonel Uti ir F'OI'Cf' Sp 'cial ' lpnnc C 'nl ' ' Chid T li r1If T - f Divj - jon I il'tlclllcl T l i ' vI l'iJ 1'1 2 20 -l-U1A Irq HEICI-l RDT Dr 1 icJ · - I 'tomic Ener '5' Commi - sioll vV Jshin' ton D C 05-t5 221 401A r S P L EK ior Fd' vnrd J i l' F'j ' 't t' ' r 11 -' l l Ol' 1'ory r ' 'r j i r- i1 Willi 210j-WIA -lOt H F PP GU1'don ' CnivL' 'sit of California L · vrt·nce R -cdi - tion Laboratory P O Box 80S Live l l l O 'C Cd £ HS 50 222 40 L l RE -LEY LTC Rcl l l'1 D FC D S S - ndia Basl lbuqUl'l' jdl L 37115 223 401 10 3E- Jack Specj ll ssi t 1n t c CO J l tL i c rH r Tl ompson 'C S t01nic Enel'g- - CO H -l s'_'_' 1 -asi1in n D C Oc-tJ 232 -lOP RCl E GRFS he 'y Cnivl' ' ity 0 ' Cal forn i l L tWr 'ncL' R dLlt l1 L tb ' J l P O Box SO 3 Livl rm r C lif 04 J t • 233 -WL RHO_ l DES Dr Ricl ard G 'C S Army Iissile Command Attn IS II- R Redstone rsen l la 35809 224 401A RHODEH L IEL LTC 'vV- R US Mission to - TO DPD APO 0Jew York -J Y 09667 225 401A RICHARDSO J Hampton 'vV- Naval 'Weapons Evaluation F cility Kirtland AFB N VI 87117 226 401A RICH VIO D Dr Donald R Lovelac e Foundation 5200 Gibson Blvd S E Albuquerque N M 87108 227 401A RIDLEHOOVER Colonel Edward lVI Commanding General U S Army Missile Command Attn X tIS VJ - RF Redstone Arsenal Ala 35809 228 'lOL- RIERA RAD I Robert E DS J ADCNO Fleet Operations - Readiness 03 B Nav-y Department -ashingt0n D C 203 50 229 '·WL RIVERS LTC ·Ohl S HQ C F DCS Ttl' P 'nt a' on J Lin J ln D C _ O Ol 2 JI to ROGERS LTC ' i Llh n -' tS F dtional Cap hilitil' D 'vi irm uclear Tr ining Dil'cctnr tl Sandi BCl s _ lbt q lcY' l'd· 1 87115 231 -iGLI_ ROSS LTC HarJan P t ' 3 ' ' F' HQ 'CSSTRICO' I J5- PP IacDill - FB F'b 3 1 08 C 3-1 -icOL RO VDE Colonl J Rob -rt 'X Deputy Director - ir Force eapons Labor - toTY Kirtland _ FB N 1 87117 235 401A ROW ' 'TREE Dr R F ProgT2_m Director fo1' A1r Strik ' v arfare 'vVcapons PL nning Group Code 126 N tv Ll'vVe apone Center China Lake Calif 9 3555 236 101 - Rl -CKER LTC Carl L S LPL Air Force Weapons Laborator ­ Kirtland FB N vI 87117 237 401A Rl VIBLE CDR VI2_urice IY DS '-T Naval Neapons Evaluation F i cility Kirtland AFB N VI 8711'1 238 '401A RT VI EY ' IIaeon P SRI Secudty Officer IGll N Kent Street _ 1' lington -Ct 22 2 09 2 38 40 L RC CHEY Le' v1s J a'ial -f lpnn CC 1 t r CI na T i kc C l j f 9 3 2·-iJ -lO L IU ' WI I n i1ir ll f d l • - S H r J' 77 ·-1 ' ' 11 1 t n c T lcon vasl 90·j JS Hl '· Ul Rl ' SEL L L TC T t mc l III Hq Dcpart 'l cnt c f 1 1- c 1' _ ' Office CLid f En 2inE- l'S · - hin t n D C O 3 J 2--1 2 ·i O _ • • RL rI'IFIELD Captain Richard l'S IC HQ' IC Code 0311'33 - lsi ington D C 20380 2-f3 40U SE CE fB CGH D W Kaman uclear Garden of the Gods Road Colorado Springs Colo 80907 254 i 4 01A S 'LES L rc Hobert HQ D SA ' ·· bin 2ton D C 20305 244 401A SHA V Colonel H E P O Box S Oak Ridge Tenn 3 LET ' hj General Eug'ene A Deputy Defence - ch -isor rs Iist'ion to K TO PO Te'li York N Y 09667 245 40L- 37830 255 401A SHEP A RD Iajor William J HQ D ASA Vashington D C 20305 256 401A SX0IDOV - L Colonel Richard R l S l CDC Institu te of Nuclear Studies Fort Bliss Tex 79916 246 401A SHIELDS Colonel Buren R Jr FC Defense Atomic Support Agency Sandia Base _ Ubuquerque N 1 87115 257 401A SCHLEICHER Robert B Lockheed-California Co P O Box 551 Burbank Calif 91503 247 401A SHOI P Jack P Org 2340 Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 Albuquerque N M 87115 258 401A SCHNEIDER RAD Yr R J • USN Naval Air Systems Command AIR-03 Department of tl1e Navy vVashington D C 20360 248 401A SHREFFLER Dr Robert G US NATO IS APO New York N Y 09667 259 401A SCHWA RTZ Robert lVI U S Army Munitions Command Dover N J 07801 249 401A SHULTZ Colonel J J • Jr USA CDC Institute of Nuclear Studies Fort Bliss Tex 79916 260 401A SCHWEITER l aj General L H Deputy COlTl_manding General US ' Combat Developments Command Ft Belvoir Va 22060 250 401A SHUSTER Don B Sandia Laboratories P O BrJX 5800 Albuquerque N ' 1 87115 261 401A SCOTT -T F 1 S• rmy Combat Developments Co nJ rnand Institute of - dvanced Studies Carlisle Barr cks Pa 17013 251 J 01A SHWILLER Colonel SeYlnour Joint Cornmittee on Atomic Ener ' ' ' Congress of tte United States Room --' E-1 The Capitol Washington D C 0510 262 401A ' v SCC CfIO -RicJ- 'H'd C ' r l n K - nD-' Dir 'IllY T ·l cril · Sysh'ms nalysE 'i i 'cnc 1'Jcrdl'en Fl'ovin ' Cr' ' l md ' Id 21005 2 32 1 40 1A ' EG r IXF Ho ' rcl - 1 'ial Orcln tnct System COl1J l tnd _ 08226 SMITH Donald H raY3 l 0 rcln ne- ' r_ d Llf It' Y Silver SpJ'in oLe 0910 263 40U S IITI1 GeorgI E Vice President i-- General bn Lg'cr Iartin Iaridta Corporation p O Bo 58 n Orlando Pl t -'l _ ·CS c RET ECOP - _ 1II1II' 2flO J 26-1 101 ' SEjIii'RD 8 IITI-T Leon D • Ol'g 2300 Sandi J Laboratories P O Box 5800 Ubuquerque I 87115 265 40L SPRY LTC Ufred E Department of the Army - CSI Vashington D C 20310 266 40Li SQUIRE Robert K University of California Lawrence Radiation Laboratory P O Box 808 Livermore Calif 94550 267 401A STEVENS Yilliam L Org 1650 Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 Albuquerque N lVI 87115 268 401A STOESSELL Captain Alfred L Air Force Weapons Laboratory Kirtland A FB N M 8711 7 269 40 1A STONE Brig General William W Jr CBR and Nuclear Operations Directorate Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development Department of the Army Washington D C 20310 270 401A STRAUB Major Edward C HQ US - F USAF Scientific ''1dvisory Board AFBSA The Pentagon Room 5D982 Washington D C 20330 271 40 1A STRO G Captain William Y CSN Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility Kirtland FB N I 87117 272 401A STU RT LTC Dougbs B Office of istant Vice Chid of SL1Jf Dl p trtll1C'nt of tlw rmy 1 -81 Room 1 E628 The Pentagon Vasbin Q' ton D C 20310 273 401A SljLLn-x ' LTC Iarvin B ir Force capons Lo boratory Kirtland ' F'B x V1 87117 274 401A p j T TE Colonel Grayson D • Jl' ssistant for vIissiles P S R D Department of the 1'm -ashington D C 20310 275 40L- TAYLOR C -r CS - rmy Combat Dev-elopments Command Institute of dvanced Studies Carlisle Barracks Pa 17013 2 7 6 '-to L- • T_- YLOR Jean G Institute for Defense nalysis 400 rmy Navy Drive _ rlington Va 22202 277 401A T YLOR Wiliiam VI Lockheed-California Co Advanced Development Project Bldg 311 Burbank Calif 91503 278 401A TETK- UL T Colonel William B DORQL Tactical Air Command Langley AFB Va 23365 279 401A THOMAS Frank J The RAND Corporation 1700 Main Street Santa Monica Calif 90406 280 40 1A THOMPSON Major George HQ S - C Offutt - FB Nebr 68113 281 401A THOMPSON George E Air Force Aero Propulsion Lab Technical Plans Office ' PP-l Wright-Patterson _AFB Ohio 45433 282 401A TILLERY R J Naval We 'tpons EVclh c tion Fc-ccility Kirtland _ FB ' 1 87117 203 lOL TRLVIBER ER Victor F FC iD - S Sandia 8 2C Ubuqut rque I 87115 2 1 ' WIA • • TRYBCL Theodore Dir 1 S - rrny dvanced Material Concepts Agency - 'J sbington D C 20315 285 401A V - 'X CLEAVE Dr R OASD ISA The Pentagon Room 4E820 d sbin ' ton D C 20301 286 401A 'i DE Dr James P • Jr A dvanced Research Projects - gency ·ashington D C 20301 287 401A 'vI ' ALKER Colonel William A Picatinny Arsenal Bldg 151 Dover N J 07801 288 401A WHITT KER LTC Howard C HQ C SET' -CO I Directorate of Plans 8 Policy APO 7ew York X Y 09128 295 40L 1 vV-HITTENBURY Dr Clive G Research J nalysis Corporation McLean Va 22101 296 40IA VICKS Willard P Martin IIarietta Corporation P O Box 5837 Orlando Fla 32805 297 401A WIESEN J M • Org 100 Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 Albuquerque N M 87115 298 401A VALSKE Dr M C Assistant to tbe Secretary of Defense Atomic Energy Department of Defens e Washington D C 20301 289 401A WILLIAMS Colonel Ralph 1 USA-FAS Guided Missile Dept Ft Sill Okla 73503 299 40IA WEIHE J W Sandia Corporation p O Box 969 Livermore Calif 94550 290 401A WINBLAD Alfred Sandia Laboratories P O Box 5800 Albuquerque N M 87115 300 401A WEISLEDER C -1 Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility Kirtland AFB N M 87117 291j401A WISE Jack W U S Naval Ordnance Laboratory White Oak Silver Spring Md 20910 301 401A WHEELON Dr Albert D Vic e President- Engineering Hugbes Aircraft Company Culver City Calif 90230 292 401A tVOLCOTT Fred W Research Analysis Corporation McLean Va 22101 302 40IA ·v -HITE Dr Clayton S Lovelace Foundation 5200 Gibson Blvd S E Ubuquerque 1 -• vI 37108 293 40IA HITE· FEE Captai n J J tncs G • CSN ffir ' of 'bel' of aval Opcru tions OP-7 X3 V- ' Dep lrtJ11E nt Wc 2hin2 'ton D C 20350 294 401A WRIGHT William B The RAND Corporat ' on 1700 Main Street Santa 1Ionica Calif 90406 303 40 lA YL'DKIN Maj General l1ici1 lrci •• GSAF Dir of Doctrine Concepts 6 Objectives DCS Plans and Operation8 HQ U S Air Force Washington D C '203 '30 304 -JOlA 8i Qfl IIIi@ Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory _- ttn Report Librarian P O Box 1663 Los Alamos ew Iexico 87544 305-400 40LA For Dr Harold Agnew Technical Information Division II 3412 Sandia Laboratories Albuquerque New Mexico 87115 401 401A •