I · 'I CATCOMS-III ✓E - it t• •• ' -· ENCRYPTED FOR 'rRANSMl SSlON Page l 0 i 9 1l_etin # ·c 1 81 By LLL Event Sent Open 09 02 24 15-Jan-86 LLNL F Jessen NVO G Allen W Adams i ect ti 1fo Copy '' Mighty Derringer Critique LAX R Young D Stillman LSL M Lucas PLC M Miron YAR J Krofcheck ZDV W Nelson D Eddy FOR R O'Brien - - TY DERRINGER CRITIQUE F Jessen 16 DEC 86 REV 13 JAN 87 'ERVIEW I '' The revised NEST Command Structure worked far better than most eople anticipated I I I I The separation of the NEST CP and TOC functions worked well but nly because the two activities were located within the same iuilding and within short walking distance of each other For the first time the Assessment and Intelligence unctions personnel worked in concert with each other i For once the on-site phone system worked l i l I I l N__ i l -------·--------------···-·--·-· ·- b 1 I I Too many experienced NEST personnel were used as controllers thereby leaving the player side either understaffed or saddled with too many inexperienced first time participants Classified communications were very deficient they simply _went from bad to worse or were non-existent in many cases Established notification procedures were ignored by NVO from the start likewise clear identification of personnel assigned to the various NEST command functions was never accomplished - as a result confusion and indecision ran rampant during the predeployment phase Playing out the logistics of deployment vs prepositioning of players needs to be reconsidered particularly if the players miss playing during a significant portion of the player time window I J I I ' I OMS-III ENCRYPTED FOR TRANSMISSION Page 2 of 9 1 e threat scenario was not well thought out and on many occasions tne controller iniects were either poorly timed inconsistent with the information already 1n p1 ay u1 S t 1111 J t Y 1u11- i s c _ c_ven the magnitude of this national exercise it is unfortunate if not inexcusable that many of the participating agencies were not i rious players they either stopped playing too early or did not ' - 1lly participate right from the start _ '- • UNCLASSIFIED ' l ii I ' I j ' OMS-III 4 ' ENCRYPTED FOR TRANSMISSION • ' Page 3 of 9 --P EDEPLOYMENT ------------ n b 1 TOTA served as an effective focal point for submitting ques ions to the Intelligence Community however there are improvements which hey need to incorporate into their procedures to be better prepared _o accomplish this important function - 'he LL NL Intel personnel were very helpful in expediting ·etransmission of classified information via the DYFAX system l ·rhe LANL Technical and Operational assessments were off base in that their Teams did not grasp the fact that the information to be 1ssessed related to intelligence reports of a nuclear terrorist hreat detected in it's initial stage of activity rather than the conventional threat message used by an adversary to communicate their threats and demands The use of fictitious names for people places and country capabilities caused a major disruption and the lack of prompt controller injects simulating normally known explicit background information was very unrealistic The controllers provided bad guidance on the use of existing proliferant country data ultimately this added a great deal of confusion to an already confused situation and may have compromised some information to personnel who did not have a need to know Secure CATCOMS was needed Closing down the DOE Germantown communications center at COB EST stops all SACNET classified communications and should not happen even during exercises - a SOP needs to be established at the DOE EOC Forrestal for emergency operations on a 24 hour basis likewise switching to the special NEST NET crypto key is of questionable value and should be reconsidered as an SOP 1 ' There are no procedures for extended work day 24 hour operation of the z Division DYFAX system during emergencies 10 I I l UNCLASSIFIED - c IS-III ENCRYPTED FOR TRANSMISSION Page 4 ·-- of 9 Director of A I cannot meet his A I responsibilities and also I i temction as the LLNL SSA charged with coordination and preparation of LLNL based personnel and equipment required for deployment in ' is exercise the A I activities suffered at the expense of LLNL 1 iployment planning r I J The LLNL SSA's listed on the ALERT Roster are not properly trained t informed of their responsibilities in a NEST incident There was little or no coordination by NVO with the LABS concerning he requirements for and make-up of the Advanced Party · The requirement to cut back on the OCONUS main party deployment was oorly orchestrated and revealed a genuine lack of understanding on he part of NVO management as to the manning requirements to I properly meet assigned tasks there is little sense in attempting to 1 '' do a job with insufficient resources - if a foreign government w Jo't· 1llow a large enough NEST contingent into their country to get the i Job done then NEST should NOT be deployed · i ·I ·-- u · A N · tj T f ij _ v _ JL 1 4 C'1 J tJ-87-3 o S-III UNCLASSIFIED ENCRYPTED FOR TRANSMISSION Page -- 5 of ' I DEPLOYMENT 0 OCONUS The Deputy Director for A I Wayne Adams NVO was picked to c company the Advanced Party this turned out to be a wise move and t i was very effective at establishing initial contacts with the three other Intel Centers already functioning at the OCONUS site f 1is resulted in a quick start-up of the A I intel function once the 1 tin party arrived Limited but adequate space was provided for the A I function in the · and the NVO support personnel were very accommodating in helping r set-up their work space two rooms 20 15 and 8 15 equipment set-up went smoothly as did the arrangement of tables files etc i 9 wo 12 hour shifts were established noon-midnight midnight-noon using the predeployment shift assignments shift change briefings - re conducted religiously through out the exercise and a written I summary plus an AIMS update were issued at the end of each shift these measures expedited the shift changes and provided good continuity from shift to shift he Director and Deputy for A I maintained a focused activity through out the exercise requests for providing staff support to he osc for non-A I functions ·were properly but diplomatically ejected Information flow between A I CP and the TOC went well mainly Jecause of the efforts of the A I team with the Intel section members carrying the brunt of the load the scientific teams located at the TOC need to be more disciplined in relaying information they either generate or obtain back to A I for analysis Information Data management functions were properly anticipated and functioned smoothly All incomming information and outgoing assessments field documents must be processed logged by the A I Coordinator before any further distribution and an adequate sized AIMS staff is required on both shifts The procedure of using A I ·_ team members to score information reports and assessments for entry into AIMS worked well and should be used on future operations -- 0 l i r- UNCLASSIFIED mpo s ed and distributed 11 I · i · f f111 ' • ii OCONUS rs --III ENCRYPTED FOR TRANSMISSION Page 6 of '· fhe 7e are ot en ugh A I Team members to properly staff two separate ncident sites J d SUular assessors NSU members and IMS CATCOMS operators are in short supply This situation was known prior to the exercise but recommendations to the locate all issessors at one site with direct classified communication links to he second site were rejected out-of-hand by the Chief of Staff and On-Secne Commander - as a result the support at the second site was inadequate I I There is only one stand alone AIMS system again the second site suffered A faster Xeroxing capability is need for reproducing multiple copies typically 12 to 14 of the Assessment Reports A I Field Documents and AIMS Reports Recipients of the A I publications did not establish some sort of simple filing system or clip board method for maintaining their copies of these publications as a result some many NEST personnel did not have an opportunity to review all of the A I I published information j I The information contained in the AIMS Reports is organized in a straight forward manner however most NEST personnel have not l bothered to invest 15 to 30 minutes of their time to learn the reporting format iI Most NEST personnel are still communicating crucial information verbally which results in much wasted time Intel team members were assigned to the TOC to insure a good flow of information between A I CP and the TOC however there still seems I to be either a misunderstanding or a real lack of interest on the part of most NEST personnel assigned to the TOC - information flow I between the TOC and CP must be in both directions and NEST personnel stationed at the TOC must recognize that they have a responsibility to inform A I of critical information originating at the TOC or reported to the TOC from the Working Point as soon as 9 u I 1•e Intel function was also disrupted by tracking down faulty - ontroller injects and repeatedly requesting information that was E ther non-existent or not yet scheduled for release by the ntrollers again this was very bad planning on the part of the 'exercise planners Some mix ups are to be expected in any exercise r·1t Mighty Derringer is noteworthy for the excessive number of these ✓ •MS-III ENCRYPTED FOR TRANSMISSION Page 7 of 9 disruptions he procedures for certifying that Intel Team members from both LLNL Z-Div and LANL IT-Div have special waivers for access to No ' ontractor caveated information were non-existent as a result LNL LANL personnel were barred from entry into the tactical intelligence centers operating on-site rhe Intel Lead Tracking IBM PC was not set up to be connected to the hIMS computer as a result pertinent information could not be electronically transferred back and forth between machines The Intel Section needed a word processing capability that could operate in parallel with the Lead Tracking program or they need to be a user on the Assessment Section's word processor Requests for Intelligence information were not coordinated between the field elements of A I and their respective home teams before the requests were to transmitted t0 DOE OTA for follow up this lead to some confusion and extra work by the parties concerned The end of the OCONUS exercise play was not well managed proper forensic evaluation of the disabled device was precluded by the rush to close down the Working Point - ultimately this impacted the appropriateness of the disablement recommendations made to the CONUS site r O CONUS At the CONUS site the to make the TTNt T - I CONUS - the CONUS site the A I Director was distracted from his primary r ponsibilities of directing the A I activities and advising the NEST osc because of the shortage of A I personnel given the s tuation the A I Director should have focused more on providing t rn leadership and less on functioning as a team member At the CONUS site the NSU had to be d1v1ded between two separace I - 'Y S-III I ENCRYPTED FOR TRANSMISSION Page 's of hostage-barricade locations again there were insufficient nersonnel to cover both sites properly and certainly not enough ersonnel to support both locations on a 24 hour basis At the CONUS site the CP was relocated notionally to a safe ocation the NSU personnel at the two hostage barricade locations ere never notified of this change and the CP apparently did not address the risk to the negotiators at there original locations his blatant lack of concern for the safety of NEST personnel '- _ssigned to forward working sites is inexcusable u 9 u SI II - I _ _ •• r f l' nMS-III ' I ENCRYPI'ED FOR TRANSMISSION 9 of Page 9 ER COMMENTS OCONUS iving on-site is an efficient mode of operation sleeping accommodations and provisions for a 24 hour cafeteria were good pecial Intelligence considerations were identified during the course of the exercise briefed to the NEST osc but not actually implemented due to the lack of personnel in this type of scenario hese Intelligence considerations might very well override many of the standard NEST operations and impose stringent additional OPSEC conditions upon NEST I t b 1 ----- ---------- _ _ _ UNCLASSIFIED IJtJ-f1-d b 1