R iPFlOOUCED l _ - W - JJ •1 Y me UA TJOUAL I RCffl lE I p •P1 ' - ii - lo -- r - r • • i j t l 5 4 ili ' • •- • • - r_ •• ___ C I • ••_ t - - ci - 1 · • ·i _ J '§J• I J p J _ 1 1 p1 · LL ---· _ DEPARTMENT OF STATE Tiu L GA L ADv rnEn r---- July J 6 1961 TOP SECRET M MORANDUM L - Mr Abrom Chaye o FROM r SFP - John H SUBJECT Atan Lc s·t ockp1J es The fo l lo i Pg ic an ana lys1s of the a ccCt11penying two Defense memornndn on problem a in orenoted are a vhich State ha ll 'b een anxious to resolve The f lrat memorandum that which Dr Sterns submitted to Mr Gilpatric on Mnrch 22 focuacc principally on safety stability and communica tiona probl eme concerning e toorl c wea pona systems available to NATO Nuclear Strike Forces Thia memorandum reflects a candid assessment of 14 Gi tuation end an attempt to propo ae something constructive The m emorandum acknovl dges thD t while there has not been e n acoidcntal detona tio n of a varbeacl to da te there is despite all the ao fety deVices presently 1n use still a finite probability or such an accident S e p 8 Tb 1r hazard can be further m ln imized and pe rha pe even eliminated accordlng to Dr Stern by incorporating in the weapon a so- called interlocit either - j -t_ 6 · _ _ mecbaniceJ or electronic which vould in effect keep the vea pon in an · uo t riggered state but wbich would enable 1t to be triggered ror use momentarily by anyone having the ''keyu '-- The safety of -warhead a deployed a broad 1B obviouoly a ma tter of ooocern accidental detonation of any size nuclear vea pon vould ha ve ae rious foreign -relations repercussions f'Ol State since even 8ll -J 1 Durillg ·the variou a negotiations with the Ital 18 lls for CXBll1 ple out' negotintors ho ve reported that the question o f safety repeatedly came up and tbe Ital iaos looked to the Em bu soy for assurance on this score one accidental detona t i on could scuttle the entire atomic a·t ockpile program and even worse 1t could kick of'f a general war should a local COllllllllnder become al armed e ssume nn enemy attaek vas under way a nd conclud e it was necessary- to launch his weapons to pr eserve them from destruction State tberofore could righti'Ully insi s t on a voice in this area to e sourc tha t all possible aa fety features are being explored and adopted whenever feasible TOP SECRET G'-- ' _ Htl flOOUc e o AT m e IJI TIOt IAL ARCI IIV S TOF SECRET - 2 - With reopect to uo tability Dr Stem ta keo the position tbo t the problem is intertwin e d 'With that of' 1 no dequnte and unreliable communicationo betveen the field o nd the top commend Three different oi tua tions nppee r to be in vol ved Tb ey are l Premature expenditure by a local commander Ibo knowing the ina qa cy of the communication systems dee idea he cannot take the cb u i' ce or waiting and launches against a supposed attacker or lo unchec againot en o ttacker in fo ct even though top coomen d would order destruction rather than use or the Yeapona 2 Dela yin expenditure becauae of failure or the commun cations ayatem to provide timely direction to the point that the unit 1'1 re power is destroyed o r otherwise nullified by an actual o tta cker 3- Unauthorized expenditure after aeizure by oll ied per oonnel e vulue of nr Steni 's interl-0ck proposal here wuld depend on vhetber a mechanical or an electronic one vs a employed An electronic one i ndependent of the existing communications netwrk wuld take care or both the first end third situations It should also be of acme value for the second situation if the electronic arm Lng of the- warhead vould be readily ap p o rent to the latmch off'i cer since this could be re ded as his fin a l alert warning or his order to fire Such a de-vice ia J artic ul arly attractive to tbose concerned about the need for c i v ilian control of' the military since carried to its ultimate concl ueion it would seem ponsible for the President himself' to contro 1 the fi Dc l arming of the weapons for us e Moreover it ·woul d seem that au ch on approach -would open up a hoGt of poseibilities for dealing vi th multilateral control problems UnfortunateJ y aucb a device is some years a way from availability according to Dr Stern Apparen t ly a mechanical interlock device io nov or can be made ree d lly available such a device vould rninlmize or eliminate the danger of allied unautho r i zed ex pendi ture or weo pon after seizure since United States cuatodial arrangements arc not alwayn designed -oo deal w1 th the problem of seizure by friendl y f'ore cs • It would also be a J u e ble for safety reasons as l 'eviously noted But the mechanical interlock vould DO t 'b e or much value for preventing premature expenditure by our own comm anders si tu o tion l and it would not do much to overcome our existing vulnerability nttributo ble to an inadequnte and unreliable commun1cations sys t em whi ch does not au fi'icicntly meet t he needs pO sed by the Soviet a rike-f'irst threat TOP SECRET nC PfWOUC G AT n I IM n or ML AflCI 11 11 S TOP SECRET -3The Stern memorandum ia esoenticl l Y an ntternpt to identify ·th e areas in · might help meet military political and legal needs It does speculate however t'lia t th e interlock uwouJ d help Batisfy tbc custooy poosesoion requireme11tt' p 10 vhich scientific o r tecbnologicw aido ' That par·t icula r concl uaion ma y not be Ju stifi d aince the ' cu atody reqUirement which involves phya1ca l gwu die nship o'f vea pons by United states personnel to prevent acceso to the weapon must be distinguished tram the 0 control'' r equirement -which concerns una uthori ed use The interlock wuld take core or r•controlu problems in tbat it wul d prevent unauthorized use by friendly orces But it wuJ d not precJ ude seizure of or unauthorized access to the weo pcrn and consequently may not resolvc our cuatody d 1 spute w l th the Joint COmmittee even though the device would probably remove tbe primary motive for seizure Copica of recent memoranda of mine on the custody- problem arc attached r tha cha Finally it ie worth noting that the Stern memorandtW seems to suggeat e inter · lock ea not involve interi'erence with the normal military d o of command or issuing orders to take ae tio n The JCS papers dated nearly two months later reflect suspi cion of' anything which could make it possible to circumvent the esta b11ahed chain ot colIIIIl Wd In any event the JCS have reached the conclusion tha t the needs of operational ree dinees preclude something leas than absolute sccur i ty and tho t consequently a balance must be otruck by weigb 1 ng a stric t ly military decialo u againat such factora as the degree of mutual trust within NATO faj_th in m ilitary command and discipline domeatic l ega l requirements and inten1at ionel political factors It seems clear frCilll the JCS papers that the milit ary believe the decioion on what wight to aoeig n each auch 1 actor 1n the balancing proceas is primAriJ y one fox- the military I see no reason vhy that is the ooJ y alternative Indeed the appropriate process woul d be for the military to identify wbat is neceasary fl -om th c operational readineos standpoint and for otb crs to paaa o n the question of the price that can be pa id in each of the other spherea of their respective competence rlth any dioc greementB eventuall y reaolved by the President Illustro ti ve of the all --encompo saing role now exercised by the military is the di acussion on page 7 of the Appendix to the JCS memorandum There t he eqUipping of certe in Turkish forces with atomic weapons wi·t h alert status is justified on politico l grounds al thou gh thia pa rt i cu lar question w l S not referred to State TOP SECRET RH ' l'lOOucco Al n e NAT1oru 1 ARCHlV TOP SECRET - ··4 Again we iind such euphetniGlllB in the JCS papers ru i the weapons II arc adequately safe rltb in tb e limits of' the opern tiono l requirements imposed upon them n or uMo imum sa fety conointent with operationul reqUi remcnta i• o t P• 12 In other -word a everything is relative and we cannot aacerto io the degree to whi ch and where corners h o ve been cut in the balcncin g procesa I t i s not surprisi ng therefore to find the JCS memorandum con eluding tha t o 11 ta well with tbe o tomic stockpile program o nd there ia no need for any changes even euch as t hat po s ed for cono idera tion by Dr Stern In t ho t connection tb e JCS paper e i ves uo an e xcellf n t inn ight to the Jnili t o ry approach when it sto rte the discussions of t his problem f'ro n t he premi se that no aingle device can be expected to increnae both safety and rca dineso id at p 10 such a state nent begs t he question and o ctuo lly pooen n falae issue Perho pa the most disconcerting aspect of the JCS paper however ' ia the feelin g one gets from ita genero l tenor tbnt units 1n tbe t'ield equipped ·r lth th e veapons are going t o u ae the m when on d how they oee fit that in the la st e nalysia one must expect tho t for the most part cocwnanders o-r such uni'ts will put those wce poos to use almost a utom0 ticaJ ly when they -consider they are under attack without o witing a deci s ion by the Preuident See f or example the discussion on p 5 p 8 and p ll of the Appendix to the JCS memorandum On tb e matter of custody th e JCS paper s-1 atea that the custodial units h ave the know--hov and tn eans to destroy the weapon a i f they are im lnently 1n danger o f' falling into enemy hands id at p 6 • T'nere is no similar sto tcm e nt concerning unauthori z ed seizure s n d use by al lied forces Dr Stern's interlock vouJ d be helpful here ae Yae discussed above In summary neither of tb e papers under discussion touches upon the problcm of whether State should h a ve a voice in certain aupects of the inotao t warrant a voice the JCS problems There is nothing in either pa per hovev-er which would a ch8 tlge in our· previous position that ve should insist on having in a t least certain of these matters before o ction ia taken Indeed p0 per helps to reinforce t he m e rits of our earlier conclusion that fo etoro o bout which State ohould have a voice are involved over four months hc ve elELpscd sin c c your February 28 memorandmn to the Secretary recommending t hat the Department insist on exerciaing 11 cinlian supervision of the depl o 111ent of United States atomic weapons in support of all ied troops abroe d so e s to a Gsure that the weapon s are deployed i n e manner conaistent w1 th l egal and policy requircmen ts once m ing their cust ody ond control' 1• TOP SECRET r - •I •I --· DE·G• • · --·· L' • • • L ••H • I ' I Autho 1 l Cy _t ¥tti- I -- _ _ _ r N TOP SECRET - 5 - Since then the Joint Ccmmittee h ua a sked us as well aa Defcnoe for our renpccttve lognl views on certain NATO military documenta over which we had no voice We have been wa i ting f'or aome three montha for Def'enee to develop a n 1 nitio l drn ft It seems to me that ve con no longer defer inai Gtence on r1gb tf'ul po rticipation 1n studieo and d eciaionn in thi6 oxen Indeed rather tho n continue na at preoeot it vould be bette to take the position that the matter a one for Defense o nd the President At to clltneo t a L SFPtJI Pender lhd TOP SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article The U S Nuclear Presence in Western Europe 1954-1962 Part II 2020-09-17