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[Charles Collins], The History of SIGINT in the Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-1970, October 1971. Top Secret.

C01175219 b 1 b 3 ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • ' ' r• I f CIA HISTORICAL STAFF The DCI Historical Series ' L I The History of SIGINT in the Central Intelligence Agen' ' 1947·70 Volume I DCl-4 October 1971 Copy No 1 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 · of 3 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' I• I I • I • f I I 1 ' I DCI HISTORICAL SERIES I• 4 • DCI-4 t • f' L t • l • 1 - THE HISTORY OF SIGINT IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VOLUME 1947-70 I 'I ' by I f • -I -- October 1971 ' ' L ·war • Proctor CIA SIGINT Officer I ' I • HISTORICAL STAFF L CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY I • ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I • I - I I • t T I • A Note on Classification l - ' t - The overall subject matter of this history requires that it be f • For purposes of quotation or subsequent sanitization individual parts of the - history may be treated as follows Volume I and Volume I I Volume III ••• •• ••••••• Volllille IV • • • • I Special Supplement ••••••• I • 1• L I I • J • 1- i' 1• - T6P L - iiCRET Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - i1OP S SCP El' • r Acknowledgment I This history of SIG INT in the CIA is a recapitulation and interpretation of events during the past quarter century and the people who caused participated in or were affected by them Many peop e are mentioned but the work would not be complete unless tribute were paid to the SIGINT professionals who worked on the staff of the CIA SIGINT Officer Huntington D Sheldon -- some of them for many years Volume IV Appendix C con- I tains a list of members of the lstaff In particular the work of lr---- --- ---- l who I • was the first member of the staff in 1946 should be noted Her foresight in establishing and con- trolling the SIGINT files from 1946 until her retirement in 1967 made the writing of this history a far easier task than it would have been otherwise - iii - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 Foreword The CIA SIGINT Officer like Janus the Roman doorpost god has faced in two directions -- toward the inside of the house and toward the outside He was responsible- for insuring the growth and security of COMINT as it was then known inside the buddi g Agency He was also responsible for participating in the COMINT community outside This history then will reflect events not only within the CIA but also in the broad SIGINT world beyond The CIA SIGINT Officer as the SIGINT Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence DCI was because of the DCI's governmental intelligence role concerned with the total SIGINT terrain As the governmental SIGINT empire grew so did the DCI's concern Through the years several panels of busi- nessmen and scientists have been convoked by On 30 April 1962 the COMINT Communications Intel- ligence and ELINT Electronics Intelligence communities were integrated and the term SIGINT Signals Intelligence applied to the new conununity The term CIA COMINT Officer was officially changed to CIA SIGINT Officer on 28 May 1962 For a list of senior CIA SIGINT Officers see Appendix A - iv - 'i'OP SiCRFT Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - iuP tffi01Y 'T j - the DCI or the Department of Defense to study and make recommendations concerning the government's SIGINT activities varied The impact of these studies Those which buttressed an already dominant governmental view such as the Brownell· Committee resulted in action • Those which espoused a minority viewpoint generally resulted in only minor changes Eventually the cost of the COMINT and ELINT efforts became so enormous and the processes so complex that both the Secretary of Defense and the DCI had I misgivings about the value of the product compared with its cost so from time to time outsiders were called in to advise what to do about the SIGINT empire The history of SIGINT in CIA is however far more than just a history of the SIGINT Officer and his staff While the SIGINT Officer acted as a catalyst and a control point the primary work in CIA with SIGINT and for SIGINT was undertaken by the substantive intelligence offices on the one hand and the operating collection offices of CIA on the other To understand SIGINT in CIA therefore the history of these offices must be read in conjunction with - V - - fop Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 --- --j TOP SfS FT - this history In particular the histories of the Deputy Director for Intelligence the Office of I Current Intelligence the Office of ELINT and of '------ IDDP and the Office of Communications are heavily concerned with SIGINT I • ' T• I' - vi '1 ili SBGP BI1 ___ -__________ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 Contents Page Acknowledgment • Foreword • • • • I iv Beginnings 1941-46 • 1 A The Spirit of th e Times 1 B How the Office of Strategic Services was Kept Out of COMINT • • • • • 4 The Big Game -- Army Versus Navy • 7 c • • 12 D E COMINT Codewords • • 17 1 Origins • • 17 2 The Philosophy Underlying the Codeword 3 F II iii • • Special Codewords 20 • • • 21 Recapping • 23 COMINT Comes to CIA • • 23 A First Steps B Inside CIA -- COMINT Beginnings c Advisory Council D • 18 l The People 2 The Job 24 • • 25 25 • • 28 Military Reaction to CIG -- Fear and Hope • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 30 vii · - OJI SECR EI I _______________ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I e P EGRET III v Page E The Magic Summary • • • • • • F The Intelligence Community -Class of '47 • • • • • • 37 G CIA Struggles to Get COMINT • • • • 39 H USCIB Approves CIA Receipt of Raw COMINT Data • • • • • • • • • • 42 I COMINT and Atomic Energy Intelligence 45 J The Joint Counterintelligence Center 51 33 The USCIB Magna Charta -- National Security Council Intelligence Directive No 9 IV 1 • • • 57 57 A How It Came About • • • B Draft and Counterdraft c Forrestal Makes DCI The Boss 60 D CIA Takes the Offensive 61 E A House Built on Sand • 66 Armed Forces Security Agency AFSA 58 69 69 A An Inauspicious Start • • • • B Forrestal's USCIB Is Stymied 70 C Secretary Louis Johnson Creates AFSA Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff 72 David and Goliath • • • • • • 76 A Special Research Center 76 B CONSIDO 81 - viii - - - - _ Of SliCRE'D- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP S i eRE't-1 Page VI The Brownell Committee 85 86 A Milie B Impact c How the Brownell Committee Came About 85 87 D The Report E USCIB Acts F Th e Communi ty Carries On G Huntington D Sheldon 91 94 97 98 Appendixes A List of CIA SIGINT Officers • 102 B COMINT Codewords 1944-70 103 C Chronology 104 D_ Source References • •• 128 Volwne II I The Dark Ages A 1 Director of the National Security Agency • • • • • • • • • 2 B A Taste of Honey 3 C The October Surveys 6 0 The Need for Strategic Warni g • • 8 ix - i________________ I OP S ECR BI Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ----· C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 OP 9flORB I 1 • - Page I t • I E Order-of-Battle F COMINT in the Doldrtnns A c f r ' 16 l· ' F t G I III 20 l _· ___ I __________ _ 22 27 11 L The llak er Panel Investigates the r roblem • • • • ' - - - -- 9 A Candle in the Dark c r I• 25 I l B 1• l The Robertson Survey of NSA A I 32 32 35 36 D CIA- - - - - - - - -- - • • • • Cloud on the Horizon E The Becker- Canine Agreement 42 IV i 18 The Erskine Exchange E i - 1• 16 D M kai - IJwUie _want the ' I 14 CIA Pressure on NSA B I I • I• 10 rr ____-- 7 r t '- US Versus USSR 39 45 A 45 B 46 c L 48 - i X - L ' 'l 'OP S ECR ¥ I IL--------- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • ' I • I• I Page E l I so D 51 F • 52 i v I A The Other Fellow's COMINT • • • • •• 58 c COMINT Direct Support for CIA Operations D CCMINT Utilization by the Clandestine Service I I• I ' 66 67 VI ' - I • t• ' f • F l• L VII COMMO and DDP Teamwork • • • • • 78 • • • • • 80 One Plus One Equals One A Don't Rock the Boat B Killian Rocks the Boat c USCIB Versus Killian • • • 80 81 83 - xi t • 7 I • I - t • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP SEGRHT Page i f • • D The Truscott Memorandum • • • • • • • • 83 E Army Spearheads the Counterattack • • 84 F USCIB Goes on Record G Dulles Agrees with USCIB • 86 I • t • H J VIII ·t • I I • ' 11 • 92 Law Unto Itself No Longer • • • 93 A A B Complexities of USCIB Decision Making 95 I •I nfluence I Appendixes t I - - i 90 The Millenium c A • • 89 Ike and Killian Kill USCIB i • I ••• Source References • 98 101 Volume III I 1 ELINT • • • • 1 A Cabell -- Father of ELINT B USAF -- ELINT Giant c NSA Battles Services Over ELINT j - D NSCID No 17 the ELINT Magna Charta 6 l • E ELINT Inhouse 8 F NSCID No 6 -- NSA and ELINT G Telemetry ELINT • • • I r 3 I • l • ' l - xii • L ' TOP SJ1iCRFT Approved for Release 2013 07 18 5 • 10 • 13 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I • ' I• Page H ' CIA ELINT Kudos l I The TWo-committees Period A f • L COMINT Cormnittee 22 1 I• 2 ' 3 T• I • 4 ' s ' c III ELINT Committee The SIGINT Commi'ttee - I 31 - B ' 16 21 36 A SIGINT Committee Chairman B SIGINT Requirements and Evaluations c SIGINT Foreign Policy 40 40 42 44 1 l • 2 • 3 I • I i • IV A Third-Party Matters I • -54- 56 Sheldon's SIGINT Committee 1 us SIGINT Bases - - • • • • 56 I L xiii 1 • - TOP S eML _l- - - - - - - - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I • Page l' 59 a 1 • • 2 SIGINT Guidance to NSA The Intelli gence Guidance Subcommittee b 1• i • ' B c lo SIGINT Satellites 72 75 2 Aerial Ears 3 COMINT Satellites 4 COMOR USIB Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance 78 s SORS SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subconunittee 79 r F I· The Role of COMINT in Vietnam G Other Subjects 81 82 • The Requirements Grune A Overview B The Philosophy of Requirements C The Six Periods D The Two Lists Period 1947-55 • l • l 76 E Projec ' 72 Aerial Eyes ELINT Evaluation 69 D v 68 l I I 63 The USCIB Requirements List t • - xiv - --10P SB iEl1 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 83 85 87 • 87 88 89 90 92 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' f Page ' 2 The AFSAC List •• •• 3 The Contest I • 4 The Big Evaluation 5 Joint Reading Panel Turndown • • 100 t • 6 The Marcy Letter • • • • f • 7 Brownell Conunittee Views on Requirements • • • • • • • 96 99 I• • • I 94 101 • 102 105 E CIA Requirements Staff • • • F The Broad Brush Period 1955-61 G The Social Register -- The Top 400 11 Period 1961-62 • • • • • • • • • • 114 I • • 108 t 1 Tying Dollars to Requirements l • 2 Requirements Spelled Backwards •• 114 j 3 Origin of the Optimum Program Concept • • • • • • • • I 'i I VI ' H The Samford Period 1962-65 I The '-- _ _ _ _ eriod 1966-70 •• 114 118 The SIGINT Organization Study Group -11 Sausage • • A 116 Regulation 120 • • • 122 125 127 •• 1 The CIA SIGINT Officer ' 2 The Deputy Director for Plans DDP • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 12 8 J Office of Communications DDS I I I • ' ' i - xv - -i1or S EGRFT Approved for Release 2013 07 18 128 •• 129 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r ' ' f · 4 l ' B l VII f• 6 Office of ELINT DD S T 129 • • 129 The SIGINT Organization Study Group c CIA Gets the Ball Eaton Runs His own Show D Reactions to the 8 May Trial Balloon ' 1 130 133 133 136 138 141 1 Army 141 2 Joint Chiefs of Staff 144 3 CIA 4 NSA 145 s National Reconnaissance Office 146 6 DIA Air Force and Navy 146 E The Final Report F Impact on the Eaton Report 144 146 I 'l • I ·• l 'f Central Reference Service DDI Origins • B f • s 129 The Eaton Panel -- A Study of NSA SIGINT A J l The Information Requirements Staff DDI f ' Page VIII Communications Intelligence COMINT Security • • • • • • • • • • 151 A A Sound Secure Craft 151 B A Hole in the Hull • • 153 c Let's Legislate Security ' I • 148 154 - xvi I f f'OP SBORE'f 1 - -- - - -- - - - - - -- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 '' f • ' G • 156 • 160 COMINT Clearances Mushroom • 162 The Traitors 166 The H Finis o E 1 F I l • I j • COMINT Security in CIG USS Pu eb 1 o • 168 I • Appendixes •• ' A • • • • • • • • 169 Source References Volume IV General Appendixes A Chairmen of United States Communications Intelligence Board United States Intelligence Board B Secretaries of United States Communications Intelligence Board United States Intelligence Board c Names of Individuals Who Served With the SPINT Staff D Chronology USCIB Intelligence Committee E Mission and Functions of CIA SIGINT Officer Revised 12 April 1968 - CIA Regulation HR l-2d F Mission and Functions of Advisory Council G NSCID No 9 1 July 1948 H NSCID No 9 Revised 29 December 1952 •• f j • ' j • I I I • - xvii I • ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • TOP I s gcp EX I - --------------- I • I • 1• 1 I NSCID No 17 16 May 1955 r• J NSCID No 6 New Series 15 September 1958 j • K NSCID No 1 New Series 4 March 1964 I I L I M Total Numbers of CIA COMINT Cleared Persons by Year 1950-70 N Maps I I • i 1 SIGINT Resources Western Hemisphere 31 March 1970 2 SIGINT Resources Europe Africa Middle East 31 March 1970 3 SIGINT Resources Far East 31 March 1970 1• I I I • • ' ' I l • I L l - xviii - l• r • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 · The Histotl of SIGINT in the Central Intel1gence Agency 1947-70 Volume I I A Beginnings 1941-46 The Spirit of the Times With the following words of President Truman the Central Intelligence Group was born on 22 January 1946 into a cold and hostile bureaucratic world It is my desire and I hereby direct that all federal foreign intelligence activities be planned developed and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security Before the President's desire became a reality twelve years elapsed Not until 15 September 1958 when the United States Intelligence Board was established with the Director of Central Intelligence DCI as Chairman did Communications Intelligence COMINT activities come under the aegis of the DCI The leadership of the US Army and US Navy communications intelligence organizations in particular took a rather dim view of the new Central For serially numbered source references see Appendix D See the chronology Appendix C• I U' P Sl3CllF'I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ----- __T - OP SECR FT 1 I '----------------------------------A Intelligence Group ClG which in their minds was the bar sinister offspring of the defunct Office of Strategic Services OSS To sense the tenor of these times it is necj • essary to understand the nature and spirit of the COMINT empire that had grown up during World War II The combined US-UK COMINT operation of World War II was perhaps the most successful large-scale intelligence operation in history ' At its peak almost 20 000 Americans were involved in intercepting and decoding German and Japanese military traffic At times up to BO perce t of the German military Enigma cipher machine traffic used by both the German army and navy as their principal cryptographic device was decrypted by the United States and the United Kingdom Additionally much of the traffic sent via the German high-echelon teletype cipher machines was read This gave the Allies an excellent window not only into German operational plans but also into their strategic policies as well It played a decisive factor in the US counteroffensive against German submarine attacks on Atlantic shipping in the defense of Britain against bombing - 2 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'TOP S G R E'I and in the groun warfare in Europe from D Day on 6 June 1944 when the Allies invaded France until VE Day 8 May 1945 The COMINT effort against Japan was similarly successful The 1946 Pearl Harbor Report made public some of these successes and revealed that I • Japanese diplomatic communications were being deciphered by the United States even prior to US entry into World War II In the early years of the war after the Pearl Harbor disaster depleted our Pacific fleet COMINT was vital in neutralizing Japanese naval superiority As us Naval forces were rebuilt COMINT continued to be the eyes and ears of the fleet enabling us to concentrate limited forces at strategic times in the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean Thus US military authorities were jealous and proud of the intelligence source which had provided them this support They were fully aware that COMINT success depended on a thin thread of sec rity which if broken could immediately cause changes in enemy codes and ciphers and loss of the information They were reluctant to share COMINT secrets even 3 - TOP SEeRBT --_ _ _ _ __ _ _ ___ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 7 __ _ _ _ _ _ _ J within the military sphere much less with a nonmilitary governmental organization B How the Office of Strategic Services Was Kept Out of COMINT The Office of Strategic Services OSS was considered a definite outsider by the Army and Navy COMINT authorities Throughout the war the military 1 had successfully resisted oss attempts to obtain military COMINT product and this attitude persisted at the time of the creation of CIG Even as far back as 6 July 1942 the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Ernest J King Commander in Chief us Fleet and General George c Marshall Chief of Staff -- stated The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that in the interests of maximum security and efficiency cryptanalytical activities should be limited to the Army the Navy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation At present small cryptanalytical units exist in the offices of the Director of Censorship the Federal Communications Commission and the Director of Strategic Services It is also possible that other offices have installed or are contemplating cryptanalytical units y 4 -TOP G ET _l_-- ---------------l Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TO President Franklin D Roosevelt as a consequence wrote a memorandum to the Director of the Budget dated 8 July 1942 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum received today from the Chief of Staff and the Commander in Chief of the US Fleet I agree with them Will you please have the proper instructions issued discontinuing the cryptanalytical units in the offices of the Director of Censorship the Federal Communications Commission and the Strategic Services If you are aware of any other agencies having services of this character will you please have those discontinued also F D R l I The Joint Chiefs were motivated at the time by the need for absolute secrecy with respect to the capability to read German and Japanese military communications in order to keep their treasured source from drying up Thus six months after Pearl Harbor they succeeded in obtaining exclusive rights to COMINT production by the most effective possible Presidential device -- a directive from the Bureau of the Budget cutting off the funds devoted to this purpose in all 5 -- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 T8P SEGRE - other governmental agencies The oss shortly after the beginning of the war was thus prohibited from T • engaging in communications intelligence Addition- a ly and even more important it was kept from ' getting the results of communications intell gence except in rare instances As a matter of fact oss people in London had access through the British to COMINT for purposes of oss operational support whereas their access in Washington was practically nil An incident later in the war which served to exacerbate the situation was the Lisbon episode wherein the OSS was accused by the US military of undertaking uncoordinated pinch operations to steal codes in Lisbon which the United States had already broken by cryptanalytic means This caused the Japanese to change this particular crypt graphic system called period 11 JMA11 and dried up the source for a During this period the United States under- ' took the landing on Kiska Island and found that the ' Japanese had already moved out ' j Some time later when the system was again broken back messages were read which told about Japanese plans for leaving Kiska - 6 T Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ET _ C _ _ _ _ _ _ _ The Big Gatne· -- Army Versus NayY During the early part of World War II the Army cryptanalytic effort and the s ilar Navy effort operated with considerable rivalry and independence The Navy concentrated primarily on the Japanese and German naval problems whereas the Army cryptanalytic 1 • effort worked not only on German and Japanese military ciphers but also on the diplomatic ciphers of all the countries of the world One exception was the Japanese diplomatic cipher machine the Purple Machine which was decrypted on alternate days by the Army and Navy each wanting credit for the valuable information The independence of the two COMINT organizations although bridged by liaison officers resulted in both missed opportunities and duplicated efforts and it became apparent to the officers of the Army and Navy concerned with the communications intelligence that more direct coordination between Army and Navy communications intelligence activities was required y On 10 March 1945 the Chief of Staff US Army and the Commander in Chief US Fleet created the 7 - 10f' 8¥GPF ___·_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ l ·Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 Army-Navy Communications Intell gence Board ANCIB and a subordinate working committee known as the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Coordinating l Committee ANCICC j George ' ' c On 18 August 1945 General Marshall War Department Chief of Staff sent a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations 5 I This memorandum recognized that the termination of hostilities would cause a reduction in Army and Navy signal intelligence activities as practically all Japanese army navy air and shipping coded communications would cease much as all German coded communications tenninated at the end of the German war ' The memorandum went on to say that the United States Navy and Army signal intelligence agreements and commitments as well as with the Federal Bureau of Investig tion Office of Strategic Services Treasury and the Federal Communications Commission would require reexamination and readjustment in the light of the post-hostilities situation This memorandum sparked an internecine bureaucratic struggle between the Army and the Navy which waxed and waned on and off for seven years - 8 - ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 f6F SECR F'I __ until the creation of the National Security Agency NSA in 1952 frontal scenes At times the strife was open and Mostly it was paramilitary behind the In 1947 the creation of a third force the United States Air Force rather than pouri g oil on I the waters created a new and powerful bureaucratic ' weather front that kept the climate from stabilizi g until even long after the NSA was well established Three basic factors combined to cause periodic recurrences of the 'squall the problem was techni- cally a complex one to coordinate even with the best of good will from all sides normal service rivalries were augmented by strong personality differences and essentially different doctrines on the use of COMINT existed in the different services The Navy had little technical experience in working with diplomatic ciphers since it had concentrated primarily on Japanese and German naval ciphers take time Retraining the Navy cryptanalysts would The Army enfant terrible 11 at the time was Colonel Carter i w Clarke Assistant Deputy G-2 Clarke a powerful and vocal personality was in 9 - ' I Of 9£CRliT 1 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 10' P SEGR C I favor of combining the Navy and Army COMINT organizations The Navy viewed Clarke's proposals as an effort to take over the whole show which i t was The major wedge between the two however was neither personalities nor even policies both 'o f which ch ge with time but rather a basic difference in philosophy lj The Army believed that all phases 1 of COMINT processing were so interrelated that they could properly be worked only in close proximity to one another The Army favored physical consolida- tion at Arlington Hall Station -- the Army Headquarters of all cryptanalytic activities The Navy and later the Air Force were afraid that a consolidated organization would be unable to give adequate support to operational commanders The Navy also felt that the overall COMINT problem was so large that it should be broken into parts The great mobility of Naval forces the rapid changes in the operational situation over wide areas and the high security of operational and technical communications employed by foreign naval forces required that Naval COMINT be produced at a high-level t Naval processing center which could respond lQ -- ' - - - - -7----' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I • immediately to swiftly changing operational requirements Both the Army and the Navy rec gnized the need to coordinate their intercept cryptographic and cryptanalytic activities under some kind of joint direction I - They disagreed on what kind The Navy was not about to move its physical facilities at OP-20-G on Nebraska Avenue in Washington over to the Army Security Agency Headquarters in Arlington Virginia The senior officers of both services were adamant Admiral King and General Marshall in the latter half of 1945 excha ged several memorandums without obtaining agreement Finally on 2 January 1946 General Dwight D Eisenhower Chief of Staff us Army sent a memorandum to the Commander in Chief of the US Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz saying he had come to the conclusion we should make a fresh start on this entire subject '1 Eisenhower agreed with Nimitz that this step need not await the final result of the study being made by the State-War-Navy Committee on the formation of a Central Intelligence Agency and l • that there must be a complete and free exchange - 11 - TOt' SECRET I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ J Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 Tflf SECRFT f between our Army and Navy of everythi g pertaini g to commW1ications intelligence Admiral Nimitz replied to General Eisenhower in a similar concil atory tone and the State-ArmyNavy Communications Intelligence Board STANCIB once again started to work on the roblemL Jfter j additional pulling and tugging STANCIB on 22 April 1946 approved a pl'an creating the Coordinator of Joint Operations CJO outlining his duties and ' responsibilities and appointing the Chief of the Army Security Agency Colonel Harold G Hayes as the first CJO D Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 Tl The United States and the United Kingdom started working together in the field of communications intelligence early in World War II The first approaches were made gingerly the United States providing a few cryptanalytic recoveries that they had made on a problem and the British countering with the few additional recoveries which they had made The principal US contribution to the potpourri was the brilliant cryptanalytic feat of breaking the Japanese diplo atic cipher The British on the other hand had been successful on European diplomatic ciphers and more important had the capability to read the German military 11 Enigma 11 cipher machine This cipher machine was a German version of the original Enigma cipher machine principle used by several countries The German version had plugs to ch ge daily the input and output letters to the I • cipher machine by means of a 11 stecker board The Germans considered this cipher machine absolutely unbreakable and used it for the bulk of their navy and army communications Prior to World War II unknown to the Germans the Polish cryptanalytic 13 - ______________ TOP iCB E'Li Approved for Release 2013 07 18 __ C01175219 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- TOP SECR E ' organization had devised a system to break the German This system they called the Bombe 11 Enigma The Bombe was a battery of 10 to 20 high-speed Enigma machines hooked in tandem j These matched an intercepted cipher message gainst lO to 20 letters 1 of assumed plain text underlying the cipher mess ge ' Each day when a given communications net was broken into all the messages in the net could be read When the Germans overran Poland the Poles made the secret of the Bombe available to the French intelligence service The British later obtained it from the French As the United States entered the war the British informed the United States of their capabilities against the Enigma and the early tentative exchanges of COMINT information became more and more C - The Bombe worked by deciphering the message at every possible machine setting at a high speed through all 17 576 permutations of any given threewheel group until it reached the proper setting where· it deciphered all of the underlying plain text Some Polish cryptanalytic genius devised a simple cross-wiring system called the Reciprocal Board which when used in connection with the 11 Bornbe 11 removed the effect of the German stecker 11 14 T' Of SECRET 1 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 open and frequent Liaison officers were excha ged and later several score US Army and Navy cryptanalysts and intelligence analysts were sent to work at Bletchley Park an hour's train ride north of London j which was the location of the British Government Code and Cipher School the cover name of the British COMINT organization The British and the US cryptanalysts during this period developed mutual respect and trust and made many enduring friendships as is natural among scientists particularly those who shared and developed technical secrets which played such a vital role in the survival of their two countries • - 15 - op s EcREr _ ______________ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'TOP EGRET ' ' 16 ET Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'f6P SECRl T I ------------ -- - - - - --------- I - E COMINT Codewords 1 Origins COMINT has always had a special codeword At the beginning of World War II the codeword was MAGIC II I___- ____________________ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ___ lthe codeword ULTRA was used 17 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I o designate COMINT activities or products ' received from readi lg codes and ciphers The code- word ''ULTRA covered the most fruitful and prolific ' COMINT product ever to be produced However the Pearl Harbor Inquiry compromised the word ULTRA as denoting the product of communications intelligence so the State Anny-Navy Communications IntelI• ligence Board agreed that it should be changed Accordingly the word ULTRA was replaced by the word CREAM effective 0001 GMT on 15 March 1946 y 2 ' The Philosophy Underlying the Codeword - ' 18 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - -- TrluTIP - - - - -- _'S'ISE C R E T ---- - - - - - - - - - IOP 9E€Ri r •L - - -- - - - - - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ------------ I - 'iO' P SloGR E r 3• - Special Codeword s __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 7 - 2Q Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' ' F• Recapping Thus COMINT was in existence long before CIA was established -- a system a society unto itself with its own hierarchy its own troops and even its - 21 -f•P SEGRFTL L-1- - - - - - - - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - _ OP 9 EGRllT I' own secret passwords -- an international _global empire richly fabled with stories of its glorious past and still ruled by the mandarins whose genius had bro ght it to the apex of its power Into this milieu was born CIA ' - 22 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 A First Steps COMINT played no part in the first six months of CIA's life January to June 1946 a period which was devoted to creating a new o ganization recruiting personnel and finding quarters directorship of Rear Admiral Sidney This was the w Souers USNR 23 January 1946 to 10 June 1946 When Lieutenant General Hoyt s Vandenberg USA AAF Assistant · chief of Staff G-2 became Director of Central Intelligence DCI on 10 June 1946 COMINT quickly became a factor in the life of the young Agency At the time General Vandenberg became DCI he was the Army representative on and Chairman of the United States Communications Intelligence Board USCIB He was thus accredited to the COMINT community and brought with him to CIA COMINT know-how and prestige Less than one month after he became DCI he received an invitation from the Senior Member of the USCIB Major General s J Chamberlin• ·1 1 23 _ Approved for Release 2013 07118 ------ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - 'IOP SESR F't l stating that USCIB had recommended and the Military Chiefs of Staff the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and l____ _ l had approved requesting the DCI to become a member of USCIB The Department of State had been a member of the USCIB only for seven months and the FBI was even more of a Johnny-come-lately having joined the board only a few weeks earlier B Inside CIA -- COMINT Beginnings As was perhaps natural as well as symbolic one of the first Agency actions of General Vandenberg in the COMINT area had to do with security He had his executive issue a memorandum on 26 August 1946 to the Security Officer CIG and Acting Assistant Dire tor Office of Research and Evaluation establishing regulations for security and dissemination of communications intelligence instructing them to follow the War Department regulations in this regard and requesting them to submit a minimum list of personnel who would require special indoctrination to Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 CRET ________ I Special Security Representative CIG 12 C Advisory Council 1 The People General Vandenberg saw the need for a full- time COMINT advisor and controller on his immediate staff and on 16 August assigned the responsibility I• to I I chief Advi ory Counci I -- - 25 - 16P atiOaul __________ _ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 '' Lposition was held In the next 22 years the by only four incumbents 1·-o n -------- 1 December 1950 at the time of General Smith's reorganization of the Agency the Advisory council was disestablished and its functions were combined with those of the former General Division of ORE into the Office of Special Services to consolidate responsibility for additional special intelligence functions including the publication of a daily special intell gence I ' I - 26 - l'OP e EO 'Fr'------- - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 L Ion 15 January the f itle OSS '------ was chang_e d to the Office of Current Intelligence After about a year and a half Do glass again left the Agency to be succeeded on 12 July 1952 by Huntington D Sheldon both as Assistant Director OCI and as the Director's senior staff officer for COMINT matters Mr Sheldon exercised the latter responsi- bility for almost 18 years carrying it with him through various senior assignments until 1 November 1969 shortly before his retirement Mr Sheldon was succeeded as SIGINT Officer by Edward w Proctor Douglass had served as Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from 2 March to 11 July 1946 and as one of two deputies to the Assistant Director Office of Special Operations from 22 July to September 1946 Mr Sheldon retired on 9 January 1970 • 27 - · Df SECRETI Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 T who assumed the responsibility in addition to his other duties as Assistant DDI 2 The Job On 6 October 1947 the DCI des gnated Finn gan Chief of the Advisory Council to represent the Director of Central Intelligence in all matters '- relating to Communications Intelligence including collection security and dissemination of intelligence derived therefrom In this capacity FiJmegan was authorized and directed 1 To maintain liaison with all USCIB agencies and any other organizations of the Federal Government whose operations were related to COMINT matters 11 2 To keep the Director and Deputy Director informed of significant trends in the communications intelli gence effort in other agencies 3 To transmit CIA requirements from COMINT sources to USCIB agencies 4 To support these agencies by providing them with information in the possession of CIA • '- 5 To control the receipt security utilization and dissemination of communications intelligence by CIA in accordance with USCIB policy and directives - 28 - • 16P EGRET Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 - j Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • 6 To maintain lists of authorized CIA recipients of communications intelligence based on recommendations of Assistant Directors and Staff section Chiefs in accordance with the need to know 7 To sit as CIA member of the us Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee USCICC and to represent the DCI on USCIB when necessary t - 8 To designate CIA representation on subcommittees of USCICC _ Y Through the years the Director has continued to have - such a repre entative In the early period he worked to obtain access for CIA to COMINT produced by the military services and represented the Director on COMINT matters in the USCIB structure '- The organi- zational location of the Director's COMINT Officer as noted above has changed over the years although - the incumbent has tended more and more to be a very s nior Agency officer in one of the intelligenceproducing directorates Or ginally known as the Director's COMINT Officer the title of the position was ch ged on 28 May 1962 a month after the combination of the USIB COMINT and ELIN Committees - 29 _ Of' SFCB ET ---------------Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 1 T _l - - - - - ----------------' - _ to CIA SIGINT officer The COMINT and SIGINT Officers have been supported by a deputy who has in turn been the chief of a support staff known variously but from November 1955 until its dissolution on 2 February 1970 as the SPINT Special Intelligence Staff D Military Reaction to CIG -- Fear and Hope As is perhaps natural when a rival organiza- tion is created in government different echelons have different reactions to the new contender The topmost echelon in the military supported the CIG The next military echelon saw it as a potential rival The lower echelons hoped that the new organization might assist them in solving their considerable problems An interesting episode demonstrating this latter viewpoint is portrayed For the discussion of these events see Vol III Chapters II - III -- - --- as deputy to the COMINT an l at er SIGINT Officer from June 1947 with two interludes until his own reassignment on 2 February 1970 • 30 ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 in a memorandum for the DCI dated June 1946 from Colonel J A Michela Executive Director Military Intelligence Division G-2 War Department General Staff 14 At this time the COMINT organizations of the military were reaching their lowest ebb insofar as personnel and funds were concerned Post-World War II cutbacks had decimated the ranks of COMINT organizations and the COMINT product that they produced was of primary interest to the Department of State and to the budding CIG since it consisted of information obtained from reading diplomatic summaries I I The Michela '-------------------------' memorandum asked the DCI to request higher authority to issue immediate directives suspending all reductions in all US intelligence agencies until 1 January 1947 or until such time as CIG is capable of fulfilli g its mission Colonel Michela stated that the manpower board had authorized the Army Security Agency ASA only 2 838 civilian personnel but the budget which had been ass gned was sufficient only for 1 675 This letter enclosed a letter from 31 - 'fOf' SEORBT L-_ 1 7__ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l Colonel Harold G Hayes Chief ASA which stated that among other results expansion of the cryptanalytic effort on the Russian problem would be impossible and that intelligence would be curtailed I I He added that '----- this recent agreement in number of foreign ·systems was to have been transferred to the Navy Approximately 100 specialists were to have been transferred from this agency to the Navy to carry on these assignments This agency · has been advised that the Navy will not have sufficient funds to pay the personnel who will be transferred and as such the Navy will not be able to perform these missions The letter also contains a litany of other disasters that would befall the ASA The DCI was of no mind to prevent the budgetary ax from falling even if he could The dire pre- dictions as to the demise of the COMINT effort did not take place As the ASA and its Navy counter- part were forced to tighten their belts they man aged to retain the muscle of their effort despite the cries of agony over the impending operation - 32 rtii fmCR ET -- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 Lean years ensued Salaries and morale were low both at the ASA and at the Naval Security Group NSG and remained so for many years During this period the CIG received a stream of job applications from unhappy ASA and NSG personnel The CIG was besieged by so many jobseekers that an informal agreement was worked out whereby the CIG would not hire personnel from the cryptologic agencies without an pproval from the front office of these organizations During this period the CIG pay scale was at least one grade higher··-- a condition which prevailed for almost 10 years until General Ralph J Canine became Director of the National Security Agency NSA and raised the NSA pay scale E The Magic Summary During World War II in addition to their almost unbelievable success with enemy military ciphers the United States and the United Kingdom read and exchanged the diplomatic ciphers of many countries Military decrypts during much of the war were printed only in seven copies and diplomatic decrypts were even more t ghtly held 33 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 The C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ASA did all the us work on diplomatic traffic and G-2 published daily the cream of the information in a black-covered book entitled the Diptomatic Summa y or as it was familiarly kne wn the Magic Summary MAGIC was the apt cover name applied to COMINT at '' the time When USCIB was searching for a USCIB publication for briefing senior governmental officials the Diptamatic Summary was a natural selection since it contained important information obtained from the cryptanalysis of the diplomatic comrnunica- · tions of1 On 31 July 1946 the Diptomatic Summary was made an official publication of the United States Communications Intelligence Board to be signed by the Chairman of the Board W At the present time 1970 the State Department still publishes a Black Book which has black covers like the ones on the original Magic Summary This was the first publication of its kind ever issued by USCIB It thus predates by some years national ' estimates and Watch Committee reports '34 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 USCIB itself determined the distribution of the document sending one to the White House keeping 17 within the War Department and giving two to CIA four to the Army Air Forces three to the State Department and· six to the Navy The distribution list gives a significant picture of the intelligence power structure at the time The War Department got the lion's share of the copies and the DCI received only two The USCIB publication process did not function without friction The War Department complained that the State Department had failed to furnish collateral information as agreed toward improving the quality of the Diplomatic Summary and finally - 35 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 succeeded in persuading State to use some non-COMINT infonnation for footnoting purposes when pertinent to the story ' The Diptomatic Summary nevertheless remained essentially a communications intelligence rather than an all-source document j The first CIA representative on the Diplomatic Summary Editorial Board of USCIB was Mr Frederick t ' •• A Vo gt who assumed this responsibility early in May 1947 after the CIG request to have a man on the board had been approved by USCIB At that time the group was housed in the Pentagon Room 2 C 836 and the Chief Editor was Mr Willard c Matthias • The CIG appointed Voigt to the job not so much to assist in the general editorial work as to learn what use was being made of the material and to determine how the CIG eventually could get the material ' for itself A couple of months after the CIG started participating on the board USCIB approved passi g I the chief editorship to the Department of State and some months later the entire staff moved over o State Department J • Matthias later came to CIG and is presently 1970 a member of the Board of National Estimates - 36 - 1 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 j F The Intelligence Community - Clas·s· cif ·•·47 As the CIG Office of Reports and Estimates ORE began to grow in 1947 it became obvious that the Magic Summary was inadequate as the sole COMINT input to the ORE intelligence production process A study was undertaken by Voigt at the direction I • of the Deputy Assistant Director ORE Captain A H Mccollum USN 1 This study reviewed the use of COMINT by the other departments In the light of the well over 100 000 people cleared for COMINT throughout the US Government today 1970 the minuscule number of people engaged in COMINT evaluation in June 1947 is rather startling In the War Department COMINT material was ' processed only in the Special Research Branch SRB • Intelligence Division ID War Department General Staff This branch consisted of four persons in- cluding one typist who scanned COMINT material for inclusion in their subject files which were visited by cleared personnel from the various geographic and functional branches of ID taken by these personnel No notes could be In the Navy Department all COMINT material was processed in OP-322-Y Office 37 - - It f SFCRET '-------- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -1 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 of Naval Intell gence Out of the total Table of Organization T O of approximately 30 persons only two or three were engaged in the production of intelligence from COMINT In CIG ORE 35 sub- stantive persons were cleared but only 11 were regular readers of the DipZomatic Summary and 24 were occasional readers In addition a cleared individual in CIG OSO was orally kept aware of COMINT matters pertaining to the operations by the CIG representative on the Diplomatic Summary Board of Editors All told approximately 44 persons in the member agencies in USCIB are fully occupied with the evaluation and production of intelligence ' from COMINT material 18 On 7 July 1947 the Assistant Director ORE recommended to the DCI the establishment in ORE of a ten-man COMINT organization with the cover name I of General Division W approved with Knight This was subsequently w McMahan as Chief COMINT of interest to CIG at the time in addition to the diplomatic traffi was also obtained was the cover name applied to Russian - · 38 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 T traffic which was just b ginning to be productive and which later became a major source of COMINT on the USSR G CIA Struggles to Get COMINT With the creation of the General Division CIG became more than ever dissatisfied with the Magic Summary as its sole window into COMINT A draft was prepared for Admiral Hillenkoetter's signature to USCIB requesting that CIA receive in addition to the Diplomatic SummaPy the following COMINT series 1 diplomatic series 2 attache series 3 armed forces series 4 internal governmental series 5 illicit clandestine series 6 police and security series 7 summary series of the above 8 various Russian series T • CIA was willing to continue to visit the Pentagon to scan the X series and other sensitive series and to request individual items from these if necessary • Q J The proposed draft met with the approval of the I State Department and Navy USCIB members The Army member however stated that he would vote against 39 -wrr Sfi C C tSi8 ET l _ _ _ _ _ _ _7_J -- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 approval because CIG already had full access to the DipZomatia Summa y through reading the material in the Pentagon and the proposal would establish a duplicate file of COMINT material in CIG and thus increase ecurity risks 21 Despite the adamant refusal of the G-2 the DCI on 3 October 1947 in a memorandum to the Director of Intelligence WDGS and the Director of Naval Intelligence referenced his responsibilities under the National Security Act of 1947 and stated It is considered vitally necessary to the effective discharge of the responsibilities under the National Security Act that the Central Intelligence Agency be furnished with copies of all communications intelligence bulletins and decrypted messages produced by the Army Security Agency and CSAW the Navy COMINT Group to the extent determined by this agency without restrictions 22 Admiral Thomas B Inglis Chief of Naval Intelligence on 21 October 1947 concurred that it was essential for CIA to carry out its mission 23 The Army however never replied to the DCI request On 9 April 1948 the Assistant Director Reports and Estimates CIA Theodore Babbitt again requested 4Q - TO Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 the DCI to press for action at the earliest possible moment on the problem of COUNT bulletins and of ORE access to Arlington Hall W In the interim the alarm over the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in March 1948 gave ORE an unusual opportunity to request immediate action on the matter of COMINT bulletins '' Another memorandum was sent by the DCI to the Army G-2 General Chamberlin Still no reply was received At the very time that the G-2 was continuing to resist Colonel Carter w Clarke Army Deputy Director of Intelligence wrote a letter to the DCI concerning analysis of propaganda in which he stated that the Army had need for a complete analysis and that if the CIA is unable to furnish such complete analysis the Intelligence Division will perforce be required to perform this function The DCI acknowledgment in a memorandum to the Director of Intelligence US Army again requested that the necessary action be taken to include CIA on all COMINT distribution lists and daily delivery schedules as requested in DCI memorandum of 3 October 1947 W 41 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'iuP SECB E'f - Finally on 14 April 1948 after six months of recalcitrance the Army capitulated General Chamberlin in a letter to the DCI stated that the raw decodes are now and have for many months been made available in the Special Research Branch in the Intell gence Division where properly indoctrinated CIA personnel would read them Therefore the request contained in the subject memorandum concerned only the physical delivery of these raw decodes directly to the ffice of Central Intelligence The Department of the Army he said would no longer oppose the DCI request for delivery of the raw decodes to the CIA provided this action was concurred in by USCIB and parallel action was taken by the Department of the Navy 27 H USCIB Approves CIA Receipt of Raw COMINT Data The matter was submitted to USCIB on 21 April 1948 and approved six days later After a year of repeated official requests CIA finally had obtained access along with the Army and the Navy to the COMINT product W Although the Army gave in on passing raw decodes to CIA 11 they still kept the fence around - 42 - - ' 1 fii SECP ___-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 their operation s far as liaison was concerned On 29 April 1948 General Chamberlin told the DCI It is believed you will agree that since this office is receiving all material here to have made available to your personnel for scanning at Special Research Branch ID GSUSA the expedient under which this scanning was foi merly accomplished no longer appears necessary and should be discontinued However no change is contemplated at present and the arrangement permitting Captain Finnegan and Mr Collins your staff to visit Arlington Hall Station for the purpose of consulting and effecting coordination on COMINT matters of a technical nature ••• all other requests for infoi mation or intelligence nontechnical in nature will be made available through the Special Research Branch ID USA 29 From this point forward CIA had access to the bulk of the COMINT product with the exception of certain sensitive series of General Division ORE was responsible for reading these special series in the Pentagon and often jo ged from his office in temporary Que Building near the Lincoln Memorial over to the Pentagon as part of his personal fitness program in order to read restricted series still retained by G-2 as its private domain In October 1948 CIA again made an approach to G-2 to obtain the restricted series 43 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 on a loan basis and several months later this was accornplished lQ_ Th us by the end of 1948 CIA at last had full access to COMINT -- then the most important basic raw material of intelligence The acquisition of COMINT provided bone and sinew for the growing intelligence competence of the young Agency While the political str gle to obtain COMINT had been going on CIA had developed internal strength and competence by acquiring a cadre of bright young people and had developed its external relations through two series of negotiations First through arrangements with the Atomic Energy Commission CIA acquired the primary community responsibility for atomic energy intelligence for which COMINT was a key input This later became a keystone in the arch of intelligence competence which CIA was to build Th rough another series of negotia- tions the CIA Office of Special Operations established a COMINT Joint Counterintelligence Center JCIC which initially was located at the Naval Communications Annex at Nebraska Avenue Washington D but was later moved to CIA • 44 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 c C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -I COMINT and Atomic Energy Intelligence The Atomic Energy Commission AEC membership in USCIB was a bit of an anomaly How the AEC got into the intelligence business is an interesting story the outline of which will be sketched here The Manhattan District Engineers were extremely interested while they were developing the US atomic bomb in what other countries were doing in the same area They were reluctant for security reasons to express their intelligence requirements through normal military intelligence channels so they set up their own intelligence shop The War Department Office of the Chief of Engineers on 22 April 1944 assigned responsibility for Manhattan District Intelligence to Lieutenant Colonel w D Parsons US Engineers Office P O Box E Oak Ridge Tennessee llf Hiroshima revealed to the world one year later on 6 August 1945 US possession of the atomic bomb The requirement for absolute secrecy was thus relaxed Two years were to elapse however before the somewhat ostrich-like attitude of the AEC was changed by outside pressures and atomic energy intelligence requirements were issued through normal channels 32 -· 45 i 'OP M 6Rll7£ ----------------- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 T The Department of the Army G-2 had asked AEC what should be done about a collection request on uranium sources CIG also had intelligence requirements for atomic energy information which it was discussing with the AEC Colonel L E Seman Corps of Engineers finally wrote from his office in Room 712 of the War Department on 20 March 1947 a memorandwn to the Atomic Energy Commission saying A new orientation is necessary due to cessation of war with the former enemy nations and requesting that new intelligence requirements be issued 33 In the spring of 1947 CIA started negotiations with the Atomic Energy Conanission In May 1947 Rear Admiral Louis L Strauss of the AEC wrote DCI Hillenkoetter This is in pursuance to our informal luncheon conversation the other day and your kind letter of May 8 •••• You asked me to let you have an outline of the kind of information which the AEC would like to have supplied to it by four organization and I have prepared the following as a temporary guide W I The Strauss letter was used by the DCI as a basis for a full-blown discussion within the 46 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 Intelligence Advisory Board IAB of the best way to cooperate in collecting atomic energy intelligence W In the interim Chairman David E Lilien- thal of the AEC requested former CIG Director Rear Admiral Sidney w Souers to write a staff study to determine the intelligence requirements of the Atomic Ene gy Commission and the type of o ganization appropriate to that end This study was forwarded to the National Intelligence Authority in July 1947 and resulted in the Atomic Energy Commission becoming a permanent member of the Intelligence Advisory Board The memorandum effect- ing this was signed by G C Marshall Secretary of State Kenneth c Royall Secretary of War James Forrestal Secretary of Navy and William D Leahy representative of the President 37 the invitation to the AEC Thus to join the intelligence community carried more VIP signatures than those invitations issued to the original members of the IAB Despite the high-level invitation the IAB welcome mat was not out for the AEC DCI Hillen- koetter had to pressure the three services for more 47 _ __ 't'OP SECRET 1 _ _ _ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -------· ----· C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 --j - ' Of' SfiCRET I than six months to get them to gree to create a Joint Atomic Energy Committee- JAEC under the IAB to deal with atomic energy matters While Rear Admiral Thomas B Inglis USN Director of Naval Intelligence was willing to go along rather early in the game Major Generals J Chamberlin USA Director of Intelligence War Department General Staff WDGS refused to go along until the Air Force which had just been created as allowed to sign as an independent entity 38 The Air Force had responsibilities of its own for collection of atomic debris and was hesitant to join the club Finally however Brigadier General C P Cabell USAF Acting Director of Intelligence greed that such a committee is considered reasonable and desirable W and a joint agreement for establishment of a Nuclear Energy Special Intelligence Committee was signed on 31 December 1947 Qj · USCIB was even less hospitable than the IAB not only was the welcome mat not out but USCIB didn't even have a candle in the window -- much less the door open ill USCIB met on 27 February 1948 for its 29th meeting chaired by General 48 TOP ·sBCBET Approved for Release 2013 07 18 7 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 Chamberlin and decided to deny access to raw COMINT to the Atomic Energy Commission USCIB was willi g however to let the DCI provide finished intelligence to the AEC on a limited basis 42 The USCIB also suggested that now that this problem had been decided by them that the DCI call an Intelligence Advisory Committee formerly Intelligence Advisory Board - until September 1947 meeting of the same people with their other hats on to consider the entire problem and include the USCIB decision in its solution The Intelligence Advisory Committee IAC met and on 5 March 1948 agreed that the AEC could receive intelligence based on COMINT provided that the COMINT source was sufficiently concealed as to warrant removal of any COMINT classification of the end product The AEC was disappointed but agreed that if they could have a Dr w F Colby fully cleared and given access to all COMINT they would accept the USCIB decision 43 The AEC then informed Senator Bourke B Hickenlooper Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy in response to his query that although 49 I6P lfflCflE -______________ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I 10f SECRET• 1 I j they could not answer his question as to the earliest date at which any foreign nation might have an atomic bomb that Dr Colby was _going to head up the AEC intelligence activities and concentrate on this question 1 The political maneuvering finally ended and CIA became the focal point for atomic energy intelligence -- one of the most important intelligence problems of the period --- - - - - - - - ------------------ - The IAC during the spr g and summer of 1949 was concerned with trying to improve US intelligence on this subject and making the best estimates possible on the basis of scanty infonnation Anny Navy and Air Force COMINT easily had their budgets expanded to so Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - ' OP SECRET I _J L - - - - - -- l - improve intelligence on this subject and CIA explored every possible resource within its capability -46 The explosion of the Russian atomi c bomb on 23 Sep- tember 1949 ended the speculation as to when the event would happen An interesti g sidelight was a visit by the i • f CIA analysts to the COMINT shop in Arlington Hall six days after the event was announced by President Truman fl I Arlington Hall had decided not to publish this information and ruled that critical information should for an indefinite period be passed to the CIA through frequent CIA visits to the Hall J The· Joint Counterintelligence Center The earli est breakthrough for CIA in obtaining · 51 ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 unrestricted access to raw COMINT information came about in March 1·9 47 before USCIB approval was given for CIA to receive COMINT on its premises The Chief CIA Office of Special Operations OSO Colonel Dabney and his special assistant for COMI T accompanied by _l____ 1 ' undertook discussions with the Chief of Counterintelligence Operations in the War Department Gil Jacobus and his counterpart in the Navy Lieutenant Commander Fred Weldon about starting a central counterintelligence file based on communications intelligence The proposal was received enthusiastically by the service intelligence chiefs and a Joint Counterintelligence Center JCIC was established in April 1947 at the Naval Communications Annex at Nebraska Avenue It was understood from the beginning that eventually the Center would move to CIG The Center was a useful cooperative venture from the start By the end of the first year of operation more than 85 000 items were carded two-thirds of the information coming from COMINT _V While the rest of CIA was struggling to obtain and - 52 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 learn how to use COMINT the Counterintell gence Center was a going operation with complete access to even the most sensitive COMINT information particular good information was available from l- In _J giving a good insight into --'· the espionage activities of these countries I Just two years after the Center was established at the Navy DCI Hillenkoetter proposed formalizing the Joint Counterintelligence Center under the operational control of CIA 51 The Navy tried to 53 10P 5f CRE _______________ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 T seize the initiative from the DCI and keep control of the Center by calling a meeting within the Center at the Navy Annex and inviting Admiral Hillenkoetter I J Edgar Hoover Park Armstrong of State General Erwin of the Army General Cabell of the Air Force and General Carroll of the Army to attend on 30 May 1949 g Representatives rather than principals attended the meeting -- except for the DCI who personally appeared at the meeti g in order to show the CIA flag and keep the pressure on for CIA control of the Center The maneuver was effective and some three months later in August 1949 the Center was moved from the Navy to the CIA COMINT area in Que Building The Navy remained unhappy after the move In December Conunander Rufus L Taylor who at the time was Chief OP-322-Y wrote a letter to Captain Finnegan Chief of the Advisory Council CIA Rufe Taylor had earlier 1946 been Acting Chief Advisory Council in CIA He later served as Executive Secretary USCIB 1952-55 and as Deputy Director Central Intelligence 1966-69 - 54 - tJ 9P SECRET I L Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 CRET complaini g that he was frankly disappointed with the results of the move because no charter had been written and CIA had neither put additional personnel in the Center nor integrated CIA operational files into the Center to the extent that Taylor had anticipated W The Chief · _ _ _ _ __ OSO William K Harvey attempted to mollify Commander Taylor to some degree but stated that I wish to point out again that Commander Taylor's request is of such a nature that it is difficult for us to honor it in OSO and still be consistent with our accepted principles of counterespionage operations and controls 54 The Navy continued however to provide a person to the Center for the next year but the Center became more and more a creature of oso In Septem- ber 1951 Lyman B Kirkpatrick the Acting Assistant Director of oso requested that it be moved from the Office of Current Intelligence COMINT area in Que Build g to the OSO area in L Building The request met with initial resistance by Kingman Douglass but he eventually acquiesced and the Center was moved several months later • 55 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - 'LOP Sf GREII - After OSO got full control of the Center the Army again raised the question of where was the charter that had been promised for such a long time Finally in January 1952 Richard Helms Acting Assistant Director Special Operations 55 forwarded to the Deputy Director of Plans a proposed charter which was submitted to the USCIB and received its approval at the 79th meeting on 12 September 1952 The FBI was invited at the time to join the Center but declined in a brief memorandum from Mr John Edgar Hoover which stated The FBI does not desire to participate 57 The Joint Counterintelligence Center remained on the books as a community venture but as time went on and the Center became more and more of a CIA support file the services lost i nterest and eventually stopped participating in it • 5 6 - -'f'oP SECRET Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 III '' A The USCIB Magna Charta -- National Security Council Intelligence Directive No 9 How It Came About Late in 1947 the United States Communications Intelligence Coordinating Committee USCICC -- the operat ng body of USCIB was drafting a proposed legislative bill S-1019 which it was attempting to get through Congress This bill which imposed legal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of COMINT information contained the phrases unauthorized persons and communications activities An argument developed in USCICC concerning the propriety I • of these phrases inasmuch as there was no governmentwide definition of these terms and the USCIB itself did not have a clear charter to require the elements of the government to comply with USCIB mandates Colonel Harold G Hayes Chairman of USCICC proposed to USCIB that a charter be drawn up for approval by the President Work b gan on the charter in December 1947 and on 1 July 1948 National Security Council 57 - - ·i 6F M CRil _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I e p S ECR ET I - I Intelligence Directive NSCID No 9 came into force During these months CIA fought its first major battle in the political trenches along the Potomac Sec- retary of Defense Forrestal in a deus e maahina maneuver forced the decision in favor of CIA against the protests of his subordinates However CIA did not win the battle no one did B Draft and counterdr·a f t The first draft considered at the 25th meeting of USCIB on 19 December 1947 consisted of a prop9sed presidential executive order and a proposed USCIB charter Th e executive order was keyed to Section II of the National Security Act of 1947 2J I This section pertained to the Department of Defense and thus would cause USCIB to function as a creature of Defense The second draft considered by USCIB when it met in the CIA area North Interior Buildi g on 19 December surfaced as an added a gle a fight going then and ever since between the new national military establishment and the services w The services' version 11 would make USCIB a joint board 58 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 Tot M OR E'Pl of State Army Navy Air Force and CIA The De- partment of Defense version made it a joint board of state the National Military Establishment and CIA The meeting also brought out the basic str g- gle that was to _go on for five years over how much authority to give USCIB The Army and the Air Force had doubts that a USCIB was necessary at all and if one were created they wanted to be sure that it had little or no coordinating authority over their activities CIG Navy and State wanted a strong USCIB The chasm between these views was so deep that the dispute was raised an echelon Rear Admi- ral E E Stone chaired an ad · hoa committee to draft a suggested executive order and charter for USCIB consideration 60 This draft evaded the issue of subordination of the board and compromised the issue of power of the board in favor of the Navy view g This draft was considered at the 27th meeting of USCIB at which meet g the board readily agreed to a State Department suggestion that USCIB report to the Under Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff At its next meeting on 3 February USCIB ' ' 59 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 considered a clean draft -- a paper which was approved by all including the DCI and which contained a proposed executive order from the President putting USCIB under the Under Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS limiting communications intelligence activities to those departments or ' agencies represented on the board and maki g the measures and policies of the board applicable to all departments and agencies of the government 62 C Forrestal Makes DCI The Boss Service members started staffing the proposal up through the chain of command which reached Secretary of Defense James Forrestal on 13 February 1948 He wrote a memorandum to the Secretaries of the three services pulling the rug out completely from under the USCIB paper g He said There is no need for an executive order in view of the very clear provisions of the National Security Act and especially in view of the language of Section 102 of the Act which deals with the Central Intelligence Agency I feel that the objects desired can more appropriately be accomplished by means of a Central Intelligence Agency Directive ••• since the Central Intelligence Agency by Section 102 was established under the National Security 60 - TOP SliCREI - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 Council •••• If this is done the National Security Council will itself constitute a group which can resolve any matters which are not decided at a lower level A copy of this memorandum was sent to the Secretary of State and DCI Hillenkoetter It closed with an interesting sentence which the DCI copy shows was an afterthought since it is typed in a different typescript I also suggest that this would be an appropriate matter for consideration by the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Committee which is to examine the operations of CIA Signed Forrestal 64 D CIA Takes the Offensive CIA up to this point had played a passive role It had acquiesced to the military members' proposal th at US communications intelligence · activities should remain completely in the military domain The Forrestal decision however spurred the gency to action A new draft was prepared by CIA for National Security Council NSC consideration along the new lines s ggested to the DCI by Forrestal 65 This draft put the USCIB charter in the form of a National Security Council Intelligence 61 - 7 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ------- __· or SFCB ETl Directive NSCID instead of an executive order It established the USCIB under the NSC •• to effect the authoritative coor- t • dination and unified direction of Communication Intelligence activities of the Government and to advise the Director of Central Intelligence in matters relating to protection of the sources of such intelligence in those matters in the field of Communication Intelligence for which he is now or may hereafter be made responsible 66 Within four days after receiving this draft the Navy member of the USCIB wrote the DCI saying the preamble to the proposed Directive quoted above could be interpreted to mean that USCIB will be placed under the CIA and that access to the Nati onal Security Council would be via the Director of Central Intelligence 67 the wording was changed The DCI capitulated and It was to take another four years and a new DCI before this element of the DCI's authority in the inte'iligence community was to be partially achieved Since the charter was now to be issued as an NSCID the matter fell to the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Advisory Committee rather than the USCIB so a special meeting of the IAC was called - 62 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 on 1 April 1948 to consider the proposed NSCID on COMINT which Secretary Forrestal had requested the DCI to prepare 68 At this meeting it was estab- lished that USCIB would report directly to the NSC and act for the NSC In this matter USCIB was to be completely unlike the IAC which advised the DCI and reported to the NSC through the DCI • In USCIB the DCI was to be just a member to act thro¥gh USCIB but to exercise no direct control over COMINT activities Finally the COMINT NSCID would state that all other NSCID's and DCID's shall be construed as nonapplicable to COMINT ••• unless the NSC has made its Directive specifically applicable to COMINT The IAC then referred the new version to USCIB where changes were made which further curtailed the DCI's role and a proposed NSCID was forwarded on 18 May to the Exe cutive Secretary of the NSC by the DCI The Executive Secretary of the NSC Rear Admiral Sidney w Souers intercepted the directive and returned it to the DCI with a request for further consideration by the IAC Souers balked at making the DCI merely a member of the USCIB which would report independently and directly to - 63 - - i OP 9 SQR FT __________________ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 2IOP ECflET the NSc ·7 0 I • He also questioned whether the direc- tive could be made applicable to all departments and agencies of the executive branch I • ' The DCI forwarded the correspondence of the Executive Secretary of the NSC to USCIB withdrew his concurrence to the former proposal and requested the views of the members on a voting slip ll This caused a flap to reply The military members refused The DCI then regretted any misunderstand- ing that might have arisen from utilizing USCIB voting slip procedures and requested that immediately following the 32nd USCIB meeting to be heid on 11 June 1948 the board members remain and sit as the IAC to consider the matter 72 The DCI was thus placed in a tenuous position He was caught between his superiors his peers and his subordinates in a position made more precarious by considerations of protocol To make matters worse his one ally the Department of State broke ranks and on 7 June sent him a paper reviewing USCIB charter developments and setting forth the position of the Department of State 7 3 This paper lectured the DCI on the value of - 64 - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - _rr I lvr 1 communications intelligence and the necessity of keeping this source under control of the military The State Department stood firmly gainst Admiral Souers' proposals and the version of the charter as unanimously accepted by USCIB and the IAC and forwarded to the NSC The DCI faced with a mutiny went back gain to the Executive Secretary of the NSC with a split paper containing the DCI version and the version supported by the rest of the IAC 74 The matter thus came unresolved before the NSC The DCI ver- sion followed the instructions received from Souers and established USCIB to advise and assist the I • Director of Central Intelligence in effecting the authoritative coordination with COMINT In the DCI version he not USCIB would act for the National Security Council The National Security Council at its 14th meeting considered the two versions and supported the majority IAC USCIB version as opposed to that put forward by the DCI 75 This action vindicated Admiral Hillenkoetter's earlier judgment concerning the political art of · 65 - '1'6P ----------- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 the possible versus Admiral Souers' charge to the DCI to try to get the NSC to make the DCI a COMINT czar Souers' admonition to the DCI was not sup- ported by the NSC E A House Built on Sand NSCID No 9 was issued l July 1948 Z Thus was created the COMINT minotaur half man half bull to wander around the Washington labyrinth for five years It was the best that could be done at the time it From the first all sides were unhappy with The military strongly suspected that CIA would use it as a power base to obtain control of COMINT CIA was unhappy because NSCID No 9 failed to establish a strong USCIB The document was virtually emasculated inasmuch as it was the subject of a number of compromises and the product of many authors USCIB was so weak thlt it could not only not harm its members it could no even help them Although it was given responsibility for See Volume IV General Appendixes 66 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 authoritative coordination the service members so feared the new setup that they immediately set out to vitiate this basic purpose by creati g an Armed Forces Security Agency responsible to the Joint Chiefs rather than to USCIB The second major objective of NSCID No 9 to advise the Director of Central Intelligence in those matters in the field of communications intelligence for which he is responsible was also vitiated The document itself insured that the DCI was not responsible for any communications intell gence matters unless the NSC itself so directed and the military were not about to let the NSC so direct NSCID N o- 9 created an exclusive COMINT club which non-COMINT intelligence authorities coul d not enter The DCI was a non-COMINT intelligence authority Directives issued by him did not apply to COMINT The Gordian knot had been tied around COMINT a knot not even to be hacked at until NSCID No 9 was rewritten in 1952 as a concomitant of the Brownell Conunittee recommendations and not to be cut until 1958 when· the USCIB and the IAC were 61 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l co117s219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 amalgamated into a single United States Intelligence Board - 68 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 lv 1 IV Armed Forces Security Agency AFSA Secretary of Defense James Forrestal after he brought about the subordination of USCIB to the NSC instead of to the JCS gave te rms of reference in July 1948 to the Secretaries of the three services for the creation of an Armed Forces Security Agency 77 A An Inauspicious Start Major General A R Bowling of the Army Rear Admiral E E Stone of the Navy and Major General c P Cabell of the Air Force were appointed to work with Mr Robert Blum of the Secretary's office and to draw up a charter for the new organization The committee was instructed to take into consideration the equirernents of the State Department and the CIA on questions in which they have an interest and if appropriate to consult with them W In early September 1948 Admiral Hillenkoetter the DCI asked to have his representatives Captain Joseph Finn gan USN and -- 69 'JtJp tffiGllET --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 participate with the Defense committee worki g on the problem After a month the Defense chairman of the committee Admiral Stone replied saying that the first meeting of his ad hoc group would take place in three days· llj The very next day he phoned Captain Finnegan saying that he was forced to withdraw the invitation extended by him to CIA and State to attend the meetings of his committee in view of the strong stand of the Department of the Army in opposing the participation in any manner by CIA and State Q_ B Forrestal's USCIB Is Stymied For four months the committee debated In January 1949 Mr Robert Blum forwarded the results to the DCI and State g The military had reverted to their earlier pre-U CIB positions and were squabbling among themselves to such an extent that they could not even agree whether there should be one joint COM INT shop or three II coordinated II shops Above all they were completely unwilling to permit the new USCIB to have any hand on the COMINT reins • 70 TflP SEGR ET __ ___________ 1 · Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ET The DCI replied to the Secretary of Defense concerni g the two principal phases of the report the proposed creation of a new board called the Armed Forces Conununications Intelligence Board AFCIB and the Armed Forces Security Agency •• stating that 11 a number of functions assigned to the proposed AFCIB are in direct conflict with the functions of USCIB as defined by NSCID No 9 gj 11 He added that the cr eation of the proposed board would result in an increased service control to the detriment of the other interested departments over a problem which is essentially governmental rather than of sole service interest The DCI continued The CIA and the Department of State need full COMINT support tod a y as much as the armed services needed it in war In fact 75 percent of the current production is from diplomatic and economic sources and of primary interest to the CIA and the Department of State The creation of AFCIB with such broad power would give hegemony to a major source of intelligence which in the national interest should daily be operating increasingly to service those departments and agencies charged with prosecuting the cold war • 71 TOP SEGR T I - - - - - - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07i1a Admiral Hillenkoetter thus threw down the gauntlet and the battle between the USCIB and AFCIB was on a battle th at lasted for three years until 1952 when the next DCI convoked the Brownell Committee and sounded the death knell of AFSA The Department of State replied to the Secretary of Defense in a similar vein in a letter signed by w Park Armstrong Jr who was Special Assistant to the Secretary of State On 3 March 1949 Secretary of Defense Forrestal resigned worn out by his futile efforts to bring about the unification of the armed services llJ Forrestal had led the COMINT horse to water but he couldn't make it drink He was succeeded by Louis A Johnson on 28 March C Secreta Louis Johnson Creates AFSA Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff Two weeks after he took office the new Sec- retary of Defense sent a letter to Admiral Hillenkoetter on 20 May 1949 sayi g We have on this date established with the approval of the President and on advice of the War Council a unified cryptologic organization TOP 72 SEOR 8T __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ ____ l Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 T --------- - - - ---t the Armed Forces Security Agency ••• The Joint Chiefs of Staff ·••• will exercise general direction control and authority • • • • Within the Agency there will be established the Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory Council •••• This directive and its implementation will not interfere with the functions of the United States Communications Intelligence Board established by NSCID No 9 J The DCI replied that he was gratified by the assurance that the ne o · AFSA would not interfere with the functions of the USCIB because NSCID No 9 specifically involves statutory responsibilities laid upon the CIA by the National Security Act of 1947 11 85 He added that his attention had been called to a further directive r garding the COMINT structure being considered by the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Department of Defense and requested a copy § Secretary Johnson replied that the current considerations II by the JCS were merely for developing a Defense Department position which would be forwarded to the USCIB if it involved organizations outside the national military establishment 1 On the same da·t e 2 June 1949 that Louis Johnson turned down the direct request of the DCI for the document he sent the document to USCIB - • 73 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 co117s219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 itself as an attachment to a reply to an earlier ' USCIB letter on the subject of the atomic energy program of the USSR BS This provided the CIA and State a handle to raise the subject at the regular USCIB meeting on 17 June This meeting was a Donnybrook II with nose-to-nose confrontation between the military and the nonmilitary members After the meeting the DCI informed the Secretary of Defense89 that in the meeting of the Board it became evident that the National Military Establishment members are unable satisfactorily to clarify the issues 11 The letter forwarded the detailed listing of the issues and requested that the Secretary of Defense consider these problems with a view to resolving them in order that the present confusion between the responsibilities and the authority of USCIB and AFSA may be liquidated A reply was never received from the Secretary of Defense Thus the DCI and USCIB lost the first round · Admiral Earl E Stone was appointed the first director of the new Armed Forces Security Agency - 74 TeP SiCRF f - _i- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 and proceeded with the difficult task of try i ng to make the Army and the Navy work in harness CIA and the Department of State through membership in USCIB continued to levy intelligence requirements on the new organization via the USCIB intelligence committee mechanism USCIB however as an author- itative coordinator of COMINT was totally ineffective 75 - ET Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - -tor SE RET v David and Goliath While th e DCI had been deeply involved in the Washington political COMINT scene with the USCIB Charter followed by the creation of the Armed Forces Security Agency AFS the Central Intelligence Agency at home had been quietly going about the building of its technical competence and a sound and smoothly working organization In Novem- ber 1949 less than six months after the creation of AFSA there was established in CIA a COMINT organization known as the Special Research Center A Special Research Center From the beginning of COMINT in CIA the Chief Advisory Council Joseph Finnegan Captain USN considered that it would be unwise to create a command line COMINT OFganization in the Agency independent from and competing with the res t of the Agency offices such as had been done in the Army and the Navy It was decided rather to feed COMINT i nto the existing Agency structure in a secure and con olled manner to leaven the established 76 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C0 1 175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP GEC RiT activities and responsibilities of these offices The individual offices of CIA were responsible through their assistant directors for the substantive content of intelligence they produced or operations they undertook The first Chief of the Ad- visory Council was responsible for controlling and protecting the acquisition production dissemination and utilization of all COMINT within CIA as well as of the physical and personnel security of all phases of COMINT 90 He carefully refrained however from stepping into the substantive intelligence role The diverse variety of activities undertaken by CIA as well as the many-faceted types of intelligence re9eived from COMINT required a special organization if the full value of the source were to be utilized by the various offices of CIA On 30 June 1949 the Chief Advisory Council recommended to the DCI the establishment of a Special Research Center to consist of a federation of special groups assigned from ORE OSI OCD 00 OSO and OPC according to a presently approved T 0 under a Chief 77 'IOP CRE L - - - - - - - - ---' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - TOP 8f €Ri'T I who would be assisted by a staff assigned by the Chief Advisory Council Altho gh Captain Finnegan had assured the Director that The Statement of Functions of the Center ••• has received the concurrence of all Assistant Directors involved when the DCI passed the recommendation to the Executive Captain C L Winecoff USN on 2 August it was with the instruction that comments be obtained from the offices concerned Jthe Management At the behest ofj Officer _____ ---- ja senior member of the management staff walked the memorandum through the offices of five Assistant Directors on 3 August and obtained their concurrences without significant dissent A month later on 2 S ptember Captain Winecoff approved the revised statement of functions for the Advisory Council with an expanded T 0 to cover its administration of the Special Research Center Finally Captain Finnegan informed the Assistant Directors of ORE OSI oso and OPC on Later of the CIA Historick- T- - _ - - - - - - - - - - 78 - op Si SIYi' If __ _ _ _ _ _ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _ _ C01175219 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP S fCRHT 8 November that there has been established under the policy control of the Chief Advisory Council a Special Research Center SRC for Communications Intelligence Q Bl g 11 91 Present location of the SRC is 2161 The Ch ie f of the Center was to coor- dinate the activities of the groups assigned to the Center from the six interested offices control their liaison with other_government organizations ensure the security of COMINT in the Center indoctrinate and train personnel in the Center in COMINT and be the channel for CIA assistance to AFSA Under the Chief of the Center was established an Information Control Division and an Assessment and Requirements Division The former division oper- ated the teletype communications and courier routes to and from the Center anq maintained readi g and situation rooms The latter division established for the first time outside the military an independent assessment system on the value of communications intelligence Additionally it prepared periodic and long-r ge intelligence interest and priority lists The key personnel involved in the early years of the Center operation included 79 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 L _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ JI amo g others These personnel as time went on left the Special Research Center for other jobs in the Agency and carried with them their COMINT know-how and expertise to stre gthen the offices to which they went During these early formative years they did yeoman work in traini g large numbers of CIA personnel regarding the technical strengths and weaknesses of the COMINT sources On 2 November 1949 Admiral Hillenkoetter notified the State Department AFSA Army Navy and Air Force Directors of Intelligence of the establishment of the CIA Special Research Center and apprised them of its functions and invited them to maintain COMINT liaison with the SRC thro gh the Chief Advisory Council for any assistance it may be able to provide in research and evaluation or in securing selected COMINT material 1'W Exactly one month later the military services proposed the creation of a similar governmentwide Center to function under JCS control This center was intended to absorb and replace the CIA Special - 80 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 T6P S ESR F rL -------Research Center 7 Th e battle between CIA David and the military' Goliath was on B CONSIDO At the 47th meeting of USCIB on 2 December 1949 the United States Air Force presented on behalf of the three services a proposal to create a consolidated Special Information Dissemination Office CONSIDO W The services had been working on the establishment of a single intelligence organization to handle COMINT ever since the creation of AFSA in May 1949 They envisaged such an organization would be the only one in the government allowed to receive COMINT and that it would function under the JCS CONSIDO was established said the pro- posed Secretary of Defense directive in order to provide for placing under one authority the conduct of evaluation and collation of the product of the Armed Forces Security Agency and for the maintenance of liaison ••• between _AFSA and the intelligence staffs of the military departments the Department of State the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ••• CONSIDO will operate under the direction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 94 CIA and the Department of State were invited to have · 81 Approved for Release 2013 07 1 8 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 analysts in the organization They would however have no control of the o ganization other than through a priority system by which USCIB would express its priority views on nonmilitary matters Military matters were considered to be outside of USCIB and the prerogative of the military departments At the USCIB meeting which was chaired by Major General c P Cabell since it was the Air Force turn to be Chairman in the _rotating system used by USCIB the Department of State member Mr Park Armstrong indicated that the matter would require considerable study and asked that the discussion be deferred until a later date 95 The CIA staff worked vigorously through the Christmas holidays on the proposal and prepared a memorandum for USCIB members which was signed by Admiral Hillenkoetter on 12 January 1950 96 The memorandum began 'lhe proposed CONSIDO ••• adversely involves matters of vital interest to the Central Intelligence gency • • • I am compelled by my statutory responsibilities so to advise the Secretary of Defense 11 It continued It is my opinion that - 82 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 1' '01 r------- SFCRET I- AFSA and a proposed CONSIDO are derogations of the responsibilities authority and functions of USCIB The Central Intelligence Agency already has a current facility performing most of the functions proposed for CONSIDO The DCI went on to state that he had no objection to an Armed Forces Information Dissemination Office but he wanted no part of any CONSLDO which functioned under the JCS and purported to be the sole COMINT intelligence office of the government The 48th USCIB meeting held on 13 January 1950 discussed the CIA paper and a 'paper was handed out at the meeting by State which reiterated the view put forth by CIA W This meeting created an ad hoc committee chaired by Mr T Achilles Poly- zoides of State to consider the matter mittee proved the undoing of CONSIDO This com- A split soon developed in the committee among the services themselves over command and control of the CONSIDO operation and for four months the wrangling went on Navy was unwilling to give up control over dissemination to CONSIDO The FBI' was unwilling to_ give up control of its personnel assigned to the 83 TOP SflORET '--------------- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ____-_ TOP MSCRF c e 1 organization· 99 The Army wanted its man General Carter W Clarke to be Director The Army and Navy welcomed JCS control 100 whereas all other USCIB members preferred USCIB control After considering · the matter several times the USCIB on 14 July 1950 removed the item from the agenda· 101 dead CONSIDO was ' he CIA Special Research Center continued on David had won the first round 'lOP Sf QR FT l Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I Of SffiRET VI · Th e ·Brownell Conunitt ee The Brownell Committee was established on 28 December 1951 at the direction of the President to make a survey of the communications intelligence activities of the governme t The findings of this committee had greater impact on COMINT activities than any similar study before or since for this impact were twofold The reasons First the Director ' of Central Intelligence Walter Bedell Smith the Secretary of State Dean G Acheson and the Secretary of Defense Robert A Lovett were strongwilled personalities who were determined to see some action Second the responsible military op- erational COMINT authorities were tired of the inefficiency and internecine infighting among the services that had gone on for some three years All parties were therefore anxious for a change A Milieu The events of the past three years had been traumatic l L _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ - 85 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 COMINT had ' - not predicted the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 but it did become the keystone of US operational planning after the United States entered the conflict on 30 June 1950 In the early part of the Korean War COMINT provided the US commanders with a first-rate picture of North Korean plans and capabilities and although the North Koreans gradually tightened up communications security COMINT remained the principal source of intelligence for three years until 27 July 1953 when the armistice was signed at Panmunjom B Impact The Brownell Committee Report thus came at a propitious time and produced major results viz the creation of the National Security Agency NSA and the revision of the governmental· COMINT structure through a completely new National Security Council Intelligence Directive No 9 NSCID No 9 Even so COMINT remained an independent int elligence empire separate from the rest of the intelligence community and functioning under the Secretary of Defense i - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 The DCI was given another hat Under his old hat he was the czar of the non-COMINT intelligence community and Chairman of the Intelligence Advisory Committee which was subordinate to him Under his new hat he was also made permanent Chairman of the USCIB This latter hat bestowed more prestige than authority since control still really rested with the Secretary of Defense who was made the executive agent for US COMINT activities c How the Brownell Committee Came About When General Walter Bedell Smith became DCI on 7 October 1950 one of the earliest problems to come to his attention was the difficulty then current in the govemment's communications intelligence operation US forces had entered the Korean conflict three months earlier The atmosphere of bickering among the services CIA and State that had prevailed for the past three years was beginning to change to a war-team spirit The bureaucratic structure however designed under divisiveness precluded pulling together - - USCIB and AFSA were 87 - I Of SllCR F ________________ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 both ineffective The COMINT effort was at a low ebb Adding to the gloom was the COMINT security problemJ - - Th e treason of Whittaker Chambers Allan Nunn May the atomic spies and especially Judith Coplan in the Department of Justice gave evidence of Russian penetration of our most closely guarded secrets was penetrated COMINT suspected that it too Even more it could feel the pene- tration but it couldn't find it 102 Thus Smith came on the intell i gence stage at a critical time and he came with the proper connections President Truman made General Eisenhower' s old Chief of Staff and confidant General Walter Bedell Smith a man of personality power and prestige -- his Director of Central Intelligence On the recommendation of William Jackson Smith persuaded Kingman Douglass to come back to BB - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 CIA from his New York investment firm to assist him for a couple of years Douglass had been in air intelligence in London during World War II and had helped in reorganiz g OSS Douglass took over the functions performed by Dr Horace D Pete Craig who had served briefly in the latter part of 1950 as Chief of the Advisory Council and even more briefly as Assistant Director of the successor component the Office of Special Services from 1 December 1950 General Smith named Douglass to succeed Craig as Assistant Director of OSS on 4 January 1951 Eleven days later on 15 January Smith renamed OSS the Office of Current Intelligence with Douglass as AD Do glass retained the responsibility of bei 1 g the CIA COMINT Officer and thus had two hats Under one hat he was responsible for producing current intelligence and under the other he was responsible for advis g the DCI on COMINT community matters and for controlling COMINT within the Agency Kingman Do glass immediately undertook a studyl03 of community COMINT problems and on 20 October 1951 See Ch apter II c · above - T6P 89 - SESIU T'L ___ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 sent a memorandum to the DCI stati g There is an u gent need for a fresh look at the entire communications intelligence picture The study re- sulted in a letter to the National Security Council from Smith stating The DCI herewith advises the National Security Council that he is gravely concerned as to the security and effectiveness with which the Communications Intelligence activities of the Government are being conducted 104 James s Lay Jr Executive Secretary of the National Security Council on 13 December 1951 advised the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense that the President had approved the survey 105 Within two weeks a letter signed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State naming the addressees as members of an ad hoo committee was sent to Mr George A Brownell Mr Charles E Bohlen Brigadier General John Magruder USA Ret and Mr William H Jackson 106 Within the next few months a small staff was selected headed by Mr Benjamin Shute - 90 TO Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP SECR T- D 'Ihe Report The committee met during the spring and summer of 1952 and had formal interviews with 43 witnesses and a large nwnber of informal conferences with other individuals On 13 June 1952 the committee submitted its report to the Secretaries of Defense and State 107 The report was a masterpiece of its kind It was broken into five parts I A Brief History of the Communi- cations Intelligence in the United States II III IV v The Value of Communications Intelligence The Present Organization How the Organization Operates Including Its Size Cost Priorities Processing Dissemination Cryptography and Security Conclusions and Recommendations -- recommendations as to changes in the organization below within and above the AFSA level The Committee conclusions and reconunendations changed the course of history insofar as US COMINT was concerned They noted the vital importance to national defense of COMINT particularly in times 91 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOf SECRET of war They also noted the present lack of success in the COMINT field compared with what we had had up to 19 46 11 They brought out the point that in place of the Army and Navy organizations that existed in World War II there now were four COMINT o ganizations since Air Force and AFSA had been added AFSA had no authority over the service units each of which was independent The Committee re- commended strongly that AFSA should be made the keystone of the COMINT organization that its director should serve for lo ger than two years and that he should be military rather than civilian They recommended also that the Department of Defense should be the executive agent of the government to man ge COMINT that AFSAC should be abolished and USCIB substantially changed With respect to USCIB they recoB111ended that the DCI should be chairman and that representatives of Defense State FBI and AFSA should be the members They also recom- mended that the Director of AFSA should report to the USCIB orally or in writi g regarding any new major policy or program· 108 92 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 T These reconmendations were accepted by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI except for one major point The three military services were kept on the USCIB as members rather than being represented by ·a single member of the Department of Defense 109 To insure that there would be no slippage in the implementation of these recommendations General John Magruder was appointed by the Secretary of Defense as his personal representative and board member The Brownell Report was submitted on 13 June 1952 within six months -- a record in Washington 110 It became the law of the land when the revised NSCID No 9 was completed The report of the Brownell Committee was an earthquake that not only shook the governmental COMINT structure it toppled it It changed USCIB it changed the responsibilities of the DCI it revised the role of the military services and it led to the creation of the National Security Agency on 4 November 1952 - 93 7 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - Of SECRET • - USCIB Acts E In the fall of 1952 the United States Communications Intelligence Board under the chairmanship of Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith started to implement the recommendations of the Brownell Committee It had taken over six months of squab- 'bli g to draft the original NSCID No 9 in 1948 Now within a period of weeks NSCID No 9 was completely rewritten by USCIB in accordance with the Brownell recommendations and issued on 29 December 1952 In the new NSCID No 9 communications intelligence activities were made a national responsibility A Special Committee of the NSC for COMINT was created consisti g of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense who with the assistance of the DCI were to establish policies governing COMINT The Department of Defense was designated as the executive agent of the government for the production of COMINT USCIB was reconstituted as See Volume IV General Appendixes · 94 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C0 1 175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 a body under the Special Committee consisti g of the DCI as Ch ai rman and representatives of State Defense the FBI NSA the services and CIA Re- commendations of USCIB were binding on the Secretary of Defense The Director of NSA was placed under the direction of the Secretary of Defense but was cha ged with making reports to the board from time to time as requested The board was charged with coordinating COMINT formulating policies concerning COMINT relations with foreign governments and establishing intelligence requirements for NSA and security standards and practices for all departments The NSCID incorporated a Directive to the Secretary of Defense establishing the COMINT mission of the NSA 11 to provide an effective unified organ- ization and control of the communications intelligence activities of the United States 111 The Director of NSA DIRNSA was to be of three star rank and to serve for four years and was given the power to issue mandatory instructions to the military services subject only to appeal to the Secretary of Defense He was also charged with pre- scribing requisite security regulations for elements - 95 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - - - _-_TQP SECB EIJ ________________-- under his operational or technical control including inspections if necessary The DIRNSA could at his discretion delegate direct operational control to field commanders otherwise all COMINT activities were under his control The Director was given a civilian deputy to ensure the effective employment of available human and scientific resources Noth- ing in the directive was to contravene the respon- sibilities of the individual departments for the evaluation and dissemination of finished intelligen e based on COMINT Finally the directive rec- ognized th at the special nature of COMINT activities requires that they be treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities Orders Directives policies or recommendations of any authority of the Executive Branch ••• shall not ·be applicable to COMINT activities unless specifically so stated and issued by competent authority represented on the Board Other NSC Intelligence Directives to the DCI and related implementing Directives issued by the DCI shall be construed as nonapplicable to COMINT activities unless the NSC has made its Directive specifically applicable to COMINT • 112 - 9G Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 F The Community Carries On The intelligence community set about with_good will and with vigor to implement the new NSCID No 9 Changes as drastic as these did not come about easily In particular the military services had difficulty in knuckling under to the Director of NSA At the 80th meeti g of USCIB on 28 November 1952 Major General R J Canine sat for the first time with his new hat as the Director of the National Security Agency replacing that of Director of AFSA The role of the DCI was somewhat strengthened in that he was made pe rmanent Chairman of USCIB The Brownell Committee had considered and rejected recommendations that COMINT activities be put under a civilian rather than a military structure COMINT rema ned therefore as an empire unto itself functioning outside of the Intelligence Advisory Committee structure and reporting to the Special Committee of the National Security Council directly rather than through the DCI TOf S E ___ _ _ _ _ _ ___ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 G Huntington D Sheldon The month after the Brownell Committee com- pleted its report June 1952 Kingman Douglass having completed his _government stint for Smith returned to his business and was replaced by Mr Huntington D Sheldon 12 July t What the Brownell Report did in a short time for the COMINT community as a whole Huntington D Sheldon did over many years for COMINT in CIA Douglass had known Sheldon in London during World War II when they were both on the Air Intelligence Staff and he recruited Sheldon to come to Washington to replace him inte ligence officer Sheldon stayed on as a career His impact on the Central Intelligence Agency and on the intelligence community during the 18 years from 1952 to 1970 was great An able administrator and a seasoned intel- ligence officer he filled three senior ·governmental intelligence positions simultaneously during much of his career As Assistant Director of Current In- telligence AD CI he was responsible for the intelligence provided to Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy on a daily basis - 98 He built the Office of Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - _ I TOr _ _1 'T • Current Intell gence during his ten years of stewardshi p from 1952 to 1962 into a team of intelligence experts who were respected th ro ghout the government In his capacity as AD CI Mr Sheldon inherited responsibility for the operation of the Special Center On 15 September 1958 he was des gnated CIA COMINT Officer to 1 advise and assist the Director in formulating implementing and coordinating COMINT policies 2 coordinate the CIA COMINT program 3 provide centralized guidance for the conduct of CIA COMINT activities and 4 act for the DCI in COMINT matters as appropriate 113 In May 1954 he was instrumental in the reconstitution by the IAC of the Watch Committee under CIA chairmanship and in July of the same year of - the activation of the National Indications Center NIC by Director of Central Intelligence Directive DCID 1 2 The Center was housed originally in Que Building within Sheldon's Office of Current Intelligence and later moved to special quarters in the basement of the Pentagon The NIC staff sup- ported the Chairman of the USIB Watch Committee a job filled by the Deputy Director of Central - 9 9 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 Intell gence When Lieutenant General Charles P Cabell USAF retired as Deputy DCI in January 1962 Sheldon was designated chairman of the USIB watch Committee a position which he held for eight years until his retirement on 9 January 1970 From April 1962 to November 1963 Sheldon '• r 1' served as Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence DDI prior to becoming Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Research DDR This office title was changed to Deputy Director for Science and Technology DD S T in August 1963 Some time after Sheldon transferred to the DOR his Special Intelligence Staff which supported him as CIA SIGINT Officer was also transferred from the Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence to the Office of the DD S T The Special Intelligence Staff SPINT under Sheldon remained at tached to the DD S T for rations and quarters for eight years until 1970 It was disbanded as a staff on On 8 June 1962 following the consolidation of the USIB subcommittees for COMINT and ELINT his status was changed from CIA' COMINT to CIA SIGINT Officer effective 28 May • 100 - - Toi SEQRET C Approved for Release 2013 07 18 a r·l • 4 ' I C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 2 February 1970 and its functions were reabsorbed by the DOI Information Requirements Staff The mantle of the SIGINT Officer had been assumed on 1 November 1969 by Mr Edward Proctor Assistant to the DOIi oeputy Chief SPINT became Mr Proctor's Special SIGINT Advisor The Special Intelligence Staff was thus closely associated with Sheldon in the direction of COMINT and later SIG INT during much of his Agency career - 101 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - ----------- Appendix A CIA SIGINT Officers Officer and Title From To 16 Aug 46 13 Dec 46 Acting Chief Advisory Council 13 Dec 46 9 Jan 47 Acting Chief Advisory Council 9 Jan 47 6 May 47 May 47 7 Aug 50 Chief Advisory Council 9 Oct 50 1 Dec 50 Assistant Director Office of Special Services 1 Dec 50 4 Jan 51 4 Jan 51 15 Jan 51 15 Jan 51 11 Jul 52 Assistant Director OCI 12 Jul 52 23 Apr 62 Assistant DDI 23 Apr 62 4 Nov 63 CIA COMINT Officer 31 Oct 58 28 May 62 28 May 62 1 Nov 69 Captain Thomas F Cullen USNR Chief Advisory Council Conunander Rufus L Taylor USN Captain Joseph Finnegan USN Chief Advisory Council 6 Horace A Craig Kingman Douglass Assistant Director OSS Assistant Director Office of Current Intelligence Huntington D Sheldon CIA SIGINT Officer 102 - T _____ _ _ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ____ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l TOP S SCRET I Appendix B COMINT Codewords 1944-70 - 103 I • • • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 0 0 1-1 1-1 -- u N - 1-1 I D Appendix C Chronology Intelligence Conununity CIA 1945 'O 'O a a 20 Dec ANCIB becomes STANCIB with addition of Dept of State 0 11 -- X a 0 D 6 Aug Hiroshima 0 1 O O 10 Mar ANCIB established D lb II World Events C 0 0 Ill lb II Ill -------------------------------- 1946 I 0 - -- 22 Jan President Truman c 0 ---1 creates CIG Cl 23 Jan Rear Adm Sidney d ers USNR appoint- I 10 Jun Lt Gen Hoyt s Vandenberg USA AAF becomes DCI 1-9 Jul CIG Advisory Council established for COMINT I --13 Jun STANCIB becomes USCIB FBI becomes member 31 Jul CIG becomes member of USCIB DCI Vandenberg elected Chairman 0 I-' - Jl N I-' 0 CIA World Events Intelligence Community 1946 Contd O O a tia o' - 0 CD iii II en I J 0 I-' 0 U1 16 Aug Capt Thomas F Cullen USNR appointed Chief Advisory Council O O Nov USCIB authorizes CIG tc receive two copies of COMINT Diplomatic Summary o' a t CD iii 16 Dec Cmdr Rufus L II 1 1 Taylor USN appointed Acting Chief Advisory Council CD I J 0 w § 1947 0 0 Jan appoin'tea Xct ing Chief Advisory Council 9 Mar CIG sends editor to Diplomatic Summary Staff 3 1 May Rear Adm Roscoe H Hillenkoetter USN becomes DCI pr Joint Counter- intelligence Center started at Nebraska Ave Navy Installation by CIG pr ASA star__j §_process1 n Russianl _ _ __ a-e--Plmtagon - J w i - -- e v e ' people g 1--1 1--1 - u I' 1--1 CIA Intelligence Community World Events 1947 Contd 6 May Capt Joseph Finnegan USN appointed Chief Advisory Council 't J 't J a 26 a persons in CIG only 11 regularly see COMINT a a en iii n Ill 0 l O'I 1 a --m 'C 'C a en May Of 50 indoctrinated I 0 a en ------------------------------ iii n 1948 Ill 1 Apr USSR interferes wi traffic between Berlin an' West Germany 27 Apr USCIB approves dissemination of COMINT to CIA 26 Jun US launches Berlin airlift 1 Jul NSCID No 9 reconstitutes useIB under NSC 19 Oct Pol ygraph made requirement for all CIA COMINT'ers a l I a ---a c --ex 0 f--l f--l - fl N f--l 0 Intelligence Community CIA ----------------------------a I C ----------------------------- o' - u ii ' II I I J 0 -------------------------------- Nov USCIB Directive No 1 establishes Intelligence Committee 'C 'C I 1948 Cont World Events · 1949 'C 'C D --------------------------------- 1 28 Mar Louis-Johnson I-' p succeeds Forrestal as Secretary of Defense - J C 0 - u D I II en I J -- u 0 -- CD 20 May AFSA created by JCS 2010 Jul Joint Counterintelligence Center moved to CIA Sep Arlington Hall suspects security leak 25 Apr German Federal Rep 0 established in Bonn § 12 May Berlin Blockade li -- -- u CD 0 0 f l f l ---J u N f l 0 CIA Intelligence Community World Events 1949 Contd O 23 Sep USSR atom bomb announced 0 l Oct Chinese People's Republic proclaimed in Peking -0 a O 0 I m Q u N 0 w a CD O 7 Oct German Democratic _ Republic GDR establishe4 in Soviet Zone p 00 2 Nov DCI announces to Directors of Intelligence for IAC Agencies and AFSA the establishment of the Special Research Center under the Chief Advisory Council 2 Dec CONSIDO considered by USCIB 1950 Mar Judith Coplon convicted of espionage 2 I Q 0 0 D m m u N 0 a --- J CXl n 0 1--l 1---l _J J 1 N 1--l 7 Intelligence conununity CIA ----------------------------20 Jun 1950 Contd World Events -------------------------------- 81' 2 'O -0 'O 'O 25 Jun North Korea invade South Korea 1 a o' 0 1 iD Ill UI D 30 Jun US ground forces e conflict in Korea ·J I-' a 0 0 1 1 Ill UI 0 lO 14 Jul USCIB kills CONSIDO proposal N 0 I N 0 u -- Sep Gen George C Marshall succeeds Johnson as Secretary of Defense m 7 Oct Lt Gen Walter B Smith sworn in as DCI 9 Oct Horace S Craig appointed Chief Advisory Council § m 0 0 I-' I-' - J J'1 N I-' li CIA World Events Intelligence Community 1950 Contd O O Nov CIA sends personnel tc work at AFSA on Russian I a 0 - 0 CD iii OJ UI CD N 0 _ c l 0 _ _ • 26 Nov Chinese cross the Dec AFSA strength 5 000 people AD CD Cl CD iii OJ Ill CD N 0 _ _ _ 1951 15 Jan OSS renamed Office of Current Intelligence1 Douglass continues as a o oss 4 Jan Kingman Douglass named AD SS O 0 - 1 Dec Advisory Council disestablished functions transferred to proposed Office of Special Servo ices £ormer Chief 1 Advisory Council designated Assistant Director X Yalu 'C CD 0 0 I---' I---' J u I---' ° CIA Intelligence Community World Events 1951 Contd 'O 'O 'O a 'O a CD a I a 0 0 o I ii Ill u o CD Aug Gen Ralph J Canine becomes director of AFSA II II u I 0 8 Sep US signs peace and security treaties with Japan § CD 28 Dec Brownell Committee established to survey COMINT activities of the US Government 0 1952 27 May European Defense Community treaties signe in Paris 13 Jun Brownell Committee Report submitted I 0 0 0 I-' I-' -J u N I-' I O Intelligence Community CIA ----------------------------- World Events 19 52 Contd 12 Jul Huntington o Sheldon replaces Douglass as AD CI C C C C 4 0 29 Dec NSCID No 9 revised Nov NSA replaces AFSA - 11 0 - o ----------------------------- 11 D m II 11 N 0 25 0 0 - o 1953 11 11 20 Jan Gen Dwight D Ei I-' I-' N hewer becomes President II II N 0 w 1 -- 26 Feb Allen W Dulles 0 sworn in as DCI 5 Mar Stalin dies 27 Jul Korean Armistice 12 Aug USSR H-Bomb explo 12 Sep Khrushchev named secretary Communist Par USSR 0 0 0 f l f l - J u N f l 0 ----------------------------- 1954 -------------------------------- tJ tJ 'O a 25 Feb Nasser talces over Egypt 1 a 0 0 m iii 111 Ill 11 I 0 § World Events Intelligence Community CIA - H Marshall Chadwell AD SI named CIA ELINT ·1 Staff Officer ESO w 0 I-' I-' 'O 0 1 D Q Ill 11 May National Indications Center established by DCID 1 2 to be located in 19 May us and Pakistan si Q Building defense agreement I I 0 w -0 XJ O 3 Jun USCIB approves plan to provide US cipher equipment to NATO 20 Jul Dr Otto John defe GDR 0 J JI N '-0 Intelligence Community CIA 1954 Contd ------------------------------- -- 3-6 Sep Quemoy and Matsu shelled by Comnunist Chin O O Oct Nine power conference in London agrees to admit West Germany to NATO D a 0 a D iD 1 I-' 5 Nov Land Panel recommends a I a 0 D ' w § 1 u-2 0 24 Nov iresident Ejenhower approve 0 0 ----------------------------- 1955 ---- --- - ------- ----- -------- May Berlin Tunnel becomes operational a m 1 I-' - 1J 1J a I Nov Digging of Berlin Tunnel started m 1 World Events 14 May Warsaw Pact signed 16 May NSCID No 17 issued as ELINT charter 18-23 Jul Four power summ conference in Geneva Sep West Germany and USSR establish diplomatic rela 0 0 I-' I-' - J JI N I-' ° CIA Intelligence Community World Events 1956 23 Apr Berlin Tunnel discovered O O a a I m Q en I I 0 a O a D 0 - 0 O l I t D 0 0 ti I ro D Jun First U-2 flights USSR over en 1 26 Jul Egypt nationalize Suez Canal I w 0 -0 co O 23-24 Oct Revolt in Buda 29 Oct Israel invades E I o 0 1-1 - J1 N 1-1 World Events Intelligence Community CIA ----------------------------- 1957 ------------------------------ 1 C O O O - 0 a 0 - o Cl ii' m I ' I 26 Aug QSSR announces successful ICBM test flight 0 - o Cl m • I-' I I ' 0 0 -- 0 - J CX Cl a I -- a _Fall NSA startsl contract for Russian linguists CX I Fall NSA assigned responsibility for CRITICOM Net 24 Oct President's Board of consultants recommends that USCIB and IAC be merged DCI does not approve because USCIB IAC members disagree 4 Oct USSR launches Sputnik satellite 0 0 f---1 f---1 - J u N f---1 Intelligence Community CIA ---------------------------- I 0 - a DI I I ' 0 -- X O O a Nov NSA starts ci-Yilian operator program ia I ------------------------------- Nov NSA moves to Ft Meade O O - 0 0 1957 Contd World Events ----------------------------- I-' I-' -- J '' --------- - 1958 a a ------------------------------- Jan Baker Panel dampens hope of solving high-level Soviet ciphers 0 - 0 a io D I 31 Jan US orbits Explorer ' 0 Feb NSA global communications automated X 3 Mar CIBD No 17 establishes ELINT Committee under USCIB 13 Mar By direction of President Eisenhower NSC Action 1873 f combines USCIB and IAC 15 Jul us marines ordered Beirut to protect indepen of Lebanon 0 1-1 1-1 J u 1-1 0 CIA Intelligence Community World Events 1958 Contd 15 Sep Sheldon designated CIA COMINT Officer 'O 'O a Ct 1 Ct o' Oct ELINT Committee established under USIB o a Q o' - Ql -0 -0 23 Sep First USIB meeting Ct Q ii 15 Sep NSCID No 6 establishes USIB replacing USCIB and IAC - o ti I-' I-' Ct Dl 1959 co I J 0 _ Jan Castro taJces over Cuban Government 23 I I J 0 _ 23 - _ CD CD Apr Work starts on COMINT Objectives List Sep Khrushchev visits US -- - - --- --- --- --- - --- 1960 Jan USIB requests COMINT Committee to review the US program 0 0 I-' 1---1 - u N 1---1 World Events Intelligence community CIA · 1960 Contd 13 Feb First French nucl device detonated O O • a ii 0 o' - -- -- - J gets under O O a Mar COMINT Requirements List 400 List completed D 0 o' - 1 May U-2 shot down over 0 m •I USSR 1 Ill I-' I-' 10 11 Jul USSR downs US RB- 0 in I l Ill I plane over Barents Sea I 0 L - X D 1 I 0 L Aug NSA employees Martin and Mitchell defect to USSR Aug USSR recalls technic from China § L Cl Aug KH-I flies Nov USIB approves 400item COMINT Requirements List 1961 c ---------------------------3 Jan US breaks diplomat· relations with Cuba 17 Apr Bay of Pigs 0 I-' 1--1 J Ul N I-' '- 0 r Worl d Events Intelligence Community CIA ----------------------------- 1961 Contd ------------------------------May Castro declares Cube a socialist nation 1 C C a Aug DIA charter issued D 12-18 Aug GDR erects Berl wall a o' - o D m II 6 Sep NIC established 0 1 a w 0 OJ c5 a o' - D CIA moves to new Headquarters Bldg IV a o I D O O D II II ' a 29 Nov John A McCone succeeds Dulles as DCI ----------------------------- 1962 --------------------------------· 10 Feb Khrushchev propose IS-nation disarmament conference 14 Feb Richard Bissell resigns as DDP effective 17 Feb 16 Feb Herbert Scoville named DOR effective 19 Feb I --- - - OJ gl 1---1 1---1 - Ul N 1---1 0 CIA Intelligence Col11Illunity ------------------------------ 1962 Contd · ----------------------------18 Mar -F ranco-Algerian cease-fire agreement 'O 'O a D Ill N 0 30 Mar Sheldon leaves OCI 0 - m Ill 'O O D o World Events 1 D to become Acting DDI a 23 Apr Sheldon named o Assistant DOI m Ill 0 - D I-' I-' a 1 30 Aer COMINT Committee D combined with ELINT Committee new SIGINT Committee chaired by Gen Samford at first meeting in May 0 a I 28 May Sheldon named CIA SIGINT Officer 3 Jul France proclaims Algerian inqependence 20 Jul Geneva Conference guarantees independence of Laos I · - - - - - ·- --- --·- · 0 0 f l f l -J u N f l i 0 1 Intelligence Conununity CIA World Events 1962 Contdl 30 Jul Office of ELINT tab__l_ished_jJ DDR under I 22 Oct President Kennedy m o' announces Soviet missiles in Cuba 0 m a 0 I iii D 1 I '_ 0 _ ·I 0 m 1963 a iii D U l'J 14 Jan De Gaulle vetoes British membership in Common Market ' May Penkovsky trial and execution _ CD 10 Jun Collection Guidance Staff established 30 Jun Philby granted asylum in USSR 23 Jul NSA spy Jack E Dunlap conunits suicide 5 Aug DOR becomes DD S T I I 0w 0 CD 0 0 f---1 f---1 - J1 N f---1 t O CIA Intelligence Conununity 1963 Contd Oi 30 Aul Washington-Moscow hot ine activated • C C a 0 o m m en D ' 1 Nov President Diem assassinated in South Vietnam coup 4 Nov Sheldon named Special Assistant to DD S T continues as CIA SIGINT Officer D II World Events _____________________________ I • a 'C 'C D a 0 o m D m 22 Nov President Kennedy assassinated I-' I w 0 1964 w 0 Feb US increases strengti in Vietnam from 75 000 t 125 000 a 9 Jul SPINT transferred from DOI to DD S T 2-4 Aug Tonkin Gulf incic en ' 0 w 0 -- J -- a 0 0 I--' I--' - u I'- I--' 0 Intelligence Community CIA · World Events 1964 Cont 15 Oct Khrushchev deposed in USSR C C 16 Oct Communist China reports first successful test of nuclear device D a 0 - o 11 ·J II II in I 0 ---1 -CD -f ----------------------------- 1965 ------------------------------- a a 0 - o I I II 12 Feb Sheldon succeeds Gen Sa mford as Chairman of SIGINT Committee I 0 28 Apr us intervenes in Dominican Revolution 28 Apr Vice Admiral William F Raborn Jr USN Ret becomes DCI w 0 CD 10 Aug NSAM No 337 directs reduction of US dependence on SIGINT bases in - j Sep OSP satellites separated from OSA planes C C 30 Sep Communist coup in Indonesia aborted gl i l ' i l -- J J1 N i l 0 r CIA Intelligence Community World Events 1966 21 Jan Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee established C C a - 0 C -0 a 30 Jun Richard Helms becomes DCI D C 0 D D QI II N 0 l Jul France withdraws armed forces from NATO I-' N Ul o' 0 D in QI II N 1967 5-10 Jun Six-day ArabIsraeli war -- w 0 -- en Jul-Aug Eaton Panel named to review national SIGINT effort 0 0 30 Aug SIGINT Organization Study Group SOSG reports on SIGINT in CIA 1968 23 Jan USS Pueblo captur n 0 1--1 l J 1 N 1--1 I O CIA Irtte·1 1igenc·e· Commu·n i·ty ----------------- ----- ------ World Events 1968 Contd 30 Jan Tet offensive in South Vietnam C C a 31 Mar President Johnson restricts bombing of North Vietnam m C 0 0 m m ll ' UI I N § _ _ C 0 ID iD m II D 10 May Opening of Paris peace negotiations betw US and North Vietnam u a m 0 May National Intelligence Resources Board established 0 _ _ 0 C C I 0 u § CX 16 Aug Eaton reports to DCI 20-21 Aug Soviet troops invade Czechoslovakia 1969 15 Apr North Korea downs unarmed US reconnaissance - - plane 0 0 1---1 1---1 - J u l'v 1---1 0 CIA 28 Apr De Gaulle resigns as President of France O O 8 Jun President Nixon initiates withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam a D C 0 - c m iii fl Ill $1 I 1 --------------- 3 I N Sep Ho Chi Minh Presi '1 of North Vietnam dies N 0 w - 0 0 World Events Intelligence Community 1969 Contd g_ trj 0 - c Cl D fl Ill N 0 0 0 1970 2 Feb --w -- 1 Nov Edward w Proctor named CIA SIGINT Officer in addition to duties as ADDI 12 Jan SPINT Staff abolished effective C C 0 C01175219 ---- --- --· Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I Of SEC li ci Appendix D Source References yep SECRF t fL_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 1co117s219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TO' P SflGRE' P I - · 129 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - 130 - TOP gQP iTcl -- - - - -- - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 co1175219 I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I I - 131 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'l'• -- 10 SFCRRT 132 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - 133 11' 't'61'PP 'iSSl C BR RJT J I_ _ _ _ __ _ _ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _JI C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l'OP 1'iCBET 134 - b ____________ -S CtlP SECB E'T' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'I OP M GRi T 1 - 135 7_ - 'l'OP S'ECR ET L_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 136 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 T • 1 - 137 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ET 13 - 'lbr SSGP FT I - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 · Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -- I I 1 - Top c et • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'r C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 CIA •HISTORICAL STAFF The DCI Historical Series The History of SIGINT in the Central Intelligence Agency 1947-70 Volume II - DCl-4 ___ _____ October 1971 Copy No 2 of 3 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 i Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I ·1 r·1 I - t ' • f • · j - I ' I t j i - ·i ' l 1 DCI HISTORICAL SERIES l• I • ' DCI-4 I• I l THE HI STORY OF SIG INT IN TijE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY· VOLUME II - I f • • r I • ' - 'I • -- I by l - ·' ' · J 1· j • ' I October 1971 1· I ' •' •I ' If I l l ' 1· ' 1• HtSTOR iCAL ST AFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ' ll I • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 1947-70 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - I • ' l 1• L • I • I• A Note on Classification l • ' I f• I f • ' j - I- f• I ' l l• L 1 l • I I 'I l • l • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ·t • l I I ' I ' I I Contents ' I l j ·i i ' Page 1 Director of the National Security Agency • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2 B• A Taste of Honey • • • • • • • • • • • I I 3 c The October Surveys 6 Ir D The Need for Strat gic Waming • • • • 8 E Order-of-Battle i I A • I• The Dark Ages l i r - ' r• I us Versus USSR F ' COMINT in the Doldrums ' II A CIA -Pressure on NSA The Erskine Exchange D DCI l E -l · I • I 7 · 1 l I l I 1 L 1 • • • I • -- We Want the l_ __ • • 18 • • III • • 20 • • 22 I • • • • 25 I· • • F ' ' - • 14 • 16 • • • • 16 B c • 10 The Robertson Survey of NSA • • • 27 G• The Baker Panel Inves t ga tes the 1 - i Problem • • • • • • • 29 A Candle in the Dark • • 32 • • • • A • • • • • 32 • • • B • 35 • --- c CIA - - iii TOP S CB E CL __ _ _ __ j_ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • • • • • • • • 36 _ _ _ _ _ ___ C0117521 9 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 j'' _ ' • y j I j - - - - - - 0_-_ P_S_FCRf l ·i' 1 • I j ' I • Page •• l • ' Cloud on the Horizon E The Becker-Canine greement ' I I 39 • • • • • IV ' I D 42 45 A 45 B 46 c 48 ' t J • so D E I 51 F I 52 '· ' l v ' 1 ' 1 I Fellow ts COMINT A ' he Other c COMINT Direct Support for CIA Operations • • • • • • • • • 66 CGIINT Utilization by the Clandestine Service 67 58 • I · I • • · - · • D I •• ' i C VI ' - t 1 r · I •• 1 •• I _ I • ' - iv j ' t • ' - - _ Gt SEGP F-T Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' t C01175219 r •I • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 T rot SiCRd ' - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - -- f ' l VII l ' l I ' j - -·' - ' ' I I I • VIII F COMMO ·and DDP Teamwork • • • • • • • • 78 One Plus One Equals One • • • A Don't Rock the Boat B Killian Rocks th e Boat c uscm Versus Killian D 'l'h e E ArJl' Y Spearheads the Counterattack • • • 84 F USCIB Goes on Record G Dulles Agrees with USCIB H Ike and Killian Kill USCIB B • f • I i C I ' ' - -• I • • • • • • 80 81 83 • • • 83 86 • 89 • 90 • • • 92 A Law Unto Itself No Lo ger • • • • • • 93 • Complexities of USCIB Decision Maki g 95 Influence • • • • • 98 Appendixes · ' I - 80 • • Truscott Memorandum Th e Millenium A • • • • • A Source References • • • • • • • 101 ' - •• I • - ' r I L 1 L I l - I • - - i OtJ f- S Bl i C JRtE T I JL liiii - - - - - - - - - J l Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 '' 'f I • I r ' i l• The History of SIGINT in the Central Intelligence Agency 1947-70 ' 'I Volume II 11' I ' I The Dark Ages The early 1950's were the dark ages for communications intelligence r I Intelligence officers who had been accustomed to providing solid information not only on the capabil-ities but also on I the intentions of the enemy duri g World War II ' I' 1 t i timates based on_ frail fragments of information rather than factual foreknowledge I d lf • were reduc'e d to providing the government with es- The ciphers · of China as she crossed the Yalu in November 1950 1 7 I t · l •I • The conmunicat ons of our threatening adversary Russia •- 1· ' ' · i ' ·1 • I j J I 1 •1 I '1 I I• I effectively cut off other sources of intelligence Early in the decade the Brownell Committee addressed itself to straightening out the bureaucratic disarray of the multiple US COMINT efforts The seed of service unification planted by Secre- I ' l tary of Defense James Porrestal five years earlier - - TOP SB'21 EI I 1· '---- - - - - - -- - - - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ·I ' UP •I j D 'T'I I t · ' I ' 1 'I • ' j ' j 1 was put to harvest by Browneil and resulted in the National Security Agency NSA in November 1952 • · A Director of the National s curity· Agency The Director of the National Security Agency DIRNSA was charged with making the Anny the Navy and the Air Force pull in harness as a COMINT team a formidable task and one which was to come about only gradually during the next decade The first driver 1of the team was a fortunate choice the Director t • of AFSA Lieutenant General Ralph J Canine who served s •• as Director -of the NSA from its creation on 4 November 1952 to November 1956 Canine was a go-getter with a I brassy effective no-nonsense style - i r •• 1 During the al- most five years of his tenure he raised the morale the calibre and the competence of · NSA personnel and in 1956 moved NSA· from jammed inadequate- quarters at Arlington Hall into fficient new quarters at Fort Meade I I He vastly improved the timeliness and effec- tiveness of communications intelligence in support of military operations by decentralizing COMINT processing from Washi gton to overseas field posts l and through the years raised the National Security l i Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 iI Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r • 1 ET -- 1 ' l • f • I Agency from a second-rate to a first-rate organiza- I l tion These changes were gradual and hard to come 1 I by however and this chapter is the story of his 1• travails rather than his triumphs I • I Despite the organizational and admini·strative improvements made by Canine NSA remained unable i to fulfill its nwnber one objecti f-- - - -- ------ 1 B A •Taste of Honey D ring World War II COMINT made tremendous • contributions to the allied victories j 1 • t •• 't ·• ·• • l - - f I • battle over Britain the desert war in Africa and the naval war in the Pacific were fought with fore- knowledge of enemy intentions Nearly all German and Japanese military systems were read on a con- tinuing basis J Li The air Additionally throughout the war almost complete knowledge of axis diplomatic correspondence was available to allied governmental leaders giving the long-range strategic plans of I' • the axis' powers At the end of the war the German and Japan I L ese military material ceased to exist 3 L Approved for Release 2013 07 18 United C01175219 1 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 '- ' OP SECRET ' r ' States cryptanalytic efforts were then directed j f• principally at Russia co unications Many of I l f 1 ' l t • t I • •' ' I t ''' f I I _3 I I ' l I --- COMINT organization concentrated on this prob- lem and vastly expanded its interception and pr cessing activities ' 'his enabled the United States for a period of some 20 years to stay on top of i Russian ctivity This intell gence l j l- - 4 II Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 --4 IOP 8 CRE T l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I · r · for this entire period respect to i apability with window provided the major l r • I • 1 j ti ' ' · - ' j 1 • i 1 • '' i I I I 1 J • TOf 9ECU 1 ---------------' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - - -_ T Or P S E C I ------- -- ' ' I ' · J '• '' t • ' I ' ' I • f • i 1• ' I - ' i t r c ' The October Surveys i ' _5 ' i t • • •' I • i I I I t __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ I' Some l ' - 6 -· ' 'lOP r GR li T IL - - - - - - - - - -- - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 two Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' q gp SECRET l I • _ _J dozen of the best cryptanalytic technicians ' • t I f • L A year later in October 1951 after 12 months of hard work the same people met again - ' ' I • j_ J After a month of study they made specific recommendations ·calling for additional I t computers and personnel to work on the complex problems of intercept and cryptanalysis ' the Director of AFSA in order· to get a non-technical In 1952 point of view had the subject reviewed by the AFSA T ''Special Communi cations Advisory Group SCAG ' chaired by Howard T Engstrom of RCA 5 They con- ' I ' I r · ' t · - I cluded that there is a clear-cut promise of successful solution I • I t - ' I • I • l The SCAG also recommended that a senior civilian · technical director be appointed · directly under the Director of AFSA It also stated that a careful revision of personnel policy is needed to attract and keep personnel Noting that AFSA had not taken advantage of outside I• 7 l • ' ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' r t developments in machine and basic research the I• group concluded that the effort devoted to the problem was entirely inadequate • ------- I These SCAG recommendations were reiterated t • ' several months later by the Brownell committee • which severely criticized AFSA's personnel _policies ' because technically competent civilians were second- ' class citizens and administration and control of ' j NSA was in the hands of military personnel who more t often than not were inexperienced 1n the cryptana- lytic field J D The Need for Strategic Warning The pressures on intell gence for info rmation on China and on Russia were great When the Chinese crossed the Yalu into the Korean War on 26 November 1950 five months to the day after the North Korean invasion of South Korea the US COMINT capability ' • I • j - --- against Chin 1971 - a • r 'TOP S CREl' _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I 1 • I ' · i f • ' I 1• I • i Since the f rst Russian atomic explosion in September 1949 the Russians had been building up I • ' their stockpile of _weapons '' ' bomb test on 12 August 1953 shook the whole world figuratively as well as literally ' I 1 ' i The Russian hydr gen The Rus-sian Long Range Air Force charged with delivery of these weapons was building up at a rapid rate I • - g - TOP SFCBE rjL__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ Approved for Release 201 3 07 18 C01175219 ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I _ ____ J'l Q O I' 9 E C ll E T · -----------ii f The us need for strategic warnin of a posI• sible Russian attack was paramount According to the 1953 Robertson Report on the potentialities of COMINT for strategic warning A surprise atomic attack on the united States would result in carnage devastation psychological shock and curtailment of our retaliatory ability on a scale difficult to estimate or even to comprehend in ten11s of any previous exl erience 10 t I• t • A Defense Department report by General Bull on the· same subject considered the payoff so great as to j _ • • I ' warrant any possible attack on the problem regard- I I less of its cost funds and manpower E This was the bomber gap period of American Order-of-Battle ·US Versus USSR history The Russians were estimated in 1953 to have I • '- an atomic stockpile of approximately 120 we·apons which • I would increase to about 300 by 1955 not including • 1 thermonuclear types _Y In 1953 the Soviet Long Range Air Force was estimated to have about 1 000 medium propeller driven bombers of the 'l'U-4 type similar to i - 10 - OP ECR ET Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 · Approved for Release 2013 07 18 j 1 I I I • I I ' I • ' 1 ' the US B-29 capable of reaching all ta gets in the United States on a one-way mission _ Y The 1953 es- I timate assumed that the USSR would replace the TU-4 • with a medium jet and th at there might already be a L prototype of a heavy turboprop bomber I it was estimated that the USSR would have by the middle of that year 1160 TU-4 1 s 200 TU-16 medium jet bombers In May of 1955 and 40 heavy bombers 20 jet 20 turboprop the latter t a capability The Soviet Union was thus believed to launch an effective large-scale atomic air attack against all major targets within the 1 United States including densely populated areas in- I I - 1 • • with atomic weapons to have ' capable of two-way missions against the United States dustrial centers and military bases • I _• I • ' ' through its network of 71 radars had only a JO-minute I - ·1 ' f Against this threat the United States in 1953 warning capability against aircraft The US Air De- • 'I • fense Command had 53 interceptor squadrons 25 aircraft per squadron with fixed forward firi g aircraft guns -- • I 15 percent of which had all-weather capability A total of 57 AAA battalions equipped with 90 mm • and 120 mm weapons were deployed to assist in the defense of 22 critical targets in the United States - 11 - _______________ TOP s gcRBT __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I ·1 TOP SECRET 'l'he grim I • us defense posture in 1953 was pretty Not until two years later were the intercept • I' squadrons equipped with collision course fired rock- I T ets and NIKE guided missiles and not until 1956 I • was the early-warning radar extended across northern t • Canada These measures increased the warning time to two hours and the kill probability to approximately t • 50 percent under all-weather conditions The cost for these improvements was more than $40 billion and almost 200 000 full-time active service- personnel were involved ' The need for strategic warning during this period was thus overwhelm g and to the military -------- planners cost was a secondary consideration I ---- • • • • ' I ' - 12 I 'TOP S ECR FT Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I -'1 ' TOP iGRET 1 l • I • I• t • ' ' ' ' ' • f • · ' • · L i '1 i ' - ' I The need t • Ito obtain strategic warning for the defense of -- ' the United States was thus a number-one priority Even after the early success had dried up hope for future results rem'a ined stro g in the Ca•t r T commun- I• ity - 13 - 1 FOP iiCR ET f Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 iI • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP SECRE'f · 1 · • I F COMINT in th e Doldrums 1 · ' ' The total COMINT effort expanded considerably from 1950 to 1953 I and then to 1954 However the rapid expansion resulted in many ineffi- t • ciencies The pperators were short-term military enlisted personnel and were poorly trained inter- The -__ 1 _c_e_p_t_ o_ - - -- - --- d __a_ n_e _e _d less setback • t because of poor NSA planning •' r ' t ' • j J · _L ·-· 4 ' At Arlington Hall in 1 54 ' t • the L - - - -------l--------- r • · I - COMINT effort on the USSR was devoted to cryptanalysis and Ito traffic analysis - - - - - - --'--- processi g The i' pressure on NSA from the services was to change this ratio in favor of traffic analysis in order to - 14 - CfOP QiCR ET '--------- ---- --' - - ·-··•-o ••--· -- -· Approved for Release 2013 07 18 i -- a ·-·· -- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 1 · L-------------------------------- ------' i 'l produce current tactical intelligence CIA was pressuring NSA to increase work I '• f ' 8 and likewise to improve the Russian ______ fort by improving the quality of personnel --- NSA civilian pay grades were very low I Of thel_____ people in the Production Division PROD at NSA i ' • j • which processed all intelligence-producing traffic there was only one GS-15 and there were no supergrades at the beginning of 1954 22 ization which was charge with cryptanalysis was ' The PROD o gan- unwieldy and bewilderi g with line and staff functions crossing each other • Military men held three- J fourths of the key jobs al tho gh three-fourths of the personnel in the divisions were civilian Both civilian and militaey morale was iow The ' I • COMINT effort was in the doldrums dead in the water and the intell gence community started ' - ' ·· • 0- us i whistling louder and louder for the wind needed to get the ship once gain underway • • i - 15 I l Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 J f ' 1 _J 'fOP SEORET f • T• ' II l ------------A CIA Pressure on NSA I j I was the shib- L _ __ boleth of the mid-1950's shouted loud and often by I • the entire intelligence community but loudest of all by CIA I • The basic responsibility of the DCI with respect to the NSA '------------lbecame the subject of a major study within CIA and for high-level discussions between CIA and the Pentagon Deputy G-2 Brigadier General Carter W Clarke opposing the DCI pressure in the matter wrote Lyman B Kirkpatrick Jr CIA Inspector General in April 1954 It would seem to me that the Director himself could be absolved of all blame in the event a crisis •' arose in NSA 11 23 r The Chief SPINT Edmund H Kell 99 commenting to Sheldon on the letter in a masterpiece • I I • of understatement said You may wish to inform the Inspector General that we are not in accord with General Clarke 's conclusion £ l I OP SECRETj ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r • • I t At Sheldon's request SPINT had in preparation I' · f prior to receipt of the Clarke letter a major study I • on the subject ·of NSA and i the DCI 's responsibilities • This study advised the DCI that An all-out US effort I____7_-1 has not been made by NSA and whereas NSA' s I • 1 It also stated that t the entire personnel situation of NSA was still bad and noted that the new NSA civilian Deputy Mr A 1 B Clark the retiring Vice President of Bell Labor- ' f atories was serving only part-time at NSA and had t no authority over cryptanalysis• 26 A principal factor in the CIA pressure on NSA was the presence in CIA of a former NSA senior offi- • • f J' J ' ' - • cer lhad left NSA shortly after Canine took charge because of perso al differences arising out of Canine's policy of rotating key · ' I •I I I • personnel at NSA In World War II and in the postwar period __ ___ ad been in charge of the Army's crypt- I • I • analytic effort When Canine arbitrarily shifted rom tnis job to a job in Communications ' - 17 l • Tc P SBCR Jl'I f 1-------------- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 i ' I - I • --- I • I • Security I quit William K Harvey at the of time Chief the Clandestine Service ' I • with CIA for six years returning to NSA in June 1958 During this period as Chief a major contribution to the of - I to replace himself in April 1952 1_____ r tayed after Canine retired 1in CIA Agency's work in integrating CIA COMINT and covert activities ead and hands were Althoug at the service of CIA during this whole period much to CIA's ' advantage his heart remained back in the cryptanalysis field of his youth as the gadfly who persuaded one else in CIA I l More than any- ld outfit NSA was not DCI Dulles that working hard enough on __ _ _ _ ___ _ problem I • I •· 1 ' •• I I · 1 r 'I l See Ch apter v below l I 18 - --- - ---------'---- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 'I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • I '' li ' I 1 I• ' · t 1 • i - 1• This letter came about as a result of the Clark Task Force on Intelligence Activities which functioned under the Hoover Commission on o ganization of the Executive Branch of the government 28 Recommendation II of Part I of this report had stated ' that the Director NSA be given clearcut Directives which will enable him to mak e r__a n u _ J L1U-1 iu ULu u __ _ __ I J - • I • USCIB in considering this recommendation commented ' t -' 1 'I ' I 1 l ' l I - 19 - L Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r • r ' This resulted in the preparation by the SPINT ataff of the above letter which was cleared by the DCI and l • forwarded to the Secretaries of State and Defense I for signature and transmission back to the OCI 30 C I The Erskine Exchange About this time December 1955 General Graves - B Erskine USMC Assistant to the Secretary of De- fense Special Operations addressed a letter to the Secretaries of the military services the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the DCI and DIRNSA °W Three years have passed since the- present national COMINT organization was established under the revised • l National Security Council Intelligence Directive No 9 • •• which in turn reflected the bulk of the findings of I the Brownell Committee said Erskine The Depart- ment of Defense would welcome your frank views at this time as to any improvements that could be made ·' t • ' in the national COMINT mechanism It Erskine's letter took the lid off the community I • l 'I kettle which had been boiling briskly with discontent • i The Secretary of Navy C s Thomas led off with a I litany of complaints l - 20 - I I i - o _ _ _ _ - -- · · -·••· - -- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 · - - · - · · - • • • • • C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' I I 1 T i I ' •J Adequate technical information is not presently being furnished •••• The large volume of intelligence information and its wide dissemination among US and foreign intercept stations is undesirable From the standpoint of security it overloads the communicatio L SJqi tem • • • • The assignment of th __ _problem exclusively to the Air Force may cause serious difficulties to the Navy • • • • NSA frequently includes comments and interpretations which give the material the appearance of finished intelligence ••• cause confusion as to the validity ••• •W I i 1 t ' ' The Assistant Secretary to the Army George H I I Roderick likewise expressed Amy unhappiness over N A's lack of success - - - - - J in spite of the high priority assigned to this objective and the large increases in personnel and funds provided to NSA since 1952 W He added that NSA had increasi gly published • and disseminated reports in Amy's -field of the respon- I i I • ' 1 • I sibility which invol ved evalµation and interpretation of information and were clearly intelligence reports were frequently in error or in conflict with I interpretations of intelligence elements of the Army ' Traffic intelligence was frequently incomplete and erroneous Such I • Supporting evidence was withheld by NSA on the basis that it was technical information I • - 21 - l L ' TOP s cu ________-_ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 20 13 07 18 I I • It t l The Air Force chose not to reply since it was I in · essence running its own COMINT shop quite inde- t • pendent of NSA · at Brooks Air Force Base in Texas ' The Air Force was the one holdout of the three serv- r • ices that did not knuckle under to· the NSA dominaf • tion as recommended by the Brownell Committee The L • Air Force argued the need for dispersal of facilities t • in case of atomic attack With this as an excuse the Air Force had obtained funds and established a t large and independent COMINT organization to support ' the Strategic Air Command ' SAC SAC on 24-hour air- borne alert needed direct intelligence support wholly within the Air Force and could not depend on NSA to t provide the needed intelligence rapidly according I to the Air Force CJ No major attempts were made either within Defense or by CIA to curb Air Force indepen- · l dence as it was recognized that their case had considerable merit t ' I l I D DCI -- We Want the The DCI reply was prepared by ' with the assistance of his staff officer Mr Fred Griffin who had followed NSA when - 22 '· - Ye f SECR i'I i --------------Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'TOP SEQPJiT I -· __________ ransferred 34 I - t • I have become increasingly concerned in recent years over the fact that we have not et been · able to e loi -- ' began Allen Dulles's letter to the Secretary of De fense on 23 March 1956 j • I '- -- I for one would be willing to suffer substantial cut in· our current COMINT receipts if such a measure promised however remotel entual i a -- 3 _ I t is my beli e f t hat we have 1 _ o__ _E hd o i c e but to proceed - · and t o procure and app y to em from wherever they may be found those resources and talents which are needed for a systematic and sustained attack The DCI went on to offer his assist nce and support · · 1 I 11 in recruiting a civilian Deputy for NSA whose primary I - f ' _ I responsibility would be - -- - - - - -- 1 He closed indicating that this memorandum was • • a partial reply to the Erskine letter Erskine answered the DCI stating ·1 - The Department of Defense shares the concern ex ressed in our me orandwn - - 23 ' - r l TOP SBGRET L- - - - - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOf S15Clli 'I f _ j 1 • l 1 i ' r • l • I I ' I • ' • I ' i' I 'I ' I • - 24 I • I 10P SEGRR L _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ I ' I ••••• _• - 1 • o••• _ A pro ed for Release 2013 07 18 - • C01175219 I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 '1 0f SBCRFL r • ' ·' •' f • he added I must disassociate myself from your conclusion that the COMINT community at large is not prepared to accept a reduction in the present volume of COMINT infonnation • • I am not aware that either USCIB or the individual consumers have add r eseed themselves to this question •••• I am so convinced of the correctness of this position that as Director of Central Intelligence I shall exert every possible effort to ensure that the intelligence community does not lose sight of· the vital importance -of our main COMINT mission i • I ' ' E• • I • _' I • • ' - I - 25 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 App oved for Release 2013 07 18 r - - - - - I ' ' ET - ' I j • ' l' _______ 1 __ was j ' DIRNSA in August 1956 presented to USCIB by and was supported by a I I special br_iefing for senior officials in the Pentagon by General Erskine as to how it was p'r oposed to carry out the project Erskine also announced the appointment· of Dr Howard T Engstrom RCA as the new NSA Deputy for Research and Development effective 20 August 1956 39 Erskine also took this oc- casion to state that when General Samford moved from Vice Director of NSA to Director NSA on General Canine's statutory retirement that the Vice Direc- tor's post would be filled by a civiliap - _ Later Dr Louis Tordella was chosen for this post and has • • I • held it since that time boost toward becoming Number One in the computer field and later supported the IBM development of many new devices · - 26 TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r T Th e Department of Defense DOD fanfare -- a underway and all would be well that I failed to quiet the voices of those who wanted the I • • j I With in DOD a senior committee had· been studying NSA and was about to report even as I as j conceived and announced i This was the Robertson Committee F The• Robertson Survey of NSA Dr • H p Robertson was designated Chainnan of the Department of Defense Scientific Advisory Board in December 1956 In this capacity he chaired a DOD committee studying the managerial and technical ·l problems of NSA Robertson had previous experience j as a COMINT consultant I since une 1946 an NSA consultant since 1952 and l He had been a CIA consultant in 1953 chaired an NSA panel on the potential of COMINT for strategic warning At that time he was professor of physics at the California Institute of _Technology I I The Robertson· Committee in 1956 studied the NSA work on the Russian problem in the context of • I I - 27 - J Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I - 'I ul' --------- S ECR E rJ 1 I l • Ir I the overall NSA effort which at that time cost ___ _ __ a year in addition to the l allotted t • to the military service COMINT o ganizations f ' report noted that NSA had 'I whom were civilian and the total SIGINT effort in- • 1• cluded about I l I I J personnel I The j of intercept positions located at __ __ ·· ifferent sites of whic - ere overseas 4 2 The findings of the Robertson Committee were made available to the DCI in September 1957 and served to convince him even more than the Erskine episode and _ ____ at thel ___ _ __ problem was so important th t consideration should be given to it not only within the Department of • j • Defense -but at the highest governmen al level as well •'I • Accordingly in the fall of 1957 he DCI raised the I s ject with the President's Board of consultants on I • Foreign Intelligence Activities chaired by Or James ·' I Killian ActiQn by Dr Killian's board resulted I in a Presidential letter dated 3 May 1957 establish- • l ing under the Science' Advisory Committee Office of I l ' Defense Mobilization a panel of scientists headed by Dr W O Baker of Bell Telephone Laboratories o ·28 - I • I I I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I t I I • G T• 1 • L ' 1• I - The Baker Panel Investigates thel Problem The Baker Panel studied the problem for several months and foJ Warded its recommendations to the President through the Special NSC Committee for COMINT early in 1958 45 The Panel had one major impact Up to this time the various groups investigating the __ _ problem f had indicated that success I I • was possible -- perhaps not today but maybe tomorrow The Bak er panel for the first time put a damper on this optimism The panel also sought to calm the intelligenc community's pressure on NSA to do more on the problem ' '' - ' • The overriding priority assigned should · be relaxed I The intellectual problem is much too refractory to yield to administrative pressure 11 ' said the panel lj that no national strategy should be based on the I hope or expectatio I i The panel also stated flatly ' The panel did not recommend abandoning the effort however but stated that I I ' ' I We should nevertheless continue the most v gorous attack _i_ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ I Oµly thus can we possibly 1 I ¥ I • 29 - -J l10P BEGRii l _ 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - I • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r T I T 1t hich may occur in times · hope ' l of emergency I 1 • I f I l to these findings the panel made two recommendations 1• which turned out to be abortive II mended that control of ELINT processing and analysis I be assigned to NSA 1 I I • First they recom- When this was considered by the Special NSC Committee for COMINT on 10 Februaey I 1958 the ELINT item was deferred _ V Second the panel suggested that an independ nt research organt' ization be created outside of NSA similar to the Los '--Al - - amo-s _o_rg _ an _ i_z_a_t_i_o_n_-- J -I I · which was used to develop the us atomic bomb 2 Qj II This suggestion met a visceral and immediate negation on the part of the Department of Defense CIA and d '• even NSA and nothi g ever came of it I - After the B er Panel community pressure on NSA I l I t lbegan to l_-_--_ _ __ ___ o I - -7 As the years went on relax whether increase as to ail the I I I I - 30 l I ' ttlP S ECR FT Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I I I · ' • funds bei g devoted to it l ________________ 7 ' i I I I I ' I I i f I I • t ' • I • i • J '• ' ' 31 - l I • • •• - •• -•••-- rr _ • ••• • • •• 1 _ _ _ _ ___ • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r • --j I I • f I r ' I ' f • 1• 1 • C I •' i ' ' ' I I l- 32 - TO SECRE'tjL_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C011 75219 Approved for Release 2op10111a T t' SEGRET l I ' • ' as the cover-name given to the entire Russian problem r I • at the time• ·53 CIG was highly interested in the potential of th is source and in the success of this group even at this early date and initially gave I • to ASA for this project a list of qualified personnel who had applied for jobs with CIA The the A rmy so much so that this project was set up ' I roject was held very closely by at the Pentagon rather than at Arlington Hall Station where a new group of this nature would be noticed The Army did not even make I____ intercepts available to the Department of State in the early days volume of material rapidly increased The Practical problems of handling it soon caused securicy restric- ·' tions to be relaxed even within G-2 at the Pentagon and the ' ltraf fie was made available to th _ e_ G___2_ m _i_l_i_t_a_ry _ _ '---section Special Research Branch where cleared personnel from the Eurasian Intelligence Branch had ' ' - 33 t • _ _ _ _ __ • •• ••• _ _ _ _ • • • -• r - o •-•• ·•• Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 I • I l Approved for Release 2013 07 18 access to it 1 • I ' ' r I • ' ' ' ' I ' 1 - 34 'fOF 8 i CR FT• _ -- - -------------- -rt•-·· --· ·-···-··•·-•·-•··-- ---·-··---· Approved for Release 2013 07 18 1co ·1 175219 I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • --I j l • i I ' I j I I I l f - 35 • TOP B EGR E ' - - - - - - - - - - -Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - l c01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' I • ' C CIA - - 36 - TOP S CREijLf_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ ' ••• - - H-•U·-•- - _ _ Approved for Release 2013 07118 _ _ _ -·- rC 01 7 5219 1 Approved for Release 2013 07 8 ' '· t - I f I r • I • • • I i ' t ' - 37 · Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175 2 19 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' ' I • 1 ' f ' ' l • 1 CIA in L------------------- was the principal intelligence agency 1948 exploiting this traffic to produce finished intelligence 1 • I • Throughout this entire period CIA was the • co sumer l - - - to increase production and pushed AFSA In this regard DCI Billen- koetter together with other USCIB members met with Chief of Staff General McNarney on ' I I ·1 • uly 19'49 to 6 try to obta'in additional AFSA funds to process __ ____ - 'Ibey were turned down by McNamey because the military was reducing civilian personnel uotas by 50 percent W A year later in 1950 CIA ma e· ar angements to send as many as 100 of its own intelligence analysts to AFSA to assist in processing the material By 1951 the Soviet rob lem was in AFSA-246 retained ----------------' of these after primary scanning approximately and published items each month while utilizing· 38 _ • - · ·-·····• 1 ro - - _ ___ ·- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ··-··-·-- --·-•-r--- ---· -· C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 t ' another ' Of the people at AFSA in 1950 working on technical productio ' andl worked on Soviet communications lof these on the scanning and processing of IAt the time AFSA estimate_d_ th_ e_y_____- - - l - - - - ' - -- were intercepting available By early 1952 the AFSA section on Russian --- had expanded to abou group was scanning about I eople messages inter- cepted each month and publishing some This tems per month from this amount D Cloud on the Horizon 1 • ' l • T6P l s cux _________ - • - - - • - - •-- • • • • ••• - • • -• • - ------ --• • a •• _ _ auL M _ ____ _ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 ' ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 IOfJ SEORgi' l A report maae to USCIB in July 1951 by Assis' tant Chief of Staff G-2 statea During the past two years it is im- ' portant to note that quite frequently s h or tly a ft er the p ub l -1 e_a t ion Q f an excellent COMINT •I ·- r • I -- ' ' f - 4Cl - 7 - ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 • 1 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 t ' 1 I • ' Despite these evidences of Soviet penetration 1 • I of the United States intelligence community the • security leak was never found ' he cloud that had appeared on the intelligence horizon in 1949 gave indications of eventually blotting out the sun in the fall of 1952 IA -2 re- port to USCIB in 1951 stated It would be physically ' of the messages This was soon to be proven one of the more fallible · • ' estimates of the decade I •• j 41 - - TnO P S1t i 1 e R iE D _ r_ - - - Approved for Release 2013 07118 - - - 1 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' f • 'I t • I 1 • E The Becker-canine Agreement '· • r '• •• I CIA was unhappy with what it considered cursory 'processing of this huge volume of material NSA l ' - 42 - I • -- - - - - - 10P ORET 1 __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 Additionally there was a tremendous amount of unpublished material· in the NSA files and a large backlog of reports f i • After preliminary staff level CIA-NSA negotiations in 1953 Loftus E Becker Deputy Director for Intelligence and General Canine Director NSA entered into an agreement wherel y CIA would augment the effort with its own anaiysts I • r l i - L ------- 43 - r rOP SEC T - _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ J ________________ _ __ __ _ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I ' I ' I I - ' I • I t - 44 l - l • ___ t•••• 1t •- - - M----- ·-·-- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - i-- - - - t ti T' I ' I I i' 'I I ·' - 45 • 'J 'OP SECltff L_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 L I • p • I I I • l •• ' 1I ' l •j - 46 t • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' _ O P SfJGRli'L f • i 1 ' I • I l • I • '' l - 47 r TOP €REJ L__________ l • ·- ·r-- • • - T U•M1-•• 1•• ·-•k•N - -- r ••--· Approved for Release 2013 07 18 · · - C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 J ·101 GREI i ' '· - 48 I TOP SEC¥F'q-L_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 10 P Sf CRET ' ' - if9 • I • -TOP S E6RFT 7 _ 1 •• 0 • · 0- - • - -• _ _ - M • - -- - • - •• • · ••- - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'luP M GRMT t- t I I • • l ' I · 'II t I I I l i • I I i ' ' l C 'I '• - ·1 • t' 1 f · - I j I ' l t t ' • I J I - 50 ET ' • •• • • • •f •• '· l f •f-'l• OI · • •• _ 1-H • - - • - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -• ••• • C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'n -- f - - - ------ l • - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 I i ' I I r C ' J l51 TOP SflGRETlL_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 OP8FCRKci__________J-7 i I I • I I I • I' 'i - 52 'IOP SEGR ET ------------- L 1 -· ____ _ p ---'T'- -rl •·lf' _ •• - • •• -·-··· · ·· ••111- • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 __ u • r ' -·--- - -- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -- f ur SH1 R ET I I -- - - - - - I __ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ I r j ' I I ' ' • I I I i i 1' I_ - 53 - I- - rt QF SECREl' j • • I -• • • I • I •• I • • - - _ - • - • • • • • - - - • • • - • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I i· ------- ------------7 j ' I ' I ' j' i 4 iI ·' I · I - 54 - ETL___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ • ••• • o n A u 1• • ••- - - • • • ••• Appr d for Release 2013 07 18 - - • • • P • Wt• --- •• • ·• • C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ET ' ' I • I • i i I I I ' - I j I I I ' I -l I t • I ' •• t - ·l · I -' • I 55 ' OP SECll 'f IL__________ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07118 i' l I i I I ' 1 I I I l ' I I ' 56 • ' lOF SBCBETI b Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I I OP S etlE'f · I ' I' I r I I • I I I I I j - - 57 - --rne p S EGP F'11l _ _ _ _ __ •• - -· - I••• • •- • I • •• l '1 'rl'I _ _ 11 • • · • - - • • • _- _ _ _ - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _ J - c01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 1 I __ ____ _ i I i I I A The other Fellow's COMINT There was a wide chasm of distrust during World War II between OSS and the Army and Navy COMINT services The CIG inherited from oss this somewhat sticky situation as well as the governmen al respon sibility or running espionage operations and con- j ducting liaison with foreign intelligence services r I I I 58 - TOP Si CR E'I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I '• 'I ' I · J •I • l ' ' • I ' ' ' • j • • I '• · · • i • I • · The Communications Di vision was transferred from the Executive for Personnel ·and-Administration to 0S0 on 1 July 1947 t'• TOP 59 '• s c - - - ------' •- r-• - •-•u rt• ••f•l '1t 1- 1T 1- tt --n•- 1--' - • • •••1t_ _ _ • -- - --- ---•-• - -• - - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 1 C01175219 I • I ' I 'fOF SECRET 60 - I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 -------j Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOf SEGRFxJ - - - - - - - - - - - - ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- ' I '' ' 'I 4 • r t' I I J ' ' r I 1 '• I r '' l ' I I I I I I I I 61 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 1 · ----- --------------------- -------' I' ' ' one of the more dramatic operations and one of the few which came to public attention was the Berlin Tunnel During 1954 and 1955 the ' tunnel 6 feet in diameter and approximately 2 000 feet long was dug surreptitiously from the American sector of Berlin into the Soviet sector of Berlin 100 A special warehouse was built on the American side and filled with dirt from this tunnel to conceal it from prying eyes across the border At the far end of the tunnel a complex sophisticated wiretap was made on three armored unde ground cables two of which were used both by the Soviet and by the East German governments and one of which was used exclusively by the soviets - 62 - 0¥ SEC T '- - - - - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -----' • - • - 1 ' ' Tt 1 f • Almost 300 separate circuits were monitored from May 1955 when the wiretap of these three cables was completed until April 1956 f • e tap was at this time discovered by a Soviet maintenance crew I who were apparently investigating trouble on the cables caused by an unprecedented amount of rain f • which caused shorts ' I I I' • • I i ' I l I - I ·• I • I • II • I t I I - 63 - OP SEGRiTL- - - - - - - - - - ---'l Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' 'l UP SECRET r• '' • I The r material contained some cipher mes- sages but consisted mostly of plain-text teletype messages and telephone conversations Chief of ·sta_tion Bill Harvey who was running the digging end of the operat __i_o_n_ _ a_n d _________ Chief D wh9 was running the translating and processing end • I I inl persuaded DCI Dulles that the plain- text material should for security reasons be proc essed by CIA rather than by NSA much to the chagrin of the latter - I NSA considered COMINT process g to be their exclusive bailiwick and feare might t be a CIA move to set up a rival COMINT shop which would compete with NSA The pro lem poisoned CIA-NSA relations for a couple of years • ' Finally after the tunnel 64 - ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP l 8 EGRF'T' I • was discovered and the source was blown DCI Dulles I • i I •• A definitive letter from the DCI to DIRNSA establishing this right was prepared and after be- ' ing cleared by Dulles with the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities de- _i f livery to DIRNSA was delayed by Dulles until Canine who felt strongly abou • ' ' General Samford 103 • r I I as replaced by The letter was then dispatched on 9 February 1957 after Dulles made sure Samford had seen the draft and indicated no objection 104 •• r • I I Allen Dulles held the DCI big stick lightly and was loath to use it -- a stick which was but 1· · a small branch when he first grasped it but which ·'I • I grew in size and in weight as the stature of the I DCI kept increasing during his tenure - I • I Afte as all over he said if he had another such operation he would let NSA rather than CIA do the ·washington process g of the take despite l •I 65 ____________ 't'OP 813Clt iT ___ r• •• - - t't _ l IM° _ _ __ • r11-t•t t l'f Approved for Release 2013 07 18 __ 4 ••--•••••• • _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ • • _ C01175219 J I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _____ -ToP MSGl ET ' I ' I ' • - CIA's legal right to do so in view of the bad blood c Jcaused between the two agencies c COMINT Direct Support fo·r CIA Operations r i r ' I ' · • I · l • I _ I · I 1 ' I • · '66 - - fup M S P-F 'T a _ ___________j Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 1 1 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' i t I ' t I f I i I ' I I t ' 1 I I ' I ' ' 'I I - • t t • I - - 67 - -- ' ·- - - - - - - - - - - TOf' SECR EI ----------- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 --------• ' feP SEGRE i I 1 j l I • I I I I I • I I • - q g p SFCRETI 68 - C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I l r • ' I ' VI CIA' Interce t The Office of Special Operations was the first r element in CIA to have direct access to COMINT thro gh its participation April 1947 in the Joint Counter- I inte ligence Center JCIC 110 • went on provided the traini g ground for OSO pers' n- I I rl f The center as time nel to become familiar with the kinds of information that could be obtained from COMINT to support their I ' I - I - 69 - I ' FOP Si CR ET•IL_-_ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ ___ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' I I • I • I I I '' • I - 70 - -iiott SiCf EI '- - - - - - - - - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 '' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ''I' 1 • I i ' -1 - ' - I f • l - · 71 - - I _ - --- -- A proved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 i I • ' 'i ' •' 'i ' ' • 1 I · ' I '' ' ' ' ' • ' ' ' I ' I ' ' - 72 • J TOP S GRB L _ _ _ _ _ _ _ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' ' ' I - ' j I ' -· • I I t I -· l I - l •' j i r l I I i 73 - -1or SiCRE LI -- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I I 1 • I I I j I r • • ' I ' 74 - 'f'OP SEORE1i _________ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 1 UJ ' te» a1 - ' I l ' I I ' I ' I J I• ·' ' ' i ·' ' ' l • I 'I t ' · I 7S - IDP Sl ORE tjL_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ A ro ed for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I I • '16 OP S GRiT L_ _ _ _ __ __ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I OP Sll CRB'F --- ---' l I I I • I 77 - · -'l•f SFCRETI Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _ _ _ _ a__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ The CIA Office of Communications thus has through its COMINT organization provided impo ant support thro ghout the 20 years of its singularly successful operations not only to CIA covert operations but also to the national intelligence effort F • COMMO and DDP Teamwork The CIA intercept effort under the Office of '• Communications in the very beginni g worked in harness with the DDP Th is was · in• contrast to the CIA over- seas ELINT intercept operation run by the Office of I I BLINT OEL DD S T This latter relationship re- sulted frequently in friction between the two offices The reason that the Clandestine Service got • -· ' i I along well wit - FOMMO whereas it did not with OEL was due in some measure to personality differ- j ences but primarily to vary g operational philos- - I ophies f support function to the Clandestine Service overseas I COMMO had long experience working as a· and had a tradition of providi g service ' 78 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 OEL on C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 VII One Plus One Equals One The merger of the United States Communications Intelligence Board USCIB and the Intelligence Advisory Committee IAC i March of 1958 into a t - new board called the United States Intelligence r Board USIB would not have come about for years ' ' i ' had the decision been left to the intell gence community itself • A Don't ock the Boat The OSCIB was in 1957 quite happy with its modus ope andi and its Chairman DCI Dulles was I I not by nature one to rock the boat particularly I when he was able more or less to chart its course l He did this however as a navigator rather than as ' I a captain for he was not the boss of the USCIB but merely its nonvoting Chaipnan - I ' he chain of command above the USCIB actually ypassed the DCI and ter• I minated in a special Committee of the National Se- I cu ity Council NSC consisting of the Secretaries I I • of State and Defense 'lhe military -services were very jealous of this direct USCIB relationship to I • - SQ - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - fup ----- s QB El' - - - 1 • 'I the Special Committee and considered the IAC to be a junior board compared with the USCIB DCI Allen t ' Dulles however had no fear -that USCIB would set an independent sail even tho gh it did not report directly to him since in the final -analysis his I • ' I brother John Foster Dulles was as Secretary of • State fifty percent of the NSC Special Committee I • to which USCIB reported ' • B Killian Rocks th e Boat I A force putsids of the United States intelligence community therefore had to be b ought to bear even to suggest that the U CIB and IAC should j i be merged r I ' The President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Iptelligence Activities known at the I time as· the Killian Committee after its Chairman James A Killian was such a force Just as the Brownell Committee five years earlier had made recommendations which led to the creation of the National Security Agency· and caused a major shakeup ·I in the us COMINT organization so the Killian Com- mittee in its Recommendation No 2 to the President on 24 October 1957 threw the stone that started an - · 81 - 'I OP MJCR£1f Approved for Release 2013 07118 ' C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 avalanche which drastically ch ged the way of do g ' I ' 1· i • I business in the entire intelligence conununity Recommendation No 2 read That in order to achieve a better integration of our national intelligence resources 1 the policy co ordinating and supervisory responsibilities presently being discharged separately by the USCIB and IAC be vested in a single Board to be known as the USIB established at the present level of the USCIB with appropriate membership und r the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence and responsible directly to the National Security Council 2 the operation of the National Indications Center be made 't he direct responsibility of the new Board and 3 the remaining functions of the USCIB and IAC and their subcommittee be redistributed on the advice of the Special Comint Committee and the Director of Central Intelligence respectively 131 ' Mr james S Lay Executive Secretary of the National Security Council forwarded the recommenda- '' tion to the DCI stating that before the President takes action on this recommendation he requests that you consult with the USCIB and the IAC •and furnish your vi ws 132 82 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 c USCIB Versus Killian The reaction of the militaey members was ex- l- tremely negative as could have been predicted In a USCIB meeting of 8 November 1957 ·even the Chairman Mr Dulles in introducing the subject of the merger stated that his first reaction was not favorable 133 He appointed General Lucian K Truscott of his staff to meet privately with each member of the board prior to a joint IAC-USCIB meeting on the subject 134 Truscott's discussions with the members put on record their stro g opposition to a single· combined board D - II The Truscott Memorandum In a memorandum to the members of USCIB and IAC dated 6 January 1958 General Truscott reviewed his discussions with the community and listed the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed merger favoring the former over the latter 135 The princi- pal advantages included probabl improved stature of the intelligence community _possible improvement in intelligence product and attention paid to intelli- gence product by govemmental policy levels more - 83 - 1 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 effective community support for bu get simplification of the intelligence community's structure crossfertilization -of ideas and improved overall intelli• gence coordination The principal disadvantages in- cluded impairment of security for special intelligence undesirability of combining dissimi ar functions and different policy responsibilities I • Truscott concluded by saying two lines of action were open to the DCI One nonconcurring in the reconmendation of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities this he said clearly should be supported by the most cogent reasons • Two concurring in the recommendation that a task force be established to develop detailed plans E Army Spearheads the Counterattack The USCIB members' views ran the gamut on the merger The AJ Iny and the Navy whose oxen were be- ing gored since they owned the major COMINT assets were adamant gainst the me ger Major General Robert A Schow Assistant Chief · of Staff Army Intelligence wrote the keynote memorandum on 21 January 1958 oppos g the President's 84 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 We Si3P P F JL -------------- Board of Consultants' proposal for the merger of the IAC and the USCIB •136 Schow several years earlier had served as Chief of the Clandestine Service in CIA 18 March 1 49 - 15 February 1951 and he was highly regarded throughout the intelligence community ' It is the considered ju gment of the Anny said Schow that a me rger of the USCIB and the IAC would have an adverse effect on the national security and would impede the effective conduct of both · US COMINT operations and the production of national intelligence Schow used the arguments of tradition security and efficiency in buttressing his position - ' ' US COMINT activities must be compartmented and treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other intell gence activities he stated The Brownell Committee had reaffirmed this idea and incorporated it int9 NSCID No 9 which established the Special Committee of NSC for COMINT matters USCIB acted for and under the Special Committee of NSC to govern COMINT activities which by definition do not include the production and dissemination of finished intelligence · ' he IAC on the other hand 85 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Ap roved for Release 2013 07 18 was directly concerned with the production of intelligence by the terms of NSCID No 1 and NSCID No 4 It was charged with approving National Intell gence Estimates and had cognizance over the production and dissemination of all finished intelligence including COMINT and ELINT The IAC was therefore an altogether different kind of organization from I - the USCIB Schow stated that a merger of users and IAC would break down compartmentation of COMINT activities and increase the total nwnber of individuals cleared for COMINT it would fail to achieve econI ' • 1 j omy or eliminate conflicting decisions and it would • result in heterogeneous agendas of meetings and con_sequently slow down action 137 F USCIB Goes on Record The United States communications Intelligence - t Board sat in full panoply on 22 Januaey 1958 for its I 146th meeting to consider whether it should be abol- l ished 138 The Ch airman Mr Dulles stated that he was very open minded on this proposal that al tho gh his first impression of the me ger recommendation '86 - TOf SECitF'D Approved for Release 2013 07 1B C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'I'OP___iECRE ----'-------- '' had been somewhat n gative he had been attracted I • by some of the arguments in favor of it On the t question o the proposed merger he said USCIB should ' ' I ' consider the best way to build up _the intell gence community 1 • The members of the USCIB were then in- vited to comment General Graves B Erskine the I • D fense member thought that more study should be ·given to the proposal I I • 4 • General John A Samford the NSA member stated that he could see no real advantage in a change General Millard Lewis speak- ing for the'Air Force stated that he could see no substantial advantage to be gained by a merger Admiral Frost stated that the advantages listed are I • ' ' I • of doubtful value and he felt that little would be gained by such a merger I The Atomic Energy Com- mission representative Charles Reichardt felt i • that the benefits to the AEC would be greater under • l the proposed IAC-USCIB merger General Richard Collins the JCS representative stated he could not agree in principle to the merger before a thoro gh study has been made 11 I General Schow speaking for tl_le Army opposed the - 87 - - l' -TOP SECRB jL- -- - - -- - -- ---- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 WP --------- merger and emphasized that USCIB would lose its iden- I • 1 - '91iCBEI • tity in the merger and its present stature would be i 1 • damaged not only in the United States but interna1 •• tionally He added that the functions of the two boards are distinct and a merger would impede the I ffective conduct-of both US COMINT operations and the product of national intelligence The State Department representative Mr Cumming stated that he had initially opposed the merger but now favored it I I Mr Sheldon the CIA representative stated that CIA believes it to be in the best interest of the community to concur on the recommendation for a merger of IAC and USCIB ' ' lI ' General Cabell · speak- ing as the CIA IAC representative took a somewhat different viewpoint from that put forth by Sheldon who was spe king as the CIA USCIB member Cabell stated that he would like to see the merger given i ' a trial but sin e sensed a deep-seated opposition ' to the merger he would reconunend that the me er not be made at thi time · l l After additional deliberations the USCIB recommended that the DCI reply to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities '88 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP S C RHT j ·l · ' reflect the views of the members of IAC and USCIB 1 and conclude that IAC and USCIB believe that a me g- I • er of IAC and USCIB is not desirable at this time I • A footnote to the decision read considered jointly by IAC and USCIB and these This item was ' I minutes reflect the joint IAC-USCIB discussion and ' 1 dee is ion 11 I G Dulles Agrees with USCIB 'l'his argumentation supported what was essen- tially D I Dulles's basic feeling on the matter and as a consequence he replied to the National Security ' • ' Council on 29 January 1958 that it was his own con- ' clusion that while tQere was much to reconmend a J ' merger and it might eventually be desirable it · · should not be directed at that time but should be deferred until the community ha an opportunity to work with the new National Security Council Intel- I I •• 1 J ligence Directives NSCID's which had been just recently revised 139 •• I The matter was referred to the President's Board of Consultants on Fore gn Intelligence Activi- · ties This Board held to its or ginal recommendation 89 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 · C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ---'ll - - - -T O P___ B C RE - -t 1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ l stuck by its guns suggested the intelligence com- ' munity get on with the merger and report back to the NSC within six months 1·40 H Ike and Killian Kill USCIB The matter was then referred to President Eisenhower on 12 March 1958 the day before the NSC meeting scheduled to consider the revision of the National Security Council Intelligence Direetive 141 • I ' ' i ·•' I I I ' ·' ' •' ' ' t l • I ·• I I I iI The President decided the problem in camera prior to the N C meeting and ordered that a single_gro up be established to assist and advise the Director of Central Intelligence in discharging his responsibility for the coordination of all operations concerned with both special and other forms of intelligence which together constitute the foreign intel igence effort of the United States such single group to be assigned the policy coordinating and supervisory responsibilities presently assigned to the United States Communications Intelligence Board and the Intelligence Advisory Commit t ee the remaining functions of USCIB and the IAC to be redistributed to appropriate subcommittees 142 The President also directed that a draft NSCID be · submitted to carry out this recommendation within six months • This decision was incorporated as ' 90 - -I-------Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 ' 1 j Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' j 1 1' I • ·L t l J • • Paragraph F of NSC Action No 1873 when the NSC met on 13 March 1958 143 Thus President Eisenhower himself ended the ' • f I • independent USCIB dy asty that had existed since World War II The arguments of the us military were of no avail and a decision gainst th'em was made by their former military commander now Commander I in Chief r ' ' • · ' I • •• I 91 - · I Of' SEGll 'U Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 · i ' ·I I 1 l VIII '1 j The Millenium The decision of President Eisenhower on 12 I t March 1958 to accept the recommendation of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board over that of the DCI's Intelligence Advisory Committee resulted in the creation of the United States Intelligence Board USIB The era of communications intelligence independence cam to an end The former USCIB which up to that time was directly responsible not to the DCI but to the Special Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT the Secretary of State ' gamated with the Intelligence Advisory Committee ·' f - and Secretary of Defense was ordered to be amal- which functioned under the Director of Central Intelligence • · • I · -' ·1 - r A six-month gestation period was to elapse from the 13 March date of its conception until 15 I - September 1958 when the new NSCID's No 1 and No •• I 6 were issued establishing COMINT as part of the • I t responsibilities of the USIB Dur g this period a considerable amount of pulli g and t 9gi g took plac with drafts and counterdrafts bei g worked 92 - IOP GRETI ------- - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 i Approved for Release 2013 07 18 '1 I ' over at le gth by drafti g groups representi g the different o ganizations General Charles P Cabell Deputy DCI assumed the r le of lion tamer in this 1 ' menagerie and cracked the whip until he finally perI ' • r suaded the several k gs of beasts to sit properly on their pedestals A A Thi·s was no mean task • Law Unto Itself No Longer COMINT up to this time had been a law unto itselfJ The former COMINT charter NSCID No 9 had stated 'I- •• ' I ' L ' r r '• I · ' I l The special nature of COMINT activities reqGires that they be treated in aZZ espects as being outside the frameWoPk of other or general intelligence activities Orders directives policies · or recommendations f any authority of the Executive Branch relating to the collection production security handling dissemination or utilization of intelligence and or classified material shall not be applicable to COMINT activities unless specifically so stated and issued by competent departmental or agency authority represented on the Board Other National Security Council Intelligence Directives to the Director of Central Intelligence and related implementing directives issued by the Director of Central Intelligence shall be construed as nonapplicable to COMINT activities unless the National Security Council has made its directive specifically applicable to _COMINT 1 4 93 - - I ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TO -------- I Cabell decided that now was the time to es- ' tablish once and for all the superior position of the DCI in COMINT as well as in the entire intelli- 4 l 1 • gence community As the drafting proceeded it was decided to establish in NSCID No 1 the basic rela- '- ' tionship of the DCI to the community and to include in this directive the essential elements of the charter of the new board It was also decided to separate out those unique communications intelligence responsibilities of the old USCIB and put them in a separate directive There was to be no doubt that the DCI and the new board had complete jurisdiction over communications intelligence and the COMINT lion was to be bearded in his own den Communications intelligence was n longer to be of a special nature • 1 outside the framework of other intelligence - · l l l For this reason the new NSCID No 1 rather than the specialized COMINT NSCID No 6 was designed to contain the basic relationship between the DCI and the board i all int_e lligence matters COMINT included I I The new NSCID charged the DCI to coordinate the fore gn intelligence activities of the United States • •' • I ' I 1 ••• Such coordination shall include both -special 94 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -1 Of' SECR FT • I ' • f · 1 and other forms of intelligence _____ I 't f • r The new board also was to report to the DCI directly to advise and •- assist 'him' as he may require I • ' l among other things to make recommendations on foreign intelligence matters ••• including partic- uiarly recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on intelligence matters within the jurisd ction of i • It was charged the Director of the National Security Agency 146 I - B Complexities of USCIB Decision Making The decision-making process of the board also -' _ I • _ was changed Back· in 1948 when NSCID No 9 was first written decisions of the board were based I · '' on the principle of unanimity which shall be a pre- ii - - requisite for matters within the purview of the Board J except that the Chairman shall be elected by a majority vote 147 · -• ' In those early years it was difficult for the members to agree on a ythi g -- even who •' ' 1' •• 1 should be Chainnan I - f I I In 1952 when NSCID No 9 was rewritten decisions of the board on matters not affecti g NSA I l were bindi g if ad6pted by the unanimous ·vote of 'I 'f'Of 95 - S EoRE'P Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I I J ' I the members of the Board · 148 ' • Recommendations approv- ed only by a majority had to be referred to the Special ' on matters affecting NSA the Committee of the NSC board would reach a decision by a majority vote ' L DCI as Chai rman would have no vote altho gh the CIA member did 149 ' The ' Dissents to the majority opinion were referred to the Special Committee and o action was taken if this di$sent involved NSA until the appeal had gone through the Secretary of Defense to the Special ' Committee and had been resolved In case the Secretary of State ' and the Secretary of Defense disagreed the appeal was taken directly to the President 150 The mutual suspicions and lack of trust of · this earlier era resulted in language even at the NSCID level protecting the rights and prerogatives of the individual departments had calmed these waters ·' the phrase •' ' II 'lbe passage of time The new NSCID No 1 used the intelligence cornrnuni ty '' and in a footnote to Paragraph 2a of the document named the members of the community 151 The concept of com munity 11 nurtured early in his regime by Mr Dulles had pr gressed from concept to reality ihe stature of the DCI had_grown with it so that the decision• I - 9i - TOP cREqf L __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _IApproved for Release 2013 07 18 1 r C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' ' mak g process established in the new NSCID No 1 was able to read I ' ' I The United States Int lligence Board shall reach its decisions by agreement When the Ch airman determines that a given position on a matter under consideration represents the consensus of the Board it shall be considered as agreed unless a dissenting member requests that the issue be referred to the National Security Council• 15 2 NSCID No 6 was titled Communications Intelligence and Electronics Intell i gence 11 Paragraph 1 of this directive established forcibly and clearly that these activities were now a part of the intelligence community Paragraph 1 stated COMINT and ELINT and their associated activities shall be treated as being within the framework of general intelligence activities ••• J 153 COMINT was thus no long- er an independent empire Further BLINT activit es were raised to the same jurisdictional level as COMINT • • activities Howeve·r precaution was taken so that · Special COMIN security standards and procedures generally shall not app y to ELINT and ELINT activi• ties 154 BLINT was added to the mission of the National Security gency which was cha ged •to - 97 - 'fOP SEGRE '--- - -- - - -- - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' ·1 I provide an effective unified organization and control of the 1 r COMINT 2 ELINT intercept and proc- essing activities of the United States 1'5 5 Pro- vision was made as in the previous NSCID No 9 for NSA to delegate COMINT and ELINT responsibilities to the services and to CIA when DIRNSA determined this desirable for direct support of their operations 156 t • Those portions of the foxmer NSCID No 9 which pertained to the SIGINT COMINT and ELINT activities of the Secretary of Defense NSA and the military departmen s· as well as to the DCI responsibility were put in NSCID No 6 J' ' 1 ' ' · 1 ••1 r for SIGINT arrangements with foreign _g vernments The other more generalized authorities of the old NSCID No 9 were transferred to NSCID No 1 c IL___rlin___f l_u_e_n_c eAdditionally the new NSCID No 6 reflected • • f the squabble that had taken place between CIA and NSA over the Berlin TuMel peration by es- tablisll ing CIA 's r ght not only to collect but als o r ' to process such material in the future -Par gr ph 8b of NSCID No 6 addressed this problem · Other - 98 - IOt' S l CREJj __ _ _ _ __ _ _ ____ l- • ·-• - ·-·--· -ti ••· -·- - ·-- -----·· - ···--· ···· ••· - _ _ _ __ _ ____ ·-- - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l i ·I provisions of this Directive are not applicable to ·j ·t those intercept and processing activities other I than cryptanalysis W1der the authority of NSCID I • No 5 • NSCID No S was the charter for CIA clan- des tine activities1 and this paragraph exempted CIA •· type activities f m nonnal COMINT activities which functioned under the Director NSA Thus began the milleniwn the reign of the DCI and USIB -- King Arthur and his court The dawn had already started to break on the black night of intelligence two years earlier with the CIA-sponsored u-2 IThe intelligence flights - ver Russia blackout was coming to an end The role of COMINT in this era was reduced to that of handmaiden PHOTINT photographic intell gence was usurping the princely role played in prior years by COMINT COMINT remained important however in giving guidance to t I PHOTINT to spot places where important a ctivity was taking place which needed to be phot graphed PHOTINT however annered the $64 missile question of the time which gave hard· evidence as to ·the precise location the type and P' 99 - TOP SECRET Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C nwnber of misstles and planes and details of the - installations • ' he eye of the camera was replacing the ear of COMINT as the key intell gence sensor I t ' l • • • · - lQO Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 l L_-------- ------- ·r j Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - Volwne I I r-r • • J Appendix A 1 • I I i i 1 ' ' • t i • •' 1 - i i t ' · t · 1 p j • I • •j _ r ' ' - 101 - Of S CRRTIL_ __ __ _ _ _ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ----- - T Or l SE Q P EJj 1_ ____________ • ·•t '1 f ' • I •I • • f • I • • I ' •• · ' t 14 • ' •' •• I j I ' ' • I - 102 ' · App oved fo Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 1 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • I ' I ' t • l • ' ' ' • • '- 103 Approved for Release 2013 07 1 8 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' • • I I • i • I i • ' I • I 1 · J £' ' •' I _I 1 • I 104 - TOP SECRET - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - •• QlU ''RET I i - - '- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -• 1 · I • I i f •• ' • I - ' l I J ' _ ' '' T • i 105 'FOP SECRl sT I _________ - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 t ' 'I I f I ' ' j • ' I I - I I I • t • I -------- - 1Q6 T6PSl5CRii'Ij ___ _ _ __ _ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • 'I • • ' t p · • I I • J • I I L -J - · ·' ' · - • • • • -· I - 107 - OPS CR L _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ·-- ·-·-·-··-------- -····---- ··-- ·- Ap ed for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I I l • ' I i 1'uP s2eiHi T 1 'L- - ---------- · Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I OP S BGRitci r t • I • t ' t ' I • i• 109 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 t · I l • I ' I I • • I • I ' f • 1 ' t l 1 ' • i 1 l - 110 r -TOP f CR iTIL-______________ Approved for Release 2013 07 1 81_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ----- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 '1 J I • ' ' f ' -·' • r I ' r - 'i I 1' I • f I I • T I • 11 ' I ' • f • ' 1 I ' • i l • I • ii I J 1 1 ' ' · t · • J 1 ' ' t I •• l ·l l 1 ' •I - 111 - I • - OP S f G R F L - - - - - - - - - - l • • _ •• ___ _ _ 1 • - - - 1• t rtit -1•1111- u- •• ' ' ' ' ' 0 - •• • • - • • • • • i i ·• • ·-••• - - • ·•• Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I fo11 Sane• - - -----' Ll • I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 I' f ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l I • CIA HISTORICAL STAFF The DCI Historical Series The History of SIGINT in the Central Intelligence Agen' ' 1947·70 - I I Volume III I -I ' • _ _ Jop s 1 __ DCl·4 October 1971 ' 1 ------- Copy No 2 of 3 J Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 7 I i Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I I ' ' Te P SEGR E'L I I I • I ____ - - - ' I I_____ I I I • DCI HISTORICAL SERIES I DCI-4 J I • I THE I HISTORY OF SIGINT lN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY· t 1947-70 VOLUME III I • l - · ' 1 •· I • I 4 by ----- I I• October 1971 I •• I • ' I awar-a w Proct or CIA SIGINT Officer _ j 1· HISTORICAL STAFF · I • CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY I I • SE'2PEI I I • t • I -- -· • t • l •- -• • _ • •L••• - •• · • • • · • • • - - · •- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - ••• - • - - - • - - • - • - • • - • - - • -•-••• • C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP S EGRJiTI ' I _________ J --------·--- I • I• ' I• A Note on Classification I• r• I • The overall subject matter of this history requires that it be handled via I• I• I • control systems For purposes of quotation '----- or subsequent sanitization individual parts of the history may be treated as follows Volume I and Volume II • • I ' ----------- Volume III ••••••• •• ••• 1 • I• • I ' Vol'Wlle IV ••••••••••••••• Special Supplement ••• •• I I• L L l • I L I• I I l • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l C01175219 · - I i Approved for Release 2013 07 18 --ir·op 1 ------ l __ r_ SECRET _ _ ___ - J Contents · t I t • I ' ' '' t • I I D NSCID No 17 the ELINT Magna Charta 6 E EL INT Inhouse - - F NSCID No 6 -- NSA and ELINT H II I The A ' Cabell -- Father of ELINT 1 ·1 2 I I III A 21 • • • • • • 16 4 The COMINT Objectives List s NSA COMINT ELINT Program ELINT COnDDittee • • • • • • • • • • 23 28 29 • • 31 • 36 • • • • • 40 40 • • • I 22 27 e SIGINT Committee 1 13 coMINT ELINT Agreement • • 1 • l • Agreement • • 10 26 B c• 5 • • i ' Other Third-Party Matters 3 1 8 • • CIA ELINT Kudos 'l io-Committees Period COMINT Conmittee 1 fIGINT • --- Telemetry ELINT - · r • 1 1 c G • • • 3 B• I • USAF -- ELINT Giant NSA Battles Services Over ELINT • • • A I ELINT • • • • Page SIGINT COlllllittee Chairman • • • • • • j '- ' iii - j I • I • °'IOJi SFCR _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ I •• ----------------·--- I f •• • • f -11-•••1ttaH·t1 ol'II - ' • • • ••• •• • • • ••••••• • - • • - - • • • • • • • • • • - -• • - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 •- •- •• • • - - • - - - C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I I I I _ - TOP EGRi'TI ___ -------------------J Page I• I I • B SIGINT Requirements and Evaluations c SIGINT Foreign Policy I• 2 f • 3 Othe i _A coinPlishments -r I ' J V I • A I t ' ' I • I B c 48 51 • • • • • • • • 54 56 56 59 63 68 69 72 l Aerial Eyes 72 ' 2 Aerial Ears I• 3 COMINT 'Satellites 1 4 COMOR USIB Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance • • • • • • • • I • 44 SIGINT Satellites i • • SIGINT Guidance to NSA The Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee • • • • T• 1 • • • 75 76 78 I• t • ' - __J Third-Party Matters • • • l us SIGINT Bases • a 1 • • 'b· I • 2 Other Th ird-P arty Matters • • • Sheldon's SIGINT Committee i - 42 44 • 1 I• s SORS SIGINT overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee • • L • • • • • 79 t i - iv ' TOP 8 EGRH'YI I • I • - - • - - _ _ lt1T1 -·••Tn•tfftf '•-••- - • • • - - - • • --••- - - -•- ·---- • -·• Approved for Release 2013 07 18 --------- - -- - -- - C01175219 - - - - - TOP SECRl 'I I ------------ 1 ' 'I I l t ' • ---7 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I • Page ·j I • I D E l • v Project ______ • • • • • • • • • ELINT Evaluation - - - - -· ' ' 81 82 F ' he Role of COMINT in Vietnam 83 G Other Subjects • • • • • • • • • • • • 85 • •• The Requirements Game • A Overview • B The Philosophy of Requirements • • 88 c The Six Periods • 89 D The Two Lists Period 1947-55 I ' l The USCIB Requirements List • 87 87 90 92 2 'lhe AFSAC List 3 The Contest I • 4 The Big Evaluation ·• 5 Joint Reading Panel Tumdown 6 The Marcy Letter • • • • 7 Brownell Comnittee Views on Requirements • • • • • • • • • • 102 I I · I I t ' ' • I I • • ·' • • 94 96 99 100 101 E CIA Requirements Staff F The Broad Brush Period 1955-61 G The Social Register -- 'lbe Top 400 Period 1961-62 • • • • • • • • • • • 114 • • • 105 •• 108 I• • I I • 1 Tyi g Dollars to Requirements I • I • TOP SBOR E'f Approved for Release 2013 07 18 •• 114 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l -YOP SIECR FJJ '-----· 1- ------' Page · I ' ' I I I Requirements Spelled Backwards 3 Origin of the Optimum Program Concept n • • • • • • • • • • H The Samford Period 1962-65 I The • 116 • 122 • A Regulation 120 • 2 The Deputy Director for Plans DDP • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 12 B 129 The Infomation Requirements Staff 129 Central Reference Service DOI 129 Office of ELINT DD S T 129 s 6 B ' VII • • • • • • The SIGINT Organization Study Group A Origins - I B CIA the Ball I • c Eaton Runs His OWn Shaw D Reactions to the B May Trial Balloon L • • 130 The Eaton Panel -- A Study of SA SIGINT •• 133 l • • • 128 ·office of Communications DDS i I• 127 The CIA SIGINT Officer 4 I• 1 DDI • • • • • 1 Gets Anuy • • • • • • • 133 136 • 138 • • 141 • • • • • • •• 141 I vi• I • ' • 3 ' • • 118 Period 1966-·70 t I • 114 The SIGINT Organization Study Group - Sausage • • • • • • • 125 VI 2 I • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP SHGRET Page • I ' VIII • • • • • • • • • • 144 • 145 3 CIA • 4 NSA 5 National Reconnaissance Office 6 DIA Air Force and Navy The final F Impact of • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 146 Report • • • • the Eaton Report • • 146 • 146 • 148 Communications Intelligence COMINT Security • • • • • 151 A 151 E A Sound Secure Craft • • • • • A Hole in the Hull • • Let's Legislate Security • • COMINT Security in CIG • • COtUNT Clearances Mushroom • • F The Traitors • • • • • • G The TJSS • • • • • H Finis • • • • • • • • • • c r 144 Joint Chiefs of Staff • • E B o • 2 • Puebto • I • • • • • 153 154 156 160 162 1Ei6 168 A2 2endixes A Source References • • • I I • I I 169 - vii - 'f'OP SHORB'f' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ---· - ···-·-----··-·-- - - 1 co1175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I I j I TQP SSCRET - I I ·t Th e History of SIGINT in the Central Intelligence Agency 1947-70 Volume III l I • '• I ELINT The Central Intelligence Agency and in particular its Deputy Director General Charles P Cabell played a decisive role in raising Electronics Intel- j I I - ligenceI ELINT operations to the national level and in putting CIA into the ELINT business In addition to the key political and policy role played by CIA1 I j the Agency through the years has made important con• tributions to US knowledge off ____________ - _ • l '1 t I • _ through CIA-sponsored signals intercept and analysis operations 1· - ' ' A Cabell -- Father of ELINT The father 'of ELINT in CIA was Gene al Charles I • Pearre Cabell USAF who was Deputy Director under Allen Welsh Dulles from 23 April 1953 to 31 Janua I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I • ' I I• 1962 General Cabell was an old hand in the intelli- I gence business having been a member of the USCIB I• even before the Central Intelligence Group was inI • vited to join USCIB and chairing the USCIB during I • its early years when DCI Hillenkoetter was just a I member of the Board Cabell's Air Force background helped him to ' I in particular and to the other services as well • I ELINT was the technical source that listened to the ' enemy radars and determined how powerful they were j where they were and whether or not the United ' ' appreciate the importance of ELINT to the Air Force States Air Force could evade them or knock them out l A precise order-of-battle of the Russia n radar net· ' 'I ' was absolutely necessary for the US Strategic Air I Command SAC attack plan In the mid-1950's as US bomber forces increased and went on a 24-hour I I t• I l i I airborne alert th need for good intelligence increased more than ever The early and mid-19SO's was th period of the intelligence blackout compared to the intelli- us gence successes of World War II communications intelligence was• - 2 - I i L - '• •t• - - - - - - - - - - • • -•• • - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - - - - - ' •-h••---•••••-•••• ••--• - •• - c o117s219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I '• ·1 ' - 'LVLdflGRFT ' r _ ' ' ___ ' ' # I • J I • I • I• ' •• ' l •• I • I I - I • j I I • ·i • • B USAF -- ELINT Giant ' l I I l I 1• I • I l up 8f36 L_ _ _ __ _ _ ___ ---·---•-·------·•-- - -·- ___ ·--- ------ ---·-·--·----- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 ' - roP SE£R ET - 7 I I I i I • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 J -- - ' ' • • I I • I I • A °large ELINT capability was thus acquired by • • I the Air Force during the 1950 1 s To a lesser extent t I I the US Navy and Army also needed to listen to radar and other electronic signals being put out by enemy forces which opposed them As the size of the three military ELINT organizations grew money invested j • • ' I• in the equipment and training of personnel became considerable Airbome intercept operations in par- ticular were expensive because of the cost of the aircraft and the special configuration required to install ELINT and COMINT equipment I• Airplanes however were able to hear signals from farther I i Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - TOP SECRET r 1 inside the Iron Curtain than ground stations and 1 ' thus were an important part of the total system i c I I NSA Battles Services Over ELINT In 1952 when the Brownell Committee did the basic study on the COMINT organization of the govern- • I • ment ELINT was a relatively insignificant operation and the Brownell Committee did not address the problem as to whether or not ELINT like COMINT should be con rolled by a single national authority As the Nati nal Security Agency created as a result of the Brownell Committee grew in size and power it served more and more to antagonize the three ' · military services -- primarily because they resist- I I • I • ed coming under the control of a national authority and desired their own independence - However the law was the law and General Canine Director NSA insofar as he could tried to consolidate his authority I • I over service communications intelligence activities National Security Council Intelligence Directive I• NSCID No 9 was the COMINT Magna Charta Initially written in 1948 and completely rewritten n 1952 the Directive did not even contain the word BLINT I • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOf SfiCRi 1 I The military service as their ELINT organizations ' ' grew resisted strenuously any suggestion that the National security Agency should be given authority over their ELINT activities similar to the authority ' it had over their COMINT activities There was a basic similarity between CCMINT and ELINTLintercept operations ' using electronic listening devices similar in many I L_ land both respects but covering different radio frequencies ' he military services however insisted that their ELINT intercept operations be independent from COMINT ' I and not covered by the hated COMINT codeword which I ' - f · ' j I • · •' I • 1• had become the symbol of NSA control D NSCID No 17 the ELINT Magna Charta By 1955 the cost and size of the ELINT oper- ation had increased so much that some type of national authority cognizance was required The United States Communications Intelligence Board USCIB l • ' I did not have the right name to assume control over ELINT but it did have the know-how Therefore USCIB undertook to have its charter but not its • I I -•tuP S SbRBI_ __- - - - - - - - - - - - I • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ------- -- -· C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' 'fOP SECRiT I' name expanded by the National Security Council so I ' that it would have cognizance of ELINT 1 ' ' J On 16 May 1955 NSCID No 17 Electronic J ntell Lgence I • ELINT was issued charging the USCIB I t • in addition to its authority and responsibility as defined in NSCID No 9 and operating under the procedures established under Paragraph l f of that Directive shall be the national policy body for ELINT y By I ' basing its procedures on Paragraph l f of NSCID No 9 the ELINT authority of the board was deliber tely limited decisions binding on all deparbnents of the govern- t I r · I I ment only when adopted by unanimous vote 'lhe ELINT'ers thus retained their fierce independence • This paragraph made board not only from NSA but even from the board itself l • insofar as their departmental operations were con j • · 1 _ I • • cerned • NSCID No 17 established a Technical Processing Center administered by the Department of Defense staffed by Defense and CIA personnel and independent •· I• I t ' of NSA y The NSCID also gave CIA as well as the For serially numbered source references see Appendix A · - 7 I - TOP SEGR EX ------------ ---' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ---------- --- ------ C01175219 Approved ror Release 2013 07 18 'rOP Sl i CRET I I I Department of Defense responsibilities for ELINT collection activity y The NSC Directive was primar- I • ily the work of General Cabell who believed that US ' ELINT activities required an independence from COMINT I • activities if they were to grow and thrive ' He was aware that most of the old COMINT hands in the intelligence community were not sufficiently sympathetic l or understanding towards ELINT as an intelligence I • source He therefore was the prime mover in causing th special NSCIO to be written for ELINT Cabell thus enabled ELINT to become an organized religion j I in its own right to the jubilation of its devotees ' ' E ELINT Inhouse • ___ Within CIA too General Cabell established I ' ELINT as an independent entity He gave the Assist- • I ant Director for Scientific Intelligence H Marshall •• 1 • Chadwell an additional hat entitled Agency ELINT •• Staff Officer ESO in M y 1954 • • 1 Chadwell soon appointed his Deputy to the ELINT Staff Officer job as a primary responsibility and I• I he held it from August 1955 to July 1957 when he was succeeded by James Sears I 8 I • I -------- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - -------- ------ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' · 7-· I •• became the BSO in August 1958 and he has been responsible for Agency BLINT programs from that date to the present 1971 except for a one-year period from I I • ' August 1960 to June 1961 when the ESO job was held - y by I Despite its new responsibilities for ELINT under NSCID No 17 the two USCIB subcommittees con- I • I cerned with COMINT BLINT failed in Cabell's view to bring about a vigorous ELINT program The USCIB Security Committee was concerned by charter with COMINT secu·rity a complex field in its own right The USCIB Intelligence Committee was charged with ' establishing requirements and reviewing the product ' of NSA Since the BLINT produced by NSA at that time consisted primarily ofl - - ----- - 11-- - - - - - - - - -- - - -'T' _i_t _w _ a_s not an active ' • • I• I • J• concern of this Committee After almost three years of little or no ELINT action on the part of the USCIB General Cabell proposed establishing a specialized USCIB Committee for ELINT I USIBELCOM was established by USCIB on 3 March 1958 • § ' _ I As a result - This committee was given the rather nebulous job of I'· 9 _____________ __ I -------- -- -------·--- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ___ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'I OF EGRET - I ' being generally cognizant of the status of various 11 ELINT programs as well as formulating national ELINT policy national BLINT objectives and recommending ' arrangements with foreign governments on ELINT matters y I • I ' The committee was also to recommend policy in relation to the National Technical Processing Center I • This rather vague charter was short-lived I • USCIB's concern with the charter of the BLINT comI • mittee 'was at the time far overshadowed by concern over its·own charter and even its own existence L Only 10 days after USCIB approved the ELINT charter the National Security Council on 13 March 1958 abolished USCIB and directed that it and the IAC be combined into a single board ' i I • F NSCID No 6 -- NSA and ELINT A feverish period of activity on the part of I • • drafting staffs of the two boards resulted in the issuance on 15 eptember 1958 of NSCID No 1 es- I tablishing the new United States Intelligence Board and NSCID No 6 giving the Board responsibility for COMINT and BLINT activities -· At last ELINT had I • TO B JUi ------- - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - - - - ---- - ---- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I I I - i OF SiCRET arrived and was equal to its big brother COMINT i in that both were considered equally in the new directive r This new directive also sounded the death knell of the independent National ELINT Processing Center and gave the Director of NSA operational I • and technical control of all crnUNT and BLINT I ' intercept and processing activities of the United States Y The independent control of the military services over ELINT collection and processing thus followed the pattern established earlier by COMINT when it was placed under the National Security Agency This came about through an interesting coinciI • dence f 't • BLINT had become so expensive and so imper- tant that the Baker Panel in 1957-58 which was convoked as a result of DCI pressure to study thef ' ---- I • -- 7 problem also was exposed by NSA to the NSA-versus-military-services ELINT contro- · versy The panel ended up recommending that the ELINT activities of the government be placed under • i NSA -- a recommendation which covered a subject outside of their initial charter · When the President on 10 February 1958 approv- I I I ed• the Baker Panel recommendations on improving the 11 ' I -- -- - TO' P SfiOilET ___ _ _ _ _ - -----·--- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 ' ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 J '-------r-o_P_sE_c_RE_T_ II_________ problem he did not ap- effort on the l prove the recommendation that NSA be given more ELINT authority but rather directed that a special study would be made of the problem This special study was made under USIB auspices and was chaired by CIA representative General Philip G Strong The Strong Committee supported the Baker Panel recommendations that ELINT activities be placed under the National I • Security Agency Accordingly when NSCID No 6 I was drafted in the summer of 1958 to replace NSCID No 9 COMrNT and NSCID No 17 ELINT this re I sponsibility was i cluded ' The ELINT National Tech- nical Processing Center was thereafter transferred I l - to NSA at Fort Meade Maryland from its location ••• I I I - at the Naval Security Statio on Nebraska-Avenue N W Washington D C The next spring in ·March 1959 the Department of Defense issued an ELINT '' Directive S 3115 officially as igning ELINT- re- l sponsibilities to NSA Y •- l The earlier pattem of NSA's COMINT relations repeated itself n ELINT Just as the COMINT com- I • munity had earlier blamed NSA for failing to ful- ' fill its COMINT role'adequately so the ELINT - 12 • I • I au l • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 --------- -------- -- ·- - C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP aECR li'I L I • _L community for the next few years berated NSA on ELINT NSA was slow in processing the massive volume of raw ELINT data that was being collected by various sensors and dumped on NSA to process into finished ELINT product -- data which defined the signal parameters of various radars and other emitters More than that the military services started to hide most of 1 their ELINT assets from NSA under the cover of Electronic Warfare EW Y Responsibility for EW be- longed to the individual services not to NSA 'Ihus the paragraphs of NSCID No 6 which gave the Director of NSA control of 1'all ••• ELINT intercept and processing of the United States were never really carried ' • out The military services and CIA to a lesser ex- I tent did not recognize the NSA ELINT authority ' Ten years after the words were written they remained I ' I I ' just words This was brought out clearly in 1968 in the Eaton Panel study and is discussed in Chapter VII G Telemetry ELINT I i 1 A period of intense argument concerning what signals constituted ELINT took place during the 1950 1 s I • ' r • I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ------ - · -------- - - C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I TOP SECRET I I L·-----'------ -----------' tI ' I J i The issue came to a head over telemetry ' Was telemetry ELINT or COMINT or was it ' neither I • The argument raged vociferously during the closing years of the decade If it was neither it l • fell outside of NSA's responsibility If it was I COMINT it had to be protected with a codeword If it was ELINT would it receive enough protection if f • I ' it did not have a special security category similar to that of COMINT Information from telemetry was a key input to intelligence on Russian missile capability · If the Russians found out we were getting C • this infoz mation would they not encipher it thus I I j denying it to us These questions were argued with more political than intellectual fervor by all parties A clean resolution was never achieved • The volume of telemetry increased I • 'l'he October 1957 launching of Sputnik was followed by many Rus- I I • sian satellites -- all of them spewing forth telemetry which required miles of magnetic tape for US intercept stations to record • I I NSA within a few years was up to its ears in tape -- so much so that the haystack obscured the intelligence needle ' I ffQP S E€UT _ _ I_ __ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ I ·•- - • - 0 -- - - · ·· • • • • • · - --- • - - - - - •F- - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - - • - - - • - - - · · -- · - C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 •• J ' I • l ' I I I• j f • I t i • • j ' '· l i ' · · l ' i l I • • l• 1 l • ' I 15 - I I • L l zCf9P SEGRE -------- Approved for Release 013 07 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - -------- - - I SECPET t ' I• ' l • ' I ' I L I • ' I I I I ' I I • ' · • I• I I ' I t I' 16 I• L I • T6P •• iFCRETj - -- --- - - J • - - · - - _ _ __ __ --- • - • - - - r --•• • - - - - • - • • - Approved for Release 2013 07 18_ _ • -------·- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP S CRET I ' ' l l I• J t i- 1• I• I I T When the Office of ELINT OEL was established I on 30 July 1962 by Agency Notice HN 1-23 under the 1 jurisdiction of the Deputy Director for Research l I• DOR withe s the Assistant ' Director for ELINT it was given responsibility for 1 Agency ELINT activities subject to policy guidance l• from Mr Huntington D Sheldon by that time the T • Agency SIGINT Officer I I• ' I ' Clandestine agent operations and liaison with foreign intelligence services 17 '' L l • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -- - --- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' remained under direct control of the Deputy Director for Plans DDP I I • I This dual responsibility for over- I • seas ELINT operations caused friction between I -7 in DDP and OEL in DD S T from the beginning i • I t The Office of ELINT pulled together in CIA functions that had previously been performed by the Office of Scientific Intelligence DOI the Office I • of Communications DDS and jL_ _ ___ cooP I R D responsibilities were later transferred from the • '· Office of Special Activities DD S T I rapidly to•approximatelt OEL expanded people within a year Vigorous pursuit of its responsibilities particularly in the overseas collection field frequently ' caused friction between OEL and the DDP which had basic responsibility for CIA overseas operations ' ' f • The SIGINT Officer often was called in to adjudicate 'i I • ' • I I • disputes between these jurisdictions which arose out of the similar overseas responsibilities of the two organizations and from the personalities involved I • who were intensively pursuing their overlapping • charters t • The role of the SIGINT Officer in these cases was to make Solomon-like decisions supporting the technical know-how and enthusiasm of the Office ' ' 18 I • -wrl OP S CP ET r Approved for Release 2013 07 ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · ·-- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 S1'l0 Rl T l _ 1 ------------ of ELINT yet insuring that the experience and political sophistication of the senior service the I DDP was a decisive element in the decision I ELINT in CIA thus followed a completely different growth pattern from that of COMINT I Early in the history of the Agency the COMINT Officer decided I • I • ' I that his role was more properly a staff function to encourage the development of COMINT and its use by the line offices of the Agency rather than the creation of a separate Office of COMINT This decision was dictated by the nature of COMINT which produced I • information ·from communications dealing with every subject under the sun I cations was thus of interest to most CIA components I t ELINT on the other hand was a highly special-' I 'l I • I Intelligence from communi- ized source producing intelligence on foreign electronic hardware The technical expertise for BLINT operations did not _exist in the DDP the CIA office responsible for overseas collection operations l I Likewise top management in the DDP had minimal in- I i depth scientific background or desire to undertake I ELINT operations themselves I 19 t • • I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOf SECRET I I J j John A McCone created the Directorate for Research in February 1962 changed to DD S T in August ' ' 1963 • Five months later when the Office of ELINT was formed he placed it in the scientific abnosphere of the new directorate rather than in the DDP I • This decision gave ELINT far more policy support than it would have had in the DDP but it sowed basic I seeds of conflict between the two jurisdictions that still exist At one time Bill Harvey Chief j DDP remarked ' l ELINT is the only five-letter dirty word in the English language OEL feelings l ere in towar a similar vein Despite the troubles however or perhaps J 1 -• I • because of them the CIA ELINT operation flourished and contributed importantly to national intelligence • - • - I ' I I t 20 - TOP 9f 6 Ri1iL·_______________ ---···- -- ------------- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ---· ------------ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 __ f '------------------------II The ' Wo-Cornmittees Period I The impact on COMINT and ELINT of the estabj lishment of the United States Intelligence Board on 15 September 1958 was immediate both within CIA and ' ' within the intelligence community Within the CIA the status of the COMINT Officer was changed Former- ly he had functioned in one respect at the same level as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in that both men were CIA representatives on the two senior governmental intelligence boards I With the • demise of USCIB the COMINT Officer no longer held th s job 1 General Cabell was the CIA member on the new USIB L In the intelligence community SIGINT responsibility as it was becoming known was now divided into two committees the USIB C INT Committee I i f • I chaired by T Achilles Polyzoides from the Department of State and the USIB ELINT Committee chaired by Colonel Charles P Richman USAF The parent organizations of the two chairmen were a determining I l factor in their selection chairmanship of the COMINT Committee it was hoped _ ' 21 I The Department of State - TOP SBQRE ---Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l _ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 would give more emphasis to nonmilitary COMINT prob lems and lead the COMINT Committee to deal increasI J ingly with substantive intelli9ence problems as well as policy problems The choice of the Air Force to chair the ELINT Committee was in recognition of the dominant position of the Air Force in the ELINT field Both Polyzoides and Richman were able chairmen with long experience in each of their two specialties • • I i • A COMINT Committee The COMINT Committee started off with great I I 'I • ' _ I i vigor The first meeting of the Committee in the Director's Conference Room Administration ·Buildi g CIA on l October 1958 was attended by T Achilles Polyzoiges State Colonel L G Lansdale Dept of Defense L-- - - - - - - - NSA Barnard A Wells FBI Charles D Reichardt AEC IL____________ CIA John F O'Gara Army Captain William M •- I - l Stevens Navy Colonel William F -Scott Air Force Colonel Monte Cone Joint Chiefs of Staff_ and Colo- ·• I · _I t nel Charles M Townsend Secretary 'lhe COMINT f Committee met weekly and during the first year tackled a variety of problems - TOP S CRET I Within a short time the - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 j •' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -TOP SECRET I · COMINT Committee charter DCID 6 1 was drafted ' t • 1 • ' I • I • I l '' - I • t I - ' SIGINT Agreement ' ' - • I I •' T i · ·• - ' I' ' • t · r ' I ' 1 I - I - I I 1'0P SECRET - - -_-_ _ _ _ ____ l Approved for Release 2013 07 1 ------- C01175219 • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I - - lOP EORiT I • I • J I I ' I ' I• I • ' j I • I t • ' ' · ' j I • I • 24 • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 --------'-- ----------- -- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - _ _ _ _ f0LS6£ 1YiT I • I r _7 l I I • C f • I • I t t - I I • ' I •• I' I ' I i I I • - 25 ' -1 Of' S15QR F tjL__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ l Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ------ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _'f_OP S CR ET I - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - 7 I t ' I • r I I • • I l I i • f • I ' l' • - t 1 2 Other 'lhird-Party Matters • I • ·1 · I I - 26 - Approved for Release 2013 O7' l 18 __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 iI r-l __________ - l i I t f • i • j • ' I ' I • 1 ' I •' I I ' • I ' I - 27 - TOP CRETL -- --- -- - --- - ---- - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 I_ I • i Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'i'uP Sl P R PW r I ' I j • I • I• I I' I I• I • ' 4 Tne COMINT Objectives List One of the more important steps taken by the committee during this period came about as the ref sult of a CIA member's proposal in April 1959 USIB- ' CC-9 3 14 to update the COMINT Objectives List in the light of current needs and conditions 25 'l'he CIA played a major role in designing this I • • I • I • List and Ray Russell of the SPINT Staff designed an original COMINT Objectives List I • system 26 This system keyed COMINT objectives to national objectives taking into consideration the peculiarities of the COMINT source COMINT had a high fOtential of providi g intelligence on some • l '28 - ------ - ' OP SBCP F'q1___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ -J Approved for Release 2013 07 1__8_________ ------- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - I 0 £1 ESD FT I J intelligence targets and prac- I • tically zero potential on others depending on the type of intelligence objective and our ability to read given target communications ' I • CIA did most of the work on the COMINT Objec- tives List in-house 11 and then tried it out on the• I ot er members of the community I • as a catalyst on the committee and resulted in an I The CIA List acted t ' ad hoo committee which took a completely different and radical approach to requirements priorities After considerable wrangling an attempt was made to place in absolute priority order some 410 COMINT requirements ' - This work was completed in April 1960 thus ending a year of feverish activity in the COMINT requirements sphere 27 - I After this exercise the requirements people I • were rather exhausted and the subject lay semidor- ' ' I • I• I• mant for three years until raised once again under General Samford's chairmanship of the Committee 5 NSA COMINT ELINT Program The NSA COMINT ELINT program budget during these years was presented in its tentative form to the two committees for consideration ' The presentation 29 I • 1- ' FOP SiCP FTI L------------- ----· Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TO' f' SECRE'F 1 L----- I j I ' I I was more proforma than practical as the committee did little except note the budget and make broad recormnendations as to its effectiveness The NSA I budget was so complex and technical that no outside ' authority had the competence to ·review it until some years later -- a special staff was established in 1963 in the Office of the Secretary of Defense under J ohn O'Gara with the full-time responsibility of reviewing the SIGINT budgets of NSA and the military services An' t illustration of the type of impact which l the committee could and did have on NSA as a result of these presentations occurred as a result of the I • 1959 budget presentation At a joint meeting of the COMINT and ELINT Committees held on 22 October 1959 Dr Louis I • _ _ I • I w Tordella Vice Director of NSA and Mr Francis A Raven together wi'l h l made a presentation to the committees of the NSA budget W I • I • -I • Growing out of th is and because of SIGINT Conmittee I •f - - 30 I • I 'fOf' SESR 1 _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _- _________A __a p pr __o_ve_d_f_o_r Rele a se 2 0 13 07 18 - - - - - --- - C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • I • ---------'_1'I_Ju _P SffiE C R F _TC l f_ 1- An I • illustration of the indirect impact of these NSA budget presentations was the NSA request for ' Russian linguistic assistance 1of NSA went over the proposed NSA effort on this target in detail stating in November 1959 that one of the major problems was a need for more Russian linguists The CIA member of the committee undertook to pull ' together the various linguistic assets available through the intelligence community that could be- - - - --provided' to assist NSA in this problem I - I B• I The CIA Berlin Tunnel wiretap in 1955-5 • I • 'produced large quantities of Russian telephone I I ' 31 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 I • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l_ I • conversations Processing intercepted written Rus- sian messages was difficult enough but processing ' ' 1 • voice transcriptions required almost native Russian - - - - - -- skills L t • ' • ' t • ' I I I i 32 - - - - - - - ---- df'9P -·----------- SFCBETI Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -----------·- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • · r1 I tu£ EGRET - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - -I- - - - - I • I • I ' I • ' ' I I · I I • · I • ' l • I • •• I I I I I I • I • ·' ' 33 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _J C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -10P SiCRET ------ • l ----------------- • I · r I ·' • ' •• • • I •I ·t - •••• 1 • • t' i • • l • TOP SECR i L_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -- - _ _TO _ L_ -- _____ ___________ ----- ---- - I • I• ' I I • I • I • · ' I • ' I • · · I I • t 35 - 'f'QR SF CRE Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I I I ' I r c The ELINT Committee started off life under the •1 I ELINT Committee I • auspices of USCIB on 3 April 1958 and held five I • meetings from that time until October by which time USCIB was absorbed into USIB 43 During its five meetings under its first parentage the ELINT Committee started to revise the national ELINT objectives I with the CIA member doing most of the work 44 'lhe committee also struggled with its charter and with studying what to do about the ELINT matters that had been'suggested for further attention by the • i USCIB ELINT Task Force chaired by General Philip G Strong of CIA ' ' ·• The details of this period are t I covered more fully above in Chapter I Section F of this volume The ELINT Committee met approximately once a · month ' I ' • As time went on more and more of these meetings were joint meetings held with the COMINT Committee · __________ I The committee also concerned itself with a charge from USIB to study the security aspects of telemetry signals At the 31st meeting on l 36 - 'i'Q 8ECRE Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approv·ed for Release 2013 07 18 26 May 1960 Madison E Mitchell Office of the Secretary of Defense became Chairman replacing Charles P Richman USAF Y Mitchell remained chairman of the committee until the committee ceased to exist when it and the COMINT Committee were combined into the SIGINT Committee on 30 April 1962 One of the highlights of this period was the comI • mittee review of the NSA ELINT program in June of 1960 47 t ' ' · I • • t ' I I - - -37 - - -- - - - - - I • TO Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ----- - - ' C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I' t I Dur ing the years that Mitchell was chairman of the committee the nwnber of joint meetings with I the COMINT Committee increased so that by the time the two committees were combined joint meetings were a regular feature -- some 24 having been held These meetings were primarily concerned with SIGINT ' l · ' r At its meeti g on 23 May 1961 USIB discussed the advisability of combining the COMINT and ELINT Committees in view of their similar responsibilities • 1 ' and in recognition of the fact that NSA was now the primary recipient of the guidance of both committees i • On 25 July USIB finally agreed that the COMINT and ELINT Committees should be merged and it was understood that the chairman of USIB L - 38 I ' ---------- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -----· C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 T_OP SECRE_T J would consult with the members regarding the chairmanship of the Committee and submit recommendations i ' for consideration at an early board meeting Nothing happened for nine months during which period McCone replaced Dulles as DCI on 29 November 1961 The search for a chairman of the combined committee was given new impetus by McCone and it was suggested by Sheldon that Lieutenant General John A Samford USAF Retired who had just completed his tour as I I Director of NSA might accept the job approached ·and agreed I I Samford was In May 1962 he conducted the first meeti g of the new USIB SIGINT Committee in the USIB Conference Room Headquarters CIA g I I •• f •• I •1 I • - • ' •• I I •r I •i On 8 June 1962 Sheldon's designation was changed from CIA COMINT to CIA SIGINT Officer effective 28 May HN 20-51 I - 39 I • I • ' ---------- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ----- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ______T0PQiC8EL III A The SIGINT Committee SIGINT Committee Chairman The appointment of the ex-Director of the NSA to be the Chairman of the new USIB SIGINT Committee in May 1962 provided prestige and status hitherto unthought of to this committee of USIB Prior to this Lieutenant General John A Samford USAF Retired the Director of NSA a three star general titular conunander of almost 60 000 COMINT ELINT troops and ·master of a budget of r -- - 7 I _ _ dollars was considered a cut above the Chairman of a USIB Committee as far as government hierarchy went ' Ihe fact that he accepted the job as Chairman of the new SIGINT committee indicates the level in government to which the prestige of this committee had risen during the years Dulles chaired USIB -- a chair just recently occupied by John McCone I Samford was an unusual man More of a pedant l than a pilot more of a philosopher than a fighter I • he was a man who understood and loved the SIGINT ' I • 40 - TOP SECR T --------- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ----------------------------------------- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _ _ _ _ -OF ' S CR EI business Having been the Director of NSA DIRNSA he knew well · the problems of trying to carry out the I • I DIRNSA's decisions down through a command chain staffed I• I - I by NSA old-line school-tie closely knit SIGINT bureaucrats He hoped that in his new capacity he might improve the relationship between NSA and the rest of the intelligence community as well as achieve I Ii I • 4 • ' ' ' l i Samford came on the scene at a time when I 'I some of the goals he had established as DIRNSA bureaucratic infighting in the SIGINT Committee was at a relatively low ebb due in no small measure to his policies while DIRNSA The word SIGINT in I I I I lieu of COMINT ELINT on the masthead of the new Committee was an indication of this Although this word had been used by the British for COMINT as l I ' · ·· • I ' I ' · i •• 1• • t far back as World War II the United States was unwilling to accept it In the mid-1950 1 s NSA proposed that the United States adopt the British terminology only to run into a stone wall on the part of the US military services who opposed it on r• I -• 1• the grounds that this would tend to give NSA a leg up on adding ELINT to their COMINT responsibilities • l So the term SIGINT did not come officially into - 41 I • t • i - IOP Si3€RFTI - - - - - - 1 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP S CRET ' ' US jargon until after USIB was created in 1958 at which time NSA was given nominal jurisdiction over I• both COMINT and ELINT ' B SIGINT Requirements and Evaluations I• General Samford served as SIGINT Committee I I Chairman for almost three years -- from May 1962 to • February 1965 I • I 'lWo types of actions dominated the committee during this period Thd first type self- generated by Samford dealt with the relationship between SA and the intelligence community the second type •consisted of policy fomulations for US governm ntal SIGINT relations with foreign counI tries ' Samford was a prolific writer and wrote I • I several philosophical papers proposing various methj I ods of expressing intelligence priorities in formats I that would be most useful to the NSA g 'lbe ideas in these papers failed to strike a spark in the ' committee at the time because of the somewhat ab- I struse Samfordese prose in which they were co ched W l Three years later however many of Samford' ideas I' 'I were reinvented and ch ged circumstances enabled l - 42 - ' l· 'f f B CRF L ---------- I Ap roved for Release 2013 07 1_8________________ _ ------------- C01175219 I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I 'rtiP SSCPET them to come to fruition Among other things Sam- ford proposed that USIB requirements be keyed to the I • SIGINT subelements used by the Department of Defense I for the combined cryptographic program NSA rejected the idea on the grounds that it would be very time ' l consuming and difficult Samford also urged a mas- l sive evaluation exercise of the total SIGINT product • put out by NSA and the military services I He had Mr John F O'Gara who was responsible in the De' partment of Defense for staffing the NSA annual bu get exercise appear before the SIGINT Committee I I in September 1962 to help sell the committee on the usefulness of such a program W This evaluation l was undertaken and was keyed to the combined crypto- 1 graphic program CCJ sube lemen ts I divided the total NSA budget into 60 categories SS The CCP system l • ' t I • i' I I j 'lhe remaining subelements were concerned with administration and support costs These administrative subelements absorbed l 43 - i t· CL-_ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ °TOP 1' tEGJ liFTL I • ' Approved for Rele se 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I i I l - - - - - wark was also undertaken on a new require- ments system and on 14 June 1963 a new SIGINT priorities requirements paper was submitted to the USIB 56 This action is covered more fully in Chapter i V The Requirements Game • I • C s SIGINT Foreign Policy I i ' I - • I I • 1 44 - l __ AP _proved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l ___ 'i'OP Si CR ET _ ------- - 45 l _ _ _J _ _ _ j --------1 TOP SECR ET IL_ --_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 T Q S ECR aTJ L _ __ _ _ _ _ _ L_ -- I - I ' I 'I ' l • I i ' ' I I• I • I - I - - I I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 I • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • 'fOP SECRET' I i I i t ' • I • I ' • ' • I r 1 i • •• T ' • t I I • I • 1' ·- 1 - TSP SFCRE ·•- ·•· · • -··· Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ·•· ·------·---- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -PSP SECRETJ 7 L_ ______ --_ r- I • _---- - _----1 _ -__ - _- I 1 I I I' I I I j I• I • r 1 I • • 1 ' I t • l • 48 - l - TOf S'EORE L _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ----------· -·- - - -· - C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - IOP SiCRET - ' I • I • I • I I I I I • '• ' i • I • t • ' l • I ' l ' ' - 49 - L 'IOP ECR ETL r _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-_--_-_- -1 ' Approved f r Release 2013 07 18 -------··-·- -- --- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -· l · ' i I • ' • ·• •·• I • • ' SQ - t I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ---------- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 OF SECRET ' '' I • ' - • · -_ I ·· I •• I • r' 1 I •r l 'P • 51 - I I • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' ' OP SECRET ' I • ' ' '· ' • · • _ • • I -· · ' - • ft • · ' 'Ibis was submitted by CIA on 2 August 1963 at the I r' 40th SIGINT Committee meeting and forwarded to USIB 11J • l • I • General Samford concluded his chairmanship of the SIGINT Committee in January 1965 at which time - 52 - I • T O ''--_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'I OP S BCRE'9 i I I _ _ _J HWltington D Sheldo the CIA SIGINT Officer took on this job in addition to his other duties as Assistant OD S T Chairman of the USIB watch Committee and CIA SIGINT Officer 1 Y ' i • I • - SJ - • I • I • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ---- -· -·--- ------- · - - - - --· - - C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ---- - - - - - - - - TOP 8EC RliT l ------ - - -- - ------- IV Sheldon's SIGINT Committee A dramatic change in leadership style took place when Huntington D Sheldon took over the Chair of the USIB SIGINT Committee at its 80th meeting on 12 February 1965 79 Sheldon was patrician and more than a bit autocratic and by his personality he dominated the SIGINT Committee I Sheldon used the SIGINT Committee as a formal mechanism to approve I • work done by groups utside of the committee rather than as a mediwn for the exchange or generation of ideas I ·' Unlike General Samford who drafted his own ' papers Sheldon picked people in whom he had confidence and assigned them the responsibility to do the drafting He had a tendency to compartment his staffers one from the other and wanted to feel the I pressure of events pushing up to him from the sepa- •• I I rate staffs Sheldon's modus opePandi resulted in the I • establishment of the SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee SORS under Ernest J Zelmer _filY the i • Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee IGS under I 54 I TOP Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - R E T '____ fa pilot ELINT Evaluation under 82 and a SIGINT Evaluation Subcommittee under DIA's Lieutenant Colonel Henry Howells w Work on a variety of other problems including third-party countries Project -7 and security problems was assigned primarily to l his own SPINT staff Sheldon attempted initially to have more senior representatives from each of the USIB agencies attend the committee meetings ful for a He was success- few months but soon the professional SIGINT'ers who ha4 represented their departments in SIGINT matters for years again filled the chairs around the table ·• I This came about because of the· kind of business handled by the SIGINT Committee This committee was the senior governmental-level technical group It turned complex technical problems into policy but it did not have the final 1 say on policy ' This was the province of USIB SIGINT Committee members therefore had to have considerable technical knowledge in the SIGINT ' I ' business to understand the intricate problems and to convert them into·nontechnical policy papers 55 r TOP StCRET 1 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - --- TOF Si CBRT --- --------- -- that could be understood at a senior level --····------·- Thus its personnel tended to be technicians rather than politicians A Third-Party Matters Under Sheldon the SIGINT Committee considered a number· of important third-party matters 1 1 ' US SIGINT Bases I I • ' • l - 56 - - I UP S CREI1 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP iCRFT - - - __ - _I__ - - - - · ---- -- ---1 I • ' ' --·' • I ' •• j • - 57 - TOP SiCRE'IfL _ - - - - - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for R lease 2013 07 18 7 TOP S ECRET I I ' l__ _______J ----------------- - -------- I I ' ' ' I I I • ' ' '' • ' j I I I I • l • C I • 1 · I •'• • I •• I •I • I• 58 - -TOP tJf GRli'TI - - ------------- ----- LI Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _j ----- - C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _______________ ' L---------·----- - ----1 I ' ' -' ' • t · ' · ' - i - t - 59 I • TDP ECRE IIL_________ ___ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' 1 I 7 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _____ r u e_s ECRE' l ----------- I I I I I I ' I I I 7 ------···---------7 • I • ' I I • I 60 - I Of SEC E'D - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - - - - - -ffiF_ SECRET -------------- ' r • • I • - j ' I ' I • TOP S SQR FTc_________________ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _______ 1 • I I ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --·------ - - - - - - - - - ----------------- --- j I • - 62 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ------- - -'f_Q 5 CRET i ' -----·-' - - - - - -----··- - - - -i I I I L I ' i I - - ·---·------- ---- --·---··-· -- 63 - ----- - --- 1 uTPl S El CffiR Eg --LI - ____________ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - --- C01175219 ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 1 - - - - - · - tl O P StfE G i I I I L - - - - - - - - · · - - ---------·-- -·---- - - ___ _____ ------ -·---·--- • I - 64 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - -'I OP-- S CRET rI jI _ _ _ _ __ '··------- i - 65 - -Y8P SEC E Q _ _ _ _ __ _ __ ____ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 --- --- - C01175219 Approved for Releas 2013 07 18 - TOP aE€PET I I l - - - - - -----------------------7 I I I I i' - ' 66 - ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 T J i' SEGRBT - - - ---·---- - ----- - -----·· • I • ' 67 - 'f'Of' S£6RET c ___ _ _ _ _ __ ____ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - --··--- TOP flECilfi'F r--· I ' I • ' l_ 2 j Other Third-Party Matters ' - 68 - TOP Si R vxl LI- - - - -- - - - - - Approved fo _ elease 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -TO P SECil T I • ' I j B SIGINT Guidance to NSA Guidance Subcommittee The Intelligence Ever since the original creation of the USCIB in 1946 the board had assumed that one of its principal responsibilities was to provide intelligence guidance for US SIGINT activities f As the board evolved through the years this function was assigned The subject of SIGINT guidance to NSA is covered more fully in the chapter titled 11 The Requirements Game 11 Chapter V below • At this point the role played by Sheldon will be recounted - 69 - TOP 5ECRET· Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - iufl SECPET 1 - ·------- - to its subordinate elements and finally to the SIGINT t Committee as one of its principal responsibilities When DCI John McCone established on 9 September 1963 in - his immediate office a Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation NIPE he gave his office an overall responsibility that encompassed among other things SIGINT evaluation and guidance The relationship between this office and Mr Sheldon the CIA SIGINT Officer was uneasy at first but quickly settled down to a close working arrangement· due in no small manner to the personality of Mr John A Bross Deputy DCI NIPE and his ability to work with senior officers in the intelligence community including Sheldon The NIPE staff of the DCI had undertaken to validate COMINT requirements during the latter half of 1964 independently of a parallel action going on in the SIGINT Committee under General Samford 116 At the time Sheldon took over the SIGINT Committee in February 1965 both groups were still working on the problem The NIPE_group didn't finish its work until almost a year lat r on 20 January 1966 when - 70 TOP SEC1t 'f Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP SEdRi'L - -----' ' its report was considered by USIB ' USIB prior to taking any action asked the SIGINT Committee for its views as to whether or not it could assume the tasks proposed by the NIPE report 117 The committee agreed that it could and Sheldon announced that of the D DCI NIPE staff had been designated chajrman of the proposed new Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee IGS as a full-time assignment 118 By this action the SIGINT Committee undertook to have the IGS complete the first annual review by l August 1966 and to furnish recommendations to USIB by mid-March 1966 1 - i • I • I The travails and tribulations of the IGS in getting underway and completing its task are covered - 71 I • 'fe f SECRETIL _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ - - ••· Approved for Release 2013 07 18 --·---- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I • l • elsewhere in this history During the next four years the IGS worked full-time assiduously in developing a highly detailed list of requirements for I • guiding NSA C SIGINT Satellites An important Sheldon accomplishment was the SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee SORS established effective 1 July 1967 Responsibility for thfs area was transferred by USIB from the USIB Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance COMOR to the USIB SIGINT Committee Th is responsibility included establishing 1 collection requirements for 2 processing requirements for and 3 evaluation of SIGINT ·reconnaissance by satellite aircraft or ' - other vehicle over denied areas 120 Excluded was SIGINT -reconnaissance in direct support of combat I forces or by aircraft flying peripheral photo flights I I • on the edges of the Iron Curtain 1 Aerial Eyes I A recapitulation of SIGINT satellites is in i- order at this point I • • Intelligence satellites looked See Chapter V below - 72 TOP SBCR Elli _____________ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' before they listened -- photo satellites preceded SIGINT satellites ' l Sky spying was a vintage con- • cept in CIA starting in the mid-1950's when balloons were lofted over Russia carrying cameras and leaflets ' and reaching a climax when the prolific u-2 photo aircraft was flying high out of reach of Russian Mig fighters After the l May 1960 shootdown by a Russian surface-to-air missile of Gary Powers• U-2 President ' ' Eisenhower decided to standdown further U-2 flight s over the USSR he knew that shortly the photographic sate lite would be flown · I I This decision was made easier because Four months later in August 1960 the first US photographic satellite obtained pictures of the USSR The spy in the sky had come of age The first pictures were not very good -- certainly not as clear as the U-2 pictures However the I ' I system worked and KH-1 was a success 11 KH 11 for KEYHOLE was the codeword assigned to the photo • I ' satellite project Following the KH-1 techni al developments and modifications carried through a series of KH's until at the end of the decade • I I satellite photograph y had become the principal US 73 I TOP S CR TjL --------- i Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 intelligence tool in denied areas I • It provided routine surveillance through regular detailed photography of known target installations This gave US policymakers highly reliable intelligence on the status of Russian missile sites and airfields as I well as on other targets at a time when this was l critical to US policymaking As clarity and scale improved detailed photography became available of I objectsI and equipment enabling an evaluation of their technical characteristics thus opening up a 1 • new important source of intelligence 121 SIGINT acted as handmaiden to PHOTINT Photo I graphic Intelligence I Through SIGINT potential targets for photographic coverage were spotted I I I • • I I - 74 I 01 Sf GR E L------------- _-__ -1 4 • - -· · - • • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • IO · -· • • -4 ··· -· • • C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -lot' SECREJ Aerial Ears 2 I Although the initial intelligence satellites I were photographic 'they w re soon followed by ELINT f • I • satellites The earliest of these ·was targeted against Russian I • radars There was a need to locate radars precisely in ·the interior of the USSR so that the US Strategic · Air Command could draw up its attack plans to avoid I I the radars or to jam them I As we g adually progressed from a US USSR bomber stalemate to a missile stale mate it became necessary to know the location and types of antimissile radars deep in the USSR I I ' ' • I ' ' 'I t The only way this information could be gathered was by BLINT satellites A series of these sponsored by ____________ lthe_·Navy in the mid-1 60 1 s produced vast quantities of data on Russian radars -so much so in fact that the high cost of this intelligence overkill caused ational- level budgetary ·' reactions with CIA in the forefront of the intelligence community pushing for a reduction of this effort • 75 - • I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 3 COMINT Satellites COMINT satellites did not come into existence ' ' until the end of the 1960 •sl • f • • I • I I • - 76 • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I ' - I ' 'j • • - 77 ' r Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 I I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I • I • 4 COMOR USIB Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance Satellites had been used to collect ELINT since June 1960 USIB control over these activities spon- sored by the military services was exercised through COMOR and was a bit tenuous to say the least The COMOR Committee of USIB had initially been set up to provide guidance for satellite photography - 78 I l Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 I• Approved for Release 2013 07 18 When satellites started to collect ELINT the acquisition of this data by satellite as also assigned to COMOR rather than to the SIGINT Committee I After Sheldon became Chairman of the SIGINT Committee he arranged to have this _responsibility -transferred_ from COMOR to the SIGINT Committee 124 l • 5 SORS SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee In July 1967 the SIGINT Committee created a permanent subcommittee known as SORS 125 with the I power to act for the parent committee in reconnais' sance matters involving requirements processing evaluation security and coordination of overhead I reconnaissance activities ' · subcommittee to act for the SIGINT Committee gave ' f 11 e empowering of this I it a unique position and the subcorranittee chaired by Ernest J Zellmer CIA with Donald E Haller as Executive Secretary CIA became a major factor I' in the intelligence community The relationship between CIA NSA and the National Reconnaissance Organization NRO had always I I P ge 72 above - 79 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l been a bit sticky Zellrner•s subcommittee moved in where angels had feared to tread and established a reputation for forthrightness vigor and accomplishment • ' I I SORS studied in detail the requirement land provided guidance to the ----------National Reqonnaissance Office NRO with respect to launching the satellites and collecting BLINT -· t information and to NSA with respect to establishing priorities for processing the information collected • • I - 80 I • --FOP SiCP FD - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -7 _ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I at their installations 128 The Committee revised basic ELINT and telemetry requirements and established ' long-range objectives for satellite collection in these fields 129 ' After two years as Chairman of SORS Zellmer ' - left CIA and was replaced by Dr Charles W Cooke i I• I on l November 1969 130 D ELINT Evaluation Another major project was a computer approach to ELINT evaluation t The Department of Defense National ELINT Plan 11 approved on I 8 February 1966 stated that The SIGINT Committee will propose an evaluation program for ELINT 131 In October 1966 I • - ' this matter was raised by CIA in the SIGINT Commit- l 1 tee The Department of Defense co sidered ELINT to be primarily its own bailiwick and was reluctant to have the SIGINT Committee enter too deeply into ' i this field March 1967 DIA and CIA undertook to draft an approach 132 I • I CIA kept pressing the matter and in Out of this an ELINT evaluation working group chaired was assigned the l r • I • task of developing a model for ELINT evaluation based - 81 - TQI SECRET I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 -···- - ·-- -------- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' 'lOP Sf CR ET I _ I• ' ' ' n the first quarter of 1968 This project was completed and presented to tne SIGINT Committee in May 1969 I I r on an examination of ELINT T and became the basis for further discussions within I the Department of Defense without resulting in any I firm recommendations on the part of the SIGINT Committee 133 I E Pro·ect • ' j I I 1 • - I t • I I j • i i -· - 82 -r- I • ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' C01175 2 19 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 --- ---- --· -- -- ---- ----------- - - - ' • I I I • I • I I • I '· F The Role of COMINT in Vietnam Good COMINT in the Vietnamese war was much I harder to come by than in the Korean war The North Vietnamese who were very security conscious used •• I low-powered radios which carried only short distances - - - - - -- - -- - -- - - - - -- -I I • I ' · 83 IOP SEORET - - - - - - - -- - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r ·--L - 'LOP SHCPET - _ _ - --------------------- ------ I• 'I I ___ Nevertheless SIGINT was I • of tactical value to our military commanders I I T I I 1 j ' •• i 'I I • ' II I - 84 'TOP S SCR EXJ L __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 IC01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - TOP SECRE'T ------------- ---- - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - 7 r I I I The role of CIA SIGINT in Vietnam was secondary ----- ----- ------ II L - - -_ _ _ _ At the Washington level the --DOI found COMINT useful as an input into current J analyses ' and estimates of the situation but it provided scant strategic insight into North Vietnam's plans or intentions G Other Subjects Other subjects considered by the SIGINT Com- mittee during the Sheldon period included establish- I II I • - 85 - ·- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _ _ ··---·-··· C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r---•---- J - -'iOP SE RET I -- - --- - - - - -- - 86 'I O' P 9DGRET L__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ 1 Approved for R_elease _2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'f8P '9JiQRET r -·-·------·-·- I' I ------ -·-- - - - - - - - - • V I A The Requirements Game Overview Ever since the end of World War II the intel- ligence community has been trying to devise the best way to guide the elephantine COMINT production organization Some have questioned whether this massive j ___ ___ hydra-headed organization could be guided -- even if it were amenable to rei • ceiving guidance which is a moot point in itself This subject of guidance for the national • I COMINT effort is of particular interest today and is being treated integrally as a chapter by itself spanning the period 1947-70 Throughout this total timespan CIA has provided connnunity leadership in • I attempting to develop new and better ways of providing guidance to the NSA and assessing the responsiveness of NSA to this guidance The SPINT staff under the CIA SIGINT Officer was for 18 years the group in CIA responsible for establ shing and levying COMINT requirements on NSA - 87 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -- -1 r I I _J In June 1963 the CIA Collection Guidance Staff CSG and made re- was created under sponsible for all intelligence requirements including COMINT CIA interests in this problem culminated in January 1966 in the assignment of a senior officer I exclusively to the COMINT requirements business At that time the USIB SIGINT Committee established the Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee IGS to take ' a new approach to giving guidance to NSA _____ P f the Office of the Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation NIPE was made Chairman of the IGS and undertook the job on a full-time basis of devising and implementing a new COMINT intelligence guidance system B ' The Philosophy of Requirements During the past 25 years many different basic requirements philosophies have been adopted to control the collection of COMINT In the early days requirements were very single-minded The idea at that time was to relate two scholarly disciplines - 88 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175 2 19 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 --- ----- - - - Of SiCBE T __j so that each would interact to benefit the other Intelligence analysts with knowledge of world affairs and cryptanalysts with knowledge of codes and ciphers -were brought together through the requirements mechanism to work as a team I In those days requirements had no managerial or budgetary overtones but were simply an expression of what was needed by the intelligence analysts In the latter years DCI John A McCone made ' a fresh start when he and the Secretary of Defense agreed to t ·ry to use intelligence requirements as a device to contain the size and point the direction of the national COMINT effort I Today the COMINT • requirements system is massive It dominates the interdepartmental COMINT scene How the present requirements oak grew from the acorn of l947 is the story of this chapter C The Six Periods The period from 1947 to 1970 may be broken into six different segments as far as COMINT require ments are concerned Each was dominated by completely different requirements philosophies From 1947 to 89 'i OP SECR FTI _t __ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _ _ __ _ __ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - 1 ___j I I _ _ ' ------- 1955 was the 'IWo Lists Period during which there was a USCIB Requirements List and an AFSAC Armed Forces Security Agency Council Requirements List ' The second period was the Broad Brush Period from 1955 to 1961 The COMINT Objectives List COL was the guidance expression of this period The pendulum then swung to the 400 List where the COMINT Requirements List CRL consisted of some 400 intelligence requirements listed in absolute priority order This was succeeded in 1963 by the Samford period which produced the Priority COMINT Requirements List PCRL Finally in 1966 th period began culminating in the present requirements list consisting of almost 1 000 pages issued in two large volumes and distributed in 350 copies I D The Two Lists Period 19 47-55 During World War II COMINT requirements were I simple direct and immediately effective In the European theatre control of COMINT intercept and processing was done from the British COMINT headquarters at Bletchley Park in England GC and GS -Government Code and Ciphers School - 90 - TOf Sf2ORE i Approved for Release 2013 07 18 In the Pacific C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I theatre control was effected from Pearl Harbor Both of these control points were the principal processing centers familiar on a daily basis with every message decrypted and fully aware of the daily military operational situation ashington COMINT operations provided strategic backup to these control points The end of the war changed this situation drastically Military communications disappeared I and COMINT shifted its primary emphasis to international communications with a secondary effort towards internal domestic communications of selected countries The primary consumers of this COMINT product became the Department of State and the CIG rather than the military services did not last for long short-lived This situation The Russian-us detente was The Berlin Blockade in April 1948 opened the cold war I ------------------- - 91 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - 'POP iCR ET ' I I' • I J L Under Admiral Souers the CIG did not receive any COMINT intelligence General Vandenberg who succeeded Souers on 10 June 1946 was elected Chairman of the USCIB on 31 July at which time the Board authorized the dissemination to CIA of two copies of the Dipiomatic Summary -a publication produced by the military containing generalized informa ion based on COMINT It was not until April 1948 that the USCIB at its 30th meeting approved arrangements for CIA to obtain original COMINT messages 144 CIA learned quickly the value of COMINT and nine months after it received its first COMINT translations directly from AFSA a CIA representative L ____ _J l was to become the first Chairman of the newly created USCIB Intelligence Conmittee 1 The USCIB Requirements List In November 1948 USCIB decided to split the Intelli gence and Security Committee into two separate committees- the earlier Committee having been far more concerned with ' security matters than with intelligence matters 145 - 92 - -'I 01 SHCR BT __-______________ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 __J The first order of business of the new Intelligence Committee was to establish a Monthly Intelligence Requirements List MIRL This list was to be used by the USCIB Coordinator of Joint Operations CJO ' as a guide in expediting the procurement and processing of pertinent readable traffic i46 list was quite simple It had two sections The List I A included subjects of immediate vital importance an all messages bearing on these were to receive priority treatment List B contained subjects under regional groupings without attempting to include all subjects of current interest The newly established Intelligence Committee ·' ' created the Point-to-Point Subcommittee This subcommittee provided direct guidance to AFSA • I radio circuits ·o nl _ _ _ __ Each month this subcommittee established priorities for coverage of each of these radio circuits The I I • voting mechanism was interesting in that it reflected the competitive spirit of the times - 9 3 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 Each of the six C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP BHCRET - members of the subcommittee CIA State Army Navy Air Force FBI was allowed to rate an individual requirement for radio circuits from l to 5 points If the item received 21 to 30 points it was top priority 18 to 23 points second priority and 12 to 17 points third priority 147 I • The Point-to-Point Subcommittee continued to ' function until 1951 It finally was disbanded be- cause of NSA resistance to detailed guidance by intelligence consumers of NSA intercept operations The intelligence consumers then lost and have never regained their ability to apply intelligence requirements directly to intercept tasks 2 ' be AFSAC List A little background is necessary in order to understand the origin of the AFSAC List As soon as USCIB was reconstituted by NSCID No 9 under the National Security Council on l July 1948 the Armed Forces members began kicking against the goad imposed upon them by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal when he placed COMINT activities under national rather than military control 94 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 While USCIB C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 Directive No l was being drafted establishing the new USCIB structure a part of which was the USCIB Intelligence Comn ittee the services were working at the same time on a new JCS Directive The USCIB Directive was issued on 1 November 1948 and seven months later on 20 May 1949 JCS Directive 2010 was issued which placed AFSA under the direction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and created an Armed Forces Security Agency Council AFSAC to determine and coordinate joint cryptographic military requirements 148 ' At just about the time the ink was getting dry on the first USCIB Intelligence Committee Requirements List the military were establishing an independent requirements system under AFSAC By this device they hoped to regain the control over military requirements which they felt they had lost by the creation of USCIB CIA and State were unable to understand why the military should feel they had lost control of the requirements -· In CIA's view we were still outsiders looking through the window at the military COMINT banquet without ever really being invited in -95 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -- C01175 2 1 9 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -'I Of' SFCR ET -- - Annual programming for intercept sites was still done completely by the military establishment through an Intercept and D F Planning Committee which functioned under the military CJO The services also controlled daily intercept targeting I ' Just about the time of the JCS issuance of Directive 2010 an AFSA report showed that b f the COMINT targets of interest were Russian military communications whose intercept was directly controlled not by USCIB but by the US military components ' CIA State priorities expressed through the USCIB system therefore actually applied only to the remaining 7 3 The Contest The contest between the two lists continued until 1955 It became one of the major irritants in the relationship between CIA and AFSA and contributed to the DCI decision in 1951 to request the President to appoint a committee to study reorganization of the entire COMINT effort This re- sulted in the creation of the Brownell Committee which is covered elsewhere in this history See Volume I Chapter VI 96 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _J C01175 2 19 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 The USCIB Intelligence Committee after a sixmonth trial of its first Requirements List revised the system 149 A Recurrent Requirements List was established in August 1949 containing long-range requirements which seldom changed and a Monthly Intelligence Requirements List which contained only new items intended for coverage during the next month I • This system continued for a year Twelve monthly versions of the MIRL and three versions of the Recurrent List were published When it became the State Department's turn to chair the Intelligence Committee in June 1950 Mr I • T A Polyzoides the State member proposed combining the two lists 150 Current Intelligence Require- ments List No 1 was issued for the period beginning July 1950 Mr Robert F Packard of the State De- partment became the chairman of the committee in • I September 1950 andr - - -became the CIA member a month later 151 About this time CIA again raised a point it had made over a year before emphasizing the need for a separate requirements list applicable to Russian - - - - - raffic After some additional pressure by CIA the committee 97 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 tuP SEGRl T in January 1951 finally agreed to a separate list 152 The military members however insisted that this list be applicable only to the product produced by AFSA 246 a division responsible for processing traffic Soviet The military did not want this list to apply to Soviet circuits even though these circuits might contain intelligence bearing on the subject matter Three months later a special steering committee was also created to provide direct guidance to AFSA 246 153 This was followed by committee approval of the CIA request that CIA and other members be officially charged with giving direct technical guidance to AFSA 154 as long as it was in accordance with the USCIB Intelligence Requirements List After all this bickering the first issuance of the list appeared on l October 1951 155 • I Indicative of the friction between CIA and the military services at the time was the CIA proposal to change the coversheet of the Current Intelligence Requirements List to indicate that the list applied to military as well as nonmilitary requirements The Committee Chairman - 98 - 'ror 3tiOP E ii Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'tOP 5i CRET - Colonel Horace D Neely USAF pigeonholed it after the CIA request made no headway I ' 4 The Big Evaluation At this time the Intelligence Committee under- t took the first major evaluation of the total COMINT 1 product ever to be · rnade as a community exercise and published the results in October 1951 156 1 I • 99 - _ O' P SfiQP FT I - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP EOR T _ J I • 5 Joint Reading Panel 0 Turndown In October 1951 AFSA proposed creating a Joint COMINT Reading Panel at AFSA as a security measure to reduce the dissemination of intelligence outside of AFSA 158 CIA and State immediately viewed this as another move on the part of AFSA to block them from having full access to COMINT material - 100 - -lf'OP S SCIUa Approved for Release 2013 07 18 The C0117521 9 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'FOP S SGR iT proposal met with such a storm of opposition that it was quickly dropped ------- - -- I I I l 6 The Marcy Letter The contest of the two lists was coming to a head In o·c tober 1952 the Chairman of the Intelli- gence Committee Howard L Shonting Major USAF formally requested that the USCIB Coordinator provide AFSA views on the adequacies of the then present r _e quirements system At the time there were three USCIB requirements lists l Current Intelligence Requirements List revised monthly 2 L ----- Appendix to the CIRL revised monthly and 3 Soviet r L _ _ _ _ _ __ 1Priorities A List revised periodically 160 month later a reply was received from the Chief of Staff AFSA Colonel Alfred R Marcy- 161 The Marcy reply brought the contest of the lists out into the open 11 It is not clear 11 he said - 10 1 •• • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • •• •-•·•• •• • •••a - •• C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP S EClliT I_____ - whether the USCIB Current Intelligence Requirements List CIRL applies only to nonmilitary traffic • • If the CIRL applies to all traffic it should be made clear that the Armed Forces Special Intelligence Priorities AFSIP List is solely a supplement to the CIRL serving to amplify the military items in the latter without affecting relative priorities He added that As a practical matter virtually every single AFSIP Requirement was covered in one form or another in the CIRL 7 'Brownell Committee Views on Requirements The Marcy letter came at just about the same time as the -Brownell Committee recommendations were being studied by the USCIB members and undoubtedly Marcy's frankness was influenced by this fact The Brownell Committee had pointed out the inadequacies and conflict existing in the COMINT requirements system It noted thqt the USCIB Priorities List was decided by voting on chart-like forms expressi g interest in terms of numerals 1-5 It stated that the requirements were broadly phrased subject matter interests of the USCIB Intelligence consumers which do not attempt to pinpoint the type of information desired either by nationality of traf fie or by Links oi- fi-equenaies· 162 - 102 TOP Si CRFT - '-----------------' Approved for Release 2013 07 1 C01175 2 19 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 7 TO' P SECRET I The Brownell Committee stated that in most cases These priorities are so broadly expressed as to be t • of little value to AFSA The Current Intelligence Requirements List which the Brownell Committee found deficient was a document of some 22 pages issued monthly 163 The list consisted of a worldwide section and 14 major geographic sections covering areas from the USSR to Latin America Each of these sections had three groupings of requirements ity A Priority B and Priority C Prior- In an average month only five to ten changes were made in the document USCIB studied the Brownell recommendations in the fall of 1952 This resulted in the demise of the AFSAC and AFSA and the creation of the National Security Agency 4 November 1952 The period of the two lists thus came to an end The Brownell Committee's criticism of the USCIB List also bore fruit The USCIB Intelligence Commit- tee created an ad hoo committee composed of __ _ _ _ __ _ _JCIA Mr • Winkler Army Mr Crimmins State Mr David Clark Air Force and Commander Peter Belin Navy Senior NSA representatives assisted the committee • 103 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 j C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 OF SECRET L Many months were devoted to creating a new requirements system in the form of a USCIB Master List of Intelligence Objectives and Requirements coupled with an appendix 164 This was superior in concept in presentation and in detail to any previous guidance furnished AFSA or NSA It directed the efforts of consumer agencies and NSA toward specific priority goals and eliminated departmental lists which in the past diverted COMINT effort and created duplication The Master List was designed to give basic guidance to the Director of NSA in planning and allocating resources It was based upon the National Intelligence Objectives List DCID 4 1 and DCID 4 2 COMINT objectives paralleling these national objectives were stated in priority order The countries of the world were placed in two categories 1 the Soviet Bloc and 2 the non-Soviet World which was divided into five groups in order of priority Intelligence requirements were keyed to all of these obj ctives The apP endix contained detailed information requirements related to the Master List The COMINT Committee in designing this system found that the National Intelligence Objectives needed - 104 T6P 612 Clli'tli _____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____ r Appro ed for R lease 2013 07 18 I C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ---------- TOP iCR i T to be updated and to be made less ambiguous and overlapping These faults were not to be corrected however for some years In addition to the formal guidance leveled by USCIB on NSA NSA created three priority committees under the Director of NSA Representatives of the intelligence conswners also sat on these committees This was done in response to Paragraph 2h of NSCID 9 which directed the Director of NSA to make provision for participation by the intelligence consumers in those offices of NSA where priorities of intercept and processing are t ' finally planned 165 NSA created the General Pr_iorities Committee a Processing Priority Committee and an Intercept Priorities Committee This system worked moderately well for a number of years before it fell into disuse E CIA Requirements Staff Early in the period of the two lists in Novem- ber 1949 the CIA member of the USCIB Intelligence Committee was charged with drafti g for the committee the paper on allocating research responsibilities for C0MINT among the several intelligence agencies 105 - TOP SECRiTl'---------- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 or - ---SECRET_ _ _ _ _J --·------ This eventually resulted in the assignment of intelligence responsibilities for COMINT research along departmental interest lines as follows military intelligence to the Department of Defense intelligence agencies G-2 ONI A-2 political intelligence to the Department of State Office of Intelligence and Research OIR economic intelligence to the CIA scientific intelligence to the CIA and the three services CIA's interests however were far broader than the specialities assigned to it CIA was pre- paring all-source intelligence reports on a daily basis for the ite House and was preparing national estimates in order to support senior policymakers of the government In 1951 when Kingman Douglass was made the Assistant Director of the Office of Current Intelligence responsibility for CIA COMINT matters was assigned to his office and the Advisory Council the COMINT staff established under DCI Hillenkoetter was abolished Shortly thereafter there was created within the Office of Current Intelligence OCil under the control of the Chief of the Special Center _____ - - - - an Assess- ments and Requirements Division Initially it was - 106 - TOP S GRET 1 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 7 TOE 5£CRET L I headed by '---·------ The Requirements Branch had two functions --· l it was responsible for COMINT requirements and liaison throughou't all of CIA and 2 it was responsible for all-source requirements for the Office of Current Intelligence The Requirements Branch established CIA COMINT priorities for inclusion in the USCIB Master Requirements List It also arranged for CIA liaison with NSA and the USCIB agencies 167 The Assessments Branch evaluated COMINT and other intelligence received by CIA and prepared reports analyzing trends in COMINT product Liaison between CIA and NSA increased rapidly at this time and in 1951 a CIA Liaison Office was established at NSA on a full-time basis This Liaison Office and the Requirements and Assessments Division worked in closest coordination A relatively large volume of COMINT material was being put out by NSA at this time separate reports were received in CIA each month from - 10 7 - I 'fOP 8iCR ETI Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 7 TOP SECRB'f r--- 1 NSA These contained military political scientific and economic information The Requirements and Assessments Division of OCI performed an important service to CIA and to the community for many years by producing statistical compilations and lists of COMINT produced by NSA for the benefit of the intelligence community Ad- ditionally the Assessments Branch had the only continuous evaluation system for COMINT in the community The capability of this branch was brought into play in a 1951 USCIB-sponsored evaluation of COMINT The Coordinator of Joint Operations CJO had requested each of the consumer agencies to undertake a detailed evaluation of COMINT products and the CIA experience in this field was shared with the other intelligence agencies F The Broad Brush Period 1955-61 The Broad Brush period opened with a good product The COMINT Objectives List foxwarded by w Dulles Chairman USCIB to the Secretary Allen of Defense in August 1955 was a well-thought-out and well-designed basic approach to providing broad 108 - rep SECit - -- - -- - -- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I - C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r ----- - ___ l OP SEORE_T1 7 I _ _ guidance to assist NSA in planning its overall COMINT program 168 It was divided into three parts as follows Tab A contained Continuing COMINT Objectives which should constitute the mission of NSA Th e objectives were designed to remain valid over a long period of time Only 12 objectives were listed The first five were concerned with the Soviet Bloc military threat ·-7 The sixth dealt with activities of ______ 5 nd r each of these twelve objectives were listed four or five specific COMINT requirements delineating the objectives It was anticipated that the requirements would change from time to time - - 10 9 --J Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ·roP 9f3CRiL Tab B listed the COMINT sources which were expected to provide information pertinent to each I o cor-lINT requirement The COMINT sources consisted of the specific organizations whose communications were COMINT targets In addition to Tabs A and B which spelled out specifics Tab C established principles and procedures for supplemental guidance This guidance would be furnished by the individual members of USCIR and would provide amplifying details about the requirements Eacn USCIB member appointed an accredited 110 - TOP SECRJ TI _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r---- 'I'Of SECR i't I I I 1 _ _j representative to levy this guidance on NSA Should this guidance result in significant changes by NSA USCIB would be notified The forwarding letter from the DCI to the Secretary of Defense stated that the objectives were based upon the Priority National Objectives in DCID 4 4 the unique character of COMINT and the value of COMINT in relation to other intelligence The requirements acknowledged but did not cover the need for technical development and continuity which it was recognized that NSA must maintain The letter also stated that USCIB considers it imperative for NSA to allocate COMINT resources to military commanders A key phrase in the forwarding letter in August 1955 was a recommendation that the Secretary of Defense require the Director NSA to report to USCIB at least annually concerning his responsiveness to • I the requirements This request of USCIB was not honored The Department of Defense had built a high fence between the USCIB and the Defense Department's managerial responsibilities for directing NSA and provided USCIB with only the generalities of its annual COMINT - 111 - 'TOf SECRET Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP SECRET program and this only after the Secretary of Defense had already approved it Defense was willing to give details to the DCI or his staff but not to USCIB CIA was active in providing supplemental guidance to NSA For example during 1957 CIA levied 130 fonnal requirements on the NSA PROD Division 169 ' In addition to the fonnal PROO requirements teletypes were sent at the rate of about 12 per week to NSA covering all subjects and all areas LI_ _ _ _ _ __ - 112 TOP SEORE'F-jL _ __ 1 _ _ _ ___ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'f'OP SECRE't I I _ The COMINT Objectives List system remained in effect for more than five years During this period few changes were made in the list itself The intel- ligence community exercised influence over the activities of NSA primarily through the Supplemental Guidance Mechanism USCIB members either individu- ally or coltectively would request NSA to increase effort on targets of special interest leaving it to NSA to determine which targets if any were to be dropped Since NSA was not receiving guidance on what targets to cut out it began to clamor for either additional assets to cover the new targets or better guidance to determine which targets should be dropped This resulted in a Directive to the COMINT Committee from USIB in January_ 1960 170 - 113 TOP SECilET I I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 1 0P SECP EI i -------1 I G The II Social Register - The Top 400 11 Period 1961-62 l Tying Dollars to Requirements USIB asked the COMINT Committee in January 1960 to study the total US COMINT program on a continuing basis so that USIB could review the program including cost considerations but excluding budgetary forrnulation 11171 Specifically USIB charged the committee with designating areas of increase or reduction in programmed effort which were required The phrase includi g cost considerations made the requirements exercise II for real 11 This was the first time that USIB aggressively associated costs with results in the COMINT business The cost spiral had been rising and the value of the product had been diminishing USIB thus gave its COMINT Committee a difficult if not impossible job Because the exercise impinged heavily on NSA operations an NSA an was nominated to head the committee 2 Requirements Spelled Backwards The COMINT Committee undertook a novel approach I I l to the p oblem and listed some 400 individual requirements and priorities in relative order of importance • 114 - TOP Sl1CRET Approved for Release 2013 07 1 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'i'OP SECRET The purpose of this total list was to identify problems of such low priority that assets could be diverted from them In effect the tail end of the list was far more important and more debated than the top of the list since in theory these end items would receive little or no COMINT coverage 'Ibis was the first time anything like this had been attempted and the _J committee under the chairmanship ofL NSA worked for five months 172 The list when published met with ridicule because the concept of trying to list in absolute priority order 400 intelligence subjects appeared stupid to persons not familiar with the real name of the game Nonethe- less the project was important and fruitful Several major impacts on COMINT activities resulted from this compilation ---- 1 For the first time the Russian dropped in priority and opp-e-r- t h-e 11 st with six of the first eleven items This shook up old-line ___ ---- -types but the list set the stage for reapport i onment of COMINT assets in_a c c ot dan c_e __--- with the s h if t in the Russian l--1______________ 2 The Russian l was raised to Priority 12 This was a maJor v i cfory for CIA The subject at the time was handled by NSA as though it were about nwnber 200 in a list of 400 - 115 - TOP S EGRET L-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - ror ----- i I s-EGPFT T CIA was aware of the fact that although the battle of the list had been won the resultant shifts in COMINT effort would be hard to come by because the Army Navy and Air Force owned the intercept assets and NSA's control over these assets was often more theoretical than real Committee finished its work in August The NSA then 7 commented in detail on the list and in November 1960 USIB approved the 400-item COMINT Requirements List CRL with the understanding that it was an intermediate solution 173 3 Origi'n of the Optimum Program Concept Since this list was to be used as the basis for making reductions in the COMINT effort a new concept arose to make the idea more palatable to NSA This was the concept that NSA should prepare its program in two formats one that took into account the dropping of the lower priority items and another that would contain NSA's views on what would be necessary for an optimum COMINT pr gram 11 This charge to prepare an optimum program as well as a minimal program became a pattern which has more or less been followed since then 116- - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 --1 't'OP SBCR T I _ _ 1--- - ' USIB had agreed that the new list would become effective in eight months at the beginning of FY 1962 At the prodding of CIA however the CRL was made effective immediately i November 1960 CIA was anxious to have the list start bearing fruit in tho next year's NSA program planning insofar as the I • major shifts in emphasis - ' problems were concerned The committee immediately set to work after I I the CRL was approved on trying to devise a more satisfactory system of guidance Supplemental Guidance Mechanism enabling consumers I ' By March 1961 a ' to levy their individual requirements directly on NSA had been hammered out and approved by the committee and work on devising a better system than the 400-item list was underway 174 The CIA member at the COMINT Committee meeting during this perio expressed the hope that any new - • • I • I I' • basic guidance docwnent would be manageable and that it would fall somewhere between the earlier COL which was a long-range document requiri g few changes annually and the 400 list which was so detailed as to require constant change 117 • • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 t •• • I • • • • C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - l f SECRET However nothing happened - l The effort of pre- paring the 400 List had drained the interest out of the community for any new requirements gambits 11 The 400 List thus ruled alone and unchallenged for two years until after the COMINT Committee was amalgamated with the ELINT Committee on 30 April 1962 to form a new •SIGINT Committee chaired by Lieutenant General John A Samford USAF H The' Samford Period 1962-65 When General Samford retired on completion of his military· service as Director of NSA the Director of Central Intelligence John McCone at the suggestion of Huntington D Sheldon persuaded Samford to become the Chairman of the newly constituted USIB SIGINT Committee Samford held this job from May 1962 into February 1965 chairing 79 meetings of the committee during this period General Samford was naturally interested in the relationship between the intell gence community and the NSA having served many years of his military career on both sides of this relationship and climaxing his military career as Director of NSA - 118 - TOP S EGRBT f Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C0117521 9 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 1- ----- - - _ _ _ _'i OP S EQ lET I 1 In his new job as Chairman of the SIGINT Committee he became particularly challenged by the need to devise an effective requirements system so that the views of the intelligence community could be properly expressed by the community in terms that would be acceptable to and easily interpreted by NSA Samford inherited three requirements lists 1 the Broad Brush COMINT List designed five years earlier 2 the COMINT Objectives List and 3 the detailed 400 List called the COMINT Re- ' ' quirements List In addition there was a draft ELINT Requirements List which had been worked on by the ELINT Committee A new ELINT Requirements List ERL was quickly produced in June 1963 under the chairmanship of Mr L_ CIA 175 The ERL was more interesting as a historical document than a practical guide and represented a swing of the pendulum away from the earlier days when ELINT technical requirements were a law unto themselves without reference to higher National Intelligence Objecti ves - 119 I TOP S C T Approved for Release 2013 07 18 This earlier C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 1 B Ii I 1- -- - - - trend was now superseded by a document that forced each requirement no matter how technical to be keyed to a Priority National Intelligence Objective PNIO • l --------------------1 In this regard it resembled the fi-ve-year-old COMINT Objectives List which was similar in nature although not quite as far-fetched • Samford put aside this material and attempted •' to grind out a new list He personally did a tremen- dous amount of work in trying to establish a logical relationship between broad national objectives and SIGINT requirements Much of the work covered in earlier years was resurrected rehashed and regurgitated After considerable interest and work by the f • SIGINT Committee most of whom were old hands who - 120 - 'FOP iCR liX ----------------J Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP SiiCR lilT had been through this many times before the mountain brought forth its mouse -- a very tidy mouse notwithstanding A year of work by a subcommittee chaired by CIA produced a document entitled the Priority COMINT Requirements PCR 176 The PCR consisted of 12 pages divided into four sections In the first category three PNIO's dealing with the Communist r - Bloc threat were quoted and up to six COMINT requirements were keyed to each of these PNIO's The COMINT ' requirements were the expressed statements of the kinds of COMINT that were available to satisfy the PNIO The same system was applied to the second category The third category listed some 70 require- ments against which COMINT had capability • These were listed in priority order but were not keyed to I a PNIO The fourth category contained four intelli- gence requirements dealing with lower priority I targets in the Middle East and Africa - Latin America and South Asia ' Again the pendulum had swung back to a simple broad guidance statement -- a far cry from the 400 - f List The ad hoo committee that foi warded this list to the SIGINT Committee recommended that it be - 121 - TOF SiCBET - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'FOP SECRET I I __ ------ - ------- - - - - • - - - - - · - · reissued annually and that work be started in addition to that on a five-year guidance list which would provide long-term requirements for NSA programming The five-year list never materialized and the PCR of June 1963 lasted until January 1966 When General Samford retired in February 1965 Mr Huntington D Sheldon became Chairman of the SIGINT Committee and some eleven months later in January 1966 the Inteiligence Guidance Subcommittee I IGS was created I•• I The 1966-70 The IGS was established by the SIGINT Committee at its 99th meeting and • I jof the DCI NIPE Staff was appointed to be its full-time Chairman A USIB Directive to the SIGINT Committee formed the basis for the new committee's work 177 The basic charge to the SIGINT Committee by USIB included the cost of COMINT in relation to the contribution of the product to intelligence among seven criteria to be used in the development of intelligence guidance for COMINT programming This costing charge became a major bone of contention 122 Approved for Release 2013 07 8 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - -- 1 I TOP SEGRBT __ _ between NSA and the IGS a problem which has not been completely settled even to this date 1971 The IGS had a difficult time getting underway and it was to be two years before its charter was finally approved In the interim however much original work was accomplished The committee immediately began a new approach to the requirements system Under the aegis of Secretary Robert McNamara the Department or Defense had developed a programming I system for SIGINT activities called the Consolidated Cryptologic Program CCP '11le CCP was divided into some 60 subelements about half of which were primarily' ' managerial The other half were keyed to substantive areas of the world In l964l Chief of the CIA SIGINT Staff SPINT negotiated with John O'Gara of DOD to represent CIA in the DOD review of the CCP The following year arrangements were made forl --- • I of the DCI NIPE staff to represent the DCI ----- in this annual DOD review prior to his appointment as Chairman IGS The IGS designed a compatible system whereby the intelligence requirements were directly keyed - 123 - ------------------ TOP S ECRET '---_ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - 1 TOP S£€RET _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ' L ____ ----- ----- _ - - ------ -- -------------- J to the Department of Defense's CCP substantive subelements The original USIB charge to the SIGINT Committee had requested immediate study of four problems 1 The formats devised for these problems became the basic format used by the subcommittee in its later approach to the total requirements problem After some four years of work on these and other problems the IGS completed the monumental work of applying the system to all of the substantive subelements of the CCP totaling almost l 000 pages of requirements The historical impact of this document qannot be assessed since at present l97t we are too close to the event • • I - 124 - TOP Sl3CR RT 1 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • j C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -1 ____ TOP_ RET VI The SIGINT Organization Study Group -- 11 Sausage At the end of 1966 the CIA SIGINT Officer Huntington D Sheldon set up an ad hoc SIGINT Organization Study Group SOSG to examine what CIA was doing in SIGINT who was doing it why and under what authority 178 SOSG soon became known as 11 Sausage -- a phonetic nickname and an apt description of the problem Total costs and manpower resources allocated to SIGINT in the Agency were to be determined and recommendations made on the best organization within C_IA to accomplish existing objectives This study the first of its kind gives an ex ellent picture of CIA SIGINT involvement at the time It came about beca se of pressures from the CIA Director of Planning Programming and Budgeting PPB John M Clarke and because frictions between some of the CIA offices engaged in SIGINT particularly between the Office of ELINT OEL DD S T and the SIGINT Staff of the Clandestine Service --- j were increasing For several years the CIA offices responsible for overseas intercept COMMO andc J perations - 125 - TOP S GRE1 1L__ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ------ r·· ------ ____ 'fOP SECRET 1 I I I I had been pressing for additional personnel 'Iwice in the previous years these increases h ad been initially granted only to be reduced or taken away prior to implementation The Agency Director of PPB was another factor He found it difficult in the annual CIA budget exercise to validate the SIGINT objectives and budgets of the many CIA offices charged with responsibility for SIGINT and he looked to the CIA SIGINT Officer for assistance in_recommending to the DCI the proper size and allocation of the CIA SIGINT Budget By the end of 1966 these pressures caused th e SIGINT Officer to undertake a study of the overall problem and he established the SIGINT Organization ·I ' Study Group On 30 August 1967 SOSG turned in its report which contained an excellent summary of SIGINT - - -- ------ activities in CIA '° 126 - ----------l Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r--·-- TOP SECRET 7 I I _ _j A Regulation 120 The SOSG was charged in effect with determining whether CIA Regulation 120 1965 revision should be revised Regulation 120 was the COMINT bible within CIA and established the mission and functions for all SIGINT offices throughout the Agency 181 • The regula- I I I • tion was initially written by a drafting teamr - --------- i n 1952 •l • • I • ' - 127 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 1 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'fOP EQRij J - - - - --- --- -l The CIA SIGINT Officer Regulation 120 charged the CIA SIGINT Officer with advising assisting and as appropriate representing the DCI in SIGINT matters and with coordinating the CIA SIGINT program Specifically USIB matters the CIA SIGINT budget liaison with NSA SIGINT evaluation the COMINT security program and SIGINT policy matters fell under his jurisdiction He carried out these responsibilities by means of his SPINT Staff 182 2 'lhe Deputy Director for Plans DDP ' - 128 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ---------- ---- TOfl SECRE '- ----------- ---- ' I I ' I 1 _ __ 3 Office of' Communications DDS ----- j The Director of Communications DDS in addition to providing secure COMINT communications for the Agency was responsible through his Special I • Programs Staff for conducting CIA intercept activities 184 4 The Information Requirements Staff DDI The SIGINT Group of this staff IRS was respon- sible for establishing CIA requirements for COMINT to be levied on NSA and for evaluating the COMINT reI 1 ceived as a result of these requirements 185 S Central Reference Service DOI The Central Reference Service provided a central facility for the dissemination of COMINT and a central repository and retrieval service for published COMINT 186 · ' 6 Office of ELINT DD S T The Director of ELINT was charged with estab- ' i lishing and coordinating the Agency ELINT program including the collection and analysis of ELINT as well as research and development 187 - 129 - TOP KCR KT Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP SECRET _ I ------- --- -----B The SIGINT Organization Study Group As noted above the SIGINT Organization Study examined the mission and Group SOSG under functions of all of these offices and made proposals for reorganizing the operations The individuals in this group all had devoted most of their careers to SIGINT and had definite and different ideas of what the CIA SIGINT objectives should be and how best to obtain them group A consensus was impossible with this Accordingly it was decided to present to the SIGINT Officer for decision the gamut of possible organizations -- running from a consolidation of all SIGINT functions within a single office to leaving • I the organization exactly as it was were drawn up Five options The first and last options proposed integration into a single office of most SIGINT functions in the Agency • Option A would put these functions under the DD S T Option E proposed that I they be put under th_e_ D_D _P_ _-_ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ Option B was a proposal to put under OEL certain ELINT functions ' -- -- - - I ' 130 - TOP S ECR E'f'I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOf SEGRi T Option C was a proposal that the SIGINT Officer divest nimself of his other responsibilities which at the time included the USIB Watch Committee as well as responsibility as Assistant DD S T and that he devote full time and attention to CIA SIGINT matters exclusively Option D proposed continuation of the status quo with the addition of the creation of an Advisory Committee under the SIGINT Officer primarily to assist in the exchange of information between the various CIA SIGINT operations Options A and E were ruled out by the SIGINT Officer as being impractical at the time SOSG therefore concentrated on presenting arguments for and against the remaining three options The SIGINT Officer after consideration of the matter chose Option D viz the status quo with the establishment of a SIGINT Advisory Committee of which he would be the Chairman The SIGINT Organization Study Group turned out to be another one of those government paper exercises The reason was that - 131 'fOf S£CR Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I J C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ------7 r I II I ' POP Sl iC Rli'I ------ ------ i -------·-- - - - ----- l ' ------ while offices were unhappy with each other they were completely satisfied with themselves and their relations were not · ad to warrant a corrective major shakeup Sheldon who was a practitioner of the Qssible and the last o e to be interested in triggering the confusion that would result from a major reorganization of SIGINT when nobody really wanted it decided to let the sleeping dog lie 188 The Advisory Committee to the SIGINT Officer • was formed but met only twice After that Sheldon followed his regular method of operating directly with each of the individual component chiefs concerned He had an excellent rapport with the DDP in fact it was better with the DDP than it was with the Office of ELINT even though both he and the Office of ELINT functioned under the 00 S T was true primarily because This the Director of the Office of ELINT found it to his office's advantage to deal d rectly with the DD S T bypassing the SIGINT Officer for all practical purposes and Sheldon chose not to assert himself too vigorously in the middle of this relationship - - 132- - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'I OP SEC P FT I ·- j I I I ------- - VII The Eaton Panel -- A Study of NSA SIGINT No sooner had CIA finished and reviewed its own SIGINT activities as recounted in the previous chapter on SOSG than circumstances arose which caused the creation of a somewhat similar but far more extensive exercise to be undertaken under the aegis of the DCI and directed towards the NSA In July of 1967 the President directed that a special study group be formed ta review the national SIGINT effort 189 Again as within CIA budgetary pressures were the proximate cause of the exercise A Origins The national SIGINT budget had just passed L----- ------ -- ---_JI An NSA request for jfor FY 1969 was the straw that · another j broke the camel's back 190 - ' The Bureau of the Budget staff member charged with responsibility for NSA Mr William Mitchell obtained support from his chief Director of the Budget Charles L Schultz for a national-level review of SIGINT management and tried out a proposed staffing paper to this - 133 - 'T6P 8iCR Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP EGRET I ---- ------- L_ effect on the DCI 191 The initial reaction to the DCI and his staff was somewhat reserved and on 23 June 1967 the DCI told Schultz I am troubled by some of the reasons which are advanced in support of the necessity of such a review In particular he disagreed with the Schultz view of the relationship between the NSA and the National Reconnaissance I • Office NRO as well as some statements made in the memorandum conc e rning the development of CIA as a SIGINT collection Agency 19 2 The Director stated that despite his reservations concerning the validity of many of the statements in the Schultz proposal he did think that there were some basic issues which might warrant a special committee if Schultz and Secretary of Defense McNamara thought it desirable Two days prior to the DCI letter on 21 June Schultz had written a rnemorandwn for the President proposing a national review of SIGINT management 193 When Mr Helms found out that this letter had gone forward to the White House staff without his concurrence he called Bromley Smith at the White House As a con- sequence Smith recalled the paper and sent it back to Schultz telling him to make sure he had written 134 - • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ··• C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 7 ' OP 8 ECRET concurrence from Helms and McNamara before he sent it to the White House again 194 Walt Rostow then entered the act in an attempt to get a better coordinated paper before submitting it to the President and forwarded the Schultz memorandum to Clarke M Clifford Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 195 Clifford stated that McNamara's complete support would be necessary for any such review and that it might be appropriate for the review to be undertaken by a group established by him 196 I • When Rostow referred the matter to McNamara on 15 July he stated I believe it should be done under the direction of Dick Helms Dick could quite properly resent my direction of it and we don't need a totally outside group 197 'lwo days later the President when given the options for sponsorship of the committee agreed with McNamara and with the Ros tow recornmenda tion I believe there is virtue in putting this matter in Dick's hands but we would need strong support from McNamara's people to assess the management as opposed to the pure intelligence aspects of NSA 19 8 - 135 Approved for Rele se 2013 07 18 I C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l - T6P li'CR ET _ _J I I i B · CIA Gets the Ball Helms accepted the project and assigned responsibility for getting it going to Sheldon and to Bross The original Schultz proposal had as possible members of the review committee Thomas s William O Baker Lieutenant General Andrew Gates J Good- paster George A Brownell Eugene G Fubini with alternatives John A McCone General Omar Bradley John J McCloy Edward Purcell and Frank Pace For a variety of reasons the only one to end up on the committee from the original suggested group was Fubini When Bross suggested that the group might be chaired by Mr Frederick M Eaton of the New York firm of Sherman Sterling the Director arranged to meet Eaton and afterwards agreed with Bross that Eaton should be Chairrnan 199 In addition to Mr Eaton the full committee consisted of Ge eral Lauris Norstad Dr Eugene Fubini and Ambassador Livingston T Merchant Staff members -assigned to assist the panel were General Richard Collins Chief of Staff ___ _ _ _ _ _ f obert E Hastings of CIA 1---_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - 136 - J OI iCaziT j -- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 j r C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I Of' 9 ECR iT J - - - - - - - --- I I i ---------- - - -----·------- -· Walter J Deeley of NSA Colonel L s Hammond USAF of DIA Lieutenant Colonel Merritt P Booth USA of Army security Agency Carl w Fisher William A Mitchell of the Bureau of the Budget and Dr Thomas w Wolfe and Mr Malcolm Toon personal consultants to Mr Eaton 200 Terms of reference for the project were drawn up by Sheldon and cleared with Eaton who tentatively accepted them pending the views of Lieutenant General Marshall s Carter Director NSA Genera1 ·carter made a counterproposal for the terms of reference that would have precluded any delving into NSA management by the committee 201 • I _ I • j This counterpro- posal was not accepted but gave an indication of tough sledding ahead for the committee By 18 August 1967 just one month after the President's decision· to give the job to the DCI the DCI notified Clarke Clifford Chairman President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board PFIAB that after discussions with McNamara and Nitze I I I decided that we should go ahead with the proposal to establish a review group and that the group would be chaired by Eaton and consist of Norstad - 137 - I • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ------ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -YuP _________ sEsRET ___ Merchant and Fubini He forwarded a copy of the terms of reference which had been approved by the Secretary of Defense and Eaton 202 These terms charged the Eaton Group to conduct an objective appraisal of all significant management policy and operational aspects of present and future US SIGINT activities to make them responsive to possible national needs at minimum necessary cost C Eaton Runs His Own Show The first meeting was held on 5 September in ' the conference room of East Building on 23rd and C Streets which had been turned over to the committee I which was expected to function for six months to a •· year 203 The principals and the staff members started to work with a full head of steam I ---- ------ ' j Very early it became apparent that widely divergent views were held by the staff members who were representing not just their per- l sonal views but the views of their organizations as well As time went on these views became cast in concrete rather than interwoven and melded 204 - 138 - - lOP iECRETf Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - --- - l I ldP Ji1EC8ET - The NSA representative kept emphasizing the need for more authority for the Director of NSA particularly in the ELINT field in order to enable him to defend his position and resources against the military services Defense Intelligence Agency DIA members had just the opposite viewpoint citing the confidence gap that existed in regard to NSA as far as the military services were concerned and their unwillingness to concede NSA any more authority In fact they felt th e NSA had far too much authority already and wanted some of it taken away Eaton saw this dichotomy within his staff and as he personally became more familiar with problems of the SIGINT community by listening directly to the •' leaders of the community he tended to use his staff less and less Eaton was a powerful personality who operated in a decidedly nongovernmental manner and dealt personally o ly with the senior echelons in State and Defense and with the DCI He made C __-_ __ his principal writer instructed him to separate himself from the rest of the staff and draft papers solely under Eaton's guidance Needless to say this caused the staff members assigned to the ' 139 T6P SiCB E ____ __________ _ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ------ - - -- -1 - i OP S EGRET _ ------ · - - - · - - I -----·---- - - - ---- --- -- - project to find themselves wtder the gun from their own departments for failing to have their departmental views fully expressed to the Eaton Panel 205 Finally on 8 May 1968 Eaton surfaced a tentative draft report which he stated has not been submitted to or staffed out by the men assigned to the group from the several departments and agencies 206 Eaton used this draft as a trial balloon to get reactions as to the practicality of the subjects contained in it The report noted that it was 15 years since the Brownell major study of the SIGINT business had taken place and that many developments had intervened particularly in the ELINT area · report was broken into twelve major sections I II National Intelligence Programming and Guidance Resources Management IIIa IIIb L _____ J IIIo COMINT and ELINT Satellites IIId Overseas Bases IIIe Direct Support of Electronic Warfare IIIh Third Party Relations - 140 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 The C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 7 'f'OP SECRET Il_ _ _ _ - IIIi IV V VI D The Role of the Cryptographic Community in Intelligence Production Administration The Value of ELINT and COMINT The Future React ions to the 8 May Trial Balloon The report elicited an immediate and varied response from the principal officers of the SIGINT community Several of these responses were person- ally written by the Senior military officer responsible for SIGINT and are worthy of note because they contain the basic military and intelligence philosophies of the authors · ' 1 Army The Chief of Staff US Army General Harold R Johnson said Over the past several years I have become increasingly concerned over a neglect of the intelligence function in the Army These years have seen an enormous improvement in our fire power and a growing increase of tactical mobility Our combat intelligence system has not kept pace and we are unable to take full advantage of our fire power and mobility because of a lack of suitable - 141 - TOP eiCRFT - - - - - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175 21 9 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ----- --- ---- --- 'I 01 SECR - EI _ - - - and timely intelligence 11 207 Johnson went on to say that he had become convinced that the Army should depend for COMINT support on an integrated unified national COMINT system provided that the system is designed and operated so that the imperative needs of the Army for combat intelligence are met He saw no advantage in transferring ELINT responsibility to the Defense Intelligence Agency DIA as recommended by the draft Eaton report and he supported the proposal that an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Management be established within the Department of Defense DOD He also commented regarding the re- port's recommendations on resource management that There is a very real danger ••• that information with an unavoidable institutional bias will be used ' to support demands for increased resource allocations to the agency involved The result of this self- feeding is that a faulty allocation of resources can occur and erroneous estimates ensue The c assic historical example of such a mechanism at work was ·1 he said the supposed gap between the missile str gth of the United States and the soviet Union - 142 - I ______ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - SECRET In addition to General Johnson's comments Major General Charles J Denholm Commander of the Army Security Agency made known his personal views 208 You point out that the authority of the DIRNSA has been eroded • I do not agree You may view it as not so much a question of authority being eroded as it is a matter of an authority not finding an object against which it can assert itself Then Denholm pointed out that the services can always find shelter I from NSA authority by withholding information charging costs to other service programs and the like Denholm agreed with the Eaton report's view that ELINT is a good part of the direct support resource needed by theater commanders 11 He said The Army planner who is considering an ELINT capability for an infantry battalion will look long and hard at the potential of ELINT when he realizes that in order to gain the capabilities he may have to give up a recoilless rifle section He supported the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Intelligence Management to I ensure that intelligence resourcea were not allowed to escape control and be dissipated under the masquerade of electronic warfare - 143 1 - 10' P SECPEI Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - T ------------- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -I --- - - - - ---- - __j 2 Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earl G Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 209 stated Your recognition of the very real need of the tactical commander to have immediately available to him those COMINT and ELINT assets required for the proper support of forces in the field is noteworthy He supported the Eaton proposal to place ELINT under the management of DIA and was against creating in the Department of Defense an Assistant Secretary for Intellig nce Management 3 CIA ' The Deputy Director of CIA Vice Admiral Rufus L Taylor 210 opposed transfer of control of all ELINT activities to DIA as well as the recommendations affecting the structure and workings of the National Reconnaissance Office NRO I cannot agree with your statements that lines of authority are blurred and that there is lack of understanding at all levels between NRO and NSA He added I am perplexed by the reference in the report to theL a nd the proposal that CI should have the status of a contractor to NSA or DIA 144 - -' - -----Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - - ---i·rriorn r- sijE C PIUErTr__ _ ·_ ----- - - --- -- 1 - He was also surprised by the findings of the report that no attempt is made to relate information to the resources or sources which produced it • • It is my own view that the intelligence community has been devoting a very considerable amount of time and energy on doing just this with rather impressive results 4 NSA The Director of the National Security Agency Lieutenant General Marshall s Carter stated The special study group has identified the principal problem areas connected with the SIGINT activities of the US government 211 He endorsed the conclusion that there is a need for an agreed statement of essential national intelligence purposes and objectives around which a national intelligence program c be built He was se·r iously con- cerned that the findings · failed to support the need for upgrading the authority of the DIRNSA He stated It is my belief that management of the SIGINT effort by the Director NSA is the keystone of the most effective and economical SIGINT structure for the nation He was also concerned over the transfer of ELINT to ------ DIA the negative findings on Project _ _ __ Sovie _ J the effort and more detailed program - 145 - Tor SBCR ET _-- -___________ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -- -----I I I _____JI guidance from the DCI and his staff in SIGINT resource management S National Reconnaissance Office Alexander H Flax the Director of NRO wrote a letter to Eaton in which he took issue with a reference made to the 11 blurred lines of authority in the DOD with respect to satellite SIGINT activities This is in distinct variance to the facts of the matter 11 212 Attached to the Flax letter was a rather thick documentation supporting his argument He opposed 'transfer of ELINT satellites to DIA and agreed that it was essential to measure the value of information against the cost of obtaining it 6 DIA Air Force and Navy Comments by the DIA Navy and Air Force principals took sides on the major recommendations of the Eaton Report paralleling their departmental positions without contributing any new personal ideas or arguments E 'lbe Final Raport The replies received by Eaton were mostly sub- stantive and useful in helping Eaton to detei mine - 146 -rrot S GR E C Approved for Release 2013 Q 7 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 7 OP SECRJiT --- -------·1 'I _ _ _ _ _ JI ------------ what type of final report would be most useful At this point Eaton turned principally to J J Hitchcock to undertake redrafting of the 8 May report and after some 18 redrafting attempts accompanied by constant consultation with Eaton and the other members of the Panel the final report evolved and was forwarded by Eaton to the DCI on 16 August 1968 213 This version dealt with the comments received on the May draft many of which were contradictory because they reflected departmental rather than national viewpoints The final report in summary stated that there was a need for a long-range intelligence plan that • '' I guidance must be target-oriented and cost-related j ' ' that the creation of the National Intelligence Resources Board NIRB -- which was established shortly after the 8 May draft recommended it -- should be periodic guidance that there was a need for a point ' of central review within the Department of Defense helpful in providing such a long-range plan and for COMINT and ELINT that the authority of the Director of NSA over COMINT should be reaffirmed and that he should strength en his progranuning staff by 147 - TOP _____________ SECitET Approved for Release 2013 07 18 J C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 --7 TOP s gcRHT I _______ I L-- - -- - including more military representation ELINT reshould be sources devoted to radar assigned to the services and that most of the remainder should be assigned to NSA except for satellite ELINT which should remain with the National Reconnaissance Office with tasking and processing of the satellites under NSA overseas bases should be consolidated but not to the extent that we denied ourselves access to important areas of the world thirdparty arrangements should be encouraged to offset the loss of· overseas bases no firm recommendations 7 were made with respect to eithe F · Impact of the Eaton Report Although the immediate impact of the Eaton Report was negligible its longer term catalytic effect was considerable in that its stepchildren if not its direct offspring made their mark on the government intelligence structure 'l'he creation of the National Intelligence Resources Board under the DCI and the establishment of an Assistant for Intelligence under -the Assistant Secretary of Defense were stepchildren of the Eaton Report 148 - iI I i I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 CIA C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 --- 7 _______ TOP SECRET I had jumped the gun by creating the NIRB which was an Eaton Panel idea prior to the issuance of the final report This took the steam out of much of the report because the community then waited to see what the NIRB would do in establishing national goals As one of its first tasks the NIRB studied the problem which Eaton had pointed out took of the national SIGINT funds and produced Llittle intelligence The NIRB efforts in this were 1 frustrated by an NSA counter ploy within the Department of Defense A committee known as the ••Eachus Panel was established and it came up with conclusions completely different from the NIRB 214 This effectively stymied any action based on the I ' ' NIRB recommendations Another recommendation of the Eaton Report the establishment of an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Management lay dormant for nearly a year but ultimately inspired one of the main arguments as the new Administration took over for the establishment of an office for intelligence resource management in the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense In June 1969 Mr Robert F Froehlke took the post - 149 Approved for Release 013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -- I 'rOF SECRET of Assistant Secretary of Defense Administration and promptly appointed an Assistant Admiral Harold G Bowen for Intelligence Mr Froehlke thus repre- sented DOD as one of the three members of NIRB With respect to the many other Eaton recommendations concerning changes in management within the Department of Defense these mostly met with lack of enthusiasm at high levels including the DCI and the Joint Chiefs and were tabled The Eaton Panel failed to bring about any major changes in the SIGINT organization such as had resulted 15 years earlier from the Brownell Committee although two prime recommendations for intelligence management of outside the SIGINT com- ' 1 munity the NIRB and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence have been adopted in principle and have had some of the effects Mr Eaton and his group sought It was not until 1970 two years after the Eaton Panel and six months after the period which this history covers that the Fitzhugh study of the Department of Defense organization again recommended major reorganizations of intelligence management within the Department of Defense Thus the seeds sown by the Eaton Panel appeared to be finally bearing fruit - 150 Approved for Releas 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP SECRET VIII -------- ---------- Communications Intelligence COMINTl Security This chapter covers the whole span of this history 1947-70 and reviews CCMINT security in CIA and in the intelligence community insofar as it affected CIA A A Sound Secure Craft During World War II COMINT made a tremendous contribution to the allied victories because the COMINT community was able to keep its successes secret The Battle of Britain the invasion of Europe the war in Africa and the war throughout the Pacific were all fought to a large extent with prior knowledge of enemy capabilities and intentions attained through US-UK COMINT The military communications of the Germans and the Japanese were d ciphered on a continuing basis The secret diplomatic communi- cations of these and other countries were also an open book to the US Government As thousands of persons left the Army and Navy COMINT organizations at the end of World War II and carried with them secrets of our success - 151 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 i _j C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 OP t1EGPFT ---- 1 II - COMINT authorities were greatly worried lest stories on How I Helped Win the War of Cryptanalysis would appear in the press It was known from sad experience that such stories had a stimulating effect on foreign communications security organizations causing them to review and tighten up their communications proce- dures making it more difficult for current US cryptanalysis Fortunately in the immediate postwar period very few unauthorized stories by insiders co cerning our COMINT successes made their way into print Perhaps this can be attributed to the broad support of the total American public for the war Of course the Pearl Harbor investigation brought out into the open the fact that the US had been able to read Japanese diplomatic and naval codes 215 but for some reason the impact of this on other Communications Security COMSEC authorities was minima i - --- ----- ----- At the end of the war the German and Japanese communications ceased to exist of the war the us _____ Even before the end COMINT author ties started turning their talents in other directions - 152 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'rtiP SECRET ------ ------------- - - and began work on the Russian codes and ciph ers They hoped that they would be able to repeat in some measure at least the fantastic successes that they had had against the Germans and Japanese f 7 - - - - - - - - - B J A Hole in the Hull •· ' •' In the post-World War II period the Communist star was ascendant Communist sympathizers were present both in the United States and in the United Kingdom to provide a basis for Russian espionage operations In the I United States the Rosenbergs stole for the Russians our most closely guarded secret -- the atomic bomb 153 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ----- - --- - - r-·- l - ---- - I'l'CO 1f SnE G R Fi T I _________________ Alger Hiss stole State Department secrets Even the Department of Justice was penetrated by Judith Coplon The Russian bear became politically and militarily more and more bellicose The Berlin Blockade in April 1948 set the world on edge and the first Russian atomic explosion on 23 September 1949 caused people to hear the approaching hoofbeats of the Four ______________ Horsemen of the Apocalypse _ I C • I Let's Legislate Security The original United States Communications In- telligence Board USCIB was established after World - 154 - l Of SE'7R EI j ______ ______ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - ltP SEGR KI __ ___ War II as a result of Army and Navy efforts to obtain legislation to protect COMINT 217 During World War II the United States had neither a nation- al COMINT organization nor a law imposing penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of COMINT During World War II we had no known COMINT breaches since then despite the law and despite the organization we have had many USCIB thus was an organization conceived in security and dedicated to the proposition that COMINT •e·rs were more equal than anybody The first two subcommittees created by USCIB were a Security Committee and an Intelligence Committee • The former I was far more active than the latter This group ' drafted the initial public law pertaining to COMINT which later became Title 18 Section 798 US Code dated 31 October 1951 ' ' • I •• Ii I _____ _ _ _ _J 13 June 1946 - 155 - • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r• C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 --___ --- l I - - --- -____ ------ -- --- --- - - --- - - - -- - - ·- ··--- _J D COMINT Security in CIG In May 1947 15 months after President Truman created CIG there were only persons in CIG in- I doctrinated for COMINT and of these on1Jl _ J aw_ LNT codeword rnater _a_l _ _219_ __ _______ In the beginning the only COMINT received by CIG was contained in the intelligence summaries received from the State Department the Army and the Navy CIA did not obtain approval of USCIB to re- ceive COMINT directly until April l948 after a long political struggle At the beginning of CIA in 1947 responsibility for COMINT security was assigned to the· Chief of the Advisory Council under whom the basic CIA COMINT The functions of the Advisory Council were transferred on 1 December 1950 under CIA Regulation 70 to the newly proposed · Office of Special Services which became the Office of Current Intelligence on 15 January 1951 Kingman Douglass AO OCI then assumed responsibility for COMINT security - 156 I - - -- -- -- ---' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 1 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I _ security philosophy was developed -- a philosophy which has persisted since that time and has materially facilitated the growth and efficiency of the Agency This philosophy was worked out together with the then Executive for Inspection and Security Colonel Sheffield Edwards whom CIG was fortunate to have as its Security Chief and who molded the basic security policies of this Agency He created a security at mosphere in th e Agency that was professional and practical rather than bureaucratic and police-like The Executive for Inspection and Security was responsible for arranging for the investigation and approving the basic TOP SECRET clearance of CIG personnel and the Chief Advisozy Council took over COMINT security responsibility from that point on Initially COMINT security was quite independent from Colonel Edwards The COMINT Officer was responsible for both physical and operational security of COMINT and for determini g the need-to-know of COMINT personnel Mr James Beard was assigned to the Advisory Council and functioned as its principal security officer during this period 157 - lOP S CR E'F Approved for Release 2013 07 18 An example I I i _ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'fOP SliCB EI ·• ' of the mutual support provided by the two offices 4 was the initiation of the tool in CIA On ie ·d te tor as a security 23 August 1948 Edwards obt ined approval from DCI Hillenkoetter to initiate lie detector use as part of the personnel security investigation on a volunteer basis 221 The Advisory Council proposed to Edwards that the lie detector be made compulsory for all CIG personnel who were to be approved for access to COMINT and on 19 ·October 1948 Edwards in a memorandum to the Chief Advisory Council arranged· to accomplish this 222 Thus COMINT'ers were the first group in the Agency and indeed in the whole intelligence structure to regularly receive lie detector tests This practice was not initiated in other departments on a regular basis until many years later At the time it was an innovation and considered an imposition and invasion of personal liberty by some senior levels in the Agency • However the Advisory Counci 1 stuck by its guns and eventually the opposition waned As far as the Chief Advisory Council was concerned the polygraph was a godsend in that it enabled him to feel more comfortable about expanding COMINT clearances - 158 OP SES RFT I I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 CQ1175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 tor 7 -- SECPF'r II 'I - - - _ J in the Agency as the need arose USCIB had approved CIA getting COMINT only a few months earlier and the number of people needed to handle the product was increasing -- ----- L___ Clearances in the Clandestine Service however were held to a minimum The Chief oso William K Harvey was responsible for recommending the need-to-know for OSO personnel Harvey gave out COMINT clearances as though they were thousand dollar bills of his own money • in I He controlled COMINT oso like a duke ruling a medieval fiefdom -- on the basis of personal knowledge of each of his retainers COMINT operations in the DDP during the early years were relatively few ------------j · 159 - I • - I OP 9f CR ET - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - r _ Tor Sr GRET I -- - - - - - within OPC Office of Policy Coordination - the office charged with political action the sister office of oso which was charged with espionage As time went on the Advisory Council authorized direct liaison between the covert offices and AFSA both for purposes of obtaining guidance from AFSA ' J The Chief Advisory Council t maintained overall responsibility for the security of these operations but the immediate operational decisions were made by the Chief j ---- oso E 'COMINT Clearances Mushroom The size of the COMINT organization in the com munity and in CIA was relatively small prior to the 25 June 1950 invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans 160 1 OP SRCB E1 'I 3 - _____________ Approved f r Release 2013 07 18 __ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I - 1015 SECBRT -iI I __ L The Korean War caused a massive increase in the size of the US military establishment and a corresponding increase in the COMINT organization From that point on COMINT clearances continued to grow at a rapid _J rate that has continued to the present - - ----- - Of this This • I t vast expansion in clearances over the years made it impossible to guarantee personnel security There were just too many people cleared to be sure of every one of them CIA so far as is known has never had a defection from its COMINT-cleared personnel Perhaps the polygraph has contributed in no small measure to this phenomenon - 161 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - -- I Of SFCR ET -----·---- ' '--·------ F T ne I Traitors Outside of CIA there have been several serious defections which have caused tragic damage to the r- 1 COMINT effort The list of traitors includes Burgess and McLean the two British homosexuals who defected to Soviet Russia in 1951 These men had --1 broad intelligence experience __J Much _J closer to home was the case of Josephs Peterson an NSA employee who in October 1954 was arrested for making available US COMINT secrets to his wartime coworker _---- -- - - - -- - - - ---- -- S_i_x_ y_e_a-rs_l _a_t_e_r_ _ M _a_rJ r and Mitchell again two homosexuals left NSA via Mexico City and Cuba and ended up in Russia On 6 September 1960 these two told the press that NSA had broken the codes of more than half of the world's nations 162 - I -TOP SE' Ul EI J Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - _ Of SECB ET Martin had worked two and one-half years and Mitchell had worked three years at NSA While these two were not directly familiar with US successes against Russian problems since they worked in the non-Russian area security breaches on our capability on Russian communications occurred from another source -- a source which through the years has caused the entire intelligence community much agony -- namely stories given to the US press by US officials who for one reason or another in attempting to achieve what they think are legitimate political or budgetary assists from the press do irreparable damage to intelligence sources Three years later on the 23rd of July 1963 two other traitors in the SIGINT business were uncovered -- one by suicide and the other by flight Jack Dunlap a sergeant at NSA on this date committed suicide by inhaling monoxide gas from one of the two Cadillacs he owned along with a Jaguar sports car Dunlap had been working for the Russians for months passing to them material he obtained at NSA On the same day th e Russians chose t9 surface Victor Hamilton an ex-NSA employee by publishing his letter in the Soviet newspaper Izvestia in which - 163 - TOP SE1CR i TJ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'lOP Si O RET - -- - - - - - - - he identified himself as a former expert on the Near East Sector in the office designated ALLO at NSA The duties of my colleagues in ALLO included the study in breaking of military ciphers ••• including those between the United Arab Republic' Embassies in Europe and the UAR government in Cairo Hamilton had worked for nearly five years at NSA prior to his defection The list of defectors was still not ended The Russians had under their control Sergeant Robert L Johnson who had worked for them for 12 years -from February 1953 until his prostitute wife cracked up and informed on him in December 1964 For one period in this long bondage -- namely from November 1962 to May 1963 -- Johnson worked for the Armed Forces Courier Service ARFCOS at Orly Field in Paris During these seven months he made available a dozen or so envelopes each weekend to a Russian photographic team These would be opened photo- graphed and resealed by the Russians The opera- tion went on undetected by the United States and during this period between 500 and 2 000 were made available to the Russians 4 000 documents There were NSA documents in the Orly vaults during this - 164 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -- -------- __ J time and almost 200 CIA finished intelligence studies including weekly bulletins and topical reports of a scientific and political nature The State Department COMINT Diplomatic Summary was also available there Through this operation the Soviets had access to ' information on the US-European war plans called The SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan including the identity of Soviet targets the attack plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and US knowledge of Soviet atomic energy and weapons facilities industrial complexes and order of battle Additionally as far as COMINT was oncerned the extent and success of the US worldwide SIGINT effort was contained in the daily US intelligence summaries on military and political developments around the world 223 The tragedy of this successful Soviet o peration was great Of far less importance but still a matter which concerned USIB and the intelligence community at the time was the 1965 publication of an excellent book on cryptanalysis by David Kahn Efforts were made to no avail to persuade Kahn and the Macmillan Publishing Company to suppress parts of the book that Kahn had - 165 r ' 'OP SECllE'f' Approved for Rele se 2013 07 18 - C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP SECR iT -- I iI based on interviews he had had with two World War II Navy COMINT old hands Captain Wesley K Wright USN Retired and Captain Thomas H Dyer USN Re- tired G The USS Pueblo The greatest single SIGINT compromise to occur was the loss on 23 January 1968 of the SIGINT ship Pueblo when it was boarded by the North Koreans off the coast of Wonsan The Pueblo commissioned as AGER-2 in mid-1967 departed the Sasebo Naval Base on 10 Januaxy 1968 on her first SIGINT collection patrol off the coast of North Korea The ship was under the control of and on an intelligence mission assigned by the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet CICPACFLT The CIA had no requirement for the mission and no part in its planning The operation was conceived and controlled by US Navy intelligence authorities in the Pacific The ship was to intercept communications and electronics signals in the Sea of Japan off the coast of North Korea in response to purely military intelligence requirements The Pueblo arrived on station off the coast on 12 January 1968 166 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ---------------and conducted intelligence surveillance in this area under radio silence until she was captured on 23 January 1968 22 4 Subsequent to the capture the crew of the Pueblo was detained for a period of 11 months in North Korean detention camps During this period the North Koreans conducted intensive interrogations I • of the communications technicians assigned to duty on board the ship On 23 December 1968 the crew was released to US authorities During the period 26 December 1968 through 10 January 1969 these crew members were given an intelligence debriefing ------' in order to assist in the assessment of the cryptologic-cryptographic damage incurred as a result of the Pueblo capture This investigation brought out that the Pueblo compromise provided the enemy with a major US SIGINT • I facility including its associated technical COMINT and ELINT equipment and materials • I All but a small percentage of the ___________________________ I operational intelligence messages 1 -- which provided - 167 - --fup S CR E't I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - ------- -------- ·--- --- - 'f8P SECRET L I I __ ··----------- - 1 I I - -- --- -------- __ I the detailed background information -- fell into North Korean hands 225 Nearly all the equipment aboard the vessel including four different types of crypto machines was captured intact or in a condition which could be reconstructed The operational intelligence messages contained a complete picture of US SIGINT capabilities in the Pacific and Southeast Asian areas These messages together with other documents provided a broad overview of US 'SIGINT and other intelligence activities throughout the world c_-The Puebto incident resulted in the most comprehensive single compromise of classified material in the history of US intelligence 226 - I H Finis After all of these security disasters the wonder is that any COMINT is produced at all Perhaps though one hopes to the contrary the span of this history h as encompassed the rise and fall of the COMINT empire • 168 - - I 01 S GR E tj ________________ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ---iL _ _ _ __ --- -ir·op SHCRE'T - - - -----I ---------- ------- Appendix A I • - 169 • i lOP S ECRiT L - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - - - --- -- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r- ·-··-- - -1 TOP S ECR E'F ·---1 ----------- - 170 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - _I C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'FGP SECB EI i j_ • ··- - · ·•• -----·-· - - · - -•----•·· - - - - - - - - - · I · 171 - iuP SECR ET1 - - - ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - taF SECRET - l ' I ' i • • • ' - l • - 172 - I TOP SECRET LI_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -·- ··---- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -I Of SECRET ---·---·-- - I I ------------- r I - 173 101 S CREJ i __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __J Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - -----------------7 --l - · --- 3T o P s E £ R E ci___ ___ I _______J - I • - 174 - ' TOP SflCR i' I' lL _______________ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'fOF SEGRET L______________ - ·------ ---- ------ ---- I • 1 - l • 175 ' TOf SECRET LI-----Approved for Rel_ease 2013 07 18 --- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ----------- il________ _ r ----- ---------------- I • '176 - ' 1 '0P S EGUT4 '----------- J Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I ---------1t I i ------------------- ' - 177 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP l SECRE T -1 I · - - - - ---- ' ' ' - 178 - TOPSiCPF' 9L_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 i --------' C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOf SEGRltT 1 I ' ----- I I I l_________ I • 179 - ca POP SiCP Approved FXiL_____ ---_ - fqr _ Release 2013 0 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 OP SEGRE __ -------r-••-·---------·- - 180 - -df'OP Si CR FT l __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _____ Approved Jar elease 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ------- - ·- 'f'OP S EGRl i'l' --------------- - 181 - TOP 6f6R L_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ·-- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r -· - top i ____________ SECRET i ______________--J-1 ---------------- ' 182 - Approved for Releas 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 7 'FOP SECRET r----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - 1 • I 183 I TOP SEGRRT L'- -- - - - - - - ApprQved for Releas 2013 07 18 C01175219 I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • ' ----·I op SECRET I I I L --------- --·---------· I - __________ j 7 I - - 184 - OP S CRi L - -- - - - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 iGp Approved for Release 2013 07 18 SPC II _ fop lec•IL c ______ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 · t r CIA HISTORICAL STAFF r ' l - ' 1 • L The DCI Historical Series The History of SIGINT in the Central Intelligence Agenty 194 ·70 Volume IV General Appendixes C t L e TuP Sosa DC1·4 '-------' October 1971 Copy No 1 of 3 ·--- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 J l - I - J J Ji Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 4 0P C ECRRT I - i J • ' - I I• 1 ·i I DCI HISTORICAL SERIES DCI-4 I• • I -I r i I 1• i I L ' THE HISTORY OF SIGINT IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 1947-70 I '' VOLUME IV GENERAL APPENDIXES bl - f • l J• 1 • October 1971 1• _l I • t I if ' 444 1 l • - 1 l ·I ' I• QLL2 Edward w Proctor CIA SIGINT Officer HISTORICAL STAFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY --«fOPSiCRB q_ '_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ · Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 f r I • ' l I• A Note on Classification L f • I I The overall subject matter of this history requires that it be handled via l• i- '- lcontrol systems L __ _ _ _ _ For purposes of quotation or subsequent sanitization individual parts of the I j • f• history may be treated as follows and Volume ---------------- Volume I Volume III • I I I Volume IV •••••••••• •••• I' Special Supplement •••••• L J T• - L r L I• l' • I I• t i• Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • - - -- -- - ' I • The Histor of SIGINT in the Central Intelligence Agency 1947-70 t Volume IV 1 General Appendixes l I• I Contents A Chairmen of United States Communications Intelligence Board United States Intelligence Board B Secretaries of United States Communications Intelligence Board United States Intelligence Board c Names of Individuals Who Served With the SPIN Staff o Chronology USCIB Intelligence Committee E Mission and Functions of CIA SIGINT Officer Revised 12 April 1968 - CIA Regulation HR lw2d 1 F Mission and Functions of Advisory Council I' G NSCIO No 9 1 July 1948 H NSCID No 9 Revised 29 December 1952 I NSCIO No 17 16 May 1955 J NSCIO No 6 New Series 15 September 1958 K• NSCID No 1 New Series 4 March 1964 ' l ' 1 ' • ' I• J • I j ' 1• I • • I I L M Total Nwnbers of CIA COMINT Cleared Persons by Year 1950-70 j I ' I I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l 'OP SECRiT • ' ' N Maps ' 1 SIGINT Resourcea Wes tern Hemisphere 31 March 1970 I• 2 SIGINT Resources Europe Africa Middle EastL 31 March 1970 3 SIGINT Resources Far East 31 March 1970 i j I• l • j ' ' I • - ' I • • I ' I - ' I •• •• I • '' - - • • t• r 1 0 10 •• • no • oro o • •- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • • • •••• a o o• u • • • • •- • 0 0 0 0 • 0 4 •• • • • --• ••• t• • C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' I j I • I• J · App·endbc A I J • ' j • Chairmen of United States Communications Intelligence Board I United States Intelligence Board ' j - t • 'I I I '• -L IOP SECRi ------ 1 · Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • • I Appendix A r Chairmen of I' • United States Communication·s Intelligence Board I• United States Intelligence Board l ' I I• CIG Lieutenant General Hoyt s Vanqenberg USA AAF USCIB · 15 ·october 1946 - 10· July 1947 Anny Major eneral Samuel J Chamberlain USA USCIB 10 Ju1y 1947 - 27 April 1948 Navy Rear Admiral Thomas B Inglis USN USCIB 27 Aprii 1948 - 1 April 1949 USAF Major General Charles' P Cabell USAF USCIB ·l April 1949 - 14 April 1950 I I• 1• I I • I • r State Mr W Park Armstrpng USCIB 14 April 1950 - 13 April 1951 CIA General Walter B Smith USA USCIB 13 April 1951 - 9 February 1953 CIA Mr Allen W Dulles USCIB 9 Feb ary· l953 - 15 September 1958 USIB 15 September 1958 - 29 November 1961 CIA Mr John Alex McCone USI_B 29 November 1961 ·- 28 April 1965 CIA Vice Admiral William Francis Raborn Jr USN Ret USIB 28 April 1965 - 30 June 1966 CIA Mr Richard Helms USIB 30 June 1966 - I I • I i ' I l • I i 'fOP S CPE tj_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • I _____ 'fOP SiCR E' I __ t ' • t I II I • · Appendix B I I • Secretaries of j United States Communications Intelligence Board United States Intelligence Board Ir l • I t t I • i I • l - l • ' POP s gcRET -------- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' ------ ___ I • Appendix B '' I• I j I' l I • f I Secretaries of United States Communications Intelligence Board United States Intelligence Board Lieutenant c T R Adams USN Captain Wason G Campbell Signal Corps Secretaries 15 October 1946 Captain J E Fitzpatrick Signal Corps Lieutenant c T R Adams USN Secretaries 10 July 1947 I Lieutenant C T R Adams USN Mr Hamill D Jones s Corps Secretaries 27 August 1948 1• I Lieutenant Paul J Karl USN Mr Hamill D Jones Secretaries 14 January 1949 Mr Hamill D Jones Lieutenant James w Pearson USN Secretaries 14 April 1950 ' 1• i 1 J • t rI ' l l t Mr Hamill' D Jones Lieutenant Donald G Maize USN Secretaries 24 March 1952 Mr Hamill o Jones Acting Executive Secretary 28 November 1952 Captain Rufus L Taylor USN Lieutenant Commander Paul J Karl USN Secretaries 28 May 1953 Captain Rufus L Taylor USN Executive Secretary USCIB 13 October 1953 I • I 'rof SEGRE ·- --------------- ' I • •• I 'T' • • • 4•1 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 M h ••t • o o fl • -• l i t • • • • 4 •' •t11 • • • • C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' i • I I • ' L f • • I • Mr Hamill D Jones Acting Executive Secretary USCIB 10 June 1955 Captain Allyn Cole USN Executive Secretary users 30 September 1955 Mr John Heires Executive Secretary USIB 15 September 1958 Mr James s Lay Jr Executive Secretary USIB 23 May 1962 ft I l I • ' 1 • I• II L f I• I • l• l i• I I I • 1 - I • - -· ---- -·· - ·-- · · - Approved for Release 2013 07 1 8 ' u w · - • • - C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 'f'OP Si CR BT ' j I I ' ' · Appendix C ' Names of Individuals ' Who Served With the SP INT S taff I ' ' J I I • 1 -TOP 8 8CR liT I- - - - - - - - • _ •• •• OI f ••r'• • • r r-n• t• • ••r-• •••tl • tflU °' ••l•••1 1n1 • 11 • t l 'll' 1 P•Mlf• 1to •· • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 •• ' r 1 • ••-- •• C01175219 f f Approved for Release 2013 07 18 Appendix C Names of Individuals Who Served With the SPINT Staff ' I j '' I l 1• I 1 I I 1' I• I 'J t I l L ·j I - ' ' L ' I I I I t•• • •• _ p _ _ _ i • h -•••• • •- -• · _ r- •- - • • - -e H a o o a -r••• • • • -••• Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - -·--- C01175219 I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • OP SECRRTl I• I • I I I Appendix D - l- 1 l Chronology USCIB Intelligence Col1Jllittee ' I I i I • 1 i • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -j ToP SECitET ' Appendix D 1• Chronology USCIB Intelligence Committee Nov 48 USCIB splits Conmittee on Intelligence and Security into two conunittees Dec 48 First meeting of new USCIB Intelligence Committee Chairman j CIA • l • I' j I• j 12 Jan 49 Second meeting in new State Building Room 7258 17 Jan 49 Committee argues over its charter Military want charter to exclude responsibility for military targets 25 Jan 49 First meeting of Point-to-Point Intelligence Subcommittee Grady C Frank Army chairman I CIA member i t L - - - - - - - - - - - - ' I • 17 Feb 49 Committee unable to resolve charter fight -- decides to operate without charter for six months 26 Aug 49 Monthly Intelligence Requirements List split into two sections Recurrent List and Monthly List I j ' l • 1 • 1 Nov 49 Dec 49 It ' I 1 - 17 Mar 50 CIA agrees to draft paper allocating responsibility fo COMINT research among departments • Monthly Intelligence Requirements List No 12 Recurrent Intelligence Requirements List No 2 Admiral Stone Coordinator Joint Operations replies to Intelligence COlTlllittee request on status of COMINT effort against China • i ' I • - 'i'OP SECRErj _____________ I· Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I r I I • ' ' ' • l JO Mar SO to th e Intelligence Committee 15 May SQ Commander John Holmes Navy Ch airman Point-to-Point Subcommittee 16 Jun SO USCIB authorizes INTCOM to establish requirements hich up to n ow n__ __ had been handled subrosa because o agreement ___ _____ I f• Mr T A Polyzoides State becomes Chairman I 14 Jul SO ' ' ' t I Sep SO • I j ' ' I o I FBI Director J Edgar Hoover replies to USCIB Chairman Major General Charles P Cabell appointing an FBI representative Twentieth meeting Current Intelligence List and Recurrent Intelligence Lists recombined into a single list called Current Intelligence Requirements List CIRL No 1 effective 15 Jul so USSR kept priority number despite Korean conflict priorities Robert F Packard State becomes Chairman • 13 Sep 50 CIA pressures Intelligence Committee for revision of Requl men s_ L st dealing with Russian ___ _ _ ___ raffic • Fall 50 lus COMINT representatives '--m e-e-t i-n-w-a s tiington to plan collaboration in case of hostilities • I · l 6 Oct 50 21 Dec SO becomes CIA member OSCIB Coordinator Rear Admiral Earl E Stone directs Intelligence Committee study on COMINT operations and COMINT security of selected foreign nations ' I TOP 6 SCR ET 0 • ·• • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • • · · • • - j r 0 0 - 10 00 • • • - - C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -i' 'OP BfJG Rri' I 10 Jan 51 Committee finally agrees with CIA establishing separate Rr i7ents List for processing Soviet traffic This list applicable on y o product of AFSA 246 14 Mar 51 Committee creates long range Intelligence Interest List in addition to Current Intelligence Requirements List Intelligence Advisory Committee models Requirements List after CIRL 11 Apr 51 Thirty-second meeting Special steering committee created to guide AFSA 246 18 Apr 51 Rear Admiral Earl E Stone Chairman Armed Forces Security Agency Council sends letter to service in 1 i · -c e chiefs informin r esults __ ' I • I ' i 1 • I l ' f • ________ I • I 22 May 51 i Jf l 13 Jun 51 • - ' Committee approves CIA request that it and other members be charged with giving direct technical assistance and guidance to AFSA in accordance with USCIB requirements I• T I • ' I ' I j • Colonel Horace D Neely USAF becomes Chairman 9 Aug 51 CIA proposes changing cover sheet of the Current Intelligence Requirements List to indicate list applies to military as well as nonmilitary requirements • I -· 1 ' ' wCfOP SEGRE Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - ET f • l • 21 Aug 51 Report on foreign COMINT organizations requested in December by Admiral Stone forwarded to USCIB I• Fall 51 Major General Ralph J Canine USCIB Coordinator expresses appreciation to committee for reporting on foreign COMINT organizations I• j 1 Oct 51 J l 1• Committee forwards first overall evaluation of COMINT to Deputy Coordinator tJSCIB • 11 Oct 51 AFSA proposes creating a Joint COMINT Reading Panel at AFSA to cut down on dissemination outside of AFSA COMINT 16 Oct 51 AFSA reports problems in satisfying Intelligence Conanittee requirements and notes reliafice on the producing activity rather than on intelligence agencies for determination of handling priority I ' I • 8 Nov 51 I I oc Committee requests AFSA to do SP eci l ana1ysis study on Sovie communications as a result of terest I I • 15 Nov 51 Commander Peter Belin USN replaces Vice Commander R L Taylor USN 13 Mar 52 Committee approves Foreign Trade Requirements List by CIA I I' 1 I I 26 Mar 52 I I I I • 1 i J • -L ' l - 'TOP Sf CR ET1 _-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ I • • ·•• • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • ••••••· '••••l•-• •- 1 • • •-• • ••••••tl'• •u ••••t••• C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I • I __ 'fOP SEGRiT I I 15 Apr 52 I Committee turns down AFSA proposal on j l • Joint COMINT Read g Panel 25 Sep 52 • t I L 8 Oct 52 • r• I • I I Colonel Alfred R Marcy Chief of Staff AFSA gives AFSA views on intelligence requirements • 17 Nov 52 Committee approves Special Requirements List for Soviet air communications intelligence information 13 Jan 53 Special Committee appointed to design new USCIB requirements guide for National Security Agency new name for AFSA Oct 53 H C Simmons Lt Col USAF becomes Chairman USCIB Intelligence Committee • 20 Oct 53 Sixtieth meeting of USCIB Intelligence Committee ' ''l f • I • j 1 ' I - L Intelligence Committee asks Coordinator USCIB whether present requirements method is adequate A Current Intelligence Requir eawe n t s _ Y e iiUL- -l------- vised monthly B Appendix tp_J IliL_ t e ni ecnn crnm- cy- ------' c Soviet revised pe r io _ i-c a y- 14 Nov 52 ' Howard L Shontong Major USAF becomes Chairman USCIB Intelligence Committee • Nov 53 Army requests special INTCOM consLderation of Sovie problems L ------------- I - j • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 I I I I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I l 1 4 Dec 53 f' 1 I • L i 22 Dec 53 j Committee establishes principles for use in jamming and intercept operations Committee considers recommendation of the Brownell Committee that a single alerting technique for crucial COMINT items be established CIA to present a paper 7 r l I j • 1 r t ' 1 l t • I • I• I I r ' '' I i • j TOP S SGRBTI __- - - - - - - - - - - l Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - 1175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r r 1 t '' j ' j • Appendix E I• J I • 'Mission and Functions of CIA SIGINT Officer Revised 12 April 1968 - CIA Regulation HR 1-2d 1 • - I 'I 1• I I • I • j 1 L I1•• J I - I TOf SECR i T t ·r• • - ••·- • • • ·• • Approved for Release 2013 07 1 B - 11 - 01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' f 1Ri1'i 1 n 1-2a I ' - • •' 1 J I • -1 r• - • b De 'clop recommend nnd provide ccnt l'alizcd re•11cw or nnd p uldn ncc · j c 1 d c ' r 1 g 1 Ch I 1 the establishment ni d conduct or CIA SIODiT actlvltlcs and pros-rnms 111 1r eord1111ce wlt h pollcicc established by usm Provide guidance to Agency 01 eratlni Officio ls lu the lmplementntlon of nntlonal SIGINT poli - les ConducL CIA Unison with the Nntional Security Agency and with other USIB member dcp u-tments and agencies in matters o ftect 1111 SIGINT policy Advise the Director ln consultation wtth appropriate CIA components on the lmpllcntlo11s of SIOI1'1 T-r1 I itcd pi·opotmls or recommendations of the President's Fo1·dgn Infolllgcnec Advisory Boa rd and similar bodies and prep nc rccommcndo tlons thereon Chnlr the CIA SIGINT 1 dvisory Comm Uee Review a nd lnitlate ln consultation wUh appropriate CIA components CIA regulations iroverntnc the p1'0curen1ent use security and control o SIGINT bll 'led Oll USIB policies Direct the CIA SIGINT security proi riun Perfonn such other functlo as the 'Director may direct 01· i 1 1 1 f r· by usm - I _ i I MISSION The CIA SIGL' IT Officer shall a Advise asalst and ai npproprlatc represent the Director ot Central Intelligence ln the tormulntlon lmplcmentatlon and coordlna t lon ot SIGINT policies b Coordlnntc the CIA SIGIN'r program 2 FUNCTIONS The CIA SIGINT Officer shnll a coordlnntc the Agency posl lon ln SIC INT matters under consideration ·r I' j 1 1 I I • • 0 c CIA SIGINT OFFlCEI't i 1 I • ORGA IZATlON • · r N The Deputy t o the Dlrcdo1· o Ccr tr il IntelUgencc or N itlon il · t •llii oncc Pro1 rams Ev ilur tion Is responsible for tl c 1·evlew and evaluation • i nroi tr im11 of thr lntellli -cnc coaill lUllltY as a whole represent Ing the Dl1· ctor as Director or Centro Ir tcllig ncc ro ther than as head or the Central Intcllise1ice Agency I • t cl ITl TO TliE DCI 1 -m i N • r o - L 1 o ' J'JiI LIGENCl I'ltOGRAi'oiS F ' L- I' I I I 0 r t L ·i j t t' f- l I I • I i i 'l I • 0 l · I r i ·• • I • l l i I Revised 12 April 10118 383 10 • - --- ·- ---·--- -- ---·- i' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ·--- -------• r • H f i ----------------------- ----01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 9TOP SEGB EI'I '' I ' '' f • ' I I Append ix F l rj • ' 4 • 1 Mission and Functions of Advisory Council ' i 1 I I ' - i 1 I L Approved for Release 2013 07 18 01175219 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 h 4 ' J - • I 3 • I i I ' I • I I 4 • ' · r u t 1 9 -7- J s JJ JA 1 30 AU ust 1949 I l • j · J tm OMNDUU FO The Exco tivo SUBJEOTs Functions and Tabl9 of Organization for tho Advlsory Counci1 t• ' l Ti ansmittsd herm•lith aro the recolll lo11d d Statement or Functions and Table of Organization vltll cba1 t for the Advis0l 7 ' Council including the Spacial Research Centor I 2 I Doth tho Statement of FunctioruJ and tho Tablo o Organ- ization aro considered adoquate for initial oporation 1·dth tbo undoratand that as experience is gained fr0ill actual oporations both will bo i'llprovod broadenod or correctod 3 noco1 13nd 2pproval f ' I • I •1 i 1 L 'i --- o -r o tut u r 1 t 9 -t- L _ - -Jl r T o C u v l t - O 1'h o 0 b S r -- • l 1 I i --it I t ' • ' I' •i J ' ' ' · ' ' lI ' I _·- _t Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _ -·· 5 J-1 t • •I ' • ·- - 2 J 14 01175219 _Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • • 1 - ' • • r • • • 1 • l • • ' $1'1 Z J HLJUY £l fJQH§ '' I •• I 1 •j ' I • I i t• l I ••1 • • I • ' ' ' I - j • 1 I I f I • • • l • ' • • • • • • • • • I t • • • • • Ap tho 0001·dinnting encl planning O 'icGr for tho Dil-cctor in tho field of SpocinJ Intelli6cnca 1 Controls coordinates and protects tha ncquisi tion production dissemination and utilizntion or all Spacial Intolligenca Tiitllin en 2 Is roopon 1iblo for tho coordination fu iCtlon3 bot • oGn tho ofi'icca or CL or all Spooial Intollittonco 3 Establishes and rnaintaixlB liaison for Spacial Intelligence Tlith all nsoncioa outside CIA Adv i sos and asaists tho Director in tho formulation and implc1n0ntntion o policy relating t Spacial Intelligence 0 S Ropresents the Director on Special Intellieonce Boards and Co1Mdir tees 6 Is 1•espousible £01 tho pbysical and par iom1ol 5c c it3· o r ol l phaa G o s1 ocial Intellieonco to includa Gource proouroment rocaipt unc rn 9 in·tonauoo dissemination and dost uction or such • • ml' LQ ' Z llLQ LIFt lP QHX_QOtmc b t •• l • 1natcrial Thl'O l8h liaison nnd inspect icn keeps constantly inrori icd or troncls end dovelopzasnts in othar agencies including field act1vit1eG1 atfooting sourco potential and Cr A rntelliganco 1 ec1uircrncnts 8 Assµros tho cO itplisnce m th Spacial Intolligonco policy of other offices 0£ CIA including 1' iold acti 'ities · 9 Doterminos which personnel in Cl A ohall r avo Adudnistrative or Oporational kn0 1ledge o r Special Intcllie ence and io rm1ponsibln for tho indoctrination and de-briefing o r·such persor nol I • ' ' I •' 't • • I £ -9L l2 2El-Ef I SEecial Rosoa1·ch C_on or Under tho rliroct'lon 01' the Chiot ·Adviso y Cov cil l Coordinatos l nc diroct i tho -Special lntol1 ieonoe actin tioa or tho groui s er aie ncd to tho Conto1• from tho officea of CIA QlU OSI OCD 00 OSO OPC - _ Controls wo1•ldng lliisou botwocn Cantor p rsonr ol and other govarnracntal oreanizntions 2 L · J 'I - -- ---- • • • · ' 1 · -t' • • J J · Approved for Release 2013 07 18 '° I •H•I ' f t ' '• • ·- jJ - • • - -- • 011752 1 9 _ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' ·1 ' • • ii I I' - -- ·- ' I ' i 'j • · -----· • · •'· · · · I · 1· - - i 1 I Iwuros · thnt all Spocial Intolligonco mtorial is confined tc a seicure area a11d insures its ph 13ical socuriiq l'tif hin that aroa 3 I l I' • i I • 'I l' - ' •'• 1- ' I' l j •• f • I I • II · j l Advisory- Council 5 · Prov1ds3 tho CIA editor £or tho Diplomatio Summary Board 6 Insures that mwm um CIA assisbnce is i'urniohed to Spooiol Intolliecnco-producing ngonoio J ·rhcn eonsistont r ith security and Tthen no Lntortcrcnco Tdth CIA operations or unctions vrill result Provides orion tion indoctri Mtion and training or p 1•sonnol ausi JJled to tho Conter • I I I 4 Cont rols access to the Center to personne J authorized by Chief'1 lnformntion Control Division I • • l Oontl 'ols th13 internal and oxternnl dissemination 01• thi Centor of all Spacial Intclligenco on a 11nead-to-known basis ' l ' 2 Receivoo controls and dispatches all mat cri l tor tho Cantor l 3 Providos coui·ier cervice I '•• ' I £01• tho Center Controls the operation of tho teletype room 5 J tnin· ins the Contor 1•onding and sit l2tion 1·oo ns • Ii ' • I • - L I J ososs 11i f d Rc9 aj n3 viaion l Assosooa on a continuing basis tho exploitation ond utilization of Spccinl Intelligence by tho Center 2 Determine 1 el l i £ e en requ iJ-emeDts and priorities for Special In- l 3 Collocts col Jl te3 and integrates CIA Specfal Intollicence t 4 P1 '0pares periodic and lona-ranee Intelligenco Intorocta listr • J 'l requiromontu 5 Prepnros intercept pi'i ori1 y listo f I ·• ·- ' -2- I • - I - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 u • • • ' ·• ' • · · • • 1 - •r•• • 3 1 ii ' v 1 - - • · _ 01175219 'f • • Approved forI Release 2013 07 18 • • __ • I ·1 -- j • • · · 'I ' r ' ' I ' l ' -J · ' 6 J aintt ir s a clearing house•• for Spec f al Intcllieouce rcquirom Jnts f r crn other f CEmcios and answe1·s ¼hem eithor by t lctn a or meruoranuu 7 ProceBocs Oonter r quirarnents or collateral material I -l t ' • j 1 The above is conourrod in J iI f• ' j I I t APPllOVED I l• ' I • f_ I SEP r · · • • - l M - it I 18 -9 JU5EPH rnmEOAN Captain USN Chier Advi2ory Council d C · O L WINEOOFF · Captain USll E couti-v·e I • i i 't J • · i I r •I • ' ' i • 1• · ' l i • ' t ' l l I I • L - - I 1• -3- -·· · ' · Approved for Release 2013 07 18 IS --__ _ f'C ··- -- I' -' 01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -- __J TCJl' 1 • J l L Appendix G t • i 1 I t NSCID No 9 1 July 1948 t I • - 11 l ' i l I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 COPY NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRE IVE NO 9 COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE July 1 1948 I• Pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 and Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that I• 1• I I' I • -• i ' - -- 1 There is hereby established under the National Security Council the United States Communications Intelligence Board hereinafter referred to as the Board to effect the authoritative coordination of Communications Intelligence activities of the Government and to advise the Director of Central Intelligence in those matters in the field of Communications Intelligence for which he is responsible 2 The Board will be composed of not to exceed two members from each of the following Departments or Agencies The Departments of State the Army the Navy and the Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency Only those Departments or Agencies designated by the President are authorized to engage in Communications Intelligence activities · 3 The Board members will be vested with authority to represent their respective Departments or Agencies in the field of Communications Intelligence and each member Department or Agency will be represented at each meeting by at least one member or alternate with the necessary powers to act 4 Decisions of the Board will be based on the principle of unanimity which shall be a prerequisite for matters within the purview of the Board except that the Chairman shall be elected by majority vote When decision cannot be reached the Board will promptly refer the matter for resolution to the National Security Council provided that when unanimity is not obtained among the Department heads of the National Military Establishment the Board shall present the problem to the Secretary of Defense before presenting it to the National Security Council J f t ONFfBilWTI U Approved for Release 2013107 18 01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - CONf'lDBUQlIU· ' ' I• 5 Decisions and policies promulgated by the Board within the scope of its jurisdiction shall be applicable to all Departments and Agencies represented on or subordinate to the National Security Council and any others designated by the President and shall be implemented by those Departments and Agencies of which action is required I ' I 1 • I I 7 The Board shall act for the National Security Council to insure proper and full implementation of council directives by issuing such supplementary directives as may be required Such implementing •directives in which the Board concurs unanimously shall be issued to and implemented by the member Departments and Agencies When disagreement arises in the Board upon such directive the proposed directive together with statement of nonconcurrence shai1 be forwarded to the National Security Council for decision as provided in paragraph 4 - I ' I I ' · 6 The special nature of Communications Inte ligence activities requires that they be treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities Orders directives policies or recommendations of any authority of the Executive Branch relating to the collection production security handling dissemination or utilization of in elligence and or classified material shall not be applicable to Communications Intelligence activities unless specifically so stated and issued by competent departmental or agency authority represented on the Board I 8 Other National Security Council Intelligence Directives to the Director of Central Intelligence and related implementing directives issued by the Director of Central Intelligence shall be construed as nonapplicable to Communications 'Intelligence activities under the authority of paragraph 6 above unless the National Security Council has made its directive specifically applicable to Communications Intelligence 9 T e Board will perform such functions as may be required to accomplish its objective set forth in paragraph 1 above and in the exercise of responsibilities and authority delegated to it by the National Secµrity Council in this directive 10 The Board shall leave the internal administration and operation of Communications Intelligence activities to the member Departments or Agencies 2 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I • ' i ' t ONF lfJflH'i'I nL I • I • ' l' 11 All currently effective decisions policies and operating arrangements of the Board and its predecessors the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board and the State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board as previously constituted which are not in conflict with this directive will remain in full force and effect unless changed by subsequent decisions of the Board I• l I I ' 'I 1 I • I 1 1· ·j • 'l - 12 Definitions For purposes of this directive the following efinitions apply a Foreign conununications include all telecommunications and related materials except Foreign Press and Propaganda Broadcasts of the government and or their nationals or of any military air or naval force faction party department agency or bureau of a foreign country or of any person or persons acting or purporting to act therefor they shall include all other telecommunications and related material Qf to and from a foreign country which may contain information of military political scientific or economic value b Communications Intelligence is intelligence ' produced by the study of foreign communications Intelligence based in whole or in part on Communications Intelligence sources shall be considered Communications Intelligence as pertains to the authority and responsibility of the United States Communications Intelligence Board c Communications Intelligence activities comprise all processes involved in the collection for intelligence purposes of foreign communications the production of information from such coJNnunications the dissemination of that information and the control of the protection of that information and the security of its sources l - I• 3 'CeHP I DBllTI P L Approved for Release 2013 07 18 01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I • I • l Appendix H i NSCID No 9 Revised 29 December 1952 I I • I j I I I • ' - ·ror Sf5SR E r Approved for Release 2013 07 18 j 01175219 ' I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 NSCID 9 REVISED December Z9 1952 TOP J SGj'PQ' SECURITY INFORMATION I• COPY NO I • --- NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO 9 COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE 1• ' Pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 and Section 10i of the National Security Act of 1947 as amended and to the Presidential directive approved October 24 1952 which I l • j f ' a Stated that the communications intelligence COMINT activities of the United States are a national responsibility and that they must be so organized and managed as to exploit to the maximum the available resources in all participating departments and agencies and to satisfy the legitimate intelligence requirements of all such departments and agencies 1 I ' I ' 4 I • ' ' I • • I ' j b Designated the Secretaries of State and Defense as aSpecial Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT which Committee shall with the assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence establish policies governing COMINT activities and keep the President advised of such policies through the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council The President in approving this directive also directed that the Attorney General shall be a member of the Special Committee whenever matters of interest to the Federal Bureau of Investigation a re before that Committee and c Further designated the Department of Defense as executive agent of the Government for the production of COM T information the Special Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT hereby authorizes and directs that 1 Directive to the United Sta tea Communications Intelligence Board USCIB a USCIB shall be reconstituted as a body acting for and under the Special Committee and shall operate in accordance with the provisions of this• directive Only those departments or agencies represented in USCIB are authorized to engage in COMINT activities NSCID 9 REVISED December 29 1952 - 1Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TbP SS'7B 01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 1 ' I I ' - 10 P SECPEI SECURITY INFORMATION _ b The Board shall be composed of the following embers 1 The Director of Central Intelligence who shall be Chairman of the Board Z A representative of the Secretary of 3 A representative of the Secretary of State Defense 4j A re resen tath·e 0£ foe Director o the Federal Bureau of Investigation f • 5 The Director of the National Security Agency NSA ' 6 A representative of the Department of the Army 7 the Navy A representative of the Department of 8 A representative of the Department of the Air Force 9 A representative of the Central Intelligence Agency c The Board shall have a staff headed by an executive secretary who shall be appointed by the Chairman with the approval of the majority of the Board I I• ' I I NSCID 9 REVISED ' · December 2 9t 1952 d It shall be the duty of the Board to advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in accordance with the following procedure with respect to any matter relating to communications intelligence which falls within the jurisdiction of the Director of NSA 1 The Board shall reach its decision by a majority vote Each member of the Board shall have one vote except the representatives of the Secretary of State the Secretary of Defense the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall each have two votes The Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman -zApproved for Release 2013 07 18 'TtF ss P EL 01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' TOF SS€1tET SECURITY INFORMATION --- will have no vote In the event that the Board votes and reaches a decision any dissenting member of the Board may appeal from such decision within 7 days to the Special Committee In the event that the Board votes but fails to reach a decision any member 0£ the Board may appeal within 7 days to the Special Committee In either event the Special Committee shall review the matter and its determination thereon shall be final Appeals by the Director of NSA and or the repreeentativea of the Military Departments shall only be filed with the approval of the Secretary of Defense ' ' J• ' I ' • l f ' I · I i i • Z If any matter is voted on by the Board but i ' a no decision is reached and any member ilea an appeal 1 ' I b a decision is reached in which the representative of the Secretary of Defense does not concur and files an appeal • l • no action shall be taken with respect to the subject matter until the appeal is decided provided that if the Secretary of Defense determines after consultation with the Secretary of State that the subject matter presents a problem of an emergency nature and requires immediate a c tion his decision shall govern pending the re sult of the appeal In such an emergency situation the appeal may be ta ken directly to the President - I - j -' • f 1 • • i ' 3 Recommendations of the Boa rd adopted in accordance with the foregoing procedures shall be binding on the Secretary of De£ense Except on matters which have been voted on by the Board the Director of NSA shall discharge his re sponsibilities in accordance with his own judgment subject to the direction of the Secretary 0£ Defense l I ' I t l • NSCID 9 REVISED December 29 195Z 10F SFCBEI - 3- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 01 175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP E ORE'l' SECURITY INFORMATION 4 -The Director of NSA shall make such reports and furnish such information from time to time to the Board either orally or in writing as the Board may request and shall bring to the attention of the Board either in such reports or otherwise any new major policies or programs in advance of their adoption by him · - ' I 1 •I I I • ' e It shall also be the duty of the Board as to matters not falling within the jurisdiction of NSA 1 To coordinate the communications intelligence activities among all departments and agencies authorized by the President to participate therein · I• i I 2 To initiate to formulate policies concerning and subject to the provisions of NSCID No 5 to supervise all arrangements with foreign governments in the field of communications intelligence and 3 To consider and make recommendations concerning policies relating to communications intelligence of common interest to the departments and agencies including security standards and practices and or this purpose to investigate and study the standards and practices of such departments and agencies in utilizing and protecting COMINT information J t I • ' 1 I I 1 L ' ' • j i r ' • ' I l f Any recommendation of the Board with respect to the matters described in paragraph e above shall be binding on all departments or agencies of the Government if it is adopted by the unanimous vote of the members of the Board Recommendations approved by a majority but not all of the members 0£ the Board shall be transmitted by it to the Special Committee for such action as the Special Committee may see fit to take l• The Board will meet monthly or oftener at the call of the Chairman or any member and shall determine its own procedures NSCID 9 REVISED December Z9 195 Z • 4 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 lOP SEGB il 01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 1' - l Oli' SECB E I SECURITY INFO RMATION ' Z Directive to the Secretary of Defense l a Subject to the specific provisions of this directive the Secretaiy of Defense may delegate in whole or in part authority over the Director of NSA within his department as he sees fit I I b The COMINT mission of the National Security Age y NSA shall be to provide an effective unified organization and control of the communications intelligence activities of the United States conducted against foreign governments and to provide for integrated operational policies and procedures pertaining thereto As used in this directive the terms communications intelligence or 11 COMINT 11 shall be construed to mean all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications other than foreign press and propaganda broadcasts and the obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients but shall exclude censorship and the production and dissemination of finished intelligence I j • I • ' 1 c NSA shall be administered by a Director designated by the Secretary o Defense after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Sta who shall serve for a minimum term of 4 years and who shall be eligible or reappointment The Director shall be a career commissioned officer of the armed services on active or reactivated status and shall enjoy at least 3- star rank during the period of hls incumbency ' ' I • t - J ' d Under the Secretary o Defense and in ac cordance with approved policies of USCIB the Direc tor of NSA shall be responsible or accomplishing the mission of NSA For this ·purpose all COMINT collection and production resources o the United States are placed under his operational and technical control When action by the Chiefs o the operating agencies of the Services or civilian departments or agencies is required the Director shall normally ' 1 ' '' I I • ' See Public Law 513 81st Congre·ss ·19so NSCID 9 REVISED December 29 19SZ s -1cr SE-PET t • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP ECRU SECURITY INFORMATION I • - r• I l I • I issue instructions pertaining to COMINT· operations through them H wever due to the unique technical character of COMINT operations• the Director is authorized to issue direct to any operating elements under his operational control task assignments and pertinent instructions which are within the capacity of such elements to accomplish He shall also have direct access to and direct communication with any · elements of the Service or civilian COMINT agencies on any other matters of operational and technical control as may be nece_ssary and he is authorized to obtain such information and intelligence material from them as he may require All instructions issued by the Director under the authority provided in this paragraph shall be mandatory subject only to appeal to the Secretary of Defense by the Chief of Service or head of civilian department or agency concerned e Specific responsibilities of the Director of ' NSAinclude the following 1 Formulating necessary operaticmal plans and policies or the conduct of the U S COMINT activities 1 I l Conducting COMINT activities including research and development as required to meet the needs of the departments and agencies which are authorized to receive the products of COMINT l I • l 1' j ' r 1• t 1 ' -• I I • 3 Determining and submitting to appropriate authorities requirements or logistic support or the conduct of COMINT activities together with specific recommendations as to what each of the responsible departments and agencies of the Government should supply 4 Within NSA' s field of authorized operations prescribing requisite security regulations covering operating practices including the transmission handling and distribution of COMINT ma·terial within and among the COMINT elements under his operational or technical control and exercising the necessary monitoring and supervisory control including inspections i f necessary to ensure compliance with the regulations • NSCID 9 REVISED December Z9 1952 - 6- eP Sli'CB Fi t Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - 01175219 ' '#' r I • I • •• f • i • ' j ' - I • ' TOP 3EG R i T SECURITY INFORMATION 5 Subject to the authorities granted the Director of Central lnteUigence under NSCID No 5 conducting all liaison on COMINT matters with foreign governmental communications intelligence agencies f To the extent he deems feasible and in consonance with the aims of maximum over-all efficiency economy and effectiveness the Director shall centralize or consolidate the performance of COMINT functions for which he is responsible It is recognized that in certain circumstances elements of the Armed Forces and other agencies being served will require close COMINT support Where necessary for this close support direct operational control of specified COMINT facilities and resources will be delegated by the Director• during such periods and for such tasks as are determined by him to military commanders or to the Chiefs of other agencies sup-_ porte d g The Director shall exercise such administrative control over COMINT activities a a he deems necessary to the effective performance of his mission Otherwise administrative control of personnel and facilities will remain with the departments and agencies providing them • f j • I • - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 4 1• l i r I j 'I • h The Director shall make provision £or participation by representatives of each of the departments and agencies eligible to receive COMIN-T products in those offices of NSA where priorities of intercept and processing are finally planned l The Director shall have a civilian deputy whose primary responsibility shall be to ensure the mobilization and effective employment 0£ the be st available human and scientific resources in the field of cryptologic research and development j • Nothing in this directive shall contravene the responsibilities 0£ the individual departments and agencies £or the final evaluation of COMINT information its synthesis with inforrriation from other sources I and the dissemination 0£ finished intelligence to users NSCID 9 REVISED December 29 1952 - 7 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - lOP S1 i£PEI 01175219 t Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • TOP SECflEL SECURITY INFORMATION -- I I '' • • f ' f ' I t L • ' I • I 3 The special nature of COMINT activities requires that they be treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities Orders directives policies or recommendations of any authority of the Executive Branch relating to the collec• tion production security handling dissemination or utilization of intelligence and or classified material shall not be applicable to COMINT activities unless ape• ci ically so stated and issued by competent departmental or agency authority represented on the Board Other National Security Council Intelligence Directives to the Director· of Central Intelligence and related implementing directives issued by the Director of Central Intelligence shall be construed as non-applicable to COMINT activities unless the National Security Council has made its directive specifically applicable to COMINT t r 4 Nothing in this directive shall be construed to encroach upon or interfere with the unique responaibilitie s of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the field of internal security I l '1 j • 1t 1 I I I l t - 1 l L NSCID 9 REVISED December 29 1952 'f0P si-CRi T • 8 • 'i l Approved for Release 2013 07 18 · 01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I • X ' • r• ' I • •• ' ' Appendix I f I - ' '- NSCID No 17 16 May 1955 I I • 1 I r 1' 1• i 1' I j ' 1 I -'rOP SECR E Approved for Release 2013 07 18 --- 01175219 Approved for Release 201 07 18 May 16 1955 I • I ' NATICNJ L SECURI'IY CX lNCIL lNl'ELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO 17 i •EIECI'OONIC INl'ELLIGENCE EI JNr t ' I I I II ' L ' ' • ' i • t• ' 1' ' I l Pursuant to Sections 101 and 102 as arrended of the Natia1al Security Act of 1947 'llJE NATICNAL SEClJRI'lY CXWCIL AUlHORIZES J ND OIRECl'S 'lHATs The follcMing organization and pmoedures am hereby established in order that Electronics Intelligence hereinafter called ELmr may be made ncre effective l Dgfinition 'lhe tenn ELINT is defined as the mllection observation and reoording and the tedlnical pmoessing for later intelligence purposes of information on foreign non-a mmunicatims electromagnetic radi atims emanating from other than atanic detcmatim sources 2 The' t BCIB in addition to its authority and responsibility as defined in NSCID #9 and operating under the procedures established under paragraph 1- f of that Directive shall be the natiaial policy bcxiy for ELINT including policy in relation to the Technical Processing Oenter pi ovi d by paragraph 4 belc M arrang ts with foreign gove crurents in the field of EI INT and r- o amendatiau oonoorning research and devel oprrent quirerrents 3 Subject to the provisions of paragrafh 2 above the Dgpartrrent of Dgfense and the Central Intelligence Agency shall be respcnsible for their respective ELINT oollectioo activities · 4 The technical processing of all ELINT shall be aocaiplished in a center to be organized and administered by the partnent of fense HCMever parallel processing in the field may be accxrrplished for essential imrediate operational or tactical purposes 'Ibis center shall be jointly staffed by individuals detailad frc m the parbtent of refense and the CIA in a proportion to be determined by the Secretary of fense and the DCI 5 All data collected by the collectiai agS1c i es shall be made available forthwith to the Technical Processing Center subject aily to minimum delays maassitated by prior exploitation in the field for urgent tactical or operatiaial purposes 6 The Technical Processing Center shall effect fullest and rrcst expeditious prooossing possible and fumish the results thereof to the inte ested t epartments and agencies and to the extent practicable in the fo cm desired by them• NSCID No 17 hlar-' J I 9 -f-6' I I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - -two»- C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - --- - - I I l ' I f r •• • ' Appendix J i F I 1 I • I• NSCID No 6 New series 15 September 1958 I• I I L 1• ' I • ' • I l I • ' I I • l '• l -1 j • I • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I • • I•• I ••t •1• • •II • •' • • • C01175219 •••' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -- ' NOT TO BE DIS'rRIBUTED ' 'l or i Jj'QHET OUTSIDE THE U S SPEClt L LIMl'l'ED DISTR713U'fION I ·• NSCID No 6 New Sel i NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE 1 DIRECTIVE NO 6 l • •tr COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE f • i ' Effectl 'e 15 September 1958 r 1 Communications InLelligence COMINT and Elcct1·011ics Intelligence ELI T and the actMtles pertaining thereto ns defined in paragraph 3 of Uiis directive nre national responsibilities whose impo1·tnnce to national security 1·equires an organization and managcme11t which i ' will I • i '' ' i I t • • • o• I - •- ' 1 • · • I I • I ' i I ' a Exploit to the maximum the available l'esources in all participating departments and agencies to satisfy legitimate 1·equi1·cments or Co1·elgn intelligence relating to the national security including those of tl1e departments and agencies concerned b Provide or efficiency and economy in the use of technical resom·ces and c Ensme the necessai-y degree of protection Therefore pursuant to the National Secul'ity Act of 1947 as amended the National Security Council authorizes and dlrects thR t COMINT ahd the COMINT activities ol the United States as well as ELINT and ELINT activities shall be conducted as prescribed he1·eio COMINT n11d ELINT and their associated activities shall be treated as being within the frame• work of genc1·a1 intelligence activities except as othcnvise established under this directive 2 Only those departments 01· agencies represented pn tl1e U S Intclllgencc Board USIB are authorized to engage in COMINT or ELINT activities and only in accordance with the provisions or this directive except tha t only the Secretary of Defense shall exercise or delegate this authol'ity vithin the Depa1·tment of Defe e 3 Definitions For the purpose of this directlvc the terms Communications Intelllgcnce or COMINT shall be constl'Ued to mean technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients COMINT actlviUes shall be const1·ued to mean those activities which p1·oduce COMINT by the h1terceptlon and processing or roreign communlcatlons passed by radio wire or other electromac rnetic means with specific exception stated below and by the processing of oreign enc1·yptcd communications however transmitted Interception comprises search intercept and direction finding Processing comprises range estimation trnnsmlttcr operator identification signal nnalysls t1·amc auntysis cryptanalysis decryption study of plain text the usion of these processes and Lhe reporting of results • I • 1 'This Directive supcm1r dcs NSCID No 9 revised 29 December 1052 nnd NSCID No l'l dated 18 May 1D55 Page 1 Revised 18 Janua1-y 1961 1 - -1or si cFEI I _ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 COPY NO _ ob __ ' • - • • t _ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 or - - - I f I' • I SECREJI I j ·-· I ' COMINT and COMINT activities as defined l1c1·ein shall not include a any intercept nnd processing of unencrypted written communications p1·css and propai anda broadcasts or b censorship • I • ' I • f ' I ' i _' 1 I· I I I l1 I ' '1 •l I -·1 'I I • ' I • I I i · ELINT activities are defined as he collection observation and recording and the technical processing for subsequent int clligence purposes of Information derived from foreign non-communications electromagnetic rn diations emnnatlng from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources ELINT is the technical and intellige11ce-in ormatlon product of ELINT activities 4 The United Stales Intelligence Board USIB In addition to tis responsibility as set forth in paragraph 2 of NSCID No 1 the United Slates Intelilgcnce Board shall a Study in connection with its responsibilities for communications intelligence security the standards and practices of the departments and agencies in utilizing and protecting COMINT and establish procedures whereby departments and agencies not members of the U S Intelligence Board are enabled to receive and utilize COMINT b Determine the degree and type of securJty protection to be given CO MJNT actlvltics th1·ough the protection of information about tham or del'ivcd from them taking into full account that different levels ol sensitivity obtain and applying balanced judgment between the need for exploitation of the COMINT p1·oduced and the need to protect the specific producing activity or activities Procedures for special handling will include treatment of the infom1ation in its initial stages and also as it may be included in -finished intelligence c Dctennine the degree and type of security protection to be given ELINT nctivltics through the protection of information about them or derived from them Special COMINT security standards and procedures generally shall not apply to ELINT and ELINT activities 5 The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Defense is designated as executive agent of the Government fol' the conduct of COMINT and ELINT actlvltles in accordance with the provisions of this directive and for the maintenance and operation of the National Security Agency a The Secretary of Defense may determine after co11sultation with the Sec1·ctal'y of State and the Dlrecto1· of Central Intelligence that a COMINT or ELINT matter fonvarded by the U S Intelligence Board to the National Security Council for decision presents a problem of an emergency nature and 1·cqukes lmmedlate action 1Iis action will be hnplcmented and will govern pending· a decision by the National Security Council b The 1·csponsibllity to conduct those EL collection and proc• _csslng activities which the Secretary of ·Defense detennincs arc essential to provlde direct support to commanders who plan al'ld con- duct military operations will b delegated by the Secretary of Defense t o those commanders or to the cryptologic gencles which support th m I' • 2 • I • ' ' i • - 1 or SiiCEB'l' - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 I J _'• · • • I • ' t I • I f 'I I • I • 'l' 1 • ' ' L ' I •i ' - l t• ' I ' l I ii f II •• i • • j ' - TOI €FCHET 6 The National Security Agency a The COMINT an ELIN'l' missions of the National Security Agency NSA shall be to p1·ovidc an effective unified organizat ion and control of the 1 COMINT and 2 ELINT Intercept and processing activities of the United States to provide for integrnted operational policies and procedures pertaining thereto and to produce COMIN'r info1·mation and ELINT information in accordance with objectives 1·equiren ients and priorities established by the U S Intelligence Board b NS shal be administered by a Director designated by the Secretary of Defense after consultation with the· Joint Chiefs of Staff whose appointment shall be for a term of four years The Dh·cctor shall be a career commissioned officer of the armed services on active or reactivated status and shall enjoy at least 3-star rank during the period of his incumbency The Director shall have a civilian Deputy f • I c The Secretary of Defense may delegate in whole or part authority over U1c Director of NSA within his depa1·tment as he sees fit ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • 7 The Director National Security Agency a The Director or NSA shall be responsible for accomplishing the mission of NSA For this purpose all COMINT and ELINT intercept and processing activities of the United States are placed unde1· his operational and technical control When action by the Chiefs qf the operating agencies of the Services or clvlllan departments or agencies is required the Director shall normally issue instructions pertaining to COMINT and ELINT operations through them However because of the unique technical character of COMINT and ELINT operaUons the Director is authorized to issue direct to any operating elements under his operational control task assignments and pertinent instructions which a1·e within the capacity ol such elements to accomplish He shall also have direct access to and dh·ect communlcatlo11 with any elements of the Service or civilian COMINT 01· ELINT agencies on any other matters of operational and technical co11troi as may be necessary and ·he is authorized to obtain such Information and intelligence matelial from them as he may require All instructions issued by the Dlrccto1· under the autholity provided in this pa1·ag1·aph shall be mandatory subject only to appeal to the Secretary of Delense_by the Chief · or Service or head of civilian depa1·tment or agency concerned b Specific responsibilities of the Director of NSA include the following 1 Formulating n ccssary operational plans and policies 2 Conducting research and development to meet the needs or NSA and the departments and agencies which arc engaged in COMINT or ELINT activiLlcs and coo1·dlnating the relatccl rcsea1·ch and development conducted by such deparLmcnts and agencies 3 Determining and submlLtirig to the authorities responsible for logistic support for NSA requirements together wlth specific recommendations ns to what each of the responsible departments and agencies of the Government should supply I • ' I • 3 r----- N COPY I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - IO I I 2 • • • fol O C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' - 'I'oP Sl36JPE t_ · I I• I • f • ' r • i l I I I I ' ' f • j I• I ' I j 4 Within NSA's fleld of authori cd opct·at ions p1·cscribing 1·equisltc sc curlty regulations covering operating practices including· the transmission handling and distribution of COMINT mnterlnl withln and among the COMINT elements under his operational or teclmlcal contl'ol and excrcislng tile necessary monitoring and supcnisory control including inspect-ions if necessary to ensure compliance wiLh the regulations 5 Making sucl1 rcpo1·ts and furnishing uch infonnation from time to time to the Doard either orally or in writing as the Board m Ly request and bringing to the attention of the Board either in such re1lo1·ts or otherwise nny new maior policies or programs in advance of their adoption by him 6 Except on matters which have been decided by the Board the Director ·•or NSA shall discharge his responsibilities in accordance with his own Judgment subject to the dh·ection of the Secn ta1·y of Defense c To the extent he deems feasible and in consonance with the aims · of maximum over-all efficiency economy and effectiveness the Dlrecto1· shall centralize or consolidate the performance of COI UNT and ELINT functions for which he is responsible It is recognized that the Armed Fo1·ces nnd other departments and agencies being served require direct COMINT and ELINT support of various ldnds In providing this support operational control of specified COMINT and ELINT facilities and resources will at times be dclego ted by the Director for such period and for such tasks as are determined by him to an appl'oprlate agent Each member department or agency 1s responsible for stating 1 o the Dii-ecto1· NSA its requirements for direct support d The Director shall make 'provision for participation by representatives of each of the Boa1·d members in those offices of NSA where the Director NSA establishes p1·iorities of intercept nnd processing e It is the intent of this directive that NSA not engage in the production aml dissemination of finished intelligence as distinguished from intelligence information The production and dlssemlnation of finished intelligence are the responsibilities of departments and agencies other than NSA · f • • 8 The Director of Central Intelligence 1 • a COMINT and ELINT al'l'angcments wlth foreign governments rdance with the olicles established b USIB I ' ' I i • b Other p1·ovislons of this directive are no npp 1ca e ose nlercopt and processing activ tlcs other than c1·yptanalysis undertaken unde1· the authority of NSCID No 5 whether by the Ccntl'al I I ' 4 I l 'l Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I - C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • • I • ' j • • • •• _ • • •• 'J • TOP SIWitE'f • i l Intelligence Agency or by Lhe military departments which are specifically excepted by the Director of Central Intelligence However to the extent practicable in ormntion pertaining to these activities an derived therefrom shall at all times be handled as to give sultnblc protecUon to i·clated COMIN1' activities 01· COMil'lT activities in general Matedal which may be collected under these circtunstances and which othel·wlse would have been consido1·ed the product of COMJNT or ELINT activities will be passed to the National Security Agency to the extent desired by the Director NSA as soon as special security requirements or the collector have been satisfied I • I • '' f• I 9 The Mllitary Departments The Milit'ary Departments shali be responsible for a The cslablisllment maintenance operation and administration or COMINT and ELIN'l' intercept and processing aclULies as authorized and directed by the Secretary of Defense b The conduct of those intel'cept and processlng activities other than cryptanalysis undertaken under tlle authol'ity or NSCID No 5 as specifically excepted Crom other provisions of this directive NSCID No G by the Dlrector of Cc11tro l Int elligcncc Howcve1· to the extent practicable Information pertaining · to these activities and dcriv d · therefrom shall at all times be handled as to give suitable prot ectlon to 1·clatcd COMINT activities or COMINT activities in general Material which may be collected under these circumstances and whlch otherwise would have been considered the product or COML T or ELINT activitles will be passed to the National Secu1ity Agency to the extent desired by the Director NSA as soon as special security requirements of the collector have been satisfied c The conduct outside the scope of pamgraphs 6 and 7 of this directive or S LJCh search intercept direction finding 1·ange estimation and signal analysis or communications and non-communications electromagnetic radiations as must be undertaken · to permit imn1cdiate operational use or the information in support of electronic measures and countermeasures and rescue opel'atlons I J• 'l ' ' I l • r• ' -· 1• I I ' • 1 • ' L L 10 The Federal Buf'eatt of Investigation Nothing in this directive shall be construed to encroach upon 01· inter cre with tbe unique 1·espo11slbillties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ·1n the field of internal security including such intercept and processing activities as may be w1dertakcn by_the FBI in connection with_its functions ' ' -1 • I l l 1 I I t L_ _ _ _ 5 ltbi SFCRWf - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 COPY N J 2· ' j C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I I f ' ' 1 • I Appendix K i I 1 NSCID No 1 New Series 4 March 1964 • • I ' j • • • • • r - t ' T • I I I • i 1 ' ' ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - ---- NSCID - 1 New Sc -it s l' TO 13 DISTRII3UTED ·r TSI JE T1- E U S NATIOi lAL S ·y ' cc · - c L INT2LLJGENCE l BASIC ou· t2s A' '-lr i s ONS13lLITiES • Rcv is id 4 I - ·ca 1964 ' ' 1 I l I l ' ' I• I - i I ' 1 i - l i ' The intelllgence effort cf t - c United Str tes is a national responsibE ty and must be so organized me nan g d as to exploit to the m - i r · m the nvailable 1·csom·ce s o the G ver m ent and to satisfy the int lii e rcqufrements of the Nation Security Council and of the depa1'tn · t 1 d agencies ot t -ie Governme t For - 11c purpose of coordlnatini i e intclli ence ctivities of the scvcr l 0ov rnmcnt clepartments and E i ' 1cici in the t· tcl·cst of national s curity c nd pursuant to the provisions c f Sc i ion 102 of the Nation i I S curity Act of 1947 as amended the j_ at io 1 il s curity Council hereby authorizes and directs that 1 Ov t-all Coordination • • 1c irector of Central Int lllgence shall coordinate the foreign L- tclligencc activitle of ti1e Uni ed St tes in accoi·dance with e dsting ln w nd applicable National Security Council directives Such coordination shall include both specia and other forms of intelligence which together constitute the fo •eig - intelligence activities of the 'qnited St tes 2 The United States lntal igence Boa rd USIB a To maintain th rciationship necessary for a fully coordir ated intelligence community d to pl·ovide tor a more effective intcgr t 011 of and guidance to the national intelligence effort a Unii - d States Intelligence Board USIB is hereby established under ka directives of the National Security Council and unde1· the chairmc nship of the Director of Central Intelligence The Board shall advise and assist the Director of Ce tral Intelligence as he may requi ·e in the discharge of his statutory responsibilities and pursuant to 1• g1· ph l above - S ubject to othet· established responsibilities under existing aw and 'fo the provisions of Na ional Security Council directives the Board shall aiso 1 Establish Jollcies a 11d develop progi·ams for the guldanc cf all departments and ag·encles concerned • 2 Es ablish appropriate Intelligence objectives requireme ts and pl·io1·ities 1 This Dll·ective supersedes NSCID No 1 da ted 18 January 196_1 T e h telllcencc community inch cs the Central Intelligence Age11cy the •- telliJ llCe components of the C r i rt ncmts o f St i te Defense Dafcnte Il' tcl11 cnec A l'cncy Anny No vy md i ir Force N i tionnl Security Ar ency h i 1 -edernl Buronu o Invcst gr t on nd t -ic Atomic EnercY commission o e components ot the departments md n cncles of the Government are 1ncl- c J to t ho extent or their ng1·ccd p rtlclpntlon in regularly cst11 bl1shcd intc1·0 Jlartmc11tal il tclll cncc ncLlvltics 1 COPY Approved for Release 2013 07 18 lJ C01175219 I• I I • tI I I • I I I • • I I ' 1 I • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 vi w ll'l 6 r port to t he National Security Council on the c l foreign-intelligence e fort as a whole · fake l'ccommend2 tions on lorei n-intelligence matters to - _ ·o _ •i te United States ofiicials including particularly recom · 1 •nciations to the Secretary of Defense on intelligence matte1·s w tnin the jurisdiction of the Director of the National Security A cl'lcy 5 Develop and 1·eview secu 'ity standards and practices as they · re atc to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosui·e 6 Formulate as app1·opriate policies with respect to arrangements with fo1•eign governments on intelligence matters b The membership of the U S Intelllgence Board shall consist o the following 1 The Director of Central Intelligence Chairman 2 The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency 3 The Dil·ector of Intelligence and Research Department of State 4 The Director Defense Intelligence Agency 5 The Dil·ccto1· National Security Agency G A representative of the Atomic E11e1·gy Commission 7 A representative of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation The Dkcctor of Central Intelligence as Cheirman shall invite the chief uf any other depa1-tmcnt 01· gcncy having functions related to the n itional security to sit with U1e U S Intelligence Board whenever matters within the purview of his department or agency are to be discussed c The Boai·d shall determine its own p1·ocedures and shall establish subordinate committees and working groups as appropriate It shall l provided with a Secretariat staff which shall be under the direction o1 1 Executive Sec1·eta1-y appointed by the Director of Central Intelligc 1cc in consultatio11 with the members of the Board d The U S Intelligence Board shall 1·each its decisions by agi·ecmcnt W11en the Chairman detet1 1nes that a given position on a mc tter under co 1sideration represents the consensus ol the Board it sh tll tc conside ed as agreed unless a dissenting member requests that the issue be 1•efcn·cd to the National Scculity Council Upon such request the Director of Central Intelligence ns Chairman shall refer the m11ttc1· together with the dissenting brief to the National Secu'rity Council fo1· decision Provic d That such appeals to the National Security Council by the Director Defense Intelligence Agency 01· the Director National Security Agency shall be taken only after review by the Secretary o Defense 2 3ElvlET Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - ' C01175219 Approved for Release 201 07 18 I ' i I • ' • I • 'dl cnevcr mrittct'l oi c o -1c L'n to the t i'ederal Bureau of Invcsti1 ' on 1d or the Atomic Energy Commh sion are referred to the Nat 01 al S curity Council the Attorney Gcn ral and or the Chairman oi the • tom c Energy Commiss on resp ctively shall sit with the Cou cil The Boai·d may recommend through its Chairman that a sensl'i ive intelllgence matter 1·equil'ing th attention of higher autho1·ity iJe dealt with by the Council in a 1·estric ed meeting including only those officio ls who hnve substantive interest in the matter or directly by the President e Decisions and recom nendations of the Board shall as a pp ·c priatc be transmitted by the Jirector of Central Intelligence as Cht irman to the departments or agencies concemcd or to the Nation Security Council when highi r approval is 1·equired or for infonnation f In making recommcnd tions to the National Sacurlty Cou 1 il 1 -1 matters concerning such intelligence activities of the depa1·tmcnts md uiencics of the Government as 1·elate to the national security Lhe i i ·cctor of Central Intellige ice 2-s Chairman shall transmit therewith a statement indic tini the concurrence or 11on-concurl'ing views of those members of the U S Intellig·ence Board concerned Such recommendations when a p 1 ll'ovcd by the National Security Council s 1all as appropriate be issued as National Security Council Intrl igcncc Directives or as othct· Council directives and as applicable t r 11 be promulgated and implem ' nted by the depc 1-tments and agencies of the Goven1mcnt J Decisions of the Boa a d arrived at unde1· the authority and pi occdures of this paragraph shall be binding as applicable on all departments and agencies of the Govl' rnment 3 'i'he Director of Central In telligence I • I• • I • ' t I • I • ' - a The Director of Centre l Intclli mce shall act fo1· the National Security Council to pro •ide for detailed Implementation of National Security Council Intelligence Directives by issuing with the concurrence of the U S Intelligence Bar rd such supplementary Director of Cent1·al Intelligence Directives as may be 1·equired see par 2d above Such directives shall o s applicable be promulga ted and ir 11plemented within the normal command channels of the departments ruid agencies concerned b Dil·cctor of Central Intelligence Dh·ectives to be issued in accordance with the provisions of sub-pa1·ag1·aph a above shall include 1 Gene1·al guidance and the establishment of specific priolitics fo1· the pl'Oduction of national and other intelligence and for collection and other activities in support thereof including a cst lishment of compt•ehcnsive National Intelligence Objectives cncrally a1lp - Lble to foreign countries and areas b identificatioil om time time and on a current basis of P1·iority Nationai Intelligence Objectives with reference to specific countries and jects and c issuanc of such comp1·ehensivc and priority obj ctives for genera I intelligence guidance and their formal t1•ansmission to the National Security Council to ' COPY Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - ro 1• i 285 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _ -_-- 'J' -- f • ' ' 2 E t bl shmcnt of policy proce ures and pi·acticcs for the - · at r · nce by the individual components of the h1tclligence c m 1u11iLy of a continuing interchang·e of intelligence intelligence ir iJrmation and othcl' information with utility ior intelligence purposes 3 Establlshment of policy llrocctlures and practices for the p1·oduction or procurement by the individual components of the il1tclligence community within the limits of their capabilities of such intellig· nce intelligence in ro1mation and other info1·ms ion with utility for intelligence purpc es relating to tbe_national security as may be 1·equestccl by one of the departments or e gencfes c The Director of Central Intelligence or representatives designated by him in consultation With the head of the intelligence or other appropl'iate componc 1 t of the department 01· agency concerned shall ma a such surveys o departmental intelligence activities of the varl• ous departments and agencies ns he may deem necessary in connection with his duty to advise the Nation l Security Council and to coordi ia te tl1c intelligence effort of the Uulted States 4 National Intelligence l t I CL National intelligence is that intelligence which is required for the formulation of national secul'ity policy concerns more than one dcp rtmcnt or agency and tl'anscends the exclusive competence of a si1'1 le depa1 tme11t or agency The Director of Central Intelligence sh Jl produce 3 national intelligence with the support of the U S IntelU c lce Board Intelligence so produced shall have the concwTence as app1·opriate of th members of the U S L telllgence Board or shall can-y a statement of any substantially differing opinion of such a member or of the Intelligence Chief cf a Milital'y Depai-tment Dcpa1tmental intelligence is that intelligence which any depa ·tment 01· agency requires to execute its own mission c Intereep rtmental intelligence is integrated departmental intel t 'ence which is required by departments and agencies of the Govern n 1t fo1· the execution of theh' missions but which transcends the axclusive competence of a single department or agency to produce Tr 1 subcommittee st1'Ucture of the U S Intelligence Board may be uti izcci fo1· the production and dissemination of interdepe rtmrmtal ir telligence d The Dh·ector o Central Intelligence shall disseminate national intei lig nc to the President members oi the National Security Counci appropl'iatc members of the U S Intelligence Board and subicct to existing statutes to such other components of the Government - s the National Sccu1·ity Council may fl'Om time to time designate or the U S Intelligence Board may recommend He is further autho1·iz d t o disseminate national intelligence and intei·depa J tmentru fntelli- produco ls meant lo cor1·cl i tc nml evcluatc lntcllli cncc rein Uni to the 11 Uonu l sccul'lty o a provldcd ill the Natlonal Security Act o 1047 as amended eilon 102 d 3 B Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 gence produced withi 1 th - - - 8 Im i ence Board structure o i a ·-1·lct ly contrcllcd br sis tc ro -i gove1· 11 1mts and intcrm tiono l i uC ies upon his cte crmimition wi' the cc - cu1-rcnce or the U S Intclli t· - CC Boa rd that such actio 1 - c d subs ntially promote the sccurLy of I ' J I r the United States Prov d That suc11 dissemination is eonsi nt with exli ting statutes c nti rcsidm1tkl policy including that rcilc c ci in international ugrccmenls u1 d provided fw•thcr that any cUsc c ure or Fl3I intelligence informu 1011 shn 11 be cleared wltl1 that agency fit'ior to clisscmil1ntion Dc1x1 rtmcntal intelligence and interdcpartmenL l intcllii cncc produced outsid the U S Intelligence Board subcommittee sLructure may be di cminated in accordance with existing statutes anc l Presidential policy including that reflected in international ag· L·ccmcuts e Whenever any member of the U S Intelligence Board obtains inionml tion wl1ich indicates ar impending crisis situation wl' ich uil'cds the security of the u'niLecl States to such an extent that im- ml diut action 01· decision by the President or the National Sccunty Council nay be required he shall immediately transmit the inform ition to the Director of Central lntt lllgence and the othe1· membe1·s of ti1e U S Intelligence Boatd as well as to the National Indications Center and to othe · officials or agencies_ as may be indicated by the circumstances Ti1r Director of Central Intelligence she ii in consultation with the U S Intelligence Board immediately p1·cparc a 1d diss lminatc as appl'Opriatc the national intelligence estimate of the situation in accordance with the procedures outlined above 5 Protection of fatelligtmcc a nd of Intelligence Sources and Method • I • t • • 'rhe Director of Ce11tral Intelligence with the assistance and support or the membars of the U S Int llig mce Board sha_ll ensure the devc' opment of policies and procedu1·es for the protection of intelligence m1 l of intelligence sources n11d methods from unauthorized disclosure E ch depa1-tment anci agency however shall 1·emain responsible for the l•otection of intelligence and of intelligence sou1·ccs and methods wi l m its own orgn1'lization Each shall also establish appropl'iate inte1 1l policies and prnccdu1·es to p1·event the unauthol'ized disclosure fro n w thin that agency of intelligence information or n ctivity The Dh·ecto1· of Central Intelligence shall call upon the depa 1-tments and agencies as appropriate to investigate wiLhL theil· dep u-tmcnt 01· agency u ny unauU1ol'ized disclosure of intelligence or of intelligence sourci' s methods A report of these investigations including corrective me s- ' urcs t l en 01· recommended within the departments and agencies h1- · valved shn 11 be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence io1· l review and such further action as may be a ppropdate including repo1·ts to the National Sccul'ity Council 01· the President 1 I ' • I • G Community Responsibilities a In ir · lemcnta tion of and in conformity with approved National Sccu1·ity Council policy the Director of Ccnt1·al Intelligence in con5 be COPY • •r Approved for Release 2013 07 18 285 l'J' 1 ••• • • • · - r• • -- ---- C01175219 •• - ' c 1 •s th and sup Jor ed by 1 other mernb l'S of the U S Intellib _ _ 3 0 1·u and by other approp1•iate omcas shall I '' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - C upon the other ciapa1··i ments t nd a encies as appropri te m m· that on in telligenca r a tter s z iiecting the n tionai secu•• J tile intelligence community S sup1 orted by th full knowledge - d technical talent available ir or to the G-ove ·nment 2 Ensure that the perti11ence e t mt and quality of tha nvail le fo1•eign intelligence and intelligence information relating to t ic national security is continually 1·eviewed as a basis for improving tl e quality of intelligence nd the co1·1·ection of deficiancies 3 Tc kc approp11c t mca urcs to t' cilitate the coo1•dinat - d ctcvclo1Jment oi co npati llc · icrcncing srst ms within the depa rt ·nents o nd ager1ci1 engaged in foi •eign intelli imce activities Central reference fa cilitfos as a service cf co1nmcn concern shall be l ·ovided by the Central Intelliz-ence 1 gency and or other departments and e gencies as appropriate and 4 ial e an·angements with the departments and age11cics for he c ssignment to or exchange with the Central Intelligence A Iency of such expe1·ienced and qualified personnel as may be of G Vi 1 ntc ge fo1· advisory operational or other purposes In order to i cllitatc the performance of their 1·espective intelligence mis• sions the departments and ag·encies concerned shall by agreement ravide each other with such mutual assistance as may be within ' heir capabilities and as may be required in the interests of the inl lligcnce community for reasons of economy efficiency or ope1·a nal necessity In this connection primary departmental interests s t ll be recogi1ized and shall receive mutual cooperation and r1 1p1 ort - n so far as practicable in the fulfillment of theil' 1·espective responsibilities for the production of intelligence the several depart• ments and agencies shall not d· plicate the intelligence activities and res arch of other departments and agencies and shall make full use of ex ing capabilities of the other elements of the intelligence community c The departments and agencies of the Government shall establish appropriate policies and p1·ocedures to control and llmlt undesirable publicity 1·clating to Intelligence activities l l I - I i ' I f I i • J I · • I I • t • I ' • f 6 1 16PET • • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • ·• - I r - • · I ' • • • • · C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 · t • • i • I • I • Appendix L t • ' - I l • l-------s • ' _ I l t 7__ - _OP SiiCREJiL ___________ Approved for Release 201 3 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I • ·I · I • 1 • ' I ' t I I • t ' • I I • I • • • I •• I 1 r • I • • -·---- --- ·4•- - --- - ·- -- ·- - -·- -·--- -· _ ______-- --·- - · ·---·-·--··-· ••• Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' ·•• • •· I• r ' • • ' • • C01175219 t Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - I I • I• I •l • • I I I I • r ' t -•' I - I • t • 1 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 1 ·J Ii I ·• ····· 1- -- l _v ' 1 - · ' l -- _ C Ll- - J ' ' ' ' j ·' '' j l • ' I • t • ' 11 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • 1••• 1 ' I ' I • ' I' ' • C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 0 18 '· ----- · - - - ' ' ' I • I • ' • j •• 3 • ••- •- • •· - •i•• Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r T t ••• • •••••• ' - • 1 ' C01175 2 19 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I I I' I 4 ' ' I i r 4 ·-·------·- -- ·- ---·-- ·----•- •------ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 -· - C01175219 I Approved for R lease 2013 07 18 • I I I ' '· • I I • i I • I - ' '• 1 5 I l • _ -----···-····--·- - ·· ··-··--·------ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 · - j I l i · ' · x __ 1 -· ' 1 --' 1· -1 l· -· i 'J '1 • --- ''· - t l 'r I J' J' Jj 1 - 1 J - - 4 • r- ll • r I• I I I • 'l t l • - J 6 • l - ' •· Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - • • • I O t C01175219 A' • t • I ' l t I 1 I •I • • I I I I I I • • I I I • i 1• I • I I r - 7 · I I• 1 i - l • '• • • I • • ' J ' l '• • • --- - ··---· -···--·--•-· _ - ·-·- - ·•----- -- ·- - - ·------- · • - - - l Approved for Release 2013 07 18 • - - - • •• f · - ·- · · - - - - -- C01175219 I I • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I 1 1' ' Appendix M ' ' Total Numbers of CIA COMINT Cleared ·Persons by Year 1950-70 I' • • - I I I J • • ' I i ' I • f I I i i t - 10 P SECRE't Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - I TOP SE6Ri I I I • r · L Appendix M r 'I' Total Numbers of CIA COMINT Cleared Persons by Year 1950-70 I I _ - 1 I l ·1 - '• · J _r · l ' J' n I u• n I I i • _ r i-- _____________ TOP Sf C PEI __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _ C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' J rl Appendix N I I I l Maps 1 SIGINT Res ources Western Hemisphere 31 March 1970 a 2 SIGINT Resources Europe Africa Middle East 31 March 1970 3 SIGINT Resources Far East 31 March 1970 J J ii ill - 'I l I I'I UI -itOP SHCP tjL - - - - - - - - - - - hlll I ------'--'---•- - - - ----- - - · _ - • • W '-G Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I I WX h 11 _ • _ - CO 1175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 lbp Secca L i______ I '7 ·7 l i J i I ••I l ' r j ' j Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 t Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r· ' I- CIA HISTORICAL STAFF • I The DCI Historical Series The History of SIGINT in the Central Intelligence Agency 1947-70 Special Supplement I i I I t - ' DCl-4 October 1971 L Copy No 1 of l Approved for Release 2013 07 18 _I C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' I • J -· • J ' J Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I I · f• l j ' I DCI HISTORICAL SERIES DCI-4 r 'I f 1 I j • I THE HISTORY OF SIGINT IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY· 1947-70 SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT I ' r i by October 1971 1• - l L CIA SIGINT Officer l• L l L H1sro 1CAL STAFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY i Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I • Special Supplement t' Compartmented Series I ' The dominant problem of the entire period ' covered by this history is I' l Russian communications l The work on the problem began before the end of World War II on a small scale I r l l • f • I I I I I • • l ' I L L L I r L - I t Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 ' ' ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' rI ' -I - I f I ' i l I ' r f ' l • l 1 - - t L l I i' - l ' l - 2 - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - - - C01175219 - - - - -- - - -- - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I r• l I I L I• ' I I• ' I ' 'i I l I - l I L I L r t 1' ' I - 3 - 'lOF Sf GR Ei cl ____________ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 r I Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - - - - -T 'f' - SECR E • I f j t I I I ' j • I' I• i f• l I • I L 'I I' I • 'I - 4 - TOf SEQRF c -------- Approved for Release 2013 07 1 8 C01175219 I ' I • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 l V 1 ---- I• I • I• I• J l• i t i ' f • I j t I • 'l ' - f '' j • ' I • t ' i - j ' - 5 - •• TOP SREI - - -- - - - - - - Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I -i C01175219 I • f Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - ·1 -- J i ' I r J • I• I• f• i I • ' I p L L i f • I L 1 • I t f L I I p I J• 4 • - G- t • i • Approved for Releas 2013 07 18 C01175219 ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 TOP 8E6lilFT_ Ir ' I • ' • i f• I• Ir i I I • ' T • I ' ' f Ij • I i 1 i 1• I 1 • i ' i I • 1• 1 l • - 7 - 1 l Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I I • I• f• j J i f L 1 L I• ' I - L I I• 1• - 8 - j • · J I -iluf FCRF T - - - - - - - - -- Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 ' Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' I• I I • I T• I I • f • L I t ' r i I I I l I I T• L • I I I• I r I• 1 • ' - 9 - Tt p s µ cglt _b _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ I• Approved for Release 2013 07 18 · co117s219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' I l I• L I• l f l J' ' ' i J• i r• L I• I t• f• - i - I I - 10 - 1 - TOP SEGRit rL__ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ l Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 I ' I I• • I ' 1 f I J• • Ir r L ' D A New Embassy_ A serious shortage of space existed in the United States Embassy in Moscow almost from the beginning of its occupancy A similar shortage of space existed in the Soviet Embassy in Washington T • Tentative discussions were held off and on between I• the two governments during the early l960's on I the mutual need to expand the two embassies and I l ' by 1966 it appeared that both sides were serious in offering new facilities --------------------1 I j • - L 1 L l j • -L I • l • - ll - I I • Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C01175219 Approved for Release 2013 07 18 - - - - - OP SECM'L • l ' t l ' f J I • I I I I • f L I• I L f• l 1• I i ' - i l I • 12 - i ' iOf SECRE qL_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 C0117521 9 - j Approved for Release 2013 07 18 ' I i I 1• r I ' I • i I i I• ' f l i l I I• ' 1 ' - 13 - ______________ 1 bP--SFCBET _ Approved for Release 2013 07 18 __ C01175219 - - - - - -Approved for Release 2013 07 18 r -IL ------- •I - I J ' • I • I ' I i I I • • I I l Approved for Release 2013 07 18