UN CLASSIFIED Tl ' ' ' ' ' ' To bj -- L J W lt•on NAVE0DTECHCEN R N1l1on DOE NV0 1 I EXERClS MIGHTY OERRJNGER b 1 b 3 L - _ I UNCLASSIFIED ' - ···--- • Tht ttoy ot wvidtnc • •nd intell1'31rnc• inicr111• ion -trcm l•n •r• and •rem u c ndw at tht t i t • was not wet I don -•• i t 11i9ht -av• been Play b 1 b 1 ' · - -• · - - - ' ' • I I ·- f' - ' 'P - O N CJ r A '°'' -J t - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - l •lf lT l- 1 i -- L ' --·-_-- -- ···· j I I j ti l - ·r_ 'il · r··si 7 ' J J · i _ - - - - 1 · 1 1l' i th• U CLAS i I 7 ti ' I' ' • TJ • ' Command and Centro I a Who is in control of differe t activities during the 5 OOOJ phase 7 b 0 Does DOE and DOD wor1 re - 'lne C C5 s - cCJ E 2 - - c Does OOOJ have ti- e knowledge and the tec hnic al NO c--ritermeasures perspective to uni laterally direct ac c ess operations 8 l Genera I a Sa t et y of per son e i near a potent i a I I y de ton at i n g nu c I ear not played -- too many players were at the forward staging area no al lbac k of personnel oc c urred during more hazardous operations no detailed e• 1c uation of CP TOC was planned implemented prior to disablement etc bt Tb was L b DOOJ b 1 It one were to end game the situation the DOOJ might b able to provide the same end result but in a very quick and effective manner Speed may be the essense at a real operation The probabi I ity of s c cess may not be too ifferent than that obtainable from a complete DOE EOD S T · ope r a t i on b 1 d Oeployment Notific ation tar 000 EOD and DOE could be improved Headquarters deployment metl't-0 e Logistics lt appears that too muc h emphasis and player numaers are devoted to logistics versus the essential tec hnic al ac tivitiesi --at sure of the essential value in muc h of the logistics f Jm - Technical 1 Efforts tend to be overburdened by peripheral c alc ulatipns n d d i s c us s i on s We ma y b e t r y i n g to do t o o mu c h t h e o r e t i c a I a n d o t h e r ' u nassential work in the field b 3 It is essential that Working Point procedures be ref i 7ed _disablement' dia9nostics and disc ipl ine setup methods I oo -1 t1't ent I On · r -• - U if g ersonnel •0 •7 J - l' J UNCLASSI - lED J l O-f 1- 3 ' 7 Disablement Good disablement plannin9 and analysis l-iome laboratory explosive tests and analysis were conducted _ S W i 9 n i t_ c aun t_____ -- --- 9an i za l i ona I persona I inter fac t _ _i irob I ems occur red _ b 1 f nducted to document conclus vely tr- e c 1er n9 te -- r cc 8 Comma · ens Effective and provided the necessary support 9 Command Very goad decision making leadership and management ai individual organizational elements and the overall operation DOS OOO EOD DODJ EST DOS were al I exceptionally and professionally directed - e c Lessons Learned Issues tor Considerations 1 Security Deployment in the U S or overseas must incorporate ubstantial security elements tor both control of classified material and tar ite security Hast government personnel or FBI personnel are not considered either appropriate or ot sufficient number ta accomplish the role 2 DOD Command After an assault a DOD General officer must be command of the DOD assets at the incident site -- unless it is formally greed directed that OOD EOD wi I I report work to the DOE OSC 1n 3 EOO Currrently EOO interfaces with DOE elements but works far the senior DOD commander and through him reports to the DOS or FBI 4 Personal i'ties Stress Interpersonal relationship problems were drawn into focus by the interactions of several at the key players iigniticant considerations should be made relative to who can successfully 'play in the large field organization typical of an IND incident and who might not be gooE choices 5 Personnel Numbers The entire operation was slowed and overburdened by the numb r at personne I i nva I ved More cou Id be acc amp Ii shed and probably accompl is ed as wet I with many fewer players Many fewer on-productive useless conflic ts in direction coordination decisions etc uould result Quicker implementation of activities would oc c ur Too many people tended to overburden ac tual accomplishment of activities ln al I Jrganizations smal I skeleton teams for each technical support element might ravide a superior field organization b Inte 11 i gence There is too great a prevalence to bet ieve what might and probably is very i nconc I us i ve i nte I Ii gence information a Can we believe a calendar marked -- 10 December -- as positive indication of device functioning time b Can we derive detailed technical imp I ications weights of containers obtained from third level sources c from gross How muc h credence should be placed on debriefs of locals U N CLAS lr'1 U I I ' b 1 ASr IF 1 F_ D 1f nVTN f '11 'r • -V ' JL 11 - ·- 1 -- __J -·------ - - - 1 I • • i _ A '---- IFIED b 1 b 3 ------- --- - ·- '•- UNCLASSIFIED f I r ' • ' b 1 b 3 - I f · 1 r • »11• • 4 I UNCLASSIFIED I ' b 1 l ' • '• -