• I ____ DECLASSIFIED - h l oritvM' f jl 27 rr_ _sy _NAP A - - - -· oa 1 1J tt ' t DEPARTMENT OF STATE 7517936 ACTION MEMORANDUM SECRET SEP 111975 COP f ES TO EU PM'l RF l jhw To The Secretary Through c - Mr Sonnenfeldtf From EUR- - · th - A ·-Har ··_ 7 f PM - Thomas Stern Acting J The DOD Modernization Program for Tactical Nuclear Forces in Eurooe The report sent to Congress last April on the status and concept for the use of tactical nuclear forces in NATO Europe the so-called Nunn Report established an analytical basis for considering the composition and modernization of those forces Secretary Schlesinger at the NPd Ministerial meeting last Ju e left the Afliis i little doubt that modernization would involve a new look at tactical nuclear forces TNFs their size and their relationship to conventional forces • Since then DOD has developed a working draft on modernization which outlines various options on modernizing TNF concepts stockpiles and deployments sets them in the context of NATO's existing and projected nuclear doctrine and concepts and provides a rationale for each option l As it now stands however on the basis of technical military criteria the draft proposes a reduction of about 2 000 over several years in the present European stockpile of 6 951 warheads The reduction proposed would be taken from some combination of the options in Attachment 2 t There are sound technical and military reasons for considering modernization and reductions of the stockpile However fne projected reductions have substantial political and strategic implications SECRET GDS ·' ' I - ___ c _ ___ - - - - - - - - - • -· ' • • SECRET - 2 - The Allies will scrutinize our proposals very carefully As in the past their main concern will be with any evidence that the US nuclear deterrent is being decoupled from the defense of Europe The current DOD study suggests retirement of certain systems modernization of others reductions in numbers of warheads and shifts in targetting responsibilities from tactical nuclear aircraft to missiles including Poseidon submarines Separately in response to the Presidential request in NSDM 300 DOD and State are considering the concept of a · SACEUR Deployable Reserve which involves withdrawing nuclear warheads from Europe and storing them in the US for rapid return to Europe in the event of a crisis Moreover the US reply to NATO's 1975 Defense Planning Questionnaire DPQ foreshadows a major reduction over the ne t five years in us nuclear capable tactical aircraft based in Europe • - 1 • -- Soviet interpretation of such modernization and reduction actions are uncertain · It might be seen as part of the new nuclear strategy of flexible options and a step toward lowering the nuclear threshold in Europe It might also be considered a precursor to an eventual US effort to turn over to the Germans and other Allies a larger responsibility for de ivering nuclear weapons • -- All of the foregoing of course will have consequences for MBFR Premature exposure of these ideas would damage severely the utility of Option III The Germans in particular will be concerned about this problem because a prime alternative to Option III would be a reduction in German forces as the necessary ingredient to the successful conclusion in MBFR The Soviets will be less likely to bargain if they know that the US in any event will be with'drawing substantial nuclear forces The DOD draft at our insistence takes some of these political concerns into account in that it ·stresses 1 MBFR will be a controlling factor in the pace of any nuclear modernization program involving changes in the stockpile 'SECRET -- DECLASSIFIED t rityM'1Jjf 27 iL Sy - - I-MP A Date ------ -SECRET - 3 2 attention will be given to reinforcing NATO cohesion and improving the deterrent and 3 NATO political and military authorities and staffs must continue to be d i rectly and deeply involved in any process of modernizing NATO's concepts and posture In contrast to previous years State on the staff level has been able to participate actively in the DOD discussion and drafting effort We remain concerned however that Secretary J Schlesinger may not adequately underscore some of the caveats with Ministers Mason and Leber when he travels to Europe in the last week of September His discussions with them will serve as a prelude to the November NPG meeting in Hamburg Accordingly we recommend that you take an early opportunity to mention our political and strategic concerns to Secretary Schlesinger prior to his departure for Europe Recommendation That you find an early opportunity to convey to Secretary Schlesinger views on TNF modernization along the lines of the Talking Points at Attachment 1 I •• • • • • Approve ____ _ _ Disapprove Attachments ti 1 Talking Points 2 Modernization and Reduction Proposal Paper Mc Drafted by -r t·r• 'EUR RPM GBHelman PM ISA LBrowri 9 10 75 X 21627 __ _ SECRET · · ·-- ·- - -- or r- -- -- ···---- ---- - -·--- --·--- -- -______ _ --- -------- ·- SECRET TALKING POINTS -- Nuclear modernization proposals that improve our military capabilities and increase deterrence should be pursued but political factors must be c on-trolling Deterre nce will not be increase d if the impact of modernization proposals is to lessen US credibility with our Allies nor will it be increased if discussion of our proposals undermines MBFR -- Any presentation to the Allies must be carefully tailored to - stress credible military rationales for suggested changes - derscore the importance of MBFR a nd our commitment not to reduce outside MBFR - make clear that our proposals at this stage are options not final decisions on which we seek their views avoid discussion · of numbers -- __ SECRET GOS · - - ·' -- ·-··--- ·-·- -• - -- -• -- ·-- ____ __ --·- -···- I ·oECLASSIF EO i L rityM Qjl 2 7S S - - y _NAP ADate --- - - - -- 'SECRET Tactical Nuclear Force Mqdernization and Reduction Proposals The Defense Department's wprking draft proposes reductions in the present European stockpile of 6 951 warheads of about 2 000 over several years One thousand of these would be part of MBFR Option III The reduction proposed would be taken from some combination of the following ·- Nuclear Capable Airc aft DOD proposes to target Poseidon and Pershing warheads on fixed targets in SACEUR ' s General Strike Plan GSP now assigned to nuclear strike aircraft in Europe to replace a large number of nuclear capable F-4s in Europe with nonnuclear F-15 and A-10 aircraft and to replace older fixed yield nuclear bombs with a new selectable- yield B-61 bomb on a less than one-for-one basis The net warhead reduction that would result from these proposals is not clear but it could be substantial there are currently about 1 600 tactical nuclear bo s in Europe Issue The missile-for-airplane substitution and nuclear bomb reductions raise two special problems 1 shifting a substantial element of the US theater nuclear deterrent from tactical aircraft in NATO to strategic submarine forces will make the theater deterrent less visible and thus would suggest to the Allies the decoupling of the US nuclear deterrent for Europe's defense and 2 reductions in the bomb stockpile in Europe could be very substantial thus raising problems for MBFR Air Defense A 50 percent reduction in Nike-Hercules batteries is proposed by end FY-76 with a gradual removal of all 700-plus nuclear warheads now in Europe DOD argues that the nuclear Nike-Hercules is useful only again ·h4 gh altitude massed bomber attacks whereas the threat is from low-level penetration which must be dealt with by conventional means • Issue Nike system is widely held by Allies and though obsolete is the only high- altitude system operational in Europe Accordingly the Allies will approach the proposition cautiously and will also see it as a potential negotiating problem in MBFR SECRET GOS t ' - - - - ---·- - ·--· · '° '--• zrr c- · • ····-- -- --- _ _ I --- -- -- ·--- - --·--· - -- - ·-----c -i - ·- --- •·•- -- - I I DECLASSIFIED ----···· l ul ritvMl1 'Jf 7$5 i Sy - NAPA Date 4i 1 lJ h SECRET - 2 - Atomic Demolition Munitions ADMs DOD has scheduled 275 high yield ADMs for early retirement with 100 l ow yield ADMs retained pending development and possible deployment of a new earth penetrator system that would not require pre-emplacement The weakness of the present system is that it requires an early Presidential decision for use if it is to be effective Issue Since there is no NATO agreement on the use of ADMs the removal of the high yie l d systems should pose no serious political problem with the Allies Removal does however raise the negotiating problem associated with MBFR Retirement of some 400 ASROC anti-s ubmarine rockets and ASTOR nuclear torpedoes in the Atlantic and Mediterranean area is proposed on the grounds that the MK-48 conventional torpedo and other non-nuclear ASW weapons now coming into the inventory are more effective ASW Issue None of these ·weapons are for use · by the Allies so retirement should pose minimal difficulties for them None are stored in the NGA Nuclear Artillery Both the 8 11 and 155 mm nuclear arti l lery shells have very serious technical limitations Congress has refused to fund a replacement for the 155 mm but development of a new 8 11 shell is underway It is not clear what Defense proposes to do with the 155 mm inventories Issue t I Both systems are widely held for £Y the Allies and the inventory amouhts to 1 525 The numbers involved 755 in retiring the 1 55 mm warheads will have political consequences not l east in MBFR i Lance The Lance missile is now replacing Honest J ohns and Sergeants in Europe on a less than one-forone basis l 1 SECRET -- ----- ____ • - ----- --- --- --·- -·- _ - ----- '· - --- - ·---· -·----- ·-- -- -- -- - DECLASSlflED t uL rityM' jf 7SS Sy - I JI-PA Date 1 JJjb • SECRET - Issue for MBFR 3 - Potential negotiating problem Site Consolidation There are 145 nuclear storage sites in Europe Fifty-three are Nike-Hercules sites of which 43 are projected for closure Other consolidations mostly on security grounds are being considered Issue Site consolidation offers benefits for peacetime physical security against the cost of higher vulnerability in wartime The larger issue for the Alliance however is not the number of sites but the number and types of weapons within the sites SECRET - ·-- - 7 7 -- --- -- - · _____ -•--· ··