DOCID il236 TOPSEeRET NO 1666 UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOCllC HISTORV - ' ' i I g American Cryptology during the Cold War 1945-1989 Book JI Centraliz ation Wins 1960- 1972 - ' TOP SECRET DECLASSIFIED l' DER AliTHORlTY OF THE l TERAGE CY SECURITY C LASSIFIC ATIOi APPEALS PAi'iF L E O 13526 SECTIOX 5 3 b 3 ISCAP i'io 2 · o L • Document l Date °' ly z 2 e I 3 DOCIO 523682 REF ID A523682 Withheld from I TSP SEetEf UMBRA E O 13526 section l 4 c public release Pub L 86-36 llCNWAY As for the control issue that was aolved by moving taking contrul to NSA ---- - ---- - -- - NSA set up a new facility called SSSC mGINT Sat ellite System ontrol to provide teclinical support and tasking guidance to the propam Some non-NSA USIB memben were less than pleased because SSSC amounted ------- Withheld from I E O 13526 section l 4 c public release Pub L 86-36 LE ilX l8P SECREf UMIR A • trr KEYH'll fCOMINI tON HOI SYSTEMSJOIN ILY FORElCN Xliu 4' fld 5 DOCID 523682 REF ID A523682 f8P SECR f UMBRA I E O 13526 section l 4 c Withheld from ta a de fado delegation oftaskia controi ta NSA The direction was irreversible however public release Pub L 86-36 and by 1972 representatives from the SOC in the Pentagon had moved to SSSC The program wae not popular downtown and it came under repeated attack Whee this happened Admiral Gayler himsetr indicated that be wanted to attend the NRP Eucutive Committee meetings t o defead the program At his very flret meeting Gayler went on the attack not just defending the money that bad been put into the system to date but demanding more money to launch more aatellltes and to buy more processin1 equipment I I 8 UNPALL Thi RUNWAY program was encountering sueh ferocious opposition in Washington partly because CIA already had a competitor The CIA project had been initiated by Albert Bud Wheelon who had come to CIA during the early years of the Kennedy administration A brilliant and aggressive administrator as well as a top-notch scientist Wheelan had been newly installed u John McCone'e director of science and technology when he read about the Syncom II geosynchronous satellite• __ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ Crom Soviet miuile tests was the number one U S intelligence priority Wheelan wondered if a aeosynchronous satellite could be i laeed In an orbit that would continuously look down on T 'uratam and Sary Shagan Wheelan presaed his idea with McCone who approved or a pilotstudy 1911 --- -- - - -- -- The project waa fraught with tremendous risk It would be hideoualy expenSive the most cosUy intelligence ayatem ever mounted 1 _ An immense antenna would be required - a acientist calculated that it would have to be at least seventy-five feet in diameter the largest such object ever unfurled in space The Department of Defense wanting CIA out of the sat ellite businesa anyway opposed it from the beelnnlng 1 Albert Blad TI111loa I E O 13526 section 1 4 c Withheld from public release Pub L 86-36 MSJOJNTI Y 409 lOP SliCRir UMBRA DOCID 523682 REF ID A523682 Withheld from public release Pub L 86-36 TOP CRl T UMBRA I E O 13526 section 1 4 c CIA cleared no one at NSA Thua CIA knew about NSA's nascent plans for RUNWAY but NSA did not know about CIA's plans for a similarly disposed geosynchronous satellite system ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 This situation changed in the late summer of 1965 because General Marshall Carter migrated Crom the poaition of deputy DCI to director of NSA When he arrived he arranpd to clear a handful of NSA people and sent them t o CIA t o learn a bout the RAINFALL prc eram in The road proved rocky in the extreme CIA wanted no NSA partipatlon at all and in the early months did a great deal to shut NSA ouL But a breakthrough of sorts occurred in December of 1965 when t o clear the air Through these highi le_v_e Ico-n ta_cts_ - th -e_t_wo_o_rp-ru ·za-tion e -s e' be-gan- jo 'in_t p 'l__ aMing 1ts NSA immediately suggested that COMrNTbecome an ancillary mission After a period of hesitation CIA aa epted the proposal and gave NSA the job of col Iecting what CO flNT they could from a bird whose job wu TEUNT notCOlffln' Through the Director's Advisory Group for EUNTand Rec onnaiuance DAGER headed by Charles Tevis NSA negotiated the details of their participation in the RAL'VALL program NSA got a COMINT roceuing subsystem and an EUNTsubsysteml- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ and when the money for t hose ayetems was cut from the budget NSA alloca ted CCP funds DAGER wu also inatrumentall I I I 1 ______________ J E ea ually NSA •••• ' all U COMINTstaff I and about half ofthe TEU - 'Tcrew w SIGrNT satellites were the wave of the future and the offered breathtakin new op rtunities for access t o the Soviet Union But it also offered a significant ne battleground for the control of intelligence resources CIAAlr Force conf tct a over the control or imagery became well known to the American public through the publication such books as William Burrows's hep Bl a clc Fat more obscure but just u fierce was the competition between NSA and others especially CIA over the ownership and conlrol of stcrNT payloads It eventually settled down to a series of compromises based on the areas of respective technical competence But the early years when these compromises were still in the future were not easy or I E O 13526 secllon 1 -l c Withheld from public releusc Pub L 86-36 410 -- - --· -· DOCID 523682 REF ID A523682 lQP SECRET tJMlltA NSA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS Tbey IThini Parti I abould not be ueed ror economy na10na to nppt Dt vital U S capabiliuu Hew var rapport with Thlnl Part lea ahowd be d• lop•d u lnamanc• • pin th• ION or U S II Na I a ill• Jut au•• EatooCommiue• 19'8 With the cryptologic budget being cut back in practically every area except Southeast Asia NSA in the mid-1960s gave a serioua relook at what the Third Partiet could do for the U S Every budget ezercise resulted in an increased determination to bring foreign countries more fully into the process By the late 1960s the budgeteers demanded that I E O 13526 section 1 4 c Withheld from public release Pub L 86-36 e Eaton panel in 1968 see p 479 backed NSA'1 contention and stated that Third Party collection ahould complement U S collect ion 119 General Carter fresh from his stint at CIA placed Third Party relat ionahipa on center stage and he was reputedly the first NSA director to permit Third Party representatives into the NSA complex But Carter's attention to foreign relationships brought NSA up agaimt CIA's long-standing prerogatives in this area Although NSA began to take a inore active hand in several ofthe relationships the disputes were not resolved during the decade and resolution wu put off until the late 1970s ' OW R« LETOPOR IGN m _ - - · · p 411 TOP Sl Clll TUMBRitc DOCID 523682 REF ID A523682 'F8P SEClt T tlMBRA I E O 13526 section 1 4 c Withheld from public release Pub L 86-36 Germany The Reinhard Cehlen orpnization the BN'D was one oC NSA's most lucrative Third Party sow-en during the 19601 But there were serious problems within the organization it self which limit edits utility and caused the Aceney to keep it at arm's length Most of the problema revolved around aec urity Basically the BND like almost all Wat German governmental organiutiona waa penetrated and publicized The problems bepn in 1952 when a lef iatjournaliat named Sefton Delmer published a hiehly critical article in the London Daily Mail entitled ''Hitler's General Now Spies for Dollars Delmer appeared to get much of bis material from one Otto John who had headed the West German equivalent of the FBI until his defection t o Eut Germany John was in 1952 engaged in a bitter bureaucratic struggle with Gehlen over the control ofintelligence • Thinpjuat went from bad to worse In 1953 one Hans Joachim Geyer a member of the Gehlen organization fled to East Germany with the names of Gehlen aeenta Within hours more than 300 Gehlen •rents had been r0unded up and East Germany expoaed the spy ring' in a resonalin11 press conference Oeyer had been passing classified documents t o the KGB for several years although it appears that he wu not involved in SIGINT 201 or But the coup d e was not administ ered until 1961 with the exposure Heim Felfe A rialng star in the BND Felre had worked for the KGB ainai the early 1950 and bad passed thou sands ot documents He worked in counterintelligence not SlGINT but his us L E VIA TALENT kEYRug 6 CNT e akui SYSTEMSJO _ JIOTKELEI SABLETOFOREIGNNATIONALs · ' feP SECRET l IMIAI 412 DOCID 523682 REF ID A523682 l0P SEQIE r YMIM accua waa very wide and nothing in the BND was really aaf'e The e rpo1ure of Felfe in November 1961 led to a prolonged and highly public spy scandal during which it was revealed that the BND had been thoroughly compromised by the East Bloc At the same Lime Gehlen bimaelfwu involved in a public row with FranzJosefStrauH the minister of defense Hill in£lexibility in dealing with outsiders and hia lack 0£ appetite to rid the BND ofEut Bloc agents ended his effectiveness Gehlen continued to head BND until 1968 but withdrew more and more from active managemenlIClt j E O 13526 section l 4 c Withheld from public release Pub L 86-36 This did not stop NSA-CIA competition However it did lesaen the points of friction and charted the way f'or a gradual CIA withdrawal from the day-t cMlay intricacies of Third Party SlCINT ucbanps As Third Party SIGlHT became more important and more timesenaitive this was a natural and evolutionary step E O 13526 section l 4 c Withheld from public release Pub L 86-36 WLEvtAtALENT8Et usrcv151 @NrROLSYSTEMSJ01NTLY NOTR£I EASABLE TO POR£IGN'lfxttetw c t _ _ ___ 413 TOP t f t ffUMll A DOCID 523682 REF ID A523682 TQP 5EEAET UMIRA j E O 13526 section l 4 c Withheld from public release Pub L 86-36 TOP SE ilET UMBR 414 DOCID 523682 REF ID A523682 Withheld from public release Pub L 86-36 'TOP SECR 'I' UMIRA I E O 13526 section l 4 c NSA and Cl A in the Third Party World By the end of the 1960s the control of Third Party SIGINT relationships had become quite muddled I Withheld from public release Pub L 86-36 j E O 13526 section l 4 c NSAandGCHQ Aa for the American-British relationship the two SlGtNT operations had become virtually in eparable by 1970 I I HANDLE VlATA LENT KEYH L SYSTEMSJOlNTLY U ASABLE TO FOREIGN NA TJONA 415 l8P SECRET l JMDRA •