F ID A523696TOPSECAET UNfTED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY U American Cryptology during the Cold War 1945- 1989 U Book III Relrenchment and Reform 1972-1980 OP SECRET DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL E O 13526 SECTION 5 3 b 3 ISCAP No 1 6 ¢8- 02 I Document Date J IA L 1 z '1o • • DOCID 523696 REF D A523696 MP SEERff tlMIRA I E O 13526 section l 4 c Withheld from public release Pub L 86-36 U HACJnvestlgaf on and the Negotiation ofa #'Hee TtNty M The matcer of cryptologic integration had bumped aJong for years with ·patched together compromise11 - an issue here an issue there It appeared doomed ta more of the same over a longer period of time until in the spring of 1976 it was brought to a head and TOP S CRR YMIIM 228 - --·----- --- - DOCID 523696 REF ID A523696 TeP SEERET tiMBRA KAt Langley they stalled hoping somehow that Snodgrass would go away George Bush was the DCI ud his instructions to his staff were vague and vacillating - clearly CIA thought that they could muddle out a compromise as in yean past Allen'• boas Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Ells rth sensed a kill and pressed home the poin't At Defense they were not going to let the moment slip away uc LS C_C The result was the Knoche-Allen letter of January 17 1977 Henry Knoche Bush's deputy wu effectively running CIA as the Cart er people had made it known that they regarded B111h as too political and did not intend to et him stay on Thit short seven-page document a t up the buis for a resolution It drew CIA S CINT uaets firmly into the natlonal SIGJNT system run by NSA I Withheld from public release Pub L 86-36 IE O 13S26 section 1 4 c I I Much of the funding would roll over to the CCP 48 eee But the Knoche-Alim letter did notbrinr·a11 the issues to c losure f I E O 13526 section l 4 c I Withheld from public relun f And in each instance where the two sides could not agree the DCI would decide The DCI wu hardly panive on these iuun And that was where the matter stood when Admiral Bobby Inman became DIRNSA in July of 1977 11 Pub L86-36 Withheld from public release Pub L 86-36 I I I E O 13S26 section l 4 c I Withheld from public release Pub L 86-36 ll MID 'I fl T WHl'P JiHH8bll 881ffN'f eeHftOb 9Yfffiilil9i9DA'b¥ l8P SEEAE'f IMDlblc 23D DOCID 523696 REF ID A523696 I E O 13526 section I 4 c -- ·- - Withheld from public release Pub L 86-36 l wu U 7h PNc 1 T waty 8CotThe •peace Treaty signed by the two qenci• on August 26 1977 Much of the lan 1 ge related to rather dull upects of how JR'Ol1' ms were to be managed and funding to be apportioned but the central principle was that all SIClNT assets would with rare exceptions be centrally managed by NSA Third Party prop am1 were meticulously worked out country by cou l I I FOUO The formulation of the Peace Treaty re1ulted from a unique Ht of circumat ances But for t he advent or Charles·Snodgrass in the House Appropriations Committee investiptive •taa it could hardly have gotten tarted And even then it could have run BlfOuad but for the timely ucenaion or Admiral Bobby Inman at NSA The Peace Treaty owed much to his nqotiati ng any and political connections He cultivated Snodgrus other' key congreamonal niu a and contacts within the National Security Council Hia connections were unuu ilable and behind hil ne otiating strategy waa always the mail or White House or congressional intervention - once again on the sdeotNSA mt · The Peace Treaty brought an end to much of the sniping that had been going on between the two agencies since their birth In NSA's view it wu vindi tion ftom CIA'• standpoint it wu surrender on the SlGJNT Cront A memo f'rom two NSC • tdfen to Brzezinski called it a good working arrangement whose eff'ecta would be beneficial only it the two agencies cooperated on its implementation The transition to tbe new arran ment waa in tact and bumpy __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ The working out depended on the IOod will of' both aicla _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ra - e-- 'Tl --on ' °' a-piece- o--o --'paper Ju the years moved the long-t erm benefits became Withheld from clearer buteven in 1977 the light could be seen at the end of the tunnel ua public release Pub L 86-36 I E O 13526 section l 4 c U PUBLIC CRYPl'OGRAPHY U Modem cryptography hu since its earliest days been associated with governments Ama there were like Edgar Allan Poe who dabbled in the art and it has held a certain public aac iaation from the earliest·days But the discipline requires resources and only governments could marshal the resource necessary to do the job serioualy By the end of World War II American cryptology bad become inextricably intertwined with the Anny and Nav-y'a cadebreaking effort at Arlington Hall and Nebraska Avenue But this picture would bepn changing soon after the war U Modern public cryptography originated with a Bell Laboratories IICientiat Claude Shannon whose mathematics research led him to develop a new branch of mathematics _called information theory A 1948 paper by Shannon brought the new discipline into the 231 l8P SECRET UMBRA ·- ·- DOCID 523696 -- --- REF ID A523696 Withheld from public release Pub L 86-36 j E O 13526 section 1 4 c a ' - ---··- · in a single swinstroke resolved in favor of NSA This happened in the unlikely forum of the House Appropriations Committee U The HAC had been looking at the intelligence budget where it appeared major economies could be achieved by consolidating NSA and CIA SJGINT operations The staff chief Charin Snodgrus had little experience in intelligence - hia expertise was agricu ture But lo 1976 he wu taking great interest in intelligence and he uemed Lo harbor a visceral diatruat ofCIA -'8- ee 'J Jn the very early spring of 1976 Snodgrau interrogated both agenc ie• and at the end of the process iuued a report that was devastating to CIA interests Contendin that money could be saved by placing NSA in charge of both SIGINT organizations he ected eve e lanation and contention to the contrary that Langley advanced regard to the overall question u to whether the CIA SIOINT activities should be trans erred to NSA the Investigative Staff is not impressed with the answers given by the DCL I Reprding NSA u a perceived military organization Snodgrua pointed to 1u places where NSA eivilianl were doing the job or - PS-GGO The HAC report i•sued in April demanded consolidation SIGINT programs into a single entity within NSA's national SIGINT program Only a few exceptions appeared to Saodgrass to be worthy of consideration L ---- ---- --- --- __ ____ The two agencies answered the report separately implying serious disagreemenL For NSA Lew Allen was willinl' to accept most CIA SlGINT operations under the NSA umbrella but he sugrested t iat certain ones remain under Langley control Cb 11_t_un_d e_r_ h -e-na_ti__o-na-1_SI_O_INT_s_ys_te_m O -n th-e_e_x_trem____ ely contentiollS _____________ I IWUH he proposed leaving them under CIA supervision but increasing NSA r------ ---- representation and operational control j E O 13S26 section l 4 c ithheld from public release Pub L 86-36 1'7dfflt E VIJlt 1 AUNT n t NOLE C61111NT ee ffll8L S'f5'PHM9 l81Nih¥ 229 f8P SECRET t IMIRA I