J · · ' -7 S UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMlSSION WASHINGTON D C 20545 REGE lff '1cGEORGE v r·s OF 1965 NOV 23 NI 9 42 DECLASSIFIED E O 12958 Sec 3 6 ' -TIJ 1- 1 ' JC • tB 3 ' By WBA Dei'e -3 D Dear Mac My letter of July 16 1964 discussed various aspects of gas centrifuge technoJ ogy as related to the Nth powe problem a nd transmitted a copy of a report K•OA•l2 37 on this ·subject The purpose of this letter is to comment further on this problem following disCUS$ioruJ which Coaaisaioner Palfrey and ' t had with you on August s 1965 • Our a sessmenc of the feasibility for use of gas centrifuges in clandestine operati fo production of weapons mater al has not changed $ nee prepara ian of the report pr•viou ly transmitted Attached for- your information is a brief su•iiu y· of this report supplemented to indicate the current statuf l o f·gaa centrifug• technology A re-evaluation of the Nth power problem based on development that will be made during the AEC•s curr nt three year gaa centr_tfuge development program is expected ' to be issued in the latter part of 1966 A number of- stepa have been taken to miniu dze the pr liferation problem associated with the gas cen trifuge proces Although the AEC is continuing its classified development prograa in order to improve its ability top op rly assess the potential of the process we do no - plan to permit -- industry to have accese to the technology developed by AEC after June 30• 1964 Prior to that date a limfted number of compani • had access AEC informa • tion provided each ccxnpany met the qualificattons and eriteria established by the AEC for such access In addition to tightening control of the technology developed by the AEC» it was necessary to consider an approach to minimizing the potential fpr prolifer• ation of this process as developed in foreign countries to 1- -A- • 5 -Qff11w vt--c III GROUP 1 I E i ludec frcm iutomatio I dov ngr ff tn l I _ _ _ dec c s i •t cn -•• •r - _ · _ --- v - _ - ArrangementG for onirolling dis$eminati a of informat Qn Qi1 gas centrifuge t hnoUgybymeaq ot el a t1etf1cat lon have 11 n dGveloped and a e in effect% tri 'th t ted ngdom st Ge y • and the •ns 1i1et1he1tland11 Th@s$ar r a tt fSemen • have· beeA vo1untatrilyput into effect a• a r4s u1t Qf dis ussiona h• 1a 1te are n l set fo th in any fot'fll41 agreement 0µr dtscq ssi na naye indicated stron re istance$ particularly o the part Qi th Germans to a formal ag-reement to ol ssify and control di s mi tion of information in this area buC we plan to continu 1 - ·presa thepo i nt in future consultations mth these gQvernme ts T e ct ns• of gas C$ntr tfug• information with tlu¼ United KingcJom was terminated qn June 30- i96$ by a deelar4•ion that i f9Jm ation now beint gene rat ett in t1- u s development progtam· retrese-nted produ ti$n teQtmology wh1eb was not t art$lllls ih1$ undet the bilateral Tld 11 was the only bilateral agJ eement pa itting an exchange- of elassifi d inform at f cm Ot'l t pr 'lcesi t ' i h AEO's action of June $ • 1964_ i et'llOVlng tila iQnl' lf esic n' gas centrifug resti-icted data tirom ehe Acee$• Pert d t t rogrmu t u 1 eby denying_ fiu t het a ¢ Q8 by d0ll1Qs11 te tvat• indus ll'y f o the AEC 1 8 s a • entd fuge tn ot'nU'l t®# strensuhenecl tlle u $ pQ iflon wUh foreign gQve nts With te ipe ot to autt- detet mi lf oil o event the dissemination 0 f thi$ ittfo i' Xh hq gJ te4 permission for enera1 Eleet1dc Allied Chemtcal and W a Grac Id ectro• Nueleon es Inc to continue on a c la astfied ba if pt 'iyatel v financed labotatoty liit •• resem -eh and d velopment 1 rograma in the gas centrifu3e field Ruwe 1 they d• not h v• ac ess to current data from C sp s ore d 1Qd in tbia field and Gtace Ele otro-Nucleonics have nott had accesa to any AEC clas sified gas centrtfuge information 1 If these approaohea 4o not prevent the construction of production scale gas eentt l fuge plants in Qther countries• e-very e££o r t would have eo 'be made to tu -tns -8UCll plants under a safeguards system design to insuxe that their output wae tt$ed solely for peaceful purposes It should be noted that ttt WA has not yet had oce ion to con• side inspection of ga centrifuge• or 0th types of isotope separation plants However• in the June 25 1964 Wod f ng l aper on Inspection o f a Fissionabl Material Cutoff tabled by the u s Delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disal 'In8ilient conference a scheme was outlined for perimeter inspection of declared l 1 l i I I I 'I • Honorable McGeorge Bundy is tope sepa ati Jl plant• of nucl a eountriea produ ing rutlched uraniU ll fc p aceftJl 1 1Jtppseih s c insp tion w®ld invo1ve ccm t ti • iji' Oi$cf cees - t b4 pe J 'i t t 41 tlla p roce $ buil U ngs 1 measur nt elf electrical inpu to t - pl f and· meas r ment of perir1Mft r- uratd i P ut · ani deo1 n e4 ptoduc«t oµtpu U- anq u -anitmt ea tlfi 11 i1a s en'ri s toned that A or a dmf l -i t intenlational saf auards qup tiClt ild tlit' ® h c1t -usp ction ' bit- bt - o est te n -235 prod etiqq dfqua tel1 tc ut d fac tioxt of d f 'itt tsi t ms by nuclear powts ot qua titii # t i u14 be s1 n if1c4rit - l tiW to existirig stocb· 4 s ttsfa inseec t iOil· syste _ 9t nqn• nuclea-t p t• tq gacre 1 dtftµsii 1tt isQt • sep ai-at f «t_ iaciU tt•• ha$ not bt ert- f4%'Il'l'Ulat ed fQ date tt taaf ba posai l _le tij t a perimetetrins11eett ache•_ ut ttl i J la contitiut iua aampt s oi e4 pr¢u t an d tail•• - some otbelt sys•• ot· f n$ae t_i not ±equtttus eeta ·to p ro¢eaa equi'pm@ t ¢qul4 dev 1op$i io _ a centuii£ t -ge plant th at woul4 he sµ t al te foii appl teat Ol' I by mt a _a sf mil• inte1 national inspectot 6• I t u1 J tbt t bit info t10ll wt_ll b• he1plu1 in pr d ng a meantnstut t ei -ap¢et_ive of t 114 curi'ent $i t uatto -s-1it n respegt to safi centtrifuga -iaelltl losJ fa re 1 acton #0 the Ntl p probl nt tf- y would li ke i ldti ltf ottal intorntatlQI on any 'pat lie ul poftnta please let i$ lh COJ dial 1y 1 llonorable McGeQrge Bundy Speetal Assistmi to the Pr sident fo National Securit1 Atfa4'e Enc lo sure Sunmary of Report K•OA•l237 Cy 1A cc or n 1 Hornigt Di eetot- Offtce Qf Science an4 Teclmology Cy 3A1 w enol Cy 2A -· · - _ - ·This document ccn i - ts of No --1_ of -----c lli i'r' '0 r Eel'-t-- - i · · ·· • 1 j Copies Series SANITIZED E O 13526 Sec 3 5 _0 Nu 10- is s 11 M-€I By i# _______N ARA Date -l'f-1 SUMMARY REPORT OF NTH POWER PROBABILITY OF PRODUCING ENRICHED URANIUM VIA THE GAS CENTRIFUGE PROCESS The following summary highlights the most significant information contained in report K·OA-1237 Nth Power Evaluation which was issued on March 4 1964 This report is an extension and a refinement of an earlier report published in 1960 which attempted to correlate the probability of some country an Nth Power successfully producing enriched uranium for weapons purposes by means of a clandestine gas centri fuge plant with the industrial capability of that country Fqr this purpose the countries of interest were divided into three groups designated by X Y and z Group X countries are those _which possess a relatively high degree of technological competence and which have a high level of industrial activity e g West Germany Sweden Japan the Netheriarids and Italy Group Z countries are those which possess relatively little technological skill and which have iittle iridustrial activity e g Egypt Peru and Pakistan Group Y countries are those which lie in between and which have limited internal industrial activity e g Brazil Israel India and Yugoslavia The 1960 report was a very preliminary evaluation which was based on meagre experimental data The 1964 report covers a wider range of production rates and incorporates the technological advances through 1963 from the AEC gas centrifuge development program The experimental work performed by the AEC over the three year period 1960-1963 on the development of the gas centrifuge process for producing enriched uranium supports the conclusion made in 1960 that a number of countries could successfully develop the process and thereby could produce nuclear weapons using U-235 It is estimated in the 1964 report that Group X countries could develop and have in operation a small gas centrifuge production plant capable of producing sufficient weapons-grade enriched uranium 90% U-235 for at least a single weapon in approximately eight years This assumes that these countries have no technical knowledge of the u s developments having such knowledge the time would be shortened 1 to about five years This does not include the ti fhat would be K-OA-662 roduction of Nuclear Weapons by Nations X Y and Z by Means of the Gas Centrifuge l'rocessn 11 GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification S G ET 1 pages ---1 _ I -2- needed to develop the actual weapon but this might be done concurrently with the construction and operation of the production plant For Group Y countries the time to produce sufficient material for a weapon would be about 12 years if the country had no knowledge of U S developments and about seven years if they have u s information These countries would probably have to import some of the hardware and auxiliary equipment necessary to fabricate the centrifuge plant Group Z countries would probably have to purchase prefabricated centrifuges and almost all of the auxiliary equipment for the centrifuge plant from foreign vendors In addition they would need technical advisors from the outside to aid in the construction and operation of the centrifuge plant Hence the Group Z countries probably could not develop a centrifuge model on their own However if they did gain knowledge of the U S development the estimated time to produce enough 90% enriched uranitlill for a weapon is approximately nine years A comparative estimate of construction and operating costs operating manpower requirements and time to produce material for the first weapon is presented in Table A for both a small 50 Kg of 90% U-235 per year and a larger size 500 Kg of 90% U-235 per year U-235 production complex utilizing the gas centrifuge process Two subcritical models a 1963 model operating at a peripheral speed of and an advanced model with a projected speed of are show the effect of improved design and increased speed on the costs and operating work force requirements A technologically advanced Group X country is assumed as the Nth Fower The physical concealment of centrifuge plants of these capacities should present no problems because of their relatively small size less than an acre The feed and metals processing facilities are small operations which could be performed within the centrifuge separation plant The power requirements for the centrifuge plant will be small ranging from Gf1 'ii l 1%lft ffii' i ii mf for the small plant and ft m J 1 ' J ¾ 'j 1ti 1ri ¼ 1J for the large plant depending upon which centrifuge model is assumed Disposal of the effluents from a centrifuge plant would pose no problem The waste streams from a year's operation could be contained in a few large UF 6 cylinders which could be stored conveniently anywhere •within the plant The off-gases from the feed and metals plant could probably be neutralized with caustic and the product deposited in seepage pits -3- The report shows that by further development and improvement the projected Nth country resource requirements for the gas centrifugeenriched uranium route could be substantially reduced below those shown in Table A This large reduction in resource requirements for advanced centrifuge plants reinforces the necessity of maintaining current restrictions on dissemination of information on centrifuge technology As this report is based on developments and information that existed in late 1963 it should be noted that substantial progress has been made in the AEC 1 s experimental gas centrifuge program since then The 1965 production model centrifuge for elcample is operating in an experimental gas centrifuge cascade of 35 units at f l l lif_ close to the peripheral speed shown in the attached Table for the advanced model A detailed re-examination of' the gas centrifuge with respect to its significance to the Nth Power problem will be made during the Fall of 1966 and an updated based on the latest developments Nth Fower report will be issued shortly thereafter Attachment Table A 11 Gas Centrifuge Plant Summary Group·x Nation11 SANITIZED E O 13526 Sec 3 5 By NLJ lJ z 13 A- eitl ' ____ _ _NARA Date 7 ti'-I _ 1 • TABLE A GAS CENTRIFUGE PLANT SUMMARY GROUP X NATION Production Rate 1963 Model centrifuae 50 Kg U Yr Advanced Subcritical Model r· S' W E 11fir Capital Cost $ Operating Cost $ Yr l f0 gt% ' w 0 r1 · $30 800 000 $13 850 000 4 000 000 2 100 000 309 153 21 18 Operating Work Force Total Technical Time to Produce Material for 1st Weapon Years Production Rate Capital Cost $ Operating Cost $ Yr 5 500 Kg U Yr 1963 Model Advanced Subcritical Model $260 600 000 $101 200 000 22 900 000 10 100 000 1 616 707 71 39 5 5 Operating Work Force Total Technical Time to Produce Material for 1st Weapon Years For each case it is assumed that the Nth country has knowledge blueprints etc of the model of centrifuge involved Time referred to therefore is solely the construction time required to go from demonstrated technology to the finished plant plus the time- then needed to obtain enough product material for the first weapon No judgment has been made concerning the time that would be necessary to develop the actual weapon which might be done concurrently with the construction and operation of the production plants