Division Project Clearance Sheet Project Cryptonym _______ DT_LI_N_EN_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Sub-project Cryptonym __l_ A_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ if pp9licable if afplicable Amendment No -------- - - - Developed by L-_ --- J __ J_ __ Case Ofi' icer Reviewed by - 1 1 EE PP any 27 October 195h Date EE PP G Organization J l7h L S¥ Date I tr 1lY Date 1 u✓ 17J Date 3 staff c ' c l ov $ 'I Date s Date w sv S- Chieff E Plans - C Deputy Chief EE Operations ' 9 J- sy Date S Mo v S'-1- na1 s DECLASSIFIED ANO RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY S6URCESMEIHOOsExEMPTIDN3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACl DA TE 2001- _J __ _ _ -- ----- lLn l' f Forwarded by e f l astern uropean LJJ v 1- _ _on SEGRFl Date SECRET ffi OJECT OUTLINE Project Cryptonym or Subject DTLINEN Sub-Project Cryptonym or Identification Amendment No -a-Originating Division EE a Division Chie - b Branch Chief c Case Officer Target Area J C C East Germany Type of Project Current Status J Ebct 3311 J Ext 3303 Psychological and Political Warfare Financial Mechanism Funds requested Ext 2o62 L Subsidy J for Fiscal Year 1955 Operational since 1949 under authorization of Project Outline FARTHElfflARE approved 24 May 1949 Project Outline Revised approved 16 August 1949 and Project Amendment No 1 approved 29 August 1950 SECRET -- SECRET 1 OBJECTIVE To harass and weaken the Soviet administration of East Germany including East Berlin and its German collaborators to help retard East German economic development to help promote and sustain popular anti-Communist resistance within East Germany and t o help expose conditions within the Soviet Zone to the Western world This project supports an effective CIA-guided adm inistrati ve harassment and propaganda organization engaged in helping further these objectives 1n East Germany 2 00 IGIN AND POUCY c mDANCE a Origin 1 NSC 5412 approved 15 March 1954 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NSC 162 2 approved 30 October 1953 NSC 171 l approved 23 December 1953 NSC 160 1 approved 13 August 1953 NSC 5404 approved 2 5 January 1954 PSB D-21 Project Outline Earthenware approved 24 May 1949 Project Outline Revised approved 16 August 1949 Project Amendment No 1 approved 29 August 1950 b Whence Proposed 3 The project originated in the field SITUATION a Since the inception or Soviet occupation in 1945 the u s s R has been able to establish effective controls over the population of East Germany and East Berlin through its own military forces and security police and through the instrumentalities of its East German proteges The lives of the residents of the Soviet Zone have been systematically regimented for the purposes of political indoctrination and camouflaged remilitarization and the economy has been rigorously regulated in order to maximize its strategic contributions to the Soviet bloc There is every indication that the ultimate Soviet aim is to gain political and strategic control of all Germany b Despite Soviet-sponsored indoctrination efforts and repressive measures a substantial amount of popular dissatisfaction with the Communist regime exists throughout East Germany and East Berlin and there remains a considerable resistance potential So long however as Soviet military forces remain in East Germany in strength and the Soviet Union refuses to agree to the - l - SECRET SECRET political reunification of Germany on the basis of genuinely free and impartially-supervised all-German elections there will be fem practical prospects for achieving East German liberation from Communist control without resort to military action On the other hand it is essential from the U S standpoint to prevent the complete Sovietization of East Germany and to minimize its strategic economic military and political contribution to the Soviet bloc c In view of present U S policies against the use of agressive military action to reduce Soviet power and in the light of the probably indefinite continuation of Soviet control in East Germany the U s faces the difficult task of sustaining increasing and exploiting East German popular resistance over a relatively long period of time pending some decisive shift in the balance of power in favor of the non-Communist Jes tern nations The task is complicated by the suppression of the 17 June 19 5 3 distllrbances which evidenced the extent and intensity of East German popular dissatisfaction but which did not and could not lead to liberation or materially improved conditions for the East German people by the failure of the January 1954 Berlin conference to achieve a political basis for reunification and by Soviet steps to formalize the division of Germany throu 71 the bestowal of so-called sovereigrr't y on the East German puppet regime In the face 0£ theae inherent problems the U s through CIA must exert every possible effort to continually discrediting the Soviet Union and the East German Communist regime in the eyes of the East German people strengthening popular East German support for u S European integration policies demonstrating that the East Germans have not been forgotten or abandoned by the West and persuading them that they have the power to alleviate their condition to some extent through their own current resistance actions d The Fighting League Against Inhumanity Kam pfgruppe ge€ -en Unmenschllchkei t KgU which has been subsidized and guided by CIA since its inception in 1949 was originally conceived for the purpose of e osing to the residents of both East and West Germany the co nditions existent in prisoner-of-war and concentration camps in the Soviet Zone A secondary purpose was to provide a source of useful information concerning the psychological situation within East Germany Since 1949 _ the KgU has increased in size from a total of 15 members to 85 overt West Berlin headquarters employees and 125 covert Soviet Zone contacts and has f _hifted its e_ta 1QD DJPbasia f r9 m l lYJ § g --to admini rati V Lha ra aam ent The-x@ wider CU guidance has conducted extensive administrative harassment operations in the Soviet Zone based largely on infonnation received from its East German covert informants These operations have resulted in the disruption of certain East German governmental and Cormnunist Party activities causing the expense o f Soviet time energy and money D tring an average month in addition to 20 administrative harassment operations the KgU has distributed 700 000 propaganda items in the Soviet Zone mainly by balloon operations mailed 10 000 warning letters to Soviet Zone functionaries and Communist sympathizers debriefed 100 members of the People's Police and 75 visitors of interest to the KgU 1 s - 2 - SECRET office for East German Sta te Security matters interviewed and assisted 2 Soo visitors to its overt West Berlin headquarters processed 11 000 search service cases for persons missing in the Soviet Zone and interviewed SO visitors to its covert office from which potential covert workers are chosen Also the KgU has turned over an average of 600 intelligence reports to the Berlin Base intelligence section every month as well as screening out an average of 10 persons per month of possible interest to the Berlin Base counterespionage section for penetrating or providing infonnation about the East German State Security Service Connnunist Party and People's Police CASTABIA program or as leads for inducing defection among the Soviet military forces REDCAP program e Project Dl'LINEN formerly EARTHENWARE was originally approved by COP on 24 May 1949 as a sub-project of project QKDEMOl to support _the KgU on a limited basis A new project outline approved on 16 August 1949 established Dl'LINEN as an independant project for the support of the KgU and its propaganda and resistance activities Project Amendment No 1 approved on 29 August 1950 authorized the expansion of KgU operational facilities f Outside of' occasional small gifts from West Berlin and West German organizations and individuals the KgU receives its entire financial support from CIA L PROPOSAL It is proposed that CIA continue to subsidize and direct the administrative harassment propaganda and intelligence activities of the KgU in order to further project objectives 5 OPERATIONAL our LINE a Sub-proposals or tasks CIA will continue to provide operational guidance to the KgU and to subsidize the organization to de fray its expenses for the following items 1 That portion of the KgU 1 s organizational overhecld expenses that is not provided for from other financial sources -CIA-subsidies will cover all salaries rents arid necessary administrative expenses associated with the maintenance of the KgU' s covert organization and will help provide for similar expenses required to maintain the KgU's overt staff and office 2 The preparation and execution of administrative harassment operations designed to ridicule confuse and undermine the efficiency and t·· · effectiveness of East German governmental and Conmunist Party offices - 3 - SECRET Such operations may involve the production and carefully-targeted distribution of falsified administrative instructions or other special methods that have been approved by headquarters J The editinb printing and East German distribution of leaflets pamphlets and other publications denouncing East German and Soviet practices and personalities encouraging passive resistance and informing the East German population on international West German and local East German developments These publications may either be attributed to the KgU or camouflaged as to source h The East German distribution of' defection - inducement propaganda directed at Soviet military personnel 5 The maintenance of secure contact with regular KgU covert East Gennan co-workers for information gathering operational counter espionage and positive intelligence purposes • 6 The f'urnishing of advice and assistance to and the debriefing of refugees arriving at the KgU refugee processing of'fices and visitors to the overt KgU headquarters as well as the preparation of records and file checks on refugees at the request of West Berlin and West German governmental refugee processing offices 7 The preparatlon of records reports and statistics regarding East German prisons detention camps labor camps political prisoner camps etc for Western pimpaganda exploitation through overt news media and West German and West Berlin governmental outlets 8 The preparation of articles concerning conditions in the Soviet Zone and related matters for dissemination in Western magazines and newspapers b · •' ·-' t e Key Personnel 1 The principal agent who is the incumbent head of the KgU He is forty-four years old a German by birth and is a fo nner SPD party functionary A member of the KgU since its inception he has headed the organization for over two years and has been responsible to a great extent for the increase in the scope of its operations He has proven a reliable worker He has full operational clearance 2 The deputy to the principal agent who is chief of the Operations He is thirty-one years old a German by birth and ' a former official in the German Criminal Police in Berlin Originally brought into the KgU i n January 1951 for a CE assignment he shortly thereaf'ter took over his present position Due to his efforts the organization's compartmentation has been increased and the overall security appreciably strengthened He has a full operational clearance Section of the KgU - 4- SEGRE't c Indigenous Groups The KgU West Berlin headquarters staff consiatB of 85 persons -who w I th the exception of members of the executive and advisory oonmdttees are employed within the seven sections of the organization These sections are as follo rs I - Political and Public Affairs II - Personnel and Administration III - Refugee A fairs IV - People's Police Office V - Search Service and Social Welfare VI - Central Files and VII - Operations 1ihe covert section The covert section for whose support the majority of the CI l subsidy is used has a staff of 15 five in the central office and two in each of five field divilions To these field divisions one for each of the fomer Fast German Laendar a total of 125 F ast German co-workers regularly report to give positive intelligence and to receive administrative hara• smsit and propaganda material for infiltration and distribution ill co-workers have been name-cheaked both in the field and at headquarters d Target Groups Targets for administrative haratsment operations The target for propaganda activity is the population of Fast Germany and Fast Berlin and to a lesser degree West Germany and Westem Europe are Soviet Zone govemmental and Communist Party officials 6 Indei'lni te e Duration f Graphic Illustrations NA SECURITY a Cover Both the principal agent and his deputy are knowledgeable of the factt bat they are working for a U s intelligence service and no cOYer is utilized by the CIA field case officer via-a-vis these personnel in contact 1ll th them CIA funds are camoufiaged as donations f'rom organizations and individuals sympathetic to the aims ot the KgU As the organization has an internationally kn01111 overt function of aiding and giT l ng advice to F ast Germans as will as carrying out a vigorous anti-Soviet campaign wl thin both West Berlin and West Germany its cOYert operations are being conducted behind an overt facade b Knowledgeability 1 'nle key personnel are knowledgeable of U S intelligence support 2 Although never officially informed about U s• financial support German employees of the West Berlin KgU headquarters should be preswned s to suspect that an illied Power and probably the u subsidizes the KgU These probable suspicions would be based on Soviet and F ast German allegations allegations in West em ne rs media local gossip and the magnitude of KgU activities - - SECRET 3 The West Gennan and West Berlin governments the British intelligence service and lUCOG are all knowledgeable of U S Government interest in the KgU c Operational Security Standard operational security precautions including the use of safe houses etc • are taken by CIA field case officers in all contacts with key personnel of the KgU Furthermore no information that would prejudice other CIA operations has been or will be passed to these personnel All KgU headquarters personnel ha ve been cleared or are in the process of clearance Compa rtmentation and other operational security measures are carried out among the covert personnel under direction of the chief or the KgU Operations Section who receives oontinuous guidance in security matters from the CIA field case officer In addition the personnel organization and operational security practices of the KgU are being constant reviewed and analyzed by CIA both in the German Mission and in Washington in order to identify and overcome operational weaknesses d Risks The most serious risk involved in this project would be incurred by the ld dnapping of either of key personnel As the KgU has received favorable international publicity and support for its anti Cornnnmist activities it is believed that repercussions in the event of' a compromise would not be very great in Western Germany or Europe and little capital could be made of such an event by the Communist authorities Furthennore as the KgU is engaged in a basically humanitarian and anti-Communist program it is believed that exposure of u s Government interest would cause little or no adverse reaction in the United States · the e Personnel Disposal 1 No serious difficulties are anticipated in the disposal of either of the key personnel either before or a f'ter the termination of the project 2 Although CIA does not have a direct or formal responsibility for other KgU headquarters personnel and could effectuate the disposal of such personnel during the life of the project through instructions to key personnel it is probable that in the event of project termination CIA would f ind it necessary for operational or moral reasons to assist in the secure and amiable termination disposition of KgU staff personnel On the basis of previous experience with the termination or similar projects some individual disposal problems are considered likely f Disaster Plan Transfer of key personnel involved in this operation and the abandonment and or destruction of incriminating materials in the event of a hot war will take place in accordance with the Eastern European Division 1 s disaster plan for Germany - 6 - SECRET SECRET 7 COORDINATION a Relation to Other Projects 1 In assistanc e to the REDCAP program and SE Division project AEPAWN the KgU under CIA guidance distributes Russian-language propaganda material aimed at inducing defection a1rong Soviet military personnel KgU distribution costs due to this activity are reimbursed from project CATIDAL 2 Upon occasion the KgU has coordinated its activities without CIA intercession with such other PP-supported organizations as the Investigating Committee of F'ree Jurists Pro iect CADROIT and the People's League for Peace and Freedom C J In addition the KgU has distributed propaganda material published by PP-supported projects LCPAGAN Tarantel and C _J support of the DGB 3 Project IJI'IJ NEN supJX rts the CIA Berlin Base's counterespionage and Soviet defection programs To this end the chief of the KgU 1 s Operations Section or his designee refers selected East German personnel to an outside contact office for further processing In addition the KgU furnishes the Berlin Base case officer with positive infonnation produced as a by-product of its East Genna n PP activities Such information is transmitted to the Berlin Base positive intelligence section See attached FI Armex for further details b Significance within Over-All Program in Area Project DI'LINlll constitutes one of the major PP anti-Comnunist resistance operations directed against the Soviet Zone of' Germany The KgU is the principal PP-supported instrumentality for administrative harassment operations against East German and Soviet governmental and against CoilllllUilist Party offices and functionaries within the Soviet Zone c Extent of coordination 1 The project was originated by the German Mission and has been coordinated with all appropriate CIA components at headquarters As stated above the intelligence material gathered as a by-product of this project is passed to the positive intelligence section of the Berlin Base In add i tion personnel of interest to the CASTABIA and REOCAP programs are passed to an FI-controlled agent C J for debriefing and final disposition 2 Cleared personnel of the State Department been orally briefed on the purposes and activities is regular coordinat on between representatives of HICOG pursuant to policy measures as pertaining to activities - 7- SECRET in Washington have of the project There the German Mission and the KgU and its SEGREl 3 Key individuals in the Federal Republic and West Berlin governments have been informed of U S interest in the KgU and general policies affecting certain CIA-supported KgU activities have been discussed by the German Mission with these individuals see paragraph 11 j Special Considerations Representatives of the British Intelligence Service have been infomed of U s support for the KgU Certain responsible officials of the KgU maintain a continual liaison with various off ices of the Federal ltepublic and West Berlin governments as well as other private organizations on matters of mutual interest affecting overt KgU activities the KgU prepares statistical reports on East German prison and detention camps for the use of governmental offices assists the Red Cross by giving aid and advice to refugees from the Sor iet Zone and serves as the distributor of West Berlin governmental fund a to needy persons This liaison which is conducted with the knowledge and approval of CIA does not impair CIA control over the KgU and does not inter fere with the fulfillment o f the KgU' s covert mission 8 CONTROL a Nature of 1 Direct control over the project will be exercised by the Berlin Base by means of the administration of the financial subsidy and supervisory guidance Secondary control will be exercised by the German Mission while final control will rest with Headquarters in Washington 2 No serious control difficulties are envisaged as pertaining to the Principal Agent and his deputy as both are satisfied with their present positions and highly motivated ideologically b Administrative Plan The revised administrative plan for project DI'LINEN was approved by the Acting DD A on 3 April 195h The usual reports requirements as outlined 1n RI 50-11 Reports on administrative harassment and other covert activities are consolidated by the Principal Agent and submitted to the field case officer for transmission thtt'lugh the Chief of Mission to Headquarters c Reports and implementing regulations apply to this project 9 BUDGET DATA a Total CU Funds Required for Fiscal Year Attachment A 1955 c- · b Availability of Funds CIA funds in the amount oft have been authorized for project DTLINEN within the Eastern European DivisTon' s Program for Fiscal Year 1955 - 8 - SEGREI i·'H t U ' ···• ' 'f1' ' c Non-CIA Funds d Foreign Currency e Funding f Financial Hi story I N A NA See Section I of the Administrative Plan Fiscal Year 1953 - Authorization __ Fiscal Year 1954 - Authorization ---C g Future Requirements It is anticipated that a total of _ will be required for Fiscal Year 1956 10 _J Obligation Cc_ Cl ligation L · _J SUPPOfil' DATA a Total CIA Personnel Total CIA personnel necessary for this project are one field and one headquarters case officer on a part-time basis These personnel are currently available b Material NA c Cormnunications No commW1ications facilities beyond those now available to the CIA German Mission are necessary d Other CIA Support NA e • Support from other United States Agencies No support from other United States agencies is required other than that presently available to the CIA German Mission 11 GENERAL CONSIEER ATIONS a Current Status Approved and operated under original project outline as amended b Cornmi tma1ts Although no written cormnitments have been made to either the Principal Agent or his deputy they understand that they will receive assistance from CIA should they because of their activities on behali of Dr LINEN be forced to evacuate Berlin for security reasons Such assistance would ootail a resettlement bonus transportation to West Germany for the employee involved and his immediate family pay for a three month period and whatever assistance is possible in obtaining a new job In addi ti on should either of these personnel be kidnapped or otherwise rendered incapable of supporting his family because of DTLINEN activities CI A would continue to submit monthly pay checks to his family - 9 - jECRET · nET cbn c Effectiveness 1 The KgU has grown from a group of 15 people whose task it was to uncover derogatory information about Soviet Zone practices into a major CIA-supported administrative harassment and propaganda organization with a headquarters staff of 85 and 125 East German co-workers 2 The impact of KgU ad'llinistrative harassment operations has been reflected by eye-witness reports of KgU co-workers and other CIA agents reports of counter-measures which the GDR government has been forced to take and numerous accounts in the East German press warning the population to be on their guard against KgU members as perpetrators of of crimes against the state Over the past twelve months the KgU has carried out 167 major ad rninistrative harassment operations which may be divided into the following categor1 es false instructions and invitations 70 countermanding of Ea st German governmental and party instructions 16 false information LJ warnings to governmental and party functionaries 6 true anti-Communist information under false letterheads 16 demands for payment of notional accounts 6 falsified orders for materials 8 and forged postage stamps and documents h 3 The nature of some of these operations makes their effectiveness difficult to assess but the majority have been strongly criticized in the Soviet Zone press and governmental bulletins Others have given more tangible proof falsified postage stamps carrying a 11 slow-down slogan which were widely distributed and appeared on numerous franked envelopes reportedly induced the East Berlin postal authorities to introduce special procedures for examining mail thus lessening postal efficiency issue of falsified notices of an inventory sale at the State-Owned Stores allegedly cost the East German government DM S 000 000 in losses h One of the most successful of recently-undertaken operations was directed against the East German Ministry of Trade A falsified letter purportedly originating with the Ministry was mailed to a number of the GI R 1 s customers in Switzerland Sweden Holland Spain Czechoslovald a Hungary Finland and Cmna advising them that the ram could not accept orders for the coming year because of its critical economic and financial situation and because trade with these finns had not resulted in the propaganda value which the GDR had expected As a result three East Berlin papers carried simultaneous articles denouncing the letters as vicious falsifications and the ifulistry was forced to write all its customers not knowing to which ones the falsifications had been sent explaining that forged letters had been sent These bona fide letters were then intercepted by the KgU and another forgery immediately mailed out This operation resulted in a waste of time and effort within the Ministry and lowered the GJJR 1 s prestige abroad as a by-product the operation produced a list of firms engaged in West-East trade - 10 - • 5 Evidence of 1 gU propaganda effectiveness has been _afforded by testimonials from a large nwnber of People's Police officials and other · East German residents who have come to the KgU headquarters for advice as a result of reading KgU propaganda material · 6 The West German and West Berlin governments as well as the Red Cross and other private organizations request information from the KgU on refugee matters The KgU 1 s search service on people in East Germany is utilized by a number of West German private and governmental organizations 7 The r avorable international reputation of the KgU has been reflected by articles in Time the New Yorker the New York Herald Tribune the New York Times the Christian Science Monitor and other leading American and European newspapers and periodicals d Anticipated Results 1 On the basis of past experience with project DrLINEN it is expected that continueid CIA support of the KgU will yield a fair return on the funds and case officer time devoted to the project The KgU possesses demonstrated operational capabilities within East Germany has maintained a satisfactory security standard and has proven responsive to CIA guidance 2 The KgU 1 s administrative harassment operations which will be continually refined and gradually expanded are expected to help lessen the efficiency of the East German governmental economic and Con munist Party activities both through the delays and waste motion induced by successful administrative harassment operations and by causing the East German authorities to devote time and funds to efforts to detect and forestall harassment operations This reduced efficiency should contribute in some measure to the reduction of East Germany's contribution to the Soviet bloc It should also help induce a climate of uneasiness among Soviet and East Gennan authorities by evidencing the extent of organized resistance At the SIM time it should strengthen the East German will to resist by demonstrating the practicability of effective resistance and causing popular disrespect for Communist administrative organization and procedures 3 KgU propaganda production and distribution operations are expected to help sustain East German resistance morale KgU support to the REOOAP Soviet-defection efforts through participation in defection propaganda distribution operations under CJ should also have an effect 4 KgU research and reports on conditions in East Germany are expected to continue to be valuable in helping educate West Germans as to the incompatability of the Communist and Western systems - ll - SECRET • SECRET e Zvaluation 1 General overall project effectiveness will be assessed on the basis of independent intelligence and overt media reports from other CIA agents and East German refugees and popular opinion in West Berlin and West Germany In addition the detailed and lengthy monthly reports submitted by the Principal Agent will be reviewed both in the field and at headquarters 2 The effectiveness of administrative harassment operations will be judged by directives and other counter-measures of the East German govel llllent attacks in the Soviet Zone press and radio and reports from KgU co orkers and other CIA agents The services of CIS will continue to be utilized for thi s purpose 3 Reader reaction will be judged both by letters received from the Soviet Zone and by reports of the interviews with the East German and East Berlin residents who voluntarily visit the overt headquarters in West Berlin f Policy Questions An unresolved policy question is whether to what extent and under what circumstances the Federal Republic and or West Berlin governments should be allowed increased participation in determining the policies for and supervising the operations of the KgU See paragraph 11 j S eecial Considerations for the background of this policy question HA g Congress h Extra-Agency Action i Proprietary Companies j• Special Considerations NA NA 1 In the summer of 1952 the German Mission officially advised representatives of the Federal Republic and West Berlin governments that the U S Government was furnishing guidance and financial assistance to the KgU The German fission also furnished a statement of intentions to a point of contact in the Federal Republic government acknowledging a proper Gennan governmental interest in East German resistance activities and indicating that a cooperative u s -German governmental relationship regarding such organizations as the KgUwas foreseen Since the summer of 1952 periodic policy discussions between German Mission and Federal Republic representatives have been held but the CIA operational relationship with the KgU has not been materialJ s altered 2 With the possibly ilnmi nent restoration of full Federal Republic sovereignty through implementation of the L indon agreement Federal Republic - 12 - EGRET SECRET governmental pressure on CIA to achieve greater or complete influence and control over such CIA-sponsored East German resistance activities as the KgU has increased Since a legal basis for the continued presence of u S and Allied forces in West Berlin will continue to exist it is probable that the u s could indefinitely retain reserved powers affecting the security and administration of West Berlin which would technically permit continued exclusive u s control over such u s Sector groups as the KgU In practice however for political reasons the U s will probably not choose to exercise its reserved powers for this purpose to the same degree as heretofore k Liquidation NA - 13 - i CRET FI ANNEX TO PROJECT DTLINEN CRYPTONYM DTLINEN l Area of Operations 2 Purpose 3• Background East Berlin and East Gennany To utilize the German Mission-subsidized Fighting Group Against Inhumanity Kampfgru ppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit KgU to collect positive intelligence on the area of operations through passing to the Intelligence Section of the Berlin Base both infonnation collected as a by-product of the PP activities of this group and those indigenous personnel whose knowledge may assist the section in obtaining information about and or infiltrating the Ea st German Communist Party State Security Service and People's Police CASTABIA program and the defection of Soviet military forcee REDCAP program a All visitors to the KgU 1 s West Berlin headquarters who have infonnation to give on Communist police and military personnel and operations in the Soviet Zone are interviewed by the KgU Section IV - VOPO and Police ifatters If any of these personnel are thought to be of interest to the CASTABIA or REDCAP pro grams thev are directed to an outside FI-controlled officer _j for further debriefing and final disposition No Nrther contact with tham is maintained by KgU During the past twelve months the KgU has sent an average of ten persons a month to th6 __J office b All reports and information submitted by KgU co-workers and visitors to the KgU headquarters are screened for potential intelligence value Reports of this nature are then transmitted by the DTLINEN field case officer to the Intelligence Section of the Berlin Base During the pa st twelve months an average of 600 intelligence reports a month have been forwarded to this Section see c For general background information on the project paragraph 3 of the PP Project Outline 4 References See paragraph 2 of the PP Project Outline 5 Objectives To establish penetrations of the East German Connnunist Party State Security Service People's Police and other Soviet Zone governmental functions for positive intelligence purposes - 1 - • ' E RE T v See paragraph 5 d of PP Project ilitllne 7 'i'asks See paragraph 5 above 8 a Pseudonyms and cryPtonyms The pseudonym of the Principal Agent is Charles H Newham The cryptonym of his deputy is 6 Target Personnel C 3· b 9 Personnel data See Paragraph Operational and or Security Clearance 5 b of PP Project Outline See paragraph 6 c of PP Project Outline See paragraph 6 a of PP Project Outline 10 Cover 11 Contact and Conmnmica·tions Outline 12 Control and Motivation lJ Equipment and other Support 14 Coordination 15 Timetable See paragraphs 6 c and 10 c of PP Project See paragraph 8 of PP Project Oitline See paragraph 10 of PP Project Outline See paragraph 7 c of PP Project O itline Indefinite - 2 - SEGREI