•• APPROVED FOR RELEASE HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS DIVISION HR-70-14 4-18-2012 • I HR70-14 1 I I I I S E C R E T CS Historical Paper 150 No I I CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY • I I THE BERLIN TUNNEL OPERATION 1952 - 1956 I I I • I l Other copy held by DDP Copy No 2 GROUP 1 • I Excluded from automau downgrading and ' declm flcatlon 2 of Controlled by Date prepared Date published Written by FI Division D 25 August 1967 24 June 1968 L _ _ - ------·-•··· ·-•·· - • SE C·R ET TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE i LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS iii I II - nII • INTRODUCTION 1 PLANNING 6 IMPLEMENTATION 17 IV TERMINATION 23 V PRODUCTION 25 AFTERMATH 27 VI Appendix A - Analysis of the Reasons for the Discovery of the Tunnel Appendix B Recapitulation of the Intelligence Derived Appendix C - Typical American Press Comment Appendix D - East German Press Comment • • PREFACE PBJOINTLY the Berlin Tunnel project came into being some time in 1952 the exact date cannot be e'stablished and ceased as an active operation in the summer of 1956 The writer served as Headquarters case officer on the project from the winter of 1952-1953 until the summer of 1954 and then as the field case officer until February 1955 a seni r Office of Communications officer in the project Mr William K Harvey Chief Berlin •· Chief Operating Base 1952-1958 and FI Division D 1952-1958 were intimately associated with the planning and implementation of the project at the policy level and very kindly offered suggestions for the preparation of this manuscript Their comments have been incorporated and are greatly appreciated Several other individuals ---- who were in a position to offer valuable advice were absent from Headquarters during the period the paper was being prepared and thus unavailable to assist When this project was first discussed with the then Director of CIA Mr Allen Welsh Dulles he ordered that in the interests of security as little as possible concerning the project would be reduced to writing It is probable that few orders have been so conscientiously obeyed and yet there i SECRET ----·---·-··· -······· • ' ❖• S E C ·n E T are a great many cubic feet of files connected with thi project These files mainly concern technical and administrative matters Only those details which in the opinion of the writer are necessary to a broad understanding of the manner in which the project's objectives were accomplished have been included in this paper Those interested in a4ditional data may wish to consult the files In addition to setting forth significant developments the writer has attempt d to prqvide insight into the reasons for certain coursef of actio n speculative approach At times this required a The judgments derived from such specu- lation were shared by all those acti ely concerned in the management of the project and 'it is the writer's hope that they are accurately expressed in the following paper Any error in this respect however is the sole re ponsibility of the writer -------------- - -- - --- ___________ • ·-· S E C''R E T LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 1 - Map of Berlin 2 - Detail Map of Rudow sec tion Be rlin 3 - Aerial View of Rudow Section Berlin 4 - Dirt in the Basement 5 - Vopos Studying the Installation 6 - East German View of the Compound 7 - Blinds on the Shiel • 8 - Excavating Using the Blinds 9 - View of the Completed Tunnel 10 Construction of the Vertical Shaft 11 - Completed Vertical Shaft 12 - View of Cables and Taps 13 - Shaft and Tunnel Entrance in Warehouse Basement 14 - Converted Fork Lift and Dirt Box 15 Target Cables Exposed 16 - Schematic View of Tunnel 17 - Initial Stage of Construction of Pre-Amp Chamber 18 - Pre-Amp Chamber 19·- Tapping Bridle 20 - Lead-Away Lines 21 - Soviet Press Briefing iii ' ·• I SEC ·n ET I INTRODUCTION The exact moment when the idea emerged of digging a tunnel to intercept Soviet and East German communications is somewhat obscure A number of factors must be considered among them the following a As early as 1948 U S Intelligence Officers became interested in the benefits to be derived from tapping Soviet and Satell ite landlines on a scale not previously considered necessary The loss of certain sources during this period cr eated gaps in our intelligence coverage which were particularly unfortunat during this period of Cold War escalation It became evident that the tapping of certain'selected landlines might produce the information needed to fill a number of the gaps in our overall intelligence picture b In the late 1940's and early 1950's the U S through _the briefings of returnee German scientists those who were taken by the Soviets after World war II to work in Russia and other sources became aware of a new Soviet voice secrecy device which the Soviets referred 1 to usually as VHE CHE It soon became evident that 1 •· - In normal usage VHE CHE means high frequency The Soviets however in context used this term for a special speech scrambling device developed to provide security to their high level communications ' _ SE CJ R ET --- • • I ' I the Soviets planned c In the late 1940' s the Office of Communications in the course of its continuing efforts to provide secure communications for the Agency became aware of a principle which when applied to target communications offered certain possibilities Plans to exploit this technique were immediately formulated These factors then served as additional incentives above and beyond our normal collection requirements to focus- attention on Soviet landline targets In mid-1951 exploratory discussions were held in Washington to plan the mounting of an attack on Soviet landlines in East Germany with special emphasis to be placed on the Berlin area As a result of this conference an agent network was set up which was successful in penetrating the East Berlin office of the East German Post and Telecommunications network Vital information • - - - - - - - - f i r s t became available _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ j 2 S E l R E T • S E C' a E T during the latter part of 1951 and by March 1952 all of the pertinent technical material bad been assembled and sufficiently analyzed to permit the pinpointing of tqe most important Soviet circuits Subsequent events proved --------------------' this information_ to be completely correct Various methods of tapping these circuits were explored and one sampling operation was run in the East Zone unfortunately with negative results BY January 1953 however the effectiveness of the penetratibri network had become such that a 15-minute sample was obtained of the prime target circuit This was accomplished cable pair to the West Berlin Post Office where it was recorded This operation continued for some six months for a total of almost two hours The longest continuous sample obtained was 29 minutes and most samples were of two to three minutes' duration Special mention should be made of the fact that it was necessary to maintain a 24-hour watch over a six- • month period on our end of the cable to record these 3 · SEC RET ----------·-------------- -----· --·---- • -··- ·-· I samples I L__ - Meantime collateral collection effort continued on the communications systems involved and the Office of Communications developed techniques for recovering the text from the magnetic tape recordings of the target signal Somewhat ironically the first actual material recovered proved to be a recording of·a student teletypist practicing on the home keys While perhaps disappointing from the standpoint of intelligence content this material served to prove the technical possibility A t this point mid-1953 we knew it could be done - the next step was the problem of installing a• permanent tap on the target lines Precisely at what point the idea of a tunnel for the purpose of tapping the target cables began to come into focus cannot be pinpointed ' In 1951 the British advised CIA that they had for some years been tapping soviet cables through a system of tunnels in the Vienna area and offered to share the take with the U S The suggestion was made by the British at 4 - - - - - - - - - - ------····•· -···· -·--- --- • SEC RE T the time that similar opportunities might be present in the Berlin area While it should perhaps be possible to credit one individual with the initial concept it appears to be a I bit difficult to do so At any rate· the British and CIA continued to pool collateral ·-information - ·and-by-·May ·1953- the idea of a tunnel to tap the target cables began to take definite shape •· 5 • SECRET PLANNING II Inspection of all sites from which it might be possible to tunnel from the U K or the U S Zones to the target cables · served to narrow the choices to two spots and one in the U S Zone one in the British The site actually used see figs 1 2 and 3 was selected after careful deliberation which included but was not limited to the following factors a The location of the permanent water table which is normally relatively high in Berlin was ascer- l tained to be 32 feet below ground surface It was con- sidered that this fact would obviate the necessity for the use of compressed air watertight locks and watertight construction with a corresponding reduction in the attendant engineering problems bi The length of the tunnel was considered to be not impractical although it far exceeded anything which had been done by the British in Vienna c Land was available on which to construct an installation from which to begin the tunnel d Complete collateral information on the area was available including the target cable plans aerial photographs and the plans for all utilities serving the area 6 • • • • • • View of Berlin • - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - • _ --- ·-- -· ·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · · · • -·••-··•--·•··-··· ···• '· SEC _ET '- At this point the following major questions remained unanswered a Was it indeed possible to dig a tunnel of this magnitude approximately 1500 feet clandestinely considering the fact that the border at this point was heavily and constantly patrolled by the East Germans and hit the targets b If the answer to the above was favorable what was to be done with the spoil reckoned at approximately 3 000 tons of sand c What type of cover installation could be built in such a remote area this portion of Berlin was at thai time a squattersville of shacks and hovels constructed from rubble by refugees from the East German Zone In retrospect the first question Could the tunnel be dug '' was never really a debatable one---those concerned more or less decided that given sufficient money and ersonnel the job could be done This judgment fortunately proved sound The second question uwhere do we put the dirt i haunted the minds of project personnel for many weeks and a great many ingenious ideas were brought forth and discarded for one reason or another until the suggestion was made facetiously that we dig a hole and put the dirt in it • This in effect was the solution · At this time no convincing cover story had 7 ' SE C·R ET ¾- · -· •• suggested itself and the current consensus favored making the cover compound an element of the Quartermaster Corps with a rather vague mission of housing items that should be dispersed for one reason or another in a remote area of Berlin Space requirements for the recordini and associated equipment were such that a building of warehouse proportions was needed so it was decided to build a two-story warehouse Local engineers I were told that it had been decided to experiment with a new type of warehouse one which would be half above the ground and half below with a ramp suitable for running fork lift trucks from the basement to the first floor • Berlin had been selected as the site for this warehouse because a construe tion would be cheap due to low labor rates and b the work would benefit the Berlin eco'nomy So the basement was dug under the eyes of the local border guards and we had our hole 2 to put the dirt in - See fig 4 While the warehouse cover was adjudged sufficient to solve the temporary problems of construction it was not deemed solid enough to carry the project for an extended period At this particular time the intelligence community was becoming ncreasingly interested in the potential of' ------ ' 21 As an interesting sidelight ·we heard later that the Quartermaster Corps became seriously interested in this type construction because the ratio of cost to storage space available was amazingly low We do not know if any followup ever occurred 8 S E C R E T ' • • • Figure 4 - Dirt in the Basement ·-- · ·w-a __ _ __ _- --------------- ---·· _ _ _a -••'···••¥·--• • • For example a Excuse was provided for maintaining extra- ordinary physical security and tight compartmentation ·n the Top Secret category at this period in its evolution • c Legitimate ·targets existed in the area d The _existence f at the site provided the opposition with an explanation for the site's existence In spite of the fact that any form of I presents a priority target it w a_s_a_r_g_u_e a --- t h_a_t -p_r_e_s_e_n t i n-g- th e opposition with a reason for the site's existence would make it a less prominent • target than leaving· it a ''mysterious something 9 SECRET ' The - ------------ - __ - ----·-- • __ __ ___ SECRET In site did in fact addition the sight of the Soviets and East Germans standing on top of the tunnel with binoculars focused n the roof of the installation provided ------- considerable amusement to personnel at the site See fig 5 Joint U S -U K planning for the project continued throughout 1953 and in December of that year the Director of Central Intelligence approved the terms of reference which covered formal negotiations with the British for the implemen- tation of the project A series of conferences in late 1953 and early 1954 led to the following decisions a The U S would 1 procure a site erect the necessary structures and drive a tunnel to a point beneath the target cables 2 be responsible for the recording of all signals produced and --------------------- 3 process in Washington all of the tele- graphic material received from the project b The British would 1 drive a vertical shaft from the tunnel' end to the targets • 10 SE Cl R E T ___ _ _ Figure 5 Vopos Studying the Installation - L ' -• - _ _ • Figure 5 - Vopos Studying the Installation • • s • E C' R E T 2 effect the cable taps and deliver a usable signal to the head of the tunnel for recording and 3 provide for a jointly manned U S -U K center in London to process the voice recordings from the site It was jointly agreed that each side would keep the other advised in detail on all aspects of the project It should perhaps be said here that the bilateral aspects of this operation with one notable exceptio which will be discussed later see BLAKE page 23 caused few if any problems • The skills developed by the British during the Vienna operations stood us in good stead and the distribution of effort and ox pense proved in the erid t6 be reasonably equitable Activity thus proceeded on three fronts - in Berlin steps were taken to lease the necessary land and right-of-way easements for the site and a contract was let with a German contractor The compound 1 which was roughly the size of an aver- age city block was fenced with chain-type high security fencing and contained the main operations building the one story with basement type warehouse previously described 1 combined kitchen-dinigg facilities and barracks 1 and another building which housed three diesel driven generators to • provide power for all facilities See fig 6 11 s E'C R E T Sanitary Figure 6 East G rman V isew of the Comr nund r - L 1 j m - C i L l J Figure 6 • East German View of the Compound • • ------·------------ --·•-· - -- SEC' ET provisions consisted of a cesspool The logical placement of the cesspool was such that it was situated only a few feet It from the tunnel site later developed when the tunnel was dug that this was quite unfortunate because working conditions in the sector adjacent to the cesspool were to say -the least highly unpleasant Planning called for the completion of this workr on 27 · August 1954 For assistanc in actually digging the tunnel it was decided to request help from the Army Corps of Engineers and to this end the Chief of Staff and the G-2 U S Army • were briefed on the project The initial contact with the Army was made personally by Mr Allen Dulles to General Matthew B Ridgway Fortunately General Arthur Trudeau a trained engineer had just been appointed A C of S G-2 ' ' From the first moment he learned of the operation General Trudeau was an enthusiastic s pporter of the concept The Army selected Lt Colonel Leslie M Gross the only available member of the Engineering Corps with any experience in tunneling to head the project This proved to be an excellent choice for Lt Colonel Gross turned in an outstanding job By mid-summer of 1954 he had firmed up the engineering plans selected a crew of engineering personnel and actually constructed a mock-up tunnel some 150 yards long working under • operational conditions at a high security base I___________ · 12 SE CRET ' • SECRET Some mention should be made of the actual method of constructing the tunnel Studies of the soil structure in the Berlin area showed a high percentage of sand For this reason it was decided that the tunnel should be lined with steel The same sand content contributed greatly to the danger of cave-ins at the face of the tunnel and to eliminate this risk a shield was devised see figs 7 and 8 with horizontal blinds so arranged across its face that should even dry sand be encountered the danger of cave-ins was virtually eliminated The tunnel liner was formed of sections of heavy steel plate so constructed that when bolted together five sections formed • a steel ring approximately six feet in diameter and 15 inches long Provision was made for bolting these rings together to form a continuous tube of solid steel The men worked under cover of the shield described above which was slightly larger in diameter than the steel liner and when sufficient material had been excavated the shield was forced forward with hydraulic jacks and a new section of liner was bolted in place Since this method left a void of approximately one and onehalf inches around the liner remembering that the diameter of the shield was greater than that of the liner screw-type removable plugs were built into every third section of tunnel liner • This permitted removal of the plugs and the forcing of grouting material under high pressure to fill the void 13 S E CRE T figure 7 Blinds on the Shield _ ·• --' _ _ _ · - i Figure 7 • Blinds on the Shield • • Figure 8 - Excavating Using the Blinds 8 ' 'le t- - W J E 5 _ Figure 8 - Excavating Using the Blinds • • • ---------------···-----·-· - --·- ---- - • SECRET after the liner was in place It was calculated and subse- quently proven to be true that this method of construction would not permit settling of the soil and detection of the tunnel from the surface See fig 9 Meantime in the U K British engineers constructed a mock up of the tunnel's terminal end and fabricated an ingenious device which worked in principle like the tunnel shield described above with the difference of course that the blinds which closely resembled a conventional venetian blind were horizontal but so hinged as to·permit vertical excavation his permitted excavating cautiously across the upper face of • the vertical shaft in small areas and then jacking th entire structure up at th optimum rate See fig 10 Available plans indicated that the cables were buried some 27 inches deep along the side of a heavily traveled highway The top of the vertical shaft see fig 11 then needed to be approximately 12 to 14 inches below the surface of the highway in order to give the tapping crew room to work below the ceiling of the shaft and the whole structure had to be capable of supporting the weight of heavy trucks since the tunnel and tap chamber lay directly beneath the highway fig 12 • Considerable care was devoted to insulating the 14 S E'C RE T See Figure 9 - View of the Completed Tunnel Figure 9 - View of the Completed Tunnel • • • Figure 10 - Construction of the Vertical Shaft Figure 10 'I - Figure 10 - Construction of the Vertical Shaft • • • • • Figure 11 • • • • Figure 12 View of Ca les and Taps ----------------····-•··--• • '- • SECRET tap chamber to prevent its acting like a huge drum Consid rable thought was given to the quantity and content of the material available from the target and the manner in which it was to be processed It was in this field perhaps that we experienced some of our greatest problems It had been decided very early in the project's planning stages to maintain the strictest possible security measures As a minimu preciution security checks were made on each individual who in any way became knowledgeable of the project's mission and the same standards in force for clear- • I ances for Special Intelligence were utilized A list of briefed personnel was maintained special secrecy agr ements were executed and special briefings were given to all knowledgeable personnel It was in the assemblage of a processing team that we experienced our greatest problem in maintaining security standards Since the material to be processed was largely Russian voice it was thought that we would need linguists with near native fluency in Russian It is axiomatic that native fluency is usually available only in natives and • In spite of the insulation it was a weird sensation to be in the chamber when an iron-shod horse trotted across it We also suffered some anxious moments one foggy morning when the microphone in the tap chamber gave forth with a continuous series of dull thuds After the sun burned away the fog visual observation showed that the East German police had set up a temporary automobile checkpoint directly over the chamber The thuds the microphone picked up were caused by the police officer in charge stomping his fe t on the road surface to keep warm 15 • •---•---- - --- •-••••' •• •• - - L •---------------- - -------••• • • S E C R E T natives were not clearable for the project Although we were never successful in obtaining as many linguists as we needed we were successful thr6ugh careful screening and intensive language training in assembling a minimum crew for the job This necessitated screening ea6h personnel file in the Agency of those individuals who claimed any knowledge of German or Russian arranging interviews and language tests and negotiating transfers to the projecto The Agency 1 s language capa- bilities then were considerably less than now and some of the negotiations proved to say the least difficult • • • 16 S i''c R E T ----- -------- --···---•·--·-········· • SE C'R ET III IMPLEMENTATION By 17 August 1954 things were beginning to take shape and the situation was as follows a The German contractors had completed the compound and we were in possession b All of the basic supplies equipment and personnel were in Berlin ready to start construction on the tunnel This in itself involved transporting 125 tons of steel tunnel liner from the ZI to Berlin • The initial shipment across the East Zone to Berlin consisted of one and one-half freight trains the loss of any package of which could have blown the project For security purposes all sensitive··1tems such ls the tunnel liner were double crated and banded and subjected to severe drop tests before they left the ZI Similar items were differently packaged for deception purposes c Space at Headquarters was secured and the Office of Communications had assembled a crew and was well under way in fabricating the unique equipment necessary to process the anticipated telegraphic traffic d Initial personnel had been selected and were being processed for both the Main Processing Unit MPU • in London and the Technical Processing Unit TPU in 17 SEC'- tET - - •-•--• - - -•-••M - •- • ••---•----••••-•-•• _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ • ___ __ _ - • - - - - - - - • •- • ••• •'-''••• SE C R ET Washington It should be noted that personnel and equip- ment were programmed initially to exploit approximately ten percent of the anticipated take In retrospect per- haps this could be considered overly cautious In justification of this decision it should be said that no one had ever tunneled 1 476 feet under clandestine conditions with the expectation of hitting a target two inches in diameter and 27 inches below a main German Soviet highway There were those who manifested certain reser- vations on the feasibility of so doing and it is greatly • to the riredit of those senior officials both civilian and military that in spite of these reservations the project was permitted to proceed In late August a vertical shaft some 16 feet in diameter was started in the warehouse basement floor see fig 13 and ground water was encountered at 16 feet instead of at the predicted 32 feet Such examination as could be safely undertaken under the steady observation of East German border guards and Soviet officials indicated that a clay lens existed in this particular spot creating a perched water table'' the magnitude of which was unknown Available information indicated that the clay lens possibly sloped down in the direction of the target and it was decided to proceed with the tunnel even though the 0 • top cover was to be less than half what had een anticipated 18 • Figure 13 - Shaft and Tunnel Entrance in Warehouse Basement Figure 13 • Shaft and Tunnel Entrance in Warehouse Basement • • • Careful visual observation was maintained and tunneling operations stopped each time the German guards walked over the tunnel on their regular patrols to take care of the excess water Pumps were installed Observation logs were maintained and since the highway under observation was the main road from East Berlin to the Schoenfeld Airport considerable Order of Battle information was obtained It was also possible to estimate quite accurately the relative importance of individuals visiting East Berlin by observing the security precautions taken by the East Germans and the Soviets Both sides of the tunnel were lined with sand in bags • as the tunnel proceeded and the excess spoil was hauled back to the basement of the wareho se · To facilitate movement a wooden track was laid on the floor of the tunnel and a converted electric fork lift was used to pull a string of rubbertired trailers back and forth in the tunnel See fig 14 Cool air was supplied to the face f the tunnel ·through ductwork from an air conditioning unit located in the warehouse The tunnel was completed on 28 February 1955 Construction of the tap chamber commenced 10 March 1955 and was completed with the three target cables exposed on 28 March 1955 fig 15 To appreciate this accomplishment it is necessary to I remember that the tunnel was 1 476 feet long roughly the i • 19 See ------------- Figure 14 - Converted Fork Lift and Dirt Box • 1 -· -- · _ i ' I · ii '- Figure 14 _ Converted Fork Lift and Dirt Box --·• ' ' c r ··- - - - - ·'- ' a ' •• • • _ _ Figure 15 - T rget Cable Exposed - ·-i --_ -- -- - _ _ t J i f _ - Figure 15 Target Cables Exposed • • • __ _ ___________ __ -··- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ 0 1 _ • ' • - __ • __ _ ___ _ _ -4 - ______ ___ _____ _ ·----··· ····•···-···· S E GRE T length of the Lincoln Memorial reflecting pool and that the first half sloped down and the second half sloped up fig 16 See The lack of an adequate base line made the survey- ing problem especially difficult The engineers decided at one point that an object of known size in the East Zone would be useful as a reference point so a baseball game was organized with the objective of knocking a baseball as far into the I East Zone as possible This scheme was frustrated by the friendliness of the East German guards who kept returning the baseball • Nonetheless the engineers expressed confidence that they knew their position when the tunnel was completed to a point which could be contained in a six-inch cub They were correct Excess humidity is probably one of the greatest enemies of electronic equi_pment To guard against this problem the section of the tunnel immediately adjacent to the tap chamber was insulated and sealed with marine-type plywood to form effect a closed room were erected and See figs 17 and 18 in Vapor barriers in addition a heavy anti-personnelil door of steel and concrete was- constructed to seal off the tunnel some 15 yards from its terminal end From the beginning it was realized that the duration of this operation was finite Considerable thought was given to the posture the U S Govern- • ment would adopt upon the tunnel's discovery and to those 20 S E G '¾ R E T ' Figure 16 - Schematic View of Tunnel NOT TO SCALE - VERTICAL EXAGGERATED - DIMENSIONS APPROXIMATE · h se 300 ft C l1 f ft L S L 1 ' J r V ' SCHEMATIC VIEW NOT TO SC c £ VERTICAL E AGC ERflTED 0tM EH SION 4Pt fl0t I t1ATt • • Figure 16 Schematic View of Tunnel • Figure 17 - Initial Stage of Construction of Pre-Amp Chamber - -- __ c IT i Figure 17 Figure 17 - Initial Stage of Construction of Pre-Amp Chamber • 7 - • __ ____ _ ____ - __ ____ - --·'• SE C R ET measures which would be taken at the site The following position was finally approved a The posture of the U S would be one of flat denial of any knowledge of the tunnel b The tunnel was mined at the point it crossed the East-West Zone border with demolition charges capable of caving in the tunnel liner should the Soviets attempt forcible entry into the cover installation c The anti-Personnel door described above was 4 installed • d It was agreed that the installation would be defended against forcible entry with all means a hand The three cables were tapped on 11 May 1955 21 May 1955 and 2 August 1955 All equipment for isolating and preampli- fying the signals and passing them down the tunnel for recording was in place before each tap was made so that monitoring of each pair could begin as soon as it was tapped 19 and 20 See figs Careful check was kept of the temperature and 4 This door bore the following inscription neatly lettered in German and Cyrillic Entry is forbidden by order of the Commanding General It was reasoned that this sign might give pause to Soviet and or German officials and gain time As a matter of fact there were those Communist individuals who considered the posting of this sign as one of the most audacious aspects of the entire undertaking • 21 SECRET Figure 18 - Pre-Amp Chamber F' i gure 18 Pre-Amp Chamber • Figure 19 Tapping Bridle - -- ci- •' - · _ _ ' 1· · r 3 - fc · - --7 ·' • Tapping Bridle • • • P i gure 20 • Lead-Away Lines ---•----··-· • · _ -- _ - ----- ···--•-· S E CR E T humidity in the tap chamber to prevent the possibility of the introduction of moisture into the target cables thus causing faults The moisture in the air caused by the breathing and perspiration of the technicians doing the tapping operation forced the suspension ·of the operation several times to permit the air conditioning equipment to dehumidify the chamber All the components in the electrical isolation net- works were individually selected and subjected to rigorous tests to insure maximum reliability and the lead-away cables were constructed of the best available materials sheathed in lead and handled in accordance with the highest telephone • company standards The strictest possible Visual watch was maintained with the tap crew In shorti in this as in all aspects of the operation every effort was made to guarantee success even though in many instances it meant delay in achieving the objectiv • 22 SE'GRET ____ __ _____ • ----- ------- ----- ---- - _ ----------- --- -- _ __ _ S E C RE T IV TERMINATION The tunnel was discove ed see fig 21 21 April 1956 A memorandum pre- after 11 months and 11 days of operation pared on 15 August 1956 reproduced in its entirety as Appendix A examines in detail all evidence available as of that date on the reasons for the discovery The conclusion reached was that the loss of this source was pu ely the result of unfortunate circumstances beyond our control - a combination of the fact that one of the cables was in very poor physical condition this was known from the beginning and a • long period of unusually heavy rainfall It appeared that water entered the cable in sufficient quantity to make it inoperative thus necessitating digging up sections of the cable and causing discovery of the tap Subsequent developments offer an alternative reason for the demise of the operation In April 1956 MI-6 discov- ered that George BLAKE case officer in their service had been recruited by the Soviets while a prisoner in North Korea in 1952 and had continued under Soviet control BLAKE was privy to all aspects of the tunnel from the earliest planning stages BLAKE stated that he had informed his Soviet contact of the planned tunnel at the time the final decision was m de on its location in the latter part of 1953 • 23 S E C RE T The • • • Figure 21 Soviet Press Briefing ·- ·· _···-····-····· • -·- ---·------------ · _ --·-· ·- · S E C 11 E T ' question then arises as to why the Soviets permitted the tunnel to be dug and to operate for nearly one year Many theories have been advanced but it is most probable that we will never know the exact rationale behind the- Soviet moves • • 24 E'C s RE T I - ----------··-•-·--·-····---·-········ ···--·------- ·--····---- • SECB ET v PRODUCTION The following statistics may be of interest in evaluating the project a Three cables were tapped They contained 273 metallic pairs capable of transmitting a total of approximately 1200 communications channels The maximum number of channels in use at any one time approximated 500 On the average 28 telegraphiq circuits and 121 voice circuits were recorded continuously Approximately 50 000 reels of magnetic tape were used - some 25 tons • V b • The o processing center employed a peak number of 317 persons Twenty thousand Soviet two-hour voice reels containing 368 000 conversations were fully transcribed In addition 13 500 German two-hour voice reels were received and 5 500 reels containing 75 1 000 conversations were processed Seventeen thousand of these conversations were fully transcribed c its peak The Washington center employed 350 people at Eighteen thousaµd six-hour Soviet teletype reels and 11 000 six-hour German teletype reels were completely transcribed It shouLd be borne in mind that many of these reels contained as many as 18 separate circuits some of which utilized time-division multiplex to create additional circuits The potential of any given six-hour teletype reel was approximately • 216 hours of teletype messages 25 S·E C R ET Both plain text and - ' - - ' - - - - _ J - ---- - - - - - - · - · - - - - - - - - - - - -·--·· • ·------•· · · - ·······•······'· SE C R ET encrypted traffic was received The daily output was about 4 000 feet of teletype messages Printed in book form these messages would have filled a space ten feet wide 15 feet long and eight feet high d A small processing unit two to four persons was maintained at the Berli site to permit on-the-spot monitoring of engineering circuits for the protection of the project and scanning of the more productive circuits for the hot intelligence Daily reports of sufficient value to warrant electrical transmission to Washington • and London were produced e Processing of the backlogged material-con- tinued until 30 September 1958 and resulted in a total of 1 750 reports plus 90 000 translated messages or conversations f The total cost of the project was $6 700 000 The information from this material was disseminated in a closely controlled system called REGAL 11 Appendix B consists of a summary of the value of the material received together with typical customer comments Despite our knowl- edge of the fact that certain elements of the Soviet Government were aware of our plans to tap these cables we have no evidence that the Soviets attempted to feed us deception • material through this source 26 s E ' RE T • ' S E C R E T VI AFTERMATH As previously noted considerable thought was given during the entire life of the project on the result its discovery would bring In retrospect it is probably correct to say that among those most actively concerned with the project's management a consensus developed that the Soviets would probably suppress knowledge of the tunnel's existence rather than admit to the world that Free World intelligence organs had the capability of successfully mounting an opera tion of this magnitude • In other words it was felt that for the Soviets to admit that the U S had been reading their high level communications circuits would cause the Soviets to lose face Perhaps fortunately fate intervened and as a possible consequence the Soviet course of action was exactly contrary to expectationo The Commandant of the Soviet Berlin Garrison who would normally have controlled the handling of the situation when the tunnel was discovered was absent from Berlin and the Acting Commandant Colonel Ivan Ao Kotsyuba was in charge There is some reason to believe that he for whatever reason was forced to make a personal decision on a course of action without benefit of advice from Moscowo • At any rate his reaction was unexpected in that he invited the entire Berlin 27 ·------·-----···--·-·-·-·· - - - - - • - ··· ···•··· • ·· -· -· __ -·-· • S E C R E T press corps to a briefing and tour of the tunnel and its facilities As a result the tunnel was undoubtedly the most highly publicized peacetime espionage enterprise in modern times prior to the U-2 incident Worldwide reaction was out- standingly favorable in terms of enhancement of U S prestige Non-Soviet Bloc sentiment can be generally summarized as follows a There was universal admiration and this included informed Soviets on the technical excellence of the instaliation and the imaginative nature of the undertaking • b The non-Communist world reacted with surprise and unconcealed delight to this indication that he U S almost universally regarded as a stumbling neophyte in espionage matters was capable of a coup against the Soviet Union which had long been the acknowledged master in such matters c Coupled with regret that the Cold War necessi- tated such measures thoughtful editorial comment applauded this indication that the U S was capable of fulfilling its role of Free World leadership in the struggle Appendix C contains a sampling of typical U S press accounts and editorial comment on the tunnel • Predictably the Communist press treated the tunnel as an outrage and an 28 S E 't R E T ····-•--··--- • ···-···· -- • ···· ---·------ •----· -·- SEC RE T I intolerable indecency Appendix D consists of a study of East German press reaction to the incident For their contributions to Project PBJOINTLY awards 5 were made to the following individuals Distinguished Intelligence Medal Intelligence Medal of Merit Intelligence Medal of Merit Intelligence Medal of Merit Mr William K Harvey Distinguished Intelligence Medal Intelligence Medal of Merit • Intelligence Medal of Merit Distinguished Intelligence Medal Intelligence Medal of Merit After the project went into the production phase it was necessary to brief a great many people to properly utilize the product In all almost 1500 u t personnel were cleared for the projecty in addition to a very large number of British · Unfortunately the writer has been unable to locate an exact record of those persons who received other recognition frrim the Agency for their participation in this project and any omissions are regretted It should also be noted that approximately 1000 people participated wittingly or unwittingly in this undertaking In fact thereare very few 1 if any of the elements of CIA that were not called upon for assistance either directly or indirectly such as providing manpower 1 during the life of the project • 29 • ' '·· SECitET subjects With the e ception of BLAKE as noted above we have no indication that there was a single security leak during the life of the projebt It is also interesting to note that compartmentation was good enough even at the Berlin site that a number of individuals actively engaged in working with the REGAL material were unaware of the exact source until they read about it in the press • • 30 ' SE' RE T • • • • ' SE C'R ET APPENDIX A NOTE This assessment was prepared by the PBJOINTLY staff immediately after the discovery of the tunnel and is based on pertinent info mation available At the time the report was prepared BLAKE's activities had not been surfaced 15 August 1956 DISCOVERY BY THE SOVIETS OF PBJOINTLY Analysis of all available evidence - traffic passing on the target cables conversations recorded from a microphone installed in the tap chamber and vital observations from the • site - indicates that the Soviet discovery of PBJOINTLY was purely fortuitous and was not the result of a penetration of the U S or U K agencies concerned a security violation or testing of the lines by the Soviets or East Germans A descrip- tion of the events leading to these conclusions is contained in this paper Following heavy rains in the Berlin area a number of telephone and telegraph cables were flooded and began to fault between Karlshorst and Mahlow on the night of 16 April 19560 The first major fault was discovered on cable FK 151 at Wassmannsdorf on 17 April The fault was repaired by cutting the defective stretch of cable and replacing a 3000 meter length with a temporary replacement cable • s EC' ' ET Between 17 and 22 -·•···-·'····'··---·---- -------- ----·----·---·····--··-- S E C R E T • April when the tap was discovered ·cables 150 151 153 and 157 were inoperative at various times During this period Soviet signal troops and East German Post and Telegraph technicians worked frantically to re-establish and maintain communications Telephone lines serving Marshal Grechko the Commander of the Group of _Soviet Forces Germany GSFG and General Kosyakin Malyi Tsarenko and Dudakov failed temporarily depriving these officers of communications Faults on cable FK 150 put the Main Soviet Signal Center in Germany out of communications with Moscow and the Soviet Air Warning Control Center in East Germany similarly lost its communications • German technicians began a testing program based at Karlshorst and Mahlow and working north from Mahlow A major fault on FK 150 was discovered and repaired at Wassmannsdorf on 18-19 April and on 19 April a second major fault on the same cable was discovered at Schoenfeld only two kilometers south of the tap site It appears that the faulty section of cable was replaced with a new stretch during-the early hours of 20 April but communications remained unsatisfactory par- 1 ticularly on FK 150- P and the testing and repair program 1 • FK 150 caused project personnel considerable concern from the day that the cables were reached It was physically in very poor shape with brittle and cracking insulation The actual tap of FK 150 was delayeO almost three months in deference to its poor physical condition • 2 SECRET - - - - • - - - - • • • • ' _ _ _ _- - - - - · _ _ - - -• _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ • - - •••••-••c • SEC ET continued This general situation was noted by personnel at the site who checked the tap on the morning of 19 April and found it to be in good condition with no faults present Berlin notified Headquarters of this fact on the evening cif 20 April noting available precautions taken including primary one of crossing fingers Throughout 20 April Soviet-operators at Karlshorst the Mahlow cable chamber and Zossen Wuensdorf checked FK 150 pairs carrying circuits serving high ranking officials and made switches where necessary or possible • Nothing was said con- cerning the testing being conducted to discover the faults or work being done by a Soviet labor force lent to the Germans to assist in digging up bad stretches of cable On 21 April a Karlshorst technician told a colleague in Zossen Wuensdorf the FK 150 had not yet been repaired and that another two days 9 work would probably be necessary to clear up the trouble Testing and rerouting of circuits were stepped up during the evening of 21 April and the Soviets showed considerable concern over the failure of the Moscow-GSFG Air Warning telegraph channel which had been transferred to FK 150 on 17 April Lt Colonel Vyunik Chief of the GSFG Signal Center at Wuensdorf 1 telephoned Major Alpatov Chief of the Karlshorst Signal Center at his apartment to inform him of the failure of the Air • Warning circuit They agreed that communications had to be 3 ' ' s E r R E T · · · ·- -• • • - •no -··•--•-------··-·-··· S E C R ···· •··· E T established before morning and Alpatov left for his duty station There is no significant' information available on the actual progress f the testing and repair program proper from 0300 hours on 20 April o 0050 hours on 22 April On the basis of available information hciwever it seems probable that a the testing program continued north until a fault was located near the site and a decisi6n was made to replace an entire section of cable which embraced the tap site or b the repeated faulting coupled with the age and physical condition of • FK 150 led the oppositi6n t the conclusion that the only effective remedy was to replace the cable section by section and that this program was inaugurated somewhere south of our site and continued northwaid until the tap was discovered At approximately 0050 hours on 22 April 40 or 50 men were seen on the east side of Schoenefelder Allee deployed along the entire area observable from our installation digging at three to five foot intervals over the locat on 0£ the cable and incidentally the tap chamber At approximately 0200 hours the top of the tap chamber was discovered and at 0210 Russian speech was heard from the microphone in the tap chamber The first fragments of speech indicated that the dis- covery of the tap chamber aroused no suspicion among those • present A small hole was broken in the tap chamber roof 4 - - -- ·- -- - - · Mo•· ·---'- ---- • - - - - - - · - - - - - - - · _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ • ' • # s E c a E T permitting limited visual observation of the chamber and a 2 Soviet captain was brought to the spot After some discus- sion all agreed that the discovery was a manhole covering a repeater point and the working crew began enlarging the hole to gain access to the repeater point While the working party was uncovering the tap chamber Major Alpatov and Lt Colonel Vyunik discussed the communications situation in a rambling telephone conversation at approximately 0230 hours They indicated relief at the res- toration of Air Warning Communications with Moscow and Vyunik • went on to express suspicion about the continued trouble on FK 150 In context it appears that this suspicion was directed at the failure of the Germans to clear up the difficulties on FK 150 once and for all In any event Alpatov clearly did not share his colleague's doubts The general tone of this conversation was relaxed and casual completely in keeping with the character of the two men both of whom we know well The conversation appears to be a clear indi cation that as of 0230 hours on 22 April neither of these responsible officers was aware of the existence of the tap Presumably Captain Bartash an engineer who later received an unspecified award from Marshal Grechko for the discovery of the tap • 5 SECRET - ------·-------------- --- -----··---------------•--¥-- --- - -- ¥-• ' • Meanwhile back at the site the work of enlarging a hole to give full access to the tap chamber continued At approxi- mately 0250 hours an unidentified Soviet Colonel arrived on the scene presumably in response to a request for guidance by the working party The Colonel did not appear to be a signal officer since he todk no active part in the investigation and remained on the s ene only for a short ti e Having enlarged the hole in the tap chamber roof the workers saw for the first time the cables and the trap door on the floor of the chamber • They assumed the trap door to be risome sort of box and had no suspicion of the true nature of· the installation At approximately 0300 hours barriers were erected to keep inquisitive onlookers ·away from the excavation and it was suggested that someone be sent to the Signal Directoratey presumably to obtain relevant cable data At the same time the first German voice was·h rd in conversation with a German-speaking Russian The German stated that two trucks must have passed the spot without locating it The Russian answered that ''Soviet troops are coming as well 11 and added that they must wait until morning for the decision as to J what further work would be undertaken While these developments were taking place Vyunik held a telecon with the Air Warning Center in Moscow in which he • referred to the move of the GSFG Air Warning Center and ' 6 S E C R E T ' • S E C 11 E T discussed in detail communication arrangements necessitated by thi move This revealing teleconference tends to support other evidence indicating that as of 0300 hours the true nature of the installation had still not been established The work of excavation continued and fragments of conversation connected with it were picked up by the tap chamber microphone A G€rman-speaking Russian commented that some- body has come from there and there are fewer workers there suggesting that similar work was in progress at another point The Russian gave instructions that'nothing in the installation • was to be touched A German remarked that the chamber might be connected with sewage work and proposed that plans of the sewage system be obtained from the responsible authorities The Russian answered that they already had this information and that the plans showed that chamber to be 120 meters away from this point At about 0320 hours when still more of the tap chamber was revealed and a better view of the interior obtained those present began to speculate vaguely about its exact nature and the time of its construction One of the Soviets probably an officer suggested that it might have been built during the war possibly for Vhe Che Russian abbreviation for high frequency transmission iv but used loose- ly to denote anything connected with secure communications • Shortly after 0330 hours the Soviets left the site by motor 7 ·· -··-• • --•••m•--- · ·' • n· ·· - - - - - - - - - - - - - · - - - • - - • - - - · - - - - - · · - - · - - - · - · - · · - - · ·---- S E C R E T vehicle presumably to report their findings For approxi- mately one and one-half hours - from 0330 to 0500 - no sounds or voices were recorded At approximately•0415 hours Vyunik telephoned Alpatov's apartment in Karlshorst and asked Alpatov if he had spoken with General Dudakov Chief Signal Officer GSFG Alpatov said that he had that he was getting dressed and that he would go to his signal center as soon as possible Vyunik told Alpatov to telephone him at the GSFG frame room at Zossen Wuensdorf addingp When we speak we must do so carefully • We know what the matter is so we will speak care- fully 11 This indicated clearly that by 0415 hours the GSFG Signal Directorate and General Dudakov the Chief Signal Officer had been informed of the discovery of the PBJOINTLY chamber viewed it with extreme suspicion and planned to reroute circuits passing over the target cables This coincides neatly with the departure from the tap site of the Soviets at 0330 At 0630 Vyunik telephoned Alpatov at the Karlshorst Signal Center and informed him that Lt Colonel Zolochko Deputy Chief of the Lines Department GSFG had left Wuensdorf at 0625 to go there Vyunik 1 in a resigned tone then added that all that remained for him and Alpatov to do was to sit and wait In due course Lt Colonel Zolochko arrived at the site • accompanied by an unnamed Colonel and Captain Bartash the 8 SEC TIET ' '' • S ·EC RE T Commander of the working party By this time the Soviets apparently had brought circuit diagrams to the site and were aware of the pair allocati ns on the affected cables There was considerable discussion of the discovery and one of the crew actually entered the chamber and made a superficial and inconclusive examination Shortly afterwards the statement the cable is tapped was made for the first time on the scene At about this time 0635 hours Lt Colonel Vyunik telephoned Major Alpatov and asked whether he had received the • task and whether its meaning was clear Alpatov replied that he had received and understood the assignment Speaking in unusually vague terms Vyunik instructed Alpatov to take over two low-frequency channels presumably provided by the KGB signals organization These channels would provide tele- phone communications between Berlin and Wuensdorf via overhead line and would by-pass the tapped cables Vyunik added that they could continue necessary technical discussions on the new facilities Although teletype traffic continued until the tap wires were cut - at 1535 hours on Sunday afternoon - the last telephone call of any interest was placed sometime between 0800 and 0900 hours on 22 April when an agitated General speaking • from Marshal Grechko's apartment attempted to contact Colonel 9 S E C R E T -· • ·- ·----··---·· ·- - ·--·- · ··· ····-- -··-· ····•···- · · · · - - - - - SE C R ET ' Kotsyuba who was then acting for General Dibrova Berlin Commandant Unable to locate Kotsyuba the General alked to Colonel Pomozanovskii Chief of Staff of the Berlin Garrison stressing the urgency of his call Pomo anovskii promised to find Kotsyuba at once and get him to return the call The return call was not intercepted but there appears to be no doubt that Marshal Grechko had by this time been informed of the discovery and wished to discuss it with Colonel Kotsyuba A few telephone calls were attempted after this but the operators refused to place the calls and in one case a Karlshorst • operator said I wo n't put you through to anyone that's all I won't answer you any more Don't ring It's in the order Between 0700 and 0800 hours a number of additional Soviet officers arrived at the excavation including Colonel Gusev of the KGB Signals Regiment A Russian-speaking German was heard to remark that a commission was expectedy and a Soviet officer said that they would await the arrival of this commission before making a decision as to what the next step would beo In answer to a question as to whether anything should be disconnected the same officer stated that nothing should be done beyond making motion pictures of the chamber He added however that the hoie providing access to the chamber should be enlarged and a detailed inspection should be carried out • The general discussion continued and the possibility of some 10 SEC RET ------··- ·-········ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ --_ · -----------# __ _ ----- • ----- • ·- •--··• ·s - '' SE C R ET _ form of explosive booby trap in the chamber was discussed at some length There was widespread belief that the trap door which in fact provided access to the tunnel proper was a box or battery box possibly involving a booby trap One of the Soviet officers probably Zolochko suggested that after everything had been carefully noted and recorded a grappling iron could be attached to the box in order to tear it away If there is no explosion he said then we can calmly go ahead and deal with it Several individuals presumably German cable splicers • agreed that the cables were fully tapped and discussed the method employed They agreed that it must have been done in such a way as to render the tap undetectable by measurements although one of them failed to understand why the actual cutting of the cables was not detected He added that at that time everyone must have been quite drunk 11 The Germans con- tinued to speculate on the nature of the box and about the means of access to the tap chamber One of them said They themselves must have some means of entering this place but naturally itvs highly improbable that they have constructed a passage for getting from here to there tv Some of thos present apparently believed that the tap was an old one and had been abandoned due to recent faults • on the cable During this discussion the microphone was · 11 S E d·2 E T - ·-------····------··•·-' ··----- -- - -----··-- --------------· --- ------ - -----·------··----·-· · · • S E C R E T twice noted but was not recognized for what it was In the first instance the speaker said That is not a microphone and in the second it was described as a black ball The general discussion continued with speculation as to the nature of the battery box and with several comments that it should be possible to identify the tappers from the make of the materials and the techniques employed While the Ger- mans began work enlarging the hole around the tap chamber the Soviets discussed in some detail the order in which technical experts and administrative representatives would carry out • their inspection The Soviets identified the lead-off cable - as not ours indicating that after the inspection they planned to disconnect the lead-off cable and to check how far it goes from here - probably by means of electrical measurements It is evident that at this time approximately 1130 hours the Soviets and Germans were still unaware of the existence of the tunnel the means of access to the tap chamber or those responsible for the tap At approximately 1145 hours one of the German crew was heard to exclaim The box is an entry to a shaft' n From the tenor of the ensuing conversation it would seem that a small hole had been made near the still-intact trap door • The Germans debated the removal of the trap door but continued to work at and around it despite the alternate 12 · S E R E T ---- ---·-·--- -- ---· •·-··- -- - - -----------·---- -•- --o - - --•'- - • suggestion that we should open up the road opposite until we reach the cable or the shaft By approximately 1230 they had removed the hinges and entered the lower part of the tap chamber The padlock which secured the trap door from below was examined and was identified as of English origin Failing to open the door separating the tap chamber from the ' ' equipment chamber the Germans after appro imately twenty minutes broke a hole through the wall and gained visual access to the equipment chamber which they described as a long passage • By 1300 they evidently had enlarged the access Hole and described a completed installation - a telephone exchange An installation for listening in Abhoeranlag 11 Additional motion pictures ere made and frequent exclamations of wonder and admiration were heard At 1420 a Soviet Colonel probably Zolochko a person addressed as Nikolai Ivanovich probably Major Alpatov and a Captain presumably Bartash entered the chamber and discussed the method used by the tappe s in gaining access to the cables Zolochko evidently still believed that this was done Hfrom above 11 Conversations indicated that the joint Soviet-German commission mentioned earlier had already visited the site and established the nature of the installation without going into technical details • 13 • ' S E C' R E T Measurements of parts of th interior were then taken discussion Of the installation became general and the participants clearly indicated that the means of access and full implications of the operation were finally appreciated Conversations reflected that all present realized that the planning of the tunnel approach to the cables must have necessitated a very detailed study of relevant maps and plans The stress to which the roof of the chambers would be subjected and the necessity of preparing the lead-off cables beforehand were mentioned and a German was heard to exclaim It must have cost a pretty • penny A Russian-speaking German added admiringly How neatly and tidily they have done it It was decided that work on the tunnel must have been carried out during the day when the sound of the street traffic would drown any noise whereas the actual tapping was done during the night between one and two o'clock when the traffic on the cables is slight 11 One of the Germans rather indignantly exclaimed filthy tricko 91 What a And where you would least expect itolV -- to which another replied Unless one had seen it for oneself nobody would believe ito Between 1515 and 1530 hours the tap wires were cut and at about 1545 the attention of the Germans began to concentrate on the microphone itself • One of them assumed it to be an alarm device - probably a microphone to give warning of 14 • SE c ET approaching motor traffic ·and added that it ought to be photographed the microphone At 1550 hours work began on dismantling Shortly afterward the microphone went dead and after 11 months and 11 days the operational phase of PBJOINTLY was completed • • 15 _ S E C R E T • • • • SE c·R ET APPENDIX B RECAPITULATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE DERIVED Set forth below are a recapitulation of intelligence derived from the REGAL material and some typical consumer comments GENERAL The REGAL operation provided the United States and the • British with a unique source of current intelligence on the Soviet Orbit of a kind and quality which had not been available since 1948 Responsible U S and British officials con- sidered PBJOINTLY during its productive phase to·be the prime source of early warning concerning Soviet intentions in Europe if not world-wide Following are examples of items of intelligence for which REGAL was either a unique or most timely and reliable source POLITICAL Throughout the life of source 11 May 1955 - 22 April 1956 we were kept currently informed of Soviet intentions in Berlin REGAL provided the inside story of every incident • occurring in Berlin during the period - a story which was in s E C·R ET '· • - - --------------------- - - · - - S E CRE T each case considerably at variance with accounts of the same incident as reported by other sources REGAL showed that contrary to estimates by other sources the Soviets at that time did not intend to relinquish their prerogatives vis-avis the other three occupying powers despite continually increasing pressure from the East Germans to assert their sovereignty in East Berlin as well as in the rest of East Germanr REGAL provided a clear picture of the unpreparedness confusion and indecision among Soviet and East German officials whenever an incident occurred in East Berlin involving citizens of one • of the Western powers The Soviet decision to implement the establishment of an East German Army was disclosed by REGAL in October 1955 in time to notify our representatives at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva to that effect REGAL provided a detailed account of the Soviet program for implementation of the decisions of the 20th Party Congress including measures to suppress unrest among Soviet nuclear scientists resulting from a too-literal interpretation of the new theory of collective leadership and the denigration of Stalin The progress of Marshal Zhukov's attempt to curtail the influence of the political officer in the Soviet Armed Forces • which led to his subsequent downfall was traced in REGAL 2 - _ __ ·······' '-·'· I I - - - - - - - - - - · · · · - - - - - - · - - - · · · · · · · · · · - •• • --- ----- ------------------✓----- - · - • - · · · • • - - SEC aET material from the autumn of 1955 to mid-April 1956 REGAL provided considerable intelligence on the relationships between various key military and political figures of the Soviet hierarchy and on relations between the Poles and l ' the Soviet military forces stationed in Poland MILITARY General a Reorganization of the Soviet Ministry of Defense b • Soviet plans to implement the Warsaw Pact by increasing Soviet-Satell ite military coordination c Implementation of the publicly announced intention to reduce the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces d Identification of several thousand Soviet officer personnel Air a Development of an improved nuclear delivery capability in the Soviet Air Army in East G€rmany b Re-equipment of the Soviet Air Army in East Germany with new bombers and twin-jet interceptors having an airborne radar capability c • Doubling of the Soviet bomber strength in Poland and the appearance there of a new fighter division · 3 S E' C R E T - _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ • _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- · - · - - · · · · · · · · · - · · - - · ' · • SE C r - ET d Identification and location of approximately 100 Soviet Air Force installations in the USSR East Germany and Poland including a number of ey aircraft factories Ground Forces a Order of battle of Soviet ground forces within the USSR not previously identified or not located for several years by any other ource b Soviet training plans for the spring and early summer of 1956 in East Germany and Poland • c Identification 6f several thousand Soviet field ' post numbers used by G-2 to produce Soviet order of battle intelligence a Reduction in the status and personnel strength of the Soviet Naval Forces b Organization and administrative procedures of the Headquarters of the Soviet Baltic Fleet and Soviet Naval Bases on the Baltic Coast SCIENTIFIC Identification of several hundred personalities associ- ated with the Soviet Atomic Energy AE Program Association of certain locations in the USSR with AE • activities 4 S E'' G R E T _____________________________ __ _ • ······-·-----····' ··-··· · ·-· SEC'RET Organization and activities of Wismuth SDAG mining uranium in the Aue area of East Germany OPE tATIONAL Organization functions and procedures of the Soviet Intelligence Services in East Germany identification of several hundred Soviet Intelligenc personalities in East Germany and Moscow TYPICAL CONSUMER COMMENTS March 1956 • ACS I Army REGAL has provided unique and highly valuable current information on the order of battle training organization equipment and operations of the Soviet and East German Ground Forces In addition the scope and variety of the types of information found in REGAL have confirmed that it is our best source of early warning of Soviet attack ACSI Air - The numerous productions received from the REGAL project have been an extremely valuable contribution to the Intelligence Community fn our common problems 7 February 1958 CIA OSI - REGAL has provided valuable information • on atomic energy activities in East Germany including '· · S 5 0 i'C RE T ''- --------·- ·--· ----- -- - -- -------·--------------··------------· S E CRE T organizational relationships personalities procurement details and uranium 6re shipment data The number of hitherto unknown atomic energy localities personalities and activities disclosed in REGAL traffic is impressive CIA ORR - In referenced memorandum we indicated our great interest in financial material of all kinds which was available in REGAL material I I I • ' ' Thanks to your coopera' ' tion we are exploiting the material with great success I - • 'I I 6 s ' - E a ET - • ____ _ • ------------- ·•·- c·-·-· • 0 SE C R ET APPENDIX C TYPICAL AMERICAN PRESS COMMENT • •· ·• · •- ·-· • •'••· • ' • ' ' WASHINGTON POST l May 1956 • I Tho United Sblc3 Govc1·nmcul has not yel made any ofiicial reply to lhe Soviet and East German allegations and protc ls concerning the 300 yard tunnel thaL Amcric in inlallii cnta opcrativc5 am aid to have built underneath the border· between West and East Berlin or espionage purposes 'llcanwhile assuming tho story to be corrcct- 'e cannot help thinking the Communists have made a grievous mistake lo raise so much fuss about their discovery They arc even said lo have conducted special propaganda tours through the tunnel and to have exhibited the wiretapping an l other record• ini apparatus that the Americans are supposed lo have installed inside it The probable result o all this· has been to give the anti-Communist resistance in East Germ any a i ood deal of amusc 11ent and cncouragcmenl Cer• 1ainly it must have served to strengthen the •im• pression o American resourcefulness and thcrehy to rcsloro 5omo measuro o our preslige--which apparently had bcrn deteriorating since tho equivo•• cal attitude taken bv the American authorities in the East Ger-man upr isings n June 1054-among the captive population The reaction o their kinsmen in West Germany is probably a pret1y cood index to their own ln West Germany the story ha been accepted at ace value with astonishment and tlr lighl as an evidence that tho tradition or Yankee ras'ource• fulncss and ingenuity h not a myth after all Espionage is one game in which the Communists were deemed even Y their enemies to be par ticularJy expert and our own side to be dismally inept Very ew Germans as the Frankfurter Nwe Presse exultantly observed even suspected that the Americans were capable of so much cleverness and it would'be even more devaslatin to Communist prestige it it were disclosed that the espionage tunnel had been in opera Lion for 0111e time bcforo the Communists became aware o • I it Indeed i the tunnel episode turns out lo havs hr en the product o Yankco in enuily there is an inlcrcslin parallel in mr ri ' in history Durin 1he siege or Pclcrsburi in lfiG4 an 'cnlr rprisini Union officer from the Pennsylvania coal fields conceived the idea of mining the Confederate positions from a tunnel under them 'l'he tunnel was dug and the mines were finally set off and though the operation was a fiasco in part becauso · o the failure o Union commanders lo excrulA orders the boldness or U1c itrol e has compelled admiration ever ince ' • · · ' · • · · · · • ·· ·- - - ' •• · _• _ · t ·· · • • • t•· • TIME MAGAZINE 7 May 1956 A Lot of Money Trucklo ids of Red army troops and squad cars crowded with l'olk poli ri 1011d hy '-lnhill' gt•nerat11rs i Wl'rc hum1ni11g 111 pn Yid · li hl i11r tilt' Wonderful Tunnel ·J 11 ·c 1 inn and at the ·11tr 111 · · 1 1 a h 1 · J crlin i1y of r111 i lc rcfui cc rnd 1h1g in tlw n111ml a - l 11u·l i the l 11 orr i i n tl p iti 111 i lilttr is 111 1 lircd 1-i 1n sigual Hp ras on h uul tP · 11l ii11 il l itchc ck dream oi sublcrf111sc nd suspi• all Ten IL-ct hd w its ·n1r 11ll· · 1 h k 111 cinn In hack stn'els darkly nwslcrious· in the roof by the Rus ians la ' the 1u 1nl·l hnu cs lu k hchincl hir h wire ic ccs sui itscli a cast-iron luhc abo Ul six itct J l'St · l l 1rk ·r rnd n11irc mvstcrious ThG Big Ccllor For many a month in diamclcr 11Hl 500-600 y rtls Ion the supcr-sccl'ccy surroundins the con lnin s l 'ithin ' 1·ws1nc11 r ·l't'llth couPt d cra111metl with ckrtrnnic cq11ipmcn1 r i st ruc tio11 and operation of Rudow·s radar · 7 sep ir tl ai cnocs uf 'c lc 11 inlc u hil's tapt' rnorrlcrs vc111ila1ing app 1rnt1i stat ion haJ fed the r o sip of ho red mcrgcnce known to be at work in Berlin and pumps of hoth llrilbh 111d mcriran irnns in the occupied city There were make At lhc East n 11 111 · HI c l lr -cl tho e who remembered a civilion engineer out or 1hc 111 in lrnck of the tu111wl 111 a hrir ·rativrs-somc foshionably h rcd to supervise the job he Jwd quit in cp 1ratc c hamhcr wh nc they were linJ r·rl d 11h l 111 inc grey Jbn wl oi ·w 'ork's' d1 f 'USt because the blueprints seemed so to two Easl t•rn1an rnl lcs and a third lad1 11 11 n·nu · some wil h armpit hol i nny Why build a cellar big enough to used hy tlic Ku sians 'hat ll'as at the st_l r 111i1 111 11Hkr lilue crg ·-rcpnrt to tlrivc through with a dump truck O he American t'nd- The ncll' rncn were not ' d111 ·rcn1 _lw 1d uan •rs and an·ly know a ked uid 11·as lold to mind his own busipennittecl to know As Lhry crawled wt· t· irh it thc r rnlk 1 ues arc up to ness Others recalled sccini friends whom w ird 1 a11tlh 1g liarri ·r harn·d th 11· 1 · _In di 1 nlin there is no 1 t better they knew to l c engineers suddenly apii puq1 is1 ' ·m1•hasi1 l'll · a ign r ·adi1 g 111 rl 1 1hi lli1d11·111k schrnw of thir gs pcarmi al the station ll't' irini the in ignia i in Engli h antl t'rm m '1111 art' 1ww th 111 rn ll s_cmi-d1 s1·r1cd 1rncr k1J1 w11 the li S nny Signal Corps 'hy 11 l'nlni11g lhe i nll'ri ·an • for 'l il_u L s sHlc s R11dm1· ind i11 the oi a_mused shrui was the only answer llCS• This tunnl'l aid tht' Russian expert J us 1 111 7 onc just oi-cr the i·a ' as Altt1oners C 'cr got-hut last week the Rus• l cnlt'kc Sclf-import rnt du rks and ·ith a note oi arlmir 1lion wa built to ians thou ht lhey had found a better one last year The party rcspo11 ii lc must r 11_rkl'ns st rut like rnmmi -ars in lt· One 1 i ht 1t 7 o'clock an angry ha ·c h 1d 1 Int of n111111•y l l 1cn_1 ·kt• S _ · 1lihll'd SI n· ·t llt-rli11 only hunky Sunct culum l uamctl ll'an KuL i '110 was n· ponsil I · uliody ncil her 1 Hk111g 11·111 l111rll tllrns lazih· in the ub i c 1llcd a press conference in East Ber• ' hr 't'Zl' llt' 1r hy ind rln «i lo till houn1brv lhc l't·nlai on the itat · lkp 1rlmrnl n11r l'p iraling_ East and 'est stand a U S I lhe Central lntcllii cn c Agenry was sJyr dar tat 11111 hs·11 ling its n·lintlar car to · Jin Purpose to protest the building by· mg But as Berlin's· pap ·r erupt eel µkc Anwric m organizations o a ' 'Crct hl' p ·r i in1_is 11 East lkrlin's hu y fully ll'ith the nCll'S one lkrlin 'rlitor told tunnel unck·r East l·rnun·lcrrilon· ll'ilh rh m ·tcld Airport Tll'o rin s oi barbed a r i11ki111 U S off1rial I don't know I he rimi11al i11tcnl of spying •· o'iicrctl a wm guanl lhl lonely radar post and whether your people tlui that wimclcrful chance lo sec for thcm el ·cs the 'cstern tunnel or not hut whol' 'l'r it was kt me newsmen wrre taken to a site some 500 i ay I think it was too bad iL was found h hind them a detachment o unifonned fards from the radar station at Rudow - It's the best publicity the U S has had in S1gn I Corps men liv a life a secret · Berlin for a long time '' and isolated a monks · ' - v BERLIN 0 i • 0 I · ' • C-3 _- • -H•• • •• • ·'·' · '· •• V 4195S j ' '1 jOo ' · - ' · ·· l ' · • tf _- · ' · · ' r · _ - • • ·1 - i ' · ' i · ' • l ' - ' I ·' l Oo- I i· l iS53 I-lope lt is· Tru - · Soviet· charges that American intelligence agents dui a tunnel in Berlin tapped a telephone cable and Irecorded convcrsations·ovcr the Red communication net•' work which the Reds made vith considcrabJe fanfate 'and during a conducted tour of the spy tunnel_ for cor i j respondents gives us some faint hope ' Frankly 'C d dn't'l nmv that American intclligcnc9 agents were that smart In· fact we were beginni_ng td j think that wh3 w l f _t ' l 'l U l 1 9 AFSP f r ' c c d cf 1 v rsa---rew-Tessons on the fundamentals of csp1onag · • · • _ - ···· - · - · ·0111·• om' c f c __1lt1_ i_a_1 · Snt · Bttti ' 19 ' W-G take it all back If the Soviet charges arc Gue American intel- 1Hf i c agcntsJ1ayc 'ii ctua ly collcctccl - 9ffi rn vm ¼mt1 ' 1 mn lon c riccrning S 9vkt m U a r_x_ o_p_ tJ£ ns and mstallat1ons i l i sLG tIDc rJ Y · · ·· · · r· We· fi9pe that American intelligence agents have infiltrated the· Soviet department of foreign affairs i iPlanted western ·sympathizers in the heart of the Soviet 1 bureaucracy and started a stream o microfilmed copi s of important Sovict 9 Wh C1 - G_I-A olf Washi1 fil Q U• · 1 t hope all this because that is precisely wha_t the Soviet spy network 'did and is probably doing right no ' the United States This is not just tit for tat-but a lm • -·· '· k iecessity-in_'t _ orld pow ir _ llt s • _ 01h01 P• o ' ' ' l d t P Je f • i ·· Front P•c• 0 8 Y 1· ' ·· I ' 267 372 196 496 Circ I· 1 I i • c-4 ---·- ·-···•-- ----------------- ------·--· -------- - - 1· STAMFOt D conn ADVOCAT· • Circ c ··o r ' ' I• · i' - ' i I · I 1 I' 1·· •' ' i · · • •• • I 1 ' - Ec' t Pit • If r ·1 Da t o I Front Pt1g• ' i 1n a 23 166 0th•• Pio• 1 1s 15 t J ---- i loncy Well Spent r- r 1 There ls only one o gcncy ln Y h l lngto11 which docs not account--foi· tl'iaj 1 money it spends The ntral Inte111 -l gcnce Agency headed 1fy 11cn--w Dulles has never reported to Con1 grcss A special committee appointed 1 by the President did make · n survey o the o gcncy's o ctivitlcs and was ap parcntly so t sf1cd that it was efficient so sc · ' · re the activities o this· group that even the amount · o · money it· spends is unkno 'ffi Ac countants have estimated niat there is roughly $2 ·-billion ln budgets o other cpartments which ls diverted to the CIA ' Naturally enough Congress worrlcs ' from time to· time that this money may not be well spent La st week some news came out o Berlin which should · calm such fears The Russians dLscovercd that their i three main telephone cables- from - East Berlin to points cast were tapped A tunnel from the western zone con · · · nccted wlth the tapped lines arid · · wires led to sandbags nt the z'one boundary The Russians were greatly ' disturbed They claim thr t nil mes- · sages for several years ha vc peen intercepted They blame this violatton of privacy on American Intelligence Our officials h w'c expressed horror · - at the charge They liaven't ·thcy say ' ·the slightest idea 'o where the lines lead or by whom they were laid The Russians arc just old meanies to claim' we wire-tapped ' West Berliners are lo ugh ng Good to·r American Intelligence they say · They hope and so do we that the Russians have only discovered one of · several taps At least the expose l shows that some ot the money spent by IA 1 1 J Y · ve be n vecy w ll spent I 1r dec b J · · · _ - _· ·' · · · i I •' • ' • ' _ c 5 --- --·- _______ _ ----- • CIA MAY HAVE ORDrnED WIRETAP TUNNEL - DREIER Alex Dreier at 6 00 P H over WMAQ Chica go and the NOO Ro dio Network 11 And now under tho heading special report part one --1 tG-rea 1- £ -i-tai n-w i th-1 t r--i'rog m an-spy-wh·o---turM d -but' ·- to b o-· not ·-SO-SllC C§_S _O fu L in-hi-s-scCT tivoness-ha s no thing_ on-us We have a tunnel we dug under the communist sector of Berlin and which the reds ex-posed to he light of day as you probably know a short while ago Well our NBC corro spondent good friend and colleague Frank Bu rkholzor has i·nvestigated the story of the wiretap tunnel and he says there s just one conclusion -- it's ours We du_g it we equipped it with electronic equipment to listen in on comnru nist East Germ an conversations for a whole year before they found us out C -o·· 11 Presumably we should be embarrassed but nobody in Berlin is In fact there is a hint of American and West German pride in know-ing that we pulled off an espionage trick on the Reds for a change• Of course the East GerJlVlns are making a good thing of it by con-· ducting tours through the tunnel to impress theil people with the dastardliness of the American spies but that may back fire on them because the East Germans are not beyond getting a quiet chuckle at this outwitting of their communist ruler sG Burkholzcr tells us that the United States is stampod all over the lis ening post tunnel Now the tunnel is on the outskirts of town with our end being located under a so-called experimental radar station beside a garbage dump It runs straight under a plowed field that has whit e border marking posts above it The Russiaris have made three openings for the tourists One is near the wiretap 1 another at o point about 150 yards out in the field When an -one asks an American why there isn 1 t any radar at the experimental radar station the usual answer according to Burkholzer is we said it was experimental didn't w_e Want to make something of it 11 11 · 6- Naturally tho army and the government in Washington aren't going to admit anything unleGs they have to No one tells who ordered the eavesdropping tunnel built or who paid for it or who did the listening and the digging Perhaps it was the work of a local Berlin outfit just a curious bunch of boys Or perhaps it was done secretly on orders direct from the Pentagon or the CENTRAL I 1TELLIGENCE AGENCY Anyway it was done well because it wasn't discovered for a year and now the Russians may be wonderine how much we learned from recording all the phone talks possibly includin everything that went through the switchboard of the nearby Soviet air field So th anks for the information - Frank Burkholzer and now we have a question for you Why don 1·t we open a tourist entrance a tour end of the tunnel and cash in on the publicity Step up one and all Only a quarte r See modern espionage in electronic form and all underground and who know Por po you Will meet o n occasional coranumiot touri t u - · 1A Y 7 ·rnsB · -· N W YORI ITE 'U LD TRIBUNTI ------------- ---·- • §ee·i '1I L § Winve Tap 1 nn rrneli' l ' · ii i nr Gaston Coblcr l i' I • · · I 1 · 'i · f ' I · i i ' ' ' I-' ' • i • i ' - _ '• t ' 0 If I i· ·_ i'• 1· ' ' I • 1 •' • 1- • · •'• t-i llltlbai ' narrlcade ''We l1nve no fault whntsocvcr 195G N Y 1 crald Trilmnc Irie J to fmq with he technique one r • 'DEIH IN Mny ZG -Onc of tt iHl nt snid ' the r rcatcst slr llt s o the cold ' 1 ron the cn tcrn cntrnnc n wni• ls the ''An crican spy tun- vtsito1' can walk we tward for llcl now on cxhil itior ln East nrrhnps 190 ynrds pnst the point ·l3cr'li whci·o th tunnal l'OMcn undur ' · the sccco1· border Then ·a sandThe 500-ynrd tunnel rcprc- b barricade ls encountered scn_ts n venture or cxtr iordmar1' n n voice cnlls out halt · 1Z- nua_acity-tho stufl' or which Gcrmnn · thnllcr films nre made Jt t It is clear thnt I the visitor ·ns duG' by Amcncan Intclh- could continue wcstwnrd past r rncc fo1 crs-and thnt ls the ile barricade he would cmen c m ral nssumpt1on-1t 1s _a oon nt n Jow but prominent· 1•m rn1 xu1 ple or tnrir An rrican buildlni - with rnctnr capac1tyfo1 dn1mgundertakmgs rinipinent on the rno Thei Seldom hns an intelligencrr ·1 · • -- t or rniiation cxecutect· n mere b ll llllg Is urroundcd l y barbed ·skillful and di icnlt operation I ire _und i uar ed constantly by ______ --·--· _ ·- __ _ thnn that accomplished by the Ame11cnn soldiers S13ns ln GerComplex Equipment man warn Entry most stnctll -t nncl s diggers the tappmr of forbidden Beyond the door ls a comp n_rt2o l Communist loni -d1stnnc c A study or the nre • sug l'rsti mcnt seven feet long- hou_5m telephone lmes 1unninr - unctc1• no pos 5 ib1lity other th ti I equipment to nrnlnt nm c1tnin i round In Dcrlin The llncs ap- the radar building encl s t e levels or temperature nnd hu- 1 ' ai·cntly mclud_cd some rur mng west cm end or tile tunnel ml_dlty _ ·The Commumsts saY 1 to Soviet atclhte state Jn Enst• j · this was necessary to protect I · cm Europe as well as Soviet J Clay Ilaulccl Away delicate equipment in the other- 1 rmy circuits in Germany l The men who dug the tunnel wls da'i1k und co_ld tunnel · • J - • l in ·cl ii_ T'i - · · ·- · - · o'bviously Jnborcct under two FmallY there 1s the complex' ar irncs ' major handicaps They had to tapping equipment 1111 of Amerl- J I The tunnel discovrrcd by tile '1 '0rl very silently to nvoid-de- can or British mnnuracturc Cc mmumst s i month ur o and tcction and they had to haul Thl includes cir ht rncks o now the main sightsrcinr at- ·away ccrctly the thousands of boosters to carry the tapped contraction in Berlin can be visited tons of clay they dui out since vcrsation back to the western by making n twrntY-minute l ir pil s of rnrth near the scctorlcnd or the tunnel and also to dril'C from the center or Berlin borcler would llRve alerted the hclp prevent detection of the ' to the· southeast comer ot tile Communist ltaps • ·city Apparently the excavated There are three power-control A mobile snnck bar ls doinr carth was hauled a 'C Y in closed 'imit s near two lonr racks of i thrivin·x business ·near the• trucks brour ht lnto tne radnr rc ulpmcnt lnto which the 250 · 1eastcrn end of t he -tunnel cater ·Pmildinr Possibly the same Communist lines lend from '1ini to East German factory ' 1 1 lcks bour ht in the - cctlons o threo main cnblcs Hci'c the ln ctcl i fltions bi·our ht to sec the _orru atcd iron tubinll' which divldual · monlt orlnr t11µs urc · ' work of 'American Jnperialists •P 111 c the tunn 'l TllP utmost mndc · Along the ·opposite wnll 1 After lnspcctin the tunnel isccrccy 1111st llavr brcn u cd to of the tunnel is n row of benches ftl1c factory workers record thcir avoid st1 rnni up local talk w_ith ucrcsccnt lir hting over1''indignntion'' in a visitors' book The Communists rstlnote that head ·111e compartment ls The book contnins tlii _ signn-lthls part or the work took sev- palntccl il battleship gray turrs of foreigners on both sides crnl mon tlis Consi lcrrcl Great Ex11crh of the Iron curtnin Ev'cn a I With the tunnel completed S11rlnncse officinl is li st cd '· lthrre came the job of installing At the ri _ end or the ra tcrn r • The tupncl s·ix · feet 1 ct·i the monitorlnr · 'Qulpmrnt Ip-· compnrLn ' f'llt there is anot rr n'mrtrr and with its roor tw 'lvrl pnrently this hnd to be done steel doc • On the rnstern _ de 1 feet below lhe surface wns dug-I b 'fore the Communist lines or It b oni m wr __ 11p0 L_ U1t t ·ll from i point 200 yards iflsidc co11ld br tnppcd hecnusc pnrt of _nn ultr i s n 5 tti ' the Amrricnn sector or Vestl this equipment had the primnri'which w u de 1 v mlcroJJhonc Berlin 1t runs cnstward to a tn k of prevr ntinr detcclion of octivity by th rnvcc reported any I 1the phone taps · • · • Th m r''t e ommunlst nt point 300 yards inside the Rus-1 · ·• _c ass O • he point where their line slan 6er tor The western rn- equipment wa 1 pamstakln IY'tapped An t· ·t h s Cre1 d tl ir o ui h th e t unne1 have ' · Y nc 1v1 Y t ere would' trnncc lies In o sparsely-popu- ldra'g- c meant th t th t i latrd locality called nu low J nlonc- two wooden rails nnd ber n discovcre e unne 1 ho_d' 1 Only the cn tcrn end of the houscd in a special nlncty foot-1· The mr n w · 1 tlmnel Is open for visitors A lonr compartmr nt at the cnstcrn tnPplnrr ust o dldb the nctunl l detachment · or Communist end of the tunnel lthc r ave cen nmong Pcople·s Pollcc and o communl- This compartment be1 lns with' Thr c pcrts ln the tlelcj cations cxpc1·t are on hand to o thlck steel door nt its westcrn lJicce or ork remnrkubly tl Y • explain every detnll They readily'entrance On the door-one· The w • t · ' 1 express their admiration or the the· tunnel's nicest touches-I stallntl 0Commun S s say the lr •' ' 6kill ot th project• builder written ln _Russian and Ger t apparently opcrat d I · - --- ---- •· -- man '' Entry orblddcn by ordei·· or seveial months before t WI Sf of the Commanding Gcncrol 'tllscovered Thero is no cxpl j • · • • ___ --- • 1tlon or how it wns detected ' l 1 1 D J Wireless to the l cralclTrib mc · ® 1 0'' l I CO ol - •_ - rd ____•··- ·- --· -- ' l I• • ' 1 I 0 · - · I 1 I r H l flil Pi nf U H • • Co 1· t ' skc i 'Th' k y type huildinbs Our answer in halting Ger- 1 Ul u ll _ fir ri ij n Ll a tU ULll 1 1 n R Lu al01 i • I e t tac f Po t t ofminatcd 'a'·swilchbo rd banks current boosters amp Ii• ·• 1 ' dg_was used for wire tap• f rs ai i_d c bles_ • l AU instruc• 1 Since then the spy tunne1 'f• ions on the cq ipmcnt wei c- so labeled by the nussians and in English _ Some items bore ast Gcr 1ans has been yis the labels of British or Ameri-1 i 11 ed by more than 15 000 East can manufactureres • lG rman wo kcr qJcgatioos Tieds l Ian Guns •· the ommun sts sa_1d Pm nps sent hot nd cold - erman_s A_dm1re Feat water to an air conditioning S_1tuated m me with an ex- U lt Other long J ipes held -pen mental Americ an army I oil or air The tunnel was' radar station the Russians m dc of bolted sections of cor- 1 say it is a dummy owner• runated steel lined on the ship of the tunnel· has · not _sides with sandbags been officially admitted by · Walking back- JOO yards we i hc_ American command here rcacllc the cast-west border I or m Washmgton · There• behind sandbags two ---- West Berliners are con- you_ng Vopos crouched with ' ' vmced · the Limc ·icans built their guns· and a powerful' _the tunnel cquiP1icct it with· searchlight aimed up the tun•'· ' xpensivc apparatus and then· nel under the American· sec--' 'listened in on Tied army tel•i tor ·· i · cphonc conversations slnc·el Outside again ·the ' com ' the summer of 1051 • - · I mande r- asked us yhat would' To them it was an astound-I be the reaction in the United ing feat whioh_ ··has grcatlyJ Slat s if the Canadians or Mex enhanced American prestige 1cans i ove ·-such a spy The boldness o_f burrowing tunnel_ under our borders under the Russian noses and We s 1d the Americans would _its _'technical accomplish nent b e_t u ha py ' ' about it have captured the imaginatldn ' l_s_ it right pr wrong for of many Germans · A cricans to do this urider· - --' ' No one expected sight o •• _ - •• ______ l the tunnel War• today vhen _ ______ i ' •-· ' 1 Wa chc l by Yanks man cxplaineil that ownerAmerican soldiers in' sentry I hip of the tunn l has no i EJl I nIi boxes watched U5 thru field been cstahlished but that in · ·· ----'--r lasscs as we sauntered to• a time of ••tension th · ht •- ward the clearly marked com• ' c rig LJ t munist border down a dirt ncss or wronbness depended road bordering an open ficl f upon th side of· the fence -I E · B ·We could sec knots of Vopo's from which the operation was OUr Crle OrC ' nround mounds 0£ earth cxca- viewed B Y JOHN ·' · • • vatcd to reveal two sections of He showed us a book in _ H TIIO ilPSO o J the tunnel · wl1ich tunnel· visitors wei-e1ch1e - rltiunt rr Sctvlcr1 · · k d · · · DE LlN i1ay 28 _ rf · ·ec' Across the rder Vopos ' _-e ' rnsc9b_c the_1r opin- Amcncan · n cw Gm en_ todJy' tock us fo their commander L o1 s a s rt111 _ t hcl s lla stood 20 fcct underground in i past men and women waiting r u c -- · _Cllll1C$C horcans the alleged American spy o tour the tun11cl after watch• British Arne ncans and oth• • tunnel burrowed JOO y -rds J g _a communist movie o its crs - nd asr ed us to sign under Berlin's little Jron Cur-J discovery The commander Jt s• to keep the record· t in ind peered into the _cxn_mined o u r passports straight in case the East G r loom o the Americal sector I s1 11lcd 'an led us down a· mans attempt to use 04r · · over the shoulcicrs or two fhr ht of d rt stairs into t hc stilem nts for prop g_anda··•· l German communist tommy tunnel w tc m 11 Y hand 'ntrng · 1 gunners · - Encased 1_n steel and con- 1 We w _sh · to thank the Our host in as eerie a set- cretc was the alleged-wire tap vo kspo_ ze1 very much tor Uini as ·was ever devised by a laboratory directly under a· being kind enough to show'' us mystery- writer was a jack paved road lca i g ram Ber- lhe tunnel ·· · booted officer of the East Jin to the Ru s1an ur base at ' German communist policc the Schoenfeld_ The commander · - Vopos or Volkspolizci who declined to · give his· _' _Our tour was the third per- ame _ said that 2is telephone - m1tted western reporters since lines m three big cables were · the night of l pril 2i when tapped · · 1 1 he Russian high _ command · FluQicsccnt lightinL illu- ' the bord_crs of 1ie German cp1ef dcmocral1c r c pub Ii c he A SO· A r---- •·· _______ _________ rnfo' ti 'ivcn' out to ti1c' radar · ite-- -·- ·--- -- - - -·----- fa - - r n n- Let 3 S R • · Gp Or er i· i FD IL 0 •n 1 ·---· - ---·--··· ·Hl u0 ldN OUf 1 y nobcrl T_uckm an · • · c1 ilccl Press · butcau l ··' ' 'I I j 1 - 9 i a I Chicago Tri rune r- • A ·· - May 55 • • • - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - c -· ' ' - - - ___ - - - - - - - - - - • SECRET APPENDIX D NOTE This analysis was prepared by the PBJOINTLY staff as part of the wrap-up of the operation ROUND-UP OF EAST GERMAN PRESS REACTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE WIRETAP TUNNEL AT THE BERLIN SECTOR BORDER Sources as Indicated The following is an analysis of the East German press reaction to the discovery of the wiretap tunnel at the sector •· border between West and East Berlin During the per od under review - 24 to 26 April 1956 - a total of 31 dailies per day and four weeklies were available for scrutiny however only the dailies reported and commented on the incident Mostly concerned with reporting and commenting on the incident were the East Berlin papers which in some instances devoted full pages of their local sections to reports and pic tures on the tunnel in addition to their front-page or secondpage accounts of developments The provincial press gave front- ·page treatment to the matter only in few instances generally refrained from large articles or commentaries and often carried pictorial material with only brief explanations least coverage was noted in the provincial press of other • SECRET The • SEC RE T than SED Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands Communist Party Germany affiliation none of these papers published any commentary or any cartoon of their own on the subject up to 26 April in fact Describing the tunnel as inspected by the journalists after the Soviet press conference the papers pointed out that the installation was well designed and constructed tha t the installation was costly and equivalent to a modern tele phone exchange and that the materia - of British and American origin - used in the installation was of such quality as •· to guarantee long service The East Berlin papers which were leading in the reports on the issue treated the matter as a bitterly serious incident which represents an international scandal and a breach of the norms of international law The papers in their commentaries addressed the West Berlin Senat demanding an all-Berlin understanding and stressing the necessity for united action and insinuated that Berlin is being kept divided merely for the purpose of providing the espionage centers in West Berlin with a base for launching provocations against the GDR Other commentaries by central and provincial papers contained calls for vigilance and for defense preparedness • Only one paper printed an editorial on the incident In commenting on the incident the press did not draw a line 2 ¾ S E'C RE T • S E t R' _ E T between the different developments such as the press confer' ence the Soviet protest the GDR Government protest etc but as a rule the commentaries dealt with the incident as a whole Later when the first reaction of the West Berlin press was available the central press swooped down upon the West Berlin press for attempting to belittle the incident and to divert attention from the seriousness of the matter The few caricatures published by the papers were designed to slander the Americans Day by D y Reaction • 24 April 1956 On 24 April 1956 six East Berlin papers printed the ADN Allegemeines Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau - General German News Office release of individual reports on the Soviet press conference eported on the inspection of the tunnel by the journalists and carried excerpts from General zarenko's letter of protest 1 - 6 0 DER MORGEN and BERLINER ZEITUNG 5 and 6 printed only the abbreviated version of the ADN release Six provincial SED papers 7 - 12 carried announcements of the discovery brief reports on the pr ss conference and merely an announcement to the effect that a letter of prot st has been sent to the American Chief of Staff Only NEUER TAG Frankfurt Oder printed the long version of the ADN release 12 • 3 ' - · S E''•C R E T • Provincial papers of other party affiliations carried no reports 25 April 1956 On 25 April 22 provincial papers came out with the ADN version of the report on the discovery of the tunnel 13 - 34 the six provincial SED papers which had carried a brief announcement the day before followed up their reports by more extens ve accounts of the press conference the letter of protest and the inspection of the tunnel 13 - 18 Papers of other party affiliations joined in the reporting campaign on this day •· Only MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME of all provincial papers published an eye-witness report containing a description of the tunnel and quoting individuals who had voiced their outrage at such a thing which produces new material for conflicts in foreign' policy 16 SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG which printed the long version of the ADN release reproduced the first picture of the tunnel 22 Mean hile the central press in addition to supplementary ' reports on th discovery of the tunpel descriptions of the tunnel and pictorial material showing sections of the tunnel such as the amplifier station etc came out with the first commentaries day • A total of five commentaries appeared on this The press treated the matter as a bitterly serious affair which represents an international scandal and a 4 S ' E C' R E T • breach of the norms of international law pointing out that the United States violated the Buenos Aires Treaty on Telecom munications on the one hand and the GDR's sovereignty on the other hand 35 - 39 N UES DEUTSCHLAND spoke of a new hitherto unsurpassed gangster act of the U S secret service 35 NATIONAL ZEITUNG termed the incident as a sensational international scandal'' 36 NEUE ZEIT stressed that there 1$ no word strong enough to brand such wickedness 38 and JUNGE WELT declared that this had to happen just to those who always babble about Commun ist infiltration but can never •· prove it 39 All commentaries were addressed to the West Berlin Senat demanding an all-Berlin understanding for the purpose of discontinuing the stubborn adherence to NATO policy achieving the withdrawal of the cold war experts of all shades dissolving the espionage centers in the frontier city and achieving a normalization in the situation in Berlin Three papers reported on a meeting held by the National Front at Alt-Glienicke at which the population adopted a resolution protesting against this provocation ' Franz Fischer First Secretary of the Kreis Treptow SED Executive Board was reported to have said at the meeting that the people of West Germany and West Berlin have to pay for this installation through the occupation cost and to have termed • the tunnel as nan appendix of the cold war 38 40 and 41 • SE C R ET TRIBUENE moreover referred to a report by the HAMBURGER ANZEIGER to underscore the fact that the installations in the tunnel were not of provisional nature but designed for long service 40 DER MORGEN describing the tunnel added that West German correspondents who inspected the tunnel noted with satisfaction the declaration of the Soviet Lieutenant Colonel that quite obviously German quarters have no part in this while NATIONAL ZEITUNG briefly referred to an announce- 41 ment made at the Alt-Glienicke meeting to the effect that the tunnel was open for public inspection 36 NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reproduced the first caricature on the issue - The cartoon showed a g rden which is divided into two parts by a sign indicating the Democratic Sector - full of flowers and the opposite side - a barren piece of land with a molehill topped by a flag ith the dollar ign · A strong arm is pulling out of a hole in the Democratic Sector a mole wearing U s n-marked earphones some sort·of Army trousers with plugs and pliers showing from the pocket and a U S Army cap bearing the legend Espionage The cartoon is captioned Do Not Burrow in Other People's Yards 35 26 April 1956 On 26 April 27 papers continued reporting on the issue 42 - 68 • In 17 instances the reports were supplemented with pictures as outlined above A total of 15 papers 6 ' · S E'C RE T --------- ------· ·-·- --·- • --- ···-·· · S E c''R E T printed the text of or lar e excerpts from the press release on the GDR Government protest 42 - 56 Six papers reported on the inspect·ion of the tunnel by the population the press and representatives of the diplomatic corps 42 49 59 60 ·65 and 67 Four papers referred to a report carried by the ' West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL according to which Western journalists were prohibited from inspecting the mouth of the tunn l on the Western side 42 43 51 and 58 and four papers referred to FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE which had spoken of an eloquent silence about the affair on the part of the Americans 42 51 •· 55 and 58 A total of four papers reported on the Alt- Glienicke meeting Si · 60 61 and 67 NEUES DEUTSCHLAND gave excerpts from Fisher's speech quoting him to the effect that the people of West Berlin in particular the SPD members will be invited to inspect the tunnel 51 Three papers re- produced caricatures 51 52 and 56 six papers carried 0 commentaries 51 52 53 54 57 and 58 and one paper came out with an editorial 55 Three East Berlin papers through their commentaries swooped down upon the West Berlin press for its attitude toward the incident NEUES DEUTSCHLAND accused the West Berlin papers of attempting to belittle the incident and of lauding the efficiency ·of the American goblins adding that the West Berlin press is thus making vain attempts to divert attention from the seriousness of the matter 51 7 s E C R E T • S E C'-R E T JUNGE WELT lashed out at the West Berlin DER TAG saying that by its opinion the West Berlin paper manifests its total loss of any sense of decency Besides DER TAG is not in the least disturbed about the violation lso of West Berlin's territory 52 NATIONAL ZEITUNG held that DER TAG now admitted what it has been denying at all times namely that West Berlin is a de facto part of NATO adding that DER TAG now regards as customary the military espionage of the United States on GDR territory in addition to the customary frontier-city policy the customary partition and the customary • diversionist activities of the KGU and other underworld organizations The paper stressed that all Berlineri fully agree with the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE which said that the people must demand the discontinuation of such things 58 NEUE ZEIT carrying the only editorial said that the wiretapping post is a feature of West Berlin's misuse as a NATO base The paper emphasized that GDR policy will continue to serve all-German understanding and relaxation of international tensions But it must be kept in mind that the success of this policy will not only depend on the volume of the appeal for peace but also oti our preparedness to defend our homeland as we11 as on our vigilance regarding the prevention of dan- gers resulting from the fact that one part of Berlin has be- • come a frontier city against peace n the paper added 8 SE RET What ---· -----------_ - _ _ ____ _ ___ •' • __________________ 'SECRET we need are contact points above the ground and in full 1 ight namely all German t'al'ks and not underground trenches in the cold war 55 The first commentaries arried by provincial papers dealt with the incident as an example of proof for East German press reports on hostile espionage VOLKSSTIMME Karl-Marx-Stadt pointed out that the tunnel 'represents a document which is quite apt to dispel all doubts of those who have hitherto bee n inclined to regard East German press reports about the underground activities f W stern espionage services as • exaggerated 57 MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME quoted 'several workers who voiced their iri dignation over such a vileness which makes German unity more difficult to demonstrate that the Western side is just as 'quiet abo ut 'this 'nunpleasant affairvr as the population i outraged 53 And LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG stressed that anyone reading about the discovery of the tunnel will inevitably weigh the Soviet attempts at maintaining peace against the efforts made by the U S espionage service adding that this breach of international law 11 also places the West Berlin administration -in a peculiar light The paper reminded its readers that war preparation which 'tformerly marched on Prussian Army boots 11 is now marching on American rubber soles chewing gum and tapping • telephone lines 54 __ _ --- -•-- •-•¥-- l • - • i• «flA _ _ _ '••-••-•• • t-1•- _ _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ • SEC RET NEUES DEUTSCHLAND's caricature showed an American soldier trying in vain to milk a disconnected oversized telephone receiver into a bucket marked CIC while another ·soldier is thoughtfully standing by 51 JUNGE WELT reproduced a car- toon showing a mole wearing a U S Army cap on its head and a telephone receiver on its back halting before a sign which warns that uspies are now facing danger The cartoon is captioned The Underworld that Shuns the Light and footnoted Damned we did not put up that signn 52 WORT showed rats wearing • FREIES U S Army caps being disturbed by a Russian soldier in the operation of what loOks like a communication center Two rats are shown facing the soldier in surprise another standing with arms raised and still another escaping through an opening in the wall The caricature is entitled Unpleasant Surprise u and footnoted It is an Effrontery of the Russia s to Disturb Us in Our Burrowing Work 56 • 10 SECRET - ------------- -- ----·------------- ' • -- ·--·-···· ' '- s E C'R ET SOURCES 1956 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 •· 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 • NEUES DEUTSCHLAND NEUE ZEIT TRlBUENE NATIONAL ZEITUNG DER MORGEN BERLINER ZEITUNG FREIHEIT SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG VOLKSSTIMME Karl-Marx-Stadt MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG NEUER TAG FREIHEIT SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG VOLKSSTIMME Karl-Marx-Stadt MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME LEIPZtGER VOLKSZEITUNG NEUER TAG LAUSITZER RUNDSCHAU VOLKSSTIMME Magdeburg DAS VOLK Erfurt SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG FREIE ERDE OSTSEE ZEITUNG VOLKSWACHT FREIES WORT SAECHSICHES TAGEBLATT DIE UNION NORDDEUTSCHE NEUESTE NACHRICHTEN MAERKISCHE UNION BRANDENBURGISCHE NEUESTE NABBR BAUERN ECHO DER NEUE WEG LIBERAL DEMOKRATISCHE ZEITUNG NEUES DEUTSCHLAND NATIONAL ZEITUNG BERLINER ZEITUNG NEUE ZEIT JUNGE WELT TRIBUENE DER MORGEN 11 s·i c R ET ' '¾ 24 Apr 24 Apr 24 Apr 24 Apr 24 Apr 24 Apr 24 24 24 24 24 24 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr 'I ' '• • S E C R E T '- 1956 65 66 BERLI ER ZEITUNG SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG DAS VOLK Erfurt NEUER TAG FREIHEIT DER MORGEN TRIBUENE BAUERN ECHO DER NEUE WEG NEUES DEUTSCHLAND JUNGE WELT MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG NEUE ZEIT FREIES WORT VOLKSSTIMME Karl-Marx-Stadt NATIONAL ZEITUNG VOLKSSTIMME Magdeburg MAERKISCHE UNION FREIE ERDE LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG VOLKSWACHT SAECHSISCHES TAGEBLATT OSTSEE ZEITUNG LAUSITZER RUNDSCHAU 67 DIE UNION 68 SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG 42 43 44 45 46 47 • 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 • • 60 61 62 63 94 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 2 6 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr• Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr Apr