I • • Authority N JD 91 f 5io Oy tn NARI Di t 2 ·lf jf SECRET I STATE DEPARTMENT ROLE IN ATOMIC WFAf'ON TOCKP7 4 I • CUSTODIAL ARRANGEMENTS 'Y O I Pursuant to the NATO Heads of Government decision i n De ber 1957 to establish under U s control stocks of n clear weapon or NATO forces bilateral intergovernmental stockpile agreem nts are b g negotiated and concluded through diplomatic channels with e member having NATO nuclear capable forces u These agreements however neither expressly define nor imply hov s control is to b e effected A typical provision states The custody of any stocks of at0111ic weapons provided by the United States vill be the responsibility of the United States and personnel vill be assigned in the Federal Republic of Germany for this purpose Furthermore these agreements do not commit the United States to turn the veapons over to allied forces at any specific time Thus the relevant provision in these agreements merely indicatesthe possibility of release at some time in this languag When the weapons are released by appropriate authority they vill be employed in accordance vith procedures established by SACEUR has not Since that kind of stockpile agreement impaired the right of the United States to utilize the igloo custodial system on any other procedure consistent vith u s lav we have not conditioned conclusion of such agreements upon having Defense present us Vith the details of the custodi techniques envisaged Nevertheless vhen some other kind of proposed stockpile agreement has expressly or inferentially indicated a significant change in either custody or control we have insisted on examining the details of what Defense has in mind That was the case for example vith respect to the proposed Genie arrangement s nd it is also presently the case vith respect to a nev umbrella model ve are developing vhich could embrace so- called floating stockpiles- -i e stocks of veapons on a foreign varship rather than at a land base In view of 1 the Genie discussions vith the Joint Committee during which the Committee questioned State Department representatives on custody and control matters 2 some publicity o er the Thor arrangements vith th U K s nd 3 a subsequent exchange of aides-memoire with the viets in which we assured them that the u s maintained exclusive custody of the weapons stockpiled in support of NATO forces we decided to ask Defense for copies of the ''technical custodial arrange'ments · the u s military had vith their NATOi ly counterparts Defense had never volunteered this information or any wo y i ndicated it regarded this UI area of State responsibility or concern '- J - - DECLh iSiFH O t JD fJ 4 05io By IYC NARl Daro 2 -ir-1r Aulhorily AEPRoouceo AT THI NATIONAL AAC ves SECRET -2 Since it appeared likel y that the Joint Committee vould pursue this custody matter intensively and would probably be questioning Department representatives on the matter we attempted to have Department representatives visit typical sites i n the NATO area last SUl lll1er A man from EUR went in order to play down the S IIB and L aspects but got only as far as Paris because Gen Norstad SACt'UR US CINCEUR objected to a unilateral u s inspection of NATO bases Since it we thought that trip may have been objected to because of it6 ixecipitate nature plans were subsequentlY developed with Defense tor such a tour by a few representatives from both State and Defense All the while we had impressed upon Defense our desire for details on the custodial arrangements Late last year Defense sent us a copy of USCINCEUR's general regulations he had already issued to u S Commanders with custodial responsibilities While giving us some new general information this book did not present a detailed picture of the type set forth in the Joint Committee report Finally on January 30 1961 Defense sent us copies of the agreements with its NATO counterparts on the technical details of custody along vith other documents indicating existing custodial practices One of these ws R Defense letter last September to the Joint Committee informing it of a significant change in procedures at the Thor sites in the u K Now that a number of the members of the Joint Committee including the Chairman and Vice Chairms n have first-hand knowledge of actual practices at the deployment sites it is quite likely State Department representatives vill be questioned on what they think of the domestic legality and general effectiveness of custodial control arrangements vhether the Department has endorsed them from either standpoint and whether in effect the Department regards itself as having any civilian control responsibility in this area The fact is that until very recentlY Defense had not f Urnished ns with any details so ve had not previously endorsed any of these actual arrangements which have caught the Joint Committee's attention Moreover Defense bas just written the Department that it believes there is no disagreement that responsibility for implementing arrangements for custody and control of atomic weapons in overseas areas is that of the Unified Commanders through the Department of Defense Chain of Command Letter from Gen Loper to Mr Farley dated February 17 1961 The letter accordingly suggests reconsidering the proposed joint field trip in view of Gen Norstad's concern o nd in view of the mate r ial recentl y furnished the State Department on the subject • • • ' I ·- r '- • I• 1 • u' ' • DEC' -1·1 l•J Authoriiy A' J£ ' t f J5io I By ftC NAR ' Oat 1 lf 1 SECRET - 3The letter also encloses a copy of a recent personal message to Gen Loper from Gen Noretad on thie subJect The messa g e however does not toke a stand 118ainst State reviev or i nspection It indicates that Gen Norstad sees the need for a basic decision on vhether such action is necessary and if so by whom and how i t should be performed Gen forstad therefore recommended that Defense initiate action to establish an appropriate govel'Dlllentil policy on this problem In context therefore Gen Loper's letter seems to be such an initiative proposing that the State Department agree that it has no responsibility for the actual procedures in effect at stockpile sites It is not clear from the letter whether Defense is proposing more than that The precise role of the Department in these matters is still open for resolution It would be highly desirable to have a position in time for the JCAE hearing Wednesday March 1 1961 The Depsrtment can elect t o f ollow one of three basic courses These o re l Step out of the picture after the basic governmental agreement is concluded and not assert aey r sponsibility for actual custody and control arrangements 2 Insist on seeing any contractual type instrument dealing with custody matters so that ve can assure ourselves that we have no legal commitments at aey level which would preclude the u s from taking whatever steps are necessary to comply with u s law and policy-_ or 3 Exercise general supervision of the program to the point of periodically visiting SBJIIPle installations to satisfy ourselves that the custody and control procedure are legiti ma te and effective Alternative 2 in the last analysis is only a variant of 1 since A Its purpose is the same--i e assure the absence of aey commitments on this matter an object which could be achieved simply by requiring the military to exclude from th technical agreements language on the matter of vhat practices the u s will follov and B The actual techniques have beoome so sophisticated with respect to mated veapon systems that once the concept of mating i s accepted as legitimate it is· virtually impossible to make an intelligent decision on the propriety of a particular arrangement without seeing the actual setup SECRET I t 0 • • 1t· •- DE • J· •J I -l J v- JC J 4 5io Authoriiy ' l Bv Yi REPA -ro NAM Oat 1 W AT THE NAllONAl AAC IVES SECRET -4- • The choice tor the Department theretore 1s whether or not to accept a civilian control responsibility only under an alternative 3 approach could the Department exercise genuine civilian control Unless we work out suitable procedures vith Defense to visit installations periodic it is unwise to assume there Would be no erosion of the guidelines we must expect conti lual military pressure tor more and more refinements to improve constantly the state of operational read 1 ness There are considerations in tavor of state a s11urning that responsibility First Presidents have consistently looked to the Secretary of state to keep on top of atomic 'Weapon matters involving activities outside the United states Second the non-proliteration ot independent atomic vea pon capabilities is such a delicate element ot our foreign policy toot we should be in a position to assure other nations that there is vithin the Executive genuine civilian survl'i Jen e of our NATO stockpile program F1ca1Jy as the one 1'ully civilian agency left in the picture the congress and the people may cot understand or appreciate an unvillinglless to oversee the m1J itary in this respect It is therefore difficult to see bov the Department could forego the alternative 3 responsibility Accordingly in view of the Jllportance of the subject matter and anticipated adverse Defense reaction 'Ile should raise the matter 'With the President and propose that state be assigned a civilian control reeponeibility L SFP er d s 2 28 61 SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article The U S Nuclear Presence in Western Europe 1954-1962 Part II 2020-09-17