' 1'1EK 11 ANDUM l - o r l-' erohant TOs 'l'TmOUC II FROHs S AE - Philip T Farley SUBJECT dour Dieoueeion of Nuclear Weapons Currt odio l Arrangoi mnto 6 it h Gonerol Noreted 6I undereto nd you 111a y bnve an opport unity to diocuno with Gonornl Nor etod cuetodinl arrruiee nte for nuclear wapona in tho lii TO stockpile In this onm -ct ion you - Ul I'1lcoll 1-lr Thurston' e let tor tc you of Tune 9 Teb D ro 1oing objoctione 1 o tho pro j cctod June visit of Mr Miller of flA to certain NA J O ltockpile i nstallation1t If Gonarul Horst ad '10011 not r a i io the oubject I mirtv est the1t you do so with a v1nw to removing his possible mieurxicr te r dinp of tho t'op6rtMent ' s positi on in thio field µid oleo to obtc inine hi consent i n principle for Departr -ent offi cer s to aocompe ey DOD officers from Gcnornl Loper' s office on visito to Nt TO stockpi e sites For such a di cuaeion you may find uneful the to1kinP pnpor attached at Tob A 1113 well no tho following bFJckground material BACl GilOUND As a reeult of the Deportment's r eeponaibilities in the f ield of foreien affsire and no tional securit policy it has from the st11rt followd nuclenr vnnpono c ovelopmonto closely ' 11 hough atomic legislation doos not aooign definite reoponoibilitios to tho Dopar-tmont it obviouoly hae a rooponoibility under the Atomic i nerl lY let of 1954 as flJl' endcd for t ho negotiation of intcrnotionol lll t'0ement o in the atomic field Further ' lore J- xecuti ve Orner Ho 1C560 of f eptemr er 9 1954 Tab C recov nizoi the f oportment 1 o control reoponoibility in conductini neP otiotione purouant to npecific l ' 1 lt tion t -uito apart from its atatutory rospona1bllit1on tho llopartment attochoo f t OOt importanoo to the co rr inr out of tho nnt ionAl policy of diecourai ing tho proliferation of i ndependent nuclea capobi l1tioA and protecting U S mi1ito1 · oo otn In purauil of the11e policy obJectives the Dop11rtrrent pzi vs port1 cular ott ontion to t ho c f r ' ct ivc i' lpleroon1 tion of the prov1 siono for 1 he retenU on of U S cuc torly and control of nuclear i eo x no doplo cd abro1 rl for the use• of 1111 ieo in an l 'lt nrµcncy which ore tho key fc turo of our c pilo t11r rco i nta ner ot ini cd and irJplor itntcd under tho 11A TO ctoclcpilc concept of 1957 • l f•f - ·-' ·• · ' · 1 · - - J J • - 2 Until 1959 the Deportment had no need to pl an ll Ctivo 1-ole in the dotemino tion of policy on custodial arr11I1gemonto or its implerrentation It nccepled the decision of the Deportment of Dofenoe o nd tho services that they wuld establiob o n l maintain appropriat o i o feguarda to ensure thot U s custodial personnel would bo in the ponition to prevent un11u -or1 r ed nccoss to or uce of nuclear wapona b 7 fe r e1 gn personnel un1er ell rea s onnblo oontineoncioo Our underot11nding wo s that the application of that principle Illa a rel11tivel r simple matter because 1 the weapons or nuclear co poulos were stored j n i looi under oxoluaive U S custody o nd 2 t hey 1 1ere not r eJ11ovcd until tho outbreak of hostilities There ioc therefore Al cJ concorn that U S physical posoosaion of tho 1-1c- npons would ho ondnngorod except ao o result of erious di nturbe nce s in the country Ibero the weaponn were doployco or the coming into po11er of n government detol'l linod to toke posoeaeion of tho weapons This s ituation ohan ed with the development of ne1 1 nuclear wapons eapecinlly tactical w apona Tho problem hae thus o r1oen that to reto in tho operational effi ciency of t heaa -weapons thero must neceooorily be a ohirt from the so-oallod igloo typo of custodial arr11ngementn Th1o transition is 011pcoially evident in ca les GUch as the Conie o1r-to-a1r wapon the Lulu Mti•submarine wspons the Davy Crockett oo 118 of tho shorter range ourface-to-air and air-to- rurfo oe m1 ssiles and probably mobile 1 RBM' s Obvioual y to aohleve 'llide dispersal fnllt rooction times in the uno of the weapons and satisfactory rn untcnance proceduros i t is necassary- in a nl llllbor of ca ies to affix 'llonpona on foreign aircraft kept on an alert eto tuo or to incorporate i e to mate 1o1eapona into mi seile delivery fl 'SteruJ at the l aunch eites 'l'his process necessarily i nvolves the prc sencc of foreign porsonnel in tho near v i c inity of armed aircraft or matedn miasiloe 11th tbs result that tho establishment of adcquato cuntodial e rrangemento has become more difficult In the case of the Genie or the Lulu wspone another compli cation i s that if the interceptor or marine po trol aircraft r ra to function properly they be able to leave the f I'Owld viz the wnpons are relJ Oved from U S ouot ody when hoet ilitioo s re imminent e p a otate of Maximum Reediness lfot lithst lnding these changed circUJ11st ances lhich oro lar ely t o bo implomontod 1n the 1 1turc w o nt i oipe te t hat tuTangcr ont 1 can be mace which a re not in conflict 'With tho law o nd aro oooalstont 'With tho Doportment 'e i llcy But to insure tho t this situation 11111 be the case the Doportr ent muot knov vhat arran emonts oro contemplated by Defense end or General l orstad before negotiationo t o p ice lhioh 'Will pomit thA deployment or nev roe pone It is e loo ncceaeery for the Deportment to roviev r xisting e rrCJ1Rcr ent s about which '1 -e knov very 11ttlo 1 a the V- bombor ond Co nborrP c rran' o- ents with the U r as -well as to roview nov o rrnnze· ·ants Jhich may he o sts blinhr rl under tho oulhorlty or agreement a al Toady 1n nffoct It waa thiri situation which led you to rrite Mr Dou lae on June J Tab D stroeaing our v • D1•• 4 u ltr O- ·- •·rJHl' t co cn§Gf'J 1c N lil Jo111nv Vl IVN -J t1-A8 · 03BISS 11330 ------·-·-··- - - I AEPR00UCEO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES SECRET need for edditiono1 inforn ation and to approve Hr Milllll 1 a projected trip to stockpile insttil lations whioh General Norstad opposed In epeoifio terms the projeoted Oenie arrll 18ementi ihse brought about a chans o in the Doporttnent 1 • role in this field · In June 1959 SearetQI1' Gatoe o sked the Seoratury to join him in seeking tho Proeident' e authorization for the Genie rocket propoual You vil1 reoell our prolonged eXl1Jll1nation of this request which lod to th Preeident1 s npproval in October 1959 o nd to the appearance of you and Mr Hager before the Congreeaional Joint Collllllittee on Atomic Energy on Feb 'lll l rY' 2 when oertoin bers objected to the proposal on the grounds that it might be in contliot vith the Atomic Energy Act and o n unwarranted extension or the Presidont 1 s powers as Chief Executive and Col Vllander-inChief In th e connection one point is noteworthy Corta1n Col llllittoa memboru took the vi8W that state and Dofcnse bad a joint responsibility for the cuotody nnd control ot U S atomic '11lnpons deployed abroad for the use of allies They did not differentiate botwon Defense's responsibilities for the formulation and implementation or detailed custodial arrangements and the Departinent's finding that thceo were consiirtent '111th lav nnd policy At the February 2 hoaring rnembero of tbe Joint Colllltt1 ttoe not only objected to the Genie proposal but loo expresaed concern about other custodial arrangements eepocielly the IRBM' a This concern was reiterated in Senator Anderson's Moy 16 letter to the Sooretary with a copy to Secretary Gates Tab E in which bo rererrod to fictions in existing and contemplated arrangements Again nt the June V hearing metnbero of the Joint Comnittee expressed the view that there vas a joint State-Defense responsibility for tho establish u ont and maintenance of custodial arrar gemento which wre satisfactory to tho Committee SUboequently this subject ws discussed at your meeting '111th Secretary Oat-Os and Mr l' cCone on July 22 when it was egroed that the throe agencies should review the custodial situation '111th partiou1ar reference to the Genie proposal The reeults or this review is the drntt letter to Senator Anderson attached at Tab F which baa four purpooest 1 to notify the Comroittoe or our deoieion to proceed '111th the Genie proposal 2 indirectly to answer S nr tor Anderoon1 s letter of N y 16 J to indicate the Dopartment1 e support of tho Detonso poe1t1on that the draft oustodiol legislation prepared by the staff of the Joint Co11Vll1ttea and given to State-Defense repreeontativcs at the June '2 4 hearing is not aocoptable and 4 to clcrify for the Cotnmittec the Dopartment 1 s policy and role in t his field I i I I I II JECRET SECRET - 4As indicated abovo tho DopnrtC10nt must he ve rorc dotlliled information on existing and coatempl ated custodio J arrnngoments if it 111 to discharge its re11ponsibilit1oo in this 1'1eld In viow of the Joint Comittee• 11 questions to the Department on oustody-oontrol m11ttor11 and in view or past o nd projected vioite by Committoe members to HA70 stockpile inatallat1one it is oesontio J that vo h vo 11 better understanding of this oomplioatod field At present Yo roly on throe principal aourooss 1 Gonero J Loper' e state01ents on cuetocly to tbe Plnnning Doard on A Tab 0 2 bis 11to tement to the Joint Collllllittee on Juno 24 on tho eamo oubjoot Tab nnd 3 th a USCINCEUR Plrui for Support of the NATO Special Almco storage Program Tab I The11s sauroos are 13 tcrmative but w still noed to know more about certain existing arrangements end to lmow tho status or Dofeneo thinking on arro Dgoments for nev weapons systems m We hope you will be L ble to aa11Ure General Noreto d tbo t the Dc ip nt• s interoet in this 1'1eld in no lf1Y reneote arq doubt about hi• competence and sincerity in affording P FOpor protection fc r nuclear weapons We bellno that it would be to hi11 advantage a11 wll u s as the Depsrtment of Dofonoe for uo to ho ve a bettor understanding or cuatodial-custody prooedUNs 1n hie command RECO ff NDATIONS l Tho t you use the talldne paper attached at Tab A to explain to GenGral Norltad tbe basis for our interoat in custodial orrangelllonta and the reaeona tor our need to know in oonsidernblo detail oxioting o Dd oonteaiplatod ouetodial- oontrol an-angomont11 under the NATO stodkpile concept 2 That you inquire ot Coneral lforetad whether in view or the abovo ciroumoto nooe ho would agree to Depnrt nont of1'10er11 accompanying Dofeneo ortioera on a visit to SHAPE for a dieoussion of this field and for a eubsoquont tour of NATO stockpile installations illustrating tho sevoral veapone sy11te11111 no doployod in IATO ClliAllANCF S L SFP - Mr Pender in c raft S AEsPRuttor1br September 12 196o EGRET RA - Mr Fosoondon in draft Mtt 7 -' ' _ _ _ _w • · ·rJ101 t° lCO V'dVN J1 A81· rn§GfJ 11 J f frN JOlllnv _ · ___ 031 1SS 11330 - -· __ ' REPROOUCEO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES - til l r Jt l' • - • • r • •· · f ' __ ·'1···· i · • · ' ' • l Our nuclenr weapons pol1c · inolu iin the f 'IO atom 1 c atookpile aspect 1s such m integral p 1rt of our forci r n policy that tho Departmont as well as Defenoo must bo i'ul1y conversant uith i i nplomcnt ation l 2 So long as tho W• pons ware boing atorod 1n so-oaD ed igloos it was relativel y eney to undorstand and oxpl nin our pos ition that tho weapons rern lined under our cust ociy and control 3 ThGl new 1rrane ements generated hy militnry ruquiromonta however hove ccropl1 catod our task or dofending the arrangomoots 4 Particularly ainoo tho apartmant ' a dot iiled defenoe of the 0on1e propoe i l the Jo1nt Cotn llittee has been proesing tho Dep u-tment as 'Well as Defenso to speak with authority l' nd knowleoi o on tho p aulnrs of these matwrs Sinco 1ntorgovernrocntal nt Te 'IIIOnts ond a partioulnrly delicate a1·ea of foreign policy nre 1nvolvod the Deportment cw not properly proteas i gnorance or these pRrtiaulars 5 Tho Department corta1nl n groos with Defense thut the precise aecur1ty arram emants nt ea eh site are gener i ll y lllEltters for tl e re ponaible ro Uitary commander to rosolvo 6 Yet 1 ' the f epnrtn ent is to deferrl our position th t we st1ll m dn ta in offeot1vc C'U3tody and control despite the nower deployment techniquei 0 we 1111 lst be -1bl e to speak 'With knowlG1dgo And in view of tho oomplioatcd nuture of those newer arrnneoments we doubt that we can fulfill our responsibilities sol ely on the bD e1u or the materlal s furni sbed to dote Indeed toose 1Uatorials have suggustcd the importance of being able to spoak i'rOrP first-hand knowle ige about the s1tunt1ono at tspica1 6 -Stoms sites 7 Thu approach uhould holp WI roinimi1 e any domestic or internati onal politi cal reperouas1ons since tho Dopartnent woul ci be able to add its assurance 1n domesti c nnd 1nternat1onnl forums that the United States is otill in fact offecUvel y ma1 nui 1ning custody tmd control of tho weapons i I f ' a i ' l 1 'I I 1 ··1 ' ' •· ' - NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article The U S Nuclear Presence in Western Europe 1954-1962 Part II 2020-09-17