December 19 1986 -----·-· • __ I To earl Benry Chief Controller From William B Chambers CONOS Site Controller Subj 11 Quick Look• Report Mighty Derringer CONUS Background The CONUS portion of the Mighty Derringer exercise carried the scenario ·for a second device notionally identical to the one located OCONUS from search in downtown Indianapolis through barricade negotiation assault access identification detonation and early consequence management phases The exercise was primarily ·a CPX except that the search included a limited number of teams with handheld and van-mounted detection systems and the FBI HRT negotiations and assault were played full-scale I 1 I ' I f Following location of the surrogate source downtown the action was moved to Camp Atterbury for the BRT negotiations and assault Technical working point activities were successfully simulated after gaining control of the device including completion of the ··disablement procedure employed OCONUS Site control allowed the play to deviate from the original script in this regard because the action progressed more rapidly than anticipated The consequence phase was then started -on the exercise timeline with a simulated nuclear detonation downtown as though the render-safe ha a not occurred over four hundred players and controllers took part from FBI DOE DoD EOD · FEMA and various state and local law enforcement and emergency management agencies The CP was located in a complex of three buildings at Camp Atterbury with the TOC for search operations in Franklin about midway between Camp ·Atterbury and Indianapolis Only one of the CP buildings was secured for classified discussions and materials The HRT was housed and fed at Camp Atterbury but the remainder of the participants stayed in motels in the area • 8 bt _oll i 9 f t Yr ation 1 · Some issues and concerns are related to real world problems while others resulted from artificial ities introduced by exercise constraints Subsequent reports will deal with these in more --- -••n _ 8·N'lilaillllf - 1r ·· Ul rrt v u L AJ 11 L iz ' 1·· 1 1 ·•1 ·· _ UN _ Quick Look Report -2- December 19 1986 7 I ' detail but a few significant ones are highlighted here starting with the real world These observations will undoubtedly be modified after more extensive review with the key playe s I I Terrorism Phase I Because the OCONUS action was ahead of schedule the NEST advance party was prepared to play earlier than·the agreed-upon schedule with the Indianapolis FBI The artificial delay·was frustrating l Technical difficulties with the secure communication systems slowed the sharing of intelligence and assessment information between sites initially Exchanging significan quantities of data by secure FAX is also inherently slow ·s that the backlog became substantial for ·a while · The Indianapolis Channel 8 inquiry prior to start caused some concern both with respect to the initiai information leak and the potential for media interference t Camp tterbury The noncommittal press release successful y defused the situation and subsequent inquiries were half-hearted · · A misunderstanding about administrative si_gnais for removing the surrogate source from the house downtown cause i the searcg teams to fail to confirm t -hit on later passei _ b 1 Liaison between HRT DOE and EOD in preparing or assault was excellent and an EOD representative followed th assault team into the building almost immediately • Boweve · the joint procedures for wi thdrawi_ng the RRT and survivors securing the perimeter and clearing access to the device need clarification Good use was made of the information on disable option from OCONUS with the choice hinging on whether or not the devices were identical There appeared to be less certaintf however about what important features constituted identity and what techniques were available to evaluate them before I and after access was complete -- -- -· UNWIFIED U l USSmEf NUCLEAR INFOR11lVf-WN Look Report -3- December 19 1986·-- _ Although the direction from NSC regarding the-change in leadership in the consequence phase was not anticipated the transition was handled smoothly in the field This can perhaps be attributed more to good will than good policy and procedure Consequence Phase Most participants in the consequence phase·recognized the need for a CP organized more alon9·- functional rather than institutional lines i e putting together similar specialists regardless of organizational origin NEST has always done this Some difficulties in communicating seem to exist between law enforcement and public health interests at all le els local state and federal ·· The intermingling of unclassified and class if ied documentation and cleared and uncleared personnel in the same exercise creates procedural problems These are compounded in some cases by poorly-understood sensitive information levels such as UCNI or law·eoforcement secret and by the use of secure communications·gear for privacy only State capabilities for radiological emergencies vary widely generally depending on the extent of their nuclear power facilities Integrated interstate responses were not planne or played even though the scenario provided for it There appeared to be widespread agreement that the objectives of the exercise were met However some lessons were learned about the conduct of such complex events and about the confusion arising from simulations and constraints that are worth noting Maximum free play was allowed but that makes control more difficult Different agencies take different views on the appropriate balance The DOE hazards and effects directorate was oversta ff ed for the pre-planned extent of the consequence play Apparently the limited amount of number-crunching required ---· u Ut« tttSSH IED NUCLFAR lfJF0AAAtION- ---- Quick Look Report -4- December 19 1986 to meet the objectives of a CPX was not understood initially The terrorists conducted some imaginative negotiations including the unexpected offer to confirm their possesion of a device with a camera and instruments However they may not have been provided with enough of the data base beforehand to keep the negotiations rolling consistently A limited amount of coaching helps· significantly in smoothing out artificial i t ies ' · This quick look has emphasized the issues and the lessons learned as opposed to describing the many excellent interactions between agencies and the individual expertise and spirit of the players That was intentional for brevity with the hope that the later reports will provide a better balance · cc I' ✓ St Martin NSC R Nelson DOE NV - W Nelson LLNL ·· A Seddon FBI Hqs _ G Richard · FEMA L Wolfson NAVEODTEC BCTR K Kar r • EOD FORSCOM ✓N Bailey LLNL uNtt I E I Eu FIUCLEAl INfoRHAt ION - I I I