-·· ·- ·-·-··- - 7 - 7 - - --- - • ' •' ·00uct o AT 11r1 ttl 110 1 n c s f -· SECRET i '· t - I • TO The Secretary THROUGH S S FROM C • U Alexis Johnson SUBJECT l f j I I 'If- £ 1- f 1 Davy Crockett Deployment In my memorandum brie ing you for the recent lhite Houoe r ceting on the permissive link I stated ' ' In tho course of briefingn in Dr WiosnCl%''s office about the permissive link DOD made clear that it now believed that the link 'W llig11s too much to be applied to Davy Crockett and tlult tho dangers inherent in this pcm a short range low yield firearm for u e by infm atrymen could only 1 e avoided by controlling its deployment lhen Foy Kohler wrot4 Paul Nitza last Octobor to expre is our concern with theee degoro Paul 1 s answer indicated that it was than thought the pn-ciesive link could be applied to the Davy Crockett In view of the pre sent cancluoion that this ie not feasible DOD staff advises us that this would be o good time to lay our concerns before Defense since the iamie of Davy Crockett dl plO 'IDent will be a recurring one e are preparing a lettor for yoor signature on this subject 2 A propoGed letter to Secretary Mc ra is attached Tab A DOD staff believe that the SUnday Tirnea ntory about Davy Crockett t akes thia lcttor more rather th m lesa u seful That you sign the attached letter Tab A SECRET ' ·s - - n I - s ·- -·· - - - 1co 1 BVtJ- Q-io a -- th c - °lb-e l sk JIVl'I vr - 1µol lm1 ·• '1• Ut Pr• • JOVC£O AT THE t 'ATIOfUI L A nc •• IIV 5 · 03111SS fl J30 SECRET 1 Dear Bob In the courao of recent inter-agency diocuooions of the permis sive link prog Cam DOD ropreoentativoa aclvi ed us that it would not be possible to awly the permissive link to warhcllds for the Davy Crockett dolivery syotem in contrast to warheads for other delivery oyatems to be disperoed to NATO EUrope In the light of thio nfort 8tion I li10 nted to nhare with you 'Cf1 concenw on tltO points Firot thore is the control problem In the ant of hoctilities there would be por oerful argumonto far dispersing Davy croekett rheads - like other t mrbcads to operatiODCl units so that any Pronidcntial decioion to uae nuclear weapons could be readily implecanted In cace of the Davy Crockett warhead h0i tever dtcparaal 1 1ould taean loss of phy9icel control wheroas in die cane of other orhoado such control could still be uminta Jled through the permissive link 'the risk of an authorized firing of tho very short range Davy Crockett by i dtvidual ooldiera in the midst of non-nuclear or ccntrollcd nuclear ho 5tilities seems moreover G0t1atmat larger than 1n the csse of longer rQ'Qge 1eapollS further to the rear uhich will be in tho hands of well-organi cd unitB undm tha command of wll-indoctrinated offieoro It sess difficult to be assured that no one of the privaeti soldiaro armed 1th a Davy Crockett would fire off his weapon rl tbout orders to do so in oelf-defence as tho fog of c0i 3bat swirled around him rick would oeam likely to grow with the number of individuols armGd with this weapon This ie Ronorablc Robert S V cNamars Se ret8ry of Defense SECRE I' ---------------- -- ------ - - - - - -- - - -------- 1 - - ' ' u t Pr u ovCEDAt flfE U TIOW l A RCt av t ' SECR Er - 2 - This ic the oore true cince I believe that if our allie believed a sizeable Davy Crockett program were undert14y for US forces in NATO Europe it 't'lOUld be politically difficult to limit any plans for deployment of this weapon to US force9 thuo discriminating against allied NATO forces Second thero in the effaet wich nllied knOlfledge of ny substanti ll US Davy Crockatt progTam for NATO would have on allied attitudes to1 nrd NATO strategy The difficulty of exercising control over this weapon 18 ao clear that I wonder whether such knowledge might not somewhat degrado the credibility of the vie s outlined in your Athens speech deprecating the possibility of 111 lited and uaeful amployment of t cticsl nuclear weapons and einphosizing the possibility of more than trancient non-nuclear combat in F urope Efforts to porsuade our allies to nupport and fulfill the desired NATO strategy might thue be aoo 1m tult handicappod My concern on this point is reinforced by tha questionB we are now getting from the Germans both during Stra 1as' vie it and now in the Nt C concerning recent rcportn of D iivy Crockott deployment to NATO Europe I realize of course that operational mtlltery considerations arc slso involved I wanted to outl n 1 my concerns in the t--JO respects indicated above however so that they could bo uatghcd - along with these considerat1onn - in the Defense Department's reviev of future Davy Crockett programs Ale- 1s Johnson's and Foy Kohler's peopl would be glad to discuna these concerne r n-ther ith your stoff in relation to specific proposed programs if you desire 1ith wa rr i r egar ds 1 Sincerely Dean Rusk Sl CREI' NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article The U S Nuclear Presence in Western Europe 1954-1962 Part II 2020-09-17