C B E '4 APPENDIX II D UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMI SSI ON WASHINGTON 25 D C February 19 196o MEMORANDUM FOR Mr Philip J Farley Department of State SUBJECT i CONl'ROL OF AND COOPERATION IN OAS CENl'RIFUGE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TECHNOLOGY The attached background paper summar izes the current state of the art both domestically and abroad in the gas centrifuge method of U-235 isotope separation It notes that as a result of recent developments here and in Germany the process now shows significant promise of producing U-235 at a coat bracketing the AEC published price schedule The capital costs power require ments and technical skills necessary to buil d and operate a production scale plant may shortly be wi thin the capabilities of as many as 20 to 30 foreign countries if development meets expectations and the technology remains unclassified The implications of this on the Nth power problem are obvious The staff is now preparing r ecommendations for Commission consideration as to l the future scope of our own gas centri tUge progr a 111 2 oontrol of the gas centrifuge process including information in the light of the Nth power problem and 3 cooperation with the Germans Dutch and possibly others in this area Because of the complexity and interdependence of the foreign and domestic aspects of this problem we would appreciate the views of the Department as to the several guestions raised in the attached paper Members or my staff are or course available to discuss this matter in further detail and provi de such additional technical background information as may be of assistance to you A A Wells Director Division of International Affairs -44- Appendi X D DOE ARCHIVE ET ENCLOSURE TO APPENDIX 11 D11 CONTROL OF AND COOPERATION IN GAS CENTRIFUGE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TECHNOLOGY The Commission has for a number or years supported a modest experimental program at the University of Virginia in the separation of U-235 isotopes by the gas centrifuge process Most of this work has been done on a classified basis and has not been pursued as a matter or priority due principally to the lack of a foreseeable need for expanded United States U-235 production and the relatively high efficiency of our present diffusion plant Within Germany a gas centrifuge research and development program has gone forward with groups working at the Universities of Bonn and Kiel the Max Planck Institute at Aachen and at DEGUSSA and AEO All of the German work has been 1one on an unclassified ba s ie and aimed primarily at developinE - le process for commercial exploitation In addition a Dutch grou tJ has been working under the FOM Society for Fundamental S udies on Matter at several different sites on a basis which ap e rs to be partially classified Although the Dutch interest is undoubtedly partly commercial the possibility of using the procass for developing a native U-235 capability for national purposes such as naval propulsion was noted in our recent disoussiona with the Dutch Naval Group Until recently the state of the art both domestically and abroad did not suggest that the economics of the gas centrifuge process were sufficiently attractive to justify consideration of building a oentrifuge plant As a result of developments in Germany and in the United States it now appears possible that a gas centrifuge plant could be designed built1 and put into operation within the next five years in the United States that would produce U-235 at a cost roughly equivalent to our published prices The basis for this assumption is a detailed study that has already been prepared for the Commission by the General Electric Company It should also be noted that the building of such a plant in Germany is judged by the General Electric study group to be Within the capability of the Germans It does not appear moreover that successf'ul conclusion of such a project either in the United States or Germany is dependent upon cooperation since the state of technological advancement is roughly equal in both countries with the Germans if anything enjoying a slight lead At the present time the information which haa been published on the German centrifuge effort the ZO-III model developed by Professor Beyerle of the Aachen Group if used as the basis of a separations plant would result according to our estimates 1 in the production of U-235 at a coat approximately ten times that of our published price schedule A refined model of this centrifuge the ZO-VII is al so unclassified and is currently an artiole of commerce The Commission has issued a license to Thor-Westcliffe to import seven of the ZO-VII centrifuges into the United States We understand Thor-Westcliffe plans to construct an experimental cascade for purposes of studying the economic potential of the -45- Enclosure 11to11 Appendix 0 DOE ARCHIVE EC ft process Complete information however has not yet been published on the ZO-VII According to our e stimates a plant designed around this unit if built could produce U-235 at a cost of two to four times our published price The General Electric study referred to above would require a $6 million research and development program to advance present technology to the point where a plant could be built to produce U-235 at a competitive price We have reviewed these developments 1n light of the potential or the gas centrifuge process for contributing to the Nth power problem Our preliminary conclusion is that this potential is significant and that the process now may in some circumstances be equal to or slightly more attractive than the plutonium reactor route Some of the more significant factors underlying this conclusion as useful to an appreciation of the problem The hypothetical plant described in the General Electric study would cost from 17 to 24 mill ion dollars would be capable of producing 500 kgs of U-235 at 9si enrichment annually and would have a total annual power requirement of approximately one megawatt of electricity Except for the preparation of feed materials the skills needed to design and construct such a plant are primarily in the area of mechanical engineering and are available to perhaps some 20-30 countries The principal liability of the centrifuge route as against the plutonium reactor rout e today lies in the fact that centrifuge technology is ye t to be proven and the designs of the more advanced centrifuge uoits have not as yet been published nor have these units been tested Because of our concern with the attractiveness of the process to a potential Nth power we are studying what steps might be taken to control centrifuge technology both in this country and abroad It should be noted that i ndependent of this study the staff has under consideration a recommended research and de velopment program designed to advance gas centrifuge technology within the United States to a point where it could produce U-235 at a cost competitive with our published price schedule The principal Justification for adopting such a program would be to maintain U S l eadership in isotope separation technology rather than to fulfill any currently forocast requirement for expanded U S production capacity In view of the potential of this process for contributing to the Nth power problem our current intention would be to carry out such a program on a classified basis in order most effectively to safeguard the technology Clearly however any classification action the Commission might take could be vitiated if the German activities were to proceed on an unclassified basis It appears to us thorefore that it is important to determine whether the German Government could and would classify its work in gas centrifuge technology We are mindful of several problems in this regard which could make such an action difficult The German development to date has been undertaken almost exclusively by private parties interested in ultimate commercial exploitation To the best of our knowledge the German Atomic Ministry has no classified DOE ARCHlV - -46- Enclosure 11to Appendix D11 programs due 1n part at least to Gennany 1 s commitments under the Brussels Treaties Any modit 1oat1on or this position could perhaps have serious political repercussions in Ger1nany It is unclear both from the standpoint or Treaty provisions and policy as to whether Oennany oould or would take a classification action in this area that would prevent dissemi ation or the technology to her EURATOM partners although 11 mitation or the technology to the EURATCX t members would obviously constitute a degree or information control substantially greater than a canpletely unclassified development The problem as regards the Netherlands is not treated separately here but we would assume that the EURATOM aspects would be similar Notwithstanding these proble we believe that the safeguarding of ultra-centrifuge technology by agreed procedures for the control or this information among the several states in which centrifuge work is being carried out is important and should be explored It would further appear to us that such ex9loration should in the first instance be with the German at d Du ch Governments We believe moreover that regardless or w 1ether these governments or EURATOM could control their prese1rl e nd future gas centrifuge information by classif1oat1on or utherwise agreement should be sought to control the export of gas centrifuges and related equipment and to subject such ex ort to safeguards It is our impression that agreement on such ocntrola could probably be successfully negotiated and taken tog • her t'f t r the agreed controls we are seeking among uranium supplier nationB would mitigate to some extent at least the likelihood o an Nth power exploiting the process As a related matter the Connission staff recognized the technical desirability or cooperating in centrifuge research and development • 11th the Germana and the Dutch While such cooperation is not essential to achieving the stated objectives of the proposed U S developmental program it is reasonable to assume that it would contribute to the rate and probability of their achievemen·t ln addition it would permit an immediacy of association with the European development which in itself could enhance control It' it proves feasible therefore for the Dutch and Germans to establish control over existing and future gas centrifuge information the possibility of cooperating with those two countries on a classified basis should be examined We recognize that classified cooperation With the Germans and the Dutch raises certain problems with respect to EURATCM including the concurrence of the Community in the negotiation of new bilateral instruments and the feasibility of the German and Dutoh governments• segregating their work from their EURATOM partners In this regard the possibility or considering a classified agreement with EURATOM to permit exchange of gas centrifuge information deserves examination as a means for cooperating With the Germans and the Dutch even though we recognize the policy problems that such an Agreement would present to both the Europeans and ourselves Finally if agreement cannot be reached with the Germans and the Dutch to control gas centrifuge information then there may be serious question as to whether a real purpose would be served in classifying any of our own work Should we therefore as a Enclosure to Appendix 11 D11 -47- RD DOE ARCHIVE SECPI' - result of our inability to secure German and Dutch agreement to control centrifuge information decide to declassify our own work it would appear possible to work out an arrangement for unclassi fied technical exchange with the Germans and Dutch under the ambit of EURATOM i f this should pr ove desir able and pr obably without modification of our existing Agreements for Cooperation either with EURATOM or the member states The staff is now preparing recommendations for Commission consideration as to 1 the future scope of our own gas centrifuge program 2 control of the gas centrifuge process including information in light or the Nth power probl em and 3 cooperation with the Germans Dutch and possi bly others in this area Because or the complexity and interdependence of the foreign and domestic aspects of this problem we would appr eciate the views of the Department as to a Whether an approach to the German or Dutch Governments to seek their agreement on classifying or otherwise controlling prc35ent and future work is feasible and desirable from an over-all u s foreign policy standpoint and b Whether the German Government to your lmowledge could or would in view of its Treaty and foreign policy commitments be 11kely to agree to such an acti on On the basis of your consideration of these questions we would appreciate your views regardi ng the general desi r abil ity or cooperation in this field including your specific comments as to a Whether if the Gennan and Dutch Governments coul d agree to the control of gas centrif uge information it would be des1rable from a u s foreign policy standpoint to cooperate with them bilateral ly on a cl assifi ed basis in a research and development program and if not whether it would be possible or desirable to seek to do so with EURATOM under a classit'ied agreement b Whether if it is not possible for the Dutch and Germans to agr e to control gas centrifuge information it would be desirable from a fore1gn policy standpoint to cooperate with the Dutch and Germans either bilaterally or through and with EURATOM -48- Enclosure to Appendix D DOE ARCl·HVEi RD-