• J II 20 August ·1976 MEMORANDUM FOR Assistant Comptroller Requirements and Evaluation SUB ECT The CIA HSA Relationship l RBP BRENCES Me110 from DDCI to 9- July 1976 2 I 7 ' I' 3 ' 1 dated 2 Me110 from I I alr• an SIGINT Task Force to Dr Sayre Steven• dated 12 Aug st 1976 Subject CIA Analysts and HSA j 25X1 25 25X1 J S- U 3 1 Over the past 25 years merous studies ·and study· groups have attempted t define and analyze the problem• endemic· to the CIA NS relationship These problems are generally wofold One is the CIA role with regard to SIGIH collection vis-a-vis HSA The other revolves around how and i what form NSA chooses to publish SIGINT informat on 2 In its early years HSA looked respectfully and appreciatively to CIA for guidance as to what t should • collect and produce It also depended frequantly on the Agency for support· in its annual quests for funds in the DOD budget arena As time passed and its budget doubled tripled and quadrupled NSA began to swell its corporate cheat ana· develop a personality and style of its own An organization which began with a serious inferiority complex gradually developed a feeling that it has •a corner on the market• in ·terms of intelligence information fit to print 3 This ne feeling of importance by NSA manife•ted itself in va ious ways such•• the installation of a direct communications link over CIA objections between Pt Meade and the White House and the issuance of the SlGINT Summary a SIGINT urrent intelligence publi ation designed to compete with the then ·centra°l Intelligence Bulletin CIA also objected to no avail to the SIGIHT Summary because it contained then as now gists and suMmaries of wnat NSA analysts consider to l a •hot• items of information which were in tba process of be ng pubiished in individual translation or report form but· for hicb KSA wanted to get cred t in the eyes of top level inte ligen e recipients cr 1w r I ' I · l l ' J l f l 1 2 1 2 0 Cl Calapr 1J 3 Pl or 4 Dlclasallltd oilfr Oft e p cw 1 ' _ P79M00467A002A00030009-4 T •• • t I • 4 HSA's nev feeling of importance became evident in many other ways such as footnotes to vario_ua political and military HIE's in public and not so public forums in which RSA reps let it be known in •numerous ways that there was little or no need for •middlemen• such as CIA DIA etc to chew digest and regurgitate perfectly good SIGIHT dat and provide it to the real i telligence consumers such as the President the secretary of State JDd the NSC Staff S As a part of its ceaselesa effort to assert itself more igoroualy in the intell genoe process RS began a policy of •gradualisG• wlth regard to the format and content of its output ·More and more it put less and leas data in it• publications always with the explanation or excuse that it • · wanted to improve its or the Comaunity's security and provide •better service• to its customers Almost all of these changes made the SIGINT product lesa meaningful and •ore diffiault for our analysts ta interpret Host such changes were nstitvted unilaterally hy HSA and announced after ·the fact · if at all In almost all instances however consuaers objected but alaost always to no avail RSA began aore and more to hide behind the •technical information dodge which meant that users of SXGXHT data had no need for and weren't •ally to be trusted with inforaation on intercept positions · collacti on •capabili t _i ea traffic volume crypt systems etc such practices have uauall been at the heart of 110• c A analyst coaplaints · 6 During this period which extends to the present CIA representatives at various levels from all Agency ·directorates objected to the HSA way of doing business Hore and •ore as NSA becaae ·stronger and 11ore aggressive it became an uphill battle for Agency reps in defense of the DCI'a and Agency's position and responsibilities in the· intelligence business The increasingly ag9resaive determined and sometimes overhearing policy on HSA 1 s part and the lack of a steady coherent reasoned and positive Agency policy supported by top A9ency management have resulted almost by default in the emergence of NSA in a Community role in which the tail too often wags ·th• dog 7 Another part of HSA's plan to reign supreme is_ its sometimes subtle· and sometimes not so subtle but never ceasing efforts to gain control over CIA gzGIHT activities This effort has many aspects not the least iaportant of wbich has been its ba'ckdoor lobbying wi tb all investigative and budget 9roupa including Congressional 0MB and DoD HSA'a principal arguaent is that DIRHSAl SS is the National SIGINT Authority who by definit·on -should have total control Approved For Release 2004 2 7A002400030009-4 25X1 ' ET 79M00 00030009 · J of 11 U S SIGINT activities including CIA and the Service Cryptologic Agencies Ar y Navy and Air Force The NSA hardliners define •National SIGINT Authority• as meaning NSA control of all D S SIGINT manning tasking budgeting programming and o u tput 8 NSA's almost phenomenal success in achieving _ independence to an unprecedented extent and its ability to frustrate any community effort with ·which it disagrees to control and influence it is attributable to at least three factors One is the long experience of NSA management in political infighting and its ability to defend itself through obfuscation specious arguments and on aone occasions its · steadfast refusal to cooperate with community groups and individuals whose purpose NSA consider inimical to its own interests Actions which HSA sometimes considers inimical inclu'de efforts to provide guidance in the coliection and production of SIGINT including Agency or Community efforts to _g uge and evaluate the HSA output 9 A second reason for ' the present state of affairs is the lack of a coordinated Agency not DDI DDS T or DDO effort to establish and maintain a healthy and viable relationsb1p'with NSA Too much Agency busines is transacted with NSA by individuals and components without due regard to the interests of other Agency components No consistent central record is maintained of the multitude of pro lems which Agency individuals at all levels have with BSA This means that every time a review of CIA NSA relations is conducted a poll is taken either in writing or by personal interview usually with the underlying belief by most participants that nothing will be done to correct the problems anyway The principal deficiency however has been the general failure • at the Agency management level to get involved with such mundane and sometimes too technical problems 'l'be result has been that no one in recent ye rs at a sufficiently high level has gone to the mat with NSA on any issue Por this reason many people at NSA have the impression that CIA is · manned by a collection of nice gentle and toothless pussycats • l • • ' • • • ' 10 A third ·factor 1nvolves CIA's failure over all these years to define clearly legal and defensible Agency functions an'd responsibilities in the ·o s ·'SIGIN'l' business NSA keeps picking nibbling and lobbying away at CIA SIGINT activities to the point that· members of the Congress their staffs and OMS are now causing many people in the Agency to doubt more than ever aefore t at the Agency has a legitimate SIGINT role to play 25X 25X ·roP St RE'l' - ···- _ ----Ap-pro-ved_F_o_r_Ra_l_ea_se __2004l __1_2J _ CIA- CP79M0 240003000M_ f ' 11 There appears never to have been a full • preeia tion for or understanding within th Agency of the scope and importance of -the Agency acco•plishmenta within the SIGIHT field Recognition should ba given to the fact that without CIA'• support NSA'•I idollar plus efforr in many areas would come to a standstill When one considers that CIA-managed SIGINT activities contribute directly and indirectly to about 40 percent of NSA's serialized reporting output with an Agency SIGINT budget about one-thirtieth the size of NSA 1 s 6 it becomes clear that the Agency has something to be proud of It should also become clear that such impressive and valuable assets should not be removed from the Agency without a great I eal of thooght and full con• ideraUon of •11 thu Ii• ••• I - 1 The guidelines laid down in the 9 July 1976 • emor- andam to I I are an important first step toward getting the Agency's thinking straight and our own house in ordex A positive and co pelling arg ••nt in response to the firat question sked by the DDCI What must CIA do in SIGIU in keeping with the CIA mission is crucial to the A_gency• s position The second question by the DDCI is also on the aark but should also address What h ll CIA done to help the co munity at large Whatever the Agency position an objective and complete revelation of past Agency accomplishmenes is essential and will go a long way toward answering •what · £ the Agency do to help the Community at la ge in this same area 13 In ·the event that the new SIGINT Task Force concludes that the Agency does have an importan t and meaningful role to play in SIGINT it will require vigorous inaginativa and united action on the part of all Agency components especially at the top 1 to convince Congressional nd other critics of ·the rightness of·our cause · Requirements ll ll' luation Staff Office of the Comptr lle 25X Approved For Release 2004 12 20 TOPL - e ------------ L ___ -----· - - -- -- - 25X -· I I• NAM AND APOR5N 1 I DDCI TO I INITIALS I I i 'I 6 l•Jlll'lll -- IDLY- IBOIIIIIIIDATION rllWlJAI _ _ca __- - l ft lN I taamn D11111 a Hank This uns ollcited piece from r -----_-- 1 of COAS is per eptive and thoughtful in its review of CIA-NSA relations over the years C7ala0 served a rotationai tou lnJ I S I J FOLDH ftll I I I I CONTROL NO _ _ _ _ __ Handle Via Channels Access to this dOQJment wlll be restricted to those approved far the following specific activities Warning Notice SensltlYe Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Crlmlnal Sanctions S1c11r1ty r111lflc1Utn Approved For Release 2004112 20 CIA-RDP79M00467A0024000 Oa DET