____ v r __- - •· i ' ·-· F' J F ' S - -lb 61 C'li CO --'GRESS CP 'l'IIE UNITED STATES son r COMMITTEE OH l XOM C E1IBRGY· Fcbru a r v 15 l9ql Dear lro Prooidont · · I proocnt hormiith tho Ot llI'Y portiCll of on J d Hex Sub t tco UoSo pollcioa in regard to tho cooignmant ot ·aucll ar uenP to NATOo Thi a oubccmmittoo iotod ot Soll ltcr B_o nnott and · Ccn olll3Il Mp1 noJ J HosmDr H0otland and eyoali'o Tl ot n otudy of ' of ' BoC01 ' DO 'l ho rovimi Yhich yell have ored in tho I o nt of Doi'oooo lll1d tho rclatod nppointm3nt of an Adviaory Cc ittoo dcd by tho Hcnorablo Dann Acheson to f'urt b or oxploro th1a subject t- -o uioh to pleco our roport in your bonda·D uithout _doleyo ·· Du9 to tho fo that the formal ·org atio i of o Joint Cc ittea on Atomic Enorgy Yill not occur far aavarnl days I am prooont tilio otudy infoI'IC lll y 11th the monirnous onaors0ll 9nt of five lll9lclniro of 11 d foe SubcOIC litteoo I ho va no raaoon to baliav-i that it lill not rocciitJ tho - · ova%' ho rn1ng au tt of th9 tull --ahip of th$ Joint Ccmmitteo - yu 1 lmo- o thin report ·w tho r0auit f on ·1no ct1 ¼ rip VO Do took to more than fifteen nucloar uoapon inatnllntion e in oight COlT ltrieDo G p from tho u n to1- -7 It iD p ir1 of' an· over-all otu dy of Civill m f Military rolatic w in atomc dovalop nsnt and controlo T ho n amboro c f the Ad Hoc Subcomitteo ttigethar Yith oonior otai'i' lll31libaro and conaul t antiJ i'rc n Lea ftlerno and Livorm ira Laboratorioo hova J Qrtici ted 1n th a prop' lrotion and roviow ·or th 18 ro rt on a uortl-i'or-uord booia · roport ha o al Do been rovi8 lod by M C - Groborn uho o c c d cur grc ip en the NAIO in9PQctic c ipo · · · · Tho l'r3eident Tho Hiu t o Hcu io Uns• rth-orf d lotiur wbl ct to A¢ n r ' t- c '1 C 1 ti S ui c 1a -- -·- - ·- - C ' 1 · • 1 -2 - • ✓ 'i lui intrcdu tion at pa goo l - J pointe _Qut t lto poooiblo consequences of ru1 cccidental or un authori od dotonation of i nuclear -weapon in tho lI 41'0 oyutmno • • ' • • Varicuo oparating probl clmorvvd by tho ft d Hoc group aro dioctUJsed a t pagei 28 - 38 0 all of uni ch aro of c ooriol J _ na turo J1B--E 1l nr thrt problO tS uith Jupi ter miooile DO bD le I in1 - - - di Jcusoed at JT-leoo 30 and 31 G r-UJ and tho 15roSloins or- utnorizod uao and accidental dotooations under tho fiction al t eapooo cuotody oy itsm nov in UGo ooo pagoa 32 and 37 chould bo coooidorod ' 0 3 Probl™ of n more gllilortl noturo are diDcuooed b g1oofog a t p3go 39 it cludi og the trend tOYard roliunco on nuclear 1 oapooo Thi a o tioo al oo discusaop tho lo cl of ccordiontion bat eon H AXO and U S and U K in roge rd to t goting 0 p uti l y m rolnticn tc t'allout·offecta Ccnaidoroblo atUlntien io gi-von to tha lo cl of pleno1Jig of m o ' OOp tll l t o bODod on our cost modarn uoop ma tqcbnology Tho f o UuM of tha D ifcoso Dopartl rlnt to turnish tho Joint Caimnittoo uith adequate information on tho NATO arror gemsnta OD raquired by 1ml io al oo coveredo · Ho i'urt hor quootion ed tho UBo ot a tutory coopar ativo·· orrnngemaota contrery to tho procedures osteb 1 ohed under the Atomic Enorgy Ac o 4 He havo attemr od to l 1lkc constructivo augzaaticmo ond rol Ct iltandf tions in ragnrd io· both· the particular and gen£ll' ll ptcblama ·ci1 scupoodo For o xompl 0p 1 10 havo initiated ccm i augge oticoo uhich ccul d mako Cl1l' WO nucloar IOEl much oafer Elin st accidents or tmauthorised WJe aeo _pagos 37 end -DJ · tJculd oapaciall y call your attontion io cur diocuss ion coocoroin r our conclu din3· re crnmandntioo beg1ooiog at pgge 60Q Based en cur ravio1 1 of tllo ·ouc1ear uoapon aituation0 and its crucia i importanco ln tho HAl'O picture on a wolop tie boliovo th9 ovar-all rolo oi' NATO oheuld oo r i-ovalua tod In oo doing r t- culd otrooo ·i ho i'ollmiing J on cruago or tha roporti o O O O oHO Ql'e no' ro 'amrn°ndlll$ 1 - J o l tion of l ATO uith any thcught that it be c baodooc d · or ihat 1 t i convanticnnl cop lbllity roa ' lio t-J CDd lnofi'ecti-v i or ito u oo of t i ctic u mcleor eapono bo proocribodo Rnthor th 1 o -c-ov Jluatico chould ilook i o find ay 3 in t hich NATO c m otreugtb Gndd f or i t i rolo ill tho over-all ttllit ry pc ituro of the f'rco uorldo o o o o 0 pago 62 0 NND 882003 · 2 Sinco any coru ddorotion of tho llATO nuclocr uoapono oyutom may invol vo cho ngoo in tho Ata nic Enorgy Act I ttould 111to to ouggoot th at you arrnngo for tho collcboration of tho otaffo of the Exocutivo Branch with tho Joint Committoo and ito otaf f in tbi o roga rcl 0 Wo uro a ik1ns copioo of thl o rop rt o v- JiJ nblo to tho Socrotm y of ksi 1000 0 tho Socrot iry of Stoto 0 the Aotinz Chairman oz tho Atomio En0rgy C m dsoion ond tho hcado · of 'anolo y 'Ur Di slll I laln9nt Group ond ltATO Advisory Ho voul l bo gJ ad to di acuoo tbi tJ report uith you ond ar-7 momber of J'C1 l r dt11 niotratiCIIl ond Advisory Groupoo Roop ctfu U y you roe Chet Holifield Cbair nan fer Ad Hoc Subcc-mmittoe I Enclooure 11 DLI NND ···-•-· 552003 - 3 re r '2 rr rr 1_fr 1 C' J @ ilf u SUMMARY OF TABLE OF CONTENTS --renr- - srcnr r INTRODUCTION A Pa e __ Purpooe c lnopectloo Trip to NATO Countrica •• • ••• • • 1 3 C I Background o£ Study and Trip••• • •• •• • ••• • •••••••••• 5 SUMMARY AND E VALUATION Legal and Historical Baoio bf U s -NATO Military Nuclea r Arrangem nto 11 B Review o Military Ar r ang err onto Being Ut iltzcci 16 C Deocrfption o£ Storage Siteo and Summar of Cuotody and Contre l Arrangemento br Weapon Syotem • •• ••••••• •• • • •• •••• • • • • • • • • • •• • ••• • •••• 22 A D Summary Description and Analyoio o£ Present and Future Military Capabilitieo o£ NA TO to e supplied • • I o ••••• • • ••••••• • •••••• • ••••• • • E Sumrr ary o£ Problemo and Recommendations 28 o 28 1 Polic · Conoiderationa ••••••• • • 2 Summary of Operational Probl emo •• 29 3 General Policv Problemo and Al ternatlve A rrangemen t o •• • • 9 ·-· ··· ··· ··· ··· ·····•• c - - ·tr ' · ' r• 1 G ' ·' - - t · 4· •· • • ' -· - --r • • • • · · i - -·· t· • - - NND 882003 ·4 UAIA TABLE OF CONTENTS L ZNTRODUCTEON A ' l Purpo e cl nGpectlco Tdp to NATO Ccuntrie s ••••• • ••••• l Genera z importance of Nuclear Weapons and Pr oblemo of Accidental Detor ation or Unau thorized Uoe • ••••• • • o • o 4 o o o o o • o o l o o o • o o o o o e o o • • • o o • • • o • o o o• o o o B L ist o Participaoto ••••• o C Ba ckgrouod 0£ Study and Trip •• • • o •• •• l 3 o•• o o• • o 5 Legal and Hieto -ica1 Basia of U S - NATO Military Nuclear Arrangemento •• ••• • • • • • • • • •• • 14 Review c£ Military Arrangemento Being Utilized •••• • • • •• 16 1 •• • • o 16 a Agrcementa for Cooperation I 16 c- SUMMARY AND EVALIJAT ON A B Formal Agreemcnto •• o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •b 2o NA TO Stockpile Agrcemento••••• ••• • ••••• 17 Ce Storage Agreemento 0 •••• 0 17 d Status oi Forcco Agreemcnco 17 e Service-to-Service Technical Arrangemeneo 17 Mutual Sccuritv Agreemento 18 Opcrat cnal Arrangemcotso o o o o o o •• o o o o o o o 20 a b c d 0 • •• 0 0 0 0 0 0 • • • 0 0 Uo i ed Stazes Opc -ati naA F o ceo in H_ooc Count ric co ' o o o o o o o o o o oo o o • o oo o c o 20 u S Arrangement wltb NA TO Countr1 £or F orces not Committed to NA TO 20 U S Arrangement i with Hoot National i for F rces CP mmitted to NATO ••• •••• • • ••• •• 21 U 0 S0 Ar -at lgcmente wetb Noc- U0 Sd FQ -cibll iHITEE ON ATOM IC ENERGY O her NA TO Cr 1 0 fs • • • • • •• • • • srcn r cT 4 NND 882003 - S P igc c J eoc rlption oi Storage Sltco o nd Sum ' ln -y of CuoCody ind Cont -ol Arc-angcmcnto bir 'c ipon Syoecm • • •• • •• • • • •• 22 l 22 2 Aire -a t St rUce Squi df OOO e ' · • 0 o O Q • ' • 0 O • O e • • • O • a O e O • • 0 0 0 ' 3 In ermcd a t c R a nge Balllotlc Mloollco •• • ••• •• • • • ••• • •• • f • • •• • 25 • G cocr J 1••••••••••••• o • • ••• • •••••••••••••· 25 b Cuc tody and Relcaoc oi Warheado and Noae ConCa • •• • • • • o• • • • 26 • - lo Hone at John Weapon Syotema •• • ••• o •••• • •• ••• • ••••• • 5 D 26 Nike- Hc rcu l eo • • ••••• • ••• ••• • • • ••• •• ••• ••••• • ••••• • • ·27 Summa ry Deoc r lpti on a nd Anal yol o of P -eoent a nd Furu -c Milita -v C apab illtieo of NATO to be oupplled E Su nimarv_ o PToblcmo and Rec ommondationo ••• •• •• • • •• • •• • l • Policy Cono de ntlono • • • o • • • • • 2 Sw nmar y cf Operational Probl emo •••••••• • • • •• • ••••••• d 29 DO •-1 •• ••• Prchlemo C once rning L • -- fruplt Slee •• • 30 G l P- Sccur lev nnd ProtecCicn af Weapono Doodcn lnf'o -ma tio o o o •• o • • • o o o• ••• o • •• • • • o 3 o • c 28 28 ••• •• •••• •• ••••• • • • • • • Vulne abillty o JuplCe Site lnL ···•····· 23 30 o a a 00 ' Prcb¼cmo of P -c ccting Nu lo n - V cnpoao Agalnot Una uthc -ized Uoc i2 o - DcoZroylog 't lc lpooo•• 35 c Problcmo of Ev lcuat ne c ·cmmunlcaUono P -cbl emo ••••••• • •• •••• 0 •• • • 35 NND 882003 6 Page 3 Go Training Problcmoo r ho Safety Prcbl ellloo • • o • ••• ·• o i Lack o Trained P crooancl la Case of Accidcn •• •• • • • o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • O O 0 0 •••• 0 0 0 G • •• General Policy Problemo and Altet·natlvc Arrangemeato 36 37 38 59 39 l The Trend Toward Nuclc ir Weaponry 40 2 Lack of Coordination on T arget and Fall out Between U S -·NA TO Nuclear Forces U S -SAC and Briti ib B ' mber Command• •• • o • • o • o • • • • • • • • • • • 41 0 3 The Lack of Eotablishmcnt of Up-to-Date Re quircmcato Utili ing the Moot Modern Weapono Technolog y• • ••• ••• •• • • ••• b 41 Reccmme·odationo 00000 0 • • • • • • • oco•o 4Z l Recommendation l Gcne 'al The Need to Re-evaluate NATO Nuclear Weapons Syntemo • •• • ·•••• o o •• • • • •• •• • • Jo 2 2 Recommendation 2 The Need to Coordina te NA TO wi th SAC and U K Bomber Conuna od •••••••••• 44 3 Re commendation ·3 The Need to Eotablioh NATO Nuclear Wcapono Req ulremento B ao ed on Current Technology •••• o 45 R ecommendation 1 T he Need £or Hig h Level Technica l R evie v a nd Advid £ by AEC Laboratori ea in regard to NA TO Nuclea r Weapona Syst emo 47 i5 Recomme ndation 5 The Need for Comp liance with the Law and Adequate Cong r es3ional Review oo Cooperative Milita ry Ai·rangement with NATO Ccuotrie Oo oooo •o oooooo o • O • O••o••• o 48 6 Recomm enda i on 6 The Need to Re-eva luate the Baoic U S - NATO Nuc oar Weap on Coopera tir n Po ic r -- C onoideration oi · Alternati v e Arrar g emcnta ••••••• 0 •••• tr r Jm JQ © tf 7 f Tl 882003 · 7- - - - - - - - - - - - ------- -- -- - -- ---- - - 2 11 61 - T rh·· locu I INTRODUCTION ' A • c U 10 CJ es niauns rc iu-•-- th C Atomic Encri Y Act o 190-I · 'l 1 l - IS OOCU ENT CO SISTS OF J - J'AG£S J - Pur po io 0£ Inopcction T ip to NATO Countriep-JP¥_LO__ OF•••l l SERIES•• '7 1 Genercu ----- Du ring tho period November 26--Dt1cember 15 1960 member ntl otaif of the JCAE vioitcd certain millt y baoeo in oeven NATO count -ioo wd in Spain Thie i nopcction t -ip wac u ndertn ken aa a part 0£ a ptudy of civilianmilitai y rclationohipo in the field o£ atomic enc -gy author ed by Chnirman Anderoon in Auguot 1960 Section 202 oi tho Atomic Energy Act of 1954 rcquireo the Joint Como- ittee ''to make continuing otudiea of ••••• problems relating to the devolopmcnt uoe and colltrol of atomic energy 11 Thuo in making the trip and conducting thi tudy the Joint Committee hao endeavored to carry out itc origioal and traditiootl role o watchdog over the Dofenoe Department and AEC in regard to nuclear ma ttero • See Appendi t l £or diacuooion of Joint Committee watchdog role j More opecllicnlly the purpoao of the Joint Committee trip to U S nod NATO militazy baoea abroad wao to obtain firothano knowledge and ln ormation ao tot he manner in which nucle weapoa o are being i egrated into the NATO defense oyotem The Committee dcoirod to dC termine the manrie ind degree to which the United Stateo and ito NATO allieo aze cooperati ag with one i nother Of pm-ticular intereot to the Committee wao the extent of u s phyoical aocurity and poooeaoion 0£ nuclear w·e apooo the protection of reotricted data and the oa f'ety'o£ nucloa r weapono againct accidental detonation and uo auth ori ed uo o At the 'oame time the Committee waa equally intereoted in meano o£ improving the combat r eadineoo o£ weapoo a -Tho Committee wao intereoted in theoc mattoro not only from the otandpoi nt of the experience under the 1958 NATO amondmeo ta PL 85°479 diocuooed at po gos 8 - 11 but alao in order to be prepared to conoider what additional cbangeo if y arc required in the law 0 On tho eve of ito dcpartw 'o on the NATO t ip 0 November ZS 1960 the Committee wao brio cd by the Stnto Depc tmcnt 110 to p -opooalo for cbangeo in con tr·o1 nr 'angomento between U s and NATO During ito vioit to SHAPE on November 30 196 0 General NoroUld Clloo briefed tho Committeo on hio propoocd coo ccpt of an independent NATO nuc lear force 2 Importance of Nucl ear W eapono and Problemo of Accidental Detonation o z- Urui uthorized Uoe Becauoc 0£ tile ttemcodouo inct c 100 in tho nwnbo -c and v iety of U s nuclea weapono it io eaoy to treat them io juot l llothe wonpoo 11 It must not be forgotten howcvc - 0 t h lt e ven -clatively omall eld weapon o lc i than 20 kilotono Z0 KT wac cufiicient to dcotro1 4 7 cqtJ ''O mi loo of the City of Hi oohima and in lict cnoualtico totalling 70 0 000 killed ind another 7 0 000 injured In the Joint Committee hellll'ingo on the E fecto of Nucla WD 0 c§ · · • - • M · C - • ' ' ' 'l - C- NND 882003 - 8 @ n fl - '1 ' 1 @ l' i Qf u - ' •• l - u·u ftt io coeAID itcd eh le eh c b ioe cl icceo' cl n ehcrmccuc cnr r wc ipon cl O mcgaeono · • 7cuJld dcoci -ey·cho bt'ick ot 't ctu -co 0 01 clev o i i too dioe c o a a 7 m oo l 'cm c i-cuncl cr_o ovc i 150 oquol 'c mil co ·m nro i OI o culd gnieo ccmbuo t c m iCcl ' Wo cuz ti i a- ld lllo c i 25 m Rco ' ' a-mcg iccn weapon oou d dcoercv bdct oeiruc CU rco cut ·eo l d o nc c 00 3 mllco 01 ct 28 oqu i -o mlloo n -o i tuld C ll lo C l 'OO ec n illo 1 0 c r 9 mHco o1 Thuo i v iU bo occn tb le unir occk1cnb ci aicn a i m dcto0n GD oo a u clc il ' v capon le tbo NATO ovoccm cculd cauoo e rcmcndcuo dnrnngo · Oi cqucl 1mport ince o the £act cha mr occldcnt i doaco 1e cn ln chiing c D - ibo tugh au• plooivc pr rt on cl o cuc Rca - wc ipon w ehoua n Cl clen - dceonae c c O cculld c ouoo '-7 dcoprcod apprehenolon · i I d oven p iclc unl oo p -e pc - cmer -gcncv m e iouu-co ocd ong Conn cduc itlcnnl ellon-eo Qg'O und t rt 1 koc Tbe cooocqueccco of cl c c u rcc bo·occn-mcuo i ouci oo l o ploo oo n the NATO oioeem 1 1cul ll E ven 112 occ i dcntal detcn tlc-n oo the o on_ nuclen - cornponect of nn it mlc Oil' thel ' rncccc cor ·1 oapo0 coll ld u-ooul¢ la' poUe c ol ng tatico b ch m ght c a uoo cur- NATO p tr mc l'o to -eqr oo l Cho U S to remeve to ncc enll' wenpoao The U s NATO nuc oni - we npoco ovotem Uc12g h io boca a pdme trgot c rCommwuot p -op ig dn md oco oir moiro i cc dento o ahooc weapono o ould nevltnb 17 Ro id eo I incrc iocd Ccmmuiuot ngltnt on Alehough tho a cc6dont mlgbe be eho lioule cf orolgn s o -oonncl tlb o t -clalcg al pc -occael o a U s ireopono blllav and ebe -wcopon oc old be ehe p ll'opcrq cl tho United Statco Tho poooibU tioo oS tbeo a o cc donCo which con c o uoo O Uno conbmlllil 00 u c lia om i r C o m m i t t o o b lo boon Wonned ct i ho dl 'opp5 og cf OCVO 'nlr k f _O CCCDe V 00 Jnnua -y 16 n96 0 itbell'mOJ UCilOOt' bcmot · · · -· woo impel 'iled by tllo cuSbtreak cti ttle pl i co Kn tho Un tod St lteo il num otr OU ncclcleD O bn c 0CCUtl'll'Cd--eto lb oat · cul ' 2g co J a1 J 2 i rv 2-1 i96 · ai ro on T o pooo b Ut oo a t-cvclue i c all'v e oupo ci1ebe by h o Ca nmucloio trith tioio· i c ctr iAc i '1 T O ccuozdoo t7blch n o po 1tic in 7 o ruill lb o tro di li'CCC coocczn Q ibn Comm i o Oil' • O' blo ta gc ncr nll7 rcJ e e-od Co io n 11 0 10 po ot loeon ie ioo nnd Ao dcl ocd o o Ceo occ 5dcn l o deil lbc iec doieonliZln ·ofi o HE ci i o uc'dc iir _ e p c m o n ofi aeac- n-ba l ' ir -7 p an' O l fr a cu c l' o r oru io r oocl 1c o ci l' mChln o higb c pftootvc cb po One polnt oa icey fie n Cc t 'm u oc-d to dcoc -Abc Cho toou -o ncc c n cl c i - PC lpCillo· 77bkb hen t n HE io dc c ecd d cUboiroeo v o r a cc dcct iRRv a a occgilo 0 mc oC -c -itlc il po nr - 1 ttiutcotl it Cbc moot ct U lccl unc idd o oc o gn Mc e ru cUoa c ltl ibt e on Co Cho c ploo vo 1 ic d cii ebe bdgb c pl oolve 01 0 tcm «no oigcM c 1111e 'lt1c ouv v e d hr a been gei torroU1 de£5nod no nb e1 1e l pcundo cl HE cquAvaltoct @Jc ® @JEJ'7 _ _ lfG u NND 882003 - 'l - DOC 3 D l i o r c cb C i e- ·c-vct' iiC ii a net ucl k r - r ic u S lcni Jc lp o t i lecc nde ti ca r g at ded - i tl p1r l ctc4 - uld o bo t--cJ mt c vc r du ru e C-1 oc mclec f e lo cr - ecb·nblc · eznc u S ouciont wc p r B In c uci cit'ci mo cco C Cl Bd be u ied nn n ' n ctvU '1 7 ' ' 1cob c t c · So1ttcts ' o me Cl1hci - s CCllllCll' 'o Ao i c zie emptcd c rcu mG n lCCJl m f 1 t 'igge r C t' icc ldec t iJ u ie r r c r weap1r1 1c o cuc l rJJ -oc l llllcle - WZc An7 mpo 'all'f e-r vor cl lJ s c c -e wc ipi n i dull'5lilg a co p w 1 i l p crm t occe o _to el ch· ieo6gr icl ci -rnn k e which wi i c be cl v uc Ci tlic nc 7 Go c 11 mer C t ir oem e i r CC t itr • --- Do f G f i l •' r · ·• · ij r - -------'--------- -------' _ i · - B • l Li o c- f Joki't Cr •mmM ce- on Aion1 Ectci -gg mGmb re i Ul lf ar d o' he -a b par n iipaecd · Joint C mrn ee en Atcmi c Enargy o Rep Chee H ou Chacrm n12 Subccim rr See i gLe a Rep W e •N AnpE tl e eo-r Wallace li' Benueet B ep Cz-aag HOOIT Ol ' Repo J ic k Wcoti i nd r J uneo T Rnmer E cecutlve D ill'ec oir Jr hn T Ccn wnr Aso oaa nt Dh -ectc-nu Ce l Rii l o rd C Lucger Sea Cc- l' nut u i J c ho McCc e C nhrma i o Jc ' o Gl o bam C 0mminoa0acr Dv1ogb Ktl Aootc an Geoo cl Ma ngol ' Cec u K lll 'o ' Asi t ence t c» tbc c rmnr g NND 882003 - JO ---- ----------•··---- Q 'iJl - tltf cJ Dt Ha rr ic PJ icw Al c -oatc D vcocci i Lcadcl c oi ' t' C L R c bet 'f Pa ·t - cige US Arm USAREUR Cr l C L ll' G D Br nnc t US Aic- Fo1rce SHAPE Lt Col Eme -• US Ai u- Fo l'ce liSEUCOM D ·loi - LL CoL r iGeph B o1 m icl US At • Fo1l'ce Oificc Legisla e L£acsm Dr Ha -dd M Agnew Alte rn te Dhrasicio Leader W-Div otr Lc c Alamoo Sci cnti ' c Lcb· c-atc t · partki paf ed oo t ie e rAp ao i cicntUic acr iacit to the Jolnt C •r 1mit tce ha ·oog p tP 1· i l i been app •lr Ced a3 a conoultan·l tn the Corr rnfittee io c t no Ct on w b th c o ur ir r f CiviHao-MHt -1• Rela Looshipo ' I NND 882003 - ii ' - - - -- C --·---- - - - - - ---------·- -- - -- -- Back zcu Ud c Sbr6 y md Trip ·rh l z u fo - vie i Ci g ovez-ueao military i nac i llaf iono for fircthand l o - ed3c 0£ he m r i 0r ru cl c dent of Ucit id Statco coope r atio n with ou -·allie o in the •iwe of atomi 1 WS u 1 no wao develope d as a par of tho cvo -all review bei Dg conducte d by the Co F•1' ttce in tee tui-c oi a Staff Study of Civilia •11 ilitary- Relationo in the Field oi P to llic E e -ey ece App i i di 2 fo·r oat lbe ·0£ otudy Dlll'iug the cou -oe of tho paot oovcz-al y- ara there ha a been-a oticeab1e change in the r e l ati p 1 h cn the _civilian and the milit u-y agencies o the U S Governn nt 1·ep cc1 nted by tb Atomic Zll t gy Comcieoion on one side a nd tho De enoe D 3partment i the othe r · Ti lio hr o m 0 nif otcd itoe1£ ii ™Y v yo but m no way mozo pro - cr cr d ha i u the a I'ea of cu t ody of atomic v reapon e Cu utodr of nuclear we avana by AEC wao orlgma lly·considered pr imarily aa a methc d and ro JT f' st ' ltion oi civilian coll roL The ato -age s itec 7hc -e the itomic wo a l 3 v roi e ato i ed we xe ths l'capoILBibllity o i AEc a s the civilian agency The Pzeoi deci ir tb 194'6 Act Sec 6 and th 19 54 Act Soc 91 b c o ulci auth rlzc the P EC to t 'av sfc woapona to tI1 e Defen oe epartm ecl Th rough a oe ieo of atepo thio auilioz ty has led to full tcilitat-y caatody of weapons Firot AEC civili ' n custndfaoo VJCl' i cliapatc d with ccz-taiD high yield weapono deployed to the militar Late · theoe civilian custodiano wel e oemoved and military officers wore desi ted an agents of the civilian AEC for purpoGea of Dl Jota ning civi' l ian custody Fin tlly in 1959 the Preoident granted full pooceos ion and Cll ltody to the DOD of all weay ona traneferre d to it -egardleoc of yield · · Du -ing this same pe iod there also hao been a marked cb a nge in the rn mner iUld degree of cooperation · vith other nation a in the military liaes of atomic en13rgy Part of the cbang7 haa been occasioned by legislative cbangeo pen nitting greate cooporatioo in these -eapecto with our allieo Other changes howcvci are -eoulting from independent e ecutive or more opecifically military i ecisionD The original Atomic Energy Act of 1946 the McMahon Act irot by interpretatio l and then by specific amendment in 1951 prohibited Che United Stateo from c - changfng with any othe i - nation Reatr·l cted Data on desip1 and fabrication of atomic wcapoD-3 It aloo p -ohibited the transfer of fia a ionable ttiateria 1 by the United Statea to another natiou The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 recc gnizing the noed for come cooperation with our allies amende d the law to permit under appropriate oa feguardo con miunica tion to another nation o - to a regional defenne organization of defenoo plano the t oioing oi Z'Sonuel and the ovaluation of the nucl a r weapon capabWUe_o of potewcl cnemie o De sign or fubrica tion information concentl ug atomic weaponD which cou lc bo communicate d wao limited to the ir e -ternal cha racteris tico effects and the e yotcmc employed in th ei i • delivery o we provided ciata did not reveal impa -tant information con c e ning the d13zign o - fabrication of thei nu clea - componento The Atomic Ene rgy Act of 19 54 alao prohibited the t anafe_r to another nation of any nuclear mate ia l io r mill ta -y purpoe P a -5- N m 882003 - IZ ' • s5Jf£10uu ' Notwithc · dine the lim itation G impooed by the Ato c Eneray Act of 19 6 ind 19 54 on tho degree to which the United St atco could cooporato with ito allleo b th 1 a w contained p i ovioiono -ccognizil z that future ovonto mi ht ceceooit a te i grc toi deg -ee of c oop-0 -ation Accordingly tho_McMahon Ac_t ·in oec tion 8 b and the 19 ½ Act in oect ion 121 provided that •• any p -ovioioc of thia Act Ol any 1 Ction of mo Comruiooion o tho e 'tont and duzing the time that it confllctc - iili tho provioioDD of a-iy iut rna tiona 1 ar -angement ·ma uo a fte ' the date of enactment of thio Ac t cha ll be deemed to bo of l l 0 force or effect 11 II • • • r Ao intc -nationa l arrangement i o dcfi icd in oection 11 1 · ao 1 · The t erm 'international arrangon ient• meanD any into inational agreemont hereafter appl1'oved by tb e Congl1'eoc or·any t r eat' dm-i ne the tim e ouch agroomont o - treaty ic in full force ind efioct but doeo not include any ag oement 10 cooperation It vao thorcfor o posoiblo un dc i both tho 19 54 Ac t and the prior law or the United Stal eo ii i wished by means of an intenmt iorutl agr eement approved by th Cong-reoo or by a trca ratified by two-thil1'da of the enate to cooperate to the fullect o nt poaoible with a l ally Not only atomic weapon doaign information and nuclear material for Wle k woapnno c ould thuo have been 111'11 e v ulable to other nations but by tho m ano i pecified above the law' permitted and otill ponnita tho tranofor of at mic weapons by the United F ta teo to ito a'ilieo · 11 Fol l wing the NA TO Council Me ting µl December 19 57 and io a roault of the Ruaoian Sputnik tho Executive Departm ent in J µiu alp' of 1958 requeoted c ertain unendmenta tc the 'Atom£· Energy Act to permit g lca ter military cooporation with ou allioa Accorclingl7 in the S_ ith Congreoi Znd Seooion the Atomic E rgy Act of 1954 waa amended _to par nit der c arefully stated coilliitiono and oa eg o great e r coc 'ation between the Unit ed St c teo and ito al lice in·th e exchange of atomic onorgy information and maieri i 1 for military deie oe purpooeo 'rho amendment paosed by the Cong-re30 and oignod by the Pre iident ao Public Law 85-4179 en July z 19 58 ma de poooible greater cooporat lo o with our allies by permitting mde - e change of military iniorm o1t oi i and· ma terla l a 1 ollowet · L Material w clu d ing non-nucleax• parto of weapono non-n lo u- parto of s--capon s y itemD military l'ea ctoz-c and nl Clcar materlalo for le in milit - ey rc u toro and weapono to 2 Clao cified l niozma tion Rootzictcd Data of a nat e aooillt an individual nation o - r cgio l def o g l'oup ouch o NATO to improve ito t 'aioing and prepare for mutual defe e · and · 3 'Claoai fied in o n-a at ion Rootricted Data 0£ a natll 'a to aooist anotho r individual nation to i mprove ito atomic weapon deoign development or fabrication c 1 pabillty a id concerning milit ey reactot o Undet- l he Atom c El' ergy Act of 19 5'1· ao amended by Public Law 35-479 · trancfe o f lUClear materfa 1 for atomic weapons u oe and communication of 00I1Ditivo Restricted Data c on eniil g atomic vrcapono oiay be made only to NND 882003 - 13 -h - @ JL i'J fD Ji' ' J @l WU-U-lbll Imo m lde oubc tan ial progrcoe in the development of atomic weapono cid ' 7hcre the m - tcri al or information io ncceocazy to impt'ove that country'o i tomic woapon deoign lcvelopment or fabrication c apabiE y Sim IIarly non-nuclca - parto of i tomic weapono m y bo tr afa i red only to a nation that Imo made oubotc nti al progreoo in the development 01 i tomic weapono For all int n to a nd purpooeo thio wider degree 01 c oop ra tion io limited to the United Kingdom Diot iuction io ma do ac to lccc ncnriitive information an l tho l eoo oenoitive non- nuclea - p u-to 01 atomic woapon oyote mo which arc n ot integral to a weapon but pertain to acccG lorioo n ceccary for oper ation and roainto nce work a nd which do uo dioclosc inter ro l design imo zmation of the weapon Lcoo oeneitive inforrc ation to improve the t raining and ope -ational r cadineoo o f deicnsivc forcoc may be c ommucica tcd to a i othor nation o r xceional defence org- ni ztiou tmdez i pecific conditionlJ i£ th i ifo ion doeo not contribute oigo ifica ntly to that nation'o atomic weapon design development or fub icatiou capability N'oc-o uclcar pa 'to of atomic weapon ayatems under ·opecllie condition also may be tran oier rod to a nation with the provioion that the transfer does oot c ontribute aignificantly to that nation'o atomic weapon deaign devel opm n o r 1 1 brication c i pability Public L w 85-479 -cquirtJS that prior t o ouch cooperation the P r esident muot dete r mine in vrriting that it • ill promote a nd will not const itute lll Wl 'oasr •n ible rlok to the common defence and security and that au chcoopiration may take place only while the cooperating nation or organiZ 1tion is participating with tho United Stat e a pursuant to an interilatio ml al r ing ment auch aa the NATO Treaty by- aubotantial llld matorial contributiono to t ie mutual defence a id oecurity In addition Public Law SS-479 providec that all proposed agreements for c ooperation invol comm uni ation of claoa ed inf'ormation or traruifer of material for military purpoaeo muai be submitted to the CongresG l nd r eferrod to the Joint Committee and such agreements would not become effective i£ the Congress paoaeo a concurrent z-esoluzion 0£ di approval within 60 days The Adroinir tration c id not request nnd the Congreaa did not incorporate into law any opecific p -ovi iion to pennit the transfer of a ccimplete nuclear weapon or nuclea component to any nation Nor did the Adrninfati-ation requeat J Ly c hange in law affecting U S poese aion cu oto dy or control of nuclear waaponc m accorcL mco with e mol e libe t'cl 19 SC ampnclmento tlic P eoidcnt in 19 59 oubmitt0d to ilie Coilgre ie oevon Agreemenl o for CooP 3rotion vti ili individiw cllieo Du -i ng the hoa -inga on theoe agreemento cotimony wao given by -ep -aoentativaz of llio Deicn oo Department ao to the n ed for thooc oepa_ to Agreements fo - Coope r ation in ardo r that our allieo might havo suffic ient in£o omation acd material to pe mit noces iasy t' lining of pezaon i d compi tability of thci delivery oy1Jtemo or tho u aG of 0 13 v oaponu Ou - weapana ne l ea t tho nc cleax co·mponanta it wao e plained wo re to be k ept under the control and pooseaoion cf U S personnel at all times exc apt in ca ea of ho tillties when they wore to b-0 1· deased to the Wler nation This waa the oo- callcd NATO AtomicStoc pilc concept a e cplained to the Joint Committee and the Congzeee at the time of the 1958 amendments and the 1959 agreements Ba ed on long and detailed hoanz ga in 19 so it waa UJ1dcr itocxi that U S posoeaDiOI of nucle weapcoe would b ·r linquiahed wheI ar ci only when h oatilitice begin NND 882003 - 14- t 1n 1'4ovcmt o - J 'J 'I nowcvcr aitor' tneoo w ierccm o m o toir c oop aoon ima tt gone into_ c fiect llio Com -nitteo wai i inionnally i dvioed oi a pl 'Wncreby a U S nuclear DO v rcapon ine l- B-1 the''Geni air-tou_a ir i c zet ioch di ng the nw lear componcm w uld 8 S b bo mated Tµe Commite e quootio i ed llic logal it o ow h a pm n and Ul Decomber 1'9 9 requer ted Uiit i r o u -thei action be ta until t' o Committee could 1 0viO it hor in light 'o tho legiohtive hiotoey 0£ the 95 ilmen d- rnc ito and tho 1959 az -oemeruo - I · _- ___ - - ·- - -- --- j I Oi pa r ticula r concern to the Committee with i -eopect to to lega l ity wao the p ohibiti oi ocction 92 in tho Atomic E t'g J ' Act of 9 54 · · ' Sec 92 PROHIBITION -- It ohall be unlawful c cept ao provided in oectio l 91 o r any pe rocn to t -anofer or receive iu intei ot ate or io oign conimerce manufactUl'e p oduce t ranofer acquire poo_oeoo import or -port any atomic weapon · Nothi Dg in thio oection ohcll be deemed to modify the p ro'fioiono of ouboectlon 31 1 oa- section 101 Percon io defined in the Atomic Enezg-y Act to in elude any fot•eign overnment_ o - nation or any political oubdiviaion of any ouch aovenunent or nation or other entity _ Section 11 q · A logal opinion prepa -ed by the Joint Committee Stafi Coun oel on Olio p opooa l io attached ao Appendi 3 · 1- hile the E cecutivo Branch did r uopand negotia tion o on the ·¥8-lplan and oubecquemly dropped it for other reaoono it did hoW1 ilver without notice to the Joint Committee or oubmiooion o an a mended ngreem nt continue with other plans to place 1 S nuclealZ' warheadu in m BMc and fighter bom bero O Qlled and ·o perated bf ioireign on a Undor a concept by which it clairno r ontinuation of U S eu otody the Department of Di icn ce oubaequemly appro -ed ru d e ntered mto certain Alon Procedureo JD-Creb lear were authorized- - lZ ed f i d i'l eo of th - ' ' · · ' ' · b light of thio bae ground and the ob'lioUD cha Jlgine concepto t kinz place i o the au t ii o rit y and -e ponoibilit iea of the milita 7 vio• i-vio the civilian in the atomic vr'- ip- mo fie ld in the United Stateo Govet'llment and ao to tho coopeirativc ar angc mento betvrecn the U S a i d oi-cign 3ovc 'llmcllto in the miliw ry- uooo ot atomic or c -gy it oeomed particula -ly important at thio time for b Joint Committee to z-eview Che overall civil Lan-milita ry 1 ehtionohip At the oame time it occ ncd approp te d J cccoo ry fo the Joicl Commit ee · o obtcin p -oonal o i o 'lcdge to bow thcoe Ai -cerner ±o fo CoopCl ' ltion a ld othcz u-r 3emcrit i mth NATq d individu tl forei a count co were being c i rrled oat by villitb the milit ry ba eo wh o r they i e -e being implemented md obc e the act ope ratio lD -6- @@J J 01001f fl£1J NND 882003 - IS kt Lc do · - -·-··· -· -- --7 ' - - ------ -- ---- -- ---------------·--- ·- ----· --- · -----' B r clltiB- -- -- - - --- - 11 2 60 u s t NAVE UR • --·· Pan-to '-f -F'_ll'_a_z _ c_c _____ _- •__ i ' 30 6 0 SACEtra • Gca rol Norr trad ·Br cx g d Mcce og - -'- IU •---------------- ------- --• ___ •n_ o 7_ A ' • I · 1 · · I r I' ' t i Ij f I - · f l C' • i • - ' i I l I' C - - J - f ·-- j -- r -- l2 l f 0 US AREUR • · - · ·7 l • I -- - - - Bi ld' ttg - --- --- - --- C - 1 J1 - C · He dc bc _r g I · C •' c • ' • · '' · · · J ' - ' ----- - tz· I '- ·· ---· j - 0 · - s t• · •• ' · •· -' -·· · · - - · ·_ · - • - -' · · · ---· JI I l C _J NND 882003 - 6 ·--'-'·- ----- ---- - - - r· · ' • -- · ___ ___ - ------ -- -- _ ___ ·I • ' '· · • • c ' ' - 1 · - - -• -· - - •'•' · ·- · · •- _ _ - ••_ · ·· i · f·fW • rt · -• I n · •• ' t ·' - '• - 0 a ' - C C _ · -- · __• ··'· '•· C 0 l ---_ · _ _ __ · ' '- -- _- ·- •· _ •__ r _ c - -- 1 · l 1 l O - 1 a Ftioai te e l wa -head l had n rofl b en denivc -ed to tltlo t atir •I l Ila he date d Ch c i nopec U 01 1 2 Thlo Ai ooeaUanrur o w 'tolecd by onllr a po rt L1i- cu he J o5 ce Ccmmi ec p irtr - 10- NND 882003 - 11 i • • I • i'ollowinc io n dc cz -ipticn o1 nuclen - wc ipoo c1ztcmo cl • ml -hcado b oin J ltcer o tod i 1110 NATO and di ocuoocd in o opo c RCCKETS AND MISSILES F Honoot Jo A ·oolid p -opcllant 0 £ ec fllghl 0 c u -£nco t ooon#aco ockct mth -nnge to 27 • 500 yardo appro o atol I' 5 milco • Cocop itiblo i th tho MltJ7 o nd J 1 k 31 w a-he id 0 Co 'OOt'cl A G1 pc oooic ou feco co nu t£0 co 0 ndio oco i mo nd gcidcd liquid xu l rocltot pr Qp'3lled oingl i a igo balllot c U ' OOilo '1 7ith t' lD-3 l 'W 75 mile Compatible with tho lvikq7 w h' d• · · 0 Nike Herculec A mo otage otipeToonic c'O ind guided c urfuc-c -i o '-Oll' miooile with o o 85 i auticcl mile -aagc A• oecondary £unction of o miooilc io to atta k ouri 1cc w -zoto ct ra o'g lo up to 100 nautical i nileo Compcliblo with the · Mko ll warhead Jtpitc A ou t £nce to ew -£ace liquid z-ocket propellod 0 0- ally guiclcd balliotic miooila mth r lllgo o£ 1500 mil la Compatible mth the bfik 119 wa b 0 0 Thor A our o ce to-ou -£ ce 0· one ota ge liquid rcc ct p opcllod0 inertiolly guided balliotic miooilc '17 ith -nnge of 1500 n luticnl miloo Compnilble the Ml- 049 wa head 0 0 NUCLEAR BOMBS AND WARHEADS ' • f · to - G f Ct I ' - ·4 · · I r ' · 'i' ' ' · ' ' r '' 't s - I l ___ _________ ________ __ ·1 NND aszoo3 rs - -----···-···- -- · '·· · ' 0 C · C I ' ' I 'a II o - u _ • - ' - 3 1' ·• ' ·•· 0 r ·• • - · ' C ' 0 ·1 - ' ' _·- _· 't • - - · ·J 11 ·- ··- - --'--'-- r - _ - - __••• • 'J ' · ----- - --·-·- - - - - -- - - -----·- -- SUM Y AND EVALUATION -·- Thlo oumma r includco the follO't7ing occtiono A · Legcl d hiotor iccl baoio of U S - NATO militm y- auclcm c r -ani ome nto B Rovieu 0£ lvlilita y Ai - uigcmcnto being Utilized c D-z oc -ipi ion 0£ Storage Siteo and Sum marv o Cuotodr and Contr ol Arr ingcmcoto by W oo pono Syutemo D Summ y- Deocz -iption and Anal y-oio of NATO Preeent and Future Milimrv- Ci pabilitieo E Problems ll ld Recoromencb tion o Fo - detci lo c£ the opecuic oitoo oited d overoall n uclea - d conventional c apabilit - 0£ NATO countrieo tho ender ohould rcfor to Scctiono and IV m I NND 882003 - 20 ---------· Q2i h 7 v nUb U c r l l listor i co 1 E a io of U S - NATO Militcz-y Nucie - A r -2 0gcmci 1to · A u- ' t c icrr·y J Act of 19 51 clccl 11·eo i Cc be the -co ic v o t ic U lir cd S a c - - • • u th deve l opment use and control of ato n ic c i c -gy ohal be cj irccted so as to rn i kc t b e ma dmwn contri b uti n t o the g ene ral wc fo rc oubjcct at a ll times to the paramount objective of making tl c m i ximum cont -ibution t o the· comm on defenoc and security and b the clcvclopn1c nt u c and control of a tomic c e -i r ohall be di i ccted so aa to p ror 10 e wo - d pea c e imp -ovc the gene we lfare increase the ota lcla 'ci c f living and st rcngthen f ce competition it p d v • t e c ate pr i e 11 E 1plu s i l aupflicd Sec t ion 1 Atomic Eo r-g y Act oi 1954 PubEc L 1 l 3q703 T he 19 54 Act has fo r its purpose the c2 z-z1ri lg out of the 2 bove policies by p r -o ricliug fol ' a number of programo U Clucii -ig a pro ram for Governme nt control of l he poe acuoion use and production of atomic energy d special nuclear material eo directed a s to make the m a dmum contribution to the common ciefense and security and the national weliaro a program of i ate rna ional coopc ration t o promote the co on defense and security and to make available to coope z ating nations the benefit of peaceful a p plications of a tomic energy as widely ar ex panding technology and considerations of the co on defe nse and security will permit and a progdm of administration which will be consistent with the forego policies and programs with international ar1'angementa and with agx-ee ro cnta for cooperation which will enabl e l he Cong ea s to be currently informed so as t o take fur the r legiolative actio as may be app 'opt'ia te Eropha is added Soction 3 Atomic Ene rgy Act of 19 54 Although the 19 54 Act ao Dewb at ext e nde d the 1946 Act in authorizi I E cooperation with our allies in the military us es of a tomic energy the 19 54 Act turn waa grcaUy broaden ed by the amendmenta to it by Public Law 8· 5-479 in 19 58 Howeve r the areas of cooperation were limited by Sections 91 c pe r taining to the transfer of a tomic material and 2 rts of weapons and weapons sy3tems aotl 144 b 144 c pertaining to atom ic information antl a rc re ui -ed to be eet £0 th in Agreements foi- Cooperation subject to Cong rec sion al r e view in a ccorda ru e with Section 123 Y hile the President is auiho 'ized fx om tim to t ir e to d i ecct the AEC to delive r ouch quantit iec o£ special nucleaz material o - atomic vreapons to the Depa t ent of Def nse fore sl Ch D e as he deems z o e i -a y m the w tc esl of l-ilional tleferu ea Secti n 91 b the Aci couiainll t l' ' i oilov ring all important pr·oh ibition · in 5-J c 92 P ohibit ici t hall be unlawful e cept ae pz-o·nded i n e cc tioil 91 ior any· pe zcn tc 0 cfr i1' 01 · 'ecei• re i im er ataf e o fol'c i r-2 orc mc c € · ' uia t u - ' p odt e - a _ fc· 1 cp 5 c pocr r s i mp o --r • ··-- o· •• 7 a 0 v • -c J - t ' l - u 4-J WW t_ 7 ' • - - _ Ni TJ 882003 - ·'· · · _ · A - r1 • - • 2 - - - ----------·----- ------@ fi f0JE5 £ l _ Q rut 'ts- u ocction 11 q the vl rd poroon ic defined to include ioz-ci13n Goverom- nt and ito gento 1 Wordc a uch ao control 11 ''uoc 11 ''pooe coo 0 11 and ' 't anofe - aro frequently uaed in the Atomic Energy Act Nowhere in tho law howovor io tho rc any zeference to cuotody the baoio on which the Defcn le Department in conjunction with SACEUR ic now coopero ting with foreign nationo in tho military uooo of atomic weapon The concept orig nn lly evolved tlll-ouuh tho civilian milit ry relatlonchip of the Atomic Energ • Commiooion acd tha Armed Forceo of the Unitod Sto teo Unde the or giu 11946 Mclvlah on Ac and cont inue- i through the ameudr lento of the 954 Act the ownership of all fiosionahlo materi l was to be •roated in the ommiooion cl though the Preoident could from time to ti tne direct the Atomic Energy Commieeion to transfer fiooio nable material or weapons to the Armed Forcoo iox- o a tional defense Despite claimo of milit i ry operational needs Preoid 1ot Truman wao reluctant to tranofcr rom c iviliao hando to the mllitaxy the control over tbormonuch ar wcapono Accordingly AEC civilian c istodiana were aaoign'ed with all high yield V eapono dioperocd to the military Tho civilian AEC r eprcocntative was conoidered ao mai nl aininc custody of tho wcapoo for the CommiooiQn After approximately one yenr of cuch _an arra ngement tho chdlian rep eoentntive wao diopeODed with and the c o a nding ofiicer of the milluu-y unit hol ding the weapon waa desi gnated under a ''two hat concept i a AEC cus todian In 1959 Preoideot Eiscllho- ver eliminated thio c oncept by tranofcrring outright from the ' onuniooioo to the Defenoe Department tho weapons oo diopc -oo During the Committeeta vioit to SHAPE in Pari o and tho v a iouo U S corn·rnan lo in Europ9 tho concept of cuotody a nd control c Ul'rently e nvisaged in tho U S NATO cooperative agreemento wao discussed In hio briefing oi the Corornitt 'e• General Norotad and hio otafi referred to two baoic concopts underlining bio underotanding of U s required cuotody and control 0 ''l SACEUR in hio iotcr tiolllll c pacity 0 will cm rcioe positive c ontrol over the u se of the U S ouclear weapons made nv lilal le to this progr axn Thio control vill be e ercioed in accor dance with his atomic strike plan · Z • Cus tody i o defined ao the degree of U S contli ol of l C ceoo to U S nuc l ear wea poos 0 to the extent that i would t l ke an net of foi -ce to obtain either w eapona or infor mation concozning uoapooo without p -ope - i uthorin zntion '' Gcnc -al No -ctad adviccd thatthio definition of cuotody- o -iginatcd within hio o vn command but th at it had been agroed t o b1 app -opriate agoncioa o-£ tho U S Govern° ment 11 See page 13 No ot1i d briefing juailiico' tion io th te -minol ogy and concept 0£ custody in lieu of other t er no ouch as poosesaion and t rnoa or 11 was based on the U S oficr Deccm ler 1957 to ·· the NATO Genc re 1 Council by the late Secretazy of State John Foctcr Dulleo to the effect that the U S NND 882003 • 22 ' • • 110 o o would deploy o ucl i 7 it head l unde U S0 cuotodv in 1ccor dance with NATO de£cnoivc planning ind in am-cement th ¢h di tl o e nations rec 'f cooccrned Xn the event 0£ hootilitieo · nuclo be i do would bo 1 cleosed to the oop -opriate NATO c upremo ru lied commaoder £or cmplovmcnt _bf nuclQ - cap ble £orceo Emph asio oddedl 0 @ w - 0 t might noted- h_at Uic Dc_combo 957 p oposa l wao made obortly after the · Gucceoo 0£ the fc st Ruooian _Sp itnik October 957 when tho U S wan otill attempti cg o ove -come _th pnychologic - 1 idv int ge gained by the Sovieto 0 It came ot a time wht n twas £ea r ea tb t o illieo -were queotioaing continued U 0 S 0 ouptir iority in ocience and we pon technology The e ore the December 1957 propooa l 0 which became the foun tloo for a ch_aoge of ft ad uneottl policy and manne in 1hich we v ould coopcrat with O L ' NATO allieo a loo became the baoi l for the cuotody conccp·t which SACEUR the U S De eooe Department and the Stat Depa -t ment hao used 0 ' 0 By oubstituting the word cuotody for the word ''poooeooion ao oet forth in oection 92 of the Atomic Enei gy Act tho De e l le Depat-tment ban juol ified a broader control procedure than · ongreoa inte1 _ded en _the Act would appear to permit See oection 1l E at pageo 48•50 for Jolot Cemm1 ttee comment a oo thia problem Tl e Coaunittoe w o imormcd that SACEUR 0 s co ol policy consisted of reserving to hims '-1£ 0 Ceneral Norotado the oole militaJ 'y- authority for the eleaBe of tomic weapon in Allied Co Jllll nd Europe ln addition it included the initial oeleetion and ochcdulins of target or i tt i k llld the establishment 0£ specific control arrang- m fnto for the employ ent of a quick reaction re tory force · ' B Review of Milit u y Arrangements Being Utilized 1 Fo -ma l Agreemento Tl e -c a re today many dlife -eut eypeo of agreements uld arrangements whereby the United St ates Government is cooperating with other c ationa in the military uoeo of at ic energy They involve the c change 0£ Reotricted Datz _in orrnation and m atc iat the tr ano ez- 0£ dcl ive ry ovotemoo the otatiooing of military forces to oa ge and m i nt n aoco o£ nuclear 't7e pono and the trclcing oi peroonnel They include methodo a o to now nuelea r 10 1pon s d infor tio i W ill be protec ed and h c penoco will bo oh ed Following io n llot ol theoe - w cementa by- tbe namco tiiey a r e re er ecl to by Dclcnoe De iztme nt o d NA TO perao i iel Under ea ch lenwng is a gco ercl oUIUIDZry o i to - vhzl t they COVCZ' Formal ag7 'eemonto bctwect1 the United Statea ind an individual c ierobe o£ NATO can alt10 be with NATO directly involving the co unicatioo of i ox-mati n o- the tr Gfei- oi c t a in tfpce 0£ equipment involving Re ttictcd Data Thiel t '1 e o agr t mcnt ii ap- llicall T px-o -ided £0 in the Atomic Enei -gy Act 0 I 1 · ' • '• ' - - f k ' • NND 882003 - z 3 P -io Co ouch agt ccmont certain iindingo mu t bo nm de by AEC ao ell ao DOD uo zo 1 -ho adcq y- or the tion'c security- nod Che Prccido peraonally m• 10C give hio app -ovcl o nd dotcrmin o - hz - it rill p omotc und co titutc an UD G i CJonc blc -iok to the common defe o ar d oeC't Zitv · Undo oecUon 123 of tlle'I Atomic Ener gl ' Act thooo cgrccment l iogother with tho app -ovcl and dctermjn tioc of the Preoidcnt muot bo ouhmittod to c Congroso und -e£o -od to the Joint Con unitteo on Atomic Enc 'gy- Their muct lie before he Cona re1 io and tho Comm it e fo n period 0£ 60 cizlyo whilo Congroeo io in eesoion and do cot bocome cfioctive if during that period Congi -cc pcooec u 1·ooolutioa of dioappr ovalo £ NATO Siod -pile _ Agx-eemento · o • NATO Stockpile Agreemeotll between onch WlOt' nationand £ le u s cove ing the introductioo 0 st ng0 0 and employment of U 0 S nucleru '17eapono Included in tbeoe egroomenta arc poHcv matters ouch uo 1- • Coot oharing nod co net ruction c itorui • t Cuotody 0 oecw-ity and relcaoc 0£ wenpono 3 M l imcnanco and pooitioning oi weapono 0 lb Locioticill support of U s forceo I c Storo go Agreemento Agroomeilto between the U S and individucl hoot cou atriea fo ' the illt ' 'oo duction nnd oto -nge oi u s nucle weapono in c upport of u s delivez-y fOt'CC O ac diotinct f -c-m tho to eign nation1a £orceey d Statue o Forceo Agreement · Ag -oomecto bet veen the l f • s end individu ll coui t ieo cove ing the otntioning o U S £0 -cco in NATO cou ct ricoo t 1 Ther o militar f ocr - -ice l ovcl ai i nngeme Olopplemem m-y to Cho NATO St oclq il Ag eom '1 a aec 2 abo •e uid made bet ' rcen Uio UoS Air · For c 0 Azm • o No vr o nd he cor -eopon ng milireJ 'y e -vico cl the c' hG n ati0 1 0 are l'O 2 ' Tboca ra gemem o covr l ' our h itemo all o ding opo ating p ocedUJ en mci o eimru o and l ogietico ouppo - eopvnoibilitieo fo i ackso dependem hol oini 0 cedin 30 nt ce ia roe d 0 t - po e tioo 0 eommunicatio aa and U S and ouppoi t d £0 - ce z-eoponoibilltic u in tb ctoi k· il - roct a g t £1e quea- cJ oper aiioa s invoh'l g ou len - 'weapons o NND 882003 - vJ - ·- -·------- - - - - -------------------- - - @ IT @JlJ1 · ' 9I QJUU16 _U -i p- c c aurc i hlch c 1 vc boon cdoptc tl bott ec n th Dclonoo Dopnrtmcnt 6 inc iiviO ucl foreign miliCo r y iczvlc oc c i b o opcrction XRBM'o o ncl otril o ci e1 cl i I e u dinr3 f hc meting of nuclo 1r 72 'h cado eo the ·ovo emo full 7 itbin mio cc ecgo1 o Iv1u tuu Sccuritz A cemcato Do- · ' o CI ' Tbooo Cgt' CmonUI cove o url'engomcn c - h cby wee po dollvoi s oyciemo ar e m 7 0 1_ _ _ blo Co i udividu il in ct ono 0 00 0 £or -amimplo _ __ _ · 1 - · · end tho F-SA F o nd l ' _ 00 ail'pkncc t o vm- uo NATO nnt onoo ·o 0 ' Of th ci rmmel 'ouc i oo 0¥' lg i 'O m cms and a rnngomooto n tili 'C4o ool y- Uio fi ot one i od bovo A oomonta oi Coopor ltion arc c c r i od in Cho Atomic E i -gy- Act of 1954 · Tho 0d1cil o ore not rcle -rcd ·to fu 'lt #Co 1 7hicb wao lte ll' dcd to bo the con rolling ota govezlling tho ck volopr -icnt 0 uoe nod ccnt ol of otom c OIUJt'BY• including ho' bandling o n1 1cleai ' m itc b lq Tho• mic Enorg Act of 1951 acto iorth ito purpoo'c•to l'rovido £oi · pr i ru n of intOA' O l cooperation to promoto the cornroou dc £enoo and oecuritv _ o nnd ''c pr9grom of ud ll do atio o o o with woi i liici'iml 07 rtuJge ei#o'U lii Pith agreemento o coopnrt tion hlch will onnble Congrooo to bo curre ntly- inf'o -mc d c o o o Wta fuzthe l e_giol ati •e n otion ao may bo opp 'oJ rio to 0 ' Empb' £l O e od Sec tioa 3 0 Atomic Ene gy Act of 195• • io amended _ · · · · · ··• · ' Although thG Atomic Eno -m Act ec ogoi eo the poooibilitv m ntc -Xl OUonnl m-s-anecmonto othell' thl ul AgrecmGnto for Ccopet ation 0 • ft ·opocliicclli limito th _rn to tieotieo a nd intcznntional groememo 'lprovcd by tho Cooei 900 Soctiorio 11 l Cd lZl a£ the Atomic Ener3yAc e Thooci' 0 odditiollcl · I· • o 195 ' no e manaed method a of enmtiona coopcirotion0 • both of which alcio ll'eqw o· c otifice tio·n to Cor ig -000 or id tho ouppozt of tho Logiofuii ve Br acb bavo licZ on u oed in ' • • •• • • • f ' coop r otl ng with other natioa o tho· military field de pUo aw· fact they- f o ro boon in tho law oincc tho o rieinal McMahori Act Cl 1946 Inotoa4 i -e b o o been· d evclop-Od n nd inlltitutod a bewildcricg 0£ l'OO jememc ond agrocmeio C ' templatc d bV the • Uomic Ene rgy Act • Jn·c d ion io not being· s ubje ct· to Ca eooi onal iieyiGW cv aro ooi ng c nournmated an impleme nted mthout the coacu - -0nco of tho Atomic Enorgy Comr dooion ·· · ·· · azroy ·FollGWing i o c lioZ o f elC't'oo NATO _cow1t ioo which incilc le O tho iype cir lZl'CCllleI or z i -z-angomont '10 ye w lth i u c h end the ·d 0 eo on bioh oy o o oigciid - •· ' •···· NND 882003 · • ____-- -- - ___ -1 S -- -- - ·--- -- STATUS OF AGaEI MENTS AND A t R NGEl fill i ii'S NATO SPECIAL i MMUN TXON STORAGE PaCGP M 1 DO 1o o a ' TECHNICnL ARRANGEMENTS USA FE 3 Mav·6o b - USAREUR 12 Mar 59 I 17 Jun 60 1 1 0 ' • • j - •' NA VEUR 9 Jul 59 ·c I Z 10 All ' 60 7 Apz 6 0 l 4 Apr 60 I ' C ' • • · ' Ii - C 60 · s- - • 10 May • 11 Feb 60 · ' i · • C • ' · • _- · • --· -- _ _ e C_ C_·_· _ - -' ' __ _ • -------- -•- - -- ---- -•________ · ' · L- - S · - - 19- NND 882003 - J ----- -_____ ___ _______ _____ -···- ---- - - - ___ - ---------· - ·-· -- ·- · - - -· ·- - •• r- · • U NAT _c• e m to o c r• Sb' eo •-i Bis· rJ ---l· · · · · Through Che vari ou ocz-oomo o mid tingcmcnt 0 0 o ' Jn itod Stlltoo dc T in coopert tioa 't7ith ieo allloo io rrmiato n'og ormod forcoo 7 ith•nw loru capnbilit yin erouo f orc ie a co trioo Vlhilo· oomo c United Smtoo foi -coo 0 voziouc coop 'ntivo c - r i ngcmonio lw vo bean davelopod involving u s aucl o £oi -cco 2 Operntloru ll Ar -nngemeato United Sts tco Opcir itio i Foi -c ol3 in H'o t CouctriE '2 _ Tho Uni' od Statoo tocby- hco nucloo r cc pnblo opora ing forc oc in Europe uhe r e in forcoo not only m dx b o cuiltody ond poeae oo on o£ nucl cm ' -Pcopono bt1t · in tho ovena of bes tilltioo 7ould k o uoo forc e The Unite d· Smteo 0 SAC bacco in txE Eaz and ire - -o·rnz loc of thio po 0£ i-ra ngem nt ' NAT O outhoL ity- lie 6 l i n eede d to uoe theoo orcoo and no Root -ic ted l 'aui coed bb nade cvoilo bl o to tho hoot tio i o to NATO in conne ction mth them our r -- -1 Tho Unite d Stat oo nloo bno nuclco capo blo o c oo i th ur and ground 0 c ommitte d to NATO within hoot co mtrioo While outloi ity tc uo0 thooo iorc·eo will derive through l'iA'l'0 0 ru Reotr cuid Ih need bo m o'c e cv blo to NATO or tho -· hoot nation in conneption thorowit h AccoJ din v i -J I b • Agrecmient o Cooperri tion i o c on uidore i 1cce oa y and a oithO l' o -rangemell2 · A 'Stotuo of Force · · · Asroemeat or e ornpl o would be e oi tthorlt y f o 0 1 oning cl the Forco and oithe - l Stocl pile Agreom 1 nt or Sto -ngo Arrnngement for otoTn8e o auc l e u enpono tn- in tho cOUIJtry Ao to tho lUcleDS weapoa s ot oredf anci 'E nglaud and noa gnod · 6 al to Stl C 0 -ro do not have c atcekpilo nip o ent with eH iirr· at vie do ha a oto -nge cgx-oom cm i or i ng eme o • · • rio b ·- I ' u s ·· - · -----· · A r rangement with NA 'O Cou1 1try for F c ce I lt ommltted t r NATO - -----------' · ---- ------- ------ -- 0 a C I I i '- - _ ' · ·• • • · l -20- NND 882003 - 1- ·-· ··-····-·- ·- - - - -- - - - ------- ---- -·-·---··----- - c U s AJ - ngcrncnt _ 'jth Hoot Nationnlo io Po ' oo C o mi cd Ce Nil TO pl o n I ' 'Ji'l '3 NATO Stocl Uo con copi omb dioo c ul cicb 7 111 $ nucic i r · uc lp0c ' l '7ill b v illoblc to NATO o llioo in o of Ilo iw i ci Jo Tho moue 0 common oitu ition ci itio3 t o da 7 io ii'IO x nngemcnt tihm ol y Uc itod saneco cmicd 0 u i hcafu ozo Co l 'O I rnoiuU7 ned withio ccuIIZl' l or tho uoo cf U ict nnaoo o £0 co m t cd to NATC - - --- - ·· o I - I '· 7o --- -- -- · _________ _____ l _------·- •--· I _ f• 9 - A -r Semcn2 with Noo U s Forcoo n 0- hor NATO Nztionc Ii' I • COE --- - 1 0 ___l -h - ---- -- -·--------- ------J __ - ·--- - -'-'--- - - ---JI NND 882003 - ·- --· - -- ll --- --- - - -- - - - - -- -- ------- -- c n accordance with tto coope -ativo p lan to iooi oe NATO foC ceo in ach ieving nuclea ' ca_pability the United SUlteo liao deployed weapooo ·to NATO o iUono wherein her a · - · g oto red under U s cuot_ody and control ac atorage Gites P -ocedu -eo have beca adopte d for d ifferent weapon oyi t cmo whereby- the nnn-U S forceo arc being araincd and placed into operation under ccocept l that purpo rt to maintain U S 0 control and cuotody c the nuc2ear worheado · l Storag e Siteo Under the NATO otockpile agreement NATO natiooo agree eo uroiah a olte and certain logiotico ouppor t for U S nuclear wcapona ot ored la thci - country and aaoigncd for use by t heir own c-rceo Specific criteria have been prepared to whlc thcse otte i muo t ccn orm Xocluded io a requirement o dcmble fence with the 01• er perimeter guarded br oecuritl ' orceo o t he uoer nation Entrance thrcu gh the nermoat fence la cc i tro led by U S peroonn l Non-U S per io inel are not perr 1itted inside the inner area unleoG under U S eocort Within th e inner area are l icated the buildings or ao they are called lglooo in whkh the nuclear_weapor6 a re stored There a l so are bui dingo io which U s peraonoei service Che weapons a T he non- U S peraonnel are nev e_r permitted wii hln the igloo in which be weapono are otorcd or the inopectlon and maintenance buildings wi nln which the warhead i a re aerviced When t e warheads are ph foicallv locater wntbin the cxcluoion area c the storage a iee and p irticularly within one of the buil ingo t e U s hao full po iseooion and c ustody Howe ver ao diocu ise l herein acCuai U S control c f oecurit io exceedingl slim tho I A United Sta eo enlioted man i n otatic oed ae the inner gate to control entrance to the excluolon area but he i s _ nol conoidered to bav l rcopono1biHty foir oecurity 0£ the weapon which i a the £unction 0£ the non-_U S guards who patrol the ou el ' perimeter The following regul ation i pertinent to -thi o are contained in The USCllNCE UR Plan £or Support of t he NATO Special Ammunition Seoragc P f gram Revised May ZS • 1960 • -- • I ' • • • -· 6 Conceet of Cuotoor e A m nimum c one U s cuoto Lan will be on hand a t iU Cimea with we aponc ar d c aoGi ied material in o cragc Gieea when ou c h items are being tr inGpo -ted and wb ln weapono a -e loaded oc i rc -a ft o r mated w th -e idy mboilec f The U s cuot1 diac v 111 not be uoed fr lccu -iey gua -d or oeo - d uty The resp c1billty £or pl 'ovid r g in e Ua iou oecui -it7 rer t J w i h tbc NATO fm cea be og suppr rtcd An alll roia t hc cuotr E t equire me · te ii e ich c ise ohculd dic ite cho meth d oi r pe -' ti rm- rI ' NND 882003 - 29 7 • Gcnc cpt of Security a Security c nuclear v capons and nU aooociD ted equipment i o ihe r eoponoibUity of the NA TO Ikl¢ion whooc delivery unic io bcnng oupportcd Non- US occurity forcco will provide pL otcctlon agaiuat oubver live acCiviticG attacko br e·ncmy forcco oabotcuro and paramilita ry forccn In add tio n protection will be provided againoc unauthori cd vioitoro oboerver i or curiouo oigbtoccr o whooe p_rco cncc wcul d tend to undermine the overall security o the ·ieapono and cla s ified material Trancportaticn of warhead in or out c tlie orelgn couot ry io the reoponolbllity of the Unite d Statco acd generally i o conducted b' ai r or ohlp Tranoportatlon by l and wiehin the o -cign counti·y however under the otcx kpile agreemento lo the rcspono ibility of the uoe - nation l ccorclingty the pg-actke io for the warheads to be trans ported to and from the oeo age oite by land vehicleo owned and operat ed by the uaer na t ion but U S 11 c ustodian·s 11 accompany each weapon oo trani ported Rc oponsibillty for the e ecurlty of that weapon ao previcualy no e l hao been placed on the usci natioa lo tranoporting t he weapon in and out o the otoragc olte the £01 eign peroonnel we were informed ire pe -mittcd to p ck up o - deHvcr it w thln the cxclua l'Qln a rea alongoidc Cl the i gloo but a lwayo under escort and with a U S cuotodian p r eocnt In one caoe howeve r lt wao noted that the ftirelgn personnel aoowned tranoportation reopoooibUitlea a t the outer-most fence with U S pcrnom1cl tranopol ting the wea poo from the igl oo through the ir i nermoot fence to the outet' p erimeter 2 0 Aircraft StrikcSquad rono a Several te -mo are u aed lo conju cUcn wUh U S caata iy at d control ind ohould be opellcd out The re are two atat co of a l ert that thooc aqundrc no rnalno U lin Normal Reac cn Alet·t0 which requireo r lanoo a nd plloto to b e abRe to react wlthi n three houra c f o -de -s eo attack and Quick Rcactll 11 Alc 't ORA wMch requires thc oe designated weapon B flltcms aod crcwio 1 ot indby to meet a 15-rnlnute s cramble capability• The autbcriey fci the reloaoe aod e q endlturc o U S omtc we-apcno i o c i -nU ined in th e oo-called SACEUR USCKNCEUTl R-Hour RH-1-A meooago This io the U s author i r t hrcugh the United State a Commandc --ln-Chicf Eui -ope Co rcle oe the warhead and he NATO order to tho non- U S pcroon ncl thrcugb Supreme AlHed Commander Europe to attack The USCi NCEUR codeword lo required be a uthe nticated pr o r to the rclcaoe of U S at orr k ·1cnpoco Thie iB knov n ao the R-Hour release p -ocedure i to b j USAF cuo odial det aclirhec tc act ao ihe U S cuoCod ian and are ouppo cd to cc -ni rol acceso Co a nd r elease 0£ a l nudea r 7 iapono No opccU c wnbe ' ci U S guards o - cuotcdiar o io required 01 dcro are A mfnimurn o USAF pc o cnnd will be prov ded o tnsure that nc ·1one indtvndual ever hao access to an atomic weapon and to ac ao U S cu r d ac in he atorage_faoc cmblr buildir g and wi h each weapr n when outside ' he r r riage asoembl a 1•ca M-ID 882003 - 3tJ w• C0'e 0 ti Ulb U ' P1 - 17 -· 17 __ c Under normal re icHon he USAF Cuotodao Dctachrr cnt eurnc over 'lO tho uocr NA TO na tion c cmpletelv noocmblcd ✓capon for loading en rho triko oircrafa after R - Hour belng ' coponolvc to the· NATO nlcre cyotcm The USAF caoto lfo 1 detachment bao an ale -t officer on duty ae tho otot'nge oito dur ng any NATO a lcr t d v 111 be on call nt ·otber eimco f o coincide wlth unlt t'cnctlon tlmeo cd pl 'cccdurco i'hlo olert officer rccelvco and outhcnClcatco the SACEUR ClNCEUR ' -Hour RH-1-A z ncooagc nC which tlmc he can then 1 cl oaco U So nucl ai' reapcno tao NATO oerU c forceo to poi form prcocrl bcd SAC EUR m colono U 1G mandatarr that tho USCl NCEUR codewo rd bo -e cclv d bv th o ilere o flccr priol to the telcaoc of the 't ICilpono to the fcrc co · d For Quick Re ictlon Alert enpono cuotody l o handled oomewhae dlf fercnt- 11y from the ab ove Ao o J a nuary 1 1960 ' l 1 Alr Foi -cc uuclear c apable un te aoo igned co NATO both U S• ind non- U S ·1ero directed by SAGE UR to aacumo Ouk Reac icn Alert Q RA The NATO Atc mlc Strike Pl in l 'cqui -eo th at or every oquadron of pl aneo vo a lrcraft muot be en QRA unleoo the oquad -on baa l coo tbii n 16 p lo nco in 'Jbich caoc one plane only io to be on ORA The pl ineo are on the alrfield--on n pad--wltb nuclear o eapono nbo a'r d Their ai -e oltuoted lo c ocpar ite niren from otbe - p la nec nnd n -e 11 der auard a the non- u s nntionVo nlr ioirco Orlglna ly u s proceduirao ll'equlrcd trnO U s a rmed cuo odian to b e pootcd ae encb plane on QRA Recently however tblo l i io been changed to pei -mlt one u S onllctod m io to act rui cuotodi u1 ll' or tw v oapono the p l aneo are oituated vJltbin 100 feet o£ co ell Gtbol ' and nothing to betv eed O obotruct ala vlolon No lone indi vidual i o onppooed to havo ncco110 to an clert alt'crnI with c iucl enr v capon leaded Poroounel who are autbo l'l cd acceoo to theoc Pci ptin oyotemo ire ll'cqulrcd to be acccmpanlcd nod oupe vioad by tho nlert pilot an arma nent aechnkfan and t bc USAF cuotcdian Tbc USAF cuottt d at· detachment pirovidts a n nlert c ker on duty at the baoe at u timeo tlmt aho Nit TO otrllte unlt lo on QR t ot ituo Tb o o lert olllcer ·t-eceivoo ond ctu hcntlcateo· tho SACEUR USCl NCEUR E R-1-A mcooage no undeir Normal Reactlono Ho perocn illv Jculd notl y the US F cuotodla n ot the aircraft o tho a uthority to reloooo wcopcnil nnd then wc uld g0· e the otorage oll'en to pcri onallr IlOt iy the USAF duty ccaot_odl o the authority to r leaoo other uoapono c Cu_oto v and control ln ill -ibeiber it I · -- ·• - · · non- U 6 1 NATO oguadrono l o · o tbe oame• · ·-f ' l • • l - - -- t • • • - ' ' -• - -· -- ·-' --- J • __ _ i __ · c- - _ '-'-' ·-- · • - Z4 o i - ' 0 - · - •• • ·• '·· • • ·J IDID 882003 - 3 · • • • • ·• •• ' t • -· •' ---------- ------- - --- - - ------- -----·------- ------- · 6 1 o A t time i USAF cuctodi i _r cmalno a e the i i ·cl 'cl' ilicf - latc _i· ''· Do @fr IN @ CJ Si ftb l JU1 fG°lJ • · pilot and c - ho a -c c o dutv uo t· U _no ebo USAF a l e re ofi lcor o r e conthu ouolv m eho ilort_airc i uc ualli - m i buUdlnit nc i1rb i w butc Che •cir c- i t fie on QRA• Hoo- over iltl ouib the plane and ✓capon nre __kept on ehc l'icld iiround the clock the piloto ire 0 duty only thooc houro dl rfing wh ch l£ her ll 'e ordci -cd to nttaclt tliov c on re ich ehe lr ' ea ln daylig ht r lc u s CUOtGdl • nn cn iotod m in and the azmed g uai -cb of Che uoe n it on ii -e continuouoly on cranrd • he rcmain ng ilrcraft up to 7 0% o oqu idrcn ccr e ng th aro undo - Normal Reaction Alert _and ni -e -cquli -ed to b e a b c to r oac t v1lth cnpcno aboard w tltln throe houro Ii n eeded Mnny of Chio number b ivc pro- nooinoed mtool ono o hcro ill rcoct ao Cbo o tuatlon demnndo KdcnUcal cuoecdv and control procedureo are cmplo ied 0 11 the oe nlrcrcit a nd wenpoao oo for ebe n crt a ircrnit 3 E«i ermedlate Range Ballloalc ¥iooUoo J D° b A · l DO G l o · - · · l • - ' - '' J' I · 'he J ollc ' § dlocuooion c the concept o cuotcdy and cont_rol oo lt opplioo ao Che J m oolleo vill give ocmo Idea ct the lnterpre tlcn of U s cuot11 dy and cont ro Q -'D t beado no lt lo oppUe d to XRBMo · b I a Cicnernl · r--- -- -'- ---- _ I · - · ' · · I • _ - if J ' • I J' 6 a · · - · I • t ' • • j • - -·---- ---IAUSAF La cb Auib e otlcn Ofiicetr LAO l o o ·duti7 o 8 'o icb o lte me0ir- fou1 hoo t-a po - day £or i ho pmll'pooo cl ll'ec olw t13 u d iutbocticaQ 1ce ······ l • • t l iu cch o ccuc¼on o rdotro nztd co ace ao tho cuoecdAnc oo· it'hoad o m ated to mloo ioo Hlo pa oe l o to m o clt1ced t i - oaloi - boirc ho c lE I p01r ieo n pa nel c 0t 'ai Hcg e ci' 1 -oo miooi co ic hlo cite No rmnUy the tbreo m5oo Ko imv·o nrbendo a d rre C ctr7 •rohk co m oSed to hem Tho USAF L iuo- h Aunbontkntaozn Of cei - llo do u e of tiuo cvo cocco ry eo· f r e eho m dodii a w ucb 1 07 ha rnak izf tt o a-n blo pc t ottn NND 882003 - 32 '· · • • · i - ---- -- - - -- --- -- - - --_ _ - - - -' 'c _- ' ' ' --- ' ' ' ' · t · ·· -_ _· - Jc JL5i sl 11 1W Ull b ll fib Cuo r d - ar d rtelcae cf Wa -hcado and Noec Cot 1eo Nucleai - warhcadc prot•idcd b -· t he Uo ed S atc l a rc suppooed to remailn ln full Unieod Staeca owne 'oh p cuotL·dr d ccctz-ol in icco -dancc w th Un ed Seaeee lawa Uo So pcroo el receive aeo r e ma ne i t ncpcc cl Jeck a ut and z-ceain cuser dlt cl all aootgned w irheadc az d c oe coneo The · a s do the mating c the waihcad· to the mt lcl c Un tcd· Stat eo c otr diaft reepcnolbLHtie l reiath·e to mated warheado at each 1 iunch p oo tioc are ultil cd by mcano of ccn1inucuo··etectroo c maciet1r ng by the USAF La nch Authcnticat on Offtcer on duty hventr-fcur hours per d ii · ie each l aucich po1 icn Origlnall r U 5 ·oecurit y and cuoC an c ueg rdo -equil 'ed n Ua s guai -d Co be poi tcd at each mhcific launch oite to pi cvcoe UDauthoi - cd acceoo t o the warhead n addittc 1 the U s Autbooticatio1 1 O 1' ker wao rcqulr to bo on due7 at the coce -ol pacel Theee g ar -ds are oo ltmgcir cm e dcr -cd nccecoari - and have been rem e vcd c½ccpt when the e l ectrcnic mco toring srotem sAeoperatavc ae wMch me a m n mwn of ono add t i cal USAF cuotcd iai guae-d iii to -be en duty- i J r wa -head cu - ·e l nce at the af ec ed l aunch pr sltion At leaot f wo USAF mun tlr cs pe -oonnel are rcqu -cd to be p -eoellt du -icg operati cr o n -olvi Zg the rriat ng o r de-mateng of a ire er trv vehicle wteh wa hcad and durllng anv mclct en µ ce 'n r inopectlcn AnvclvAng the -e-ct tq· vehkle-waL head comb natacm 0' 1dng ground movement outa dc the main base wax-head maintenance and aeo ragll' atrea aU claooi f ed arhead nooe cce c mpi ncn s e -e acc mpai ed by a m3r irnum c- two USAF munaUor a perocnncla 0 1a Honea Jchn Weapc n Srol ema U So custod al det ichmente rct iin £uU cuotody 0£ the nuclear wa rhead acctiooo fo ' the Hc ncat John p i 'ior to receipt an R-h u - -c leaoe meaoageo Cuatcdy0 o o uoed to this c aoe01 io concidet cd to mean uU owe ea-s hip poooeoott n and accouotabiHtr tor the weapons l n ·ol ed n peacet amc cunt d r· io ma n inod bf keep acg ¢he a ctual watrl leatlo le oeorage ig cms unde - lock and ke · Tb-c· kero aa-c a• aHab e inly to cotrtain mombe ro the u S detachmoot Finaltr a u atcdnal gua rd a £ at Aeast one m in but ca -mallr twn cr e cf whom may be asleep le re ioed c ·e - the locked igloc s Unde r cerU c cc- r di icco oucb ao pcrir do 0£ ot rafio ed r e a aca ci durit g maiieuvei o wcapor o mar be removed £rQm the Aglic ws Ai aueho iz ed bi · CKNCUSAR £UR ac d mo -ed b y c·oc 'll f -ta emp r 1 r7 e m luo oo ai -e i oo Thi atuaeac1 1 m i r be auehoi i ed es o n Hc nese John b 1-' eaCior m1 ooe mr ve tD oucb a dtoeri ce £ -om ifo pr ecc rlbed I'c id 0€ weapcr o ihat it • 11 i d1d be u able to rear 0 iUI wcapcco i n ca ie i f eme i'gencr Utzi et bcoe cfrcwno i ccc weapoco w ncrmalll r oro' l be removed i°E'Dm tbe pac Idog caoc ar d wiU n rs' be z natod to he rocke · m t6i - U and '11 en ' 7 lli'heo dc ar c ChuG m ·cd and du k g rn til e -admtr l f ra i re mc ·eo cf we pono 0 U s clint Xiia pei ooc r d accflJmpar i-each t -ac- np tac g - bkle bul tb e Ileen- nat cn d eo the a -c l ual ma v r go Uf'Or receipt a p i 1 p0rl aut hci Ck tcd R-Hcu c mo Gage0 ell c Ua 5 cuot•J il in i i authry i -i ed tr 1·e ens·e phre c nA pr -oocsc r z i a tlb' l atomic woaporia eo the c onUa S W'A TO deH ·or f £or ce c o mmande r fo r tp1'c d l' 4 re acc rdance w h SACEUR'o a im ctrr ke plan A b - g 1· P' Gcoooir n ie t c Hoqub hed U S owoeP 'sh p and accoun abt Y e r ct aic ed u eil t he weap o is acf ua2 c l aur cbed Moi·e 'l ei' c st - lf at I m a be p -ep ir -ed r o es1 - £u l cusltr d ·• i chvilt g p osesa lC'ln ic the even weapono zt 'e -1re7 JJ d NND 882003 - 33 ac · ----·- - -- - - -- ---------- ·- - n 1 -If''¼ r flClWJ uul1 U Cull ' --odr is further affected by U S rctent5on of the v arhcad firing p lug l which arc esaetr to the functioning of the wa rhead Tlieoc plug l arc required to be retained in a loc ec afe undc i close upcfl'vioion o I keif pci -oonncl c 1 the detac unent Cuotody in thio oyotem a l ou invo1'111 -S control of delivery oyotemo l f Che occaoion arioeo when weapc no muot be mated to keto and rendied for firing u S custodial pcr ic-o ncl wUl rct i in pooscooion of the fu ng plug a nd in add ti n wBl riot perm it the delive -y unit to inoe rt cloourc plugs rind - -0 C ket ignitero Thua ehe wa head is oafe and an inadvert ent l aunch can be prev nt cd by U s custodiar o s Nike- Hercules Cuotodi tl Me ieu 17 The full deealls t cuotodial a rrangemcnta £or nc n- u s NATONike- Hcrculcs delivery uilits have not been· cdtabHahed by higher headquartero at present ainc e it will be aome time before any non-U S NATO delivery unito become operatic nal Ao an ·ineerim meaai re ho ✓ever cuatodi a l dc c unento under Hq SASGOM plan t o accompHoh cuotodCal contrcl in line with the general program dcscr oed above fo the Honeot John pluo meao ul 'es indicated hereunder · 0 Fol ' the same r eason the alert otatu l for Nikc-Hei -culeo uni o in NATO hao not been prescribeci Kt ls probable hcwever that a l ert lltatuo will fo low the U S paetern which gcuerally involves a certain number of battarie·o or ta·u nchero in ot ate one ready to tire within 5 minutes otbero in cta te three ready to fire · within '36 ninutcs a Jd t hc re mainder in state our ready to flre withi n Z hours Thooe atitrobe r aiteo in clting the Nike-Herc ul eo wlll have oecur ty guards and the pr scribcd fe-nc ing lighting and oeher security features U s cuotodial guards Nill maintain cotr' ol over the a ccess gat e to the inner fence Routinely there Nill be a minimum of one man on cuotocllal duty and ano he - preoent Arming plugs for all nuclear weapono will reCaioed under leek acd key by these cuotodians unt'1 receipt o a properly authen katcd R-Hour rrie'ooage a which poane thor will relc ase the a -m plugo thereby releasing mioolleo and warheads for uoe in accordar c e with SALEJ R 1 o a tomic otrike planoe Normally nuclea r armed mlooi ea will be kept in the bu ding at the· end of the l auoche i - rails Undel ' the ae conditions no flllrther cuotod al gu irdo are required oioce i cceoo to the buUdingo i o tlen ed During pedcdo of tranning by either U0 S0 or delivery unit perecnncl however when he mioolle ia on the launcher or o herwlse accesoible two trained U So custodians must be present at each position Gt-m trcI to prevent iuadve rtent launch lo accomplis hed b r a number oi oteps The Ilnal and m o l i mpc -tan otep ie that the U So custcdiana arc net tc permlt the rock1 t not ir ig it er ca ere t_p be co inected to ebe launcher rreo r g beam untn nu aircraft has been pos ti veli - ide lt9 ied as hooeHe Whoo it is l cated cn r m i c uteo -cm tho ron Curta n and planes a re ae Mach numbers i s dcficuat o unqerstand how a p ar e wiU be posit ively- iden ed as ho lti e Fin ill r a s wi t ch is availabl e t o the control of1 cC r whic h permi Ga destruc • i f the launch shculd be unlntentio1 NND 882003 - 34 c-c o the weap n afte r aucch C • 27 1f • ··· · ·F · • ·•'· •' · _ ·-· · __ - ·· --·· • ' • H'o O ' · · · t' l f · -- ·· • • • • • - _ _ s • 0 ·• £ _ 3 f P - • ' - ·• _ · · t J · - - - - • • - - - - · ' • • n E Summa -7 o f P rcb e mo and Reccmmenda tano l Policy Conoiderationo En cutli ning and inal --z iog var nouo problcmo and recommendatlona i rnoing cu t Ch io otud 1 n umber c f pol clf conoldera cno and objecti veo too vo umtnouo for ccn ide r- itir o ii det itl hore mui e be t il en into account Some o theoe partic u larly thooe o an cveraH natu -e are of l ote re oi to other Comm tteeo ol th - Ccr 3reoo pa rticularly those having to do wi h iorei gn r e ae oce and at'mcd oet'viceo Bao ic to any cccperative nuclear defenoe orotem with NA 1'0 lo a rec ognition by curoclves and a knowledge that our NATO a lEc i -ecogni z ·e it al oo tqat the United St i teo pooocooee an independent nuc l ea r otrlklng c -ce o some ccnoiderable effectiveoeoo th -ough be SAC force t he Polarls oubmarinc fleet whkh no coming lo and h -opefully the liquid and oolid fueled terccnttnenta Balliot c Miso ile oroce e l ocat ed cutoide of the NATC a -ea Whether the Soviet threat i o euch to negate thlo force io not cle i r In acal ·zing the var ious p obl cmo and poaai bte eolutions ce -tain quest cno manl eot th emeelveo threugbout Among them are the fellowing a How mpo -tant to U S and NATO aecu rity io the U s NA TO ouclear weapons capabilit _ Pa -ticularly whae li the val11e cf t he in cf ect 11 al ert o roeem of combat re adln eoo now b What a r e the risko d accidental a nd unauehori ed u oe or detonation c nuclear weapono under preoent circumotanceo cl What rea ocnable meaa ureo can be undertaken to p revent a ccidental ci - unauthorized uoe i e How can real U S c cntrc l be lmp rove d · lo analizar g ouch probl ems it ohou d be noted that by going to a oyoecm r more immedia1le combat readine io the old conce pto of U s pcsGecoiono cuotod1 and cc o trol are being otretched beyond recognitlco The old conc ep lnvo1ved iepa -ate pbyo cal poooeocic n by U S · forceo ap r rc-m the non- U S al rcrait rccket or m isc ale I I I '1 i Secoudly in utHiztng mC l e acvaoced weapon c etcm$in NATO ·✓e muot be alert to the fact tha we increase the p - blem cl matn lo ng Che lecu1dt c Re ltrictcd p ta in tho event of 2 cc- Jo to o ich - eap i no b7 tile hoot ' c ' c oa i r nalo NND 882003 - 3S ' f ' 2 S•rrnmn oi Op zati P -oblomc ' Tho Commitiee du --ing iro hip tr 10 imnrcoood b 7 £ho cnp ibWtico and c n ' ccionZ ouonl oo o£ tho UnUcd S tco 'milita r n oi all ocl'Vicco • nth w i ior n it in c omact TliL i wuo pa 'ticul u-ly 2 f £he opei-af i er9on X both enli a2od ind comntlooioncd wh o 0 deoplio d ifficult p roblemi · a nd·j m_llll Uly occaoiono iooiatad ru oigcimcnt ociomcd to oo onthu i41 ot ic UIZ Oi iorc Jc • in their coopo #o i nth ' co mo i • • no 6 a ·71ie Committee· o o l Jo· imp eoocd by tho pcl iliticc and coopct-ative op1rit of oom o1 tho_non_ U S NATO_ io i coo · The United Kingdom figheor oquadrc p-7 rt Clllarly appeared to be Ve il trained and in diocWJoionc vrith owr gt'oup gave ov-e- yin czilion o ouppo -ting a joipt proi Trun with tho United St aeco in oppooing c milltai y cnmmwj ot Uu-oat 7 Notwithotanding theoe favorable imp roooiono eh o Com mittee wao c o Jl d by U belleVl3o c'U'a oe -ioU l probleDl I a Uocting the opo ratiollcl capabW ea oithe U S • NATO itomic• cooperative pl an · The following oection· discuaoeo tho pt'incipal ope rational p -oblomo oncounte ed undez mo iollowing hendingo ' · · · · · · · · ··' 00 0 1 a c Seclll'ity and Pzoiection of ' ' apono Design information d PzobleDl I P otect ing Nuclear V 'aapons Again mt Una rized Ua_e o ·ProbletnD of Evacuating or Dooercylne We iponoo § Communication P i obl emD ti • Saioey Pioblom ' Followbg the in diocUZJo on of each p cblem i Coi im JttteEl ru gecUon o c omm ind ati b oet io ·· NND 882003 _ _ ___ _ · -- - - - 36 - - - - -- - _- _ ___________ _ ' i •• l · i i j i1 I · Roconunendation If poooible ndd itioool lo n cl Ow T 1m•1J 3 the J _unc 3 pad oh ould ba brought mihln the· control a rcn zo c rod iU J c rf'tredin3 each lz unchlog pad c cced ir g the · On h aD -nngo ox rifle fil' fue othc ii co· wao o i lz jp - Co the CnrnrnUteo · - U1lld io diffic ul to obtain imd it i ci' lii ioruJibl e io e tl cud tho com zolled than come type movable housing· oho d e p1nc· d _ abom eacc miooiie io pa-otecl it from o- · oiblo rule fuo It i o uoted i hal - Tlioi mieolloc ·· - he United Kingdo- n ior cirarnrle m - have wc thor protective Iiow ing w¥ o ·pt fuo ho -iw itiOZ2t wnlc houoing io on track and io moved back rom tho i oiooilo at tile tiiiio it iz l 'aioed Ft-om·an - l cn rineorbig tanapo protec£ivo· ohl i dint agai twc 'rlilo - e coltld 't-e pzovidod loir- •-·-· iupite z miooilco while L l a fl rtic il • • •• • • po9Won --· · · ' • • • • · · ·· ·· 1 Cornp lred with Che aolld fueled moblle Polarfo mloo Uo or second generation Medium R a nge Bnllb lc Mlooileo cll'orod b7 lcrmer Socret iz7 Hc rter ln blo opeech be o -o tbo NATO C ouncil in _Dece mber 1960 the liqu d £uele d fb d Jupltero are oboolote weaponoo Since they i-1ill oot be p iced lo h irdencd b ioeo and wHl net h o mobile ihei r r etoH ci -v v a lue· lo bigbly t_1t e u81onableo In the event cii hoatll tloo uso u m ng NATO Ul net otz ko the lf rnt bnow t ho USSR wlch ieo b lllintic mioo lo capabilitleo lcg cclly could be e pececd eo take cue tboae baoeo on the firoC attack 'l thich undcubtedl would be a ourprfi oc lttack o - 30 0 10 fc jroJ51 fr' r' 't§i1b t fiJV1 •i' NND 882003 J'f ·- - - - --·-- ·---·- -- -··- -· - -···- - -- - -··· - · - - - ---·----··- - - ·· - -- - - ·-·· -····- - - -- - - - ------ ---- --·--- ---- - - ------·-··-··--- - - -- - - - - - -- ----'-- -- - -- · --·- - - -- - ---- - -- - -- -- -- j ' I _ - -- -ir ' Rocommcndaclon r •' ----------- '---- - - - - -- C'--- - r l - -- - - -- - - - - -• l f s uch in ia nment j could bo made boforc 962 whoo the Juplter oyote m ·would be coming ln o operation -Tho Poln -lo oubmal 'lno oyotem wculd b·e moblle and thuo n mucb better rotaHntory force c Security ind Pro ec tlein cf Wenpono Deolgn nformntiou Slnco lt o tho declared policy c Che u s net to encourngo Che o· icl Ucn ofi nne ono to tho nucloai- wenpono c ub nod tho_U S by lnl '1 l o prrohiblt d i rom ccmmuclcaelng lmportac r dcc gn and abl 'icat on huc -maeicn to other n atlona uc cao they hnve m ide oubo Ucl progreoc·• to d leo o il7 the U K mc eto tho crlteirlzi 3rent c i1rc ohould be it i kon n our cooperllUi ro oporaUcnal p1r_c cedureo ebat tblc ¢7pe cl Worm it on lo not c cimpromlocd To wbnf evor e ont an indlvtdcal n it on doola-oa co ndv ' lnco lto cwn lndcpc r dent ncclenl ' l '10 ipono cnpabUlty 'OC muoa noowne to ntol lgcnco oporaelcno lo b olng dll 'oceed t cbe i ln d ooAgn lcformatdoci partAcular 17 c Che mora ndv iitc'rd type ·- · ' · · ii ·oo 7 ·-· G• fJ - J '• i ' - • · • ' - - ' · ·---- ' C •• ' • ' - • ' ' - J Sach n clandeotlnc An oUlgence opcll'ntlG 2 bocemeo eaoloz eo whntcvoir e ten'l the lod vldual n itlcn h io ncceao t o cir c onflrol or poooooolon c1 n u s Dl c enr - c -head Tbio l o pc 'tkulni -lv true iicr c ple 1 1lthin the· uocl ' nation wlleiro ibe7 have reaponolbillCv Jirn tgoanope nntlon and fu -oioh tho t1' uiopcrt vebklea ind pc -oollnel acd hnvo i copcnolblU y i orr the occurltv GK wonpono pmccd o bcnll'd Cbe i placieo io lo occ1J1r rlng lo o Qukk ReacUoc Alert Stll'ilto Sqla ldrcco ' The oingtc u s c i io o-tllnl gua - a oo5st led eo m iln lo via ocrve Unccc cli nc e ipcn tt- o -pl itic J Jttd-mo weo pono ln acme c iooo _lo nee idequo co p ill'ekulo -lr v boo ho o -equl -cd eo o od ilcog v o echeo lo 2hc cpon for pcirlctlo o Cet dh1g no ll ocg a o eight bou -o o 1 i Umo -31 · •···· NND 882003 - JB I' rc @fG'JPc- ' Q lf lQJ liUtsU • ' · • L- -· f Oo E - po io c c Ilz n oho -n Chnt in otzmc oo oo u s au ox do in iocru h U _ s ao1 coo i S o t oo wie ou o varlouo o _oono nave lot 'booo uncommon Tho 3omt Committee ot i n loal Tlod ioz tamplo ·· · -·- - - ·-- · ·- 7 - It would appe u- i Ot o dilficult flo tho hoot mi tion ii iZ uo doci -od Co c octo cizcumota ll ceo wno roby t could cot ncc ooa Ito s 12ucl at uo apon i £oz i - ir icdo · o time ouW ciont to obt -un oom o vclu abio Roctt'icie d D ita 0 witho noc ooo 1 cauok 3 in i nto tional incident Yrcllo odditioo o i o o mol'o U S poi oom el -ould lll OC_ coooazily give any i eate - pt actic il pzotoction Co the w i pon ii-ilia o on dcio m inod to take it by fo -co tho additiooal po oonnot would ru doubt improve protec tion againot cla ndcotino intolligenco o poi-ationo u Recommendation • I Cuotodial guar ds aacignod to w- apon i b eing t r i naporte d by non u S pot oonner n nd in oon-U S vebicleo ohould bo in ot ru tep to be particulali 'ly clot t agai nD t my l tompt by unauthorized pe roonnol to obtain deoign informa on ao £or o ampl a • by X roy in on-umento A roin mnm of t 0 U S cuotod al i rua z-do ohould bo aocigned o cny nu clear weapon not ocatod within thq ockod building oz ieloo in n oti 1'agc cite gnzdlooo of how many a curlty guardo hava boon aeaigned to it by the fozcisn n ition cl P -oblemo of P otecting Ni clear ' 'l aapono Againot Unauthorized Uoe Clocely related to the problo m o pi otocting eotricted dam of U S wanpouo deoi gnc iD the problem of p r ovoming unautho1 ized 0po of nucle 'ml2 c0D l b7 pozoo zmol o tho tWei or hoot country o - othoro Evon i ono copto the coni e o U S cuatody ond control o nucleaz weap0 n 3 no cu rzcntly b eing prµ c ticcd and bollo roo that it o in c ocl'o -mity with the law of tho United Statoo ei otill appearo to b 3 n FIUrober of cot'iouo p roblenw ioscc f atod with thio concof Aloo '1b ile the pi'Obleaw appe t o b 9 baoic to nll u S nw lc weapono aoolgnod to NATO thoy tend to v izy degree and im rtnnco with the dlliorent typoo o wa rhe ad dc llvo n oy ot omo ind vith tho f c dividual t iono with which wo nz-o coopo I ·C Under the cUDtody end contr ol conceptq m practice today nnd pr eaenf y plann d oreign nation to which the U S o uclcc o apono have been aooigned hao li' eo pon io oilify xo the oecurlty of iliooe i re pono Thie oi c o ll'co may_bo zi cc o ablo · 7hon th e t tho aecu --ity io m eho ziatuzo oil oabotage Ot atta c by fo -ceo c onotho i w tioo T a rco principal P 2' 0bl em o mt 0 b e ocognizod whe em tho till'eat - ould 0man2 f zom mthu the ho t o-t u Jc z lticm md 10uld il'lcludc · to 3 c omplete t - lrc-ovcr b r tho Q i tmg govc nmien2 of - • · me hoot countzy in a perio i of o rtremc t eooi_o n The oi ogl c - oeat fighi z- etrike planeo c u re c ly on fifteen-minute Qcic Rcactioe Alert now app ia r to h moot ow ic eptibl e to unauthorize d o by an · ditrldu al o r omall g r oup The pl'eoent liquid fueled Jupitor o Dd·Thoi - miooiloo - 32 ° NNb 882003 - 39 · · • · @ nu o I r• · 1hlch c qui c fairly obbot' ito p z-cp i - i o i o id co down pi cco luroo -rotilcl bo c1H firtlll to lbt mch nthoct 1utlloz-l ilcm E o - ro- ot ooco ricnc oaC io n oolld xuol m- clium zo balliotic miooilca kcot p m g m oi c cim pl o 11 p zo- edtU'co Tiill bc mo -c o u oco ptfblo to rmauilio a-icod u mcbiin3 · _ - ------ ' -· i -l_ L- ' ---- ____· -- -- - - - -- -- l·' DD in tho cacio of the - - - unito w¥ch _tha Committee ob erved the 6 o piloto O iliteen-m inutc alort aro quarto od in bttlld ingo i wa i their pl an co T ho plan ea 0 ote on n field eithot completely e --pooor I to tho ele nto oit have mfnimnm c eyoi The pla ne and woiipon er nm on the pad with only ono U S c w todian an onllotod Dlllil l loigned with p-sli or nnol of the u qer DZ tion to gunN it An authon ticatlng U S officer i o equired to b on duty on the poet b iliio doco ilOt foquire o ny obo vaneo o r phyaical olll'Vnf1Jimce b y of the w-enp The quick -ez ctlon alert airc nt e oopa r ated on tho field and ha aooigneci of tho l OO nation p it olling the immediate ru on io protect them Tho prlmo ov uty of the gttardo of c o oo _io to theit own Hou ti rid not to lllio U $ li 1UJc - Dation oli itc po ocomi el wore to nttempt to o·rarnine iho woapon -or ta o plru2 i · cleft the oinglo S guai d would have to cttempt to communicate mth hi a oupoi ioz the o n icaiing Qf ficor or othor U S ofiicinl a by toleph ono which i s undo - conuol o i lloat nation -' Af tho oama ti mo he woul4 havo to attempt by phyaiccl molUlri to -o iu-ain the violatoro li the violation were to o· pl lco en tjle ordo o o ' by quieocen co of the ti le Dlltion he would lot bo ouppo ed by the otho1' azmed guairdD p reoont but might have to ace them a o antagonioto IC wan fu e noticed during the Cnrnrnftt qe vioit that the U s c uotodial cua irdo on duty cl the pl aneo were fo ll' the moat part young fi ot-cnlwtmem men ' lthoi - th un oldo r ezporion ced -oomiol Thay are beinz a iotzned t o g d dut J in oomo c aooc o-z cfght hou ro at n ot otch Originally tltc cle ct piooc odl 1 l•eo zoqui red n rninlrn of one u S cuotodinn to be lUloigned £0 each weapon io cle otatuo By latte dated Decombe r 19 960 t b o ·ooion ao Depa -tmsnt in ormod the Jciitlt Committoo 2hat ehio -oqui rom om full boon modified 00 ihae now ono u s Ctl ' ltodian may bo aooigncd 00 ''hav o cuotody o£ ewe 70aponc p -ovided 211 7 o ze i ioi oeparated by moi o til nn 100 foot iho -c ai -o i o t voning obc clco and adf quate viot al o - phyoicai Olll'Voi lancc- oii oaeh 't70apon io pocoiblo Tb ' tit Uiznti 0£ a lol l o U s armed gi a - o i D2 an eighZ hou via h z rould appea eo pl'ovide n adequate coclr ol of c luclear IC lpou J ot ithntarding tno c dditional occu ity gua -d J ·enoigned b 1 til o ofr tion Ie ocomo r di 'ctxW y doubUul that any n Z O ma er how dccl ' ated to ci dut r c i n otand gun -d dw y io i long penodo of time vmlking a ou e d the two p i an' c day-in on d y-ouz mthot Z becoming bored diooatiofiod nnd umtten itro to hio c 7 2 ieo NND 882003 - 40 - - - - - ---- ··--··-·- - - -------- - -···- - - -··---·- ·- -----· - - _ -· i-i s r' Orlgimilly 7 -ocoduroo r cqulrcd in i i moci u U lt d be nooi d for co ch head mated with ho miooilo in clltion to ehe U s outbentic lt ln 3 officc2' mo hcl-1 one of Cho hvo firm byo Rccont y• howovci - tile Dofcn ' JC rtmont hao · pp - -o - d chanaco v rhoi cbv u s mod 1 W CI have bec amovod m d tho u s a u1homica office - clor l l rooint lin'l uotody o the hmldf l by monitol 'U l o con2rol lP el ub ic h oec to tho ot i roo oi Uw ' rhc ido on eho tniooilao l Torm illy tho · outhellticati n ofI coi- 't'till h o i eoporuiiblc io wee miooilec and i cor rcopon · 0umbez oJC thermonu loa - _ 'iU J oado ·nnc1 mil b c'tho only Amcrlcn i m Ceo launcbinz rca Hio poot i o in o n-aUol m d ' cl I tho otnen- pci oounol uom enc to ci ill tho t railer arc non-Amorlcan U S cuntody o nd c'onZr_ol oi Uw mated warheada dopood ooleiy upon the y c rlcd on hio peroon or_iio plcturod in V'a1'iOUD - ublication o 00 l otrinic roun d hia D E neck In_ caoeI _ _ '' 1 ' 1 _ • • __ • -5 notwithotan µng duly authcnG l a ticated ordoro fi'om the U S IUld from NATO - The United Statoo o nd NATO control ehorofore io ll' Ot ou fficiont eo coouro compliance with the Ol doro to launch Conversely li tho uae iiatlon or it opc ratin poroo l were to decide to laUnch a miooilo o i zomov1 1 ito rilead for it own a oe the oinglo u S officer preoent caoily could be 011crc ome o r rendered ino foctivc Ai previouoly mc mioned th lo problem beeomeo oven more acute when tho moio ·o mplo oolid fuel miooileo a ro introduced 7 --·' Rccomme ndatio Ao ·dlocwSocd b otheir t1 eao of tbio report the United Sbtoo ohould improve ito ovaca atio l capabWtioo a nd ito a bility to rcnde inoperative cuclear weaporui 1n tho eve thoy nro andor thro t o unaut iori ed U le Coupled mth thitt io the naed or bctte ind more zelli blo tr S commanicati bidepe ud nt o the boot or uoar nation communication cbam Qlo · · Li or millt i ry i -oa Jono it i o i oceoonry to ma n ain aucl-3a ' ll ld the l o - -r i hcado on quic c ll oa o lei-t uzde - o oporatiow coiitiol of non U iozceo come r n ethod o - method mtwe bo evolved to irap rove U s cu otody and cont - s Sevora method oecm 0000 tble tlu-ouzh ol c ct onic meano which involve a ming· o dioazming weapon i P _ clloeucoecl i n gcru ro 1 occtio of W r -epo the Soim Co ittccr o aff p io l' to the Committee trlp to Eu opc i oqilooted D olt Ar rne-q oi the Loo Alamoo Labozntoz7 end Dz John Footct- o Cb s Livo -mo ro L lbo ratoey to co i ido i moa cl o -ming o clloa 'ming ' 'roa ponn b r It w0cld appear that both t'n oo of dcvicoo co tld zoadily bo dovclopod u d pzo i od · · · · to Cono doraUoo ohot ld alno be afven utilizing p oomiel i rom NATO eouclrleo otho ' t h ul tho hoot co trleo for certain cy opcra tiooo -o C• • piloto u d uthen- · ticating ofiicero • 3 NND 882003 - 41 • 0 ' - ·------------------------------------ - ---- - - - c P • blcmo 01 c ctt 'l or uoo oyu _ u ido ·tllo pzo c a i' TO _otocl pilo o f oom - 0 0 - r-- 1-U G o r icz oo llc ci po iblo io-z t ranop l' cm o U S ir Ocl ' 70 p m o s7l£ilm ttD om col t ey · 7 uio i cln dco OmDt' 30Dl '7 orocctie 1 b o oi ii tO' ' _'r '' l cJ otoz bOI t c· oz i -ovoluC-lo r Th b c m bo o v-or y oorioco p -oblcm unlooo U S aozcoo b ro ouuiici vcltlc oo ' ' d mco - nc i ovocu itirn ocr to dioei Jil' 0m '£•000 cl - U S o i fuo · • Fon- I ' • l l ' · - 'Ehc i ocoooity CTI boin - 1 e o Cv le O nucloo - 't'10 lp ioD · £ -om c oilc io oot z zi idlo or b tr-act qoootioi _ iu Joint Q mmi c n ro· p mo b uo 111 m -eo o _ • t· ---- 1 fuo United uD qtt 30 l OIUI ·•·- J Do S o £orce i wc o o Jercd e o evacuate r wcl eo 2 wa apono cm two caoionc Bowcvo G i o o o -dozo ·wo -o ouba qu eDily e ol d oo1oro the c'l7Ceuatioo took place om o ticcl point o viev1 howove -hat io zoqmod i J tho o bility to oa ielv nnd quic ly dootitoy n r- 1ca vroa ono in 'ffi e evom of a C t o fuei oocu -ity in tho e vent o1 m omo -_ v local p u itodial unit co iando ro a whocl zcd to d aotl o1 wcapono p -evem ioil ' cil ttn'e Hov ove there rn e Jing oo rnntoo ao the tlmo aaai ed to d6 tltlD deponding upon tho type of w mhcad woapon oyotem and the - hr- St m e n available f HAPE ootintateo io c ram't lo that it would reguiro Dv 1 p 'o irn telyL __ • -'t f 0 1 o · i lto c omm o 1datio c r In c acy l nDta ce in whkh tho U S ha a nucleaz u-onpono ot ered o - nvaUable i £he t o bsdepcJJ dent U S vehicleo ehocl d b e nwrlJablc oz cmorg y evncuati0 1 o 1 ue MJ d n twitlwtandlng any i ooponoibillty on tho part ox tho WJC r natia to iu ccic h L anaport o on At the o o time to mmteV'ei ont fuo United Statoc b -uznic - 'l nOl -nudenr Moista o to o natio i thro l lh millt ury nooiot uu o procr-amn the cqcipmoct µl Guppoi t ox U S fo Ceo oqcip• alitl the atioP h '-'· ag reccl to c ix C lt ti iuld be np ei fi illy c -ma kod fio tho U s -- it w to c uppo · - _ -·•··Lj__ _w_a_s_ _3_-_4_z__ s ---- - - 7 - ·- -· - ---- - _ -- -- E - · · · · · · ·• - · - · • - · •· «• · · ·__ · _ _ _ _ · - _ · · •_ ·'_ · '· ' __ • _ • · · ••- _ - o__· -_ - _ _ --· • - __· · • '' · ii ' lJit Jif bFj t i J• • • - · •• JI _ _ _ __ _-_ ••- • - · •' ·• -r • ·- --------------- ----- --- ------- r fc 0l fu J t ' ·f V f ' t • •• ' il ' 'IJtflfl U Z -oqc eru y ldiv ci -cuitn into -co oct SHAPE w cl fuc p ooo itomic dollr -y fo coo ow higa- pO'j 'ccl 2 ranoctl -o l '0 l blo Co br o idcn t -UO ' mcooa cc o -1 io llii0 ont fr-oq ncioo nnd llCCo ' liD3 t o Gcn o rcl No o d moot Jfn c 120 ·ro Co nir-b loc l c vol c m monito o o - mo c of tlwDo frcqu 9- C'ioa G ora No qtad b io lll JO adviccd SHAPE ha a cubm ittod to· o mr 6 St lndinz G 'OU C roquil omont o mor o apid cloir i capability to int ludo ' i l lta p occocinE oyotom f il at will · p -o- ndo ncccp lo clortin capo billtioo xo tile c £omic o cco c · In idditioo o Ciw cnroroond C omrol f -om Hoadqu a -tcr o comm•roicn2ion linkc a o -equi ed pa 'ticuhz-ly vrlili ciutlyillg fo c o ouch ao dep oyod Honoot Job unito in ordc - that the fiokl cnrnumndo can m emell'gency conditiono clot i hoadqu irtoro to a ccidentD lo-cal diatw bru coo · or th -oats to U S occu -ity ru d cu otc fy Ac of now U S cu otodlal cl'otachmento u ro depon dcnt for com municatio v i io - r adio lephone or tolo n o on tlw n on• U s communication fucilltioo m viov1 01 tho e-- d oaic impol tam o oi cornrnanq control ovozy ofiorZ ohou1d bo made to im provo tho NATO commuxucationn oyo tom Vlhc i i-eveir poooiblc the U s c u Zodial detachmonto ohould ottempt f o maintain opet ' lto iuid monito1' c cmmunication oyotom o· ocpi r ito and independent irom th ooo o £ - non-U S 1ozcco Thia ihould be in addition end noi in liou of NATO communicaticu notwoll' o · 3 Troh ln g Problemo li lhc in tho dcoign oi any -roopou oyotom io the aooumpticm that £no WJe1' 0 the cyotom will bo pl'Op- Jrly t ained nnd have nt hio diopooal r eady r ef'ei Cnce to zcchmcal manaaio covo ID 5 tho weapon oyotom · Tho iro bilitv nnd oo ety of any waa pon oya m could co nmtoriallv -educed ii l oco c i_ry t e chnical manu alo n -o not prope ly intor proted ind tlranolarotit into - - l ln zuaao ·in waieh tho UDO i il uont It -ra doto rminod b17 0 vioitma up iliat n t e p ocent time toclu ical and opern tioncl manualo b lve not booe zan olated into the hoot nation1 o 1--- - '3uago X io contemplatod t li and 'Cihon manuclo a -o t ••-•u latccl il -mll bo do 1 1 do ilia jl ciodici ion l d it t b c pon oo nnd initiative o£ t c hoot tio o Tho U S do i i 102 C' nticip itc ovon acccp' ing tho -ooponoibllit J o i citoc dng 'llio hoot iat oo'o gcl lcy pzooio Co wu 'l l p opc into -pll'omUo 1 bnr en a- n1llod m fuo t ' lZl lla b i It o eta tad eh at o -ro o wou d be detoc tod dw ing q •• -to -ly nop Ctiono i io· fue bolio£ oi the Com t tlttoo e b io proccduzo lo zi ol ad equate ind could load to oorlou J ciFfi clilco ' r-_ -- -- - - - - - ·- - - -- -- - -- - - - ____TI c· hioiory of th h 2ook uchlonge7 than anti ipated L _ _ _ __ - 36 - Upo n_c_o_m p e_ti o n o_f_ _ _ 1 oc _ ' _j NND 882003 - 4g - - -- -- ·- ·- - --- - r -· · · · - - ·_· ·· ·- -• · · · · - - - ··· - -· - - - - - - - -- ---- --- -- - --- - ----- --- _ -- ' - · · ••· · • '• · ' _ - - · _ - ·· · - ··· ' · · · __ ' _ •• _ _ ··- ' · ·· - - - - - · -· - ·-1 ·-- ---------- ----------·-··-- -------·- -- Recorru eod i Uo io To guai -d igalnoC pcoolble mlolote rprctntlcao end t-ccultlng erroiro lo opet l on It ·would occm boot to cocduct all ti - - lnlag ln ehc l iogungc 1y cotcnU7 to be c mplo7cd by the uoc - n 1tlonq Tra olng aldo a d opc nelcoo l m nu i o obculd be in the o cr c Cloni r - - ucll lac The U S ¼o furnlohing technical mnnualo obculd lf at all poooiolc have l i icm iranolnecd lntc tho uoer oaticn o lar guage When nod lf tl 'a nol i ted by the uocr c n Uco tbe Uni Ced St nteo ohculd at caot check tho tranolaCed cop 1 fer l urncy h S ucty Prrob cmo CE - • 6 l CW TheL ____t nuclear weapon currentl r aoolgnod to NATO nod being mated to non-U s nlrplaneo on Quick ReacCion Alci -t·w io not deoigoed with tho alrotr p a lert•· a i one of iCo mlllt arv charac erlotico I tbe pl 'cx edu vlng ' been approved bir th ·- ef ooe Dep trC• DO · ment without c o errlng wl h tho Atomic Ene r gv Commloolon no Co oa cer At the l tlmc o tlia Committee vi t in December 960 Ii wao underotood that tbo __ U S All ' Force Weapon Safo v Bo d hjd not ccmpleecd o otudy 0 thole_ noa- U S ot lp il ert configuration 196 0 - • 0 1 ·· t it - ao ebe opinion o Dr Haro d Agnc 7 -' tbe Loo Alamoo Weapon Labor itowv ho o ccompanied the Ccmm ttee 011 ieo irl ·tha lo a pooolbillty of acc ldenbl Ci de cnatlon bee 1c 0£ the m 1nner in wblch _d ie being uoed It ·100 hio r - 'J conoidered opinion th t a rajectorv oen_o ne dcvlce to prevent lt from being aceldcoWlv IW nuc¼o - r cl cecoo t d wblle_ n the plaoe ohou d be ioo alled immedl _e U I _contl uco O b e une d · ifu the j · '• · __ __ - --- --- ---- ·-- ---------- J - ·- · Reccmmendatiion T o jeceorv ocnolng dcviceo ohc-dd be inotataed lmmed o el • ln Ma -k 7 1e pono 02 15 wc i o con li iue o be lc d d on p aneo wlih the r uclc ir componer to In the infHght l o lnoe tion rnechao orn I S i iotr requlremect o o hculd be otrlngeotlr reviewed i oi - iU -cced1 rco be u p nocd under the NA TO Aeomlc Pl n ind the AC mk Enet 'glf Comm ooiou onpco opcc alioto ohould pai -ticlpnee in the 'cvic o r B ette r iliited Jan n -v lJ 1961 tbc AEC cle -eed Che Defense Deoal 'tmcnt cl ehio pcooib e lo ngcr ' c1 reccmmcnded thct tho Air Fol 'ce Sa iee7 Studv be completed o l ll oo 000 o poo Ja l c Tho Az C aleo lno i u cd engh aeri_ns deoigo nod piroductlcn · c J zto to mcdlir the Jbc mbo b r icc t 'poratil ig a velocity neo ih ' dev co • f • 37 NND 882003 '• ' · • ··- • ' - 44 ----- I • DO G Io m i ny o oo c · rioit ed little· Ot' no E rr looivo O rdnnncc Dicpoocl EOD p iblli ·r i o ov lil1blo 1c c ovo 1 cid nZ il z l dlo lctivc cnnrarnim1tio n t'eoultl c3 i ·om fi rci ca telcooncoo o • iccid oDS o - l1n ino ovccl o1 ti izeat to o cuotodr aud · I ' ' ' ' ' ' o rGonoy a poo J f · 1 L______ - ------------ ------- tr Tho nood £0 dditio l 11 t -o itlod men uc o d o r oovol'il cc wiw o a untt ofcthu ' T l C A o mentioned p -ov c oly It ID 70 J impo r ant in the event of m accidr r r pl'ompt noaoureo ho ta e io r tho ocloty of t OQpo o nd o popul u e Axiv minbondUce of nccident could i'OC til in pirooow o to zomovo u s • nucloai - uenpon oupport in oc q o c otri Ltzy o - oiho count ' o o Thio io rticu arly fz portant ot tho p c-ooont tiino ui · viow 0£ tho act that wc zc J · f to bo p iiticilly c pedic ct 'to inform thei ' people that nuclear weapono re now mthm 1b oi - countTy · ig io not d here th it tho State Dcpa ent repreoentativoo tried to · duic0 1so tho Committeo group h-omf '- ···· ·· ··· - · ·· tlu t iv' 8 ll-'_ 6 a ' i f - • • -c ' • - w j- ·- - -- -- ------- - - - -- - - - - -1 · Rocommcndation ·Eve o iort ohould be rnado w inc eaoo iirnnbe - of U S per oonnol rained or EOD c ap 1bility o nd to havo theoo pa -oon l located within cloao p rndrnify io every oite at hich U S nucl a - roa ono U e oituatod In view of the increaoed · ·· numoer o w apano b iing diop-3 eod tbl · oughoul Ew ope it i o 1mp$rative that tt-ai ning o theoo oo l bo ac cele -a d 1n ordee th lt e ic ooodo will bo mot • J • · · • · · - 38 - 882003 • ' ·' 4S -·----------- - --- -------- - -- - 3 General Policy Problcmo and Alternative Arrangcmcnto Thi c ip and the ocope of the otudy of which it io n po rt c o of co ce cncomp u J all of the many i opcct c of the rolationobipo betwocn the United Statoc c nd itc NATO J lico IZ i o obviouo a ny c opocto of tho politiccl f' i ocoo omic · relationohip i 1 0 well ao o omo i opccto of the milit n y coopor i tion could not covered bo In nddition to tho opecilic o·p orational pi oblcmo noted by- the Committee ther c appe iro to be o number of other proble o of a policy tu re - hich go to the v ery baoio of our ovcr al l coopcro tivc program mth NATO 0 Thcoe problemo no dioclooed in our otudy mo y- bo charo ctcrizcd ao followo they will be diocuoocd at gr eater l ength ia oucceeding occtioru i l Tho trend in w_e aponry in the NATO orotom nppco ro to confuoe employment of iuclear ea pons a or ·otratoe c deterrent and b 'for tactical opero tiono a conoequcnce of which io to encourage -eliance on the u oc of_U s nucleo r '1 7Caponc -other than conventional orcco particularly thoo e of the ' 'hoot countJ y · · Z In Ct frying on thio trond toward nu_clear weapono in tho NATO comple there hao been a failure to meob U S -NATO otro tcigy in termo of enemy targeto and fallout e fecto with U S onatioa al SAC t a rge t o nod thooe of tho Britioh Bornbor Command In pl inning t ha NATO DUcleo w c apono oyotemo thore hao not only been a failure to coordin etc U S 0 U K tu1 d NATO ot2' 1tcgic and t lctical plail l but the re hao cloo been c failw e to eotablioh requiremcinto fo 7eapono d coien to m oe thu unique o nd cpecial noed o of NATO Thio i o pa ticulrurly notice a b o in tcrmo of availabl e modern technology ao to oafety nnd coo t ol i eatu -co and weapon• cliectoo Fi lly no h ao oeon diccuo 1cd there llao bcoo -olinnco on orci3a o ationo fo ' he rocic cc cu ty of u s n cleo 1onpocs end the uc c of 'lfiction c'l moano U S pooa iooioc d cuotody of iucloc s e i ponc u ctlcz ccrtcln cl cunic tnn eo Tho cumuliltivc d' iect of theoc p ·oblcmo in addition to nioing rrr avo queciiono o particclu1 c opocto • io to - uoe ' 410 queotiou of hcthe - tho onti e NATO clliocce oheuld ot bo i-eocvcluntcd at 1caoC in - cBn rd to ito micle U d other milit irync pecto0 Thcoc pt·oblcmo will be diocuoood in oumm r foi m in the ouc cedinC pa ag -apho d then will be followod by z eco Gochtion s i i to poooible courooo o£ nction mm aa2003 - 46 _________ ___ __ Tho T cnd T azd Nuclo r W coponr 7 Tuo United S atco ao oisnific ontly mcr co oing ehc numbe oi 'l 7capono it io di po - oin o NATO couot ico lo $Q- £ ml Ot ivo_5r_9_p r th re h io n - cator t E o · oo · 20 i 2_lc c -eaoe with more G I •1 Autho -i ation o mice Cho preoent dioporo ¢0 W-TO co intrico hao been gr ted to the Defonce Dopa eat iccordinz io informatio n cce rtl obuincd by c Joint Committc 0 0 nnd iZ fio uadcrcicood thoC o 1c1itioc il cllopc -oal io cl ll'rontly being pl umcd · · · · · tii mL__ ___ - Ao me United Sta tee continueo to anc o i oe enc number c£ nuclc TTco poao l n NATO co trico ad to i ooign no -o of theoc o ' tlio uoe of nox U S NATO £0E'ccp 0 thooc countrico l i tend to cut b lck o id not oupporc thc-J - convontion l orc·oo Thero m i y develop o tendonc r to oupploment oi - rcpk co thciz conventioncl cap i biJAUco uith nuc ea we i pono Thie could -eoult in d 11igcr t the NATO oJJionc e ir 1 t it u uld mclro them ioel loco dblo to· de fend themoclv o 1tylinot limited probeo ·b USSR Or ' oa ellito milimr- fore At iho oo mo ti me it could lincroooc tho lil elihood oi clll -out nu cm- uc _ oinco NATO fozcco 0 l icldng convomior - 1 cnpcbility-0 ihey·did 'c ' lct mllitm-ily '7ould bo o rcod to do 0 0 mth ouc e l ' vTCOf -- Go co Wiajo - General VTiUinm H Nutter Chio m Stnfi0 HQ U S A i m- Eu ropo 0 in bio bricfinz oi tho Committoo in Hcidclbcze Ocrm i ny- 0 Dec ombar ·30 960 0 3ovo oo hio op on t NA TO could oucccoofclly mthoi lnd n S viet nttac todnv conventional iorcoo though tho ot ll erooo nadolllll product o nd m ulpc mcir or tho EUl'opo l ll NATO countrieo e c ocd thn t o ¢ho USSR · · · I • c Bo h Jiormor Soc -o y or State Hc ior o nd Gancrill Noi -OUld have i -ocogn zed illo nood or our Ew ope in rillioo to m ' '- rrtain convcation il milim -v copobility 1n hie i-ocent of e - of Medium R go Balllotic Miooileo to tho NATO Cowu il on De cmbl i 16 1960 Mr Herter rclc rred to Oenel 'nl Norotod'o pooition d col led nttontion eho need or· convcntioruu c npubility Ho otatoc 1 · · ·· ·· ''ln opc i dng to iho NATO ·P i -li unellUl iAno Cione ol Nero tad ooid m ct hnvc o oubotontin conveut io li co i bility 1 Um they c - ld bo nado up _ot· mmr• - v- nod cli o f6 cc cle montc of ow tab· ypoc- -oqw ppeGl_ ith n h 1Jom o of oa_ _ ontioncl d nucl · 7cnpon • 0 · • ···i2 J t ctho th- oob old lt qbich nuclc' l t' t poao azc int dl ced nto c tt lo obould bo n hi one 0 ·ualc Jo oll N L TO o ld goo lo - ou1 iotantlcll7 lCbiev9d NATO MiJ f v Comm - --- l o will not c vo tho' ' · ibiliey of eooo ioo - -1il1 onnble t l Z-o mccz any itu - - ion mfu uio npp -op btc· oop o Jc 11 thnt 1ow forcoo Althou3h fue oced ndclliion ll co cntioc il ccpahH 17 io n pp i c ntlv ccogni cd cvidcacccl b · o ioovo' nod otho ouitomo o the Joi a Committee eroup ol l Ild in- · ilc itiono til it ouclc u- 7C lpono nro Cendin to ouppmm eonvont ollcl TTc lpono in come rc o A2 o o o loc ntion thot c w o co convcmioncl ommuni on lo cfucl pu -p oc · · c cipI loo c-_lthough c l a q e num'bol c -f nu clc '-7copono - · wo ili l blo In inothc oc eor nee - c bo -dc - oi the Iron Cu to ino tho Committee· uoo Wot mod t theec l J ___________ - 40 - ___ NND 882003 0 # - - -···- · ··-··· ' · · ' • ' convcntioncl c -mi r c npnbillt o v iilablo Co · oiot Sov-lcZ r uoco 'rcio oc nppn -cnil 1 relied ooleli r on oucl capab-1 7 Co z-coi C limiaed _co unicC m r ·oooion '70 0 LO Z Lack o1 Coordination on Tnrgeto end Follout Berocon U So-N t 70 Nuc1 em Forcco U S -SAC and Britioh Bomber Com mnntl During tho Committee'c b riefing at SHAPE on I' ovo b r 30 0 R960 Committco mcmbcro and AEC repreoentativc J inquired O to manne ' ind deg oo that NATO coor di 'Utco ito a tomic otrike pl mth ille Unite d S too SAC end United Kipgdcm Eoml cr Co nd to p event c cceoo zadi0 1ctivc x i Uout o z d unncccooazv dupllcatlne c ort Although rclcroncc wao made eo i ''root r a p Olf-l' qhicb NATO had been working on to limit -nd ation in oatellitc o nd fr cndly tior w 0 the -o wao no clcai e planation o£ whcthe - o nd how ·NATO intcgr i tc l ito planned nnclca ko mah tho otrntcgic pl lOO o the u s and thou The nck·o ouch coordicz Cion 'm O con firmed by Geoe -cl Norotad 0o otafi dW 'ing t ip i tho the Such integ - - tion of co U oe io importo nt and will ic c eo ce in importance oo NATO o tomic c ip i bilitico continue to grO v ao planned to prevcni duplication cl effort 'which io v i ote ul oi nucle i t 7arheo do and 7eapono ov emo oca to mention uA11eceooarily dangerouo to pera onnel Duplic ltion or overbpping of oar o tt lc o cloo ould reoult in unneceooazily increnccd locul nnd 70 oldwid e i lllot Z Subo quC l co rcopondooce from Qenercl Norotad indicoteo t oomo coordio 2 lon io being developed · • · 3 The Lack of Eota hliohment 0£ Up•to-d te Reguircmeo to UtiJirdug eho Moat Modern W eapc W Technology Tho tT s a I to coopero tive progr lm mth individual NATO n ntiollO htlo m oc o o of different weepoe nod oqcl _ h'l'd • Theoe bwolve •1'0 ' co- I 6 It • •v • '' ' · - ' 0 C ' ' - · ii • ·· • • - · - -- · · - -• -' _______ _ __ _ _ _ _ Ji 11 - - -itb cuclcnr ca bUity0 n ro bainz plannodlo - nhcoc coun 'ico n additicn plan i ® JO bael l IIl l de ancl Cho Jo Chi o o£ St - f17 h lo opp 0'i7ccl p ocodu -orJ 7hc -oby U s oucloo 7 CO pol lo oow d c placed o l o d forciGD oo l'chipoo TI i- 7 i pono O ld oco pon oyotcimo t o b6in3 a mi cd b · · · ·v So o opocllic - AT9 cOWlC'ic_o o EWZ 1ccoooa ily c bcot C1c ' po00 O oy · emo for countrv £c i tho puzpooco - NATO r Uin oc i For e e J' t e 6 l o 1· I ---- '------ --- ---------·----'------- · l NND 882003 - 48 ___ ____ _______ --- - -- -- - - - - - - - - - -- -- -•• -•-- -- - -7 ' ' - --7' ' --- -- -- - -- --------- -- - - • • • - - - - •_ • - · · ' Q 1QTUlfu -u · - Rt'aj · c overage · h y • o o o bo i iadcd i P hc - ecch ct Hcw vq foi t'ea ono lorrictic co i Che aimch o p o 10 0 ocle · lo c Je · o • I ___ _ _ _ __ _ DO - - - --·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - __ Qu ck Reaction A2 rt wcie n vc - t' deoi311ed iro - ow h' oy a o end OODlO 1 Dtio6 h i ' -ci icd c - eZ'Iling eho ca crcy of tho op6 raeion ·in additiono ah e co o ' ' X llOl iu tho cockpi i oz thic 'WC l pon o qcleo co pllcatod comp ired meh mo -o modern -pc warheado - c P pa ·t' dioadvc ntag ·rhcn on i'_'i ealizcc Che pila ci 6-i -c · · i'oroign b nd i r y i · c difficulty 1 ci ao J i 1h1ef by Englich open not'i t l oro ' 16 -· G - '- @_f ' _@fc SZ · • - -- - - - - - been in ' No p -ocodu -a c hnvo been coUlbliahcd onclet 7hlch the unique ll'Cquh-oi nezi2 cf NATO can be meg ated into tho' qc'ci'i gn ond deveiopn' ·nt 0£ the ' Tc' l llh a ado or the modification 0£ e loting zhoado boinz oopigned to NATO Suzh copoc o · mcanc 0£ coDJb l t - dineoc and pi -otoctioo a3ainst a ccidcotnl oz uoau thori ad uco do rioe ippca to have z-eccived ouffkient tcchr uc I concider-2 f ion · ovcu b · Rccommendationo ' · ·· - ' ' - '- _ Recommendation L G Deral - l'bo Nead o Re-Evcluato NATO Nuclear 7eapono Syotemo 'rho Cornrnft eo belle co i o a need ort tho United St ieoo to 1 c· ilva imec Ho NATO rolationohipoo £ n Jnd ng pat tlc ly OlU policico and commitmento c oncot'nin 3 ncic le is - reapon o 0£ ncccoo ity thio woul inv lv-0 a conaidoi atiom of NATO ot a tegic nnd tac ca objec tis eo an · prope - rolo of nl eiea r voapona la -130 und_· ornall the eip · · · • · · · · · · I The -cf6rc ehe Committeo 1 ccommeniia a e•evaluation ot NATO wea ' 0 1 oyotoOl O be ini ted at nn early dato 1D c·oajunction with the propoced otudy c-•rtlinod · in the final i ccommeDdation of thw ·t'CJ on oco page Sl · • In ·a dog thio ccomm n ation the Co tteo 1a m ti ted by the' fact that ilw o -irri nal c ot t o£ NATO na ptjmnt-lly de Jnoi foi c e h no b een ind io being h-a ticnlly ebaoi e°d b ' tho addition ¥' imonnodiata-r e nnd high-yie ld thermo iuclea roapoOD• eliance OD theac megaton 73apcno wndz eo cupp cHa co on c onvention weapono It clno bllll c the di tini tio ce on low yield iiold wc·a oon o o r NATO Cucilcol dc enoo 10 diatingu iahod o ato dete o ont pu --pooc·G - 'i oo Dci'ouoo Do r mcm polk·y o£ wcigning_n1 ZC1 c n- 'Wa lpo w va tloUG NA O coun - 9c t lldo di££e -cnZ o o -n Dgoment 0 h io oc vod Co p l'oV lclo NATO • 1lfu o - itegic · 1 a bllit' vc - envic oned m · c'o'if 'irkn X cone · ·· · · ·· a 'f m J • - V • · • time m Cimo Co tilo 'coirim 1 1 o hno q u antio d oomc oz Checo ecmcof c o zo i yond the m eem of Congi-eoo ao ou llincd in · ACornic Ene i rJ of 954· c amczidcd lRBM miooiloo wl th ehe uc 1c u- m1 on v lienda and· i ' 6c op · io 1500 ra ' i'o ha 10 cl cady bc u nnc1 ci v ill iblo · ' 'lie d 'o ' Xlent d l ' ioo - · · rn ioaileo r thiD nr 1 c io p -cacnl ly being p3annod ·ruia c ccutod 'l i rmgemc ' a ha vc cl 5o been c -otl into wh 1 eby kiloton m ic bocibc azoo ' l W c l5ominutc nlo on £0 -c zn-owned pfaneo Fu -the c ommitrc snta-b o vc bcon made o tho dcp oymcot cl InO i ui leaz mcca on bombs aboa -d £0 -ciezi•owned i-craft on a 15-minute alee ox NND 882003 • 4L • ' ·•·· ' •- · __ · ' ' _ i · · _ •' · · - _ ' - ------·--- ---- ·-·--- - Tao Committoo ocognizco t tile lnto -cc ca into -n ltioncl nmity l p ovcllt the comploZc avc ool o t pact o ctionoo Novartnolcoo 0 it lo bcl icvod eb lt tile h inBC 1n·conccpt i -op -ooo ed by r rco nt cr a ogomoo1o ohould b - 1 L· -ou hly vol tod in vieo of the lfnct Ch i i b lo occu I 'od m-oueh a proc p cl er pins cvo utlon - i thc c no ·o i coult o o clcru - policlf dccioion - Coo ovc -oy a l to tile roopcctivo mcan lnfi o£ ot-c tc le' and • cticol doco noZ c l' · til £net that a cimngc in coru cpt h ao occurr ed nnd·thri loo _ o i -o neo high• ld 7cnpono have boon added to oho t-r ingc dcfonolv0 '7enpono ji i ter· tbor ·o ueh r o vio 7 it o determined thnt NAT oliould in fo cC oc -v n t -ntegic deter -aot function U c • cmln-nco l ong• t- Dgo high-yield' wcapono no w ell oho -t r lllgc dcfenoivc wcapono n r-uliilllng the purpooc of mn --d murn clc - crrcn cc cei -tcln 700 pono oy-otcmc ohould be ro o iented in viGW of the ccoential icqui om ant t o deterrent oyctcm muot ourv1 vc a fiz ctootrikc o tt icl and otill be ope a -o tlonal Prcoont NATO m iociilc oycitomo 't7ith o otrntcgi_c c ipobility o l ncldng in thio oooGntial ·' ·· 0 The 'prcocnUy deployed ffiBMo _n -o liquid fu olod and thuo mor c complicated to opc o tc od ol oqer in ooponoe time they o zc tied to fi od ioota llatioD J oubjcct So prc -ot a pio- pol nting by o enemy The Committee believoo the DO proooatly deplc rad Jupiter miooileii Gc iul d be eplo- od yo l o c o 6 1 i complica ted a ad mobile oolid £uolcd m loo o oyotem · ob ould bo Do PClldiog -oplhcement menou -eo tnkon to pl' 0toct tho Tupitc r mio_a_lleo from ·oo botnge The planned deployment of ndditio l upl c r missilcc obould bo cancelled in ui vo - of aooisznm nt of mobile oclid- fuelcd · c- 6 l6 ml 'J ouc Polsrlo n - ltBMD j u s ·control 10 - o - ou Ject to tu ti • · _J T'de Cc mm ittoc aloo obocrrveo tll it fuc liquid ueled Corporal miooUo· n ou _--itor field uoo io i oplnced by o moi- o i -elli l bl e capon ovotem • 00 deployed in or plonnedr- ·-· G I 4 n ot i d lond iblo uoapon lnd ohould be n - Comrnittco oboorvco tuzthci t mt NATO fo c oc cq_u ppcd with tnctico l o uclc - - - 1cnpono - -a now £ iced m a ooi iouo dilemma in tho cvcn1 of bo dot i nog cooiooc b i cnomli' o -coo cmploy-ln3 convcntionz _ · 7 c a poiw Since O zity- --·· •· --· Sec • Confczanc-c on NATO Atomic P lt ooiog i nd Spccbl Amm u nition SCo ogo -orr--am J ield ot SHAPE on November 30 1960 for ot i tc rnent by Gene ral No o d to JCAE memb - tbt neithc ac nor c nyone 1n NATO htio p 6poocd o NATO itt lto ic fo -cc • ·- - 43 - Q JE ol fo Jc _ - -- ©flb tJJlf1f U NND 882003 - 5o -- -·--- - ---- -- _----__ __ ---- ---- ------ ---- - - - i M • Jc' j' @_f 5i 112rr 1ffftn1 ll ' ' lJ c received prior o tr c uoc of tfie nuc ic i r wc pono ind bcc 1uoc o he Hmit 1 ti - ic dcmcr r iovclvetl the m ijc i - policy dcci iion io to whether ouch wcapcno wall t c u o•ad to c0 unier bo -dcll' tr incgrci iolon i c-1 thb -type munt be m ide ir id- ncc of i hc ever Othcr 1ioe we wc l td Hod our ielvco dc ecoelcso bcca uoc elf l ick c i cor vcr fc r i l forcc i 11 d equipment on ou - p n·t The Comn tttec ur de - oe i nd i that r G ouc poHci' dedoion h o been m a de it would icem deoir ib e to cmph i - - c in the NATO oyo tcm an -rangemcn of de ii c ipo city wc ipono wMch C ln uti li c c c cvcn lon il w 1rhc 1do ao well io nuclen r 1 rhc ids- Tha i wc ld h ic t de ehc 3 lnch h owie c l'o the Nike a ind the D ivy Crcck tto Such we ipons pa rtk i lzrlr Che howa¢ e 'o irmc d wi h coni•ention il w irbcad l or oheHo w utu ils c end hemoc veo to dual p1 rpooc r loing wlth trocpo of oui -· £01 cign alli' ' To carry Ollt the de cr oivc m oolcn the NATO dc fcnoc oyotcm ncedo augmcnt lc n ir tc rm l c convcn icmaA weaponc ao well a o nuclear weapono Tt e ialhnre lbll the p r c cr NATO aU i co tG meet their previouo conventiQnal ce mmltmentc and cui a lure t o ir nis t•n fcl i lmcr t cf oucb commi' n1ento oc w pr ocnt uo with a clCuaUcn whc -e the argument lor prdt e -atie n cl nu- leair W pons nppears plau lib e Notw lr ho aoding tt- c plauoibHiC 7 o ouch i n a gumen it wc uld occm wioe t o pauac and cc r o de - the pc ioib c cc-noequcnceo 0£ ouch cekn t wcu d ccem deoi -able Ll nc e Oer tial tha the U S reconoide - the proH e -atie o cS nucle · · 1eapona i n Che NA TO c -mplcx H it o lete -m r ed that add t ior al NATO nuclea - capability lo eccnoa - ·• we ohol d ' require as a ccndieion c'i' ouch a program tha t c- r NATO aU i a oc £ i -nish adcqcate convt-r tlonai a crmarr cn and manp Cl wcr Xi tb o lo not dcne we woutd be lim eed to a nuclea - re oponoe f or any t pe 0£ miUtatrV agresoion St e lnd ng No l page 40 o r -eas nlng ReC fj' mmendaeion 2 - - The Need to Coordinate NATO w th SAC ind U K A n aj o - cf ort mus be made ti - coordinate and integrate NATO a omic otrikc piano with U S - SAC and B dtioh Bomber Command plane Thie io impo -tant today it the p reoect level of NATO Atomic Strike Capabilit i t£ as planned NATO nuclear c 1p lbility conti nu 9 tc increaoc th -ough introduction c oece nd g eoe r ae ion Medium Rar ge Balliotic Miooilco grc iter numbero of atomic otrike ' irplaneo and nuclear grc und and Gca fc rce ouch oordir atioo ••fill be iodiopcn9able to prevent 'ante of pc -ocnnel ind wc ipono ors cms and in the eveut c f uoe unneceooarv increacc in lcca l and worldwide radioactive fallout E ective cocrdin 1tion would al oo greatly -Cdu e cvn _ - 44- NND 882003 •' • r •' ' 0 • • •• • • • · •_ ' ' • • 0 • • • M• o - SI · - · · · · · • i ·- - --·--····- - 7 '1'b c Need Co EoeabUolli NA'J 'O Ncc co 'loo pc 20 Rcqutr cm cneo 9 io cd o t C ui -ll'cn2 Tccnnclof lv 1 i I · 1 nc l 1 cloo ccm o·oocrati 1R' o o 70111 o o dccii -ob o h lC Clio U So-NA ii'O ouclc lt' pcnpoti o occmo be rc- o i mliicd watb o vie ' 0o inco pOt ' ltt Coo rooo mc lc n -' ·1cappno cc ioio cnt t'Jtah U S oocu -ii7 ind ooioev i -cql i c mc ieo XonCcnd c1 mo ldnz NA TS _ - tunpb13 c -oand io - oboolctc ' · c -nondo c n d 6oopooo oyotcn o foi - c unplo Q o nd Cllc ot pon- mlooilc nnd plac ioz icm in nn ··ulc rC poolaEon cu 15 · mmuico a-cadincoo v lchcuc c dcquo Cc c uoiv proco c lono Che ·Uniec d S o oboul ¼ln • n o Cionn d comm onoonoc n nnnoa- c iU1bli i nnt Cho NATO ·ocopono E'cquiL cm c o i -c nod oell o ito mctlcrn technolog y 1lC Lf' J f b moo nii c 1 Llvoll'mO O ao o'neloiv th oc cqul -omc tto XE l T o f n rcfo Clon Co development oZ m cnno cl ccicguni -dine JJo So · anpono Jir -om occldent il d oeonaUono e r unuuthorlzcd u oc t h o S tnff c1 ilic JcinC Commlttoc iuggeoled th at the Lo i Al in o i Llvo rmor c ind So ndb 1 iboratorlooO c oopc r ato in d cvclopi n1r d a dap ing device fo iheoc pu -pooco An 1l co ult cl thio coope ratlon ahc fe llo ing progrc rn ha i b een made • 00 G I a O n the pi -chlom of nccldcntal d cio tlono te Pao lndlcntcd ehnt the uoe of ocnolog d e vice i vill prcvcc t n ccidentc on ehc g round and whe n tho weapon io in flight A ocn o ms device ehrc -- o ho en owlech when the bomb o r mioorno coco rough tee nc 'mnl tr ijcctory Le• • when the v le clfy nnd p rrcoou ira rencb Cb e co -rc ct nmowit ehc cenolng device clooeo the e iect -onlc ·c i rcuito The · -100 IC r·------ '---· --- -- - - - · -vi obould be noted tbae n o enoing devlco l o cl co value £or nn un ilith- orizcd launch o n bomb o i mloo U c 0 but a ccldcoto• • looffoctl vo a e a n or fo On the problern cl unaut hori cd l a uoebin3 oo nuclec ir 7eapono It _ r io poin cd out tha e nt Capo Cana vciral the bunch ccntroUerc have a radio control in fligb dcstruc t cn device• Tblo o 1lloo truo c i Nike-Aja wenporic • con the Scclflo trlp o Albuquerque on October 7 and ao 1960 iMr Ramey ll 'equcotod e CommiUec Corioul o n Dr Hn -cld Acne Leo Alamoo Labo l'ntoll 'v io llcok uito deviceo io pi -cvcnt a c cAdental o - u iautbo l'l cd uoc lo eho NATO c ucRe i - oyot c m l c • • mc i of impi -oving U S cu oicd7 elecill 'onlcallv 1ltld dlocttooctl 2ho pl 'cbl · gcncrull7 uitb D - Hendcroon cl a nd ia L iboro torv ma t'cprcocnuitlvco of DASA l n oubocqacot diocuo ilono b ef ore 'and liter tbo NATO Crip D r Azno-1 lndlcntcd c o ioidot' lblo proe -c io 1n· d e v c lop n g fovicoo Io - thio porpooc 'At the m octingo c1 t ho Ah· ' -c o Sclonl ixic Advi o orii- i3oo -d nt C amb r id ec en Oct ober 2-0 1960 Mcoo ro Rnmoy and Ccn 7 17 roque itcd ehc Commle oc C o 1ou tant D r Joim D'ooiez- cl Livcrmo -c Lnboratoa-7 ao nlo c c on ado cJc icoo io - p -ovcnti ng cF - 2 nd u uthori cd· unc i n the NATO oyotem · D - Foote - inillcntcd _he b ld c o i - - d lhcoo p -cbl cmo n Jic '1 vco ro o go and nocld be vo -7 h1Co rcoted in rco llD'1i cl3 011cb t JOrZ 1ln a b -ic Hoe ·o Congrcaoma n Holliiald n l M - Ramer C ll December 15 1960 D - Foatermdicated·pzoirucrtroo ccvcir il b c udine - VO' ' p romioin radlc motiied ' • ·· co See p ieo__ 7 ace- diocuoolcn r f action tllkcn b7 A C l o cor cc Chio• i ripp chco - Y 5- · ·w_@Jrj JC_ ir t tWUlii sU NND 882003 - S2 - _ ____ -- - - - - - - - -· ' • ' ·• --- ' _ __ _ __ _________ _ __ ___ _ _ JL __ I l 'I 1 - -- e--- - ---- --'--- --------- ---'------ - --- I DgE G e Q ' 2 Thero cxiot'o today l in ndvilnced deolgn o go _oovci -ai pooolblc deviceo which could be lncorpot'atcd into c - ioting warhend_o o nd omb i lncludlng thoo·e mread17 aoolgned to NATO hic h would preclude t o rming oftnc warhead YJithoue be rccclpt 0£ o coded oignn l Th dovicc··v ould b e ouch that it ·coul be coded a nd • changed £rem iime to ti m - manually and pc iolb y b7 rcinoto control e • Ul'bc· noted bat the 11nrmlng eechn quc lo Che reveroe of the 11 deoe·ruct dcvlcco uoed a t C npe Caru i_voral The a rming o£·the we a pon cculd be a ccompllo c in oeveral wayo ouch ao · · ·· · · a -By th weaporio c·ua tcdlan inoertLng· a c oded olgnal mnnually or t rcagl i' ii ·v ire connectlon Thio ght b e u_rthe r deveio'pcd to tho polnC of pl 'eotil ng i z em o control button in much the onmo m mner ao o Celeviolon oet l r itu rned c a d o££ r emoteiy ' b A g ro_u p o£ bo b or tnlco i e warheado could be under e cluolve control o n remote airming c anter ouch-no n u S0 • cuotodv ·ea or ·a oe·a rby ohlp or oubmarrine in th9 caoe o nuclear weapo1 10 I C •• •• Do G I c The bomb - ·mlool oo _l l c hole coun¢ -V er -egicn could be n -mcd £ ·ool c Gnt rol c enter t SHAPE 0 - Krom the U s• evoluCior n r v l ong range dovnco aZ t hlo oacuro hac be n p opoocd b17 D John E'ooCer DZ L ivei mo -e md io cu -• -cntl i· und r dcvcll n'7_nC f oi ehlo and thoi - pu-rpc ieo Such o device m el i' a co oo u oed for t rano i i ng ihe R hour rnccoa ge ral other atcrcing ccmmunic ieiono Thlo deviGe requii -eo c cnoivc r·oocni ch nod dovelop eot bofoi -c feaoibllii r can be a o m -c 4 · · 0 _ c hould be oted that device a a nd ccn C -o o ouch ac llieoe diocuooed · ictu illy 10 1 pr ·✓e the comb at readin oc £ U S weapono by b lving tho wea pon r e ldy n · hd O J mu € 't • e t•f 1 f Ei p -e set t · - ·· -- ' -- · - · · · _ • • NND 882003 -· - S-3 •_ I •• _·_ -----···--- -- - ·········- -- - - --·-·-- ' · ' lit obct ud be ca9 i £ rom Chic cli ocuooion Cll2 C ·c c Ot IJC i -cqo -cmcnC ot culcl be c i bUohec' Co dcvc cp ouc h cont -o o md dcv cc o · ind c ' oc hnEccl 'aono biUtv o c d f no de Co dc c -mmc tlie bc iC 07oecm Zo - a mmedinto · c dc p Cion cZo NA'li'O 1ec po io i nd 42 Iloni Ccl 'm NATO rcquh-omcoto ' f ·-'_ Recommendation - 'il'bo Need fo i- Higb Leve£ Techn cnl Rcvia ·1 uitl Advice by AEC Laborato rloo in Regall'd co NATO Nuclear Weapon Syo cmo• NA TO eel it ic not ful y uCili u ie bi3h level technlccl odv co ID lto plilnn iug o nd rcvicv 1 of lto atom c · capono p -ogrcin • Thl o 6o pnr-ticularly r-110 wlth ·d o l c v eapouo ovotcmo oelece on While ccirtah 1 high l evol tcchnlc i -03enclco have been cotabllohcd to ooolot NATO lnclud lna thu Noto Seier co C omm letec he Arrno mont Committco 11nd Ad Hoc yiorking Gt cupo the Advi oorir G -oup fol ' Acironaui icnA Reocar c h ind Development and the SHAPE l --Dci'cno·c Tochnlc ll C enter no pol 'mnneat group fr om or Haioc a wlth Che At op lc Energy CommlooLcn or ieo eapono itabor i toirlcc hac b ecc c ce up Thia lac of coopcr atloo c an rco ale lo oorlou o p roblomo S irlv concultatloo w ith wenpon dco ign percon ne couidJ vo r eo uleed ln c cirt i in oug1 E gootlooo eo lncorpoi - ec tr i jcctorv oen ou ir doviceo prloi - to belnr 6 1 Ci n i ed C1ith foretgn· p anco F o exampl e £ i ep_rcocnta lveo f rom Cl lo AEC or A EC · ·llabo rntorleo had been ccrucrt cd wlth they w cu l d havo b ean abl e to aio -t the Dc£onoe· D pa rtmcct and NATO no to pr Oclble dangci o partlculal 'lV t Jhcc 'the qeapon wnc cot deolgucd o - tile uoo eo vb ch it would b e aoo igncd Ncc cooary mcdl fic ti onc could Mov e been 1corpornicd nt an eady otagc The follow Ing IIlC lO reo are rccomn1ende d i a P - or eo oay iooignmo ot or uoo cf a capon le n wcapcn nyotem or n nc1 c oncept not prevlouolv otlpulneed a ft the time of the 'l le ipono deolgn the rJe enoo Depar tme nt a nd NA TO ohould fullv confer · ith tho Atomic E nergy Comrn l oolo a Reprcooo tivco £rem tbG AEC a nd it i wcnpono lnbo r aeoz-loo o hou d be oppoloted ao technlc advioo -o·tc NATO 1 · 00 tochnlc il ndvloor o o hould be £ullv utill e d b y the ml lt iirv · ir prooentativeo in thei r nuclcnr weapon o plilnlllng Th rough cloi or c ooporatica and Uaiecn roquh-emento c NATO bot h on the part of 3ACEUR ind cgNCEUR c b e o q lorcd nn d ncorpo r ted Into ·tvcapc o n llil ear y- o ige in their developmone Wi tb clooo coopero tlon it mav be pooe ble to deoign and deve lop wcapon o opcclflc o Uv i o ua iquc NA T O rcquiremcneo r otho i- ¢hnn nttompUn g ec idap t outmoded c inapprop r loeo ·u So ' Capone 1nd weapono 0 7oeomo 20 ito n oodo • b Ao i d lee cc c ' - -c up il 'om Loo _Ale moo Sandk Llvcrmo -e aucl D SA i dd be rr ecli ntelq ioolg ed · o cpencl ouc h Cirne ao nc c·cooa -v nt i' ATO o_ltc i r€t-iewine the p o · mo -alood n thio · otud7 io udl ao c hc - i which mai c doCo - - 7- rc _ J f ' if t J s Qill ll G U ·-- - - · - - NND 882003 ··--·- ·-·- - - · -54 _ · · -- - ' - RocommcncL t c n1 5 Tho Need @raifco with tho Lo 7• and Adequnto _ CongreooaQa il Rcviov of Cccperatlvo Mllit iry Arrraagemcnto 1th NA TO Cow ierko• ' - '· r· It lo the CODGldercd oplnlon cf tho Jolnt Commltteo tho t e StD tc Depnrtrn·e m ·• · nnd tho Defenoc Dopnrtmcat biivo fnllcd to comply wltb tbo ntcot o tbe Atom_lc uergy Act by the mnnner ln whlcb t ley have entered lnto ut_e rnntl_o n il Arrangemonto for the pooocooloa u oe 1mi control o U s owned nuclear c ip _n o ind la tbe failure of •ttho Defcnoe Department to keep the Congreoo thrcugh the J'ol t Commltteo currcndy · and fully informed · · · Ao cllocuooed ln prcvlo o occtlono there 10 oerlouo doubt whether the facto of the llmlted poooeoolon e icerclood by U0 S cuotodlal forc'eo of nnclenr wenpona ln 11 alert 11 pooltlono of combnt readlneoo on planeo on tho pad nnd mnted to mloallto nrc conolotcnt wlth the requlremcnto cf oectlon 9Z c the Atomic Energy Act of 19S'11 Thia oectlon prohiblto any peroon lnc udlng a foreign government to pooocoo nu s ntomic weapon • Certainly ouch alert • procedureo a re contrary to Cong·reooional intent d to repreaeatatlono made by the D feaoo Departnient ex Congreo_o it the tune the law wao ended in 1958 At that ta me lt wao represented_ thnt nuclenr compone to of · · wnrheado and bcmbo W uld be kept oeparo te from the aircraft or mloolle cnrrier Moreover the meana of placing ouch alert-- procedure ln efiect wero carried outoldc o£ the frnmework pre Jcrlbod by the Atomlc Energy Act of 1954 no n mended ln 1958• Gil Al hough tho A tomic Energy Act of 1954 provldeo for n program· of admlrilotratlon wlth lntor n itlonal arro ngemento roqulrlng approval by tho Congrooo nnd · Agreemento for Cooperatlon oubject to Coiigrcoolon ll c tioii to the developme uae and control af atcmlc energy oec lo o l • • 11 L 123 tlio Executlve Branch baa entered into numC rcuo lnternatlonnl arrangemento witho at notlflc ation to and approval of tbe Congreoo• ·At the· onmo tlme ·ond through n number o f oecr ef executive l ternntlonal agreemento ond arrangemento no to tho uoe and cc_a trol oi ntomlc energy nc t provided for mader the Atomic Energy Act it hno Umlted the purpooe and efiectlvcneoo of the obtutory Agroemento or Cooperation · no ·· When c parea the var o o typeo ngre e to nd o ran emento the United Statea n0t 1 boo wlth theoe varlouo nntlono and the •type and degree of our cooperat on under them ono reali eo the rolo tivo llmlted importance belng netachod to th leglolatlvely authorl ed Agreemento or CooperntlC n I compii rloon it appenro that our cocporation ln the development f defence plano the training o perocnnel ln the employment cf atomic weapono and the development of atomic operatlon tl capablllty lo belng conducted principally under arraogemezato other than the Agreemonto lor Cooperatlon one 0 00 · 6 1 F r exa mpl • i ·· 11 Jupiter XR 3Mo wlth United bteo warhendo l _ ' ----- - _ _ I Thelr crewo have been trained by the United Stateo the warheado otored on tbe oUe and -48- NND 882003 - SS ··---·- ---- -------- ··· - -···· - - -- • '· ' • ' G 101 t o f t t r mv placcc 011 the n l Oilcol J rcopoaolbllltv wcthout Agrecn_ e t 4ca Coopcr itlon or_wichout even 1 S ockpllo Agroomo t So-c 11llcd Alert Prcc cci r c ln110 Ulcd Secret Rcotrlcted Da ta b1 1 tho Dopnrtmcnt o De onoo whlc b gc vct'n the operat ion c£ thcoc mloollco and the rcopective 1rcopo110 l bllltieo o the two countries ·in th maintenance Cl lto nlcrt ot ituo '-Yero npprovc d by the U s J oln' Chlc a oil StaJ nd Of ic e £ the Sccrc ary o Dc cnoo during 1960 vltbout either an A rccmcnt fc - Coapera¢lon or Stockpl c Asrecrr cnt with tbni na tion nnd wl hout notice to the Joltit Committco or · · coac urrcacc of tho AEC • · · · · • Cr- 6 1 tt I n addition H- nc t John battaliono · · ·' - a e lotc gratcd 'llh Amcrh an nudcar capable fc rcc11l It wao _unde_rotood that ttio warbcac o_for ehcoe 11hortcr range mioollcs olmllar to thooe aoolgned to other rinttona were not ta t c mated but tD rcn aln In the cuotody and pooocoolon of µ s c uotodlnl dctnchmen · u l H h011tilltlco However there wao o·ome lndlc atloo th it new aler a pro-ccd u -·c ·· r •il ht a uthDrli c m a Ung· c w irbea da to mloollea ln periodo c tenoloo ·• · • ' ·' In each of the ccuntrle vlolted It wao found that little or no ltectrktcd J a t being glven to the £orelgn op eratlog pcroonnel no dlotlact from b'gher adh- inie• tr tive authoritlco oven when ther wao in cxlotcncc aa Agreement for Cooperatlo ' and t he ln Grmallon ba d been tran mltted by the United Statca Govctnmcat to th ii 11 1iio Certain qucatlono occur Why h ve blghcr admlniotratlvc authorltlcu1 v · th ·ct er delayed tranofcr · R otrlc ted Datn to the operatlonnl peroonnel •· Ooco · ou h· · dela y c ec t the operational c apabillty - Wctrc the lcglolatlve provioLooo c the l9S8 amendmenta to Section 144b neccooary wao ' ' • In only one type c wenp011a oyotcm oboerved under the NATO atorr lc it_d h c plan hao· It beq o Interpreted that an Agre·emcnt for Coopcratloa lo required i c e C reign u i cr force acblevl ng operntlonal c apablllty aad tbnt lo la the Hg bite u umtzcr area nnd then cnly in the £lnnl two weeko c t _ralnlng prioa- Ao further indlc atlcn Cl tho rcl tlvely llmltcd extent to wbic b A rccm c Cot t oopcr itlcn ccnt -ol ln intern itlonal cooperatlcc In tho uaeo of atorr k wc a G o • OS the U S to date hao o eed Stcx kplle Agreemcntof · '_' · ·· · ·· 6 1 4 • ··· · · · 7 or ntoa1lc oupport 114 thelr forc 011 _wltltou an1 A reen- c - t Q r ' 0GpeiraUCl11 with Uteoe natlono A loo pr or to cur O greemcn o fer Coc pe rati r 00 we ·already tiad itcckpllc A rcemento waeh both I 'unerlco lnc luding the dc« Ued tec 1-ullcal oeirvSce•tO•oervlc e llrr iaf e cn 11 bctw lhcill' Arn y aod Alr Forc eo and ouro Ao wno prevlouoly acted tock le Agrec i Lt to nuclear wc npcno fer U l I by the forel gc lcrc c ' 0 lJ l · 1 · · - The J xecuUve Brancb nod Ccng r ooo hould rcc Ggnlec· ahat t her e iro e l a i doubto ao t o whether Che p ll'eoect NATO alert prGc cdurco i rc cooolotent wit _ _ l w and Ca ngr oolcnal li ikne Gf It lo planned to c ontinuo oucll p oce urc 1 -- cc· - t' U te p ll'C C a-dure111 wh icn perm it l o pc n11 act oc mc meaoure cl JC int pca·oc a r 1 nn l over tJ S we21pGco thea the problem ot Gu d be £aced dLrecity inc the L 1 w ·• t 1i ' pt lpc i fvu- c h l i e ur er co ahHehTl'C pnx cduiros L o •• lc l a i ve - '' ' 0 • J' atc • i't• NND 882003 - - -- -- ·· - · - · ·--· ···- -------- -SG - --·· - • f • 0 IJ 2 The baoic pollcieo under which cuotcdy pooocooion and contrcl o£ United Stateis nuclear warheado ire to be malotained ohculd be contained ln the Stcckpile Agre monto or other G vernment-to- G9vernment agreeinenti i rather than ln military oervlce-to-oervlce· i r UlgemeQtBoThe Government-to-Government agreements in turn ohc-uld come under the 1•equlremento of oectlono 91 c 144 b •• and 123 in the nature 0£ Agreements for Cooperation aubject to Congreoolonal review or else ao international agreements approved by Congreoo Oil' ao treatieo To the extent they ccntaln clasolfled a xeo or detallo like Agreements for Cooperation claooified parto need net be made· public but can be reviewed in executive oeooinn by the leglolative committP e or ccrnmltteeo havlo·g reopooslbillty In compliance with oectione 202 and 3 £ of the Atomic Energy Act of l 954 the De£enoe Depa1rtment should keep the Join Committee currently and fully in ormed with reopect to a l matters within the Department 0£ Defenoe relating tc the development utUizaticn 0 ' application a atomic energy Majer policy decioione in particula r as for example the change in U s custody concept from separate U S macntenance and poaaeaoion of warheads to the mating a the warhead to non- U S delivei y vehiclee in peacetime arc matte re of which the Legislative Branch through the Joint Committee ahculd have been in o 'med prcmp¢17 at the time they were made The January 1960 decision by SACEUR to place NATO atomic strike forces on Quick Reaction Ale l't wieh complete nuclear eapcna aboard ncn- u s planes and mioelles l lbou d have been brought to the Joint Comml tee0 o attention at the time or onortly befc re not after the order had been Implemented or as occurred after tile procedu l'es had gone into efiect in Juc o - 960 In accordance wieh its legal reopocolbllity to initiate nctificaticn to the Ccmmittee the De£enoe Department must recognize that it Cl es net comply wltn the law when lt £aUo to furnieh in otrmation until after the Committee requests it or when the Committee baa to cbtain lte initial information through odle - scurceo Recommendation 6 ' The Need to Re-evalnate the Baslc U s -NATO Nuclear Weapon Cccpe raticn Policy-_-Ccos dei 'ation o Aleel 'native Arrangements n the preceding pages a nwnbe'r of problems primarily related to the curi -ent NATO weapcne ·syssem have been discussed These probAema have been d_b cuaaed rom the standpoint cf U s national inte -esto under the Atomic Energy Act c f 1954• There are a numbel ' c£ alternative arrangementa or plane with regard to the manner in whic b the United States might beat cooperate with our NATO allies £or the uee of nuclear weapons £or cur mutual defense Objectives c £ NATO Weapocs S -stem Frqm the U S s andpoint it would appear that the NATO nuc ear weapons oyetem should oe -ve the cUowing objectives a Appropriate nuclear weapons shcu d be available in au£Hcient nwnbers and ocationa to be readr o ' pi ao ned use when needed with ae ehc t a -eacticn time as pr eisible -50NND 882003 -51 I f - -Jg f • o·hould bo oufilc leotly otrong that tho wonpona 1ill be a oed l o Dd t hco proper U S nuthorlty dctermlnoo thov ohould Concurrootly and· equal bnpo ce lo tho t they wW bo u oed wltbcut U'nlted Stateo nppuoval el¢1 lcr throug h lolldvortencc or unauthori cd a oo · b United Stateo f· f t•· • 1··• ' T COnl ll'cl c N lcnr weapono ohould be m nlntalnod trancported and otored lo ouch n manner that the pooolbUltv of nccldeoto reoulting ln contamlnatlon_ or nuc le ir etonation will be ·oon-e 1otent or nt lenot kept to a inlnlmu_m · d Nuciear wcapono and clnool icd ln orma tlon pertalnlog to them ohould be protected aga inst uo iuthorl ed poroooo obtaining important deolgo and abr catloo lo orma tlon · • The relatlve emphaolo which Dhoald be given to ou b ·objectives a hciuld of courGe depend to come extent on lntcrnatronal cooditlono cf the time no will bo · · d l oca ioed later It muot be recognized that from the _otandpolnt of NATO·a o a n International · orgaalzntloo nod o certain individual European NATO ccuntrleo there are certain problemi conceriilog the current U S -NATO we ip oo oyotem The principal problem mentioned by r presentativeo c the State Department and rec ognu ed ln the NA'l' O · lltcra ture lo the fear by NATO counerleo th at in the event of a Sovlet ttack lo Europe thnt tJ S wW bc deterred from reloaolng lta nuclear weapono ln nc cord mcc wlth NATO placo lo the face cf n Sovlet threat to retaliate bv destroying u s cltlea The oecocd problem meotl onedf' · -·· • _ · _ • 0 the SG 0 f • ·· • · • • · ·· · ' fi ' · -1 - - 6 ODO -· - -·· • • - - -· - · _ _' · 1i · Ji · Tlie tbl rd problem from th ls otandpolct r 10 · of findlng the me a to keep NAT 9 alive and 'functioning ao an effective organhi atlon• Whether or net theoe fearo and problemo arc well ounded nnd whether any · o the alter021tlve o diocuooed will take care of them will be touched upon lo the occcecd ng p ige o The foll ng p011o ble alt rnatlve arra ngemcoto· b een' the U nnd hoot natiolllll countrleo would appea r tc me rlt conolderatlon l s a nd NATO Uoe a completo U s oyotcm o pooocooion nnd c cs tcidy 2 Reverolon to oyo te m of s epa r a te u s poooeoo lon a nd prt• tectlon of nuclear warhe ad or nuclear component apa t from c a rrier a o contempla ted lo 19 ame ndment 3 · Continuation ci carreni ficticnal c w ody arra nge eneo lnvolv ng va rylng e ements o£ jo int soeliolon and control of nuclea r· bom bs nnd wa rheads between U S nnd hoot country ln the NA T O alliance - -51NND 882003 -58' • • - ·· • - ' ' · r - ' · •' ·' I _ ' · I - - @JE @ fo Je5i f G IQf fll-- 4 • El preoo joint poooesoion arrangement n alert P 'CCcdures between U S and NATO ao a oeparate entity through mulClnational NATO task orce grcupo 5 Trano e - of nuclear weapono or ccntrol of nuclear weapono £rom U s to independent NA TO task £orce • 6 1 Trans e·r o nuclear weapons to lndlvidua NA TO countries Uoc of Complete u s Syotem of Poooeoolon and Cuotody Durlng General Norotadcs briefing o the Commlttec at SHAPE in Paris on November 30 1960 it wao polnted out that prlor to 1957 the Un lted States had oeveral u nlta with atomic weapon capability in Ailled Command Europe The United States furniahed all the nuclear weapons and the delivery units and was responsible or the security custody and transportation of these weapon While o ome Restricted Data bad been made available to ATO lo acccr'dance wieh th llmited 144 b Agreement entered into in 1955 which permitted NATO to conduct some planning £or nuclear war only the United S tes £orces had operational capability to f ght a nucl ear war - ' ' While t M United S tels may not have had oufficlent ·numbers of weapons· available in Europe uor 41spersed to sufficient location tr pz ior· to 1957 · ln relation to · NATO milita ry needs the arrangement ·tended to give tnaximunfaoourance of United Stateo control It also complied with one of the baolc requirements cf the Atomic Energy Act of 195 with regard to the United States pooseosion of nuc ar weapons and restriction agains t the r trane ei to other nations U the U S w re to revert to a concept or arran q ient under which U s £orceo alone or with ' U K £orcea wo ld have nuclcar·weapon capability and the other NA T O allies w uld be reilji Q na'ible to meet conventlonal war requirements lt would decidedly lncrease u s ·-cuotody and control it aioo undoubted · would have serious drawbacks It would presumably require an increaoe in number of u SG per5onne and resuit in c rlticiem £r O m cur allies over the ir inability to resist Ruoeian nuclear attack Without oG me nuclear capability of their own or· direct particfipatlon lo the U S -NATO oyotem we are told that the • mi'ghe ccntinue to question United Sta es prcmloeo to defend them as diocuo oed in the preceding section · 2 · Reveroion to u s Separate Nuclear ·capsule Systems a £ 1958 In li eu 0£ a complete reveroion to pre-1957 a 'rangements lt mligbC be ccns ide i'ed de irabic to revert at leaet to a concept of oeparate posoeoofion and protection o nucle·a r warhead GB' nuclear c ctnp61 11ene apare from the nQ lll•llUCleair pairt the w apon oyotem ao contemplated durAng tho 1958 amendment hearings • Unde i' ouch an arrangement the nuclear warh ead Gr nuc ear C l mpo l en until hcoltilitlea begrin 0 would be OHearing a before the Subcommietee en Agreements for Cooperat on o£ the JoinZ Committee on Atomic Enett'gy ou Amendi ng the Atomic Energy Act 0£ 954--ExcMnge cf Military ln ormatlon and Matei -ial with AlUee-o J a nuat 'y 29 300 3 1 0 Februat' ' 4 5 27 o March 5 26 27• 28 AprU 17 and May 28 1958 -52- NND 882003 - S'l · I · - i r f · s t r t• · · t o nh1talnad ln the nctual pooocna on o U s poroooneL The armod o l'cco a our nlllon would be trained ln tbc 1 ut 11 atlon ·c-u thecc weapc no c d w0 uld be given the o e ipon dellvei y oy0tom ind lf pooolblc• ill ·portlono of the weapon cept the · · cuclenl' p lrto · · · G HCl Wlth the oidc - tvpe weap no l' - - · -1 ¥ r ·· ·oeapon leoc the nuc en r cnp sule tc be trano e rrcd r ' ··· _ · _ 1 '-- - - - J th o nat pooolble and under Ol Ch a n arrangement the entite weapon nuclenr and_ non-nuelca r components won· a hnvc to bG held by U S fDli'CCOo ' • I In ef e ct thh 1 lo the 0ltu 1tlon today in E·uropc with regard to the_Honeat Johno Ao oboervcd and as explala ed to tho Committee wl 1ln NATO '· · • ·· · · - · ·' · J 1 are belni trained ln the uoe o thls weapon orotem The· 00 · entire weapon oyotcm hno been made avallabl co tli c n with t tic cxccptlon of the 6 f oealed plt nuclear· warhead The warhead lo r ilntah ed by the U s culieodial · detllchll' ent ln an lgloo clooe by the non• U s operated Honeot JC hll bmt nllon In tl rreo or lncrcaoed tenolon when the Hone at Jduic wuuld be deployed the u s caotodbl perooq nel iloo would be deployed with the warbeado otlll ln thclr po011coolon The warhead would net however be mated to the oysten untll hootllltleo beg in ind nutborlty wa11 received but wnuld be kep in nc u il pc 011c11olon of U S pciroonnel nearby Ao nccldenta or anauthorlaed £lrln6 o a nuclear weapon le leoo apt to cccur in ouch an nrrangemento · 1 · _ On the ot er band ln cert tin type oyot- ma r qulrlng q9lck reaction no or c itnmplc th growid-to-nlr Herculeo oyotem wh h D 1110 uc lli ea · JI ouch · OD arrangement hao a dl11advantage in that valuable tbT e may be lo it ln rr atlng the DO · al'head to the oyotem The oa Ir e lo true flllz with a ·flghten- bon- bcr er 6 1 fwlth the Jupiter and Thor mlaolle oy temo U one walt11 untll acitual bo ctllltieo cccur bc ore conducting the macing lt may be to1 l ite L • ·f The need for mating warbe ido to rr loolleo or planes crentes a problem o prcvldlng adequate oa eguairdo agalnot accidental or unautbori cd i lng · Ao dh1cuo11cd on page a 45 • 46 there are dcvlce11 wblch can be operated· manuaU • en· rcn otely to provlde the requlrcd oaleguardo · 3 Continuation c£ pireoene oy11Cem uf letional U f OOCIIOlon nod c ontrol ln alcr e oltlono s c uo ody with ac ual J lnt When the u s malntalned o le- pC G4eoolc»n o nucl a r wcapono OU11' NATO allies que· ielcmed wbethe r or net the U S w J Xrtd re eaoe the war he id or nuc enr compcnent to them when ne ded particular v' 1l i h io lnvot ved potential deotructiGn oC U s cleleo Now however with the w irhe id mated ind U s p0 ooe00l11 n bavlcg become llctlocal the U s a c_eis n dWere problem Notw ¢ho nndlng nny agfeeme n to awaltl U s 11uthorlty the £orel ii'11oel ' oatlc n · u lC _deternil111ed to £ire the nuc ea ' weapon It c culd do 0111 quite ixily by ovcrpi wertng tok - n U s cuotcdlal - r oecurUy guards ' NND 882003 60 • r4 I •· - - if I Even ougb ooo r i lntalno that th e 11ocr nnUoo c uuiot 011 lto owp fire the vcapo'o bec nuoo o o s c iiccr boldo the oecond key or hno not grantccl permlcoloii lt lo · quilly· etae t the weapon cnnnot bo £lircd If tho liocir no tlon rc uoco to do 00 oven though ¢he United Stateo a ti1orl co l Thuo durlns the peri'od lt to mnted to' acn-U $ oapcn oyct_c in the uoe of _tbe nuclonr lo oubjoc t·to veto by either ¢ho t7 S ·or the uocr natlo · ·· • · · rn ··-· wnrl ead Acciirdlngly 't' 'c could u _d er Chlo rr ge n nt nc o a predlcament bl whlc h · ibe t7nlt li Stntca would be under i ttac k or our ¼'olarlci oub or neo wc re belng oaalt ind tho USSR tnlght promloo not to ntie cli one or more o£ our alUeo ao long no oar nlllco rc ralo rom firing or re uoo to pt rmlt tho flrlng o£ nuclear wcapooo fr n their 1 uul · Under ouch a blackmail threat lt lo conceivable that a uocr natloo would re uoc permit lricg o£ our nut lcar weapono roi n l o co_u ntry iild thuo· deprive the United Stateo o£ i· portlo i o£ lto nuclear lre ower ' · · to • ' • • t • On t ie other olde of the ccun lo the oltuatlon which mlgbt·arloe when 'the hoot u atlou engaged lo a local oklr ob wltb a nclghborlng country or Sovlot oatelllte · · nod without authority from NATO'or the Unlted Stateo decided to uoe the weapon - - i J i ·' j 6 1 · ' ' rtlculnrly would be vula'e nblo o - ch n act on •' · 0£ olmllar concern wO Zld' bci the ·p ooolblllty that n mllltnry junta or Coloncl'o evolt ln ·which one ·cu- nnotber o£ the competing actlon o might nttempt to ccmpietc control over the wcapono oyotem ind uoe thc ipon or tbreaten to• · ti De it ngnl oot the otber action ' ' ' · ' ' ·• _ ' C 0 • · tnko HeE'- again the uoc o clectronl remote control dcvlcco could oubotantlally lncrea oo real ·u s control a_o dloc_ ooed on page11 45--e6 • · -54NND 882003 · · 61 · ' · 4 Siggeotion for expreao joint poooeooion nrr gcmento in alert pooitioDE with adequate oa ety precautiono •· · • Thc_poooibilltieo of the hoot tion or o military clique_within the hoot natiQn t lidns complete control of the we pona oyotcm may be leoo ncd to come extent if the opora g v roo el arc· ru i -oalo th l tr' _ hich_they are lO B t hl -- ' For cxzi m ele • J · · uv- _ - •• • ' ' - · · l - o l o ---- -· _ ' · ' r other NATO natio I1 was -Lwith - - - jO thio thought in mind that tho TCAE eta ouggeoted if it'were neceooary £or t a r y or other reasons to ontinu ·the joint p soion and custody a rangemente whi_ h_a - exi_ o _ Yin Al _proc I ·· · Ca it might be better if inotead of the cooperative arrangement •oeing between the United Stateo and the hoot nation that it be with the U S and a multi national taok force or · a ta ok force from another NATO country •¢ •- · J W_hen the Joint Committee group wao t thcsl _it wao indicated 00 l 5 aj thr t tho cl _ • •1 hnd mcchanged extended vioito during the paot year It waa indicated thnt the rotation of air oquadrono among the NATO countrieo would not be unduly dif icult · A ieadvanta ge to any immedi 1te use o multinationnl peroonnel would be the language and training problem except poooibly with aircraft piloto It wao pointed out that English ie ·ouppo11ed to be an eooential language among NATO piloto However during ito inopection of thc-1 ' ·· Fighter Bomber Squadron0 the Committee DO _noted that not all thl I __ piloto were pro icient in English 1 5 j The ti aining problem io di£ficult enough when all the operating pcroonnel opellJt the ea me language and non° Eriglioh training manuals have to be developed £or thoir ·uoe Language difiicultieo · 11a y become inourmountable in a multinational tnok force when the ope1' atoro sp eak difierent languages However 0 the oole objection to thio arrangement voiced by a Defense Department opokeom ui at a ·JCAE bearing on Tune 24 0 1960 that the varying eating habito o differebt nationalities would make the µ-rangement unacceptable would not however O by itoelf oeem to be inourmountnble The State Dopartment and General Norotad have aloo endoroed multinational olt'gaa ization·o £or a nucleai task force In public opeech s during 1960 ootnote Genual Norotad made reference to a poooible arrangement using a NATO nucleJU' t l k orce within cw rent custody concepta In bio briefing of the Joint Committee a t s1 a_pE he d ecn s c d thi de btlt conceded be hnd not completely worked ii out in hio own mind esee Memo from Executive Director J T Ra m ey to Senator Clinton P Anderoon Senat r John O Pastore and RepresentatlG'e Chet Holifield dated June 15 1960 NND 882003 - 62 In hio propoon lo for a NATO mid range balliotic mio e program ma e it the 0 NATO P irliarnenbry Council in J ecember 19600 formor Secretary 0£ State Herter slidoroed the idea of a multinatj onal taok force opeci£ic y mentioning the uoe o£ ''mixed manning to the extent co11oidered operationally feaoible by SACEUR One o£ the firot official II r r cce to ouch n c ept wao made by General Norotad in a preoo conferenc·e OD March 2 1960 whe11 he ·otated ••• • There have been a l W devclopmento of projecto a £ew flaps• a f rumoro n few difficulties and a few problemo in the couroe of laot year I think I mentioned t you before th it we wer conoidcring tho eatabliohment o£ a mobile task force in th AJJiance Thio would not be independent of other forceo but it could be drawn from the forces and trained organized · equipped oo lt could be uo·e d ao a multinational task force emphasis oupplied 0 Now there n re problems and difficultieo in tbi°o but we have now firmly decided we are going ab cad in thio field and will establish in the relatively 11ear future with in the cou roe of e l1ext year a force of brigade group or RCT otrength in gencrn l - which will otart initially on the baaio a three battaliono perhapo three reinforced battallono ••••• · It ohould be nct d that the multinational taok force concepto of former Secretary of State Herter and Cienern l Norotad in hio later opeecheo ileo involved oome tranafer of u s control over the releaae of wcapono to NATO itoelft as diocuooed in the next oection he type c f multinatioa il ·participation diocussed in thio current oection 0 while retaining oome U S control over weapons releaoe could lay the baoio for pooeible later changeo in control arrangements based on experience gained J S Tra no er of Control of U S Weapono to Independent NATO Tack Force Arrangement As a oeparate concept there lo a plan whereby the multinational NATC Taok Force would be the operating force and NATO would aloo take full control over the nuclear warheado General Norotad diocuosed this concept of a NATO 114th atomic power in hio ddreso before the Sixth Anrn1aJ NATO Pa rlinmentariane Conference in P a ida November 1960 aP £ollowo II • • • 0 • • • • • • • Many ideas have been advan c d fo dealing with theoe que atioD B It hao been ouggeoted 0 for inotance that the control of weapono might be pa coed to the Alliance that they might be committed to NATO for the life of the Alliance in ito preaeot form When I opeak of weapoD B O I am opeaki ng not of the aircraft or the miseiles 0 the IN lUJ which deliver NND 882003 Ct ----- -63 f ·- --· --···· ·- - ·-···- - - - -- - -- - - - - - -- - - -- - ---·-· ---- the wnrhcndo but I am opealdng 0 inthio ocnoe of the ouclcnr componento which arc now retained in the otl'ictcot·cuotody It cannot be aooumed that tho creation of n multilateral atomic' authority m lking NATO o fourth atomic power no hao been e cpreoocd 0 would rieceooarily in£ lueace' the deoire of oome ll ltio·na to puroue their own independent queot for· nn ntomic eapono cap·ability However ouch action might ve r y well ootiofy the deoirea nnd intcreoto of othoro by meeting fully the militnry requ b cmeate and by c oow iag c u equal voice in tlie control of the particular pool 0£ forceo which could be eotabliched ao eooential to the direct dcfcnoe of Europe 'There are cveral a dditional ndvantagee or dividends to be gained by adding thio reoponoibillty to NATO I will mention only one for the Alliance to have continuing life and meaning it needo increnoing authority it needo power of oonie form U politically feaoible 0 action to paoo to the Alliance greater control over atomic woapotu1 n nd to oubo Ject their w se more directly to the collective will could be o gi-eat and dramatic new ntE1p fl · · 0 fl ·• In the following month Decembe 19600 at the NATO Parliamentary Couacil 0 former Secretary 0£ State Herter spoke of thie task force opecifically in rclatioriohip to the Modium Range Ballis tic Miooilco and indicated the poo eibillty of its uoe in other weapon oyot oo He oaici · My Government ouct-s the fol c ving concept for conoideration by the A Jiaoce no a meano of meeting thio requirement We ouggeat that the AJUaoce cont1ider creation 0£ a opecial kind 0£ force to operate thio weapona oyo As w e conceive it 0 ouch a force would be truly multi lateral 0 with multilateral ownershipc -financing and control and·would include mixed manning to the extent conoidered operatioDally feasible by SACEUR • • • • • • • e • • 0 0 ln the oame speech Secretary Herter went o n to oay II • • • • • • • • • • • • ''We believe therefore that tm multilateral concept ofiero the best mean a of p 'ovidin i collective bai is £or the common dcfenae in the MRBM field Ito ful ilhnent would have immenoe political oignif'icance £ the coheoion of the Alliance My Gove1 nment believes that thl11 concept o££cro a rational approach to the probll ' m of the MRBM power -57- NND 882003 - 64 - --- -·-- ··-- · ·--·- - ------- -- -•- - ·- ···· -·- ···- · -··- ·-··--- - -- - - - o£ the Alliance and if oucceoGfully £ul illcd might ofior for further moveo i n this field · a p g-cc cdent II • • • • • • • • • • • • The advnn tage of the independent NATO rcaponD oyotem would be to provide aonurance to the individual NATO countri eo that the wcapoa D could be u oed in accordanc with the NATO plan without direct coatrol o er their releaoe It has been contcn that by building up a ''multilateral taolt foxc under oole NATO control this would diocoura ge W cot Germany £rom purouing a separate couroe and poooibly provide banio for France to diocontinu ito na onal nuclc ·weapono program U s · If the w eapons co vered by the ind e pc ndcnt NATO concept wer e ·confined to Polario oubmuinc 1 with U c r ews or multi national crewoo the ''host country problem would at lea at be elimina ted i e the likelihood of the ''hoot country taking over from NA r O in time of oµ-es s · · s There n re however a number 9£ dioadvantageo nnd problems attached to ouch n oyotem It should be no ed that a CIA ourvey in the fall of 1960 indicated that an independent NATO would have little e f¢ct on the French effort to obtain a nuclear capability · Not the least of theoe pt'oblotn ll·j o_ how a decioion will be made in NATO i£ and when hootilitico occur Will it Tcqui re concurrence o£ all fifteen nations or juat a pre-oelected number If the la t o who will make the oelection'i The introduction of an intervening political body in wb nt aeceoaarily may be a military decision undoubtedly could result in ii eubs tnnt laJ and possibly fatal delny in reaction time If it is neceoaary· today· to m •iataio both U S and non-U s NATO nuclear capable forceo cin quick rea ction fifteen minute alert it would oecm incon·gruouo to set up a new arrangement which while •giv Lng greater voice to ench o our allies at the aame · time would tend to re nll in i nc_reaoing delay in author used uoe o nuclear wcapOI14o Individual nations within the NATO 9 ·g a nization which might not be under direct a ttack from·Soviet forces might be eluc ta nt to authorize the u a e o£ these weapono e ven though one o£ their NA'I'O alliea is under a ttack particularly if threatened with retalia tion from the USSR This could be particularly d etrimental to the United States if the USSR a ttacked only the United Statea and promised not to hal-m our European allies if they did not fire the weapons A pox-ti n o our current retaliatory power would be neut rallied A converae problem mig t a -ioe where various NATO countries might de5ire to launch nuclear weapons without U S eoncu rrenc ' General Nors tad indicated that the U s would undoubtedly be·rep eoe nted on any committee which would lulve a uthority to launch weapons H ver the U S could be outvoted and over x-uled unless each country including the u s pos oessed a veto -S80 NND 882003 -65 _ 1• When n sked by the Joint Committee vioiting group how ho v o uld avoid n military p u-alyaio when fi toe 11 di££erent n i tion o would htw e veto power·• General Norotad re·oP ond_cd · · a 1 'NORSTAD 1°m ather r luctant to do it becauao no propc lonl hao been made along thio line Let me mention one thing hao been ouggeotcd lllld it rni it be the nrtheot thing rom the ·council'o mind 1 ·don 1t know but one thirig has been ouggestcd lo ·that there might be a omall groupm•uoing the UN Security Council arrangement or instance--of oay three co trieo being pC rm anent emberD maybe n couple of other who ow d b« ' given opecial re po ibilitieo in this field by the CoUD il They're responsible to th ' Council The authority io the Council But they ·r ecogni e tha t you can't have n ·con erence of 15 people oittin down twiddling their thum'bci • You got to have ii n executive of or ne kind to do it · And they work out an executive th lo way 1£ they did this of coui·oe the Alllericans v guld be memboro of thio cxecutivo group I'm ·not propoeing this Thia ie a way in which II it would be done ••••• there Conference on NA' I'O Atomic Planning and Specinl Ammunition Storage Program Held At SHAPE 30 November '1960 P• 79 6 Tra ne er nuclear weapono or control of nuclear weapon a to individual· JIATO countries · · · · · o s lnatead of an arrangement wherein the U would tr ui ofer weapono or complete control of weapons to independent NAT·O taok orce 0 another concept would be to irane er weapono ·and coatrol to individual NATO nations It has been ouggeoted that this latter arrangement·might be better in that the entire NATO auclcar taok for1 e would not be tied up or made inoperative by one or more members who would fear the conoequences 1£ a nation ouccwnbed to Sovie blac it would not be nble to veto· the ufle of nuc_lea · weapons by other NATO nation a an However O it has been the firm policy ao aQ lOunced by the United Stateo not to oncOUJ'uge an increase in the number of natione having independent nuclear weapons capability By doing this we correopondingly increase the P BOibillties of accidentnl nuclear wa - We initely decreaoe the cont -ol o the United Stateo over weapons it providt a · ·A pooaible exceptional situation under thio category is the U S Unlted Kingdom relationohip In thio caee 0 the U K already hao n n independent nuclear capability• and the u S and U K ue p1 eeeatly exchanging complete weapono deoigil information ao authorii ed under the 1958 amendments The U S and U K also already have a joint comol ar rangement for Thor misoilea In order to pei-rnit the greatest economieo in U S and B dtioh weapono p1 oduction arr ingemento 0 it might be deoirable 0 -59- @ r 'l'2 rm r r NND 882003 - 66 - - -------------- - - - - - -- - - - - - s for the U to tra nnfer nuclear ·w eapono or nuclear componento to the Britioh and i ce vero l In order to accomplioh thio 0 howe• er O the la w v o uld have to be f uther smende tl - · '• 1 · There nrc many additional pros and cone to the v u-iouo ar a ng emento diocuao d Which u-rangcments might be best may vary with the time It would appear• however• that the preaeot arrangement under which n fictional concept of oole pos oeooion nnd custody by the u s exioto in alert procedures io not neceooarily the beat or the United Stn tea for the individual nations or £or NATO · It might be better to conoider cli fereot o rrangemeot with difierent countricoo · depending upori geography the political otability 0 the current state of technical advanccmeat and military otature of each nation It might l alao better to con sider dif crw it i rra ngem ent I o - different weapon oyotems Thia report of course ie baaed on the obocrvations made during the trip to NATO inotallationo and other military inDtallationo November Z6 ° December 15 1960 and oupplementary in ormation provided by Government ngencico ' We have attemp ted to identify and clari£y the various facets of the NATO program which have come under our oboervation• In oome instan cee we have pointed out problen ie both of a general n nd particuln r nature which have caused uo concern In each category we have tried to make reoponaible recommendation a ome of which may require legiolative action by this Committee t1nd the Congreois The problems we have identified and the alternativea and recommendationD we havo mad e nil add up to th conclusion that it i s desirable to reo evaluate the exioting u s -NATO nuclear weapon program and all propocals for its modification 0 The Committoeco study of the va riouo phaseo of nuclear weapon use in NATO caw eo ua to conclude that thes e specific problemo cannot be oolved without considera tion of their relntions hip to the baoic otructure of NATO inr' lµdir g the control of ito rniUtary capability We reali e that the ocope of the whole NATO problem goeo beyond the immediate legislative juriodiction of the J oint Committee on Atomic Energy but the nuclear phase of the NATO problem cannot be solved oepax-ate'ly h mWlt be conoide 'ed concurrently and with relation to NATC·o 0 1 re nt and future mis sion 2 organi z ational and adminiotra tivc structure 3 milital'y oophistication and ability 0£ eac b member nation 4j national attitude tow d co ope1 ation through NATO 0 NND 882003 - 6 7 ' ' ·--·-- --- ·- ·- -- 5 pol itical ctability _o f oac_h nation 6 oecurity riok of oabot age and dioclooure of Reotrictod Data 7 accidenW or unn uthorized uoe of nuclear weaponn • 8 app1 oprintenooo of weapons nocigncd 9 vulner ibllity o ixed bnoea compared to new concepto o mobility and evasivene as There ore 0 we believe it to be our duty to call to the attention of those in the Ex cutive Department not tho nuclear phas e of the NATO problem which io 1 oubject of opecific juriedictional intereqt but aloo its rclntion to the i vero all problemo in the NATO ramework only Recommendation Moot informed oboerver o and reopontJible autho dties in both the military and civilian brancheo o£ the Federal Oa•rernment recognize that the whole concept and rol o NATO muot be re e al t d in tho light o free· orld de enoe requh-emento in relation to ll'apid nnd cor tiro1ing progreoo in weapClltl _tecbnolomeo The Committee believes that auch n re evalu ation muot proceed fortliwith It ahoald not be made oolely from the technical militar_y vi_e wpoint but ohould include civilian apecialiots in the AEC and repz oaeatatives of oth_e r Government n gon cieo having rcspolisibilitico in the fieldo of foreign policy and natio 41 de ease 0 0 In other words this sboµld be a top level review directed o nd clor ely watched by the Preoident c The Committee would expect that in accordance· with the p -0° visiono of the Atomic Energy Act it would be kept ully and currently informed 0£ the co oe of the deliberations ' i' '· Until we know cle arly what the United States cxpecto from NATO what it oh uld give to NATO i nd what the· proper contributions obould be rom participating NATO countrieo • the Committee believea tb qt the further pr'o li oration and cl SBigw nent 0£ nuclear weapotW to NATO natlC nB ohoulq be held in abeyance- 11ii0-r 9 tninendation -- - ······- ' io co_n oiotent with mea sureo which we ha v e recommended in the report to otrengthen oecurity and control arrangemeats and p revent accidental or unauthorized use 0£ nuclear weapono ·--··- ·-- - r--- · Furthermo re 0 this recommendation is conoiotent with a renewed emphao lil upon building up NATO°o convontion i weapons resources which General Norstad and omown military i nd civilian authoritieo recognize ao esoentiai A conventional capability wao the ·originnl NATO plan and pw po e So long as NATO io a going orga nizati00° nnd thio Cnrornittee oubac ibeo to ito c 0ntinuation° ilb 'ength in conventional a i -ms will 0 0 OThio io consiotent with the Preoident0 a State of the Union Mesoage which he has llmplified by oubsequent otatementa Nl 'D 882003 · 68 -' ·i · - • ' · · · · • • · - bo n1iceooary We are not recommending ro evcluation of NATO with any thought thnt NA TO ohould be nbandoncd or thnt ito conventional capa bility- remain weak and inef cctiv0 or ito uoe 0£ tactical aucloo r weapoi io be proocribed Rather thie reQ Wl ticn Pbould eek to find w ay6 by which NATO cs n otrengthen the overaall mil ii iry potiture of the free world Upon the concluoion 0£ that atudy thio Committee hopao that it will be et Ul bl' d to determine more clearly what changeo i£ nny nro needed in e cioting atomic energy legiolat on 0 In nddit l on to the recommendationn propooed in the Committee 1o report ouch reoevalu ition ohould include an aooooement o£ the political and economic rcalit l eo of the member uationo It ahould review the new weapon technologieo nnd their impact on obooleocent military equipment nod arrangements It ohould ota te the requirementc for otr cngthening ito organizatiooal otructure and for modex-nizing ito operational pi·ocedureo in order fhat NATO might respond effectively to conventional or nudear cb allengeo ' In r nrnrnary t he Com1nittce opecifically roco enda that the Executive Department undertal e a · omprebenaive e xarniriation 0£ the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in connection with the study nuthorh ed by the Preoident We furtlr r recon mend tl a t while the otudy is being made the Exe·cutive Department eotablioh e ective liaison and clooe cc llaboro tion with the appropriate Cornmitteea of tho Co Jgreao whooe legielative and funding reaponoibilitieo will be involved in the implementation o£ aueh new programo nod concepts as may be developed -62- NND 882003 - 69 C - - -- va ··· JOilNT COMMltTTEE ON ATOMXC ENERGY Ad Hoc Subcommittee STUDY OF U S AND NATO NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARRANGEMENTS February 11 1961 ' APPENDICES Appendix 1 The Joint Cong re11nlonal Committee on Atomic Energ -· and the Civilian Control of Atomic Energy'' b · James T Ramey Executive Director Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Outline of JCAE Study 0£ Civilian-Military Relations in Field 0£ Atomic Energ y Appendix 3 Legal Memorandum of David R Toll Stal£ Counsel Joint Committee on Atomic Energy re II Propos al to Arm u K Planes with U S Atomic Weapona Appendix 4 Memo of Executive Director to Senator Clinton P Ande1raon and Cong ressman Chet Holifield ·re Proposed Amendment to Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act 0 54 14 Y 'l c Jb 1- 11r i i ll tJT rl od dt iel ro cub C to t · i r ih t C imfnol Sc i U'iu 1 ' ·a• •· ru• _ · ·· · il •· •-' • G ·1 J IJ WJ 11I • c n D c z n 1 on °'3tUon 144 b Ato ilc PQ 1 coe U1 d cJ ted · tf f Mul h 7l FOfi i EfiLV frlSYnltm tl Ttl En 11JY A t 1064 0 11 Appendi c 2 i JOli'II COMMITTEE ON ATOr 11C ENERGY 3 3 '76 TOP § CRET TOP SECRET 0OCUMEN T r o 11 e 7 ½d L_________ _ Nl TJ 882003 - '10 ' -----------------------------------------·- v q ---· I I I I THE J0 NT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON A TO MIC ENERGY AND THE CIVILIAN CONTROLOF ATOMIC ENERGY I I I I I by J ames T Ramey Executive Director Joint Committee on Atomic Energy U S Congress L ' Prepared for delivery at the 1960 Annual Meeting o The American Political Science Association· New York Statler Hilton Hvtel September 8 - 10 960 Thia paper will discuss the role 0£ the Joint Cong -essional Committee on Atomic Energy aG an institution ill the civilian co trol 0£ atomic energy It is hoped that t his discussion will give some insight as to the ope - tions o Congress in a complex field as well as shed some light on the over-all problem of the civilian c ontrol 0£ atomic energy Background The issue 0£ the c ivilian vs military control of atomic energy has lain practically dormant for ten years or more Only ao occasional spark of controversy has illwninated this c omplex area 0£ relationships between the civilian and military branches of the Gove t'n nent in the past eecade But in the 1f 1mediate post-World War ll years the question of civilian control was the burning issue which was thought to transcend all others in the consideration of what became th e Atomic Energy Act of 1946 known as the McMahon Act l At ilia t time the q• iestion was whether Cong -ess would permit the permanent Atomic Energy Commission to have active military officers on its part-time governing Soar and as its full-time Administrator and Deputy Administrator This legislative proposal was contained in the May-Johnson bill introduced in the £all of 1945 It was in this period that the atomic scientist s first became politicall active Z This era was vividly r called by an observer of t he day who The views expressed in this article are of course sol ely those of the author a nd should not be attributed t o any Government Agency or the Joint Con1mittee on Atomic Ene -gy The author is indebted to Miss Dor othy Schaffter and Mrs Dorothy M Bates of the Library of Congress for an O otated references and to Miss Patricia McMahon for notes on the l egislative background of the civilian control problem raJD 882003 -¥ - - - -·· ·-·-·- -- --- - -----• - --- •M •• James T Ramey The JCAE and The Civilian Control of Atomic Energy - zc crr mcnted • To many tbia was a simple choice between war and peace To others advocacy of civilian control was a means cf preventing 'brass hat' abuse of our precious asset -tomic eoe ·gy To many scientis t s the issue was posed in related t ei 1s m ilitary control meant a c ontinuance of arbitrary decisions uncomprehending bureaucracy and an i ntellectual gap which the military officers showed little intere£t in bridging · To a f ew historically-minded souls the i sue '-7 6 ci i of tl rn - eratic tradition••the armed for c es with their e cer tia l z' au hcritarian training and discipiine would not be adequately responsive to t 1e public will 11 3 • • •· ·- ···-· • The c ivilian control issue was r esolved in the McMahon Act by the establishment of a full-time civilian five man Atomic Energy Commission a civilian General Manager and a civilian Joint Com littee on Atomic E nergy The AEC was to be responsible for the development manufacture and cuctody of atomic weapons and other rni itar • ipplicai ions of atomic energy but the P es t' e it 7as authcrizE i to h ansfer or delega e any of these f unctio ns to the rr ilitar y departmel ts The collabo1'ation and participation by the military in th atomic energy p rogram was f acilitated by providing t c-t he Direr tor of t he AEC Division of Military A plications s iould be a u litary officer ar d by the e s tablishment of U e M J'ctary i isc i Com itte' which was to• provide a two way mea ns of comrr ur ic ticn bE ween the A C c nd the milita y Thus the MLC was established to be t he watchcog of tl e military over AEC and the Joint Corr mittee was t o be t he watchdog for the Congr iss and public over both the nlilitary a nd AEC l •' The r easons for the establishment o civilian supremacy in t be atomic energy prograin were several 4 It was thought tha t r esponsibility for t he devel opment of policies i n c onnection with this gre a t new force shoul d be in civilian hands reporting directly to the President S The 1946 McMahon Act attempted to emphasize the conduct and er couragement o peaceful civilian research and uses of a t omic energy as well as military uses which would be better handled b y civilians It was believed that a civilian agency would be more effici ent even for military applications and par ticulariy in obtaining the all i mpo rtant continued participation and cooperation o the scientific community It was further believed t hat by placing control of a tomic ' Tames T Ramey The JCAE and Civilian Costo of Atorr ic Ene -gy - 3 - energy in civil an hands we would give added assurance to the world that the Ucited States contemplated io military adventures and · strengthen the U S position in negotb ting international control s on aton1ic energy deve l opment 6 ·o • '·i • • It is not the purpose of this paper to trace in detail the subsequent history 0£ civilian control o a to mic energy and the various changes in relationi hip between the several institutions involved particcia ly the AEC Su fice it to say that in 1948 as several· o our pa -ticipan s will r ecall the principle of civilian control was challenged in pa t by the military through Secretary of Defense Forrestal 7 This issue which involved a proposal that custody of atomic weapons be transfe rred to the military was resolved by President Truman in favor of continued civilian custody S - - Since the 1947-50 period many aspects of the military applications o atomic energy have changeq From an era of extreme scarcity o r aw materials and finished weapons we have reached a stage of a t emporary sur plus of uranium ore and we have l arge stockpiles of weapons o many sizes and yields Instead 0£ r eliance solely on delivery as a bomb from aircraft a tomic weapoue can now be delivered as warheads on missiles and in artillery and bazooka shells Additional mifitary applications have come to the fore including nucl ear powered ·submarines nuclear rocket development and compact nucl ear power reactors f or remote mili ary installations And finally we have seen the Soviets and the United Kingdom develop a nuclear weapon capability and a e watching the French attempt to do so All of these developments have posed many new problems Thus the r e is the problem of numbers--what is manageabl e or a relatively few weapons may not be or hundreds or thousands Thie compounds the ordinary problems of storage handling p rotection safety and secrecy classification Problems are accentuated by the necessit ies of l ocation not only in the continental United States but in aircraft and ships and at overseas bases A further problem is the need to ha· e atomic weapons eady for action in a very short period 0£ t ime And there a r e not only probl ems between AEC and the Defense Department but also between the United States and its allies In view of these changes in program i t is not unexpected that changes have occurred in civilian -military relationships i e in civilian control miD 882003 - 3 James T Ramey The JCAE and The Civilian Control of Atomic Energy - 4 - Old institutions such as the lvtilitary Liaison Committee have apparent been supplanted in some wayo New combined military-civilian groups such as the Naval Reactors Branch under Admiral Rickover have been· successfully established within the Atomic Energy Commission The State Department has been assuming a greater role through its office of atomi energy and disarmament General Role and Organization of Joint Committee It is the purpose of this paper to discuss and analyze the role of tle Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as an institution in the civilian control of atomic energy As indicated previously the Joint Committee in a sense is one of the two primary institutions in the ci jlian cont 'Ol of atomic e ergy For it was this ''watchdog role of the Joint Committee for which it was primarily established This was made clear in the original report of the Special Senate Committee which reported out the McMahon Act · with the following l anguage The importance of the field of atomic energy coupled with the unique character of the problems raised by its development makes it peculiarly desirable and necessary that the Congress be fully acquainted at all times with the work of the Commission The bill in section 16 makes provision for reports which will · contr bute to this end • · More important however is the provision for the establishment of a joint congressional committee to be composed of nine Members of the Senate and nine Members of the House of Representatives directed to make continuing studies of the activiti es of the Atomic Energy Commission and of problems related to the development use and control of atomic energy The joint committee is empowered to hold hearings to act on legislation and to equip itself with a staff of such experts and technicians as it deems necessary to carry out its functions The usefulness of such a committee in focusing responsibility in the Congress and in keeping the legisl ature informed c annct be overemphasized The joint committee will be in a position to give substantial aid to the Appropr iat ions Committee and to give consideration to supplementary and amending l egislation as tlie need arises 9 It has often been noted that the Joint Committee is a somewhat unique Congressional institution For one thing it is the only Joint Committee James T Ramey The JCAE and The Civilian Control of Atomic Energy - 5 - which has legislative functions in that all bills relating to atomic energy or the AEC arc re erred to it audit is empowered to make legis lative · recommendations to beth houses of Congress Since the 1954 amendments le gislation to autho -izc app opricl ticn i or capital facilitice and eince 1957 l egislation to authorize governmental financial participation in atomic power projects have·also been required and muot be refer ed to the Joint Committee A furt ier statutory require1nent that AEC and the Defense Department keep the joint Committee fully and cur -ently informed of all activities r latir g to atomic energy is also somewhat unusual in ExecutiveCongressional elationships ' The Jcint Corr rr ittee is composed cf - ight' en members nine from each House 1' o mo e i han t ive mc nbere may be f - m the came political party in either House The Chairn1anship rot a tea evz y two years between the Senate ai d the nouse The Joint Committee i zs a ataff of some twenty-odd employees o wh - n about eight or r ine are professional employees In carrying on its work it utilizes extensively consultants and assigned employees -or n AEC and its b b- rato es r d th Defense Department It ha also been ably ac i teri by the Library of Congress and the Gene -al Accocnting 0£ ice--organizatioos w ich a t pri -narily respousible to -Congre ss In assessing the sources of the Joint Committee's authority Chairman Anderson z nd the author recently stated I · Refe ence has already been made to the Joint Committee's principal st tutor y sources of authori y namely acting as a joint '-'llit f y both houses 0£ Congress its right to be currently informed a 1d ito enlarged legis lative responsibil ties Also of impcrtan c have been the statutor y requirements of Joint Committee r e view of in1portant domestic a cmic power development arrangements as well as international arrangements for co-ope atio l with forei gn governments covering the peaceful development of a omic energy and military uses From a practical standpoint the success achieved by the Joint Committee over the years has resulted from the continuity in membership o many of its leading members and its efforts to keep the United States in the forefront of atomic energy development The tenure of maay of its senior members goes back to the original Joint Committee appointments in 1946 z nd several other members nu nber eight or t en years of service · This is in contrast with the Atomic Energy Commiss ion which currentl has f ur new Commis sioners and a new Ge neral Manager • O C 1 ' James T Ramey The JCAE and The Civilian Control of Atomic Euer gy - 6- In relation to military problems it should be noted that oeveral • influc ntial members of the Joint Committee aloo serve on·thc Committees of the House and Senate which deal ith the armed services foreign relations and appropriationo Several members of the Joint Committee arc also reserve oUicero in the armed· forces ·Role of the Jcint Committee in Relation to Civilian Control -Individual Views of Joint Committ c Members Several members of the Joint Committee were leading proponents of civilian control when legislative proposals were first considered in 1945-46 Congressmen Holifield and Price•joined in a minority report on the MayJohnson bill Congressman Durham served on the conference committee which inally hammered out the compromises on the McMahon Act Senator McMahon became probably the beet known proponent of civilian control beth before and after the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 up until his untimely death in 195Z Senator Vandenberg also made an original contribution to the establishment of civilian control In the years that followed Congressmen Durham Holifield and Price continued their championing of civilian control Thus in connection with the 1954 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act Congressmen Holifield and Price e ted in part ih their dissenting views Although we do not believe H R 9757 departs in any fundamental way from the accepted principle of civilian control and management of the atomic energy program we wish to take this opportunity to alert the Congress and the public to the possibilities that lie ahead It is generally acknowledged that atomic weapons are rapidly achieving a conventional status in military planning for national and allied defenses Accordingly we may expect that the military will steadily seek increasing control over the weapons phases of the atomic energy program This is not said in criticism but only as a reminder that there are bounds which the military must not transgress if the principle of civilian control is to be maintained Military influence in the Atomic Energy Commission is by no means lacking and we believe it is more pervasive than heretofore ••• The pending bill gives new authority and responsibility to the Department of Defense in various atomic affa irs 11 11 NND 882003 - r6 ' james T Ramey The JCAE and The Civilian Control 0£ Atomic Energy -7Congressman Durham in his capacity as Chairman 0£ the· Joint Committee in 1958 called attention to new problems of both small inroads by the military and potentially la -ge inc1·eases of military control in the field o£ nu lear propulGion for outer soace ·1n a apeech at the annual meeting 0£ the Atomic Industrial Forum he stated in part Last year I pointed out that most 0£ our progress under the 1946 and 1954Atomic EnCTgy Acts i s attributable to the fact that we have had a CIVILIAN Atomic Energy Commission responsible for the entire atomic energy program • • This policy of civilian control is presently being put in jeopardy in two different ways First is by the process o nibbling--of proposing detailed changes in the Atomic Energy Act nd practices thereunder which may enhance the role o the mil itary••••• Moreover we are also aced with a serious challenge to civilian control in the ield of outer space propulsion 11 lZ -- · In a recent speech on the Floor of Congress Congressman Holifield spoke of the problem of erosion of civilian control 11 in relation to proposed arrangements for custody or transfer of atomic weapons to NA TO countries He stated There has been a constant campaign to obtain acceptance of the fiction that 1a£ter all a nuclear weapon is just another weapon 1 1The nuclear weapon is a conve ntional weapon now 1 I regret to say that there has been an erosion of civilian control Part of this eros ion is due to a gradual step-by-step surrender to the steady pressure of our strong and entrenched military bloc Part of it i s due to 11 the multiplication o nuclear weapon types and quanties in inventory These problems will not go away nor will they be solved by our refusal to recognize that technological change has made obsolete the old and cumber some procedures · My plea is that we do not try to solve them through subterfuge or a calculated program of deceit• Let us lay the problem on the table and talk sense to the Ame rican people and our allies Unless we can bear the burden of new challenges through the exercise of our historic democratic processes of discussion debate and publicly arrived at decisions then our way of life is doomed u l2a NND 882003 - · ·· · t · - · · · ···• · -· - · · ·· ··· ' · · ·· • •• ·· - · · · ' ·· · •- · · · • ·· - - ' · · - ·· ··• ' • ' ' • 11 James T Ramey The JCAE The Civilian trol 0£ Atomi c Energy CO l- n the Senate side Senator Anderson has taken the l ead in relation to preserving civilian control Si nce the re have been no c l earcut issues on civilian co11t -0J in recent yea r s and also because 0£ p robl ems 0£ sec -ecy there hae been little occasion or expression 0£ views on t he subject by other members of the Joint Committee Committee Rol e in Ci vi ian Control A s mentioned earlier the role of Joint Committee in r el ation to civilian control has been that of an a ll around ' vat chdog Senator Anderson in a recent s tatement in connection with ·the President ' s press interview on the tr ansfer o atomic weapons t o NATO a llies expressed the Joint Committee 11 traditional role as follows ' 'l and when a proposal to change t he l aw comes to o ur Committee its general nature and implications must be under stood by the Congress and the American people The Chairman and members of the J oint Committee on Atomic E ner gy stand as guar antor s to t he Congres i and t he public t hat secret a cti ities in the a tom ic energy field a r e - arried on properly and in accordance with the law 11Cl 3 In analyzing the Joint Commit tee's watchdog role it may be helpful to cons ide r it in r e l ation to our general unctions carrie d on by t he Committee I l egislative investigative and inspectional informational and policy making Legisl ative F inction Thomas and Northrop have pointed out in their ·book tha t in the e rly years the Joint Committee was primarily interested in making the established civilian-military r el ationship work in practice l 4 It was not until t he amendments of 1954 that any s i gni icant l gisla tive changes were made af ectini this r e lati onship However during 1947-51 varit' US bills to permit gr eate military participati on w ere permitted to die in Committee In 1951 an rr e idment was reported out of the Joint Committee and enacted which permitted transfer of Restricted Data t o U allies intended only for the B itish a 1d provided for Defense Department participation o y through t he National S ecur ity Council s 1954 Arr e aiments The 1954 amendrnenta provided or considerably greater l atitude in the Defense Department or t he s ecurity clearance of its own e mpl oyees and those of its c ontr a ctor s l 5 Theretofore such employees had to be cleared by AEC based on FBI i nvestigations Provision was also n1ade fer NND 882003 •' t8 James T Rane y The JCAE and The Civilian Con l'ol of Atomic Energy - 9 greater participation by the Defense Department in the classification de lassi ic tio tfd trans-classiiication of Restricted Data and defense 1nformat1on · ·······• The 1954 amendrr mts also authorized the transfer of Restricted Data to U· S allies The President was given authority in section 144 b to authorize the Department 0£ Defense with assistance of AEC 11 to c·ommu li ate Restricted Data in certain categories to an allied nation or regional defense crganizations such as NATO The Restricted Data catcgor ies we -e thos e necessary to l the development of defense plans 2 iha training of personnel in the en1ployment oi and defense against atomic weapons an 3 the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment • of atomic weapons A proviso was added to the effect that the Restricted Data on weapons must be confined to external characteristics and there must be a joint judgment by the · Defense Department and AEC that any such data ''will not reveal irrl portant information concerning the design or fabrication of the nuclear components of an atomic weapon 11 Thus for the first time the Defense Department was given authority to transmit atanic information constituting Restricted Data to foreign countries It should be noted however that this information was necessary in ccnnection with activities which normally would be handled directly by the military i e plan ng training and defense against atomic weapons Also AEC was to assist' the Defense Department and participate in a joi it determination as to the extent of weapons information to be transferred On Restricted Data relative to research development and production of special nuclear material the Atomic Energy Commission was given responsibility for transmittal of information without Defense Departmen assistance Ano her somewhat obscure change or interpretation in the law apparently permitted the Defense Department to deal with nuclear components of weapons and nuclear warheads of missiles separately from the weapons system ancl the missile itself from the standpoint of secrecy classification and custody This was later to be interpreted by the Defense Department to permit the trano er 0£ Restri cted Data on submarines to the United Kingdom and to permit nuclea warheads on missiles to be treated separately from the mis ile vehicle itself in terms of develop nent and manufacture and transfer of ownership and clas9• iified information This was accomplished primarily by the new de£ir ition of atomic weapons in section 11 d It was these overt grants of authority and possibly others less direct which caused Congressmen Holifield and Price to set forth their qualms as to the proposed changes on civilian control NND 882003 - t'l ·i ·-·--- ·- --· ---------Jame3 T Ramey The JCAE and The Civ_ilian Cont ol of Atomic Energy - 10 - To sorr ewhat Jalance the additional grants of authority to the Defense Department the Joint Con1mittee added and the Coo r ress enacted ce_rtain provisio ns intended to st engthen the Joint Committ e 1 s watchdog position in relation to the Military Fir st it acded a p r ovisic 11 to section 202 o the Act to make the Defense Department subject to the same requirement as the AEC in keeping the Joint Comn1ittee ally and currently informed as to all its activities relating to atomic energy Secondly it added provisos to sections 144 and 123 to require that all agreements of cooperation ·including military agreements of coop ration must lie before the Joint Cor 'lmittee f or thirty days before becoming e£fective 19S8 Amendments Following the Soviet sputniks and the resu itant NATO conference in the fall and winter of 19S7 the Exec1 1tive Branch proposed additional revisions to sections 144 and 91 to shore up U S_ a lliances in the ace o the increasing Soviet technological and missile threat 17 bill The proposed provided for the elimination of the proviso in section 144 b preventing t he communic ation by the Defense Departmer t of important in orrr ation on weapons desig i in connection with training activities A new section 144 c was proposed to be added which would perr -iit comple e exchange of design information on atomic weapons a id submarines between AEC and foreign oouiitries A new section 91 c was p roposed to permit the President t o authorize AEC or the Defense Department as appropriate to transfer to cooperating nations non-nucl ear parts of weapons and weapons systems nuclear r eactors or submarines and other military applications and source byproduct and special nuclear material Uz35 and plutonium for use in weapons or in nuclear reactors for military applications None of these provisions changed t he previous pattern as to responsibilities between AEC and the DefenGe Department However the Defense Department did profiose to obtain gr eater authority in the trans-classification of iclormation 18 And the division of responsibilities between AEC and the Defense Department was left somewhat vague in section 91 c Although res·ponsibility between AEC and the Defense Department was not changed significantly the extent of permissible transfer and exchange of atcmic information materials and non-nuclear parts with foreign allieA was substantially enlarged This caused certain seg·m ents of the scientific community and certain groups with pacifist l eanings to view the proposal s with alarm The pri cipal basis of their fears was not so much the military as the stimulation of the nuclear arms race with the Soviet bloc and the possibl e facilitation of the entr r f a fo h II nation and subsequently other countries into the atomic weapons picture 9 NND 882003 • ' • - • • • •• • • • • • · • · · · · ' B James T Ramey The JCAE and The Civilian Control 0£ Atomic Energy ·--- 11 - The Defense Department provided a subst ntial portio i of the testin on • in favor of the amendments Certain representations and assurances were made _ hich as we shall see have been subject to considerable subs que ct discussion The Joint Committee in reporting out the 1958 amendments and Chairman A 11derson on the Senate flo or added a number 0£ restrictions and limitations lO One of these had the effect 0£ limiting t Ietailed weapons cooperat on to the British 21 Another gave the Congress a v to over future rr ilitary · · agreements for cooperation by means of int reasing the waiting period from thirty days to sixty days and providing that no agreeraent could b comc effective if a concu -rent resolution of dicapproval shocld be adoft d by the two Houses of the Congress during the sixty clay w iitinz period 2 • • • Since 1958 no s i gnif cant amendments 0£ the Atomic Energy Act af ec tin g civilian c ontrol h ve been adopted However• on July 15 1958 on the Flooz- of the Senate an amendment to the AEC Authorization Bill £or Fiscal 19 59 sponsored by the Defense Dcpa otment was proposed which provided for Defense Department approval on transfers cf funds by AEC under e ction 106 £or AEC weapons facilities Alt 1ough the amencrr ent • a-as a re sJ o by the Senate for purposes 0£ study it was elimir ated Ll cod' r encc _ 1 - · Anoth r amendment was proposed by AEC Chairman McCone in 1959 with Defense Department support would have removed AEC 1 s responsibility for establishing or approving safety re gulations applicable to w eapons and atomic reactors in the custody 0£ the Defense Department 24 The question 0£ · AEG's responsibility for approving safety regulations was first raised i 119 59 by Admiral Rickover wear ng his AEC hat lo testimony before the Joint Committee during an underwater hearing on board the s ubmarine SKIPJACK Admiral Rickover indicated that he believad that AEC was the legal and prope agency for the approval 0£ Navy safety regulations applicable to nuclear submarines 25 The AEC possibly in view of the increasing nu'm ber oi crashes of military aircraft carr ying nuclear weapons w a nted its responsibilities £or safety clarified so that it would not be held r esponsible £or failur es in design o ai r craft or weapons The proposed solution was· an amendment to authorize the President to designate the responsible agency £or safety as betwem AEC and the Defense Department The Joint Cot 'lmittee after considering various alternatives did not r epo t a bill out Instead it requested r eport s on the problems involved from AEC and the Defense Department for consideration in t he Second Session of the 86th Congress beginning in January of 19 60 As of Augui t 15 1960 the two age ncies had not submitted the requested reports NND 882003 -81 ' • · · · · •·•· · · • - • · · - · ·• · - - ' ' • James T Rarre y The JCAE and The Civilian ContDl of Atomic Energy - 12 Policy Making and Recommencing Functions Perhaps the most unique function of the Joint Committel in its ''watchdog role has · been its affirmative policy making and program recommending unction Normally a watchdog is supposed to exercise a negative or restraining role But the probl em of the military in many cases is not that it has tried to dq too much but that it has been content with too little Faced with this situation the Joint Committee bas made many contributions to the national defense and security The Joint Committee's affirmative role in the decision to build the H- bomb and its initiative for the large buildup in the AEC raw •material and production plant expansion program beginning in 1950 has been described in 26 an article by Senator Jackson in the 'November 1953 issue of THE ANNALS The activities o the Joint Committee in initiating a step -up o the missiles program in 1955 and other national defense e orts are described in a l etter to President Eisenhower rom Chair an Carl T Durham and Vice Chairman Anderson dated December 5 1957 27 The Joint Committee 1 s efforts in support of the NAUTILUS nuclear submarine and an eventual all-nuclear Navy are well-known This was recognized in testimony by Admiral Rickover the •rather of the nuclear Navy as follows Admiral RICKOVER There is one more thing I must say •which have said many times before but l would like to say it agaif Had it not been for the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Congressional Committee we would not have any nuclear-powered naval vessels today I think these two organ- 28 11 izations and their way of operating deserve most of the credit •' A brief review of the authorization of the new Hanford plutonium reactor i n 1957-58 should hel p in understanding the Joint Committee' s affirmative -ole and methodology The chief culprit i n t he enterprise was the so- called requirements system of the military services In order for any development or production project to be sponsored by the military the top management has to establish a requirement'' or ita end product whether it is conventional tanks or aircraft or nuclear weapons or the special nuclear material U235 and plutonium necessary or weapons In 1947 at the first meeting of the Joint Committee which considered military applications the Committee criticized the method used by the military in establishing requirements for Uz 35 and plutonium then called if sionabl e material because requirements were baaed on AEC existing productipn capacity Again in the 1950- 52 period the Joint Committee was cri tical of the requirements system and in effect persuaded Congress to establish requirements in terms of national needs £or an enlarged stockpile NND 882003 - 82 • • • • N • - • • I • · ' · · · ·-·· ••- · • c ·· • · ·' - ' - r - · ' • ·• James T Ramey The JCAE and The Civllian Control of Atomic Energy - 13 of weapons in the f ace 0£ the Soviet threat The expansion program for the Uz35 diffusion plants at Oak Ridge Paducah and Portsmouth and the · 2 plutonium production plants at Savannah River and Hanford resulted 9 Following the above expansion period the Joint Committee Chairman and the Chairman of the Military Applications Subcommittee in 1955 and 1956 pointed ut that ther·e were still shortages in regard to special nuclear materials 3 0 In 1957 the effort to authorize construction of an additicnal large plutonium production reactor was begun in earnest An engineering and design study was authorized in the AEC Authorization Act for fiscal 1958 3 l In fiscal 1959 the Congress authorized ·$145 million for a single purpose production plant with built-in features which would make it convertible II to dual purjose operation for electric power pr eduction s ubject to later authori zation Z In justifying the project the Joint Committee's unanimous report stated The Joint Committee has studied the problem of plutonium 1·equirements for many years It seems clear to the com1nittee that fiscal limitations rather than sound military planning have held back necessary increases in our plutonium production facilities The committee is convinced that dollar limitation while important should not dictate national defense policy and that more plutonium production facilities are urgently needed The fcmmittee has therefore recommended to the Congress project 59-a-5 a new $145 million production reactor facility at Hanford Wash as a minimum effort vital to new weapon development and our improved defense posture 1n the event a limitation of armaments agreement should be successfully achieved the facility can be converted after congressional authorization to peaceful purposes u 33 It will be noted that budgetary considerations rather than the military a s such are the targets for consideration Indeed the Joint Committee report pointed out that the Army Navy and Air Force and the Joint Chiefs 0£ Staff had all recommended additional production of plutonium 1n addition AEC weapons laboratories and a special Panel 0£ the Subcommittee on Military Applications had testified as to the need for more plutonium As a parting shot at the requirements system the Joint Committee report stet ed Since 1947 the committee has been critical of the Defense Department method of determining requirements baaed not on the military needs but rather on he Commission's planned p -oduction rate A summary of Joint Committee interest in this problem is set out in appendix I p 24 It is essential that the Department of Defense correct this procedure and determine NND 882003 ·83 • 'I- •- ·- - ···-- -· -·--· James T Ramey The JCAE and The Civilian Control of Atomic Energy - 14 - future military requirements of reactor products solely ·on military needs independently of Commission planned production schedules tr 34 The sequel to this story is that a ter some more encouragement by the Joint Committee the Defense Department finalJv came up witn a long-term schedule of its requirements for Uz35 and plutoniwn But Senator Anderson while commending the Defense Depat tment for this effort sadly pointed out in an article in Nucleonics We have recently learned that the Defense Department has finally dev·eloped a long-term requirement for its future needs for plutonium But no one should be surprised if this long-term requirement coincides with the production from current AEC facilities plus improvements and the new Hanford reactor So round and round they go I 11 3 5 Investigative and Inspection Functions The Joint Committee has not utilized its formal investigative powers to any cons iderable extent in connection with the Military However the Committee has made studies of various aspects of military applications of atomic energy ljor example in 1958 Senator Jackson Chairman of the Subcommittee on Mil ta y Applications established a Panel of outside experts to study the need for plutonium and problems of undersea warfare The reports of the Panel have been most helpful to the Committee and the Executive Branch 36 Inspection trips by Committee members to installations operated by the Military are another means of keeping up on current problems In 1955 for example on a trip to European installations Chairman Anderson and other Joint Committee members discovered certain deficiencies in U S weapons installationa which were called to the attention of appropriate U S military oificials a ttl corrected lo 1959 Senator Jackson visited U S Antarctic scientific bases operated by the Navy and recommended the provision of atomic reactors fo - such remote sites lo the AEC Authorization Act for fiscal 1961 $13 million has been authorized for such atomic power plants In July of 1960 Congressman Van Zandt and a Committee staff member · visited U S Arctic bases from Greenland to Alaska and also recommended the provision of atomic power plants for these areas• ' Joint Corr mittee classified hearings and briefings in executive session by the Defense Department AEC and CIA serve to keep the Committee and sta f informed as to the current e atus of military applications of atomic mm flfl 03 -FU 6 _ - James T Ramey The jcAE and The Civilian Con rol o Atomic Energy - 15 energy and provide leads as to possible problems A number o ouch classified meetings are held in each session o Congress and in case of emergencies between seasiOJ1s Five meetings were held on the weapcne custody problem alone in the period of November 1959 to July 1960 On occasion the Joint Committee requests special r eportc rom the Defense Depa -tment on specific problems Thus when the ommittee irst heard in orrnally o the proposed 2 key a rrangement on joint cusi c dy of U S atomic warheads with foreign contries it immediately r equested a full report on the matter ··•··· ···•···•·· In ormational Functions An impor tant part of the Joint Committee's watchdog role is to make available to the Congress and the public information and judgments on mil ita -y applications o atomic energy the detailed basis of which may be classified in whole or in part · In recent yea r s the Committee h s made a determined effort to conduct public hearingo on important questions in which the technical aspects bad been cast in doubt because of prior secrecy Examples include the hearings he ld in 195 i and 1959 on radioactive fallout from weapons testing 37 and the hearings on the effects of nuclear war held in 1959 3 3 In the spring of 1960 public bearings were held by the Joint Committee on the technica l aspects of the detection of nuclear tests 3 9 In each case a Summary-Analysis repo t of the hearings was prepared and issued for the information of Cong ress and the public 4 o V✓ e have been informed tha t these bearings and reports have become valuable reference book_e for s cientiots and engineers as well as l aymen The Joint Committee has a lso followed a practice of publishing in the Congressional Record proposed military agreements for cooperation as well as civilian agreements with f oreign countries Public bearings have also been held on the proposed military agreements and reports issued Speeches and press statements by members of the Joint Committee a1·e anothe r method of informing the Congress and the Fublic on problems of m ilitary and civilian control of atomic energy For example Cl airma · Anger son in 1956 revealed in a speech on the Floor of the Senate that the De£erise Department and AEC were proposing to tra nsfer secret design information and bluep r ints of the NAUTILUS nuclear sub1narine to the Br_itish contra ry t o t he intent of the law as inte rpreted by a number of members of the NND 882003 - 85 j ' James T Ramey a'be JCAE and The Civilian Control of Atomic Energy - - 16 CommittC ili including Congressman Cole the ranking minority House member More recently on February 3 1960 Chairman Anderson felt it necess ry to issue a statement concerning the President's answer at a press conierence to a question whether the United States should transfer nuclear weapons to its allies 42 The President's press conference occurred on the day following a classified Joint Committee session with the Defense and State Departments arid AEC on the status and plane for the custody of U s atomic weapons Following various leaks to the press by the Executive Branch Congressman Holifield made speeches on the Floor of the House on February 9 and March 1960 as to 3 various problems involved in proposed custody arrangements · • ·•···· From the for egoing discussion it should be evident that the Joint Committee has bad a v aried approach to its over-all watchdog role in the maintenance of civilian control of atomic energy The performance of its various functions has entailed numerous c ontact s and relationships between Joint Committee members and sta f with representatives of the Defense Department and the Army Navy and the Air Force Departments · On the whole relationships have been good especially between the military officers of the armed services who re gularly appear before the Joint Committee and the Committee members and staff I Paradoxically it has been the civilian epresentativee in the Defense Department who have had the most difficulties in relations hips with the Committee On reflection this is understandable since problems in recent years have related to the effect of budget ceilings on programmatic decisions and other t op level policy and management problems Some of these problems will be discussed in the following pages Problems of Joint Committee in CiYilian Control Role 1 Keeping Fully and Currently Informed One of the chief problems for the Joint Committee i n its ''watchdog role has been the pr·actical matter of actually keeping fully and currently informed on important aspects of th e military applications of atomic energy as they develop The Joint Committee has had its problems with AE C in keeping informed particularly in the period o 1953-58 But the Defense Department • · •····· NND 882003 -86 James T Ramey The JCAE and The Civilian Control of Atomic En rgy - 17 - presents even more difficulties because of its large size its multifold laye cs of authority and the fact that atomic energy is only one o many activities under its wnbrella · The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 places an affirmative obligation on the Defense Department as well as AEC to keep the Joint Committee fully and currently informed as to all its activities involving atomic energy applications The Joint Committe - eport on this provision in 1954 stated that the obligation applied to pending matters as well as those where the Defense Department had take n final action or reached a ''po_sition The Def ense • Department in its procedures however provides or reporting only on significant matters and only after final a·ction has be en taken within the Defense Department There appears to be some question in recent years as to whether the Defense Department has performed its statutory obligation even with respect to certain significant matters Thus as noted previously the Joint Commi tee was not officially informed of the s o-called Z y custody arrange1nent for U S thermonuclear warheads on foreign-owned Thor and Jupiter missiles until the Committee requested such information Other cases could probably be mentioned such as the revelation by an official spokesman of' the Executive Branch that land-based Polaris type missiles with thermonuclear warheads were being considered for some type of joint U S -NATO arrangement I 2 Reporting to Congress and the Public A further problem encountered by the Joint Committee in its watchdog role has been that of real or contrived secrecy labels p reventing public discussion of issues The technical details of any military atomic project must usually be classified and wit justification Occasionally even a unique idea or concept is so hot it must also be classified But in many cases particularly after a lapse of time it is necessary and possible to provide unclassified descriptions of projects or arrangements in sufficiently general terms as to permit meaningful discussion and yet protect security Joint Committee members have made a considerable effort to observe the letter and spirit o secrecy regulations In some cases this has regretably prevented full and free discussion of policy issues of importance to the Congress and the Country The security problem has been accentuated by the 1958 amendment to s ection 123 which provides £or a sixty day waiting period on military agreements of cooperation with the proviso for a veto by concurrent resolution o the two Houses of Congress In the debate on the 19 58 amendments various NND 882003 · - - · • · · ' • • r • • • • - • •• H • • ' • 0 • 8'f · James T Ramey The JCAE and The Civilian Centro l of Atomic Energy - 18 - Houi e members questioned how the House would be informed by the Joint Committee as to the problems involved in military agreements of coope -ation They recei· ed assurances from members 0£ the Joint Committee that the Joiot Committee would report to the two Houses on the issues as fully as se urity would permit In this connection the report of the Joint Committee states The Joint Cor unittee on Atomic Energy in compliance with its duties to the Congress aod to the peoples of the United States will closely and thorou ghly review any and all proposed agreements for cooperation that will be submitted to it pursuant to the' amendments contained in this bill The members of the Joint Committee are keenly aware of thei r important responsibilities to the Congress and to the peoples of the United States 11 44 Sometimes the problem of reporting to Congress and the public is made more difficult by security labels imposed by the fiat of the Executive Branch which be r no relation to real secu -ity In statements on March 19 and 22 1959 45 Senator Anderson made public a report by the Defense Department on fallout from weapons tests which revealed that stratospheric fallout was coming down much faster than AEC had predicted This report had been 1 las s ified confidentia -defense information II but after much discussion between the Defense Department still and the Jcint Committee still it was declassified However the Defehse Department attempted to keep the confidential tag on the report The stated r eason for the delay was in order to permit AEC to review the bases of the report although an AEC Commissioner had received a copy of the report in December of 195 8 The p oblem of maintai_n ing real security and yet keepi g Congress and the public infcrmed is compounded by the practice unfortuna tely of long s tand ing of deliberate leaks of previously d assified information by the Executive Branch For example the statement of Senator Anderson of March 19 1959 was occasioned by a front page story in a New York newspaper whic h revealed hitherto classified informa tion on the AEC high altitude Argus test shot which apparently had gone undetected by t he So -iets anc1 others Thus w e have the situation where the Defense Department is upen to the charge on the one hand of apparently ''le i king classified information b elpful to its alleged viewpoi 1t on the difficulty cf detecting tests and on the other ha nd o trying to s1 rpres 1 •Jnc aeoiiie ir forr 1ation which inclicatcci somewhat greater haza ds from fal out Another example involved the custody problem previous mentioned Following the Joint Committee's classified e ecutive session on February 2 NND 882003 · · · · · · ·- · ·' ' - •· - 88 James T Ramey The JCAE and The· Civilian Contrcl 0£ Atomic Energy - 19 1960 at which reprcGentatives 0£ the Executive Branch were present an obviously iniormed story on the subject 0£ the meeting appeared the ne¼t morning in a New York paper It was this story which provided the occasion· for the President's discussion later that morning 0 4-1b1joblems o custody and transfer o nuclear weapons with NATO allies Thereupon that afternoon Senator Anderson as Chairman 0£ the Joint Committee £elt obligated to issue a quite restrained st 1tement presumably because o security and diplomatic considerations 47 However the next day and in the weeks that followed various newspaper and magazine stories appeared which according to the grapevine were based on ini ormation from the Executive Branch An example 0£ the information provided is contc ined in a story in a Baltimore paper dated March 5 1960 as follows • •••• Something is under consideration now within the Administration It has come up in connection with the intermediate range Thor missiles £or example which the United States is supplying to Britain and other NATO allies and also with the use of such air-to-air defense missiles as the Genie also being supplied to the British •••• In the current discussions within the Administration it is being noted that the weapons being assigned to allied forces in some of the NATO countries -- the ground-based missiles and ·the aJ-to-air missiles -- must be ready £or instantaneous use Yeti£ the nuclear warheads must be under the custody only of Americans -- while the Thor or Jupiter missiles are operated by British R A F units £or example or the Genies are attached to R A F bombers -- precious time could be lost in arming the missiles and in otherwise maintaining American cuotody until they were £ired• Thus there could well be times under presently visualized circumstances when it would be difficult to say that the nuclear weapons were under control and custody 0£ the United States From this situation has arisen the belie£ that the law should be changed 43 It should be noted that the Administration did not recommend a change in the law However following this series 0£ sto -ies based on inside information a tour 0£ a Thor base in England by newspl per correspondents was permittec in which photogra hs o the 2 key system were published 4 9 More · recently photogr aphs of a U S Air Force Major with his key in front of the instrument panel for the missile launching system have appeared in newspapers and magazines SO NND 882003 - ·-· • • • • •· •• · • · - •i - -- • · • • '- · •·••··••-- 39 - --- ---- -· - --------- -···- · James T -Ramey The JCAE and The Civilian Control of Atomic Energy - 20 - Xet in spite of what would seem to have been a deliberate publicity scheme to popularize the Z ke system the information was still officially classified secret b the Defense Department until recent inquiries by the Joint Committee It will readily be seen that the practice of maintaining a strict classification system together with the liberal use of leaks for political or bureaucratic purposes can be an effective instrument in attempts to manipulate public discussion and opinion This practice of administrative fiat as to what is classified and what may be leaked will also inevitably ndermine a real security classification sy_s tcm 5l · · 3 Problems 0£ Keepi -ig Faith With Con rcss One of the most aggravating substantive problems affecting the relationships between Executive agencies and Congressional Committees is that of keeping faith with Congress By keeping faith is meant the t k ing of actions consistent with representations and assurances given to Congress at the time of Congressional enactment of a law or amendment or the authorh ation approval or review of a proposed policy project or arrangement In the matter of civilian-military relationships in atomic energy the matter of keeping faith with Congress is pa -ticularly sensitive because of the role oi gu i-antors 11 to Congress and the public which has been assigned to tha Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Members of the Joint Committee in their reports and staten1ents make representations to the Congress and the public as to how a proposed amendment to the A tomic Energy Act or proposed military agreement 0£ cooperat on will be carried out in practil e These representations in turn are based on assurances and information supplied by the Executive Branch In their watchdog role Joint Committee members must therefore be on the lookout as to whether these assurances or representations are actually being observed in practice and if not whether there is justification and authority or the change • It was this role to which Chairman Anderson was referring in his February 3 1960 statement concerning the President's position on weapons custody ' When the present law was adopted in 1958 P L 85-479 the officials testifying to the Joint Committee time after time stated that it was not intended and that the law if amended in accordance with their recommendations would not permit completed nuclear weapons or the nuclear components of weapons to be transfer ed to a foreign country or to get beyond the custody of the United mm 882003 - 90 James T Ra y The JCAE and The Civilian Control of Atomic Energy - Zl - States forc es In turn the Joint Committee in its report and members of the Joint Committee on the Floor of the Congress defended the amendments to the law and the agreements thereunder stating that no t ransfer of weapons or nuclear components was intended or permitted and that the United States would maintain custody of such weapons ••• We therefore have a right to assume that aI y program the President may have to shar e our arms with our allies will not violate this provision unless a change in the l aw is rf52 quested by the President and appr oved by the Congress Chairman Anderson was referring to the weapons custody question which is an exampl e of the problem of keeping faith with Congress The student of civilian military relationships might appropriately examine the representations by the Defense Department in the l 9S8 NATO hearings that custody of nuclear weapons components would be maintained aI iffotected separate fror i the carrying vehicle i e aircraft or missile The much publicized 2 key system apparently involves the mating of the U S -owned nuclear warhead with the foreign-owned missile and at the most the United States has jointc stody cir joint-possession of such weapons I Ther e may undoubtedly be good r easons froin a techr ological operational and policy standpoint supporting changes s uch as the above But in keeping faith with Congress the question arises as to whether they should not have been disclosed and discussed preferably in public in order to determine whether the l aw or its intent was being followed before action was taken 53-A A closely related aspect of keeping f aith with Congress concerns following procedures established by Congress for review by Cong ess of proposed projects or a rrangements If such procedures are bypassed questions of l aw and comity are raised In this connection our political scientist might inquire as to whether or not the United States 1 nuclear weapons stockpile agreements with NATO countries are bypassing the procedures established £or Congressional r evi ew under the sixty day provision in section 123 d of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 · NND 882003 - t I James T Ramey · The JCAE and The Civilian Control 0£ Aton1ic Energy - 22 Joint Committee Study on Status 0£ Civilian Control ln view 0£ the problems discussed in this paper and renewed inte eot by Joint Committee members in certain· aspects o the military applications 0£ atomic energy it is not surprising that the Joint Committee staff has been instructed to undertake a study in this area The following subjects have been tentatively designated £or st11dy l Weapons custody and transfer arrangements both between tl e Atomic Energy Commission and the Department 0£ Defense and between the United States and its military allies 2 Security classification of military information and materials 3 System 0£ determining military requirements and methods 0£ financing such requirements 4 Responsibilities for safety of atomic weapons nuclear submarines and military reactors acd S Relaticnships between organizations responsible for militar y applications 0£ atomic energy · I Political scientists may be most interested in those aspects of the study dealing with weapons custody arrangements and organizational relationships The weapons custody arrangements may be particularly inte esting beca· is certain fictions have developed between AEC and the Defense Department on custodial responsibilities and the q11estion is now presented whether these fictions are also being applied between the United States and foreign countries under stockpile agreements All 0£ these subjects in one way or another bear upon the complex question 0£ civilian control over the most devastating and powerful forces yet devised by man Atomic weapons and nuclear energy Our obj ective is to strike a proper balance so that peacetime policy decisions affecting the national defense and the public health and safety may be made by r esponsible civilian governmental authorities and yet make possible rapid and effective military applications if so directed by the President S 4 l T he problem is growing in magnitude and complexity as fir st on own services a nd pow our allies become armed with an atomic capability It i's a problem worthy 0£ constant vigilance end study by the Congressional watchdog the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy • • NND 882003 - 92 li JQf lQj fU U J ames T Ramey THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY AND THE CIVILIAN CONTRO- _ OF ATOMIC ENERGY Foot iot es 1 For a f airly r ecent discussion of the civilian control issue in the context of other post-war problems see Walter Millis Harve y C Mans field and Harold Stein Arm s and the State New York 1958 at pp 155-169 2 See John A Simpson The Sci entists as Public Educators A twoyear s ummary Bulle tin of The Atomic Scientis t s Vol 3 Sept 1947 PP• 243- 246 3 Byron lv iller A Law I s Fassed--The Atomic Ener gy Ac t of 1946 The Univers ity of Chicago L aw Review Vol 15 No 4 Summer 1948 799-822 a t p 817 P 817 It should be noted however that t he Manhattan Engineer District MED perated autonomously from the r egul a r military servic es and achieved spectacular success i n 1ts r esearch and devel opment effort 4 See generally James R Nevm- an and Byr on S Miller The Control of Atomic Energy New York 19 48 a t pp 7-13 39-45 5 See generally Harry s Truman Memoirs Garden City NY 1955 Vol 2 pp 2-16 a ls o lette r dated Feb 2 1946 from Pres Truman to Senator Brien McMahon New York Time s Feb 3 1946 8 1 2 3 6 Report Atomic Energy Act of 1946 Special Committee on Atomic I Energy United States Senate 79th Cong • 2d Seas s R ep 1211 1946 at pp 5 6 11 12 7 See Walter Millis The Forr estal Diaries New York 1951 pp 458 460 8 'Truman Dec lares Russia Forces U s Into Bomb Secrecy •• Military Role ie Barred•••• New York Times July 25 1948 1 5 and 4 1 2 Text of President• e Statement 4 1 2 3 For di scussion of background of military v s civilian c ontrol and politica l and technical arguments of AEC and DOD · resp ectively see news a rticle by Hanson Baldwin entitled Milita ry ·May Ge t Atomic Bomb Preeident 1 s Approva l Coul d End Civilian Control --New York Times June 10 1948 9 l 2 9 Report Special Committee on Atomic Energ y op c it fo otnote 6 at PP• 29 30 10 Clinton F Ande rson and J amesT Ramey Congr ess and Research Experienc e in Atomic Research and Development THE ANNAL S Vol 327 Ja0 1960 pp 85-94 l l pp 90 91 11 See Separa te Views of Representative Holifield and Representative Price on H R 97 57 H Rep ll2181- 83rd Cong 2d Sees p 137 12 Joint Committee Press Rel ease #135 March 19 1958 with speech attac hed NND 882003 '13 '-· • • ' ' _· · James T Ramey Footnotes - 2 - 12a _Cong -essional Record 86th Cong 2d Sess Daily Edition F bruary 9 1960 p 2169 13 Statement by Senator Clinton P Anderson Chairman Joint Committee on Atomic Energy February 3 1960 Joint Committee Press Release · No 253-A 14 Morgan Thomas - Robe1·t M Northrop Atomic Energy and Congre ss Ann Arbor 1956 at p 46 This book·provides a good rwuing · account of the civilian vs military problem up to 1956 in the context of other atomic energy events 15 Section 143 Atomic Energy Act 0£ 1954 P L 83-703 4Z USC Sec 2163 16 Ibid Section 142 c and 142' d · 42 USC Sec 2162 c and d 17 H R 10348 S 3164 85th Cong 2d Sess 1958 l8 Section 6 of H R 10348 op cit fo otnote 17 19 Hearings Amendments to Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to Provide fo Greater Exchange of Military Information and Material Vith Allies 11 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 85th Cong 2d Sess 1958 at pp 374-385 387-389 410-425 435-444 I 20 Report Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as ame nded to provide for Greater Exchange of Military Information and Material With Allies Joint Committee on Atomic Energy H Rept 1849 85th Cong 2d Sess 1958 at pp 7-10 21 Section 144 c and 91 c 4 restricted cooperation to nations which have made substantial progres s in the development of atomic weapons For explanation of what is meant by substantial prog1·ess see Report cited in footnote 20 at p 12 22 Section 123 d See Report op cit footnote 20 at pp 16-li 23 Congressional Record 85th Cong 2d Sess July 15 1958 at p 13803 Report by Managers of House Con£ Rept No 2236 July 21 1950 24 S 2569 H R 8754 as introduced and Report Amendments to the AtomJ c Eoei·gy ·Act of 1954 as amended Senate Rept 871 Joint Committ e on At · ic Energy 86th Cong 1st Sess p 2 25 Hearings Review of Naval Reactor Program and Admiral Rickove1· Award 11 Joint Co nm ittee on Atomic Energy 86th Cong 1s t Ses s 1959 t PP• 4-11 ' • · •' · ' NND 882003 4 James T Ramey Footnotes _ 3 - 2 6 The period oi 1950-55 is covered in great thoroughness by Thomas and Northrop in their book cited in ootilote 14 2 7 Joi it Committee Press Release No 105 · dated Dec 10 1957 with letter of pee 5 1957 attached 2 8 Hearings Naval Reactor Program and Shippingport Project Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 86th Cong lat Seas at P• 98 2 9 See Morgan Thomas ooto lte 14 a PP• 101-108 12 6-131 30 See Chronology o Joint Committee interest in greate - plutonium in Report Authorizing Appropriations or the AEC in accordance with Section 2 61 of the AEC Act oi 1954 as amended 11 House Rept Zl08 85th Cong 2 d Sess appendix 1 pp 2 4-26 31 P L 85-162 AEC AuthorizationAct or Fiscal Year 1958 71 Stat 403- P -oject 58-b- 8 Production reactor or special nuclear material development design and enginee -ing study $3 000 000 32 P L 85-590 AEC Authorization ·Act £or Fiscal Year 1959 7Z Stat 490 - Project 59- a-5 Productior reactor acility or special nuclear materials convertible type Hanio -d Washington $ 45 000 000 33 Repor t 11Autbo1·izing Appropriations f or the Atomic Energy Commission in accdrdance with Section 261 of the Atomic Energ·y Act o 1954 as amended - H Rept 2 108 Joi it Committee on Atomic Energy 85th Ccng Zd Sess 1958 P• 5 34 Ibid page 9 35 Clinton P AndE rson The Outlook for the U S Atomic Energy Program 11 Nucleonics Vol 17 No 3 _ March 1959 PP• 77-81 36 The Advisory Panel on Reactor Products consisted o the following members Mr Gordon Dean senior vice president General D rnamics Corp Dr John Harol d Lampe dean of engineering North Carolina State College Dr John A Wheeler professor of physics Palmer Physical Laboratory Princeton University W r J Kenneth Mansfield assistant to the dir ector nuclear division Combustion Engineering Inc The Underseas War are Advioory Panel to the Military Applicati on Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic E iergy consisted of the fol owiog members Dr Harvey Bro- ks · dean of engineering anc applied physics Harvard University Dr lvan A Getting vice president engineering aod research Raytheon Manu acturing Corp 1 Dr Gaylord P Harnwell president University of Pennsylvania Mr Kenneth Mansfield assistant to the general manager nuclear division Combustion Engineering Inc D - NND 882003 - S James T Ramey Footnotes -4Oskar Morgenstern professor of economics Princeton University Dr Roger Revelle director Scripps Ins titution of Oceanography · 37 Hearings The Nature of Radioactive E' allout and It a E££ects on 11 fan Special Subcommittee on· Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Parts 1-3 and Index 85th Cong 1s t Sess 1957 Hearings Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 86th Cong 1s t Seas 1959 38 HeariLg Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear V 'ar 11 Special Subcommittee on Radiation Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 86th Cong 1st Seas 1959 39 Hearings Technical Aspects of- Detection and Inspection Controls of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban 11 Special Subcommittee on Radiation and Subcommittee on Research and· Development Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Vol 1-Z 86th Cong 2d Sess 1960 40 Joint Committee Prints as follows Summary-Analysis of Hearings The Nature of Radioactive Fallout and Its Effects on Man August 1957 Swnm y-Analysis of Hearings Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tes t s August 1959 Summary-Analysis of Hearings Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War August 1959 · Summary-Analysis of Hearings Technical Aspects of De tection and Inspection Controls of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban May 1960 41 Congressional Record 85th Cong 2d Seas July 17 1956 at PP• 13066-13067 42 Statement by Senator Clinton P Anderson op cit footnot e 13 43 Congressi- 1nal Records 86th Cong Zd Session Daily Edition February 9 1960 at pp 2167-2168 and March 9 1960 at pp 4680-4683 44 House Report #1849 op cit footnot-o 20 at p 10 45 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Press clelease #210 March 19 1959 and Pr ess Release l 2U March 22 1959 46 Transcript of President Eisenhower's Press Conference of Feqruary 3 1960 New York Times February 4 196 0 P • 12 47 Statement by Senator· Clinton P Anderson op cit £ootnote 13 NND 882003 - - · ' '16 James T Ramey Footnotes - 5 - 48 Atomic Policy Discussed Talks Concerning Resumption 0£ Tests C' stody Issue ' Baltimore Sun February 5 1960 p 8 • 49 See £or example The Truth About Missiles Where U S Thors Stand Guard 11 U S News and World Report February 29 1960 at pp 50-51 Under this arrangell ent the nuclear warhead is placed on the missile and the launching 0£ the missile is controlled by a key held by a U S officer and by a key held by an o££icer 0£ the NATO country in which the base is located SO See or example Key to Existence 11 Time ivfagazine August 8 1960 at p Zl 51 Perhaps what is needed most is a liberalization of securjty practices to permit a greater di scussion 0£ policy issues and a tightening up on the· disclosure 0£ the details 0£ technological developments in the weapons £ield 52 Statement by s nator Clinton P Ander ion op cit footnote 13 Section 9Z 0£ tile Atomic i uergy Act of 1954 p ohi its any person to t ansfer or possess in atomic we pon Section 11 - defines person to mean a 11 S gove 'mne r agency and any foreicn gove ninent or nation and any repr esentative tne -eoi 53 Hearings op cit footnote 19 at pp 101-104 53a A more sensible alternative would be to draw on the experience o the United Nations Fo - ·example a joint custody arrangement between an international NATO custodial force con1posei of o icere and men of all NATO countries and a U s force o s• icient size to protect our nuclear warheads might make the moet sense In such ana rraogerr en there would be no incentive or means o a mi 1ry ccup by the host c ountry to tz ke over the U S key 54 For i iscussion f some of Llie prc cm involved see Gordon Dean Report on the Atom New York 1957 pp 121-143 and Thomas E lvlu ray Nuclear Po icy For W tr and Peace Clevelanc and New Yer 19£-0 PP• 181-ZIS NND 882003 - CJ'f ______ _______ _ - - - ··------ -Rovombar 15 1960 DRAF1' ourLINE STUD Of ClVXLIAN-mLITARY RELATIONS IN FIEID C F ATOMIC ENERGY l o Logielntivo 1U atorz ot Civilian-Military Relntionnhipa 1n Atoud c Energy•Field vitb Particular Emnhe eie on Topic Headings II-VI Ao f_M Mabon tomic Energy Act ot ·1946 Bill and Amondments Will cover organization or AEC establiebmant ot AEC JCAE Mr£ Military Application Diruion etco veapona and military reactor controls and safety security or in i'ormntion IIIld ma terial Include earlier logielativo prol ooale and recommendations or Houae o nd Senate Ccmrnitteeso Bo Atomic Energy Act ot 1954 and Amandmants Proposal by- Adrnfniet i-at ion aa compared vitb JCAE bill and as passedo 1958 Military Cooparntion lllll ndmen and 1959 proposed bill aa to ·rasponoibility for veapone and Jliil1tary'reactor safety II leapons CuetodY and Transfer Arranf' 'ioonts Ao Custody vis-a-vis AEC-DOD I Chronological revi01' of arrangemanta 11ith1n and vitbout interior sons of UoSo including date and typa or revisions authority and rationaleo Bo Custod Y vis-a-vis U9 S 2 -Foreign Nations Chronological reviS I of arrangemsnta to include date and· type of revisions authority and rationeleo NATO and other stockpile agreements alert procedures tvo-k ey and other arrangemantso · Co C -rnmend and Control Review or c ethod a by- which authority lill be able to transfer and release 11e pone for useo Ullo 11lll have authority to make decieions and llnea of cnJTJffllm1 ationo Do Problems or Current Custody and Transfer Arrang imanta Discussion of auch problema oa l the oparation nl difficulttes of aaauring adequate Uc So control to prevent e ccidenta l or unauthorized use of weapons and at the eams ti ma assuring quick response capability 2 the rieing doubts of allies that UoSo will reloase nuclear wapons in certain situations 3 the developoonts of logal fictions and questionable legal cOl ipl iancea NND 882003 - ' 8 · - - · ·· • · · · ··--- ··-- -·· -····--- -B -2E Al ternativo Courses of Action Revio l of vnriouo altorn ative o rrnng0Dl9Ilto auch run Ren1raion to a ystem o separate u s poosoaaion and protection of nucleo r uarhead or JJUClear component apert trom carrier ao contemplated 1n 1958 amendm9nt 1 2 ' Continwltion of current f'ictional cuatody o rrsngo l l81ita involving some ele1D8nta of Joint posseosion m d control of' IIUclear bombs and warheads beweon U o S and host country 1n NATO oU1ani e 3 Eicpress joint posoession arrangement between U S• ll ld NATO n s a aeparate entity through a multinational NATO task force group 1n line with suggestion by JCAE ato 1' 1n 8 l lllmSr 1960J 4 'l'rans er ot nuclear weapons troci U S to indopandent NAl'O task force 5 Transfer or nuclear weapons to separate RAIO countries 6 Others I III Safety Aspect · Ao Weapons lo DOD-AEC responsibilities re setting and enforcemant ot standards of operation maintenance and storage 2 • M9thods of assuring against accidental and non-authoritative use witll1n and lit bout interior zone UoSn and non--U S oparational f'orces Problems and alternative solutions B Naval Reactors DOD- AEC resp nsibilities c s to setting and enforcing standards Revie l of DOl -AEC agreements to date and authority or Discussion of problems and unique two-hat situation ot Admiral Rickover Co Other Military Reactors Discussion of D00-AEC responsibilities as to setting and enfo ing standards to tho extent they dif' er or may bo expacted to differ trom Naval Reactors NND 882003 - 'j'f lVo Security Control ot·Information and Materiel A0 Claeeification AEC-DOD rseponsibilit y for datorm i lll t1 on and protection · of Restricted Data nod other Defense in i'ormationo Reviou originel Justification and reasons for maintonanea of Roatrictod Data11 to rmarly Restricted Data ae separate from other Dafonae · Information11 tind if etil1 Justifiado Advantages and disadvantageeo Bo Socurity DOD responsibility and standards for ·protection of classified information and materialo Reviev of methods of grantillg clearanca 11 degree of background ·investigation roquiredo Diacuseion of DOD cartificat10n practices and methods of ascertaining basia for certificatioDo Vo· Military Requirements Ao M lthods of Detf 'MJl1n1ng DisC11Ssion of nim1lsrity and differences betwen n Research n Production i rogr8 lllo Reviev of different Phase studies and chain of c ommand 1n deteno1n1ng a requiren anto Factors that go into 11drn1D1atrationo and Devalopmant Project and Bo Effect on level of Effort and Polic7 Matters · Hov 1s level of effort determined and by vho111o What are proceduros for implementing o nd hov are conflicts disposed ofo Co Impact of Budgetary ana ·Fiacal Controls Diacussion of AEC and DOD budget preparations and Bureau of Budget 1n eatablishing budget levels role of VI OrgSDizationel Aspects Ao Role of AEC Bo Role of MLC To lb at oxtent 1s its current operation 1n accordance vith its original purpose What role does it play 1n recornrnsndi ng policy _JQ a flt --- · NND 882003 - -4- Co Role of DOD Do _Rcilo of State Daparuoont Review of its unctions of t'ormulatillg policy and negotiating agreements for cooparation in mil1UU7 atomic energy matterao Eo Role of JCAE F Joint AEC-DOD Organizations for Profecta ' DieC'll8oion of Aircraft Reactora Branch Anrq Reactors Branch Naval Reactors Branch as tllo-hat organizationao Roviev of Joint Mambar Groups and Boards such as Joint Atomic Energy In1'o1'll ation Group JAEE o I NND 882003 - 10 · ' '1 · • •• • roe •' • •· • • · · • • n-oa- J'nnun ry _2 3 1 1960 s- pc r· l C -1 '' - ' LroAL MEMORANDUM RE PROPOSAL' TO ARM 11 K PLANES WITH U8 S 8 ATOMIC WEAPONS _ · · 11 • · • 'l HIS OOCUUE T C SISTS OF b A'ir J Proposed Arrangrunryptso · · · · · · or tho proposed ' · OP'i J___oF LR ·• · · arr cmoo ·· · oo tho Uo So uoulc provide_up·tot J f S 0 01 ' _ i ' ··· ' - ' i - - r to e_quipL_ __ ' · ·' LS b - · · f n th an atomic yield oft r Db integral veapon c aaning that the clear mid · · $RIES r · 9 · ' '· l rarto The _·· · e · ' · i s· nn___ non micloar components cannot be oeparatedo Tims the veapozi including the nuclear -component wuld be pbyaically lllOUllted on 11 K pl a Des Arter a declaration of Max1rnuin ' ll1Jadinese • Air Defenso Readinflss by' U K authoritiee contirmad by CINCEOR oi- _high · ' • o uthority t h e could take off Arter a target had _been identified as hostile under agreed Rul s of Interception and Engagement at least as ' rostrictivo o a th9ae ·applying to UoSoforceo dof'onding Horth Amorico and contirmation of' th1o hostile identificotion by U S CINCEUR or one of his chief oubordinatos the wepon could be expanded If the planes returned to ' the ground v i axpanding the vaapona to the 0 custody of the weapons 'WOuld revert u s• DCil end State Department Legal Arguments The DOD and State Departmant legal memranda argue in tho alternative that 1 no t r8lisfer' as prohibited by Section 92 uld take pl ace and 2 if a transf'ar io contemplated it can be legally sustained Wld r the President's Constitutional powers as ' nmmsnd1 3r-in-ch ief' Thun the 111S1Wrandum by the DOD General Counsel fUrnished the Joint Committee by letter dated December_2 1959 concluded - • • ' - TOP Ste-RET NND 882003 - 02 SEC -2- ConaequoritlyO although in op1llion thore would bs no t ranoi'er ot nu eo r 1 1aapons invo ved 1n the proposed arrangements vith -the United Kingdom if' it Hire novertheless conaluded th at ouch ii trSD1Jfer had takoo place that transfer IOuld take place only 1n the te ce of hostilitioa under the undoubted Constitutional authority of the President to effectuate the intent ot Congress in passing the Atomic Energy Act and'in agreeing to Agreements for Cooperation entered into under that ActoA 11 Relevant Provisions of the Atomic Energy Acto Se tion 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amanded in 1958 provides as follows a1t ·sho ll be unlawful except as provided in Section 9 L for any person to transfer or receive in interstate or foreign commerce manufacture produce transfer acqllll'8 possess import or export any atomic veaponooo I Section 91 authorizes transfer artel' certain findings b1 the President and I oubJect to Congreasional review of tµe material components of a 11do-it-youraelt ldt 0 including special nuclear material but Section transfer of fabricated nuclear components' of vespon s 2 ' 91 does not authorize Subsection 12 do added 1n 1958 provides for Congressional review t proposed military Agreements for Cooperation and provides that no ouch f greement I • eholl· becoms efi'ective 11 1 during such sixty-day period the Con'greeo paa_ses a Coi eu rrent Resol utioo sta ing in subatwice that it does not favor tba proposed • Agreement for Cooperati i no o on Sublection llq 0 of the Act in def1o1ng 11 personn as used in Section 92 above and elsewhere states that the term parson n aans --fOP SECRET NND 882003 - 03 ---s-or SECRET -3- Any mdividual corporation••• any foreien go vernment r nation ot 6r f liticel B' tbdivision or any such government or nation or other entity••• Missing Facts The DOD has not yet provided all facts on the crucial question of how u s custody wil1 allegedly be maintained art er the leapons are 1DOunted on U K planes The DOD states • The detailed procedures for ma1nt a1n1ng cu stoc1¥ of the weapons wan they are DX unted on _-t1 Ko aircraft on the ground have not been prescribed and tb1a ill be a matter to be resolved by the u s Air Force in collaboration vith the Royal Air Force iith subsequent approval by the 5 ' -retar y of Defenseo oott 11 LEGAL ANALYSIS MAan lng of Transfer The first DCD and State Department legal argument is that the contemplated The word transfer as defined 1n the acts do not constitute a transfer dictionary and as UGed in other statutes and legal situations connotates a physical moving from one place to another accompanied by a tek lng over of possession or 11control 0 Y In the instaJit case the weapotl 3 would be physically moved from their preDent place of storage 1n u s igloos and IIX unted on U K planee and Ble ck s Lav Dictiolllll'7 defines the word transfer as foll01 1s Trans fer To convey or rem ve from one place pers on etc to another pass or hand over from one to another spacifically to tak over the p aaess ion or control or••• -r -' • II • · I I - - NND 882003 - 04- · - ··-- - - c j - · _- 1 •J • _ ·- · - - - •• ·• nubaequantly under certain conditions the plane might take offo In each caseD t bero _would be e_uch a removal from 0 u s torceo and ruch a dilution 9f u s poaseasion° and control that it might IOll be argued that a transfer occurop oit ber wen munted on the plane or at the time of take-offQ The Supreme Court ho s said in a tax case that aThe eoaonce of a 0 tranafer 0 as respects uixation ia the passage of control over the economic benefits of property rather than any technical cbangAs in title Sanford 0 s Estate v Commissioner of Internal Revanue 9 60 So Cto 51 55 JOB UoSo 39 84 Lo F do 20 In thio case Yhere the military benefits are to be considered rather than the economic benefits it might Yell be argued that a transfer had occurred In any case the meeo1ng of the wrd tranaf'er0 is not vitbout legislative history aa used in Section 92 During the 1958 hearings in 8 plainillg that the U S wuld not transfer DOD AEC and State Department vitnesses stated repeatedly that w ·-'1ould not delivar''• furninh provide or make avnilable veapona btl t that va -would hold them in our r possessioo • Y Constitutional OUestion e The President 0 s Constitutional povarap as against those of the Congressg have been a matter of give and take over the yearao The President is tho CnmmaodAl'-in-Chief ' and the Chief Executive but the Congress as veil as the y See testim oy during hearings in 1958 on mending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 - ExcbangA of Military Information and ater iala With Allies iocluding the folloving ·AP Chairman Strauss at page 33 General Starbird at pages 34 and 35 DOD Under SecNtar Y Quarles at page 101 General Loper at pages 10 3 and 190 AEC Commissioner Vance at page 249 and Secretary Dulles at pages 447 449 461 468 471 and 47 3 · NND 882003 · - I 06 - ---- -- ·---· ·--- C r - · •- - President iis trustee o the national lelf'areo11 JI the CoagreDa has Constitutional resp msibilitieD al so to r eise end S' PJ Ort armies ato provirle and maintain a lavy'f mid to raise mnieil and appropriations for military purposeso In the mst r ecent test of the reapactive Constitutional po ers of the · President liild tbs Congress Mro Justice Jscksonc o fol lll9r Attorney General 0 stated that the Presidential p0 lera are not fixed but nuctuato depE'loding 1Jpon their disjunction or conjun tio i 11th those 'or Congress ·He lent on to reason that when the President takes meaoures not compatible 11th the expressed or implied lill of Congress his po er is at its lo lest ebbo In the instant case · Congress lhile cont 1nii1ng the ban on ransfer ·or completed leapons 0 by Vll tue of the 1958 amendments provided a procedure for atomic weapons sharing lith·Great Britain Congress maae it possible for Great Britain to equip 1 t s intercepto aircraft as lell as other def'ens components by manufacturing its O IIl atomic veapons vith the aid of a do-it-yourself kit furnished by the UoSo Ho lever it is proposed in this case not to follOY the method authorized by the Congress in considering this subject in 1958 But the Suprems Court had atated tbat were Congress has laid dovn specific procedures to deal 1 1ith the type of cris is confronting the President he must follO I those procedures in meeting y Y l'h-o Justice Douglas in Youngstoun Sheet and Tubo Co Vn Sawer0 343 UoSo 579 6290 Xoungsto Sheet and Tube Co 9 v Sawer 343 u s 57 6350 Sama at page 638 TOD i __ ·P - T l - '-- · ii '°I - NND 882003 - 06 f- • l t Jir- r--·s r -•• -•• - •• •A _ L ·i' · Admittedly tho instant case is different from that of the Youngstow Company COBO ot therPresident bu tho Joi at responsibility t 'ld the Congress in foreign affairs ha a beeu recognized by all Constitutional authoritieso For example Professor Corwin in his treatise The President 0 £ic e and Po1 1ers c 1957 0 lrot e as follo ls 0 But lhatevs r emphasis be given tbo President us role as U11ole organ of foreign relations 1 and the initiative thereby conferr d on him in this field the fact remains that no proaidentielly de·rioed diplomatic poiicy can long survive lithout the support of Congress the body to lh ich belongs the po ler' to la and collect tax s for the colll OOn defense to regulate foreign commerce to c1·eate armies and meintain nnvies 0 to pledge the Cl'edit of the United Stat o to declare war to define offenses against the J i l of nations · tnd to make 9 all la ls lh ich shall be necessary and pro ru for carrylllg into execution not only its O m povors but all the pow_ers 0o the government of the United States and of 8 ll3' department or officer thereof 0 Hence tho only· question that Ctm arise concerns t he character the relationship 11th Congress thus imposed on the President by the Constitution shall assume ut the President 0s handeo Si1sll it be the relationship of cooperation bet leen constitutionel lY eQ'lBl partners or shall it l-e the relstionehip ot principal end instrument a relationbhip resting on jointly held convictions as to hat t interests-of the United States require or 011 the calcu1ation t llst lhen Congress is presented 1th a sufficient y imperative fait accompl 1 1t can be counted on to come to heel Emphasis _added State nts by Members of the J'oint Committeeo In any event regardless of the legal and Constitutiona1 argumentn members of the Joint- Committee on Atomic Energy made· 1mport3Jlt statements on tho floors of the Bouse and Senate hen this subject las considered in 19580 For example Congressman Holifield stated in tbs House The transfer 01' atomic hydrogen yeapon material or atomic hydrogen veapon information is too important a matter to rest in the hands of any one man regardless of who that man is lhetl or ho -be a Democrat or a Republican and even though he may have the best -intention in th Jorldo This is so important that the CoIJ gt' 1SB itself should work its 111l upon this particular matter Y --·' cl r- - Sair e at ge 662 · ' ' · ' NND 882003 · - - · • • - ' '- · -· - O'f • ·- - - _ -·• •' ·- -- - ---- ---- - TOP SE - -- 7 --- -- - t · · _ i Nau 1 -a h o vo retsined aafogu arde throughout t h1s bill aettiil8 up otandardo of' procoduro o nd criteria through lhich tha executivo branch ot oJJ go 1D approacb1ng a notion such a propooal to trana or all or ps rt of' tho Jllllteriala that are 1Dvolvod ho o But 1D ·addition to thea o safeguards that era uritten throughout tha bill thero 1a tho · overriding aai'eg- ard ot final docioion by action o the Co ll re8ao0 C mgreaaional Rocord of Juno 19 -1958 Congresalll3Il Icstr Gr also otated 1D response to a question from Mrao Clturclu 0 oo Clrurcho Then U' I understand correctly' if the ge ntle Wl 0 Yill yisld further no i'1n1ah i wapona aro to be turn ohed Wlder thees agre J 90ts 0 ° · aMro Eoci ero No finiBhed wapons vhatsoevoron Congressi onal Record of Juna 190 1958 1 rn1Jer statement verc made by other members of the Joint qonmu ttee to the G fect that the Congress wultl have a voi e and respoASibilitr 1n the sharing ot atomic venpons vith other -n ationso Conclusions This i oox randum has discussed ocma of' the major leg91 and Cl nstitutional I • questions presented by the proposed arrangemantso Although it is no· an open and shut case either vay it is s afe to cay eapeci upon revi l l ot t ht · l egislative history that substantial legal questiol1l3 are presented o nd that good legal argwi snts 81'3 avail able that the proposed acts 1llB f constitute a 11 transf r11 or l'posses3ion11 by the UoKo or UoSo atoclic weapon a as prohibited by Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act Aa f'or the Co11Stitutio lill aspects t he SupreJte Cc urt hns s ited that t he P resident's Constitutional povers must bs veished agaillBt those or tha Co ess and that when the Congress has aotGd carefully 1n a f'icld the raaident 0 s 0 inherent Constitutional p01 1era are correspcnd1ngly limited In Sf r -· - r __ • i ' · -- r_ · - NND 882003 - 08 • th is coso tho o pecial 1111' - p lers o tho Prcsidont 1 -ould not become operable until the outbreak of nhostilitieo 11 o The arming ot the U Ko planes 9uld take placo during peacotims hen the Preeidont wuld be bound by tho statutory prohibitionao - In any event regardlosa of the legal and Conotitutional problems posodD otatomenta lore mado by members of the Joint Committee during fioor debate to the o ffect that atomic lleapon s cooperation '11th other Illltion s wuld ba subject to review by the entire Congreseo Alternatives to the proposed arrangements might include · a Proceeding under tho 19 58 amendments 'yhereby the Uoh 1liimu facturo the GENIE under a •do-it-yourself _kU U -'Q 'th the neceas i ry in formation and materials f'trrnlshed by the UoSo b Consideration of a Congreeefonal -resolution authorizing th p --oi osed cooperation as in tho Form as Straits and Near East reaolut ' ons c Consideration of an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act authori ing this type of cooperation under conditions deemed appropriate by t ie Congress or ' d Soma_alternative military solution such as stationing ot u s fighters as well as bombers in o U K rather than arming U K fighters with UoSo atomic weapons NND 882003 - 1 • JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM 0C ¥i u- - -u k o ll June 15 1960 C TO Hon Clinton P Anderoon Chair Hon Chet Holifield Chairmn n 0 Subcommittee on Legiolation FROM Jameo - Ra mey Executive Director SUBJECT PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SECTION 92 OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT Set forth below for your review iG a draft of a proposed a -nendment to Section 92 o£ the Atomic Energy Act to clari y the preoent c on used situation with respect to the custody and tran11£er 0£ atomic weapons vie a via foreign nationo and organi ation --- Thio propooed a inendment would reotatc the Joint Cominittce 1 o interpretation o£ Section 92 that United States peroonnel muot maintain oole and ex cluoive poeoeooion o£ a tomic weapons in peacetime oubject to two provisos The firot would permit joint poooeooion of weapono by United Stateo p i'roonnel and peroonnel of the armed forc eo 0£ the United Kingdom or o£ the armed forces of NATO The s econd provioo would provide that after war or hootillt leo or after de ra tion by the Prcoident that hostilltieo appear imminent n nd n national emergency existo the President may nuthoru e the tranofer of weapons to n nation or regional de ense organization cooperating under oubsection 144 b 0 The propos ed amendmer t would read no followo Section 92 0£ the Atomic Energy Act 0£ 1954 ao amended i o unended by inserting after the fi ot oentence thereof the following • · • • • - Any atomic weapon s ituated outoide the Unite d States ohnll be maintained in the eole and exclusive poooesoi on o£ the United Statco peroonncl · Provided however That the President may authorize joint poeoeaoioo by United States peroonnel a nd peroonnel of the a rmed forceo of the United Kingdom of Great Britain nnd Northern rel and or joint poocoa sion by United Statc3 p rocnnel and multinational peroonnel of the a rmed forceo of the North Atlantic Treaty Org ation provided any such cooperation io undertaken pU 'suant to an agreement under oubsection 12 3 d J 'X'Ovided further That after outbreak of war or hootilitieo or after public declara tion by the Preoident that bostilitieo appear imminent and a national emergency exists the Prcoident may authorize the transfer 0£ an atomic weapon to another nation or regional defenoe ox-gani z ation cooperating with the United States under oubsection 144 b o NND 882003 - ' · · · • · - ' • Memo · ·· •'i ' June 150 960 The io a bl'icf expl tion o£ the a mondm - followinB - • of 1 Tho ttat oentenco io n irootntement tho Joint Committoe•o interprebtion o tho law 00 it DOW otando 1 e•• thnt the United Statco muot mn ntain oolo nnd cxcluoivc cuotody of wenpono during peacetime Ao you l n 0VI' tho Dcp i rtmciito o Dcfonoo nnd State qo not conoidcr the preoent law to reot rict u s nuclear wenpono to the oole poool'Xloion of U S · pcroonnel The Executive Branch intcrpreto the law to reob ict nuclcnr wea p on o to the cuotody 11 o U S pcroon cel but doeo not interpret CJ Hltody to be oynonymouo with poooeooion Hence according to the- Executive Bt- llleb o ri -nngemento whereby ' miclear weapono nod wnrbe ndo might be a fixed is weapono oyotemo operated by · other natioxw o re not prohibited by Section 9Z dl the Atom le Energy Act o£ 1954 if tho U S retainn oome·control over the fh blg o£ tho w enpon Tho U K Z-koy o rrangement ·which w o deocribed hlt io February 29 1960 ioouo of • • Newo World Report ii 01' _ex nnplo ci f thio conc_ e pt You nro fnrniUor nloo with nnother concept which Genernl -Loper firat brought to tho attention o£ Congreoo Hoomer ond V1U1 Zandt in vcmbcr 1959 nnd which hao boe i the oubjeci of conferenc eo between mem ro o£ tho JCAE nd Chnirman McCone o£ tho AEC - 00 Jt ohould bo noted thnt the United Stnteo hno propooed to extend ito in oto n· nngemento to other countrle·o beoideo the lJ K i e•• K · I S AW · · t· _ nnilpooqibly otheta · •• • 1 Attached for ready re erence io n copy o£ the J'oint Committee letter of May 16 1960 to the Secretnry of State c ullng attention to problemo raised by the '1fictional•• cuotody o rrnngemento · · z Tho firot provioo contained in the ouggootod run ndment would permit tho Preoldent to nuthorize joint poooeoolm of atomic woapono with repreoeatntiveo of the o rmed lo coo o£ the U K or NATO pi-ovided that the propooed cooperntion hnd been oubmittocl to Congreoo by nn ngreement for coopera• tion or tunendinem under the ol ty dl i y ''veto proviaion o£ oection 123 d Tbio in c fec t would permit o ·z-key type nrrnngement with the U K or with NATO but _ mth an in dividunl country in Continental Europe or Aoia in which the mioalle might be located Fo r o omple it b 2 o boen publicly otated ihnt the United Statee io pbcing J'uplter IRBM miooileo in Tlll '1 ey o nd Itnly to be opernted by the host nation Thia io oimiJar to the Thor IRBM'o in Groat Britain The ouggeotod amendme_n i would in pr ctice require that if end when the wnrheado are nfib od to the mioaile in peacetime the Z-1 ey ra ngement 't ould involve U S and multiaattonal NATO peroonnel rather than 0 6 and Continental hoot country peraoll IlOl NND 882003 · -HJ Memo June 15 1960 It io believed thio arro ngei r ent would give greater protection o gainot unauthorized firing 0£ the weapon particularly in the event of o n overthrow or change 0£ government in the hoot country It likewioe would %'eflect U S oupport 0£ NATO non cohesive organization rather than a group of independent uncoordinated nationo Be ore ouch cooperation could take place a proposed 1 1 g reemcat or amendment must be oubmitted to Congreoo £or 60 da yo o nd be oubject to a Concurrent Reeolution o disapproval under oubeection 123 d 3 The isecond provioo authoru eo transfer of weapons in the event o war or hootilitieo to an ally or regionAl de enoe organization Thie provioion io consiistent with the Joint Committee 0 o l aterpretation o the law as a mended in 1958 i e that the Prceident in wartime can trano er weapons to allies and NATO 4 The oecond part of the occond provioo would nuthori r e the Preoident to transfer atomic weapono in peacetimo n ter the ·Preoident hao publicly dec a red that hootilltieo appear imminent o nd a natioonl emergency_ex ioto It will be noted that this would restrict the Preoident to a greatE l' degree the propooed arrangement with the U K which gave the Joint Committee oo much concern laot all and winter However it doeo permit the Preoidellt to act in peacetime after he declru -es an actual nation al emergency In concluoion it i11 believed that the above propooed amendment would make a real contrib--1tion in clari£ying the ctirrent con uoion on the custody poooeosion and trano£er of atomic weapoDD It would prohibit joint poooeooion arrangements with individual countries which could lead to accidental II waro But it would positively authorize joint custody arrangemento with the U K and with NATO with the under 'ota ding that the peroon nel reopon aible for guarding and controlling the weapono in Continental Europe and the Near Eaot would be multinational This would leooen the chanceo for ''trigger happy milita ris to from a hoot country to take over miooile baoeo and otart a wax- 0 It would aloo provide flexibility for transfcro in caae of national emerge Y'• NND 882003 - J t ' · ' _ _ r - - - -----· N CONGRESS OFT UNITEDST TES- ·-· JOINT COMMITTEE ON A TOMlC ENERGY · ' May 16 1960 f · i 't - - l u Mr s rct y f f · 0 ·· 1960 The Joint Commit c c io n t ecelpt 0£ c r of the USSR Mat-ch 3 0 aide-memoir e on lh ·a ubJc 't o guai -itmeco uid Gn ogu C coat oJo o fiooioiuble ma tcr ial which all O eont Wlod e t t ent eo to She Am ri AD p f ¢C10 lllh 'gcdly -epoi -ting th at the United St t lteo fz• re m 1 ing l ul6ble nuclenr wa1 p onD m anu i c turlng i nfo 'm ation 1lo £to cllieoo _r - ' L ' vt- oi rec D1 c Uoc uaeiono hsewceen e Jc in CammitlGe d t'c p 'c Ccntative 1 of the s Ah Dcp 1-l tmeot • Depn rtmoat of J ofen8ev nn_d th ' Atomic Energy Commlooion l O to lh4 l rt aa ia-y oru •olo requir C d br e Uni1 t d St h ·O or nuele-et w ti·he ids 1 wnr V Py · n U -2- to ef'cdt d in he · c h Z6 United Stt t a i'eplyo I p 1 1rticul 1rly Dfltcd the £ol• lo-wmt -cnti nc e £ rom -ngi- iph 7 of the t'Ply · · 'The Govci zimcnf 0£ tlic USSR in Illa oo doubt awue o the catabliflhrnecZ n O NATO atomic 8tockpil oye te m nn OIICJltl I elemf l11 or which 'it hould be amptaoized 0 io th il 'UOtody of 1 1tarnii wuh• ada rernaiao cxclueiv ly with Che United Stat«10 in nceoP cbncc '-'7ith p ovioia-no c£ Unit ed Stateao domeoUc 14wo I aote that the Sutc-·Depart ment tAuo ogr-eeo with many of ue on th Joint Committee th 1t the Atomic E 2crgy Ae t of 19 4• c a nmeoded l 'c4uu-e0 that until hootilitics Onited·State11 oui - enr 7eaz ooo• omponent muo·l r 'emato excluoivi ly within the -01stody o poooesoion o£ our fr u ces · Ai iodic tited in cur c rreoponden e bearlngo_ floor latemecito and informal diocu11oicna oith r eoreoenutive o£ the Executive branch m aoy of ua on ti re· Joint Committee are con• CP r' -e-d that 'VIU'i UD ''£ic tit no b ·e been develcpf d C0Beern ng -ex etiog and propoa d 0 4 - ra ngemer te with foreign couzitrieo wl- i• t t1L dr oot COO ltitute exclusive cuctt • v o - posoeosion o£ nuclear Wf opons o r - w lil t'he11d11 by the U So io ceo in pcriodc · oh rt c bo_iltilitie n Thie not c nly applies JJ 1 tt e l'rangerneat with Ole Vo K o which WD c ri cipal eubject of our cor 'eopon ldice ual heuiog oc 'obl ut ry z 1960 it woulc 0rr-Lv ·to ce taiei ccc eptiono to tbp hOrmnl ar g Jtnf nte or ·tce c uetody 0£ Honeot Joh · cllld oi nOu type o E l ort rn e-tniflsilco by U S foi cee in f- 1 ATO ct DO Tl e tlctio ne U D2 l _s Yi' qot li-h t Q· tct of th a'a r an'g ementc with the U' Ko or thr · 6 Thor tni40ilE J 7a to the Jupiter na ii1ei eo Tbe Thei- micoile · I CJl r s i gi mer t v iili 'uie OR0 ·lnc1udfng il c- pl icing ef wu-laeac b on the Ul' •0 17Ded miooil t t' 2 ke i ·''c o ocept e received coo oider-ab e publicity The Febru 'l ry Z9 1960 iocue of tJ- £ - r ind World Re-p9r -to pag-ee SO 51 fo- exan1plev c t-r·icit pbotogr2pl d mot US UY Tho - IRBM operationo eite in Feltw ll J nglaod nd de oe 'ibee th•t 0 mi ' thr d· of op1 11 ' ibona · · tt u tli cult tc une r- Gt d liow n nuclear warb ead itt l heJ tc and mad ' a 'l of a we vn i • ·oycHct mH i - OU t'Willfl lllde ' 1'pP sratiasu l •ntr ol of l llCtll r na ti- n can coooi t't' ' J NND 882003 - lo 'he - eet 'l 't v •1 - t t - r · t t· t a s ' C r 1r -·•I-tu r1aa ' · L C 1·• ' · · · - · ··· •·r r '-' 1 Jo # • - e 9 c I · - • · • • • -- • · ' -- · ·· NND 882003 - 14- NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article The U S Nuclear Presence in Western Europe 1954-1962 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