I Il WASH I NGTON MAil l 6 196 2 hi EMORANDUM FOlt 'I'HE PRESJ DENT SUE3ECT Fnrthi r DispeTs a 1 o f Nu clear Weapons in S'-'J po r oi Non- U s N · ' I'O Fo rces lBiy my letter of ipril 111 J 961 you were infm med fha t the rna tter 0£ U S u clear weapons sup port of N TO i Va EJ tmder int ·nsi'Vl atudy 'Which woul d r stilt u1 a de cis ilon a ·t o file f1 1t u course oJ aiction_ t oncerning allo cati on f nll C L ar weapons t v su ppo rt no'll-'ll s NATO forces lt was propo d that t U ntil su c h a de dsion was re _'cheid uo fu rtbe-r nuclear we apau s show d be allocated for sttpport o f n on-U s fare lay your tnem oran dum of May Z01 l9El1 'y on ag reed to thi_s p r l pa a al and stabed fh__at ilie reslllts of th e sbi dte-s iQi d xe c QlnJilendations • cas ed Qp n them shoold be communiicated to· you before furth er dispersal o-f nuclear weapon s for support of non--U · • f c wol1ld h · a11tho rize d As a result of tb e Na ti onal Security Council Action of April 24 19'61 11 subject UN TO an d the AzlantL e Na tf o R · n s everal stlil die 1 11 were initiated to d etermd ne the nt to wld oh its obje-ctives co ul d he accoili' lplll i she and the 11nean 0 £ acc lishing th m The status Qi tho studie · and the a cUon s t ake'n to da te in pu 2- · a a nee of the NSC N '- TO a t ion a re sunun i d in the Annex A to this mem orandwn F11 rtbe r stu dies a r now in train and we 11Vil 1 b i11 a better positi o n to m aki· rec o rrunenda tions to you ahou t l ong-range progra xns and policiies u pcm completion In the mean-· time certain interiq i actions a ppeai' reqw red in regard to dispersal of n ucle a i weapons • From the stu dies we ha ve undertaken it appears that the following questions ue the most relevant to ou r p olicy decision concerning such interim dispe rsal of nu d ear Wf a pons to meet inunediate operational nt u ds RE S flICTED DATA -A mIC mr3RGY ACT OF 19·54 1 rui ni D Nt DOf 8 l Will tb •e we pons 'b hoth with r e spe-ct z Is a dditi1 m al dis pe'l 'Sal politic ally ne c ssa ry to m aintain tb_e cohesw n o f the A llian ce a Jid 1 if s- 11 in vma 't n u mb e· r s 3 Will a policy th a t e1 nri J ·_ddi-iiotial dj · s p e r al be consisten 1 'With oar obJeciives of ri-e strl-eti'Bg' the nu cl e a r bw lit p m_Eurcilpe The sec-o n i qu es-1 lo n i · re com ple md in vo-lv e b only U S CQramitme-nts made in t h e pa s-t b11 al s·o- the v h ole qn esti e n of N -l'O strat e gy and the role to b assigned to-n uolea 1 · w ea po•n s- We have eucoM aged and helped o r pit'omis -e d to help Ow ' NATO a llie s to cq uire ce rtain ru 1clear d elivery systeni a we· have s e out to train their -pet'S'c mne to l l s e these systen1s and fo install necessary nu clear s te ag e fa ciliti s In their view 1 th es e n uclea r delivery systems will play a major ro 1-e in -z- th e defenJ J-e 0£ ELU'ope It would thl l·retore be e xt i eme y dis ruptive to J llian ce cohesi-on i we were now to withhold tih e nude r weapons ne c ess a ry to ru a ke £lilly eff ecti ve those spa-cific weap o na systems whim we are com mitred to p ovid our Allies except a s conb inw ng di cussio-n of' N TO st i ate y m a y lea _d N T fre· lyto decid e to ch e the prbgra m s itJ qiJie s t isQn W ar e now taia ri the lead in s uc h a foll an d frank di S U S sin oi N · 'TO Sb 'ategy with OU a1li s in the N · C We do not wam to-preju di · ·t h e ult oi this di enss u o n eitheT by disper·s ing m ocre n11cl ea w-ea po xui than are l l' nm ediate y reqw l 'ed to-fulfill U S comm in n nts or by wrlla terally 1 W 1d ng t h o ·e collUDi e ts thas giving ris to allie c harg·es oif b ad faith Until this i D sccu ssion Le ds tG clia ge in p rog tania the-re fore in my opi Dion we should c outi no e tb _s per s e n u e-1 e a r WEta pons fo-r ase b y olll Allies in n Ulm b rs s uifi c iien t to make fully -e ffective th deli ry syste m s t hat w a r ·c a mi tted to provide I a - the s be cOJrJ · operati onal The n umb r an d n atur · of delivery ystem s to whi ch we a r t'luis cr Jnnlj tte d a r·e set forth in a list which was com piled by tb e Sti¢e - Defce n · I' lep 1'-bnents 1 st S pxin g Even in thes-e c the Unite Sta tea do es n o t tak the L ai its posture- is one of v4ltin gnes tQ oorist de-r requ eab fr om other governments foli these deli ve ry system s A$ u ch r eques ts are rec eived they are jointly revi ewed by Sta te an4 Def nse to eusu re tha t they a re fully con i tent with exi s ttng p oli-cy 1 On th e· o er bud it is _n ot now ne ces sa ry that we eudQra r eq uir e 1nen a fo r nu clear d a livery sys t e1ns •o V@r ® d ab o those - ve a @ already c omimitt e'' to prp 1i notably MC 2 6 4 r e -·w r 1a z nents fo r en cl 196 6 in view o£ p ossible changes in our NAT0 stra tegy and the fact tb at we a a-e not yet co mm tted to rovlding the enlarged nnclear support indicated by such fo-r ce reqllire ments We will rnstruct U 5 pers onn el concer-ne d includi ng US G p-er s onnel in N TO colUl t ries that we hav not yet dedd d to J n ·o de 1 and th at these countries should not the r efore now be led to expect these additional nllicle - LJ delive t y systems in progra r nming futu r e defense efforts 1 Nudear weapons systems which are already operation al o· r will become so by July 1 1 1962 include -3- TOP SECRET I ws at nliclea so - •pons p1 ogi ecl f 01 diapel'sill µ FY 19 Z c r use by non-u s 1ol'ces leyonc J-1 ily l 1%2 addj tional F -84 F -ll O E - l Q 40 ll ld 0 - 9 1- #q1tadroaa are- p rogr ed - qu stiJ I or a p p l'oval o warhead dispel'sal fo r such additi al systems will walt 01 prog1'es• in cur1'ent stttjlias o£ NA 'rO strateJY · - - _progxam s Io certain of ou r A llies a r e also in £negotiation and if ca ried out wil1 in volv e a concomitap t requirement f-oo n11clear wa rhea ds 011r c mttn tment to pr ovl de' i s speciiically suJ Ject to r eview a s I s tated to on April_ Z6 in the light of s tudie a o NII TO st ra tegy Annex C contains a cli acusaion of 'l'Varhead requirement s f or va ri-0us pl'o grammed delivery systems TOP SECRF T • I 0 TOP SECRET • I A a is cia _p roblem l b volvba th e t ransnu s 'ion of R efltl'ic d D-'ta o r F'orm ilrly Reatrlctt d lilata b Allied rlati'Ons du dng the ca rly st ages of'p 'o ui eme t in orde r th at deliv e ry syst s Will c atihle wJ i 'b tr S nu cl ear w ea ppnl @ _f r h rain i'ng and p a'ollil t P P rJ bs es r 11 11 - is pM'tic l3 l y a fa c¼ Q i now with rcspecd t j bu ' ' c a uxi frtc• rogx die l '-l 04t a o d th er wilt be a_ furth e-r ee'd in tho nea r tuture- to inake Rest ricteli Dala a uabi to tl oae count ries l t anirof ng the 0-911 airc ratt an d the- Pezshing and Se aeant missiles omm ise t n sta d coiuut l iaa of ro ing Restri cted n _t a in the wcapOll B and'ut mak h g e il nuted detenniuati On uated it was dorue iidtlL the mule ra atanding tti t Ute Coi nmis sion would a forded all oppo a p nity to review the proposed hysical seem eme nts to safeguard lho Re at ricted l at o c ontai ed in in con ctlon with the de p rior to tltei r actu al Qisper11al The A tomic E nergy Co is1iol has not agreed to our p roposals conce rning t ransmission o Wo tmatlon and di e rsal Gt two-siage weapons contained in this me rno i andum Th Comnnssion believes that distJ ibution of two-stage weapons and the ne11casa y in for mation co ncerning them to make togethe r With the information t h a t covertly by the o se r nations could contribute significantly to tb e capabilities o technically advanced countrie s such as -S- TOPSECRET J TOP SECRET The majority t f fb Gom cniJ1Jio doW ts 'il at evei 1 the most vigo UA feasilile securi ty mea•l11 es coula reduce the p sl to Ju ftiiy dete r minatioiis a a required by tb__e Ai'om e rgy J ci Jo r pa s shig such lte atricle-d oat a t o allf ed nations u - U• opos i ng ii Jndlca d ablW -we l liev11 tlult _ w - l IAg -p bl- foa 11 ectri it fti ato c weapiffl s a r e a clequa_te Ac 1rfhic h AAY l been t#eA in tlµ s regatd ate -ilidicated itl 7 er il'i view df the J mportan ce Ctfl th e AJUlij ' c e of x ot witbh iJ cling fro m o i% Alii es--we apona c am-p abl e to th 0114 whl ch oto f n cp are pr d#ldfor - i mtlar mi -si aus we coui@r il naces a ey- to t h camnuml cation if lte•tnci64 D a ta- -d dicSpecr1i o _ wupoi us m •11ppon of these fO -ces progrargroed en campatlble • 1dd we are c IDJt W'ith re11pect to e thi td qu est on additioh al disper sal will of course reault in_some n ucl ear build-up -iu E w ope However in m y e p ni- control c ver the nuclear bcild-up should be exercised through th e J roparnming of tb e delivery aysten i a and throu gh ou r forniulatio11 of ii A TO strategy rather than by w ithholdil g tbe nuclear weapons needed to make these syetems effectlV t This is now bEd D g dp11 e l y our review o£ NATO force require rne-o ts tncludi ll Me an d the related question of strik o aircraft a nd 011 r continuing discussions 0£ NATO sµ-ategy both within the NAC and bilaterally with certain of our Allies - 6- IDP SECRET • I TO SECRET As indicated above we wish to conduct our dispersal program in such a way as not to prejudice the results of this review and these discussions To this end we a re proposing to disperse only nuclear weapons to ni e et the imniedi ate operatio11al requirements which we a re committed to fulfill Recommendations l That we be authorized to disperse under U S custody weapons for use by non-U S forces as indicated in Arolex B Authority for any additional diaporsals w iU be sought as necessary on a case-by-case baaia as the force s becoll18 operational and in the light o continuing studies o NA TO atrateg will cooperate urgently in a thorough study of the strike aircraft program in the light of snch factors aa existing conunitments NATO trategy and the MRBM program now under consideration We will make clear that weapons being dispersed for strike aircraft in the meantime are subject to review studies o NATO strategy -7- TOP SECRET -lOP SECRET- lnclosures Annexes A thru E -8- -lOP SECllff - ' MI R I I iUG ANNEX A NSC ACTION NATO AND THE ATLANTIC NATIONS In reaching our recommendations on objectives and procedures the principal objective of the NSC policy directive ha-s been interpreted io be cousid er a ti•o n 0£ allied positions looking toward cohesion of the Alliance Concerning nuclear forces the NSC NATO Action provided that a The President should state that an effective nuclear capability will be maintained in the European area an l that nuclea weapons will not be withdrawn without adequate replacement Nuclear weapons in NAT'O Europe may be regrouped·as further studies may indicate This policy was conveyed to the North Atlantic Council by Ambassador Finletter on April Z6 1961 The NAG has been b i iefed by General Norstad concerning the substantial n uclear capability that exists within NATO The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that all reasonable command and control measures must be developed and employed consistent with opeyational requiYements • l I11c -fo To improve cnromand and control certain meas ures were indicated and actions have been taken Steps have been taken to improve communications to the U S custodial units which control U S weapons for NATO After development of these devices each weapon system used by-NATO will be considered and consistent with operational requirements a decision will be made wbethe-r the device will be installed and at what level control of the link will be exercised Such devices can also be incorporated in weapons as· a mechanism for a ssuring custody n the meaatiroe General Partridge bas suggested measures which should be taken immediately to improve security of w e apons in NATO including clarification o the responsibility o U S Comrnao d s to de a troy quickly wcc ponG in their custody if they are subject to overrun or capture ''b Additional resources should be used to strengthen the nuclear capability now in Europe only where- i going programs are so far u nderway that they· cO uld not be changed without sei ious adverse political effects or ii the increase will not divert needed -resources from non-nuclear tasks and is clearly -required to cover needs either for replacement· of e q anslon that cannot be met from outside the theater T-be 1963 MC-70 goals ·as well as the proposed 1966 goals should be reviewed by the State and Defense Departments from this standpoint - - Such a review of U S and Allied commitments -reveals a number of nuclear weapon ystem P rograms wbicb are beyond recall without s·eriou1 adverse political effects These programs a re not inconsis1 ent with SACEtJR1s 1966 force requirements since in each case the commitments are less than indicated as rectuired in 1966 Systems co itted which a re of particular concern are the Pershing and F-104O aircraft c The Secretary of Defense should undertake a study of the extent to which nuclear weapomin NATO Europe could be made more secu-re Some possible safeguards to be con sidered in such a study are- discu s sed in the body of thi s report These include making SACEUR headquarters and communications more secure against wartim e disruption These problems have been studied in detail by General Partridge's Committee and othe Sas indicated 1 reviously In addition Dr Johnson The Assista tit to the Secretary of De fense Atomic Energy and GeneTal Leon Johnson have made a thorough review of this matter Both have supported the conclusions of General Partridge's study and the resulting action taken concerning the need for increased security of conununication s and the improvement of procedures for the destruction of weapons in event of imminent capture This is a matter of continuing iuterest bo ever and additional actions may be necessary in time d SACEUR procedures for ordering use of nuclear weapons 011c e he has been give a political directinn s hou ld be clarified and made more e q licit 11 mmediate actions have been tak en Lo this regard as a result of the reviews conducted by General Partridge and Dr Johnson The dual channel for release of weapons and nuclear forces in use by SACEUR USCINCEUR have been reviewed and actions bave been taken to correct deficiencies and strengthen tbis consider this problem and there are studies in progress by military organizations of NATO 3 th1'i t o o ooruf p i F o tf_ C py lo • _or R EGO l fJylEN DED DISP ERS A ll FY 61 l'f0 - 0 s i'0Rd e s Soup try of RESTRICTED DATA A10 1C EN RG' · Ml 19 §4 AS AMENGEp · MJ R l To of' W pns cas of 30 Jtl rr 62 Si ri fa lL _ t 6 1962 rn Place Add illional ·a'il •of Die6 a r 6-Z pe i saJ s IUP SECRET Cowitry of Weapon System Wi pon TOP S 7JT l o oi Wpns as· of 30 Jun 62 IA Place RESTRICTED DATA' ATOMIC ENrnGY ACT l J54 AS AA f 10 0 Adiitiona Di a - persals • ' t I • Country of Weapon Sys Weawn 3 · No of ·Wp s a s of 3 0 J u o 6Z lti P ce Additialal C ANNEX C MAfl 1 6 1952 NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRESENTLY PROGRAMMED FOR USE BY ALLIED NATIONS The nucleac - weapons delivery system s presently progratnin d Io Alli•d use in the NATO 1966 lo ces cvmri t ot fighter - bomber aircraft inclu ng the FlOO and F-104G missiles including the Sergeant and Pershing for ground support and J 1 piter IRBMs a Aircraft l FlOO aircraft are presently available to Fraµce and Denma 2 F-104G aircraft are being pw -cl ased by NATO nations under a consortiu rn arr gement Belgiu n Italy Denmark Nethe rlands Germany Norway G reece Turkey anµ Canad a are expected to have this- type of aircraft in view o f pre s ent commitments and the NATO 1966 force 11equirem ents SANIT12 'ED E O 12958 Sec 3 6 SEC ET l s- RES'l'lU'C' 'E J 01 'rA-A 'O'Ur Jllml RGi' A C' OF 9u5 1 or1t1· 1 t' t AS rr anmo I i fv - I ' • - · - - - - · - --- The first War Reserve weapon is to enter the stockpile in Angust o 1962· b Pershing The PeTshi ng is a surface-to-sl riace inertially guided s·ol $ d P ropellant ballistic missile ¥1 nimum range is lOO nantical miles with guidance opti Jnize d for ranges between ZOO and 300 na'4ical miles P ershlng is intendecl as a replacem ent £ or lteds to n However it co·uld not 1 e provided in time to m e et o-µr present conun itxnents and wauld be more susce-ptibl e to coun termeasures The Pershing is e q ected to became operational The missile production schedule has been established to sati sfy established requirements £o r both u • S and non-p' · Ln January 1963 missile prodt etion scl edule has been estap isbed to satisfy reqµ i reinen ts f•or both tJ S aud non U S use 4 d Thor and J upiter IRBMs At tbe pr esent time restrict ions have b een in rposed on preparations and p lans Of particu1a c ' ncei n was information t po1o $1hility of Fraiu e o t'a nµfg s11cch In e xii--r nini Ji g the various way a in -which su h one which appeared p oss-Ible was through_ tne A thorough study was made of this and procedur es bave been established which provide for adequate security against this possibi lity 1f ranee contil' l les her effort at the present level she will probably tesi her first the monucl ear bomb by 1965- 1966 ansl can have such weapons in production by 1966-1968 based on Natioual Intelligence Estimates- However it is possible and the pressures are great to achieve GUch a system parallel to the availability of the MIUGE IV bomber lu this ca·s e tlie bombs woi1ld be needed by 1965 or in about three years To produce a highly sophisticated design like the Mark ZS bomb ·or the warbead for Per hi ag wo lld prob bly require additional tune nnd te ste Therefore com promise of essential elel 1e nts of the design of these weapons could advance French capability substantially but den ing the infonnati-on to France is mo·st unlikely to prohibit her from obta i ning ther ouuclear weapons of her own Countries other than F rance cannot capitalize on design information until thay at least have production capability for nuclear materials or are able to procure the materials from producing countries In view of the importance to tha Alliance of not withholcilng from dill' Allies weapons eo mparable to -those with which our own forces are provided fo r similar missions w e c o nsider it necess ary to pro ceed with ill support of all non-U S forces in Europe prog r a nmed for compatible delivery systeµ _a We will continue however to emphasize adequate measures to protect dasign information as well as the weapons themselves ·I I 0 ilA l t G 1962 ANNEX D ATOMlC INFOR '4ATION PROPOSED FOR COM M UNIC ATION TOG The info onatiQ 11 outlined In paragraphs Z through 4 below ap plie• th e foll9'wiug nuclea-r weapons e xcept ·as Indicated 1 z YWLDS 3 TECHNO LOGY AND SAFETY a Characteristics and purposes of fuz es and external features of weapons as required £or loading and delivery operations Sequence of oper-ation of fuzi ng systems to include circuitry types of components arming operations fuze settings a n d tw ing options b c Type a n d operational descriptioA of those safety features of weapons and ancillary equipment as required fo·r loading or delivery operations d The proba'pility against accidental or premature nuclear explosion e Safety criteria which revea l tlte approximate a mount of bigh e plOsive in $pecillc weapons when l n formatiou i I r e vealed by reference to quantities of expl osive such as 1 lncreniental amou nts a11 given in tables of Quantity-Distance Standards Ior Explosives as approved by • a the Armed Services Safety Board on lDecember 1955 In Ueu oi an increment tile mid- point may be u se 2 Equivalent weight ' - a e-tanda ·d 'eil eral purpose bomb £ These are lxnplosion weapons and are one-point s-afe 4 STOaAd E1 NFORMATIOft Locailon of plallhed or actual nu cleat '-Vea 1 n stot storage sites in support of • t £ I L This df' o 1t cow• 1 ' t o c -py ¥'ul I pnFJ 't' _J_ s_ % ' z i•l va _A __ ANNEXE MAR t 6 1062 FORESEEABLE REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMUNICATION TO ALLIES ON TH e RMONUCLEAR WEAPONS Foi Planning Compatibility and Training J c -lo ecDel Cont ol No $ z 3- NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 WŚŽŶĞ͗ ϮϬϮͬϵϵϰͲϳϬϬϬ͕ Ădž͗ ϮϬϮͬϵϵϰͲϳϬϬϱ͕ ŶƐĂƌĐŚŝǀΛŐǁƵ͘ĞĚƵ ZĞĂĚ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ͗ dŚĞ h͘ ͘ EƵĐůĞĂƌ WƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ tĞƐƚĞƌŶ ƵƌŽƉĞ͕ ϭϵϱϰͲϭϵϲϮ͕ WĂƌƚ ϮϬϮϬͲϬϵͲϭϳ