S E e ii Bill' AEC 61 16 4 g COPY NO _ __ April 91 19§0 1 ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION PRELIMINARY STATE VIEWS ON OAS CENTRIFUGE Note by the Secretary The General Manager has requested that the attached letter from Mr Philip J Parley Department of state be circulated for the information of the Commission in connection with consideration ot AEC 6 W l 5 Iii R W B McCool Collectfr Se re- f' Box 4 1 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Secretary 1 Folder _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ DISTRIBUTION COPY NO Secretary Commissioners General Manager Deputy Oen Mgr Asst Oen Mgr Asst Oen Mgr IA Asst Oen Mgr Mfg Asst Oen Mgr R S Asst Oen Mgr R ID General Counsel Congr Relations Finance Isotope Devel opment DISTRIBUTION COPY NO l Information 2-6 54-56 Inspecti on Intelligence International Affairs 9 - 10 Licensing Regulation 11 Military Application 12 Operations Analysis Production Reactor Development Research 15 - 18 D c Office 19 20 - 22 Secretariat i i 23 24 - 25 26 27 28 - 31 32 - 33 34 35 36 - 37 38 - 44 45 46 - 48 49 - 53 When separated from enclosures handle this document as • • • • UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMECL STIFRANIED S INFIO •TicorNAilj§ite Dept Interests Equities '' ' Dc l-uifl d It lcucc 1 by A ltPS l r_i' w' Dote This document Number 49 cm1111aMl'ffl • Series -A PIRB - SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OP STATE WASHINGTON March 23 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR Mr Algie A Wells 1 Director Division or International Affairs Atomic Energy COllll 11ssion SUBJECT Control of and Cooperation 1n Centrifuge Research and Development The Department has given careful consideration to your memorandum to me of February 19 on the problem of ultra-centrifuge research and technology and the distribution of isotope separation equipment I am writing now to give the Department's preliminary views which we might discuss in detail at a meeting betw en officers or the Department and the Atomic Energy Commission The Department shares the concern of the Commission over the implications of unclassified development of ultra-centrifuge isotopic separation equipment in Germany and the Netherlands and the availability or such equipment on the commercial market The Department believes however that possibilities or control of information pertaining to this equipment are very limited although export controls by the German and Dutch Governments might be practicable The Department does not feel qualified to say Whether information pertaining to ultra-centrifuge work in Germany and the Netherlands ought to be classified but it believes that efforts to have such information classified would raise unusually ditficult problems To begin with the Germans would probably be unwilling to classify any information of this k1nd either unilaterally at our urging or through a bilateral agl'eement with the u s The classification of such information would raise suspicions that Germany was engaged in atomic weapons development and thus would raise serious foreign policy and public relations problems for the German Government The problem would not be made easier from the foreign policy standpoint if olassification were made under a bilateral This material cont DOE ARCfllVES -1- i i i Rlilii agreement with the United States since we have refused to oollaborate with France in the field of isotope separation and Germany might encounter serious difficulties with Euratom if it attempted to conclude such an agreement Furthermore Euratom probably would insist that all such information be made available to the Col llnisaion under the terms of the dissemination of information provisions of the treaty Another possibility would be to request that Euratom attempt to persuade the member states to classify all information connected with the ultra-centrifuge development on the basis of an understanding similar to the one we have with the United Kingdom covering gaseous diffusion The Department however doubts whether Euratom would be prepared to meet such a request it would probably press us to conclude an agreement coveri ng cooperation in this field in Which it has expressed strong interest Furthermore France which has attempted to gain our cooperation in the field of isotope separation probably would also be reluctant to consent to such a request and might regard our inter est in this problem as an important bargaining point for attaining its objectives Euratom in the past has expressed a readiness to become a party to classified informati on that has peaceful applications as well as military An agreement with Euratom that covered cooperation in this field as well as others could provide an acceptable framework from a foreign polioy point of view for applying classification Assurances by Euratom that classifi cation was not a cover for military activity might wi n greater acceptance than those coming either from Germany or the United States Fu thermore Euratom through 1ts treaty responsibil1t1es for gathering and disseminating information within the Community is probably best eQu1pped to keep abreast of all significant developments in this field This approach however may raise serious questions regarding Euratom•s security We would have to assume that any information classified under an agreement between the United States and Euratom woul d be made available to the French Atomic Energy Commission Therefore since t he United States Atomic Energy Commission has not been able to approve the French AEC for security it is questionable whether it could approve Eu ratom from the security standpoint The Department believes that a negati ve finding would be quite damaging to Eu atom's status and that no attempt to check on its security procedures should be made unless the USAEC agreed not to obJect to the transmittal of information obtained by Euratom through an agreement with the United States to the French AEC Control of exports of ultra-centrifuge eQuipment could not be exercised by Euratom but the Oennan and Dutch Governments might be able and willing to impose such controls We could determine this however only after discussions with represents tives of Germany and the Netherlands Safeguards might bo applied by the IAEA Euratom itself has no power to exercise safeguards outside the Community The commercial firms and uni varsities now working on tbis ultra-centrifuge development might also be prepared to restrict the circulation of informati on pertaini ng to their work informal commercial restrictions of thi s natur e might prove to be quite effective DOE ARCHIVES '8 I • · 2B§ T The Secretary has called Chancellor Adenauer's attenti on to the implications of Germany 's work in the ultra-centrifuge field The Chancellor indicated that he would l ook into the matter I shall be happy to arrange a meeting between Department and AEC officers to discuss this problem further if you wish If this is acceptable to you I suggest that a member of your staff get in touch with Mr Chapin a Philip J Farley Philip J Farley D E ARCHIVES •