DECLASSlFIED - -- Authority -t1tJJ 9 4 W l By re NAM DatJ 1 Jf M --------·-f' •·- P8£l S es Sirifll ·•···-- ' ° ' '•• 'f ' - -·--- · -----·- J _· · - Cllpof __i_ ' S · Cs 1owngraded To • · ·- - - • I-• ' • IL - - - - t-0•• -1 --11 I 1 EO ft ' SECRET DJ Oi'trii - • t XGDS 1 11652 ti 2 w Cr' Z - HEHOR Ai·i r · OR THE RECORD · Authorh ed By H D B r o - August 4i 1975 11 r -I White House Bri e fi ns For Joint- Committee On Atomic Energy May l 1962t Executive Office Building• Present Chairman Holifield and senior members of JCAE 1 Mr McGeorge Bu ndy AEC Commissioners Seaborg and Graham Deputy Secreto r Gilpatric Deputy Under Secretary John s n staff members f'rom State Defense and AEC ·· s briefing was held pursuant to a conve r sation the President had recently with Chairman Holifield to inform the Joint Committee about the recen t Presi dentia1 decision to reGume the dispersa1 of nuclear weapons to non-US NATO forces Mr Gilpatric o pened the briefing by reviewing the hirstoey of the 1n cl ear build up in NATO He noted that three classes •O f nuclear delivery systems have beon deployed ill Europe air strilce bo t 'le field and air defense Until ·O ast yoor about 500 nu clear warheads had been deployed to ope di vided roughly between th e a i r · strike • and battle f eld ca tegories S1J1ce January 20 l96l th e re has been no further GUbstantial di rsa1 of ucleo r warh ads t Dlrope Du ring the time ' that the dispersal held J n ab ey ance1 int -en s 1 ve st udies o n the custody • control and pro·t ection •o f JlllC ear weapoDS ve b en made • Bf early 1962 the Defense_P decided in the ligllt of the studies that had been made an h frnt asures NATO forcea Mr Gilpatric noted the limitations that the President had placed Oll dispersal In the case of 2-stage weapons only those with lower yields would be dispersed 2 · All dispersals would be subject to review in the light of future decisions on NATO strategy Both Mr Bundy and Mr Gilpatric indicated that they aGNed witb the long-standing contention of the Committee that by Gelling NATO 9ountries p tieular delivery systems the US had established a strong commitment to· furnish the necessary wo rheo ds f'9r ·those systell $ · Mr Gilpatric conceded that this was nputtin g the cart-rbef ore the horsen but he said that we s' 6 r·· ···• · · -- - - -- --• - --- I 4 J have made c i v · ---- _ for improvl D g the protection of nuclear weapons had been l llSti tu t ed that it would be desirable- to make good our commitme ts to UA and resume disper s al of nuclear warheads for thoee systems which we r e in place Early in April DOD with the concurrence of State and the qualified agreement of AEC proposed to the Presi den t that he authorize the dispersal of l 000 additional warheo ds in all three categories of weapons Under the proposed dispersal plan warheads in the following ·categories would be dispersed 125 for air strike 420 for battle field and 48o for air defense Thus by July l of this yea r rough t ly 158o warheads will be positioned for non-US 1 4'- ' 1 · r DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 9 W ftf NARA Date i- f ·il' _----- l By • •• ' I j I • i -- - - have made commitments which we 111Ust go through with He indicated elearl1 that before we enter in to future c o mm itmen ts on delivery system is l IO will through the entire procedure of making the necessary determi nations first At this point Mr Holifield asked whether the ecision on dispersal was prim ily military or di pl omatic Mr Gilpatric explained t hat the reaso11 5 for res u mption are both political and military Tho military Commanders involved Genex-al Norata d contended that they needed to have the capability within their own Ni1TO forces to cover Soviet targets with air go strike weapons although the US is n ow targetting with external forces about of the Soviet targets e do not see that it is possible to stop shox-t of flI'Jning all NATO units which are now in place since ·t he Soviet f orces facing them possess ·nuclear weapons Mr Gilpat r ic continued by n o ting the thir' d condition plac ed on dispersal namely that the President luls directed that top pr i o rity be gi·v en to installing permissive links in the ·Ju3 iter tmd subsequently i b other weapons systems Mr Holii'ield inquired about the technical difficulties involved in inst-ru l illg p rmissive links Mr Seaborg stated that it will be necessary to assign priorities to this work ItwoU ld be p·ossib' lo ·to start with the D'upiter later this summe r aJ2d complete installation by the end of the year or by next fall Thereafter installation could be made on air strike weapons the·· sergeants and the Pershings In reply to j a question by Hr Holifield Mr Gilpatric stated that permissive Unks will not be installed _before this disperGal goes forward A iurtbe r condition that bad been imposed on dispersal was that there will be no dispet aa1 at this tiJDo or nuclear weapons for Turkish istrike aircraft SuDll ling up Mr Gilpatric sud that the net effe ct o f the defell Se recommendations would be to avoid ds mae e to the alliance and degradation or its · milita t-y capabilities He stressed that the proposed disperisals were not or a cb a racter which would create further commitments s to the future he mentione·d s peci f i9ally weapons tor the F-·1 04 G•s we intend to deal with these on a c ase by case basis Mr Holifield asked whether the administrati on was retreating from its _ iJlten tion to stress the conventional build up Mr Gilpatric answered by saying that we are pushing hard to brl Ilg convention up to MC-70 levels and ultimately to MC 26 4 levels Mr Holifiel d asked whether that was a quid pro quo for this dispersa 1 1 tha t is 1 whether we would demand from the Europeans a 1 a rger conven ional build•up Mr Gilpatric state-d that we can not expect a quid pro quo for this dispersal He cited the a c t that General Norata d has already n oted a 25% improvement over la st May in con ventional forces In this connection he noted improvements in both the French and German forces and reiterated tho t both State and Defense are making a strong pitch to our allies to do lilore He underscored the fact t bat our allies are facing the same threat as are we Y _ Jl _are a ssi ed P •am l _t_ -- 9F S ln Np o r f o rc e s we c t deny 't4 D 1 com 9 le _11ea Q • For example we can not ask the Germans 't9 build up to 12 divisions and take over a large segment of the l ine without fur ni G hjng them j 1th the same weapollS as our allies hol ding posi tions on the same front • I •1 I r i I I • • • • ••• I - s sa r ·-- - - 'P lih it • • I • • • • • _ ¼¢ ' • ---· - -r R ti • 1-1 - 1_ 1 ii l'I M a Mr John eon i- • -- - DEOLASSlflED 1 1 • AuUllftty _ tlAlb f 1 l 1 By K C NARA Da 2 -Jt f f · i rollgly aupported Mr Gilpatri c sta tins that we must av o id charges or bad faitb Ha given t b e Europeans these systems we must furnish them with appropriate warbeo ds Senat•c r m c enloope ia qui J edl whether the tt was a greater militax y necessity for thia dispersal Mr n L - - Gi1patric sa icl yes Se»ator Pastore wondered whether this was n ot at bottom a German pro ble • Mr J'olmso n inclieat'ed that it was r eal y a NAm-wido problem · At this point Senator J ackson asked whether this dispersal w-o·llld not ro all 1' amount to a proliferation o f nu c l ear weapons capabili t 1e 1s He thou t that by makiltg these dispersals we would be hurtil'lg our chanc e s or a greeme·n t Hi th the· Soviet 1Jnion 01 t pro l iferation of nuclear weapons to their· satellite aud ultimately to communist China He questioned the military basis fo r dispersal amt asked why is it nece s sa- to provide· a ucleGl c pability to allied G t r ike aircraft He tboug lt i t would be desirable to distinquish bet Jeen b·a ttle f ield type ·w e apons and those f o r trike weapons Hr Gilpatric explained tha t l'-' t '- eally tuc _wi - Q c i O'J lldyme s and noted that tbe US had enc our ged the Euro p eans to ·u ndertake common product ion of the F-104 1G Sena tar Jackson e·ontinued that he thought that the Eu ropom ns would ·u se tb e di ispersal as an excu e for not buiilding u p their C•on vem t£onal forces Mr BWJdy explained that not to resume diepers a l woul d actuall1 be a reversal of our position on ·c cnventioDal W•e apona 1 if• w7 were w2r9nese on these commitments the Europeans mi ght well say that we d1 cl not _ aefend Europe 1 f • Senator Jackson responded by saying that he thottgllt tld s was not persal but r ather pr o lif'erat ion Be co ncede _d that we are stu ck with supp1yillg ·warheads for surface to surface delivery s1stems 1 but wc n dere d why we could n o t a sk t be hro·pemzs ·t o accept a com ventj_o na _ capability b 1 strike aircraft keepii ng nuclear weapons for our own strike aircraft Mr Gilpatr ic Ga id that we c a n not a sk the Eul ope ans to accept a •c o nv ent Lorial capability f or the F 104a and Mr Bundy stresised t hat to do so would hurt NM'O Be ass rted that a o seDiior NAiO military offi c e r believed that the lO s should have a conventional capability Mr Holifield remarked tbat most l1Am· nat Lons hav e nat met their conventli o n al requirements· and expresse1d coneerA that we are getting no quid pro quo for dispersal Mr Bundy a ad e the point that we m u st tr y to bo·l cl ffATO Ln a iDgle nu e lear posi t i on or risk seeing it disint e g C ate into a s erieis o f national nuclear co pabili ties Gilpatric n ote d the f i naJ condition attached to dispersal of nucl _a r weapons nQl l leJ y that no 2•- stage weapons would be placed om US or alJ i -d ai tlcraft on quiick r eaetion alert Mr B o l i f i 83 _d §d cl that h e o u d _no accept the idea o f pari ty of· mielear weapons s1stemin NA O 'l'he Europe ans bav - no t 1 be sa 1 d 1 f'Ulfillecl their conventicMl requ iremants This dispersal ·r all in his OP_inio 1 prejudice the _chanc s of' he Europeans build-up their I Lforee s Mr • Bu Doy adiieated that the VS l S trywg ·t o turn the attention of the aJ lianoe to ·t he fact that US external forces ar adequate to provide· cov•e r of· stratepc ·t arp-ts o·f interest ·t o the allia11ce ·b ut he sought to make the point tba t within NATO it was desirable or fo ces having the · sWQ missions to have tb e e ame kinds o f -_ea ons Ke coudeded 1 h o wevcr that tb e principle of parity is not an absolute one Mr i • -- II • • ' • OP• • • - M i I' • ' I i r t r-r - r- t _ _ _ •• •• • ·t 2 t- · 1 • - --r0P SECJiEt _ 't ' ' here then i - i-------··--- - -----DECLASSIFIED Aulhortti _t l JD 9 W By U NAM Oat '2d f1 f · ✓ There then followed discussion of the fact that the p·r ohibit lpn against putting 2-stage weapons on al ert aircraft appli ed i o US as well as non-US forces The Coimnittee indicated that it would not think it was a• ---- r• · • • a I I I - I r • - I good idea to apply tnis restrictio J JJS air c raft as w _ l In this con necS on- 7 lr7 il'1'paE fr ·oos emd- that studies are being made of the role 4 f strike aircraft Senator Jackson re te·r ated his concern •about the effect of dispersal of weapons for strike aircraft on the US di omatic posture Mr Bundy said that our intelligence has indicated that the Soviets know that we have dispersed nuclear weapons to non-OS foreee and that the S oviets accept US custody as a tact Mr Conway of the JCAE staff aslted whether we proposed to make public our custody concept with respect to qui c k reaction ale rt aircraft It was indicated that we have done ao at least in ·general terms but that more specific publicity would be quite undesirable at least until by means of the permissive link we have made US custody more effective · The remainder or the briefing was concerned wi th repo r ting to the Committee our intention to mmounc at Athens that we would commit Polaris submarines This elicited a favorable reac·t ion from the committee Mr Gilpatric also noted o intention to give our allies more- nu clear inform a tion in particular through Mr McNa mara•a proposed statement at Athens ond ·t o give the Euro1 ea ns a better idea of the planning facto r s in our pro Gro m Finally Hr Bundy outlined for Mr Holifield the line we intend to take with the Europeans on ' a mBM mu1tiJ a teral forces stressing that we would not make any commitm e nt on such a fo r ce at the Athens meeting Mr Holifield asked whether subsequently the Committee would be faced with of situation they were in todey with regar • to_- ·dispersals namely of being facetf 'with commitment wnich they did n o t lik e but wou d feei im ll ed to honor Mr Bundy that it was being in discussions-tliat tne· S could not take cert rl n actions without legisl ation tbe Comnittee might be faced with a problem a year from now but not with a commitment The NATO discussiona migh t e n d up with satisfaction with the present nuclear program it might lead to broad endorsement of a multilateral MR BM force under custody and control arrangements along present line or it might lead to a strong push by out' allies for a comp1etely -the·same ·kind - - - - - - -• • • ' r_ _ _ • _ ' - •• • N r Ir • • • said • • • • made ·clear integrated force without US custody or veto- In that la st ease we would have to weigh with the Congress whether such a force was an acceptable alternative to the dangers of a number of national nuclear fore es in Eu rope The Committee did not pre ss the discussion of the _MRBM £0 r ee further nor did it ask that the dispersal program be held up There appeared to be a conse nsus that the briefing had been a useful one EGR l ffh A jll 5 4 62 I ------·· --- - --·- - dSf SiRET t - - m- rn · ili mi t r ' · - ' ' - • - ' - - -- - • ' ii ' ' · • - - - - - - '·- NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article The U S Nuclear Presence in Western Europe 1954-1962 Part II 2020-09-17