S H e - 4 ABC 610 15 I l T COPY pril 9 1960 O _ _ 4_9 RED C ED OPY ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION GAS CE FUOE METHOD OP IS OPE SEPARATION Note by the Secretary The General Manager haa requested that the attached report by the Acting Director of Research be circulated for consideration r 1ng the week of April 11 1960 W B McCool Secretary COPY DISTRIBUTIO Secretary Commi sa1oners General Manager Deputy Gen Mgr Ass t Gen Mgr Asst Oen Mgr I A sst Oen Mgr Mfg sst Oen Mgr R S Asst Gen lgr R ID OeoeraJ Counsel Congr Relations Pinanoe Isotope Development I nformation Inspection l 2 - 0 6 5 -56 i 9 - 10 11 12 l3 14 15 - 18 19 20 - 22 23 24 - 25 26 27 Internationa l ffaJ rs 28 - 31 Licensing Regulation 32 - 33 Military pplicatioo 34 w en separated from enoiosur a ha Ddla---trltis document as •••••••• Inte 111genee Operations Analysis Production Reactor Development Res ea rch D C Office Secretariat -r---- ---- -- 35 g I 1 45 r' r 1 46 - 48 49 - 53 OOCu MRtft' 'fftAM8 ll'nRD IEBREW f'fU 801ffAfflS j F ld r ili ICWi MlA I -C tl t c _ I 'it f • ' C ' l ' J J This document consists of a g e s C PY o _ __of 56 er1es --- ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION OAS CENTRIFUGE METHOD OF ISC1I'OPE SEPARATION Report to tge General Manager by the Directors of Claseificat1on International Affairs and Research 1 To dete ne the ethod an scale o proceeding with the development oft e gae centrifuge method or isotope separation including possible control and oollaborat1on with The Netherlands West Germany and the United Kingdom SUMMARY 2 On November 5 1954 an Ad Ho c Committee Qppointed by the General Manager to study tho Oas Centrifuge Prooeaa recommended an orderly development program be carried forward to reeolve certain key t cbnical problems t1ona ere n ver 1mple ente The Ad Hoc C and the C ao ed to establ ah policy on tbe davelo prooasa ttee is ion has hitherto not nt of the gas centri f'uge Recent develo ments in this program are reported 1n AEC 610 5 - 610 13 3 The lack or fores eeable u S produot1on need for a gas centrifuge plant estimates that this process was eoonomioally non-competitive With gaseo s d1ffus1on 1 and budgetary 11mJ tat1ons have combined to 11Dl1t the U s effort in this process during 1954 - 1960 to a odest experimental pr ram at the Un1vereity of Virginia where however aan technology have been mad s1gn1t'1oant advances 1n the Part of a captive German gro p hich DOE AR Hl -1- • 8 i C 'R E ' P developed a short tube centrifuge in the USSR during 1946-1954 haa duplicated the USSR work at tbe Uni vers1ty of Virginia a1nco 1958 Th s1 plicity of their presently developed unit along with materials improvements developed in m1ea11e programs indicates the feasibility or design of a short tube unit showing considerable potential for isotope separation Information on foreign work 1n the USSR Germany and The Netherlands has become available The German program is considered to be the most extensive and most complete gas centrifuge program in the world at this time 4 Informal discussions have been held with Dr Boettcher Director of Research DEOUSSA Germany see AEC 610 10 Professor Groth University of Bonn Oerntany and Professor Kistemaoher D1reotor Laboratory voor Maes Speotrographio Netherlands see AEC 610 7 610 9 concerning their technical programs and the desirability of collaboration As yet ot't'1o1al proposals to collaborate on a development program have not been received from the O nnan and The etherlanda gave nts l The United K1 ngdom has shown renewed interest 1n the gas oentrtfuge isotope separation process and classified disc se1ons pennitted under the present bilateral agreement ere held with representatives of the UKAEA Risley at the University ot' Virginia in November The process appears attractive to them in view of the notable advances achieved since they discontinued work on this process 1n 1948 Other reasons which aro ee their interest in the process is a U K decision to base their next round 1563-1965 of power reactors on enriched 1 5 - 2% U-235 pl o the fact that gaseous diffusion is a more expensive process with the than 1th us ijThe Secretary or State recently called Chancellor Adenauer's attention to the implications of Oermany 1 s work 1n this field The Chancellor indicated that he would look into the matter -2- DOE C l E a e a § T 5 A technical and economic evaluation of the short bowl gas centrifuge process has recently been completed by th El ctric Company under a contract 1th the ABC General Th 1r study reveals that follo ing a three-year development program the u s could then build a gas centrifuge plant which would produce separated U-235 at a price competitive with the present AEC price aohedula Their study also reveals that such a plant requiring primarily mechanical engineering skills could be built at a cost of about $17 million following a 2-3 year dev lopment progr hich could produce 500 a year of 9 U-235 an reg irenrant of approximately one megawatt have a power Except for the pre- paration or feed materials the skills needed to design and construct such a plant are available to some 20-30 countries 6 Tho potential of the gas centrifuge process in contributing to the Nth power problem baa also been evaluate Union Carbide Nucl ar Company route as compared in a study by It 1a believed that the centrifuge 1th the reactor route studied by Hanford Operations Off ce would be the easier to pursue both covertly and overtlv 7 In order to prevent gas centrifuge information and equipment from becotn1ng available to other countries and pennit them to use the gas centrifuge process 1n the prod ot1on of weapons grade 1118terials agreemen a for olasa1t'1oat1on export controls and collaboration shou1d be explored With the United llingdom Oerman y and The Netherlands and strategically desirable Collaboration would be technically Although sovious procedural diffi- culties are recognized in establishing ti a agreeillents with Oennany and The etherlands the problems are under ex loration with the Department of State see Appendix D -3- In the mea time OE information developed aa a result or u s work in this area is no longer being declassified B An expanded u s development program costing about $6 mil ion over three years should proceed expeditiously and inde- pendent of the negot1ati on 1mpl mentation or reJeotion ot an agreement with Garmany and The Netherlands A program costing about $2 million a year over a three year period is outlined which the staff' believes woul place the u s back into a position of technological leadership in this area of isotope sepsrat1on a subject of considerable military and commoroial concern The inoentiv s for such an xpan ed program are a Impact on econany of' economic comm roial power b Military security through plant dispersion o Reduced power consumption d Cheaper incremental production e Separation of commercial and military economy r Ma1nta1n knowledge of sources and capab111t1es or roreign production ot fissionable materials g Retain u S leadership tion technology in forefront of' isotope sepa ra- The recent work which has been done on the centrifuge method of' isotope separation and its relevance 1n connsot1on with the Nth power problem was brought to the attention or the White House Departments of Defense and State and the Central Intelligence Agency at meet g on Feb uary 6 1960 AEC 610 13 11 1960 the Joint Chiera ot Staff' were also briefed On February The General Advisory Committee at its last two meetings February 1-3 and March 17-19 1960 cons1dere oomnente and reoo the ce trif'• e process Their ndatio1e ere included in Appendix E 11 • The JCAE was notified of the lmplications or this process to the Nth B -4- C s- e e 'R i 'l power problem in a letter dated 2 12 60 tran the Chairman to Senator Anderson Appendix F STAPF JUDO itENTS 9 The Divisions or Finance Intell1genoe Military Application Offioe o Operations Analysis and Forecasting Oft1oe of the General Counsel and Production concur 1n the reccmnendation ot this paper 10 The D1V1s1on of Reactor Development notes that successful demonstration of low capital cost isotope separat cir plants can have major impact on the growth and developmer t of 1nduatr1a1 atom lo energy To the extent that low prices f o enriched uranium may result it would have an obvious effect upon achievement or economio nuclear power both in this 001 mtry and t i r oughout the world It would make possible real simplification of AEC problems such as those discussed by the Commission at meeting 1596 on February 26 1960 on the subject of sale of speoial nuclear material toll processing in Government diffusion plants and related matters Lastly the beneficial ef'feot of making possible a completely private ohain rrom ore through the entire f'uel cycle with the possible exception of' ultimate waste disposal cannot be overemphasized The introduction of private industry at each phase of the oyole will bring into being cost-cutting incentives not otherwise available in the program and should significantly advance the date of low cost nuclear energy 11 The Division of Production agrees that additional effort over and above the currant level on gas centrifuge development is desirable but believes that such additional effort should be directed primarily to the resolution of the current technical -5 - CHIV 'SE c h and eoonomio uncertainties as to performance of a group of centrit'uges operating as a cascade The D1 vision of' Production believes that this feature of the proposed program should be emphasized in favor of aooelerat1ng the development of more efficient or advanced centrifuge units Emphasis in the direc - tion suggested above 1ould permit proper evaluation ot the h power problem at the earliest praot1cable date and would provide area iat1o basis for anticipating the effects of further technological advances in individual centrifuge units 12 The D1v1s1on ot Intornational Affairs concurs 1n the recommendation that prompt discussions should be held with the Europeans on the feasibility of' controlling gas centrifuge process technology but notes that the serious polioy problems associated with olass1 ied coopers ion in this area referred to in paragTapb 40 of Appendix 11 A11 may be diff'ioult to overcane The Department or State has been asked to furnish 1 s Views on the international aspecte or this problem 13 The Off1oe of General Counsel notes that the provisions of Sect ion 144a of the Atomic Energy Act would be applioable to the proposed international exchanges or olassH'ied 1nf'orrnat1on Thus any international cooperation involving the exchange of classified information would rag re authorization by the President and the existence ot an agreement for cooperation Within Section 123 of the Act CO CLUSION 14 a The U s ooot1 d proceed with r n exiJr ndad research and dovelopment pr g -- -m on the oent1 i1'uge process at an estimated cost of ap roximate ly $2 0COJOOO per year for three years as described ' l n detail in Appc idix 11 B11 • DOE -6- CHIV 869RiT b s itable agree nts c no rn1ng tha control of ga centrifuge information materials and equipment should be sought promptly 1r the Department or State agrees w1th Germany The Netherlands and the U K c Classified cooperation w1th Germany and The etberlands would appear to be desirable from a technical standpoint but may be politically 1mpraot1cal d Classified cooperat1on with the U K should continue REC NDATION 15 The General Manager recommends that the Atomic Energy Commission a Approve an expanded U S research and development program on the gas centrifuge process as set forth 1n Appendix 11 B11 J b ote that total funds estimated to accomplish th a progra e au million dollars tor an approxiJllate three year period o Note that funds to 1n1t1ate and conduct this program througn'PY' 1961 Will be obtained by reprocessing funds now budgeted for the Division ot Research and the Division of Production d A ree that the prompt initiation of exploratory discuss ons with the German Dutch and u K governments to seek control or all gas centrifuge information equipment and materia a 1n 11g t of the Nth power problem is desirable e Agria that classified cooperation with the Germ ans and Dutch wou be desirable trom a technical standpointi f Note that the Department or State has been infonned of the To E ent1al of the gas centrifuge process 1n the context of the th power problem that it will be informed ot this action and that the Department•a views have been requested on a the desirability or our seeking agreed controls among the states where gas centrifuge research and dev lopment is bing carried out and b desirability and feasibility of clasai 1ed collaboration With these countries g Note that the Commission will be promptly informed as soon aetfi'e Views or the Department of State are received h Note that classified collaboration 1n this area which has been Tnit1ated with the United Kingdom will be continued within the limits provided by the u s -U K Civil Uses Agreement tor Cooperation 0 E -7- HIV 1 Note that the expanded u s development program should proceed independent or the negot1at1on unplementation or rejection of any proposed agreemen s w1th Germany and The Netherlands that may develop J Note that successful operation w1th gas oentrifuges have farreaching 1mpl1oat1ons in development or a privatelyowned atomic energy industry 1n the United States which subject will be covered in other papers under preparation k Note that th JCAE has been informed of the potential or the gas oentrif'uge process to the Nth power proble by the letter in Appendix 11 P and will be advised by appro- priate letter of the planned expansion of the AEC 1 s research and development program on the gas centri 'uge process LIST OF ENCLOSURES PAGE NO APPENDIX A - Background and Discussion 9 APPENDIX 11 B - u s Develo ment Progra · ••• •• 26 AP PENDIX 11 C11 - Safeguards St dies Analysis •••••••••••••••• 30 APPENDIX 11 0 11 - Letter to Departm ent APPENDIX 11 E - General Advisory Canmittee Comments and Reoommandat1ona ••••• •••• • 9 APPENDIX F - Letter to JCAE••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 51 APPENDIX G - Memorandum t rom Marshall to Wells ••••••• •• 52 Expande or State DOE -8- 4 CHIVE APPENDIX II AI BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSIO FRE POLICY 1 The Commission has hitherto not acted to establish policy either domestically or abroad 1n connection mth the gas centrifuge process except in the area or claaa1f1cat1on The present Clasa1f1cation Polley Guide AEC 27 136 provides that the gas centrifuge program be a class1t1ed program but that exper al work on the detai ed 111eohanioal design f'or t he method of isotope separation may be decla sil'1ed There 1s ent- ntr11'uge however a restrictive paragraph attached tor he topic which requires that such information be held cl assified when it becomes apparent that it could reasonably be ur ed Or the pro- duction of large quantities of U- 235 HISTORY OP TH3 PROBLEM S PROGRAM 2 The h1 tory of the AEC posture relative to the centrifuge process ia outlined in the AEC 610 series Pursuant to recommendations in a November 5 195 report by Ad Hoc Committee appointed by the General 1anager to evaluate the gas centri f'Uge process the Division of Research solicited bids from four companies to manufacture a prototype unit based upon a realistic an extrapolation of the war- time Westinghouse experience as possible However contract negotiations were halt d and it was determined that the Research Divis i on support should at that ti me be limited to the basic problem of spinning long thin tubes at the University of Virginia - 9 - 0 Appendix A C IVES S i9Ri'J 3 Thia class1f1ed prog now supported at a level ot at the University or Virginia 300 000 per 1ear has bad as a long- range goal the development or a lugh-apeed long-tube ceotrit'Uge and the application ot such a centrifuge to the separation ot isotopes Emphasis 1n the early phases of the program was devoted to attacking basic mechanical problems associated with bearings seals drive ayatema eta In 1957 the Virginia group solved a major problem in aucceaafully spinning a long tube through a series of critical vibrations a problem inherent in high speed rotation LI Since that time or emphasis has been placed on the problems providing tubes of higher strength materials for hi gher rotational speeds and the problems or intro ction and extraction ot gases DELETED DELETED 5 An unclassified program has also been supported at the University of Virginia since the summer of 1958 being carried out by The ork 1s Dr Oernot Zippe an Austrian scientist who assisted Steenbeck in the development of - 10 - short tube aubcr1t1cal Appendix A 11 D E R HIVEb centrifuge while a prisoner in Russia tolloW1 ng World War lI Dr Zippe has completed the construction of several of the units has subjected them to lifetime tests and is currently conducting isotope separation tests with uni ts is impress ve UF6 Total I EC The s1mpl1c1ty of these nda provided to this project are $108 000 6 A contract with the General Electric Company was executed 1n June 1959 to provide the Comm1sa1on with a technical and economic analysis of both the long and short to define the over-all problems be methods and The study or the short tube method GEL 0708 1 has now been completed and indicates that the United States could build in two years preceded by a three year evelopment progr baaed on a a gas centrifuge plant 2 Tb is plant would be short tube design and could prod oe enriched uranium at a price competitive with the present AEC price schedule 7 The AEC of Santa Pe New has licensed Thor-Westcliffe Develop ent Inc exico to import seven gas centrifuges from Germany for use in that Company 1 s studies to determine the commercial feasibility of this process for the production of enriched uranium The AEC is considering an application to perm 1t construction of an experimental cascade This activity is currently unclassified but future work may have to be conducted on a classi f'ied basis Discussions With Mr Lohbeck of Thor-Westcliffe are reported in AEC 610 8 FOREIG PROGRAMS 8 Since World War II the German and later the D ltoh effort in this field has been greater than that in the U S and 1 Y' On file in he vis on o 75 000 Kg u yr at 2% 500 Kg eaearc U yr at 95j 1 - D pendi x 11 HIV 1 11 in recent years he rate of growth of the Oerman-tutch effort bas On the grounds that 1 they should not been substantial u s blindly adopt a U-235 separation process chosen by the 19 3 nder the pressures or in war 2 that they should caref'ully study a 1 competing processes from the point of vie of technical merits flexibility and economy 3 tbat they are seriously considering plants considerably smaller than those in the U S for which the centrifuge has a greater chance of being fully competitive and that they consider it advantageo s to be able to divide the operation into several smaller plants at diverse locations the Germans and the Dutch have parted ways with the French who have chosen the path of gaseous d 1ff'us1on 9 I ur1-ng orL War II t e gas centrifUge was the method selected for study by the Germana for separat on of uranium isotopes The group of scientists who led the war-time program Oroth eXperimental Beyerle instrument development and rtin theory are ow orking on a program carried on by the OFKF Society for Nuclear Research Th1 s non-profit corporation is supported by the state of North Rhine-Westphalia the Federal Government and private industry The gas centrifuge units are designed and constructed by Processor Beyerlein a GFKF laboratory in Aachen The mechanical parts are manufactured by SARTORIUS Instrument Company Goettingen and the electrical drive and control equipment is provided by the AEG German General Electric Frankf'urt t the University of Bonn Groth leads the experimental group which is now located in the Institute for Physical Chemistry he is aided by coll boration with Professor Martin of the University of Kiel who has been provided with a centrifuge unit in order to test tions his theoretical predic - he characteristics or the centrifuge - 12 - nits eveloped Appendix 11 A11 DO C IV RB by this group a e given in the allow ng published 1n Che able wh ch wa e e - Ingen1ur Technik 31 SoecUic UZI 19 6 40 6 o 3 33 302 0 502 12 050 200 uznm 1952 63 5 6 7 7 302 0 935 8 380 2 860 za 3 za 5 za 6 66 5 9 25 3 6o 302 0 97 6 300 2 460 1959 UJ O 9 25 6 ll 302 1 64 3 710 1 460 6 o 302 3 5 5 32 1 750 1 151 685 77 1 2 5 500 5 330 1957 240 o 20 0 3lio 1960 316 0 22 5 m7 7 03 302 340 7 25 10 The Bonn Aachen group plans to assemble tr1tuges at Jullch 450 50 to 100 cen- This cascade would have three stages of centrifuges and enrich uranium to about U-235 id the type of centrifuge to be used will be determined as a result of the testing of the various centrifuges at Bonn C - DELETED 11 The program supported at Frankfurt by DEGUSSA-AEO was reported on by Dr Boe t tcher Director of Research DEGUSSA at a meeting held at the AEC see 610 10 to discuss DEOUSSA activities in the field of the gas ultracentrifuge method of isotope separation and the question of cooperation in this field AEO are 11 u s - West German Boettcher reported that DEOUSSA and coope rat1ng without contract 11 to develop the gas centrif'uge for isotope separation direotion of Scheffel iho is Their project is under the reproducing the device which he rJ together with Steenbeck and Zippe had developed in the USSR DELETED - 13 - ppend 1 x 'A I✓ DELETED 12 The Netherlands oentri 'uge program 1a several years old although as of issue • his time only two publications have been They have performed process n econo 1c analysis or the centrifuge but their estimate does not appear to be soundly based It 1a not known whether they have separated any isotopes by this method 13 An extensive review or the German and Dutch activities cont ined in a report K-1425 1 by O• • Garrett ands A Levin i These authors conclude that the West German pt•o3ram ia the most extensive and most complete gas centrifuge program 1n the world nd that the work is co petent relatively fr advanced and of such nature as to lead to ce tr1 into a production plant gea that can be d r 'CC y incorporated The costs to be expected from this production plant would be in the range or about $2000 to somewhat less than ment prog 1000 per kilogram U of sep rative ork heir develop- probably costs of t he order of one million dollars p er year incl ding the industrial participation cannot be considered a crash program This level Manpower andcbllar levels and the teobnic l status of the European gas centrifuge activ1t1es for the period 19 1-1958 which substantiate the above are on file 1n th e D1v1Bion ot Research 14 The F rench have determined to go the route of gaseous ffusion for U isotope separation report on the evaluation of their program 1a given in the report K-1 09 by o A Garrett 2 However Dr Boettcher reported tbat the French were interested 1n the gas centrifuge and offered to assist in its financial support yon rile y in the Division of Research Ibid D - 1 - Appendix C IV 11 e RR I and he believes that they w1 l consider using it to replace the top stages of their gaseous d1ffusion plant 15 Brazil has purchased three Z0-3 units from the West Germans Sartorius It 1s reported that they are planning to purchase more units nd are having two or their people trained in the operation of these units in Oroth 1 16 At the meeting on laboratory ovember 1959 Dr Boettcher of DEOUSSA reported that he had learned that the USSR had reinitiated their activities on the g s centrifuge process 3 ttcher thinks tbat they are att racted to it by the poas1b J 1ty of decentralization for reaoon of military security or that they are interested in the separation of plutonium isotopes DISCOSSIO S WITH FOREIG OROU S 17 I formal Uscussions have been eld Witt Dr Boettcher Director of Researcb DEGUSSA Germany ABC 610 10 Professor Groth University of Bonn Germany FVR-50 1 and Professor K1s temache r rector laboratory voor Mass Spectrographie Netherlands ABC 610 7 - AEC 610 9 concerning their technical programs and the desirability of collaboration As yet formal proposals to collaborate on a development program have not been received from the German and the Division of etberlands governments However esearch has been advised by Dr Eoettc er that the question of collaboration is under consideration in several departments of the Ge nistry D These Uscussions were held prior to the evaluation of the centrifuge process by General Electric and prior to the safeguards studies in light of the Nth power problem 18 Classified discussions permitted under the present with re resentat1ves - 5 - Appendu A•• E HIV 9B9Ra l'- of the UK AEA Risley at the University of Virginia in 1959 The process appears very ovember ttractive to them in view of the notable advances achieved since they discontinued work on this process in 19q8 this process Other reasons wn1ch arouse their interest in re a decision by t em to base their next round 1963-1965 of power reactors on enriched 1 5 - U-235 plus the fact that gaseous diffusion is 1th them than 1th us more expensive process hey believe that they now have unique opportunity to stuey another method of isotope separation before proceeding to the design of a plant NTI AL ECO OUCS AND P 19 The economics of the gas centrifuge process in comparison with that of gaseous diffusion were evaluated in 1957 by three di£ferent gro ps AEC staff 610 3 Dr nson Benedict 610 and Union Carbide Nuclear Company K-1368 These studies based on the technology available at that time concluded that the gas centrifuge process did not compete economically w1 th our gaseous diffusion process n t e large scale separation of 0-235 20 The General Electric Company under contract with the C has ta ken a fresh look at the over-all centr1 both omestic and of the process ge rogram oreign and has ag in examined the economica Their Phase I Report OEL-0708 presents a detailed study of the a ort tube unit Theirs dy 1a coot1nu1ng with an exam1o t1on of the long tube unit Results of their study indicate that due to significant advances in the centrifuge technology and with a 2- 3 year period to develop foreseeable improvements in t e technology it 1 United States could construct would produce enric ed present publ shed likely that the small gas centrifuge plant which r n1wn at a price competitive w1 th the C price 11st - 16 - e plant escr1 bed n the Appendix A'' DOE C B S RF T General Electric study would cost approximately 17 million dollars would be capable of a n annual prod ct1on or 500 kilograms of 0-235 at 95 enrichment and wo 1 have a power requirement or approximately one megawatt of electricity Such a plant could with minor design changes be so arranged quantities of 0-235 s to produce larger t corresponding lower enrichment the $17 000 000 plant referred to above col as to produce 75 000 Kg For example be so arranged 2% u-235 21 The gas centrif'uge method of isotope separation has been considered by the General Advisory Committee at the February 1-3 196o and rch 17-19 1960 m e etings reoomnendations Their comments and re contained 1 o Appendix 11 8 11 • SAFEGUARDS STUDIES 22 Sir William Penney U K in conversation with Chairman McCone expressed great concern over the development 1n Germany or the separation of U-235 by gas centrifuges requested as The Chairman dy of the posa1b111t1es of using the centrifuge process for the production of a em all number of atom1 c weapons either overtly or covertly by nations not now having a major weapons program For comparison two approaches to the matter of the production of atomic weapons on na amall scale Nere s ral uran um reactor route for plutoni Operations Office died t he production by Hanford nd the high speed centrifuge route for U- 235 production by Union Carbide Nuclear Company UCNC 1 23 f DELETED oentrifu e - 17 - ppend1x D 11 A 11 HVE p nts have been analyzed for three rlegr ees ot capability - c ssed as X Y or Z outside assistance ere a class X co ntry ould need no class Y co ntry would probably have to import also som e or the auxiliary equ11 1ment a class Z country would probably have to purchase pre-fabricated centrifuges and almost all the auxiliary equipment t'rom foreign vendors and 1n ddition ould need teahnical advisors from the o tside to aid int e construction and operation or the centrifuge plant DELETED 24 The results of the Hanford and s rized UC C studies are further nd analyzed in a safeguards report ppendix also takes into acc•unt the GE study 11 C ' which This safeguards study cono udes that the centrifuge route would be the easier to pursue both covertly and overtly and that it would require less - 18 - Append1X 11 A11 spec1a11zed personnel of fewer disciplines than the reactor route The pr1nc1pal liabi 11 ty of the centrifuge route as against the pl toni rote lies in the fact that centrit'Uge tech ology is yet to be proven and the designs or the more advanced centrifuge units nave not as yet been published nor have the unite been tested DISCUSSION 25 The U S can ill-afford to lose technological leadership 1n this rea of isotope separ tion as indicated in the GB stu producing U-235 ta coat alre The gas centrifuge process y aho s the potential of ich is competitive With the costs reflected in the AEC price schedule s Moreover there are other long standing arguments in favor of an expanded U S program Separations for which the gs centrifuge method has particular a vantages and for which the process is likely to find application include a Sepa t1oo of pl toniwn isotopes especially in View of the ut111zat1on of high exposure plutoni generated by the growing nuclear power industry b Topping of the gaseous diffusion plants 11 c Separation of U-236 from U- 235 reactor t'uel Clean- up 11 Separation of p rt1cular stable isotopes when required in large quantities 26 e Division of Production sees little incentive for developing a highly efficient gas centrifuge plant on an accelerated schedule from the standpoint of U S needs They feel that there is only a very slim poaa1billty that centrifuges coul ever be competitive with the c rrent or anticipated of sep r tive cap city in our large dif further no need sion plants coat There is or additional separat on capacity for at least ten and more likely fifteen years - 19 - DOE Al pendix A11 H VF -Si' CRS 27 Should the U S determine not to move forward on the development program and merely to continue the limited work at the University of Virginia it is likely that it would become increasingly difficult for the U S to hold together t his group and its research would also eturn c n be expected to diminish eaken tbe present nd internationally ch a course ture U S position 1n seeking greed controls over the process in lig of tbe th power problem 28 In AEC 27 135 as revised the Commission adopted a new Olass1f1cat1on Policy under bhe terms of which gas centrifuge work would be conducted as a classified program with the information produced being declassified until such time as a breakthrough might occur One factor that influenced the determ 1nation to classify the program in t nis iray was the fact t countries Ge tat least two other ny and The letherlands v goro sly pursuing studies ere and still are in this field that they have ad- vanced their technology to the point where it was equal to or better than ours and that moreoever they were publishing the results of their work Thia situation still prevails 29 The research project at the University of Virgini concerning the spinning of long tubes has been conducted in a physical security area on classified project tbere under Dr Oernot Zippe an on the reproduction oft e abort sis The other research ustrian scientist be unit developed for tbe USSR has been conducted on an unclassified basis 1n an open area Progress reports prepared by Zippe and issued under the AEC contract have been given distr i bu t on by TISE at Oak Ridge 30 Since the drafting of the gas centrifuge classification policy adopte in AEC 27 135 not only the German and - 20 - tch work Appendix ' A OE but the U S work 1 as well hae progressed considerably Germans have now of the gas centr1 without n y The lready so far progressed in their development ge method t tit appears that they could further advancement in their technology build a working plant or the mass prod ction of U- 235 The table of the Oroth-Beyerle centrifuge in paragraph 9 Appendix A showing steps in the development of their program indicates very clearly that in a period of pproxilllately 14 years they have been able to increase the separative potential of their machines by better than an order of magnitude hile at t e same time reducing total plant costs also by more than an ot'der of magnitude The U S work has also progressed to the point where it would appear that 1n the vecy near future using the long thin tubes developed by the University of Virginia a plant could be built for the mass production of U-235 31 There are other important dvantages of the gas centrifuge method of separating isotopes One of these is its vecy low power consumption as compared with tbe gaseous diffusion method One might say that for an approximately equal total outlay in dollars that is power plus plant one could bu ild equally productive plants However to a nation sbo ton po er the iow po e -con umption for the gs centrifuge metho co ld make possible production plant at a time when a gaseous diffusion plant would still remain a desirable but impossible goal Another advantage is the relatively small size of the gas centrifuge plant ae compared with gaseous diffusion in producing 95 U-235 This factor would enhanoe the position of m1 11tary sec rity by means or plant diapers on as permit n operation in a clandestine - 21 - manner ell as DOE Appendix A HIVF 32 Because the breakthr ough mentioned in topic 2-741 of the C ss fication Polley Guide OC Doc - 68 has taken place the e fense of the gas centri f lge method Unportance to then t1onal of isotope sep r tion 1s now consi ere classifying existing and future Department of S te to explo discussions with t e lest attem t to obtain e great eno gh to warrant S work and to request the t e possibility of entering into erman and n itcb governments e coope ation and the agreement o n n these governments to keep the resu ts of their ·ork in th1s field classified 33 Clearly however the p rpose to be served by any classification if the German ction the Co 1ss1on might ta e could be vitiated ct1v1t1es were to proceed on an unolass1r1ed basis It appears therefore that 1t is important to detennine whether the Germ n government could and would classify their work in gas centrifuge technology 34 The alternatives that present t hemselve s i n this ma t ter are of course depende nt on the vi ews expressed by the Department of Sta t e and negotiations wi th the severa l sta t es invo lved 35 There are several problems wh 1ch could make a clasa1f1cat1on ction difficult undertaken The German deve l opment to date has been lmost exclusively by private parties interested 1n ultimate commercial exploitation no c The German Atomic Ministry has ssified programs due in part at least to Germany's commitments under the B a els Treaties ny modification of this position could perhaps have serious political repercussions in Germany It is unclear both f o the stand oint of 'rreaty provisions and policy as tow e her Germany cold or would action in this rea that technology to her ou d prevent 1ssem ea olassitication t1on or the partners at o gh l1m1 - 22 - tion of the ppend1 X 11 11 C RD technology to the EURATOM members would obviously constitute a degree of information control substantially greater than a completely unclassified development The problem as regards The Netherlands is not treated eeparately but the EURATOM aspects would be similar 36 The Office of General Cour ael bell eves that the subject matter of the proposed cooperation would probably be considered by EORATOM as outside the purview of its treaty In any event they suggest that this is a matter which should be determined in the first instance by the EURATOM member nations involved 37 Notwithstanding these problems the safeguarding of ultracentrifuge technology by agreed procedures for the control or ttus information among the several states in which centrifuge work is being carried out is important and should be explored It would further appear tbat such exploration should taJce place with the German and CUtch governments 38 Moreover regardless or whether these governments or EURATOM could classify their present a nd future gas centrifuge work agreement should be sought to contr ol the export of gas centrifuges and related equipment and to subject such export to sareguards Agreement on sucb controls taken together with the controls tbe U S 1s seeking among urani um supplier nations would mitigate to some extent at least the likelibood or an Nth power exploiting the process 39 As a related matter it is recognized that technical cooperation 1n centrifuge research and develo9n nt with the Germana and Dutch may be desirable While such cooperati on is not essential to achieving the stated objectives of the proposed U S developmental program it is reasonable to assume that it would - 23 - Appendix '1 A'1 s 1 c1R E i r---1RD DOE ARCHJVEij contribute to the rate ddit1on it nd probability of their achievement ould peI'ttl1 t an 1 m mediacy o In association with European development The Europeans also may have a strong interest in pursuing such cooperation from their standpoint O If it proves feasible therefore for the Dutch and Germans to establish control over existing and future gas centrifuge information the possibility of cooperating with these two countries on a classified basis should be examined However it 1s important to note that there are a number of serious policy problems ssoc1ated with pursuing classified cooperation with the Germans an DJtch 1n this area These include 1 whether it wold be politically feasible for the U S to enter 1oto new elassified agreements with two member states withe t also agreeing to transmit th e Restricte of EURATO Data involved to EURA M and the other member states incl ding Prance 2 the nee to define the role of EURATOM in any agreement tbat migbt ensue 3 whether any such cooperation would directly or 1nd1rectly assist the French mill tary program and 4 the poas1ble inconsistency between our w1lllngneaa to cooperate on classified basis with the Dutch and Germans on the centrifuge process if separate agreements with these countries are fe Sible and or re sal to transmit Restricted Data on the gaseous diffusion proces 41 Pinal Iy if a nd y t he to France and the U K cannot be reached w1 tb the Germana eeme tch to cont ol gas centrU'uge info e serio s question as to eth e served in classifying our own work a re Shou ld tion then there p11rpoee would be e therefore as a result of our inability to secure German a nd D ttch agreement to control centrifuge infor111£1tion decide to - 2 - eo laa sify our own work Appendix II A11 DOE CHIVE i fl e R F 'j it would appear possible to work out an arrange ent for technical exc of EURATOM 1r nclasaified nge with the Crennans and Dutch under the ambit this should prove desirable and probably w tthout modification of our existing agreements for Cooperation either with EURATOM or the member states - 25 - P ppendix A11 0 CHIV APPENDIX II B11 U S EXPANDED DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM l A three year U S development program is proposed at a total estimated cost of 6 million The program would include simultaneous undertakings ot experimental and theoretical studies of basic centrifuge problems the design manut'aoture and testing or a prototype and the design construction and operation of an experimental cascade 2 These areas of development are delineated re·ow and are presented on a t'ollowing time-scale chart a Superoritical centrifuges 1 Mechanical development Bearinga gas seals drives 2 Hydrodynamic development Internal circulation 3 Process testing of UF6 - --------- DELETED 1 Alternate eane for internal circulation 2 Process testing on UF6 c cascade development DELETED 2 Analogue co uter study or large cascade d Hydrodynamic studies 1 Combined theory of thermal plus Coriolis effects 2 Olaes centrifuge experiments 3 Phenomena of turbulenoe scoop design and effects - 26 - Appendix II B 0 CHIV E DELETED 0 z o 1 Design 2 abr1cate two units 3 Mecban1oal and procese testing f Advanced mechanical studies of h gher speed machines 1 Bearing characteristics 2 Material fabrication 3 The develop ent program as outlined should serve to accomplish the f'ollo ing objectives DELETED b De natrate an operating experimental cascade 7 - b· o Establish a sounder basis for theoretical projec tions or the centrifuge process 1 1nclu ling cascade behav1ol' d Determine potential for fuDther improvement of the centrifuge process e Improve the accuracy of the economic projections - 27 - Apperxlix B E CHI GAS CENTRIFUGE DIN'ELOPMENT PROCRAM Ju y 1960 I A B f· SUPERCRITICAL CEN'lllmJGES 1 M chanical Dev lopment 2 Proceu Te acing 3 R valuation ·4 Probable Further Development __J t l--C I u Alt mate Hean• for IIl t mill Circula ion 2 Proccsa Tea ti111t on UF e l O'J D 0 a ' - c t%1 ·r ttf 2 2 1962 - l I ' • - ' l ---· -- -·--- ---- -- I I I - --- I ' - CASCADE DEVELOl MEln Op rate 20-35 Unit Experimental Cuc ada a De aign 11 od Build Ca scad b Experimental Tests 2 Anal ogue Comput r Studi a a Jltnd Dynamic Cbaracterhtic1 b Program Computer c Study Stability d Dete rmi ne C c ttde Parameter-a S t udv Exner 1 rnen tal l'lll ta 1 ' ' 7 ' - •• HmROD'J' NAMI C S'l'ODIES Computer S tudiH Program Computer b Solve Equations c Optimi%e Parameter 2 Exp riment al Bbldies 3 Onnrotzra11111ed f' nn t1nm t ion 1 July 1961 l I now I July • ' 2 3 4 5 •• DELETtu De lign Proto type Build Prototyp Te1t Prototype Rueaign for Opt 1 mum Plow - ' - - -- - - --- ' - lid Telt Confirm Senar11f-4 r 7 d - - ' - -- F ADVANCED STUDIES OF HIGHER Pl 'CED 1 1ft CT TNF S l Bearing Cbaract rict ic 2 Mat eri 111 Fa brieftti r n Unprogramrned Centi nu t I 11 - t' u g r t 0 0 trJ j e X - Jul y Jul Jul _ ' -- -- ' 2 ----- ·------ APPE IX lcn CONTRIBJT ON OP THE GAS CE TRIFUGE PROCESS TO THE Nth coONTRY PROBLEM SUMMARY 1 In an attempt to delineate the potential contribution of the gas centrifuge process to the Nth ountry problem spec1a studies have been undertaken by Hanford a reactors - gas centrifuges Oak Ridge graphite In addition the General Electric Corporation has recently completed a broad technological review on the subject of gas centrifuges for the AEC 2 These at dies indicate that the reactor approach has the advantage ot a proven operability and readily available technological data On the other hand the gas centrifuge route has the advantage of smaller manpower requirements and a lesser degree of specialization required in the manpower for construction and opera ion ore readily available materials equipment and components a lower inven ocy ot rani an ease of fission weapons fabrication from the product material and the potential for the conatruotion of thermonuclear weapons Finally in terms of costs electrical requirements and time the gas centrifuge route based on present technology is comparable to the production reactor route It is therefore concluded that at present the gas centrifuge route is the more attractive and perhaps easier route for an Nth country 3 Controls and safeguards therefore need to be exercised over the gas centrtr ge process The forms of control whicb should be sought are n t substantially different from those already encountered in connection with the efforts to establish similar controls over other types of nuclear production facilities - 30 - Appendix C 11 OE HT SECh and 'ii- aterials Strategio technolog1ca controlled on a olaes1ficat1on basis 1ntormation should be Oas centrifuge plants or important components and mate rials of such plants 1t not classified sho ld only be exported when committed to peaceful uses and eubjeot to safeguards Finally controls should continue to be exercised over the supply of feed materials natural uranium INTRODUCTION 4 Reoent advances in the technology or isotope separation via the gas centrifuge route arrant an evaluatior of this process in terms of 1ts potential contribution to vhe p oo ction of atomio eapons by nations not no having a major c a - Jru 9rogram In analysis of this problem special studies havt been ndertaken by Hanford and Oak Ridge of this Reports KB-789 a ork are attached as Annei I J -662 'l'ha Han 'or Summaries st dy treated the present production potential of plutonium Via the natural uranium-graphite reactor rote while the Oak Ridge studies examined the g3B oentrifuge method based on technology known to date as well as commenting on the gaseous diffusion process In addition the Division of Reeearoh recently completed its comprehensive review of the gas centrifuge field to determine the potential of the method based on forseeable technological advances Report GEL 07o8 5 Basic to the consideration at band is the reaiization that the decision by any country to acquire a military capability will be a political decision taken at a time when the country believes it has the means to do so These eans incl de the tilization or any type of production raoilities and the acquisition of any necessary materials or equipment by any procedures providing that the objective is obtainable through the combination of resources of money manpower and materials - 31 - Appendix 11 C11 DOE ARCHIV i 6 Three production methods might be considered a plutonium v1a the reactor route b Uraniu m-235 by the gaseous diffusion method and c Uranium-235 by the gas oentr1ruge process The example or France would aeem to indicate that the riret choice might be the plutonium reactor route Further the l ack of availability of complete technical information on the gaseous diffusion method and the lack or the ready availability of components together with the magnitude ot effort and investment required represent serious obstacles to the pursuit of this course In present ci cumstances it would seem that the initial choice by the th country might be n rrowe reactor and centri uge methods 1 wn to the For the puryos s of his study the comparison is so limited 7 The specific points which would be 1kely to be examined by a nation in reaching a decision between the t w ro ites are as follows a The potential and proven capabilities or the method b Skills and numbers of personnel required for the design construction and operation of the necessary plants and processes o The availability of the necessary teohnioel information d The availability of the neceseary components and materials without restrictions on their use 1 if the country 1s largely dependent upon the import of such equipment and materials e The time required to achieve a military nuclear capability r Capital coats and operating costs g Electrical power requirements h Availability of the feed materials and inventories or these materials in the process 1 Willingness to demonstrate overtly the military intentions ot the program - 32 - Append ix ''C 11 DOE HIV j The relative ease of sing the final produot whether Uran -235 or pl tonium Considerations here are toward a the effectiveness ot the materials 1n ission or thermon clear weapons b the quantities required to achieve the objectives c the sk1lls and equipment required for fabrication of the weapons d the ready availability of necessary technology and e the hazards involved in fabrication EVALUATION 8 The studies presented 1n Annex I co pare the production of 10 kgs of plutonium per year by reactor 50 kgs of U-235 per year by centrifuge 1th the prod ction ot These two methods are evaluated in terms of these foregoing factors in the following sections of In addition attention will be given to the Division Research rev1e or the gas centrifuge problem 9 The potential and proven capabilities of the two methods differ widely Reactor production or military quantities of spe- cial nuclear material has existed for many years The technology associated not only with the reactor portion or the complex but also with the feed material preparation end chemical separation aspects of the system have received wide unclassified d1ssem1natiai On the other hand the gaseous centrifuge process is yet untested To date experimentation and development has been limited to the evaluation of single centrifuges and no multiple cascade arrangement ha i been exam 1 ned 10 Evaluation o the t o methods in Annex I indicates that the manpower requirements for the design oonstruotion and operation of both kinds of facilities differ with fewer personnel required if a th country ere to pursue the gas centrifuge route reactor 3 11 - gas centrifuge 1 653 These numbers might still be further reduced by having personnel serve dually in the construction and operation phases In addi tion the skills re- quired to proceed 'lith these processes differ considerably - 33 - Appendix 11 If C11 0 HTVF the nation desired to pursue 1te military obJective through a reactor co plex a speciaUzed eeriee ot Bk ills in teed material preparation reactor technolog and chemical separation tecbn1quee are necessary For the moat part these ak1ll13 differ f'rom normal meohanioal ohernioal and civil engineering practices The gae centrifuge method on the other hand otters a nation the pose1b11 1ty or proceeding on a military nuclear prog ram relying predominatelY on meohanioal skills with the exception ot the teed material portion of' the complex For example it appears that a nation skilled in machine tool manufacture or large scale J appliance production could readily proceed to fabricate and assemble a gas centrifuge plant the General Ele0tr10 study This po nt was e baeized in here it as pointed o t that a possible prospective supplier or gas centrifuges is their Hot Point Appliance Division Further the gRs centlrifuge method doea not present safety problems of the magnitude aseoo1ated with the reactor route here spec1allzed skills would be required 1n handling and treating highly r d1oact1ve materials 11 There exists a wide differenoe in availability of the neoeeaary technical information required to construct and cperate the two types or rac111t1es power reactors and The nuclear technology tor civilian chemicai separations has been given wide d1 ee mination not only by the u s b t by the nuclear powers There is little difference between this technology and that involved 1n produoing plutonium tor ID1litary uses The informa- tion on centrifuges however 1s still relatively closely held in the Ge Western world i e 11m1ted it is believed to the any U K d the et erlands u s In these cases only a small number or individuals are intimately associated with the projects However the teohnologioal 1ntormat1on to date is limited to the oe n trit'uge per se and little or no work baa been devoted towards - 34 - Appendix 11 cu S- B 9 JL E T the plant control and cascading problems associated with the operation of many centrifuges in unison Commercial sales of gas centrifuges which it is understood are contemplated by the German group would make present technology readily available 12 A study of the important component parts and materials required in construction and operation or reactors shows them to have many especially designed or prepared £eatures 1 e nuclear grade graphite nuclear instrumentation and control rod drives The reactor route also requires specialized equipment to fabri- cate and process the fuel material before and after -e·actor · irradiation The gas centrifuge method on the other hand pro- vides potentially less difficult f'abrioatior tachniques This route would permit a nation to concentrate a aJor portion of the total effort on the construction of a centrifuge pl nt rather than on a variety of plants from fuel fabrication through reactors to chemical separation 13 Purchase of a plant or the principal components would# in the case of some countries make the problem substantially easier At present by law u s exports or reactors and other production and utilization facilities require an export license issued by the Atomic Energy Commission in connection with an appropriate agreement for cooperation apply to This control could also gas centrifuges if they are designated as a production facility or as important components or such a raoil1ty has in being its m e chan1cs for a similar control The U K Germany does not 14 The results of the special safeguards studies indicate that the time required for nations to independently achieve a nuclear capability by either route is approximately the same reactor 51 months - gas centrifuge 49 months - 35 - It would seem Appendix 11 0 11 DO ARCHIVE B 8 R i from this that a nation haa little choice on this basis here in determination of the route to be followed 15 Examination o Annex I 1n the terms o t the capital and operating cost of comparable production f'ac1l1ties indicates a further similarity oap1tal costs reactors 38 7 million - gas centrifuge 38 8 million operating costs reactor 7 6 million - ae centrif ge 6 7 million There are to additional factors that should be noted in this oonneotion The first of these is that for an additional million dollars the assumed reactor comple-X oo ld increase production by a tactor ot 4 ors The Hani'ord st dy shows this to be aobievable by addition of more heat exchanger fao111t1ee to the reactors thus allowing an increase in the reactor power output The second point ia that gas centrifuge costs could bes arpl y red ced 1r the General Electric conclua1ons concerning the short range potential ot the centrifuge process are correct On the basis of these conoluaiona the oosta or the gas centrifuge route could be red ced by perhaps as much as a factor of four It may then be concluded that these tw further points tend to cancel and no turther d1stinot1on between the two approaches can presently be developed on a oost basis 16 One act r that haB been to the disadvantage or tbe gaseo a diffusion route for the separation or uranium isotopes for many of the lees 1ndustr1alized countries is its large requirements for electrical power The General Electric tudy on the gaseous centrifuge rote however indicates that the po er requirements for this method ar nominal comparable to those of the reaator route a few megawatts and This factor would then permit ready consideration of th1a method or isotope separation by a po er-poor country - 36 - Appendix 11 c11 DOn CHIVES 17 In consi ering the availability of feed either ater1als tor rocess it 1s 1 ortant to examine the 1 entory of mateMal neoes ary to produce either 10 Kga ot plutonium or 50 Kge of Uranium- 235 The special studies conducted indicated that for the reactor route 100 tons a year of natural an1um were required while in the gas centrifuge method only 25 tons a year of natural uranium were required Thia may be a very important difference for a nation without indigenous natural uranium or poaaeasing only a small quantity 18 In considering whether a nation would be willing to demonstrate overtly its 1nte tion little choice eXists between the routes or Clearly reactor ostensibly producing power co ld be or the civil purpose sed to produce pl toni and a gas oentri uge plant might be constructed ostensibly ror the purpose of producing very slightly enr1cbed uran1 very small amounts of highly enriched teat reactors for o er purposes or ran1wn tor research and ·rr the military production program is carried out covertly a gaseous centrifuge plant might be more easily bidden than a reactor complex simply because of the smaller size the laok of associated radioactivity and the possibility of breaking up the facility into sub units 19 In analysis of the final weapons fabrication and assembly of the produced material consideration must certainly be given to the radioactivity hazard associated with plutonium and the 11mited amount or unclassified technology presently avaUab eon plutonium me allu gy Purt er it might be simpler to fabricate the uranium weapon 1nce a 8Wl barrel approach might be utilized in contrast to the inlplosion techniques required for plutonium On the other hand plutonium has the advantage of requiring substantially less material for a given fission illeapon size as presently reflected in the ground - 37 - rules of the study Appendix 11 C11 DOE CHTVE - equating 10 kilograms of plutonium and 50 kilograms of uranium Another factor that needs be considered in this light 1s that it it 1e esired to maximize the weapons effect ot the speo1al nuclea material on hand the thermon clear weapons rote In this instance tion of pluton1 would require an extre ely advanced degree or In over all sense thot 1gh 1 t reasonable to conclude that if a nation Oran -235 a -235 would ee ould seem ossessed either pl ton- eapon cold be constructed although the to be favored in terms of sim llcity ot weapons design and conscruet1on together of be chosen raniwn-235 would be necessary since the utiliza- weapons technology ium or Uran1 ay 1th a a potential eapon yields 20 Ins ry then of the raotors J fl enctng a nation 1n a choice of the two methods it ca be seen that 1n terms or cost electrical power requirements and time there 1s probably little to be gained by either method The reactor route has 1n its favor proven ope-raD111ty and readily available teohnologioal data On the other hand the gas centrifuge plant is attra otive beoause it needs smaller manpower requirements and a somewhat lesser degree of specialization in the manpower required for construotion and operation requires more readily available materials equipment and components and requires a lower inventory of uranium The reactor route has to 1ta disadvantage the fact that the equipment component and materials required are at least in part specialized and if a nation is dependent upon 1mport ot such items safeguards would normally be attached -In a s1m 1lar manner the gas centrifuge route suffers from the unproven aspects of th1e means o isotope separation altho gh this disadvantage should be removed within the next few years 1f the projected programs proceed - 38 - Appendix C 00 H SE8Ri 21 It might therefore be concluded that a nation desiring a military nuclear capability might choose the gas centrifuge method in preference to the reactor rote present the or the two ore attractive The method 1s at r r reasons note above and if its potential is fully realized probably the easier route to pursue 22 It ia therefore urgent that attention be given at th is time to the means of control and safeguards applicable to gas centrifuge utilization by other countries problems 1 valved ere nots bat It appears that the tially dif erent from those already encountered 1n connection with efforts to est bl1ah similar controls over other types of nuclear production facilities and materials required tor t 'h eir use whether any potential th co ntry could An 1Jllportant question is anufacture all the equipment and eornponenta required to construct and operate a gas centrifuge complex It appears that this question cannot with assurance be answered in the negative since countries having highly developed capabillt es tor the eDg1neer1ng and man f'acture of industrial equipment could proceed with such a plant in the near future The estimates or the Oak Ridge study groupp KOA-662 as to the representative nations possessing the potential capability for sch a prod ction plant are g ven in Annex n 23 Two forms of control may be im posed over gas cent•rit'uges and their relate safeg ards technology These are security control and In a manner similar o that adopted for the gaseous diffusion method of isotope separation the centrifuge technology and important components of' centrifuges utilized in the process may be classif'ied and a bjeote to rigid security controls This form of' control for gas centrifuges cannot be complete since considerable detailed information on the process has already been divulged - 39 - Appendix 'C 11 HIVE through normal commercial channels by the German and Dutch groups However 1t may potentially be possible with the cooperation of Germany The Netherlands and the United Kingdom to restrict through clasaif1cat1on the dissemination of any further technological advances in the gas centr1tuge process 24 Th second form of control that might be exercised over gas centrit ges and the1 r related technology is sort of control safeguards This ould only be applicable to the unolassi 1ed exports of gas centrifuges This system of control should involve agreements among the countries having the present capabilities to manufacture isotope separation centrifuges and their components to export such devices only when committed to peaceful uses and subject to the application of safeguards such ceotri 1 n the ges co e ean1ng o t e ou1d be exported only ation The u K Since ith1n the definition or a pro uct1on facility tomic Energy Act and C reg lationa they y the U S under an agreement ror cooper- and Canada in accordance with their practices concerning other nuclear production facilities could be relied upon to acquire safeguards for the export of centrifuges in s1m1lar circumstances The Federal Republic of Germany doea not have the mechanics for controlling the exports of reactors or isotopes separation centr1fu gea except when these devices ght be destined ho ever that and re ire or Sov et b oo co tries There are 1nd 1 oatiors est Germany - ould institute export control mechan 1 ce feg arda if the U s so requested and there coul d be achieved a similar agreement by other potent al exporters and production devices 25 While no specific studies have been made of the safeguards techniques 'lhich would be required for app11cation to the centrifuge isotope separation plant and complex it appears that - 40 - Appendix C D E CHIVE the problems woul not be substantially d tterent fro those wb1oh wou1d be encou ntered in a gaseous d11'tua1on complex techniques and effort re 'lbe i ed ·ot this latter type of complex have been the subJeot of a stu dy It appears on the basis or th1a work that effective safeguards cou ld be devised 26 In addition to direct controls applied to gas centrifuge information and components end devices associated with the gas centrifuge method controls on natural uranium needed for operation of the plant would also prove important to control system Controls on natural uranium in deterring the tilization of centrif gee an effective ould r o only assist s ell as other prod ct1on methods for military purposes but at preEent appear to be essential to the appl1cat1cn of any meaningful international s feguards - 41 - Appendix 11 c 11 DOE CHIVES APPENDIX C' UMMARY RESUI S - CO-IPARISO OF COST TIME SCHEDULE AND W1POWER REA rwwramitmrew p REQlHREMENTS PRObUcTtoN OF 16 KG PU VIA NATURAL 50 tr 10 Kg Pu 50 Kg Oy and 10 Kg Pu yr and 50 Kg Oy yr Item Capital Cost $MM Operating Cost 38 7 38 8 7 6 6 7 $ yr Time Schedule Months Design and Construction 44 Operation Reactor or Cascade thr Weap Feb 21 Over-ell 5 49 355 68 575 179 Other 194o 969 Total 2850 1216 55 57 Skilled 309 225 Other 197 155 Total 561 437 3411 1653 mnpower Reg remente Design and ConstTuction Professiona Scientific Skilled Operations Professional and Scient t fie Ora Total anpo er Uncorrected tor pe sonne ho conceivably cold serve sequentially in oo l3truction and or operations if only one year of production - 42 - Annex l to Appendix 11 011 DOE ARC IV i - SEORF'P-- ANNEX Il TO APFENDIX 11 C11 United States Union Soviet Socialist Republics nited Kingdom st 1a Belgium France Japan ether lands Sweden Switzerland West Germany Annex II to - 43 - Appendix 11 0 11 DOE HIV CBRT ' APPENDIX II II UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WASHINGTON 25 D C• February 9 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR Mr Philip J Farley Department of State SUBJECT COm'ROL OP AND COOPERATION IN GAS CEm'Rl FUGE RESEARQi AND DEVELOPMENT TECHNOLOGY The attached background paper summarizes the current state of th art both domestically and abroad in the gas centrifuge method of U-235 isotope separation It notes that es a resul t of recent developments here and in Garmany the process now shows significant promise of producing U-235 at a ooet bracketing th AEC published prioe schedule The capital coats power requirements and technical skills necessary to build and operate a production scale plant may shortly be within the capabilities of as many as 20 to 30 foreign countries if development meets expectations and the technology remains unclass1f1 e • The 1mpl1oationa of this o the N h powe problem are obv ous The staff is now preparing racommendations for Commission consideration as to 1 the future eoope of our own gas centrifuge program 2 control of the gas oentr1f'uge process including information in the light of the Nth power problem and 3 cooperation with the Germans Dutcb and possibly others 1n this area Because of the complexity and interdependence of the foreign and domestic aspects of this problem we would appreciate the views or the Department as to the several guestions raised in the attached paper embers or my staff are of course avaJ lable to discuss this matter in rurth r detail and provtde a ch additional technical baokground 1nfonnat1on as may be of aae1etance to you A A Jells Director Division or lnternat1o al Af airs -44- Appendix D DOE CHIVE §T PENDIX 11 D'' The Commission has ror a number of years supported a modest experimental program at the University or V1rg1n1a 1n the separation of U-235 isotopes by the gas centrifuge process Most of this work has been done on a classified basis and has not been pursued as a matter of priority due principally to the lack of a foreseeable need for expanded United States U-235 production and the relatively high efficiency of our present diffusion plant Within Germany a gas centrifuge research and d e velopment program has gone forward with groups working at the Un1vere1t1es of Bonn and Kiel the Max Planck Institute at Aachen and at DEOUSSA and AEO All of the German work has been 1me on an unclassified basis and aimed primarily at developins e process for commercial exploitation In addition a Dutch ti roU has been working under the FOM Society for Fundamental S udiee on attar at severaJ d if erent sites on a basis which appe rs to be partially ola sif ed Although the tch interest 1s un o btedly partly oommerc al the po sibility of using the proc s e for developing a native U-235 capability for national purposes sch as naval propulsion was noted 1n our recent disc seiona with be Dutch 1aval Group Unti recent y the state of the art both domestically and abroad did not suggest that the economics of the gas centrifuge process were sufficiently attractive to Juetif'y consideration of building a oentrHuge plant As a result or developments in Germany and 1n the United States it now appears possible that a gas centrifuge plant could be designed built and put into operation within the next five years in the United States that would produce U-235 at a coat roughly equivalent to our published prices The basis for this assumption is a detailad study that has already been prepared ror the Commission by the General Electric Company It should also be noted that the building of suoh a plant in Germany i judged by the General Eleotrio study group to be within the oapability of the Germans It does not appear moreover that successful conclusion or such a project either in the United States or Germany 1s dependent upon cooperation since the st te or technological advancement 1s roughly equal 1n both countries 1th the Germans if anything enjoying a slight lead At the present t e the information which has been publish d on tha Oennan centritug effort the ZO-III modal developed by Professor Beyerle or the Aachen Oro p it used as the basis of a eeparat ona plant wold re ult according too r estimates 1 n the pr ction ot' U-235 at a cost approx tely ten times that or our published price sched e A refined odel or this centrifuge the ZO-VII is also unol ss1f1ed and 1s currently an artiole of OOll'lllerce The Coamieeion has issued a license to Thor-Westcliffe to import seven of the ZO-VII oentrit'uges into the United States We understand Th o r -Vestolitre plans to construct an experimental oaao de for purposes or studying the economic potential or the -45- Enclosure to Appendix 11 l 11 DOB CHIVE ' ECJtEi' process Complete information however has not yet been pQblishe on the ZG-VII According to our estimates a plant designed around this unit if built cold prod ce U-235 at a cost o to to four imes our p bl she pr ce The General Eleotr o study referred to above would require a $6 million research and development program to advance present technology to the point where a plant could be built to produce U-235 at a competitive price e have rev ewed those d velopments 1n 11 ght or th potential or the gas centrif e process for cantr1but1 ng to the th power problem Our preliminary cone usion le that this potential is significant and that the process now may in some ciroumatancea be equal to or slightly more attractive than the plutonium reactor route Some of the more significant factors underlying this conclusion as useful to an appreciation of the proble • he hypothe ical plant described 1n the General Elect 1o st ould cost tr 17 to 2 million dollars o db capable of prod cing 5 0 kga or U-235 at 9 enrichment annually and wou d have a total annual power requirement or approximately one megawatt of eloctricity Except for the preparation of feed materials the skills needed to design and construct such a lant are primarily in the area of mechanical engineering and are available top rhaps s 20-30 co tries The pr noipal l abil ty o the centrifuge route as against the pl ton ium reao or route today lies in the raot that centrifuge technology ls yet to be proven and the designs of the more advanced centrifuge units have not ae yet be n published nor have these units been tested Because of our concern with the attractiveness of the process to a potent1 1 Nth power we are studying What steps ight be taken to control centrifuge technology both 1n this ooun ry and abroad Its o d ba noted that independent of this study the staff has under cons deration a reoamnended research and development program designed to advance gas centrifuge technology within the United States to a point where it could produce U-235 at a cost competitive with our published price schedule The principal Justif cation for adopting such a program would be to maintain U S leadership in i otope separation technology rather than to fulfill any o rently oreoast requ irement for expanded U S productio capacity In view of the potential of this process for contributing to the Nth power problem our current intention would be to carry out such a program on a olaaa1fied basis in order moat effectively to saregua rd the technology Clearly ho ever any claasif1oat1on action the Commission might take could b vitiated if the Ch rman activities ere to proceed on an unclassified basis rt appears to us tharefora that it is important to determine whether the German Government could and would classify its work 1n gas centrifuge technology e are indful of several pro l ma 1n this regard hich co ld ake such an action d1ff1c lt e enoan development to date has been undertaken almost exclusively by private parties interested 1n ltimata commercial exploitation To the beat of our knowledge the German Atomic Ministry has no olaseif1ed D E -46- Enclos re o Appendix 11 D11 R IVF b programs due in part at least to Germany's commitments under the Brussels Treaties Any modification ot this poa1t1on could perhaps have serious political reperouss1ona 1n Germany It ts unolear both f'rom the standpoint of Treaty provisions and policy as to whether Oennany could or would take a olaes1f1cat1on action in this area that would prevent dissemination or the technology to her EURA partners» although limitation or the technology to the EURATCM members would obviously constitute a degree or information control substant ally greater than a canpletel y unolaee1tied development The proble as regards th Netherlands is not treated separately here but we would assUJ 118 that the EURATCJ 1 aspects woul d be a 1m 1lar otw1thstand1ng these problems» we believe that the aafeg arding ot ultra-centrituge technology by agreed procedures tor the control ot this 1ntonnation among the a veral states 1n which centrituge work is being carried out le important and should be explored It would r her appear to u s that eucb exoloratlon should 1n the first 1nstanca be wttb the Oeman m d D tch Oovernmanta We believe moreover that regardless of etha these governmants or EURATOM could control their preeam 2nd future gas centrifuge information by olasa1f1cat1on or otherwise agreement should be sought to control the export of gas centrifuges and related eQuipment and to subject such eJq ort to safeguards It is our 1mpress1on that agreement on such ocntrola could probably be successfully negotiated and taken tosa he ' f t t the agreed controls we are seeking among uranium supplier nations would mitigate to some extent at least the like11hood o an Nth power exploiting the process As a related matter the COlll111ssion staff recognized the technical desirability of cooperating 1n centrifuge research and development '11th the Germans and the Dutch While such cooperation is not essential to achieving the stated objectives of the proposed U S developmental program 1t is reasonable to assume that it would contribute to the rate and probability of their aohievemen't In addition it would permit an 1mmed1aoy or association with the European development whioh in itself could enhance control If it proves feasible therefore for the Dutoh and Germans to establish control over existing and future gas centrifuge information the possibility of cooperating with those two countries on a classified basis should be examined We recognize that olassified oooperation with the Germans and the Dutch raises certain problems with respect to EURATCM including the concurrence of the Community 1n the negotiation ot' new bilateral inatruments and the feaaiblllty or the German and Dutch governments• segregating their work from their EORATOM partners In this regard the poss1b111ey of considering a classified agTeement with EURATOM to permit exchange of gaa centrifuge information deserves examination as a means tor cooperating With the Gann ans and the Dutch even though we recognize the policy problems that such an Agreement would present to both the Europeans and ourselves Finally if agreement cannot be reached With the Oennans and the Dutch to control gas centrifuge information then there may be serious Question aa to whether a real purpose would be served 1n classifying any of our own work Should we therefore as a 7- Bnclos to AQpendix 0 D0 f H SECft t' - result or our 1na Uity to secure German and Dutch agreement to control centrifuge information decide to declassify our own workJ 1t ould appear possible to work out an arrangement tor Wlolasa1f1ed technical exchange wtth the Oennana and Dutoh under the ambit of EURATOM 1f this should prove desirableJ and probably without modification of our existing Agreements for Cooperation either 1th EURATOM or the me ber states The star is now preparing reo endationa for Comm 1ee1on consideration as to 1 the 'future soope of our own gas centrifuge program 2 control or the gas oentr1fuge prooesa inoluding information in light or the Nth power problem and 3 cooperation with the Germane Dutch and possibly others in this area Beca ee or the c plexity and 1nterdependenoe of the foreign and domeetio aspaots of this p blem we would appr ciate the Views of the Department as to a Whether an approach to the German or Dutch Governments to seek their agreement on classifying or otherwise controlling prasent and ruture work ls feasible and desirable from an over-all U S fo ign policy standpoint and b Whether the German Government to your mowledge could or would in view ot 1ts Treaty and foreign policy oomm1tments ba likely to agree to suoh an action On the basis of your consideration of these qu e stions we would apprec ate your V1ewa regarding the general desirability ot cooperation 1D this field including your specific comments as to a Whether if the German and Dutch Governments oould agree to the oontrol of gas centrifuge information it would be desirable fro a U S foreign policy standpoint to cooperate with hem bilaterally on a classified basis 1n a research and development program and 1 if not whether it ould be possible or desirable to seek to do so with EURATOM under a olasa1f1ed agreement b Whether if it is not possible for the Dutch and Germans to agree to control gas centrifuge information it wold be destrab e from a foreign policy standpoint to cooperate with the Dutch and Gennans either bilaterally or through and with EURATOM -48- Enclosure to Appendix 11 D11 OE 1-llVE · APPENDIX 11 E11 GE RAL ADVISORY 1 Tha Oeneral Advisory Committee at its February 1-3 1960 meeting was briefed on the gas centrifuge method Their comments and r e commendations as co tained in their report dated Pebruaey 29 1960 to Chairman McCone are presented below Dr McDaniel of' the D1v1a1on of' Research and Dr Jessa Beams ot the Committee described recent developments in the gas centrifuge separation studies both at the University of V1rg1n1a end abroad particularly in Garmany and Holland Altho gh the 1tte has followed hie program rather closely during tha past raw years through Dr Beams it 1s now felt that it has reached the point where it demands serious and careful consideration Recent experiments and achievements are not only exciting but promising for the gas centrifuge separation process It is reco ended that we co-operate with the Ohited IUngdom the Netherlands and West German programs so that we may be fully informad or the progress that is being made in th s endeavor At the same time we should establish 1n the United States a substantial program that would lead to the development of a pilot plant The program should be carried out 1n co-operation with industry particularly in those phases that d and engineering skills necessary for the evelo ment o the pilot plant Furtbe ore it was a gested that a detai led study or the program and its potentialities might be made by the K-25 group at Oak Ridge 2 The General Advisory Committee was further briefed by G E Garrett and his aasooiatee at Oak Ridge at the 1960 meeting arch 17-19 Dr Garrett presented the Oak Ridge paper studies of the potential possibilities of the oentrifuge method for the separation of ran1um and other isotopes Oak Ridge estimates With those mad Aleo he compared the by the General Electric Company 3 The General Advisory Committee comments and recommendations on the oentrifUge process as expi-essed at the March 17-19 1960 meeting are given below DO - 49 - A pendix 11 E CHIVES SGCR i'l' It is believed that the oentr1tuge thod ha a certain oharacteristioa that may make it attraotlve especially where small separation plants are required or where power is scarce aa 1a the case in many tore1gn countrlea In order to aaseaa these potential1t1es we wiah to reatfinn our reo01J1nendation at the last meeting to the effect that a research and development program be carried on with the view of exploring further the poaeib1lities of' the method Also we Wish to recommend that the following specific programs be undertaken DELETED b This suborttical maohine should be operated as a single unit With uranium-hexafluoride until EID etticienoy of at least 60 per cent or theoretioal 1s olJtaioed o A small cascade sbou1d th n be oonet cted of a sufficient numbe r of these centrifuge t determine the character1st1cs of their operation in a ca ada d The e peror1t1eal centrifuge i1as greater potential possibilities than the subcritloal ty e o t the art la not as far advanoed In view o tis ·a Acamnend that laboratory reeearoh be continued on the s •Jpercritioal oentrtt'uge 11 - 50 - Appendix DO 11 E11 t CHIV · iCEE'i APPENDIX 11 F' 11 UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WASHINGTON 25 D C February 12 1960 Dear Senator Anderson The firet phase of a technical and economic evaluation of the gas centrifuge method of isotope separation being performed under contract to the Atomic Energy Commission by the Oeneral Electric Company has now be n completed The attached study GEL 0708 reveals that following a three year development program including the operation or an experimental cascade the U s could build a gas oen1 r1 'uge plant which would produce 0-235 at a price hioh might be competitive with the publish d AEC price schedule Thie study was based on the short bowl subcr1t1oal units and is being cont nued to f'aotor in the long bowl developments being carried out at the University of Virginia The plant described 1n the General Electric study would cost about 17 million dollars wold be capa le of' an annal production of about 75 000 Kgs of U-235 at enrichment or about 500 Kge of U-235 at 95% enrichment It appears that only about one megawatt of electr1c1ty would be required to operate such a plant Except for the preparation of f'eed materials the skills needed to design and construct such a plant are primarily 1n the area of mechanical engineering and are available to many smaller countries which heretofore have not been considered as being capable of producing weapons materials Much of the basic information underlying this process has been develop d outside the United States and can ba consi ered to be generally available to all countries The Commission ls currently consideri ng this problem and has begun discussions with the Department or State and Department of Defense on those aspects of the proble or concern to those agencies We shall of course keep you fully informed on this matter Sincerely yours s John A McCone Chairman Honorable Clinton P Andere Chairman Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Congress of the United States - 51 - Appendix F D IV 'SFCBR3 APPENDIX 11 0 11 UNIT D STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WASHINGTON 25 D C December TO A A Wells Director Division of International Affairs PR c SUBJECT COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF OAS CENTRIFUGE SYMBOL C CLM 7 1959 L Marshall Director Division of Classification J a ou know a topic or the new AEC Policy Gui e provides that expa mental work on the detailed mechanical design tor the centrifuge method of isotope separation may be considered de classifiable to date There is howevert a restrictive paragraph attached to the topic which requires that we classify that work when it b ar ie apparent that it could reasonably be used for the produc io arge q·an 1ties of u-235 One Clf the factors that 1nflue11ced the determination to classify thia program in this way was the fact that at least two other countries West Gerl ll3ny and The Netherlands are vigoro sly p su ing studies in this fiald and that they have moreovar advanoed their techno og y J tile point where it is eg al to or better th c re In considering the proper classifioations to be assigned to this rogrer 1 not only now but in the foreseeable future a nwnber or t'aots inevit bly made th mselve·s felt Important among them is the fact that the Oe ans have now a eady so far progressed 1n their develop nt f the g s centrif gem thod that they oou d Without any further eavancement in their technology build a working plant for the mass production of U-235 The attached table which represents steps in the development of their program indicates very olea ly that in a period of approximately 1q years they have been able to increase the separative potential or their machines by better than an orde of magnitude while at the sam time reducing their oosts also by ore than en order or magnitude Another of the important aspects of this method or separating isotopes a its very low power consumption as compared wibh the gaseous dHfosion method One might say that for an approximately equal total outlay 1n dollars that is power plus plant one could build equally productive plants However to a nation short on po er the low power-consumption for the gas centrifuge method could rnake possible a productive plant at a time when a gaseous diffusion plant would still remain a desirable but impossible goal - 52 - Appendix 11 0 11 DOE CHIVES iCBi We all I kno rea 1ze that a large-soa1e plant tor the separation or heavy isotopes is an important part or a eapons program Thererore a method of separating isotopes whioh would make su oh a program possible for an unfriendly nation ts clearly one which should be classified The presence of China among the nations 1n1m1 oal to the United States gives that view both point and substance Thie reawakening nation or several hundreds or millions of people is already significantly increasing its industrial potential with the help of the Soviet Union It should be expected that as econ ae possible China will attempt toe bark upon a weapons program that significantly may be Withe t Soviet help When one oons1dere that the Chinese built an advanced o1v111zation many years before our so-oalled Western civilization existed the probability of their succeeding in such a venture must not be under-estimated China ls however still power-poor and probably will be ront'sane t1me to cane he gaseous ditrusion prooess tors parat1 ng beavy isotopes is not therefore Within their grasp for many years to oome The gas centrifuge method however with its low power consumption is not nearly that far 1n the future 1f' one remembers as I pointed out earlier that present technology would already permit the oonstruction of a working plant It 1s not 1mpose1ble th refore that in a relatively short t e Ch1na could unless steps are taken to prevent it purchase on the open market a producing isotope-separation plant for heavy isotopes In imposing class1f1cat1on on i n format1on and material in the field of the centrifuge separation process 1t is not auf1 1o1ent to think on1y 1n te s of o s work since a I have said before both Germany and the etherlande are own to equal or excel our own state or the art in this tield In order to insure that euoh nations as China would not be allowed to accelerate their weapons programs by the use ot this isotope separation ethod it would be necessary also to prevent them from obtaining the 1nformat an or the mater1al f other know1edgeable nations I therefore recormiend that 1mmed1ate oonsiderat1on be given to amending the olassified bi-laterals with West Germany and the Netherlands to include full cooperation in this field with both nations on a oiassified basis Because I am sure full cooperation with both these countries will depend at least in part on economic oone derations which might involve the purchase of the fruits or Oennan and Dutch labor and beoause of other powerful oons1derat1ons involving our relations with the British of wh1oh I am sure you are well aware I would also strongly reoanmend that the bi•lat ral existing with tbe United Kingdom land possibly that with canada n the ut re also be amended to permit the same full cooperation This would not only help to maintain our f'riendly relations with the u K and increase substantially the potential market for Dutch and G rman products but by helping to obtain the cooperation or the West Germans and the Dutch would enhance he sec r1 y of the ation by denying to unfriendly nations such as China 1n ormation and materials Which would enable or assist th m to establish a nuclear weapon program Enclosure able as stated - 53 - Appendix 11 0 11 0 E I I J T QSURE TO APPEI-IDIX G Year LR 40 6 o 3 33 302 0 582 12 050 17 200 uz 3B 63 5 6 7 4 74 302 0 935 8 380 ll 950 zo 3 66 5 9 25 3 6o 302 0 97 6 300 10 300 zo 5 113 0 9 25 7 03 302 1 64 3 710 6 100 zo 6 240 o 20 0 6 o 302 34o 3 5 5 32 1 750 1 150 2 86o 1 eeo 316 0 22 5 7 03 302 34o 4 Tf 7 25 1 285 845 1 380 Q 000 2 350 Circa UZ 1 V1 p rlpbera l d d iws cm zo 7 1946 l9 io h cm IQ Bee 2 100 Qaaccu a g1 Dittuoia i 'O ags 1 1--' 0 I- l'j 1 ct c j Oormon ma rk 8