10 TH E WHIT E MO USE SHJNGTON June 6 1962 SEGRE'P RESTRICTES S- _T_ NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO 160 TO The The The The Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Chairman Atomic Energy Commission Director Bureau of the Budget SUBJECT Permissive Links for Nuclear Weapons in NATO 1 After an examination of the problem of installing permissive links in nuclear weapons dispersed in NATO commands I have decided we should now make the commitment to procure appropriate devices for all nuclear weapons now dispersed and to be dispersed to NATO commands for both non-U S and U S forces See attached memorandum to me from Or Wiesner dated May 29 This decision corresponds to Alternative 5 of that memorandum 2 This will require a supplementary appropriation for the Atomic Energy Commission budget The Secretary of Defense the Chairman Atomic Energy Commission and the Director Bureau of the Budget will work out the details of the budget presentation 3 At the earliest feasible time the Secretary of Defense will submit for my approval a schedule for installation of these devices in NATO weapons In making this schedule the Secretary should consult with the Secretary of State on the political problems arising from the existence of weapons assigned to U s forces and weapons assigned to our Allies SECRET R SSTRlCTED D l cT 0 SEGRD' P RESTaIGTE 9 E l'J T ' - 2 - 4 The Chairman Atomic Energy Commission in consultation with the Secretary 0£ Defense will carry on a research program on an urgent basis directed toward an examination of the feasibility and desirability of more advanced permissive link devices with a wider range of capabilities cc Dr Wiellller Oener l Taylor Mre Lincoln Mr Bundy 3 Mr C E Joluuon Mr Kayeen 2 White Houee File• NSC File• SECRET RESTRICTEQ Q hTl• -···· ' -· · -• -· '- 1 --w4 _ '- - ··· - ·' _ ' SAN TIZED COPY --- u r-- e- THE WHITE HOUSE ' WAS H ING-Q May 29 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT At your request I have review d ' in consultation with the AEC and the DOD the technical and cost aspects of equipping nuclear wcapor s dispersed overseas with permissive link hardware The object of this review was to establish the program options that were technically available to implement such a program as rapidly as possible and to determine the amount of supplemental funds that would lave to be requested in the AEC FY '63 Budget to accomplish these options A decision on this problem involves the following basic policy issues which while not technical in themselves are affected by the· av ilability of equipment and the program timing and cost • 1 Should a permissive link be incorporated at is time in all dlspersed nuclear weapons or just in those critical weaj on syUems with quick reaction high yield and long range e g Jupiter missiles and quick reaction aircraft 2 Should a permissive link be incorporated at t is time in all weapons dispersed to NATO U s as well as non-U s or just to non-U s weapons 3 Should a permissive link be incorporated at this time in weapons committed to NATO but based in the U K as well as weapons based on the European Continent Thes policy issues raise the m re basic question as to what objective one is attempting to accomplish by incorporating a permis• liii36RB'3 SANITIZED E O 12958 Sec 3 6 NLl -'17 s Addllio el - I been a i a cftfla tew - r t 1 · _ - ' • - · -· L' t• 2£1 -z- SECRET sive link A permissive link can attempt to meet any of the following objectives each of which iinposes increasingly difficult techi _ ical probl ems 1 Safeguarding weapons against actions by an individual psychotic · Z Meeting the legal and political requirements of U S control 3 ·Maintaining control against the unauthorized use of weapons by our own or allied military forces under conditions of high tension or actual military combat · 4 Assuring that weapons could not be used if forceably seized by an organized group of individuals or by a foreign power The first of these objectives safeguarding against a psychotic has already at least in part been met and the last objective assuring ' weapons could not be used if seized cannot be fully achieved vithout further devcloprnent which would aoaure the sell-destruction of the weapons if efforts were made to by-pass the permissive link For the purpoae of this review I have not attempted to neet a specific objective but rather have analyzed the operational value of the best available equipment and ·attempted to determine how rapidly it could be incorporated in dispersed' nuclear weapons ' While the permissive link equipment presently recommended by the AEC leaves something to be desir e d and can clearly be much unproved with time I believe that this equipment can be used as the basis for a crash program since development quality hardware exists and initial production and installation could begin in the immediate future Specifically the AEC recommends that if a permissive link program is undertaken on a crash basis bombs for aircraft and warheads for longer range missiles be equipped with an electro-mechanical lock • which would have to receive a preset numerical code in order to make ·-the weapon operable In the case of certain bombs which cannot be easily ret r ofitted with this equipment as an interim measure pending the development of improved compatible permissive link hardware SECRET IOc c_ '' ·-··•- ____ 11- 1 l SECRET 3 - ' ' mechanical combination locks would be installed to cover a socket into which an arming plug m ust be inserted In the case of these bqmbs as well as short range missiles such as Honest John and Nike Hercules and the 8-inch shell the arming plugs would be stored in self-destruct safes · The proposed program does not include specific hardware for the Davy Crockett missile which presents a particularly difficult problem because of its small size and posiiiblo fo rw r rd deployment The numbers which would operate both the electro-mechanical and the combination lock could be held a t any echelon of command I circuinstances required the combination could be held by the U S custodial officer himself This procedure could therefore give the weapons the same state of readiness that they now possess Despite the limitations of this equip ne nt believe it would give further and probably decisive protection against individual psychotics and would certainly deter unauthorized use by military forces holding the weapons during periods of high tension or military combat The question o e egal a nd political requirements of contro were beyond the scope of my review The·question has been raised whether the installation of this develop- ment quality hardware on a era sh basis might reduce the reliability of the nuclea r weapons However in view of the simple nature of SECRET IOC _ ·-·· ••·• - ___ - • 4 of this equipment and the method of installation I believe that it is now generally agreed that it would not reduce the inherent reliability of the weapons The weapons would of course not be operable if the combination number were not received from a higher headquarters This is a communication and management problem which can be very simple or very· complex depending on the level of command at which the· combination number ill' held and the degree of control maintained through coding procedures or the use of different combination munbers for different weapons In its simplest form it should be possible to handle this procedure wherever a go code can be transmitted which is preswnably a requirement if any control is to exist In any event I wish to emphasize that if circumstances demand a decision can be made to release the combination number to the U S custodian with the f eld unit and thereby revert to the state of readiness and control that exists today At my request the AEC has estimate d the cost and time for completion of th11 following five alternative programs which I believe represent the full range of possible application of the permissive link on a crash ba sis to nuclear weapons dispersed to the European Theater • Altern i tive I • Warheads for Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy and bombs for the non-u s NATO aii cra ft normally on quick re• action alert 4 aircraft per squadron Alternative JI • All nuclear weapons assigned to non-u s ' NATO forces exclusive of those assigned to U K delivery systems based in the U K ----- Alternative m • All NATO weapons assigned to non-U S NATO forces including those assigned to U K delivery systems based in the U K• Alternative 'N All nuclear weap_ons assigned to non•U S NATO forces and all u S weapons committed to and dispersed to NATO exclusive of u s 'weapons on U s delivery systems based in the U K • Alternative V All nuclear weapons assigned to non-u s NATO fo·r ces and all U s weapons committed to and dispersed to NATO including those based in the U K and as-signed to the naval attack aircraft on carriers based in European waters The estimated completioh date _ total cost and FY 1 63 cost SECRET ·-- ' Ice _ BEORB'l' - 5 - for e cl of these programs is as follows l' I Alternative 1· I II m IV V • June 1963 ' Oct 1963 Dec 1963 Mar 1964 Aug 1964 FY'63 Cost $ Millions Total Cost $ Millions Estimated Date Completed Installation 2 9 2 9 8 l · 10 2 15 2 - 23 4 7 8 8 7 10 7 10 7 ' A supplemental to the AEC FY •6 Budget would call for obligation of · the total cost of the program but expenditure of only the FY 1 63 cost of the program On the basis of this review have concluded that it is technically pos- sible to equip on a crash basis all nuclear weapons dispersed to the '• European Theater with reasonably effective permissive link equipment at relatively small co t Thc cfore tho decision as to the extent to which permissive link equip ent should in fact be incorporated in dispersed weapons can be made solely in terms of broad policy considerations as to the desired objective • j• Whatever decision is made on the era sh program to install permissive link equipment on dispersed nuclear weapons equipment I would recom mend that a vigorous program be undertaken to develop an improved electronic lock which would be incorporated direcUy in the electronic package associated with all future weapons so that the option of a permissive link would always exist This program should also include work to develop improved devices to retrofit the bombs and short range missiles which were equipped with combination l ocks only as an interim measure in the above cras program Lwould also recom- mend that there be an aggressive research program to develop more advanced concepts of the permissive link including mechanisms to assure the elf-destruction of a weapon ii efforts were made to by-pass the permissive link It is my understaDding that·the AEC has funds available to cover the R8tD necessary for these advanced programs · · · · - ei · · ·1 - 1 04 ·•· '· · · f ·- - '· f Te Om - •'U · r- ••¥ · J - » ¢ • • ft _ • • t - t· t ·· tt f ECRE I -- · ' ' - ·-----·----- ---····--·- - - -··- - -- -- -- ------ NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article The U S Nuclear Presence in Western Europe 1954-1962 Part II 2020-09-17