C2 UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 01 STATE ORIGIN NODS 00 145139 INFO 001 R OCT-01 ADS-00 RELEASED IN FULL 66011 DRAFTED BY S S PTAROFF APPROVED BY S S PTARNOFF S S-0 SSTAPELTON ---------- ---- --072060 0 061451Z JUN 79 ZFF4 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 061624Z 47 SECRET STATE 145139 NODIS FOLLOWING REPEAT ISLAMABAD 6408 SENT ACTION SECSTATE 05 JUN 79 QUOTE S EC RE T ISLAMABAD 6408 NODIS E O 12065 RDS-3 6 4 99 CONSTABLE P D OR-M TAGS MNUC PEPR PARM PK US CH SUBJECT NON-PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIS 1 S - ENTIRE TEXT 2 SUMMARY WE HAVE COME TO A DEAD END IN OUR BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY TO THE NATIONS OF SOUTH ASIA DESPITE OUR BEST EFFORTS INDIA HAS AND PAKISTAN IS DEVELOPING FACILITIES CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS UNLESS WE CAN SOMEHOW DEVISE A REGIME TO HEAD THEM OFF WE FACE THE CERTAIN PROSPECT OF TWO NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES IN THIS TROUBLED AREA SECRET PAGE 02 STATE 145139 IT MAY BE TIME TO ADJUST OUR NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY IN SOUTH ASIA WHICH HPS FOCUSSED ALMOST ENTIRELY ON PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF THIS TECHNOLOGY NSO TTAT WE CAN STILL HAVE A CHANCE OF MEETING OUR OVER-RIDING POLICY OBJECTIVE -- THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FABRICATION -- BEFORE THAT THRESHOLD TOO IS VASSED BY TREATING SOUTH ASIA AS A SPECIAL CASE WE MAY BE ABLE TO SAVE OUR GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY IN OTHER AREAS WHERE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY HAS YET TO REACH THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY SHARON E AHMAD DATE CASE ID 09 SEP 2011 201006557 DECAPTIONED UNCLASSIFIED LEVELS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN UNCLASSIFIED 3 IN THIS MESSAGE WE OFFER A NEW NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY FOR SOUTH ASIA BASED UPON THREE KEY ELEMENTS --- AN ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE THE GOP TO FOREGO A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION PNE -- AN EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE GOI THAT IT SHOULD OFFER THE GOP A FORMAL ASSURANCE OF PRIMIN DESAI'S PUBLICLY STATED POLICY THAT INDIA WILL NOT DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS A REQUEST TO BEIJING TMAT THE PRC ASSURE NEW DELHI THAT IT WILL NOT DEPLOY ITS NUCLEAR FORCES AGAINST INDIA 4 A US HONEST BROKER'S ROLE IN THIS STRATEGY WOULD HAVE TO BE ACTED OUT AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO CONVINCE THOSE INVOLVED OF OUR PURPOSE AND THE STRENGTH OF OUR GUARANTEE AS AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS NEW STRATEGY WE WILL ALSO NEED TO CONSIDER A CHANGE IN OUR APPROACH TO URANIUM SALES TO INDIA AND OUR SANCTIONS AGAINST PAKISTAN END SUMMARY 5 WE HAVE RUN INTO A SERIES OF SEEMINGLY INSURMOUNTABLE ROADBLOCKS IN OUR ATTEMPT THROUGH BILATERAL PERSUASION SECRET PAGE 03 STATE 145139 CONGRESSIONALLY-MANDATED SANCTIONS AND MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY TO STOP THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN SOUTH ASIA INDIA HAS ALREADY SET OFF A PNE AND PAKISTAN WHILE NOT YET A MEMBER OF THE NUCLEAR CLUB HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS ABILITY TO AVOID STRICT INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND ITS CONTINUING INTENTION TO BECOME A NUCLEAR POWER 6 OUR OVERRIDING NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVE IN THE REGION IS -- AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN -- TO KEEP NUCLEAR WEAPONS OUT OF SOUTH ASIA TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WE HAVE AS A COLLATERAL GOAL TRIED TO STOP THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY SUCH AS THE CONSTRUCTION OF REPROCESSING PLANTS AND ENRICHMENT FACILITIES DESPITE OUR BEST EFFORTS WE ARE FORCED TO CONCLUDE THAT WE HAVE FAILED TO ACHIEVE THIS AIM ALTHOUGH WE CAN CLAIM SOME SUCCESS IN THE FRENCH CANCELLATION OF THE REPROCESSING DEAL WITH PAKISTAN INDIA HAS REPROCESSING FACILITIES HAS EXPLODED A PNE AND PRODUCES WEAPONS-GRADE URANIUM PAKISTAN MAY BE FAST APPROACHING THE PNE THRESHOLD UNCLASSIFIED 7 WE URGENTLY NEED TO RE-EVALUATE QrnH 001 JIIt ION STRATEGY SO THAT WE ARE IN A BETTER POSITION TO ACHIEVE OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE THE SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR CLOCK CANNOT BE TURNED BACK AND WE MUST NOW TRY TO KEEP BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN FROM EXERCISING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTIONS THEY POSSESS OR WILL SOON ACQUIRE DESIGNING SUCH A STRATEGY WILL NOT BE EASY IT WILL INVOLVE SOME HARD CHOICES AND A RECOGNITION ON OUR PART THAT PAST POLICIES HAVE NOT BEEN AS EFFECTIVE AS WE MIGHT HAVE HOPED BUT IF WE DO NOT NOW MAKE A SINCERE ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE SOUTH ASIANS THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE NOT A VIABLE OPTION WE WILL BE FACED BY THE MID-EIGHTIES OR EVEN EARLIER WITH TWO INTERNALLY UNSTABLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES WITH A LONG HISTORY OF CONFLICT MUTUAL MISTRUST AND UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS SECRET PAGE 04 STATE 145139 8 IF WE FAIL TO ACT DECISIVELY WE WILL ALSO JEOPARDIZE OUR GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY WHICH COULD COLLAPSE UNDER THE WEIGHT OF TWO ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES BY TREATING SOUTH ASIA AS A SPECIAL CASE WE MAY HAVE A BETTER CHANCE TONHEAD OFF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT HERE AND ALSO TO PRESERVEIN TME REST OF THE WORLD THOSE ELEMENTS OF OUR GLOBAL NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGY WHICH ARE WORKING IN COUNTRIES THAT FOR A VARIETY OF HISTORICAL AND TECHNICAL REASONS HAVE NOT YET ACHIEVED INDIA'S AND PAKISTAN'S LEVEL OF NUCLEAR SOPHISTICATION 9 THERE ARE A FEW HOPEFUL SIGNS IN THIS OTHERWISE BLEAK PICTURE AND WE SHOULD GRASP THEM IN ORDER TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR OUR STRATEGY -- INDIAN PRIMIN DESAI PERSONALLY DOES NOT WANT INDIA TO PURSUE A NUCLEAR WEAPONS COURSE HE HAS POLITICALLY COMMITED THE GOI TO A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND HAS FLATLY STATED HE BELIEVES PRES ZIA UL-HAQ'S ASSURANCES ON THIS SCORE -- WE BELIEVE THAT WHAT PAKISTAN SEEKS IS IN PART A FULL FUEL CYCLE LIKE INDIA'S -- A BARGAINING CHIP -- AND THAT THE GOP MIGHT BE WILLING TO HOLD ITS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AT A STAGE SHORT OF ACTUAL WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT TO ACHIEVE OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE WE MAY HAVE TO ACCEPT THE PRESENT LEVELS OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN FACT WE MAY HAVE TO ALLOW THE GOP TO COMPLETE ITS ENRICHMENT PROGRAM SO THAT A REAL ALBEIT ROUGH LIKENESS BETWEEN THE TWO FUEL CYCLES EXISTS WHILE TRYING TO ENSURE THAT BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN STOP UNCLASSIFIED SHORT OF WEAPONS FABRICATION OUR A®Bf F J RATION SECRET PAGE 05 STATE 145139 POLICY COULD THUS BE PRESERVED WHILE WE WOULD BE ACCEPTING AN UNFORTUNATE REALITY WE MIGHT RETAIN SOME LEVERAGE OVER FUTURE SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS AND WE MIGHT ALSO BE ABLE THEN TO LOOK TO OUR OTHER STRATEGIC POLICY INTERESTS IN THE REGION 10 THIS PROPOSED NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY FOR SOUTH ASIA IS BASED UPON THREE KEY ELEMENTS A WE WOULD NEED TO PERSUADE THE GOP NOT TO MOVE AHEAD WITH A PNE THERE ARE TWO BASIC ARGUMENTS WE SHOULD MAKE IN FAVOR OF THE GOP'S ACCEPTING A FULL FUEL CYCLE WITHOUT A WEAPONS COMPONENT AKIN TO INDIA'S AND NOT SETTING OFF A NUCLEAR BLAST -- A PAKISTANI PNE WOULD CAUSE PRIMIN DESAI'S INDIAN ROPE TRICK ON NUCLEAR POLICY TO COLLAPSE IF WE READ REPORTING FROM NEW DELHI ACCURATELY DESAI WOULD BE UNABLE TO RESIST PRESSURES -- BOTH FROM INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE GOI -- TO DEVELOP INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESAI WHOM WE ARE SURE HOLDS HIS ANTI-NUCLEAR VIEWS SINCERELY MIGHT PROCEED ON SUCH A COURSE WITH ANGUISH BUT WE ARE CONVINCED HE WOULD PROCEED IN THE FACE OF THIS POSTULATED WEAPONS PRODUCTION SPARKED BY A PAKISTANI PNE THE GOP NEED TO BE CONVINCED THAT NOTHING LESS THAN PAKISTAN'S SURVIVAL IS AT STAKE A GOP PNE WOULD LEAD WITHIN MONTHS TO A GO-AHEAD FOR THE PRODUCTION OF INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MIGHT EVEN PROVOKE AN INDIAN EFFORT TO STRIKE DIRECTLY AT PAKISTN'S WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES IN THE END PAKISTAN'S SECURITY WILL BE MORE OF A QUESTION MARK NOT LESS -- ALTHOUGH PROBABLY LESS IMPORTANT TO THE GOP THAN ITS FEAR OF INDIA AND ITS DESIRE TO BECOME A NUCLEAR POWER WE COULD HOLD OUT TO THE GOP THE PROMISE OF A CONCERTED EFFORT TO EASE THE PRESENT IMPASSE IN US-PAK RELATIONS IF THEY FORMALLY ESCHEW A PNE WITH SERIOUS GOP CONCERNS SECRET PAGE 06 STATE 145139 ABOUT AFGHANISTAN AND GOP FEARS OF SOVIET MEDDLING IN THE REGION ISLAMABAD'S DESIRE FOR A REVITALIZED US-PAK RELATIONSHIP COULD WORK IN OUR FAVOR B WE WOULD NEED TO ASK THE GOI SPECIFICALLY UNCLASSIFIED PRIMIN DESAI TO PROVIDE MORE A FO @ t is@f_Fiffl rHE GOP AND INDEED TO THE WORLD THAT INDIA WILL NOT DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS THESE ASSURANCES-- HOWEVER HEDGED MIGHT TAKE THE FORM OF A LETTER FROM DESAI TO PRESIDENT ZIA OR A LETTER FROM DESAI TO PRESIDENT CARTER WHICH WE COULD THEN SHARE WITH ZIA WHATEVER THE FORM THE GOP WILL DEMAND MORE THAN DESAI'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS BEFORE IT COULD AGREE TO FORGO A PNE CONVERSELY DESAI WOULD HAVE TO SATISFY HIMSELF WITH OUR ASSISTANCE PERHAPS THAT PAKISTAN IS NOT EMBARKED ON A PROGRAM TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS EVEN THOUGH THE TECHNICAL ABILITY EXISTS C WE WOULD NEED TO APPROACH THE CHINESE WHO AT THE POLICY LEVEL AGREE WITH OUR OBJECTIVE TO KEEP NUCLEAR WEAPONS OUT OF SOUTH ASIA TO SEEK THEIR AGREEMENT TO -- PROVIDE A FORMAL ASSURANCE TO NEW DELHI OR PERHAPS TO US FOR USE WITH NEW DELHI THAT NO CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCES WILL BE DEPLOYED AGAINST INDIA SUPPORT OUT STRATEGY WITH THE GOP ADDING THEIR WEIGHT TO US AND INDIAN GUARANTEES 11 THIS STRATEGY REQUIRES BOTH A FLEXIBLE AND A VIGOROUS US ROLE SINCE A MULTILATERALLY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT SUCH AS THE SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECRET PAGE 07 STATE 145139 FREE ZONE NOW SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE WE WILL NEED TO PLAY HONEST BROKER AND TRY TO FORGE A SERIES OF BILATERAL UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE MAJOR PLAYERS ALONG THE LINES OF THE KEY ELEMENTS IN PARA 10 12 THIS US ROLE IN PURSUIT OF OUR NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVE IS POSSIBLE BUT ONLY IF WE ARE WILLING TO ALTER OUR PRESENT POLICIES IN TWO SIGNIFICANT WAYS -- WE WOULD NEED TO REMOVE THE PROHIBITIONS OF THE NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROL ACT ON URANIUM SHIPMENTS TO INDIA THE GOI HAS REPEATEDLY MADE ITS POSITION ONFULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS CLEAR IT WILL NOT ACCEPT THEM INDIA'S REJECTION OF SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEES A CONFRONTATION WITH THE US IN MARCH 1980 IF NOT BEFORE THE INDIANS ALREADY HAVE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND WE WASTE LEVERAGE DENYING THEM FUEL THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN ELSEWHERE IN OUR SEARCH FOR A SIMILARITY IN REGIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES SHORT OF WEAPONS UNCLASSIFIED DVELOPMENT SELLING FUEL TO INDIA WE WILL HAVE TO MAKE I li f 3SIF'f CHOICES -- WE WILL HAVE TO REMOVE THE SANCTIONS PERHAPS THROUGH THE WAIVER PROVISIONS ON PAKISTAN MANDATED BY THE SYMINGTON AMENDMENT EVEN THOUGH THEIR PURPOSES WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED WHILE WE SHOULD MAINTAIN OUR VIGILANCE AND TRY TO INTERDICT AS MUCH OF THE SUPPLY OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL TO PAKISTAN FROM ABROAD AS POSSIBLE WE SHOULD NOT DELUDE OURSELVES INTO THINKING THAT PAKISTAN CANNOT CREATE THEIR CASCADE OF CENTRIFUGES MND PRODUCE FISSIONBLE MATERIAL EITHER BY INDIGENOUS FABRICATION OR CONTINUED CLANDESTINE PROCUREMENT OUR LIFTING OF THE SYMINGTON SANCTIONS LIKE THE SALE OF FUEL TO INDIA WOULD RECOGNIZE A DISTASTEFUL REALITY BUT WOULD SHOW PAKISTAN THAT THERE ARE ADVANTAGSS TO DEALING WITH THE U S 13 BEFORE EMBARKING ON THIS COURSE WE WILL ALSO BE SECRET PAGE 08 STATE 145139 REQUIRED TO ASK TWO QUESTIONS OF OURSELVES -- IS OUR INTELLIGENCE GOOD ENOUGH ON BOTH SIDES TO PERSUADE THE GOI AND THE GOP THAT WE COULD KNOW IF ONE OR THE OTHER WAS CHEATING ARE WE WILLING OR ABLE TO SHARE THIS INFORMATION -- ARE WE PREPARED TO MAKE THE HIGHEST-LEVEL COMMITMENT NECESSARY TO GIVE THIS INITIATIVE A CHANCE OF SUCCESS CREATING CONFIDENCE IN BILATERAL UNDERSTANDINGS EITHER WITH THE US OR GUARANTEED BY THE US WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT NEITHER INDIA NOR PAKISTAN IS LIKELY TO BE COMFORTABLE WITH US ASSURANCES BECAUSE OF THEIR OWN PERCEPTIONS OF US DUPLICITY LACK OF COMITMENT AND DUAL STANDARD WE BELIEVE THAT NOTHING LESS THAN A CARTER-ZIA AND CARTER-DESAI DIALOGUE WILL WORK 14 WE HAVE NOT ADDRESSED THE PROBLEM OF PAKISTAN'S SHARING ADVANCED NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY WITH OTHER MUSLIM STATES THIS IS A SERIOUS PROPSPECT AND POINT ON WHICH WE SHOULD SEEK ASSURANCES FROM THE GOP AS PART OF OUR CONSULTATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS ENVISIONED IN PARA 10 WE MIGHT PROPOSE TO THE GOP THAT THEY WORK THROUGH AN INTERNATIONAL MECHANISM IN THE CONTEXT OF IDEAS OUTLINED IN ASST SEC PICKERING'S TALKS WITH THE CANADIANS REPORTED IN STATE 142386 WHICH WOULD PROVIDE ACCESS TO LEGITIMATE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL UNCLASSIFIED PURPOSES TO PAKISTAN' s ISLAMIC FRIE C AiootPlED RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN WOULD ALSO GIVE US A MUCH BETTER CHANCE OF EXERTING INFLUENCE AGAINST ANY GOP MOVE TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SO-CALLED ISLAMIC BOMB SECRET PAGE 09 STATE 145139 15 THIS PROPOSAL HAS A HOST OF DISADVANTAGES ANY ONE OF WHICH SUCH AS OUR INABILITY TO OBTAIN CHINESE COMMITMENT THE PROBLEMS OF INELLIGENCE AND OR VERIFICATION HOSTILITY IN CONGRESS TO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE MEANS AVAILABLE TO PUSUE OUR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY OR PREMATURE PUBLICITY COULD SCUTTLE THE EFFORT TIMING WILL ALSO BE CRITICAL WE MIGHT FIND IT USEFUL TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS IN PAKISTAN IF THEY ARE HELD BEFORE GOING TO THE GOP WITH SUCH A PROPOSAL IF REPEAT IF WE ARE CERTAIN THAT PAKISTAN WILL NOT EXPLODE A PNE IN THE MONTHS AHEAD BUT FOR ALL ITS PITFALLS WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS TIME FOR A NEW ATTEMPT TO ASSURE A NONNUCLEAR SOUTH ASIA AND TO DESIGN A NEW STRATEGY TO ATTAIN ONE OF THE PRIMARY GOALS OF US FOREIGN POLICY 16 DEPT PLEASE PASS NEW DELHI CONSTABLE UNQUOTE VANCE SECRET END OF 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