C0539041Q _ _ _ _ __ __ __________ -- _ p_ a bl • EO 12958 1 4 c 25Yrs EO 12958 1 4 d 25Yrs EO 12958 1 4 g 25Yrs ·Seer ct • PtH-U • 1 •cw 1s N'f lff M The Likelihood of Nuclear Acts by Terrorist Groups I i APPROVED FOR · RELEASEDDATE 05-Mar-2009 cret DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL E O 12958 AS AMENDED SECTION 5 3 b 3 rscAP No 2 CJo l M O 2 0 -- NIE lf AJll 119 6 Cop ' 565 ·-- C053 04l0--- - _ - - • -- - ---- THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR Of CfNTRAL INTELLIGENCE I I THE NATIONAl FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SOAR CONCURS Thtt fallowing lnto lg nc I «Gc rni otion portlcfpatttd Tri thtt· pr rotian of th I- ErtlmallfJ Tho Cmtral lnt1Uil tn 1 ARtllCy 1bt D•lan11 lnlDllf tnte A111111cy tht N 'IOl CI Stc111Uy A 1ho- foiktol aurcau ol lnv111i «ilcn and the lnt Uivenc• «vanizatlMI of ho Dtpartmenb 111 S1111t ond E11t1Q '• Also Partl ipatlngr · Jhe A11bt1111t ·chl•I cl Staff fctr lnlt lr o Dtporlmtnf of tbt Army n D rtdar cf NCYGI lbl Ulgvm Ollp ltfmtnt af lbt N IY ' lht Aulstant Chitf of Staff lnttlr gon e DtpOl'lfflfnl af the Air fON o Tht Dlrktor ol· lntelllllffl lt lioodq lilrte 1 Matin« Corps I I Warning Notice lntelll oni 11 Sourcu or Methods Involved WNINTEL r f I NATIONAL SECURITY INFQRMATION Unauthorized Dis los1m1 Subject to Criminal Scin lloni ' ISSEMINATION CONTROL A5l R VIAT ONS Not RtleaiGb e ta For ign Natl01111li r eOOlt'fAACT- Nar Rolao111blt ta ContrQC fOU or t 8F811N- Clllltradiir Cansultanu l'ROP 1• Co11t Dl --l'roprl11ary lnl01motl011 Involved Dilumtnlllhin ond l trCl tlon of lnfotmal OII C ntrclltd b ' Orlgln lor Tht1 lnform11tlon Ha Bffo Autlwrir 14 for ORCOi• - RllsH tc l A micrcll he « py of hi document h 1r10 1Qblo frorn OCR DLB 482'•7177 1 printed ccple1 lrom CPAS IMC 482·$203 ot AIM requt1t tci 11Mtld CPMIMC ' _ ·- --- u · - C 053' 0410 •• --------' WI ng 1I z C • - --- • -------- _ PC $ ¥81 3fl 'i li8£'3N' 'IU'7 'I Errata Notice to rccipicnls of N11lional ln elliicncc Estimate Tht llkrllJr'ood of N11 •leor Am by Terrorist Groupz NIE 6-86 Semi Nororn Nocontract April 1986 tu l l - 11 -The clossiftc ation Cs NF Nr hould Ix add d to the p 1ra1rnph 1h111 concludes at the top or p11 11c 3 u - Linc lo th footnote ori pa c 31houtd read low probability ' instead of low mobility U I i I I 566' 6cffl t- - i • ·u • b - f I I · • •• ·•'I -- - t · •• ' l cos3 70410 _ __ ·------ ----- -- -«--· • i ' • #Q C r t NIE 6-86 THE fKELJHOOD OF NUCLEAR ACTS BY TERRORIST GROUPS ·I t •1 lI• w lnlormauon q - 1labli- o l'i - Prll 1956 W d ill du - 11rrp a101ion of thb E iirnolr wLM1 • 11ppro ·cd hr tilt- 0 1Uanol l'nrcl 1 lntclll11 ncc tloard on 1h01 d•k- i ' i• i· t l i J ·'f • ·- · U b ··4 - ' •s_ - · '• - • t · - - G05370410 ' ' • • 4 iii' ¥t • • - • SECRET uo 0Rut eee1 fR i ei r CONTENTS face t j ·scOPE NOTE HI KEY JUDGMENTS ' l DISCUSSION ' ' ·5 Introcluetlon 4 ttH tu an New lncenti 'cs and Constraints Avallablllty of Nuclear Information M11terial and Trained Personnel 5 6 6 Nuclear Information 6 Fi ile ·i Material 6 Trained Personnel Changing Levels of Prdtectlon Security for Nuclear WeaPons • Security for Nu lcar Power Plants » · I Security of Fissile Material Produatlon Faa illt les 6 6 6 8 Security of Other Radioactive Material · Terrorist Cavabilities and Motivations · Examining Terrorist Capabilities Changes in Terrorist Motivations and Intentions State upport for Nuclear Ter orism ' Conclusions and Implications 14 l I 9 10 10 12 i i j i l i I l • - Iii oeeRET • r· ·u 6 -· s -J • -• • r •• t ' l 1 •a- • • 'I • G' 053'70410 0411 ii i • • A q a a s C - •• ow SEeRe r ' SCOPE NOTE We know of 110 ·um where a lerrnrisl ruuJ has nllempted or i ·cn st tlouslr ccmtcuwlated a tt rrorist ncl thnt had us its goal the rele 15c of nucl 11r r11 lialion While not terrorist tn 1111lurc tluealeuing nuclear• related actions und credible houxcs hr disgruntled indM lunls acliog alone and· for pen 01111 motl 'eS are 11owe er on the record These ei amples arc c ·idence that acts of nuclear terrorism are po ble lf the right motl 'atlon develops Jvforeo 'er recent worrisome clevelopments uch as increases In att cks br West Euro1 iean terrorists against NATO targets in 1 ·lldd e Eoslern terrorist operations in Western Eurone and 'in the use of powerful •ehlcle bombs-fon-e again railed the question of whether nuclear terrorl$m is just around the comer u This falimate examines the Judgmenls of prel'ious interagency vapers on tl1e subject of nuclear terrorism to see if the ' 5lill hold in llsht of whatever changes mw ha •e occurred In nuclear and terrorist trends in the last several years It also assesses the likelihood that terrorist groups will undertakflluclea r acts over the next Se ·eral years u The following possible acls when done with politkal intent b1• nonstate actors a inclu eg In the cntegorr of nuclear terroris_m _ Construction and threatened use of an Improvised nuclear device - Seizure of a nuclear weapon - Attacks on nucJear weapon storage facilities or weaoons in transit - Attacks on or ubotage of nuclear Power plants fissilt ' material production facilltle nuclear weapon production focilltles or nuclear waste storage sites - Theft n11d use of radioactive materials as contsmlnanls ' - Credible hoaxes involving any 0£ the above tJ The following topics are not discussed directh• in this Estimate although whatever governments do to counter the possibilit ' of nuclear terrorism will also have beneficial effects ·against these threats Actions b1• psrchopaths that have no rational 1 0 itkal intent -Actions bl• disgruntled lndi 'lduals such as former emplo 'ees that are taken to sat sfr pers onal grievances y SEEiRli'f •• · t _- Jj · 6 - • •- tt• ·· A- -· a a C053 0410 _____ __ 9 •• 4 Ol'a 4 W C - _ eteRHJ1 ae£»1 fll1 1 - Allncks on nuclt'ar fncllitics where it is g1 mcmlh' known that · there Is no d11111cc of rcle uing rmliaaclMlr for c-x lln1 le1 nuclear power plants lm lcr conslrnclion - - els b · stales using th ir own 1111c11ts rnthur thl'ln acting through a separate snbnntlonnl or inlcmatiom1I gruu1 - Acts b · US-terrorist grou1i u i· ·_ 6 _ - •t •· · J •'·•·•• •-··· -· -· ··' I •'· • _ _ _ _ - ' J r JJ •• Ost -L L L L '%U J IQ • G0537·0410 a CI 41 1 1• a 6$ ' J Kl Y JUDGMENTS We contlnue'lo rate as lc 1· to verr low the vros1lflcts that terrorists· w II attcm1ll htg J feuel nuclear terrorism thiit is the most tcchnlcall • difficult mnlcvolent and lrnrmful types of nuclear ncts 1 This kind of nuclear terrorism would iiwludo construction and threatened detonation of an improvired nuclear de •ice theft and threatened cletonnlion o a nuclear weal On and the dlsperrol of radfoacth•e moterlals in such a WO ' as to lbreatim mllSi casualties or cause 1 •ide pread contamination This ll $SCSSment ls b d on four maJor considerations - High-level terrorism 1m1 y be within the capabilities of a few terrorist sroups The constral its that ex 15t against it therefore probably are prJmarih• behavorlal ' - Most important the fact that most terfQrJ sls place a hfgh premfum on the t Olit cal consequences of their actions Probably help dissuade them from threatening terrQrlst·aets that could lead lo mass indiscriminate C asualtles because such a threat would alienate even those that they consider to be sympathizers among the affected public We note for e i ample that the growth In terrorist-caused casual tie · that has oi curred over the last decade ·1s largely llltributable to a higher rate of incidents in which £ewer than 10 people were Jdlled or vou11ded Iq he only category that i sht approach mass casu allles o •er 200 casuallies i er incident ·only three -OCcurred In 1981·85 the same number as in 1976-80 It Is possible however that some Middle Eastern and South Aslan separatist and radical groups might feel less constrained than groups that acl only domesl cal ly from attE mptfns acts of nuclear terrorism against fqreign populaces · · · · J l ' f I1 i i 1 I 1 - Even though extensive information has been available in the public domain since the early 1980s on what a terrorist would need to know for even the most technically dlfflculr nuclear terrorist act such actlon_s as constructing an improvised 11uplear device still remain beyond the capability of all but the most 3oph stlcated and weU funded of terrorist° groups There are no • Tlio dor houl uolo 1h 1 r 1 k111a luJJmonls •bo111 tho llhll'1ood of 11uolt-•t lotrortim 1 11Jlficul1 i tttlJJc th re i l llUle on which tob e 01 t ccn lu Jo u othor th•• our P ICl PllorJ of lr rrarJJli o -v •11 r ai bilillos and wh 1 1noUv•lC1 lhon1 in ll•n ri L tu I eeeRET ·•· t 1· ·u · o ·a ··· ' • aw a Q I C 05370410 Ltt e 'C A 51C ET NG O lNf lOCONt li' 27 sigm that anr of th m1 1roups hm altc mptcd tu rccrnll ht ill'OJllc with the ach- inccdt i ' Chnical skills thnt wonlLI be needed for tl1is kind uf nuclear terrorism Murco ·cr ' dcs1 11· th1• i rowin use of d1iclc bonbs nnd cmnmcrciulh· manufoclurccl electronic detonators thC e ls llttla c •lclcncc that ·1errorisls o rc bccomlns appre Jablr rnore sophisticated in thl 'ir abilitr to construct de 'ir es nuclear or otherwise · - Ga ·crnment capabilities ti protect lhcir most ·scns til•e nuclear l t1rgets generally ha e lt11prm•ed foster than 111 'e terrorist cnpabilities to penetrate those to rgcts While some vulnernbllities remain ph1•sical securil · has been considerabh· Improved Jn recent •ears at NATO nudHU weapons facilities £or weaf ons In trimsit in Western Europe for nuclear ·wea1 ons In the United States and Great Britain and vrobabh· for th se in France Meanwhile terr rist c11pal ilit1es hav e changed hardly at all since the 1970s Jn terms uf the sophistication of the weapons thtw use or iri their cholceof operating tactics In general the • continue to i refer omralio ns that do not ar unusually i·ntcnse government countermeasures are of short duration and that avoid well-defended llrgets Despite the improveme t S it the security afforded US nuclear weaPons potential vulnerabilities iemaln - Several Nike-Hercules nutlear w1iapons c forage sites ill West Germany will µ ot receive full physka l ·upgrades or new intru• sion detection s • tems tecause the • are · scheduled to be removed within the nexf lree years - Those US Navr surface ships and submarines that C ltn' nucl ear weapans ma1• be vulnerable to mitenlde attack especialh· when they are being on and ofiloi ded The helicopters that are wed to tranaport' weapons in We3tcrn Europe could ·easily be shol -down by terrorists - There is virtually nothins t at can be done to make storage sites or na al vessels in port l1vulnerable to standoff attack tMff In contrast to our Judgment about high-level nuclear terrorlsm we believe there is a some vhai greaterpossiblllty that terrorists will engage lri those lower leoel tl J' es al nuclear terrorism that are des rmed mainh• to garner publicity or to undermille a government's nuclear or other policies We cannot howe ·er cont entially assign a specific i robab llh• to this prospect although we foubt it reaches the even chance predicted b • earlier assessments For exa111Ple •e note that although their existing capabilltles a re suffid ent for mounting direct attacks on 5i fl T I 1 i -····u · 6 · ··· · - j ··9 0 JC Q C C05370410- -_ - - · ii bi 4 I J 41 ' - -- 6EEREl N9F-GR ltHGeeHrR-Aer 11ucl11ar facilillcs terrorbls und 'lnlcnl environnumtnli5ts 'hti ore 01 110recl to the nuclc11r indmtr · seem to have doliooratelr struck milr llCrlplu ral focllllle5 alta ks ai o inst which in no wnr could arouse the nuclear m1 dct es of the 1iublk• This suggesls thnt t- ·en if the - arc imperfectlr understood fundmnental behavioral conslrolnts contlnuc to e dst on terrorism im·ol 'lng nuclear matlers · orcover ti1erc are nu signs the · nre weakening One possible stimulus fol- overcoming the fu inhibitions might be if a patron state 5uppfied backing and enaouraaement for an act of nuclear- tcrrorlsm A number of slates-Including the So ·let Union I iby11 and Iran-could conaelv nbly have sufficient access· to terrorist sroups and the motivation to provide such support We belie 'e however that under present circumstances there h vfrtualh• no chance that the Sov iet Union would encourage an act of nuclear terrorism Moreover the chances are slight that any of the others would see much profit at this time in nuclear terrorism or would be willlog to risk the consequences of exDl sure ol liavlng backed such en endea vo1· · · E O 12958 as amended j I Section 1 4 c We also conclude that the prospects are low that foreign terrorists vlll attempt acts of n clear terrorism 0£ any kind in the United States Over the year s there has been ·ery little foreign terrorism Jn the United States and virtually none by ·foreign terrorists against official US targets In our judgment any of the foreign terrorist groups that might conceivably attack a VS nuclear target-and they arc vrob11bl • restrict• ed to maior'groups from Western Europe or the Middle East-would be most likely to do so In Western Europe where the • have a considerabh• greater operat capability than they do in the United States 1111' 11a There are certain· areas we believe are worth careful watching for lsns that the behavioral constraints that seem to be preventing nucletlr terrorlml may In the future coll1 under strain break di wn or nci longer apply - Intense internal debate on nuclear targetllll possibh• leading to· splits or defections within terrotlst groups similnr to the kinds of debate that have sometimes occurred when other fundamental targe ing changes v ere under consideration E O 12958 as amended Section 1 4 c 3 i'-RiT • - ' I 8 - I • •• • • • 1 J - ·o •J •-t •• • ' ' C053 '70410 • · • - • • '• • • • • 1 - tel ORlifl SeO- ffRlliiT - A signiDcunt tlse in ntlac ks hr· uatron il11tc-lmckc l Midtlll Easlcrn terrorists on West Europcttll or LiS Go 'crnmr mt t u11c•ls in WC$lCnl Europe This might imlicntc change in tht 1 rioritr such stntesas Lib ·o S •rlA Imo mid lrnn now 11p1ummtlr wsign to maintaining a relatively perlJlls si ·c o ratio1111I cnvironmer t 111 Western Europo for attacking other Middle East enemies - Am· substantial cilnnge in the opcrntlng 1 amniclC1rs of tr norisl groups mch as a grentcr willi11gne s s to altnck wel -dt'fc nde l · tarl S attempt compltcatc l OlJCrtl tlons of long duration or to use more xotic for examllle chemical or tilologlco l weaponn• - Terrori5m llSSOCiated with Ult grou1 s that if ther have an a POCah•plic view of history and ree themseh•es 1s the agent for bringing about the end of civilization as we now il might not be bound by concern for public reaction to seem· • ··· ·tl l ·· • 1 -··· · -•r '· l 1 _' l iJr· 1 ' - G05370410 •Y - • • • • • SEC iT 10 '0illlb'18C l1f lilcef DISCUSSION · lnlroducllcn _ rdcn f ' Crom whkh wi CIIII d re£lh- C3lalilish p t• hmis lr4·t1d1 ••nd l1k •lib0 I• Third we kuo ' nl111oil 1101l1 11g about wlrctl rr tenotl5 L• ' cr consider nucl r ncls aml if so whnt foctor l1i fiw 11cc how the ' thi11k I N£111 Co11cm1t Sc ·ctal dc1·cla 111r11l11 iu 11 illc111s of lorrorisl cllvilles 111 the la1t few 'C lU luuc ec111Jr t• ed new 1 01ie r111 tb l tl1r prosJ t i b or 1iuclcAr lcilur• i n1 u-c lncrcudng about them In Iha irca of molh·nlion thrm forc our Judsm nl 11lxiu1 wheth 1r krrorisb wonltl want tu tllcm ll nuclc 1r action ur l 11 11 i l ulmo st nmlclcli· on dcduclions of un«rlnln 1ccurac1· from what ·c t crceh·e lo be thll' war lhcr behave tllncernln nonnu• c lear matters -Since the eml of 198-1 In Ilic w kc ol tho deplo •ntelll of t S·Perrhlng ind crui$e mbsile 1 there h u bten a sur11c of tcrrurl it nllll'°l s on N TO•rel lcd IDrgcls ln WeJtcm Euro1ie fllmD terrorbt group• ·1n Weil · 0 Co11clmlo11i of Prei lous Eitlmatei The pre lous German ' France and alum- 1111 'e lncrtased i e el' nl Esllm tes arc II b11 1lc 19i8 S11 IE mt lwo their COO leiation Momor 111dunu to Holden ln 1982 • Thcr •said In e6Sen c 1IJ 1 I• · - Vchi le lximb have usl1ered In new level of terrorllt ·lolcn i i In thi - Middle East and to a - Publfo apprehension espe Mh· In ·western E u• lfJ Jel eittent We item Europe · Moreo1-er the rope over nudellr m11 1tor was 5111 h thQt there Sbla $ ilcidc bomber b ·a nel ' element on the was an eve chan that terrorists would k lg tencrist s«nc conduct Yarlo11-11 kind or low-11 vi I nuclear terror• Ill Cl$ th l would not ruk $eriow re l 'aM of - Middle Eastern teriorisl sroull$· have be« o 111e mdi Uon lncrcllS nsly ACti •e Ill Wcslorn Europe u -Slniult m 01tsh· 2 The Estimative Problem 11 ls ver1· di f cult to malce c onildont or precise e 1Umatu ·about the likeli• - The chtnces were mcderatelr low to low that terrorist$ would altempl to leal or ulze nucl ar weapon In WeJtem Eurolll to take o •er for busalnlng purpose5 a nucleat- weai ons slorag · faclllti· or that a tlalron state such as Llhya would wm0r 11 mri kind of nui lear terrorl t act a nilul the 1JnUcd Sta eJ a hood that lerrorhb wlll add nucle4r acb lo thelr el $Cnal oi tattles Thi ' estimative prolllem h115 it lc ul three 11rlncll lll e uses Flr t the ra1111e -of pos s blit nuclear tlrn'Orht ac s 15 so great-from thc delon11i011 Ci£ a stolen we ipon an lmpr01•15ed nuclear dc ·ii e that lcllls tem of tltous 1nds to a credible hDall that only 'itlr 1 publlc alarm-that the calcub lon of prob blllty ls very complex and 'l oul4 d lfer 1lgni6 antly amoni the varlow kinds of aoU Second accordins lo the records of all tJS agencle1 that colle l lhl1-f 1formallon only one terrorisl Incident has O curred in t hc la 11 10 vean In whloh nuclear radiation mlihl have been released • Con11 Qucntb· there is 1·irtually no eoiplrlcal or - The prospects were low to verv low that terrori$ls would attempt to fabricate and use their ow11 imllrD •lred nuclear dc1'icc or that they ould 'or aiuld explode a stolen trS weapon in a wai· that created a nuclear 1•leld - II a nuclear terrorist Incident occurred It proba• bh· would take plaet' 01•er as rather than in the United States On IB Dc a mb r IU3 tbo Aftkqn N• 10•11 Conatm ell lout chatw •I • lusl com1•1elod nu 1 Po · t pf•nl In J t -111 South Africa l'rrsh nucloor fuel lt U •• th •v vlUr bu1 h4a 1101 WI been IMd«I ih o the cnrc Wlillo we l«k cll1oe1 o -ldenc or 1hr lnl•iltlo lho ot10 kon the oll••k ·prob bli· W4$ d iianod lo prta 'cnt th ruclor from be-comtns OlltJJ lcnal 1a1b 1 lh n lo thrr Ut l l 10lmc ol r•dloactM11· H j · 1 •ll• • Tht doounionu rol•rr•-d lo ur liSIE 7•7X l tkt 1hnod - f Au •mpl J 1 1 11 of 'ut ar l't•a11on• or I t N•h hv f·o rlgn TcrrorUI Crt111p or U1 1 -t atn st tin• rutted Slah- nnd Mt-mor•11Ju11u lloldou wllh llw om Udo bsucd In l-'•br11 r · uucl Moich 185 l lo $ SECRET 8 ·7 2 i r •il' r••••t I ' ' • z · 11··· G05370410 ca 125 1 ii JO M l I 4 -- ll£ • - Wlwthur l rrurblS ll • 'Ollll murl' Jr lcu hkl h· lo rma igc ill nuclear a ts 01· 1 111• nc I w1·crnl 'cnu wlll I htcrmim•d as outlluud oolnw br 1ha uc ba anl raulllna from dc1·do11rncnlf l11 lour arc tl 1111' degrci lo ·wl1kh nuclear lnform lion m1tl matNlnl become mote or l '1$ a ll Llil to terrorists 2 tl1cettenl t which th lcvcb ol protection 111lorrlcd h • 11 iivcmmcnts tu l O»i Jlc taracll lmprwc or focllm 3 tl1e 'mount 1111 11· of lmpro1·crncn or d•-ara1l111l0n of louorilt opcraHonijl cupablllllt s 11ml -ll whether l Qjl ible mollv11llom for engaging in nucle u lcmorbm become tronscr or eaker 11 f _ NOl'OR l HQ QN TRt e •i N11w lncentiv1u and Constraints I ag It ' Traini• 1 1'1•rim11wl 'l' wri• ba h· •1•11 11 1t1•mlr lll'lll 'lh Wllllchridi in th • 11111111 -r 11 111•rsu11111•l lruin ·11 iu 111d1 mnlM 11s nlldl' 11 r1•actu1 ll ·ibm md 111 c rn liun ura11lum 1•11ridunc11t mtd u·1m ' 11 tt-c 111ul 1 r Qlld nud ar tkllCl'S Murl •1·cr tlw 11uml l•r ul 1ntll •lduob whCl ar - or lm ·i bc •n i uurd ul mu lrar focilllici-indudini m1ck r w 11011s •llt•i-ls i rnwlllB 'fh11 cx11a11slo11 or th ' l IJ II$ uhr nf I 1wu1 lr c11lRr1w11hc r rou11 fom -hkh a lcm1rlsl ora 1111 iut on nliillit be bfc to rccrn or coctre nui1tmll' ' from son1co11 who wouhl b11 k11owlcd cnhlr noout for ex mplc pow r rc ictor or weapon focllilY ·11l11cr lilll• Ucs tc - Cb0ngln9 LDv1 s of l'rct llon Avallabifity of Nucltor lnf01 motion Malerlols crnd Troinad Penonn 1 5 Niicla r Information If lerrQt J s dc5lrcd to ' lllt•8e In riuclear a els the · would not con tralned by lack of Information Since the cArh· 19S b more S Stcurl 11 Jar NuQlenr W-e1111on1 l irseb· In re• SjlCMI to c onc em Ill t c l 0$11bilill' ot tcrro1ill Qllacb on nuclear actlltiu 1n Western l uropc 101·• cirnments have coru derahll' lmi ro ed 1eeu ril ' In re• cent 'ears both at NATO nuclegr we 'lllOn fnct lllcs and or weapons be nit n101·ed In We$lern Europe l'h1·1tcal curll ' h111 also been lendill' tlgbuned for nuclear weapons In the United Stales o nd for l ritlsh weal OJlS In thu Untied Kingdom BrlllJh weapons are torcd under concliilons -en· iindlar lo those In the United States o nd eaul r e changes of informallon lake place bet ween US and Brlli1h nuclear sei urll ' expert We know much Jill about how lhe French protect lhelr weall m bul he u se of rising aclMlv b · dqmestlc i 'renclderrorilt g10ul 1 le1·el• of securlh· prob tbly hai· nc ued l11eruho tlian ad equatc data has been available In the public domain of the rt that a terrorbl would need to mow for • wide ra1111 e of l rrorlJt acb Including how to construct relitt vely crude but efl ctl •c 11uclear ei plo• slve evlces how US nuc Qar weapons illei In We lcrn li tirQi e are Protected how to bypm· SQ el · and security devices on the weapons and the ui01t effective wal to sabota e nu ll llr reicb rs ln all a · Department of Energy bllilioarai ih · of publications tl1a l m l ht be of intemt lo a m1clear•lncllned le rorlit lias rei l1letcd about 2 500 entrleJ sin 1962 More than a third of the publications appeared In the U11l1ed Stale$ and G1e11t 13rllltln but S Veral cnlrles are recorded each YeQT 111051 or the countries that P05SW nuclear fatllltlt $ In We stem E'Urope and eliewhere Including Paklsla_n India and South Afr ' el · in • 8 The eliort lo Improve security for US weapons slorcd in the continental United Sto te1 in us nQn• · • NATO sites-abroad and In N TO ll cilllle$ In We stern Europe U btinrncompl11hcd under a three- Portions denied are·SMFRI 6 E' u l11 Material The amount of fissile material · available hllS at wt ti mporarl y stab l zed 1in th patl Long-Ranae Seaurll • Prop ram The fir st part a civil 110hltrucllon pr0gr rn IOUIJSlade £enc Jlghll11¥ ·and thus outside of early 1980$ No w uranium enrl hmenl facllltle$ 1u1 rd towers C mmand· centers and the like fs I ISCAP'S • · • d' ·t• have opened mWellem EuroPe since then nor has complete In the United Statuand atnan•NA'l'O sites JUrlS IC IOn the amount of vluto11ium beimi·scJ ll rllled from sr ent reactor fuel lncrwed s gnll cantll' In thi West The ov mea s and'il almon finished at the NATO facilities • amount of plutonium contl lnlna mix oi tac fuelt · The s«ond 11arl hiu n th lnlroducllon of rnoxe aggressive dcp ovmcnt concepts or examl e roving b olns moved In lntematlon1l coinmeroc however ha1 grown MOJ Important whtlc there ls an a ctl •e gray p11 uols amund lorige bun ten and a11 lnlens Bed tralnfl li nrwam for i'Jard JSOnnel Io addltl n muket ln compOn¢nt tor butldh K nuclear fael11Ut$ im11roved lnlrwlon ·dcleclion sv•terns ha -e h en ln• no sray market In lhslle mo terlal i9s been or ecm1 11 bout to be developed On the other hand Pakistan 15 stalled at almost all nuclear wr 11po11s sites In the United Slates and lnstallallon will be completed al the completing II fa tllh· that l lrobably will be· able to •non•Ni TO ovenw sites earlr In 1986 After produce tub tanUal amounts o enriched uranJum te1llng a alle in Weit German · ls completetl AriientJ11a has one 11nder construction nd India b compiltable S 'sle1111 will be Installed m·er o SO month besinnlng to 11 C lumulale 1igniGcant amounts or un• period at of the NA TO sltu er safeguord d 1 h1lon um I ' 1 e • • 6 '5E€RliT ·- · -1 _- · ·o 7 · 3 C 05370410 • •• • •• I - • - • ••• • • • '5eEi ff r IQFQ-tl fHGeSNl'f AeT E O 12958 as amended Section 1 4 c 12 Dr5 llltc the e· in111ro ·em1 11ls in tl1c 5e Uritr afforded VS nuclear weapons potc1111 111ulncrilbllllli $ remain -Se1·erAI ·Nlkc Hercules nuclear weap011J stor 110 · $ill' $ In West Germ m · hp •e not rcceh'ed din full 11hl••Icnl ucurity upgrade a d wlll not receil'c the nc11· intnulo11 1fot1l ltl0n • tt•ms becau all thesa niwl es art sclieduled to rema ·ed withIn the ne t thri e rears The Nike-Hercule$ mi il o b one of tlie oldl lt In lhe NAT-0 lm·en1on· and li1 ufetr nnd securlt · syil mJ are more ·ea 1 11• b •pilsed lhAn tho 111 the newer WWIMJIIS fn addll on tlie Nlke-Hcrcule -whQn nuclear rmed-1$ vulnerable ·101tandoll attack and l Ols blc dl•IH rsal of nuclear material from me -j warhe id 10 The thlrd Jlart of tile security Improvement Is tbe 1n it11llatl n of access dtl lal dcViiies · program_ · -Those US Navy surface ships and submarlnes that nuc eu weapons ma ' be ·ulnerable to watei ipe aUQck whhn the · are In port i l I -The hell Dters lhat are used lo itansDOrt w'ea1 ons in Western Eu_rope ould easih' be ahol dawn · b1· terrorbll - P erba s ID0$1 lmporlAnl there b virlualb• 1101h- tci make storage u or naval vessels ln port Invulnerable ·to standoff in11 that can· be d11nc attack 7 'SEERE T Portions denied are SMFRD and thus· outside of ·1 ISCAP's jurisdictio·n • t t ··•- 6_ - • • --'io ·7···i· - -4 ·• - J ' ' tt0ffil N1WOC Jltfl A'C f 13 S •cm l11 fur h'ud1•at l'111r1• J'l11nt 01x·rnlh11 1111cl ir 1x11n•r f wililll• t· i•l iu fi munlri1• mmu1l lhl' world u which 11 r • d1•1· •lu1M•1l l1111111ri •s h 11n• Commu11b1 11aliu1u um si•1·1•11 ·1111L'l11 li1111 SU1tlh f ri• c r1• 1'hi11I Wurld 1mlio111 In 1l11· 113 four rMrs only 511 f wcr hon lml 1 Jf llw 1w11· 1w 11·1·r tl· tdutl 1liat had lwcn JCh lulcd tu KO u11 llrw hu1·1· u tu illr 1'1•11011111iN 1t11111 and onlr llruzil lluu arr u ld Sr 111h Idea lu11·11 JohiNI the lisl of ulfl1lri1•s lh 1l product• nudc ir l111 W Of theS ' thrcu •iunlrle s onh· Sllulli Afrira l u m acl11·c l r urist or iluurg 1•111 11robl1•m I E O 12958 as $ nended Section 1 4 c 14••- s with nurlcar wca1 o11 sitl S lws·tloui of iow well prokctcd 11uclcar 1 owc r foclltllci nre again pos il f ' tcrrariJl acts rdnlc dircdlr lo what kirid of in idcnl is undi r consld ratio11 In briui moll nud •ar power 11lanb proh b y Qru not secure Crom •lmu nlf llll 1oks 11 irlkulmy If lln · lerradll intends mph- lo 111ouse_ tiublic lln Mr rather thnn ta c iusi a mAlor relea1e of radioaetMly Tlii is 1 rimarlh· becawc It b llol ecor omlcalh· fo u bfo In surround mull nuclour J lOwer plm 11 s with contr 1lled buffer zou wide enouah tii 11u1 lbc plant berond the n111gc of the Jlandolf 1 ·catlQnJ available lo lerror Ju te 1- 17 Within the Unllcd Stales 111 ll1r fost four ·cars emir u fow nc11· t oW t rcac1ors ltnvc cu11te on line and 111 E Cutilr sUuat1011 h11s 1101 •hansed much ·ivith to - ·ulner IJ11l11e to e t nml attack - s in tCiird Ve item Europe tile teaclou ore uol o IU ' BrgeU lo ne11ctratc much lt S to do muse· se1·erch· but the1· Pr obabl ue JUS -epllble lo a Unck for e arn11le b lrucks lo ide I wllh exnlwl -eJ In a few case$ 11 mla Jt be J O lblll to »lace a lr11ck bomb close enough to 11 fnclllh· that fl ii WCI dctonaled mnssh·e dam•i e would be cawtd th 11 rnighl e•·entuall · lead lo th relea'lt' of n fa g nmount of ndloocl11 l r Morco ·cr lf ht- tcrrorlsl w wl l n lo sacrifice himself rnanl· nuclear wer facllitles probabh· could be alluc ked by cruhi11u an exp h·es•l11dcn lrilck 'thrnugh tli facillly gale and manc11 ·erJng close to a ·ital area before r mle ditii It 15 II I I di Jlcu t to aenor111ize olxiut l 1·i -ls of Prolect on ns ahnt uther kinds of J OSSlblc tcrrotlsl aetlons-1111rllcularly tholl hat 'ould Invoke int1 r1111l iabotQge or Pcll iraU on of the nucHm plant's perlml'• ter All plants ha1•e some degree of protection aga nsl unauthoriu d Intrusion-and aiihul iu•i for sabotage becau5e this ls bullt Into lnlemallonal Atomtc Eneriu· Agency ME $Uldellnes that lllPh· to facililles where fissile matedal Ii prczent l loreo1·cr the world• wide· concern created b • he Three Mlle llla11d ncci• dent in· 1979 lllmulated rt'aler allenllon IQ $ 1 hl co11sldera l0ns In the operation of many nud ar l Oll'er 18 01 pusslbh· e•·m 11teater CQJlce n worldwide i plants-and many o the proccdurn l opted to en• the J Y Jlantlal lor sabotage of mpower reactor indeed · hani e iet1· ubo impra e securltv· esaiu1l s ibotaie an · 1111c car fac lU · lil' ·so111com ·with authori2ed Nom th less the ability o 11uclc-ar power focilltie to acceu to lhe f cllit ·-the problem al nuclear t11rrorwllhJtand c lernal attad from II del rmlned and w ll llm b · an ins Ider '' We ha1·e onl ' limited lnlormnUon ulpped lerrorhl group or to au rd against sabotasc on l1n1v lll'ate 'arious countrlel a of this imslbilll1• of vital equlpmem within the faci Ur ·aric widely and whal precauliolls the · take to guard igainsr II from countri- t countr_ · w The1e miaht hiclude ccuri11· checks 011 applicants tu 1trecnoul polenllal terrorls s and lie inslallatlon· of prolectln dc ·i 4 or 11cce-s s c o11trols to pre ·ent 4 woll d-be 1t1boteur from or exaoipie turnin11 ·ah-e5 that ntlght disastrouslr sliut down u reactor' CflO fng '° s1·st m 9 seeNe1 · ·8 ·s · -- ' • i •·1 --- •• - - - G05370410 tCiR N 'ORl ' '1 See 'lffl 'cC t ll1· 111sc· IIUIIII' ur lh1• 1• 11 r111 rir xlm· · ll'L'ill •II•• rai i· mnh'li I lh1•1· rr iu 1 M11•ml ul 1 ·ml II JI l rolf•ckd ns nni· 1111 lr• r ·wr 1ij1m 111·• 11 · 1•J ll-rnal -ntl nu I iu lli l1L·trn11· 11d1 fol'llilic•J a1111I nmli · o i wilh the lls sil1• mntcri I _ Jirnl nl h· w ud I tcqnin• latl l'r i m111 of wdl nr1111•J nrul lrnitwd tnmmm1tl1k than lo thr L'rrllrt Stntrs In u trr sl nufatds exlsl on tru1tworlhh11• nm psrchnlrn kal • $labili11· Locnl 1KJ i chccb 11rohahl r urn mrrit-d out In mOll pla 011 ni w l1irr1 b111 time d1r ·h arc-likclr to 5how onlr if thr Job t1fJ lllcm1l lms u lo l crlmlnnl record or I fordlh•e Therclorc It Is llO lb t llmt 11 forclin lcrrorl t wllh 110 loco rrcnrd could B lo employment at R us nunlcar 1 la11t In foct it prcsrnt · thern 15 nn wa1• to i rtnln with ccr1al111r how 11111111· H nn1· lorelim nctlonais ma · be - cn11 1 01•od at c-ammor• · clal nucll llr reaclor facilities much l 1 who· tlrr ' are a_nd what kinds of e9nlacts 1he1· huw L -'gi5lation 10 · permit he Federal Bure1111 of lmutlsallon to makr natton1I arresl datn anllab I ' 011 new hire$ wllh a t5S to_villll ateas u vending In Consrc$$ 20 Even JI It were pW SJble to U11htb· screen all emplo1 teS at power reactorJ no on h05 l t I come u1 wilh an i lfcctlve wa ' lo cope wilb 11nothcr kind of lrulder lKllSlbllltr In this narlo a tcrrorl t group kldn ps and reth· holils h lage the famib• of an emplii •ee who fs forced to do their b1ddtni at Jhe - throot o harm to hb famlb• Thus a normalh· lrwl• worlhy Insider might be forei d to steal aensilive ro Secu tt11 oJ Other naaioacllr I ' Midertala materlab' facllltale the ent · or outsiders lnto·the · Two other lclndsor nudear m11terlal potenUallrwable facility or commit sabota e hin1$elf · bl' terrorllts are Jpent fue from a r ctor and 1·arlous JU Secuntu of Fiulll 111 ·1erial Production Fa• radloacth·e ualDpes that are u £or au array of cllltlea Because of thii presence of ll1 1lle mate lal medical rommerciul and lndu lrlal purpo e5 Su1 h uranium enrichment pl11nts and repr lng facllitres materials at Inst theoreticalh· could be UJed in a that ch mlcally separate plutonium from $p1 mt fuel dispersal de1·lce to conlaminal_ a site of economic or are al logical targets for terrorl ts Or-the 14 1m111 urn s ·rnlioll imPOrbnce Of the ll -o ll' e$ of mater nl enrlchmml 1 lanls now operat ns around the world i i ent fuel aenerDlh· would be more hazardous for only the on_c in l'o ki sllm was e$$Cnllalb· completed In terrorlsu 111 IL'le and more difficult tu g in accc55 to the Ian three yeara Such facill1les also e dlt tn Great slilce for th mQll 'part 1t Is kept In ator4ge ponds In Britain Fran the Nelherland s the USSR Japan the' same location ancl under the same curlt1· tlie South Africa China and the United Stales The reactorthatproducedit - fterith·asd aycdto11 le ·el facllitiC$ in the Netherlands J•pan and Gre_at Brlt ln at which It i 1 1 afe to tr nsJ Ort the $pent fuel 15 olaced limit their output to low enriched uranium enriched · In sealed rmki on board ·eh clcs prolecled bl' 'Qry ni to lc 55 than 20 pcrcen of U-2 for wwer reactor degrees 0 s icurllr Tests ha •e demonstrated 1hat the fuel which ti un11ttr11chve for 11511 m a nuC lear de1·ice ks · liard lo breach wllh e lllosh•es and that Pllitonlum Is separated £rom ipent fuel In Grcnt cM ate er L cl L d • Brltali Frllnce West Gerrnan · Ital ' Jndi11 Japan e •en when breacne not muc' ' ra loactMn· I reChin the USSR and rin a noncommercial basis in lhe lease No ethelel-5 terror sls m uihl not know his In United States No new reproce Slllg facilities Jin 'e iddlbon 1T thay were able to seize a cask their come on line In the lait four eaf$ although this cfotio11 pos es lon of ii probabh· would cause wld espr ad I$ sUII toniidered attracU 'e b · nal ons with nuclear public alarm and might gh·e them iome ba laimng power programs that are potentlalh· Interested In · wer wh her or not ther had the i Jlenlion or gaining weaPOns-uiabli ma r Al -II IIF_lle • _•11 Ica11obl1U1· of niwnlng t -W E O 12958 as amended Section lA c as 9 rl t a· 7 ·6 •-• • • - • ' t1 o 'Ji•• a •• • I C·053 7'0 410 -ffEf H 11 0 0ll ' 1 '-0CONfflr'cCr 2-1 lladi ti1·1• so101ici art• i cli fon•nl 111n11 r l11 mnk 11amloff a1t 1·k s 1111N1·hat nsh•r 1'h •w Ci 111du alom ar • l1 i sc•cl 011 Qlf '$ lillJI tin t• tr111 io hkh dtnnlCei l m • Ol 'Currcd i11 Jiu • folhiwlng arc 1 Irr tho las1 ic ·r I 'c m f f senr nl Iha · rc l nwh lcl l l roh-t•ll'd rum thrfl tlmn 1111rkh -d uranium t lut011il1111 nr t-1·1•11 s11Clll lu1•I 0111 tl Ir u e · rou11d th 1r11rlcl IJ RrowinK llrn1 il for cumnlc Is 1r i1111 lo· dt• ·elDl nel · food l tC'st'r illon li clmiqul j ll ' lr rn llaling loodm1ffs wl1l1 lialt•OO 1111d ccsium-l3i It would be 1 -chnk ill1· dlf lcult to use r11 dl02cll c 1so101ics clfccll1·clr tu 11ausc mRnY c uuohlcs or large area conl imlnollon Jn 11dd1t1on m ll ' of the lf IIOJ re dallBQtous tD handle and l 'oulil net d shlahl ni Bui If the la roriJI Intent wl 'Ta dlree te d mQ re ct cousins a p$ ·cl1olcsic11 l lmP11ct tho11 lit c au slnt dl llth or lnJur · whnlons al such mcd1 l Isotopes Ol odlnu-J31 could bo lnk-et ' l Into foodstuff 11 ti or CllbulHW strontium-90 wlum-131 or r11d1um- 25- uld be introduced Into water supplle or wallered In a building b IJSlns them as an lnl fedlenl In ll l 'J i l 1enod1t nib At a mh1lm11m such WIIB•' 'ould cause dttectoble levtls of rad oacUvlh· and in all likelihood a a rong public r acUon c ·en Jf the actual rbk topu l10 health Wllf $llaht - it Zfi Skilled lam am•r Willi W lt'lil lo proli t Jlf the moil worrisonw 1m1J1 ecl-llml rrorlils w ll dc ·clop 1h¢ Ql1lll1 · lo foltrlcntc lh lt own nuclear dc ·ll'CS or It bnm i tlu · s ifou· 1 n I C'Curltr mccl moisms 0 1 a lolcn nuclc ir weiJ lln-lhcrl ha 'U ' 11 no 1d1111s in recent ·cars th at lerrarbt 11roups arr cllcmpUn11 to r11crull r eople with teclmlca krio · cd c or skills lr1 the fln cls a£ nuclear c11i1noorlni mcta lursr afoctrnnics ad ·uncod csplosl 'es and the likc·thal would bl n ce1San· for this kind ol·11udcar 1crrorum 27 S01Jf11 1 caUon of Weapan In S Mral lht klnru or arms wed bi· terrorist have chunznd 'err ftrrcir 11 Ccrpc 1bili1l01 Cllld Molivationt lilllc $Ince the l li01 The iltouliler•flrcd SA-i beat• seeklris mlul e ancl the RPC• 7 antitank rocket remain the m0 1t pefcnt weapom soncralll' found In terroriit lnventorfel Other more effeeth•e 1 11J1dolf 1 ·e11pcns do not $1 fm to be In their po on Although thi 1• orobably are vaihib e on the sray market temirlsl5 2G a111lt1ln1t Te i rlll Capabll t e For tbn have ne·ver usw for e ample wlre-conttQl cd 11 tllanf weaporu which would comiderablr e tend the ranae at which lhe1· could· llltack a nuclear facilih•- ll· oreover other much less technically sophlstlcatcd-hut still hlahlr eflecth·c-devlw iui h as e plcm1·eh• drh•en llrer plates 11rll potenl mllr a ·•llable to terror• D0$l patl le rorisl c ii abilillei to atc0mplt h rtfou Ju Inds ot nu lear terrorlfm ean-be melt elfecth•elv esllmatcd by Judilna lheni nalnst the levels of protea• Ion 11ovemtJ1enls have d ve ol ed to euard aaaln t varioui type s of Jllesal nuclear cu Tbe pabllltle$ o two kmd of tmorlst Kl'IIUl S are llf particular con rn a rau that re5lde In counlrle i where nuelt llt' WeaP' lns b wxl or tramll Ot that hll'Ve nuclear Illes ·-whei e s1$111f1Clllll amounts of radioactive materials are praent 11nd im ups that have demonnrated thubillty to ronduct l litllBcani e tratenitorlal olll railons mu if hero ari 110 nuclear tarsets in their own c cuntry These two cat orles mclude In particular the ma or tertorlrt orsanl2at lonl of-Western Europe ruch a i the ·ited Brfgad1 $ of Italy the RAF ol W t Germany the ETA of Spain and Aotion Dll te of France and the· more prominent Middle organ utlott that · owate ·Abroad S loh m the Abu Nida group and i erta ln of the radic l Shi agrou 1 $i Out sencral concludons are that 1 llOvernmtnl efforts to pro - their ls but have no been wed are wtem ·m0$1Jensltive11u le ar targets generally have Jmptoved J Jtcr th1111 liave terr01ut capabllitl $ tt engage In hil h-level nuclt ar terrorism bul ht 2 ulatlve terror• st capabilities to engage In lowr r lev l nuclear tettor1$m lllllV have ln reued mewhlt for example the abll ty 0£ sovcrnmenta to protetl their inslalh1tlon frgm tandoi attacks prllliably h11J not improved 10 ll u - · • - • ii RET f• · pgwer rcaclor without risking their tOUP bi- attemPI· ins t0 peneil'llte th securlty of thew lllllallatlons ffl- · 'llllc terrorists miy now have uct1 S 1 to weaPOru th I · ·• · 28 U41l nf E1 12fosil I The bomb has o w iy1 bffn the favorite we11 pon of'IerrorislE Year after year ffl05t tenorilt bomb nltS p rtfcul rlY ln Wtllem Europe h11ve1101 been d Jsned lo cause casua1tlt5 or e 1 tensh damAse Within that general tendency however 1 notable change has OCQun-ed In rec nt times the e panded use oi the vehicle oomb While this trend has been PIOJt promJ11ent In the Middle t si1_1ce 1982 ve iicfo bombs h•ve Also been plodlng with some regU arlty in We 1tom Euro There were for e cample seven ' U h attQCb In We item Europe In 1983 five in l98t ' and fi vi In 1985 in contrast with hirdly any be£ore that The mo st dislurblng n_pect of vehicle bombs with regard 10 the l Olcnlllli for nuclear terrorim1 Is that they Jmprove the pr05pecls for stand• oH au ks The magnitude of the e ip os 0n from the 5everal 1oru of e plosiv s that c an be packed Jn 4 ·ehlcle al leait raises the l OSSihi lty that terri rbt s could -caure c leruive dama1te lo a nuclear wcar ions - site a 6$ ille material producUon facility or a nuclear 7· ··•J · ' ·· • •• •• ·· • •• • ·• C05370410 · u rm norelliit •JOCONTR CF ms f1•wvr 11i 11 11 do1 1·11 111J tlt31 tht ComnmnlJt C umhat 1111 C clli l In ll1 'fgl m nt lls 13 hnum 11 1 l onh· 11bou1 IU 'l'lw ff in S1min und lht ' Rl' I llril 11lc t In 113 · arc larp or L Jch 11rob blr luwlnlt Al lc JI SO to 100 nc M ls but th i- 1lso 011erolc in vcn· snu1ll f oups for rl' JJ01ts °m11arlmunl 1lio11 • II ol these 1m•u11s l1un · l CCu hurt hr liKnificanl t1CJ ice· suCCl '$$ '5 which 11rob l II' hDs rur1lwr n' luL•cd their ohilili· to mount 011ornllu1u 1h11 11-oul I rcqulr 111 unusuntlr l ric number of J ersu1111ol '- tuielhufoM n or thc5c arou lS ha 'c deu1onslmtcd 1hi abilltr to rcco 'cr from such setbacks l11 ddi11011 011L reccni trend thnl might lt11lhle the 1mallcr 1roups lo over• coi1111 l llt$0nncl lhnltnllo11 5 hill been 11 1110 ·cment toward cooperallon 11mon11 th R F AD and CCC So Car howe ''1t tho cooperation h u bean manlfl 'lkd in coriunan propasand11 rele And me ·Jhurcd use of resources uch a s $lDlen d ·numlle but upp rently nol In JC1ln1 o 1 erat1ons f97 2 l Another notnlile rt•ce11l dcfclopnwnt Is tl1at tcrroriilj Rrc more - £ref11wnll win lllfll 'Wh I mor • _011hlslic tcd me JU of lctona 11111 llirlr bambs Mitldk· E ulcrn tcmorbb In mtrticular ohen 111 • r 1dhl c ou• lrollcd Brin dc ioc s or Je ·tronli linum la JCI off their Lombs In Wrst 'm lturo1x- tl1c I'll lu l urth• crn Ireland frequent · U5CJ r dlci -ontroll - l llrini dc •i N 11llhouah tcrroriil 1lrou1u on tire c o11tinc11l Cem lo em11lor them much le oftc11 The ure of n1 irc sophlsllc lcd dotonators duci not mr 111 h -c ·• er thot lcrr'orilb QfC bc1101ui1111- sub1lonlinlh bullvr able Co build liombs-nurlcnr or olhcrwbc--or lo undcnland and manlpu o lc th mcchanlraf or clcc lronl dc 1l s a h1lcu wilh 11uclc r wea1 ons This might be the c i sc 11 tem rbts 'ere buildlni their own radio controlled firing d ·lcas or clcctronh tlmer5 So· ior 1 owc 'er the ' hiwc im11h• purchim d 11ml 11dapl• ed commercial Item E ·011 then an man ' ocr ulans these de •i have failed mulllns In II prem ilure explo lon or none at 11Jl- 11n Indication· tho l terrorl I te hnlca I abll Urs ma · not be 11ti11rcclablr lmpro1·ini- or 02 Chan le In To rztl 11 and Arca of Optrallon For the mo1t oar lerrorbl aroUJll ldom devl11te mur h from their establl hed moduso tierandl l11 terms 30 ' Operallona1 Tac lcs The· deslin criteria for of the tan1els the- · atla k and 11·hcre he · o tieral Two semlUve nuclear facllUles In the United States and ln recent shift I ltoive ·er In th fund menla I nP rallnii tnelll foreign nations usually specif - th11t the curlh' p ra meteu are rele ·ant' In corulderlng prospects for auangemenu provided for the faclfllY should be oble nucJear ti rrorilm · · to withstand an attac k ·br well•lralned and Since late 1984 there has hffn a stihllanllal · dedicated co111111aridoJ A po 15lble Indicator therefore incre ue 111 ·-West European terrdrist allach · tliat ierromt copabllltle to inounl ult o aoliut 11 asalinl NATO lnstallatlom US mlllt11rr faclliU nuclear weap ms storae e site were lmpro 'lnl would be and variou s defen related lndu1tr r5 pn11clpal• lsns th111 ·they have beiun lo operate in aroUPS lnm• h· In West Cerm m· 11nd Belalum - lthoueh all cmouiih to defeat on•$lte resistance 111 well defende I oE these anilcks were agaJnn c nll Jly llTIJlfC - ·faci ltle s-thai ls So far al tectcd iargelJ for e 11111plr the NATO oil pipe lea5t that does 110t ap ar to be the In all line the Attacks partlcularlr ln We1t Gcrrnanr l Ulances that 'e are aware of terrorlsls In We 1tern were part of a concerted effort 1Umul 1ed br the · Europe 11nd the Middle East continue to oper111e in RAF to strike srmbols of US Im perialum ·• and groups that never ext'eed · nd uunlh· are lo llir Ull oppos L Un to NATO 11 t II time of $maller That hai been trlle of late for e ample In comtderable public opplllilipn tu the· deplo •IDl'nl even the bloodl l and mlllt•dramallo terrorist omra• lf US Pwhlns Jl and m1Jse missiles · tlons such as the August 1985 detonation of a car bomb at the US Rhein-Ma In Airbase In Wnl C erma• ·- Several Mlddle Eastem tcrrorht Bl'OUPS ha 'e ny the hlJackll lJ of TW 847 the $el ure o the d·emonstrated a smwins abilit · to operate Achille Lauro crul5e shl 11 and the attacks In Deccm r Weslern Europe Almoit 60 teriorbt Incidents of 19 ffi on the 11i1porb in J ome and Vienna Middle Ea lern orliln OCCllrred lher e Ip 1984 and over 70 such lncldenls In 1885 Mam· of the 3l Terrorill sroups operate iu u h sniall te ms atlaclu were b · 5tale agents of Libya SYr B lr IQ particule rh• b1 Wuleril Europe In-order to maintain and Iran llialnst their m ctlve Middle E11 1lern tompartmenlallon and because the number of hardeneml s Some however 'ere bi· terrorist otgtt• wrc aclh·hts from which mcmben of an ult team 11lzallo111 like the Abu Nid il Group which ls psobably would be drawn are very fe11· Recent e1l1• assoclalcd currenlh· with S1•ria and Llb1• a and · miites are for eJtmple that the actMsi bardCl lre of Hizbnllah the radlc 1J Shill 11roup located In the RAF in Weit German · number 11bou1 20 10 25 Leb11non and generallr lnlluen d br Iran s lil' pemns tliat the A tlon D rr cle ip France probablr -t J -ca In 1l StGRiT • t r ·u ·_-7 • ' #' • •• • • • • i • O · a _ w C05370410 • '-· ua tOf Nf •iQf g •1T-1MGr Ch11n11c1 in T 'rrorill U0 it'llrio111 anti lntc11• liom -u indlclltcd c rllcr w • h vc littlr c ·ltl1m t• of how tcrrptllls thin l boul tin • 111m1h11 i1· of 11n as h1 l Iii nuclear lt'rra1ism - o cnpturcd or ' 1xmtc11 l rror l it ta our knowlcda ' li u ever been 1111111lfo11t l cm this iubJccl there m l10 human llaurc c- r« J'ICrts on lh riucsllon and ttlrrorbl•origfn 1ed dl 'Cumc111s tla nol t4'for lo ·11tc 101 ic l11 wckh1a o undmlant thcicforc 1 hr terrorist IP to now llll -c not 11ltackcd nudaAr l irgets am under wt1111 conditions 1bcsc mrulrGlnls mlaht slve wit · we uc lhnUcd to detlucl Ions drawn rram informalion on how ll rrorl lu scneroll · bcho 1·c 11nd to a mall 11mount of material on ho · anllnudll lt i n ·lronmental acth·lsts in W ' lt German · hnw 1ltous h1 4bout $11botagc- Of nuclear tari eti td l1J1· · nn immt liutc 111ll ct 'rhcS ' nctor clP• t'tfal ' 1l1t 11 wlfhuoo th it the l rmrbl ura 111i1 1• lions we kmiw hxla · woulil Ix• wllli1111 tu rn kt• 1ln c lcncl d rommlt1111m1 of lime 111111 reJ01ttC1 'J 11c 'l 'u m· 10 mount hose kimli n nudear terror• ill a1lt'rntiom-u1ch us bnlldlm1 Plld thrcat •nlng lo use an h11pro1· 5 -d Ul' 'ict• or 1olding i IID 'C rn• nMtl l u1ta wllh slol 'n m1cl ar weapon-I h t do not lcml d1cmsch·es ia quick rc saluti011 Tha ' do nol howc1·cr 11ffccl die allraclh· nclS 0£ thore c ll rnllons-Juch as st1mdoll allocks-tho I 11rc dcsi ncd for immcdfgtc clfe I 35 l'e t Gcrlllan nttmiclear cllvf '114 111 11dd 1fo11 to th ·r osslbllltr lltlach-lw terrorist orse111i211• tioni the lntcllisenr c Cammunll ' l1a boon roncema1I 3 •orn of Terrorf I Be 11iutor ln i encral terror• 111 lea st since the late 1970s that antlnudt ir en 'iro·n• ts UP lo now seom to howc aeled In i ccordance wl h mcn ali$IS or peace- nio1·cment supporler m sht turn tlte followlns 11rece1 ts e11 ch of ll'h ch could di1 1uade lo 1·lolcnce again nuclear facllllles In llll effort lo hem from tngaglng In at least lllle kinds of nuclear force go erm nenlS t i change nuclear power or 11uc learweapons policies The fact that tire leaders of the l11rrorlsm peace movement In W tern Europe ha -e worked -Be tiltenlll ll to tlii pallllcal comsequcnce1 of a hard lo pre ·ent terrorl5l5 from Infiltrating 1md ma• terro t act Terrorists may belrcve 1hat anr act nlpul3llni lhelr demonstrations agahut delllonlienl of lbat appears to lhte4ten rele se of rad oacliv·lh' Pershln11 U nnd crutsc ml5illes ug1mt1 however thot would alienate e 'en t lr srmttalhl ers amons the1· would regard acts of nuclear terrcrisin lllegll the publle and therefore should be avoided This mate This also m to be the c ise with the em·lronls suggested bi• 1he fact that rerrori I in W lem mentaltsts who Olll Me nuclear p0wer All their vioEurope regular ' attack comtruction ccmputer lence has o far been directed at mrlphi ral faallltte lllld other ·bw neJS firms associated wilh the and not at tM POWef plan $ lhemselvts In addition a nuclear power indusln• but cxeem for one 1879 Weit erman unde111rou11d handbook · -hti h isolated Incident more· than 10 year3 ago lheY prtn·ides Inform11tion on Praclical Oppos Uon lo haw never even thre tten d to attack an operat• Alomic Plants i rlmarll1• how to Mbot11 e high volt Ing nuclear reactor or a facility where ll$$ile ase lln S contains the Following lang11a11t- We state material 1 $ tored • exJ re$1 y that we do not consider II upproprlate to -·Be pru cfent about taking ruh In deciding ll'hat sabotage the oPl rallon the plant at the plant l1$elf acts to undertake terrorist aroupi genera Iii- cm We fet that no nucl ar OllJ Ollent should risk radlo•cllvc coniamlnalion of the J OJ U atlon thereby ••• We to be t cmsen•alive in terms of the degree of rilk created for thi group This lmplle that ·the le1·el do nol ha -c an •lh against d ruptlng the operation of protection afforded nuclear iacllitle s e11n so that a radloact ve danger to pie dot not ix cur make a d lfcrencc In whcthi r terrort5ts decide to attack them The • may also be deterred hr the 36 Area$ of Concern Some recent de1'elapment 1 pzospect of the ma55lve a ovcmment counlcrt - have ra1sea the auesl on whether possible lnhiblUons torlst t n se that probably would be provoked against nud r terrorism mar be weakening Of par• by an act of nuclear terrorism tkular co cern are -Befrugal In xpendlntt ourcer Terrorlsto r- Vhelher Middle EMttrn terrQtUII operating In allons e speclall ' in Western Europe are usull llY Ye$fern E uropl are leas conctrned abour the of very 5hort duration for eximp e an assa u mi' public reacl o11 to their altack t thnn local terror• tlqn attempt or placement cf 11 bomb use a ven· 1$1$ woulcf be Attacks by such oraaolutions as mall number of personnel nnd are Intended to the Abu Nida Croup or ·tt1zballah on British French or el'en US nuclear weapon S leJ arc • On IS Auawt l9i11 lwo cl Utlou• ch rv1 wer Jelonaitd •I lho more concei 11 ble than b1· lat al tmorbls because Mont d Arr e rtaclnr In Franc lh•1 dOlltortd • O ·Ater lower nd • Mlddlc · East rn terror lls would be leis con• rAcllo telephone room The llreton l lberallon Ftor 1 cfaJmc I eil 'R• cern d about the corueQuencl 's oi s11ch attacks on albllt11• c or of 12 i r 1 ··· - • '3 ·· t '_ - ' ·7 9 - •••• NOfORNµ •o JAAa 1h lr 01 '11 $1'1111 3thlr t r 011rllll'fo1J Middk• Eu t rn hirrurists do cur • n Jout wo1h oplnin11 lucludlr1111h111 of 't-Jt Eur 1ieam 111 dcma atr I• ud lw Hl1 b tllah 'i C iirfr sklllrd th m111s to ma 11i11ul11tc 'f stNn tnL'tlin in tli 11llcr111a1h of lhl' · 'l'WA S4i l1ij ckl1111 Morr o ·cr the abilltr uf Midd r mu1cr11 lcr or Jls lo 01wr lt• osainsl their principal targct1-other 0 fiddfo Ewterncu-111 'cistern Euro1ll lxmcfils from the rcfa1h· ly J tmlssl 'e mlludc taken toward 1l1c111 br 51lmc European so1·crnme111$ In cxcha11gc for thclr not oper111lns 11sal1u1 domll$tic targets Lnr uii1 foll' nntl lCCUlilY mcc mnlmu In n 'cn1 on It b 'Oll lmlJIL• tli t l1l' 1 uld Ix- Ul ' l 111 drh·c a 'c - dd bomb into a wuuld he l rr cliffic11h to lraml 'r Shfa suMdo t riari m cffccti • h oubldt its normal cultural Jelling Iulo an Jndustrinlli Western i onrJlf · 67 S 11te Suripafl for N11r lc11r Tc rrorum On chunac lhM mlsfll 1nakc a dilfercnC'i In t1 terrorist araul ·s CMJab lll · far or intcro$l In com milting an Acl of nuclear terrorism would he R dcci lion b1· A patron Jlntc lo i ro ·Jd• hacl imt- and encoura erhcnl for such nn act A number of llalc -thc SO ·lel Union Jun and radical Arab sin $ uch IU Librn S ·rla 40d lraq-mi11h1 ha1·e ufficient IC i SS let terrorist groups 3nd the mol11•atlnn dull could concch·ahh· lead hem to make lhis decision The lilrazraphs thL foflow e3a1nine · what considerations mor have constr3lned them from $0 far from backr111i nuclear terrorism qnd ll'hat 1r am·thing llli hl dilute these conslnl nls 38 The Swltl U111011 It IJ bud lo im 11lne UO ' circumslancd 111 whJch the Sovle15 would encourage a terrorist group to de ·eloi an lndeDendent nuclear Hpabtlllr 110 mailer how i rude b • burldlng 11 devJr c or stealing a woapen Lower levels of nuclear lerrorbm are anolher matter howev r Parl1oul11rb- 11t the ·ume wh n Wmt £uropean countries were milking the declrlon io riartkllpate In INF modeml2atlon and during tho J M rlod o lnll al depforment 0£ PerJhln11 II and cruise ml rlt3 any ll mJrist act that raised Weit - To ii Juit e ctenl lcrror st i11 Jfbti1 ns '1g11ln1t cau61ng ma - cawalllcs mav be charig 1111 The app r•mt lncrcru - In terrarbt-l tiused c sunlllcs 01·er the last rlcc de and the mcmorr of II fow s J ej taoulijr blood • lnerdenl$ ha ·a led R me ob lltver s toJeor that the reluctance terrorbts h ve general · shown 11bout k IJ ng lndlscr mlnatelr and in large numbers wa dlSllJ pearlni Thi probably Is not tli11 Ylrtualb· all the -ord• ed growth ls a1irlbut11ble lo II l1 3her rale o Incidents in whlth lewer than 100 ca iuallle s occurred prfmarih· where fewer thAn 10 were killed or wounded In the onlr cateacirr that J11lght 1111ro11ch ams ciuu allles over 200 per incident onli three O CUrrcd In 1981·85 the same -number' as In 1976-80 foreo •er ihe PSI' cholosical siate 0£ mind n·ece5511n• deliberately to kill the tens of thol J$4nd that mliht mult from even a small nuclear expl0$IOn may be qul e dllferent from the Jlate of ml11d nec elSllrl' _to kill j' j case f Eurollean public toncern about the siifeh• of nuclear ml$slle$ millht bve toi mci the program In lb tracl s C eul1• the SovietJ would have counted this a ma or UCCM1 ond· ll'ould have been 'llllng to t 1lie $11mt level lfrlik-10 11chl eve 11 There Is no l'a if knowlni for · 1ure wh · thev APPnrently made no move In thii direollon but the ollowlns poulble corutralnU mn e · serue · the J rge st num r In· 1he low hundtedi that -terro ls have rled for up to now · -Halli mucfi an '1pparent tncrecae In Janatlct m ·• among same terror ta aml· the appearance of 1h11 1 tc1d11 bomber h boosted tht posstbtl11v llmt terrorlJf Will toke on the high 11Jla rl1e11 probablv aaaoctate with nuclear terrurlsm 'l'he relevance of the spate of suicide bomblni atta_c s that -have occurred In the M ddle Eut and nowhere else to pros ts for nuclear terrorism probably b not iJ'CaL Almost all of those who have sacrificed themselves have been-as for au we can tell- POOr uneducated Sh a youths who ue lntoruely lndocbinated b • clerics lld thin inJectt d Into an oiieratlon as soon a i poi slble before their wlllrngne ss to d ha s a chance lo fade Thb kind of fanatic Is not he IY lt who would be fn ·olvecl In rlsklni slow death from exPQ ure fo insufficlentlv protel led radiolosical mater al while· buildlni ·a nuclea d vke or r - Terrorism does JJOl fit In with their overail 1trateglc approach toward weaken ns NATO which emphasizes POrtrarins the USSR as a re nable peace-lovinnuiierllOwer wlth whlch · WC3lem Europe c in negotl te -As part of his effort Moscow provides supp0r1 ·and encouragement to the lesal left in Western · Europe The lesal left is the most likely to suffer from 1mbllc li ckiash again1t terrorism by the radical lclL - The Soviets ma • not want lo risk breaking the barrier 4Bafnst nuclear terrorilrn becliu Communist nuc e r Power facilities partkularh· In Ei 1tern Euro mrsht be ·uln rable s r 13 1 CRf f • r1 ·f •• ii 8 • ' 8 • mwll•M facrlitl'- hul Ihm• i5 also 11nod rcn1011 11 h 'l e · l11u1 it • 0 • • 005370410 MOR l DocID 1111465 Y• 6F ERH Q'Ql 1•111 t0 mfR cr lD If rhc • e1m1tr11int 1 aro ill facl tlw um-s tlmt o p11h• tlr n It· Is likl•li· lho t S'o it'l 11111t1alt• 1 w111d nuclc ir l rrurhm w II nut cha1111 1• -c1 l 1s 11 irt uf 11 much l ritcr U' ·l ion nf thulr 1lmlt'III' 1 1 w twn Europe Noncthi I tbr tiotcmtlal bt•nuflt for lhc • riur Tlw lr 111iu11 Gun-1111111·11l 11lm dL•arl1 i111 1N1r1s tlw 1111• uf Mturi1111 • in ' 't•Jllnbh• m1·a11 tJf Jlrlklni I il L·n nii M 1 lmori I n IS 'in r w Wunl'rn J· uro1N • wJlh whM1 lr n b U 1SUUl11li·ll l 'l'tt· c- irric J ut bi· lls u11·u stlll11 u nu nnd tllr •clcd a uhut io fols rom cvc11 rdo lkd1· minor · 111c 1imu 1 tn1 llliddl c isM11 lurr 1 1 •011ull1 c ils linJa lo flli• ·ould r iiw conwr11 11oou1 fol ' of 11uclc11r 111 ifo1 L3lfah 11l l ' lr u al k•i1$l thl' 1 0lu111inl tu Mlnc l 11111 J •ai 1rc 11 rc it t•1m11gh th t 1 clinngc l11 So1•fo1 itllltud · lall t'ls 111 Wc111•rn £11r P • wllhout Jlructh· c 1xi 1n towud nucfoo r tcm rbn1 ls for from 111concclv il1lc lb own hand Tl1l• rill 111 lrAfl of IX ln11 i111plicatcJ in e s lnlb· If they l Ctcei · tiiclr ITC lent ' TO JN lic1· Juch - 111 'act hawcwir would Ix- i trvmcli· hl11h s is ele irh· faill1111 with ·l lhra th lr11nfa11 reiilrnc car111vl 11ll0rd t11 mo 11u1 arr CCollQRJkal y rro n tlm rt•Jt ur tit world uor ll'ould 40 The Radtcai ab StAtt$ Sn a's And Iraq' there oo mucb USl' in tnkfll# tit risk of 11ro •okfn11 thl' forel1m uollc1· go ls 1·hlch hnve 1dm01t cxdUJh·ch· ti Wcitetn lnduslrlallzi d CilmdricJ·lnlo •111 portlna ltnQ re11lo11al focus would 1101 bo ·ad anced bi· nuclear mort' opcmh· In Us war with Iran Doth i c115CQucnccs · tetzorhm eicc111 In 1h11 e lremeh· 11nl1keli f UC 1ha1 c11u d mull II· lffzballub llll cked n nllclllllr tnrsct in thev found 4 war to auock I1r11r -1 1 nuclc ir facllltrcs Wc1tern Euroi x bcc 1uie 111os1 of tlte world would Llb1'A howi ver ls of greater conccm becnu ie- of ilmpl · assume lh l 111111 1• a behind 1uch on attack Qadh11ft's hatred of the United Stale 1md his temlo nc1· given the strcnath II$ Iii $ lo thQt orpnlz itio11 to threaten West Europejm govemmcnl$ moll re enl· CoiucQuentb· whifo Inc ll0'4fbjllt · co1ll 11e ·u be co n• Ir the tJnlled Kingdom and Ito Ir with relllllallon ·If pfetelv excluded hat Kfo imelnl or wm 5Uccc IOI' ther tgl e a11tl-Llbyan aels Men Llb •an tcrrotbl radical rcliilous lcador mlsht lrllltionlllb· lash out it Atl4C s ore carried oul bi· $late 11$ents bill lbe prcba• lhe United Stalel bi· JJ10rnorin1t an act of nudcmr ble Llbvan l acklllll the t1 hu Nldiil Croup recch·ed for temr m th probabllltl' of lh s hDJ Jlr'nlJ111 Is folrhIts December 1985 atto clu o t the Vienna uncl Rome remote airports lndlcatel that conttcts with hilt llfoup ore 1trenllthcnlng Until recently Ci idha i had n ot for the · Concluslons 011d lmpliccilloM m »t P11rt directed terrorut assets aaalnst US interests 413 In 11 c11•ral ' 111 conclude lhAt nor ·of lhe obperhaps b«ause of fear rctallallan should his iei- ·ed chaniie l that mnr l1ave occurred In lhe ot flra• lponior h J become revealed In t e 11a5t fo1 · montlu lional cnpablllt1e1 taraellng pr ictku levels llf r• ho Ve •er there ls evidence thi t · bi-an iwets h1we lnten11ffed their effort to colle t Information 011 allon p11iron·1tale 511l l10tl o terrorist motivation$ h is slgnflii anll · rahed the lkel1luiod t h11t terrorlsts wl l NATO ·bu lncludlns mllllarv 1nst111lat1ons wherc VS attcrnPl· the IIIQ sl teclinkalh· dlHku t mole 'Plenl and lfool S arc slalloned Nl' 11e hormful of J llcnllal nuclear acls Thu1 we Iuda e the 41 Qa lhafi clearly be icvei l the lciilimac1• of prgb bilih· o tbeie kinds of acls occurrin11 rerunlns terrorist violenCI and undoubtedly would love to strike ·low' lo 1011· a 11rlc1·011J blow ag lmt the 'United Stale s The chance 44 Wulw c onelude that the PTOJl eol l that £orelg11 tht he would back an act of nucleai- tel'rorism are ltrrorlsts di attempt act I cf 11uolenr terro llm of- an ' rechiccd however by th likelih that It would be kind In the Unlt d s1 1t 5 l'ellliiln lo - Over 1he ·ears vet ' dlffic11lt to hide the Libyan hand even ff o thece Im bctn ·ery little lorebul lerror sm the 111rrci11 to clirried OUI th aCUQI h-loreover thi rest of the world probably would react b1- at a minimum United Stnles and vlrtualh· none bi· forelsn terrorf51s llolallnri his reslme totally Even lhc Soviets J£' lhci• aa alnsl official US ta111el5 rn our Judgment oriy o the terni t groul S- Uth os th from Wellem Europe hoped to relaln any inlluem tl ·1n Western EuroDC might hive difficulty maintalnlmi ari arms 5U lllY and the Middle £051-that might concmvablr allack a do so In relatlonshi1 1 with a sovem rilenl that SUlll Orted an act nu lear t rgel would be 1110 t like · We tern Europe where ihc ' ha -e a c on5ldr 1ablv o nudeu terrorism there 11rcatet 01 crallng cap bi ll ' lhan thei• do In the or of' ·err In lo· United Stales 5 In contr115t to our udgmenl about hish•le ·el uuolear krror Jm w belle · th l there is a wmewho l grel ler 1m1Jb lll ' lhat lerrorls J 11arllcularh· In West• em EurollC wlll engaie In them • lower le ·el h·pes of 0 E O 12958 as amended Sectioµ 1 4 d 1 4 SECREt- r - I ' · 8 _· _8 I '· i '• EliRiT 1etsa •1 weeemR er 1111 ·b r k1rurim1 thM ir ' dNl1U11•1l muinh lo arn ·r 11uhlidl · an r1111d1•rmim• 1 m·1•rn11wm· IU1Cl1• 1r ur ntlu•r 1 11lM1•J · •·a1111ut hn n•wr l mfi l1•111h· whui a SJ 'cifh uroiiabilitr tu thl 11M1w1 I• nhlmu h m• ilnubt th it ii Nachc tilt • ·m clmncc • l Mlirtrd h · th CMlior Esthhnl s u11ahilillc$ fur lnw•lrwl kimll of nucfoar lllrrorlsrn mur Ix- fni·rcniinR 1 111 lhc b1 ha '• oral corntr 1l1ils on 1crrn1l5111 h l'ol1•i11g Ultdc r 111allcrs · · -show no 1111111 uf Wl 'llkcnln11 - AU ' 111ullanti 1I d1 1111 • in tlw 011 1111im pam111t•• kr 11 l1•m11i ls 1i·1 11ld ht • wunh 11111hiM 'l'hiJ u cl rll'l11d1· u11 wki1111 wd di•f1•111li•d tanMs •l •t lll IK i11 llllltt1b Ne 46 There nre certain arcns we bcl e1·e are wortb ca rel ul 1 •otohl11s fur slam tl1a1 thc sc l lm 'iural constrninls mar In the filturc come under strnlu brcuk ·down or 110 longer 1111pl · · - If' West Europe·a11 torrorists seriat1 h· l esin In consider broadening lholr anlf•XATO 11t1ack iu induda nucle ir tQri ets lnt nie Internal debaccm 11• occur tbi t rould le11d to iplits defC tloru or at II minimum lnternul r clm1l1tted documents that attempt to Just - sucl1 a radical than11i Slmi13r debnks-AS when the Red Brig3de 1 Bnt decided lo allat'k ncm-llall in tm eU-hl 'I inkon -plflce when other fundamental shifts In tnr elina l 1 occurred - One sign that Jlalron 1tate-h cked Middle- wt• em terrorlil arcut 1 ol ernllni in Weste1·n Europe 'li•ere broildenlna their 1ar1ct selection to lhe i 0lnt that tlie ' m ah1 nsider attacking miclear fac Utlet 'ould be 11 ·greater 11umbcr of atl lcks jy thom on West· European or tJS Government targets in WC$tcrn Europe generalb• This 'mtsht f t • t l ' Indicate they w11re lo verlng the prlorilY they to malnlainlna a relatively 11011• apparent · u fgn I pennlui •e environment there for attacking other ¥iddle Eaileni enemle i f All or the n 101•c hrdioal'ors 1icrtai11 lo existing i mirbt grl Ul S There b Ilic pos slhill1 · h11u-e ·cr that If nu lenr tcrrorl m d s ot-cur-1 irlloularlr thr m0$1 111nlcrnlcnt am harmful klmb-tl1al It would be i cr• t elrated hr a kind of terrorist not subJccl to current· fltl1lbillcns who mn1· nut 'Ct exist We h 11·0 no 'lll' oi pil dlcllng whethar this will occur bul Juch tl lcrrorist 111l1il11 for cxam11fo 01•1 1Jre out of l ' i llin qunslrellarall$ or r ghlll'lhi ' 'sur1·h'lllist tulls cult that s11n11·ned n tcrrorisl group would 1 e· artlcul rh- worrl• some wll11 « peel' to nuclrar lerrtirbm If It Il ruid 11n apocah·ptlc iel · of hbtorr thot wclc omcd lhe end of lhe world or of cMIIinlion as wu knoll' Jt l 5llw Jtsetr m the agent for bringing ul this end and 3 featured nudcar cncra · mewhere In II doctrint Such a a roup probablv would be unconcerned 21 to hi w much the p11bllc It alienated b · lb actions and might 11ot care lf ll •JUmulated si tcre 1101·ernmcnt countcrinea ruir Moreover llS culls sornctlm do ii mls ht be 11ble lo enlist la II$ ranks much more lilshly educited and technl lb· tr ilned members 'thllll appear lu be attracted lo today'$ terrorul 11Tou s or lfflt l 15 5£CREf • _ u i ··-•··• rJ rnr n• tlmn U ullm•kwJ nuwi1111 toward i um1ilw 1tt J uJ i•rnlinns th 11 t r• jjt for so1 11e lll rfuil 111 milii mort· 1•Mlil· lfur cxam11I d1r111kd or hlolauk I w1•a1w urr 8 - 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