1 w uL11 U 'lliJJ · - -- · - · -· ·· AlP'l'Em ED TO TUEWITIIDMVl i 4 l I E 0 12 Coc 5 0 i iREPRODUCED AT THE NATIOl Al ARO IVES OJ JD 9c2 09 - -···-·H ' This document consiotp of 30 gea No 3 of' '5 copiea Series R J d · Q'1 d -SECRET -- - -Operation of NATO Stockpile Progrom Survey of Security Arro ngemento for United Stateo Atomic Weo pono '111th NATO Unito Apr1J 1962 My principal 1mprcsoiono on potentio J J y oign1fico nt points o o a reoul t of vho t I oav nnd wo toJ d about operations o t verious allied bases in the NATO areo during the period April ll-24 are ao follow J Non- United Sto teo personnel are oo intimately nssociated 'With the mo ted veo pono systems both aircraft nnd missiles that they help enforce the buddy-system or no-lone-zone rules vio-a-vio United States personnel 2 United States custodial personnel are at least o t Air Force ma i ed-veo pon sites not guardians of the veapono they do not control ac_c ess to the fenced areas 'Within vhich such weapons are positioned they have only accountability responoibilities and are expected to rely upon local allied peroonnel to deal vith any and all intrudero In contraa t _ defended the legality of the stockpile security arrangeme n t»-1 n a Joint State-Defense legal memorandum l o st Auguot in part on the ground th at United States peroonnel dt contzul access and that they o re responsible · for guardlanahip and sii iekl epmg or the Vea pons ·- 3 Allied forces could easily help themselves to the mated weapons llbenever they felt it necessary to use them vithout Ututed sto tes consent there is no over-all conoidered or effective UOited States plan in being at the moment to prevent this eventuality arro nge-11 4 I find it difficult if not 1mpooo1ble to reconcile such ments 'With t he original impressiono as to hov United States forces wuld retain custody and control of stockpile weapons 5 It is difficult to reconcile hcoito ncy about the iegality or policy aoundness of oo-cal led floating stockpiles vith vhat ie in effect on land 1rt the moment the only possible difference io tha·t communicationo to a unit afloat may somevho t more frequently be susceptible to interruption if ue to natural causes but this I wuld not regard as a controlling differt• e In fact given a ship vith the proper kind of facilities the v apono could be much so fer at sea 6 Since it is nov physically possible for allied units to launch theoe veapona oystem l over our objection o nd since it io only prudent to· o osume that a military commander vill in time of crises for his command throv everything avnilo ble into the breach the question arises of vhether our po uoe concept io realistic tl_A- J c 1-1fy r f- lJ_ C - P P D_ 5 J-ay - ··•-· J_i 7249 t • ' fi 1 - o •• ' ' 1 • •• r·· · '·' '·• REPRODUCED AT THI NATIOtW ARCHIVES of - 2 - 7 The entire progr8lll is pregnant Vith political implica tio ns a fa ct readily acknovledged by the military and heDce if the Department meMs to hD ve a voice in these ma ttcrt1 it voul d be necessary to have th o rtunit to reviev even uch 11111 tte r• as target a asle_meat -- Dt1e 6 Z o 8 I h1 1d been under the impre 11 eion that pur11uant to NF' A'a i1t C'1€ Gi11te11ce w hmd an underst u nding 'With Defense th11 t opecial otepo and J I i_o t IP' precautions 'IIOul d be taken including 'Withholding of tra i ning to assure i· 6 'Z o r I 9 Given the acceptability of the premises upon vhich the progrom i o presently conctructe4 the progrom io being vigorow ly nnd seriouoly pursued by dedicated ond capable pereonnel at all levelo although the demands on the energies of the officer personnel ln the progrom particul arly at the oitec mny be inordinate Further observations and the detailo of tye program· in operation at the siteo are set forth in the folloving resume of operations at tyPical installationo Background The core of the aurvey party '1 G an ad hoc Defense-ABC cOllllllittee five from Defen and four AEC repreaentativea vhooe main purpose w s to aacertnin vhether the oecurity arrangements vith reopect to the weapono vere adequate In that connection it ho d been agreed at the White House last year that the AEC retained a reopol18ibillty for the oecurity of weapons information vith reopect to veo pono deployed o broo d and in particuJ ar tho t the AEC ws entitled to ho ve reo sono ble nsGuro nce that the arrangements for the security of information o t t he stor o ge aitcs vere adequate • AEC Wtl already oomewo t flllllillo r 'With the situation o t the storage sites abroad since it ho d representatives accompanying the Joint Committee members who vioited varioUll NATO o tomic capable units late in 1960 and additional AEC personnel ho d visited oome such units during 1961 f or frun1 1arizo tion purpoaea or for venpono eo fety checka CJEC RE'P ------ '· ·• AEPROOUCEO AT THE NATIONAi ARCHIVES SECRET------ - 3 To'1llrd the end of 1961 AEC had registered reluctance to Join in some Department of Defense proposed determinations under Ex ecutive Order 10854 to provide Restricted De to to all 1ed forces In some instanceo the ll ll h ad to vhich the_ µiforme tion related ' Us o l ready being dioperoed t o the all 1ed unito Y Suboequently AEC preoented ito viev on disperso J propooo l e under consideration as did State o nd registered its doubto as tot adequacy of oecurity particularly 'llitb respect to tvo stage veapons Earlier this year therefore arrangements for an iAEC-DOD inspection of the facilities as they nov stand were made A Joint Committee staff member ws added as an observer in viev of the Committee's desire to learn firot-hand vhat progress had been made since their special subcollllllittee report of l ast year And two State observers· vere added so that the Department uld have any opportunity to become fllllliliar v l th aetuo J operations JI · EUCCM Briefing The committ' e of nine plUD the three observers assembled on April 9 1962 a• EUC l Headquarters Paris for a general briefing on the SHAPE-Clli'CEUR stockpile program A 11mited -------------------------------------y Obviously a question arises as to the 'lliodom of acting on the dioperso J problem o s one separable fr0111 the problem of transmission of information g Upon return to EUCOM at the end of the trip the party 'Ima informed that inBtructions had be en received from Washington that no t 0-stage Yeo pone vere to be put on QRA planes United States or allied The speculation ' lO S thnt thio ' lO S due to concern about radiography risks A fev_Department and Embassy personnel bad previously seen the IRl3M operationo at ------ · REPAOOUCCO ATTHG NATIONAi ARC14VES ' SEORE'l' - I - A 11 inited number of the group including Col Loyton Mr Conwy Mr Ink and the tvo Stnte repreoento tives met firot nth Lt Gen Uodorhill EUCCX f Chief of Stnff and his l mmedio te staff The principal item emphnoized 'Wtl 13 the need for the group to limit itself in any diocuaeiono vith non United Ste tee personnel a t fa c111ties to be visited The main concern voo th at theoe non-Uo1ted States military perso eJ not be given the impression thnt the group 'WnS conducting a special investigation of them All pre3ent seemed to appreciate the need for exercieing discretion in that respect · The formal briefing was opened by Brig Gen Davieeon EUCCX f J- 4 'Who again brief'ly treated for the benefit of t he entire group of the foreign peroonnel problem Otherllise the moot interesting point made by Gen Do viooori wo the fo et that only recently the British had come clean to the satisfaction of the Uoited Stateo military on their nuclear targetting plans A serieo of briefero then ro n throuah the various aspects of the SHAPE and ClNCEUR programg for atomic veapon storage There eeemed to be some conf'usion as to the significance of the R- hour veapone release and related mesoageo thnt vould initiate the steps leading to use of the veapons If there ie confUoion at headquarters the situation ohou ld be t Jioro tl y revieved up and dovo the line During the discuasion on communications betveen headquarters and the field units t he need for prompt completion of the tropospheric-scatter oystem vna empho ni r ed Apparently the fac111tieo in the field can be inoto lled very q tl cltly once the military are given t he green light upon receipt of governmental level approval The objective of the rtropoa°rheric oyntem is to enable Cn ICEUR to hnve direct rapid and rl ' liable comm1micatiC1DtJ to the cuatodia1 units in the field Another co1111n1micatiotW project involves d tapersa1 of the loca1 command poato Cn ICEUR ts mobile units i n coamnm l co tion llith him to be the relay pointa in the event unit in the direct chain of co11111unicati on are knocked out To the o reo o t' epecia 'l aafcty problems ve vere advised that t he particular venponn vhich the Holifield Repo1-t ea id rniacd safety problems had --·-- - - • REPRODUCED AT THe UATIOtw ARCHIVES 6 Ee R-E-'l'- - 5been equipped vi th the additiono l deviceo rccOllllllended so no to eliminate the bozo rd prcviousl7 involved With reopect to the nev program to maintain continuing vigilance for signo of clandestine radiography ve vere informed that there currently existed n shortage in certoin monitoring equip nent Nevertheless the units vere folloving recently iosued JCS rules requiring that opecio l co re be token for veo pons during tronoit on the ground The briefero advised th ot all storage aites still did not fUllymeet the SIIAPE criteria The necesao ry construction progro m hovever hod recently been accelerated The briefero called our attention to difficulties United Staten personnel vere having in troining foreign unita because of seemingly unnecessary limitations on the procedures for communicating Reotricted Data The difficulty appo rently stems from the fact tliat the authorization from JJ EIG to trnnBl lit the data runs for a fixed period uounlJ y coincident vith the planned period of training -- so y ninety dayn Consequently if after that period United States personp el not ie allied personnel making an error in veapon handllilg procedures all tliey can do is tell them to atop They cannot correct them until they get a nev authorization f rom Waahington · EUCOM has recently propoaed a nev approach to m1nimize these difficultieo The military and J EC personnel in our group recognized the need to l oak into the matter The briefero candidly informed uo that evacuation procedureo vere being currently revieved for improvement and in particular that there vere not enough plo neo avn il nble to evncuate all the veap na from the entire theatre at the some time ITence they vere concentrating on plans for evacuating a countrJ at o time There are o leo destruction plo no nnd procc 'i urt•s but time is a big factor eopecially for the J'Upiter 0Y3tem To meet the vn rious fo ctors that have to be token into account in provlding for the immedio te security of the -weapons including the communication links principo l reliance is placed on human re ources -- allied and United Stateo There are t'llo categoriea of personnel The first is the custodial all Uoited States vhich is alvn yo responsible for o'lltlership o nd o ccountabillty ond a loo for posoession until authorized to releaoe th ot to the -S E G R E T · REPAOOUCEO T THE tlATIONAI AACIWES - 6 oupported force It we emphasized that the United Sta tee cuotodio no are not guo rdo But oee diocuosion in f'ro re custod1CL11S in Army unito They do corry a pistol but only for their oel f-protection All f the United stateo personnel are required to bo ve at least a oecret cle'Eirance before toking up custodial dutieo The Air Force requires a Top Secret clears nee the milltary may grant this upon satisfactory completion of a specif1ed·number of years of service formerly ten but no'W' fifteen as veil as on the basis of a background investigation The entire guard or security force for the weapons ia supplied by the supported al1ied unit This is CO llposed of A B Security guard force Sabotage alert te llll S A T C Standby alert force and D AU€ 11ento tion Alert Force The security guard force supplies the men who are on poot vith the veapon or patrol the perimeter of a veapon site enclosure The so botage alert team is a group usually around five men llhich is al'lltl ys on duty ready to deal vith intrudero on a moment's notice The standby alert force io a group about company strength Who may be off duty but on base oubJect to call The augmentation alert force is at least a battalion size group Which is oupposed to be o ble to reo ch a -weo pon oite vithin four hours of call Thia group hall other normal dutiet1 and -would 'unction o o guard a for the weo pono only in o n emergency Iu o ddi tion to Urlited Sta tea o nd allied mo npo-wer the oecuri ty program in- volvea reliance on potrer o lo rms dogo fencing floodlighting and gates Finally it 'IIIUI pointed out that vhil e EUC l conducts general ourveya at the operational oiteo at vo riouo stages EUCOM does not run an independent IG program EUCCM does through the general ourvey approach satisfy itself that component conmumders run an adequate IG operation in this respect SEQRE'l' ' 3ECRE'l' ------ - 7 Field Guro •ey The morning td'l a- the EUCCM briefing the party with oix escort oi'ficero i'rom the principal Un 1 ted sto teR mllita ry headquo rteru in Europe EUCG t e 6 z o USJ FE und US REUR The deta il tl it lneracy- ia set out in Attachment l There 1 o no need ho ' re to revlmr compl etcl y in detail the operations at every one o f the ten facilities vioited aince thin wuld entail o large mensure o f unnecessary repetition There are oome possibl y s i gnificant_ vario tiono in the standard procedures betlreen the operations for the basic types of delivery systems -- i e betveen operations involving A1r Force missiles Jupiter m eM me mied aircraft o nd the tirmy missiles and guns Accordingly the follo ling onalynio vlll focus on the variationo betilecn security arrangements for theve three categories rather than on differences in detail o t co ch of the inetollo tions surveyed Jupiter IRPM's The group v slted both of the unito 1 o Allied Cowmand Europe -- the Tu bot b cr u iee t he Ju pi cr s TJre in plo ce_ sto ndl D upright with varheo d o tto ched t o rgetted and 1 1 ll the iust rumenta tion is l lllnlled around the clock so tho ' nt 61lY ·t im' they C81l be lt l l Ulched v i thin fifteen minutea Thre-e m l ct t• Llca ro c deyloyed a i o G ite or 1 auuch pooition in moat cases -5 J' ·i p g --If --· - -· -- AEPROOUC O AT THE NATIOW L AACHIV 5 SEOFIET - 8 - Eo ch lo u ch position normo lly situated off some bock-country rood io enclosed by two cyclone fences tventy feet po rt and each is topped '111th barbed ' fire •At the entrance uner country personnel are stationed to control o cc'eos • · The area inside the fencing io probably close to a quarter-mile in diameter and is 1n efrect o smoll base in itself It contains not only the miesilea o nd the electronic equipment vana but alao the fueling to nke quarters for all the personnel United States and user force wrk ing at the position radio and rndar antennae etc six United States air ppllce ''cuatodians are aeaigned Normally it is necessary for only one of theae custodians to be on duty po trolling inside the fence to keep the -warheads under aurveillance al thoush vhen a misoile hru been lovered to the ground it may be necessary for o second man to be on duty since one has to stand by · the vorhe11d of the lovered misoile ll ld he may not be able to vatch the other two veil enough from that apot Three United States officers one of vhom now functions as the maintenance officer take turna on duty ae the Launch Authentication officer inside the van containing the electronic launching console Theoe six-llUlll United Sta tea tea mo pull four-day touro at the launch position Eventually the United States main·tene nce officer vill be dropped t o_ 2 « since will ho ve tho t r esponsibility as aoon o e it has 'I'6· trained peroonnel The Uo ited States hovever c e 6 c presently plans to keep three United States officers 1n the team oince he believeo there ia too much for Just t'llo officers These officers seem to be regarded as the focal point of the cwatody o nd control operation 'Whil e on duty in the van they veo r the three keys that open the three l ocks 'Which permit the three misailes to be fueled o nd othervise finall y prepared for firing Moreover there ia unde r consideration a propooal by the Air Force to eliminate the patrolling n1r poli emen upon inutallo tion of an electronic device which vould register 1n the launching eonnole van ohould anyone attempt to tamper vith a vnrheo d on the missile The Air Force in no l veighing the reliability of this electronic device '' · · • · ' provide the personnel vho man the acceos gate -- they Oor 1 z c o re the individuals vho po so on o person's credentials to enter the area vhere the missiles ore situated three guv rda vho Y € 2 0 there ure three air policemen per ohi ft - - - - - ------ -CEQRE'll DoE 6 z o ' i REPROCIOC D AT lHE HATIOflAI ARCHIVES C ET - 9 patrol on foot inside the fenceo and around the missileo -- one mo n per missile Theoe interior gunrdo are supplemented by tw men vho patrol the exterior perimeter at night 'llith dogs Y The interior o re the men vho nre Oote 6 c ' expected to guard the mioaile and varhead The tlaitcd ste tco custodian ve were again reminded is not a guard He is a cll8todiai agent whose reeponsibil ity in to keep the varheo d under surveillance It 'IIOuld seem therefore that the concept that custody requires tha t control of access to the veapons be mnintained to that extent that it 'IIOuld talte an ac 't of force to obtain either weapons or information cone the veapono 'Without proper authority Y apparently is nov con 3trued to mean that sanething in the nature of a t echnical aooault 'llithout battery io aufficient to oatisfy the ••act of force criterion Actually at the launch positions it is ipossible for tlaited Ste tea personnel to go in access themselves to the w rheado 'llithout o ffirmat ive action on the part · vho are to have cha e of and t oe b z o operate the equip ncnt for lovering the missile to the ground 2 - · - ' · therefore 1t wuld be imWithout C ll€ 'Z o possible to evacuate or destroy the w rheads In other wrds Un itcd Stotes custody of the Jupiter ve rheads is essentially symbolic The initial Justice characterization of thio particular o rrangement as Joint custody seems Justified It certainly io difficult to Justify characterizing i as exclusive oe ve did ·1n our aide memoire to the Soviets about two years ago The United Stateo has an emergency evacuation plan It Do J1 z J c wuld hovever take forty- five hours · before all of the varbeads could be demo tea and airborne assuming enough cargo · Doe 6 V c aircraft could be sent from other parto of the theatre · lf ere ii rc iio-doga avniTafil e yet i or L P Ta-Nos - q ii n - - - - - - - - - - g See exchange of correspondence between Chairman M L C and Chairman A E c Feb 24 1958 and Apr 4 1958 'JI The only warheads at the IAunc h Positions are only the missiles no spares arc kept there ______ SEGRE'll- Rl PROOIJCl O I T l E NATIOUI AflQOVES SEGRET - 10 - • •• • Destruction of wnrheada in an emergency 'IIOuld llith r t he cooperation hourn to complete · Dec 0 2 c J • • • • • • • • ' • • l • • With quick de-erect equipment auch as is present llith the Thorn in the United Kingdom and is nov being produced for the Jupiters theoe evacun tion e nd deotruct timea could be reduced subste ntia lly The emount of reduction vould depend on hov IDMY of these nev sets are furnished each site Apparently the evacuation time could then be cut to around tventy-four hours and the destruct time to about l½ houro provided additional trained personnel were made available Deotruction of the wnrheade could be accompliahed in about that ollllle time opon nov by blasting the missile off its stand and then blasting the wnrhead Y While there seema to be enough demolition equipment on the opot to permit this there is not enough trained manpover on the spot at preoent to do the Job that quick1y With helicopters at their disposal however the demolition te8 IIIB could improve upon current time estimates There are tw other quick methods to prevent launch One is to · puncture the lllissile llith srnalJ arms fire -- this llill releaoe the tuel The other ir to ·damage e g vith a grenade the launching equipment in the van or the van conto 1n1ng the bulk of the electronic equipment While preventing an ·unauthorized launch neither of theee methods wuld prevent the wnrheads from falJ1ng into unauthorized hands only the l aunching von is manned As previounly noted the United States officer holds the launch ini'ti ation key ' ' - - - _ - hao the combination to a safe wherein is lie talcea that key out only upon receipt of an '- kept a launch firing key authenticated firing order from SHAPE With re pect to the launching keys Defenee has not rejected the possibility of WJing a combination lock instead of the launch key in the hands of the United States officer While a combination system wuld pose one more obotacle to be overcome a determined unauthorized user could still once the United States officer van out of the vo y eventually get at the electric circuit connection o nd launch this mioeile This hovever wuld require additional time lf Thfs-is not expect a -to produce a nuclear aefuno 'tion7 ECRE'l' --- -- - - - - - - - - - PROOUCEO AT Tt E NATIONAl AAClilVES S E C I E T- - 11 - It should be noted hovever that since the launching van is shielded by a bloat protection bunker from the missiles it is difficult for the United States vn l lcing cuatodian to Jceep that area under surv 1J J BD e ao well as the -vnrheadG It io evident hove that the Air Force oyatem placea more rel innce on the United Staten officer in the van tbo n the vn Lking cwstodian ince it iB considering removing the lotter but not the former In that connection it ia my undervtanding that the electronic device 1md er ccmaideratiot1 for mtch l ng the llllrheo d wou ld not aosiat 1n vntching the to r Lting meehauitau l oco ted at the bottom of the mics ile and 1n ·the othe-r vcm Both of the iie hovevcr have see lo and are checked periodically Moreov r it io Doc 1 2 doubtful that they could rc · arget The target ting cal eulationa are perfonn' d by a ape ia i ate ff of United State 5 officeris e t SHAPE ao preaumably no one elee know hov to program into the miosile different specific targets Thia is a 811 f'eguard that i« not present in 'the other two types of delivery syst 4 The situation vlth respect ' ' ' ' eaoentially the same The only variations stem from the fact as noted above that the CPc 1 1 lo ' were waiting for their first crews In summary the security oyetem at the launch positions aeemo well co lculo ted to prevent any unauthorized access or une except pursuant to a deliberate national plan by the Wiler forces or the loc l components in the event of un interne L revol t nut theoe missiles would probably be of no value in a r internal conflict Ginee no one on ·the epot vould knov hov to program l n loca I t ' 11 getu F11J l h' ' t1J1t•r Comm 1der is planning t ce o 2 c on hnv l ug avn ll11li le 1·0 r - the indefinite f 'tUre a United Staten Combat Support Group 01' 'Jlle 300-1« 0 The utility of such o gr-oup in the ev' Ilt of trouble ' ' pa rt1cul arly oince tre nspo tation to l oe b 2 o J the 11ite11 it'I t1Uch n Vite l element aud there did not e p ' ar to be q_uick air tranupor-to l lon ror zmr h a for cc o vnilnble I C tdrcruft is e l w y15 avnil e ble and thic force ls coo posed o-f pt ratroopg 1n the lJ11111r diate vlcinity then it could be a pote nt J a Ll y u sefu 1 ise feguo rd • I •• • • ' communicatiom t ·t o head utorage aren tiituated the Command Poot with DOE' f 2 0 SHAPE Jupiter missile trainin arena md the atomic var ' • • • •• • ' ' • ' SEClll ' ------ REPROOUCEO AT THE tlATIONAL ARC 1V S G E CR B-'11- - 12 In the storage area are the concrete igloos end the 'll'Capons mainte nance shops The area is a special area - l b 2 L 1 J · • ' ' · · but is set oft by tvo perimeter cyclone · f ences as a United States only area to vhich United Staten personnel control access ' ' f # 0-2 0 There e re normally inside this 'll'Capon maintenance and igloo a rea do enter the area for occasional ground-keeping ' Ork and vhen driving the vehicles to transport veapono But they enter only vith a United States escort The exterior of this fenced area is patrolled llho are accompanied by dogs at night · t oE 1 '2 o ' ere is no plan for bock-up storage of Jupiter varheada The storage igl ooa in this area are intended to be used for storing venpons for the United States aircraft units the Air Force expects to assign to - ·· - ·1 - · · · ·· · De1f f 2lc When it is necessary to move a Jupiter vurhead betveeri this storage o nd maintenance area and a Launch Position e g wen a nev arhead arrives or vhen maintenance is necessary the varhcad is moved is hovever a United States custodial agent vith ench varhead The c0111111unication techniques are a a teletype and high frequency receiver for back-up In addition the United States unit nt the Dase has a single-side band radio to CINCEUR to be replaced by the Tropo SY Jtcm for purposes of communicating on release of' the veapons In turn there io both voice Md radio communications from the Base Command Poat to the Launch Position means that even if the most direct route of communications betveen the CP o nd nn LP io deotroyed there is an alte- roo te line nvnilable There are of couroe more missiles and thus more Launch Positions Here the distance from CP to I P's varies from three miles to fitt ·-tvo mile21 SEC ll'Ji'T ' YJc 1 2 c REPRODUCED AT THE NATIOW 1 ARCHIVES - ---- - --SEORET- - 13 the Uaited States cWJtodieJ b SE t 2 4 responsibilities The United States air policeman patrolli ng at the IAUi leh Position io to monitor the ext ernal and intern al eccurity provided 'llho arc· both inside and outside tbc area o J€ b 2 c If the policcmnn detects something out of order he ie to use passive racano since he is only t hc cyeo and co rs of the 1Ja1tcd States Launch Authentication Officer in the vnn the individual on the United States aide 'llho is supposed to maintain custody of the varhcads for the Ulitcd States The United Sta tee o ir policeman ID8 y UBe hia 'lleapon only for his peroonal protection The United States briefing officers here explicitly ncknovlcdged that thie C114tod1al arrangement vaa 1n ID8 rked contraat to the igloo otorage and maintenance area at the main base vherc the United States maintains internal sccUrity -- even though varhcads are ro rcly there and vhen they are there ia nothing to launch them In other vord s the safeguards on the United States side against 1 Ulc ere the ve8kcst vherc the danger io the greatest There arc no blast rcve'bnent otoragc of any kind One 1 lll1tcd States officer here acknovledgcd that the •Uni ted Stateo air policemen for the most part regard their type of duty a11 an undesirable as11ignment The men do not get much experience to help their careers as o ir policemen They are on duty at the aites for tw days and off four days But one out of the four goes for tro ining and the average travel time for them from home to the LP is hours each vay 3½ the primer cord at Oo-cJb•'l ' the secon 15tage separat on point detonated during o n inapection and the top portion oft he missile containing the w rhead van nudged off its ocu t ing a bit The opcculation o t the time ms that a short in the •viring of that mi15isile due to moioture vas the moot likely co uoe of the incident I1' the top portion had been budged ground '111th o fa ix chance of the impact in the w rhcad vhich in turn might have damage or further explosions in the LOX containing HE more it could have toppled to the producing an exploeion of the IE bo d sufficient force to cause equipment or other itcm15 t here SEGPFT ------ ftEPRODU«O AT THE NATK NAl AACHV£5 SESRE'i' - 14 - If aomeone vas bent on disabling o Jupiter there 11eClll8 little question that it '1 0uld not be too difficult since their skins are punctur- d ' able by rine fire for cx11111ple b 2 1 0 J is 1n a relatively fl at area and the adjacent fields and olive groves are '1 0rked regularly practically up to the IJ ' per1llleter fence The anticipated qUick de-erect equip11ent v1l l not reduce th111 time appreciably since the necessary demating teams can vork only three of the ten sites simul taneoualy because there is only enough equipment for transporting nine varheo d s o t a time back to the airbase · In t hat connectiOll ve vere ndvised · _ •· ' - _ ' · ' that the present 11ecurity arrnnsemcnte r eflect an ev al uation of the varioun riska involved based on 11 Rand vtudy of the subject vhich apparently included an aose511111ent of alJ of the political factors involved -SECRET REPROOUCEO AT TH NATIONAL ARCHIVES SE0RE' P ------ - 15 2 Manned Aircraft There are over 1 000 Cerman Air Force b 2 - G A F baoe that hal I a nucl eo r capability At preeent the units here have · F-8J •s armed vith the MC-7 a gun-t ype vcapon llith a sepnh ble nuc1ear capsule Tb peroonnel v l ll however begin tra1n1ng 1n F-104 1 e vbich v 1ll carry the MK-28 a eeal ed pit weapon 1n October of thie year The actual change-over from 84•s to lo4 1 11 i6 expected to take place around March 1963 There in also a squadron here vith a conventional capability The Urlted states unit halS eight of'fieere and forty-eight onlioted men non of vhan are guard s With fe l exceptions ouch aa the S A s area access to f'acillties on the Base is controlled by G A F perconnel much like the arrangement at the J lpiter baaen · Comparable to the misr iile IAunch Poaitions io the Quick Reaction Alert area Q R A vhich contains the aircro ft· anned vith bombs ready to go vithin fifteen minutes That this is a G A F controlled ro ther than a United States area was evident from the fact that ve vere told that our group's authorization to enter the Q R A had cane through to the German Ba 11e r aurn nil er from h111 German superiors only the day before our arrival vc vould not have been able to ente ' the Q R A will be four tvo planets on each an al ert statue Without that action In JuJ y· there ty This area is fe nced off' and the entry y ia gwu-ded by G A F personnel Who examine credential is ll lld decide 'll'ho mo y go in Inside the fence iri a mneJJ building or ahack for housing the Q R A personnel pilots guardzl and other persOllilel On the United States aide there is on officer on duty 1n the building vhich also containe the co111111unicationo for reoching·the Cornrn nil Poot S E C J E 'J - -- -- - € t • o- 2 REPROOUCEO AT THE NATIONAi AAOIVES s x c r ---e--r ----- 16 There is one United Stn tes cUDtodian 11th each plane sheltered 1n sort of an open ended igloo The c Ultodisli 'IIUB armed vi the pistol Pro cticol ly oloogoide tho United Sto tcm cuetodiEl l is o G A F guard armed v i th the Nl1' 0 IW chine piotol The United Stu tea cu atodil ll at the Q R A · ve -were told is to wse his pistol only to defend his life or plll'outmt to e request tr0111 the G A F On the pave1 1ent a round each plo ne 111 p3 inted e circle know u the no-lone-zone much like the free-thro l circle on a bwetJ ol l court No individuol io supposed to go inside ·t iat c rclc al one A buddy system DIUllt be follovcd '11hercby a pe -r ion IIIU 5t alw Y11 be accompanied by someone vith t CO llpare lble level of l Ucletir knovledge This eyetem vaa deoi sned to guard n gn1na1' unintended errors Jeopardizing safety as Tell o s to gun rd against una utllol·ized tampering lli t h th 'I Capon • Although thia syatem en orig1ooJ1y conc lived envisaged tw lJDited Staten per21onnel keeping check oo ea ch othe 1 is nov fulfilled in · operations· auch as G A F guard watch the l c € ' 2 0 J United Ste tea cwstodian Thia gives e01 1e idea hov intimately Allied personnel have become associated vith the veapona · of The igloo or storage a reo ia actually located off t he main be •e It ia about l½ mile11 to the main ge te and about 3 4 mile to the cloacat bane fence Thi11 United States e reo is located 'Wit hin c German conventional munitions storage area Hence' it is noce1111ary to pass through the Gcrma n controlled area to get into or out of the Uilited Statca storo ge area • A single United Ste tea cu stodit t1 controls acce11a 11 t the ga te to this area Hie ''buddy ia 11uppoaed to be a German trannlator vho · rl·th him in the gate house but it appeared that that German had not been instructed thet he '1111 B responsible for asBUI ing tha t even an American did not go into an igloo alone Thie 11toro go site i ll aituated 1n a very woded e nd hilly e re of poor visibility All of the 1glooo cannot be uatched from the gate bouee although those vhich had nuclear 1118 terie l in them at t he time of our visit could be oeen from that epot -S-E e R ll i ' REPROOUCED ATTJ-ia NATIONAL AROUVES SES REX - 17 The igloo doors bcve 'h -o locks e key 111 held by the United State cw todian Oll duty nt the tc the 0th er by the M I ll1Qil on duty Each igloo ho u an al u '111 e tem llhich ri lgt1 at the gate house and can be ohut off there Hence the local ' lrl tcd States personnel recognized the need to o rraJl6e to have the el am ring con·t rolled elaevhere if' the prQeeent cueitodio 1 system ii to be maintained The custodian at the gate pullt on eight-hour tour He is reapons1ble for wtching the gate lie i J not a patroller When something appears out of order he ia to call the oeven-mm G-- rmo n Sabotage Alert Team located JU8t outside the g11 te Th is Team mu at be eocorted into the e rea by the United States night CJ 'JIIJl'Diler a id it takes aeven minutes for him to get to tho orea · There are both radio and te1ephone communications i'ro'll t he gi1te house to the main baee T'ae c1 U1todi11n is required ·to check in every thirty minutes Local civl liana vho enter the ot oroge for maintCIIG llce purpo ca a re escorted by United States peraonne1 c nd ore reqUircd to be cleared by the local police The perimeter of tbiu s A s area is p trolle d during the daytime by four German guards vith NJ TO ma chine pistols At night there are tm -man patrols plus three Ger civilian guard patrolJ1ng vith their dogs About 9 Y of the c A F giuird force here is corr poaed of draftees vho a re earmarked for this duty upon entering the service These Ycapona guard nbout 300 1 1en bo ve a Tool cbeot cl ea ranee Thio require• five yeara red dence in West ·Germnny no clo se rela tiowi in the Eo et a police check and good mpral character It talteo about 4-6 months to complete this c1earcmce A USAF£ representative characterize'1 this clear8 llce as one roughly equi vaJ ent to our National Agency check Originally these pereonnel were to o'bt41D e stage 2 or German National Secret clenrcmce but by agree1Ue11t betwcm the reapect1vc serv i ce11 the criteria rere reviecd eillce it was t8lting about tvo years to clear one of these guar • The G A F pilot8 staff offic ra and 1 oading crev hovevcr ore required to have e ot age l cleo ranc'q vhicb involveo a full backgroU11d invest igation including a check of t he United States French and United Kingdom central recoi'ds This takes nbout tvo yearo to complete The time is expected to be shortened oomevbat since the G A F h ao recently estnbli11hed 11 central f'ile operation SEGRE'P - l 8·- 6 The United States •--· • · - ·• •1 • r · - - · __ - · certification on the O A F personnel given e ot Age clearance They o not get anything on the others With re11pect to the radiogr e pill' problem c were adv 1 aed that ea ch convoy of vco pona about once a veek fr the S A s area to the Q R A area ia monitored and 1 hAt once cc ch D1011th t '1cre ie o Gveep of all vital area11 unit Thie WOrk is carried out by the two E O D men aaaigued to this The reoult s thur ft1r have been negative The re1U1on f'or the frequent movcm ni of lleapona is the need to svitch the alert eJ rcn tt frequently oo tbat they can flow and the neceasary naint ce perfomed oc Since the S A S are ia loca ted off the llU 1n base it is necessary to have a f'ull -fledged convoy o ero·c ion to movo the venpone to and from the Q R A area e«t ch time it ia neceol tl l Y to change clert aircro ft Each Jeep 1n the ccnvoy h is radio com mrui- titionl ' rlth the base And the G A F gua rchl have been deputized vi th civil ie n police authority so that they cen stop· all tro ffic at the public road interi ectiona betveen the base and the otorage area The German gw rd force wrko on a tl enty-day cycle They have ten days on guard duty including the time spent as part of the back-up J orce six d a ys of' trair ing and four deye on paas tw 'Weekends or their equivalent Thia back-up · · -· ' ' ifty men free or other duties -- i b e g 1n barracks or eating vho mwst be able to reapond to a call for l o soiotance at the s A S or Q R A o reru within tventy Ddnutca The nearest Atl@llentation Force i1' of brigade- trength located at local civilians to be reocrves for emergency oitua tiona vben considerable o ddi tional manp01rer may be ncce11oary There hao been very little evidence of any adverse political climate in the area · The over-all level of politicu activity of' any kind 111 very lov end there 111 ho rdly any evidence of any Communist activity '3E8REg t 1 c AEPR00UCEO AT1Hf NA'fl0NAL AACHJVES ------ 19 Some ban the bomb palilphlets were circulated about 11 tx month11 ago but there ho 11 not been e ny uch activity £1nce en t he other hand the general are hes e number of popular veekend resort t-ovns ao on lleekcnda these area a a re 'ill of atrangers For eve cun tion the G A F • uuat be relied on to i'urnich a J 1 tran11port4tion renourceo -- vebd clc s driver11 and guo r For an airborne evacuation it wuld telce three hourll to get e 11 the veaponz to the point of loading them on a il·crn ft With C-130 1 ll o 11 the varhead a couJ d be gotten airborne in another hour This four-bom• period could be reduced if the weapons vere moved v l thout taking time to put them in their shipping containers There are of course The Url ted Sta tea unit 6 2 there ho no organic aircraft of its ow nor cloee it ba ve any pilots 'I ho could fly out the F-84 1 0 The mc ot e 'G edit f ou s procedure vould be to fly out the oepnrable nuc1eer capsuleJ'l of the t pe of vca pons prc eently stored there This could probably be done in tllo hours and -would not degrede the theatre's capability since USAFE hu a b ck-up 11upply of the non nuclear portion of the ll'eo poi All of this aairumez a kind of threat for vhich the United States unit could expect ful l G A F cooperation Age in bovever some of our e13cort11 exp rcased aoubt ·about the practicality of an evacuation plen in v1ev of the m1nimnJ airlift capacity that would be avail able in any real crines 1n the light of prenent USAFE resources Under the deotruct plnn for the lteapons in 11torage pre-cut primer cord and 3haped charges are stored in one of the non-nuclear igloos ready for use Based on test runs it wuld take about fifty-five minutes to complete t he J ob Thia however could probably be done v l thout attracting much if any 11 ttention For the veaponu on the Q R A aircraft the unit cnv lsageo puncturing the aircraft glL8 tank o nd putting in a fuse train to deatroy the bomb by fire Present thinking doea not call for any G A F pnrticipation in actuoJ destruction but coordination io envisaged so that the G A F pcroonne1 wuld have an opportunity to Vithdrs v to a safe distance REPROOUCED AT 1Hf NAOONM AACtlYES - ----- 20 For tbe interchanging of the e la rt o ircrui't the Qcrmcn11 11t11 tion a seven- al ert team cround the pu·cl vhe -c the weapons are attached aiid detached Wllile that is talcing plaee hovever the Gcrmnne ·look avay The Germ uli cl no l'e not aupposed to ho vc Qlly idea of Ybat the irui l ju ' on the veo pon is or hov it io perfo nned Thia particulr-r action io pe -formed by United States personnel behind a ecreen 11 Once the plane is on the Q R A pad it ie reedy to go Nothing furtiler needo to be done on the bomb other than for the pilot to perform final o rming action in the air IJDder the Air Force ' a HUman Reliability Progru ii tlio men have had their accese authori%ations vithdravn One 'WtlB a cryptography man vi th unanticipated family proble1J111 and t he other w a a cuotodian who ne i-egerded as e · sbaky character Co€ b -Z The principo l diffcrencer are that the permanent facility has the double cyclone perimeter f ences vhereas the temporary ho a only concertino barbed lire al though very effective looking and leo3 desirable quarters for the alert crew o t the p d • At both of' those bases the permanent S A S area has been constructed al though it should be noted on Ooe t errain that gave ·poor vis ibility and the woda vere not cleared one hundred feet from the outer fence as is normally required by the SHAPE standardo governing theee inotallationa patrolling at night outside the f'ence 11th dogs if dogs are not available a pair of two-mnn te1111111 vil1 p atrol the exterior of the nrea at night Aleo insi de v l ll be four United States cuotodimie one for ea ch aircraft pad he discussion on thia nopect gave the definite impression tba t the terminology IJ been chosen vith delibera tion vith a vielT to meeting user country w1itical sensitivit y 0 E O R E 'l' ---- - 1 2 a • REPIIOOUCEO AT THE H TIONAL ARCHIVES SBORE-T - 21 - the veapona 1n the igloos The unit v s in the procwa of ord cr ll lg more to teke care of the ue pons o t the Q R A oreit on a one for one ba isia All thoae mt terials are to be kept a t the 3 A ' c reA none • Ould be 11 t the Q R A eren • • • J • • •• ' ' • • • • • ' • • I • • ' • • • • · • • • •• • • • ' - • · • · • · • • ·- · • in the Holifield report about the lungw ge barrier problem Ex ecutive agency vitneaftea hadprevioualy taken the position bef01•e the Camnittee that it WIJ l lufficient to rtly 011 giving allied unita courses iD English n ld 011 the fnct Ellgl ish is becoming the interna tional lenguage or the air Evidently ho1 -ever a 11 ied unita are taking meaaurea· of their ovn to meet the longuagc problem And in fact ve found that 1 recent Tbe1Ltre directive required U Uted sto te custodio l unito to be given t raining in their a1111ociatea' language u part of their mandatory training program during duty boura _· · _· ·_ - · · · · _ _·· _ · · · _· r · _· · · · _ • period for the aircraft It might not be poasible to do the Job in that time out on the Q R A pnd at night or in bad veather The F-84 ho-in ver is not rm all-veather aircraf't In thia connection diocuasion b efore the Joint Committee early in capaulee wuld be kept sep rated until the United States decioion ill time of criais to release the veapono had been made See Attncbmmlt 2 • 1958 had generated the impreasio11 that these nuclear •• • REPROOUCEO AT THE NATIONAi ARCHIVES SBCRET - 22 - 3 Army ve pona ayi tema · The survey grou1 vizsited NATO unite 1ith the Honest John and eight-inch hovitzer atomic vespon eyatems We did not viait my nuclear ND E units Theae veapons syeteroe vere not Dl1 tcd When they 1U·e deployed on field mar cuvcra tra in ing or conventiont l head J i compo ny the delivery vehicle Nucl ear wrbcncu have tbu11 te r ren i d 1n atorage In the caae of the Jlrmy unita therefore our Visit a zsurvey of the storuge facilities v u limit ed to Of the three install a tiona visited by the m-iter vere much l11te the S A $ area at th Air Force baaes That 111 they vere located 11 f thin the regul iu- bl le 01 the supported force but 11et off by cyclone fencing 11 5 o n exclueively lbitcd Sta teis controlled mren The immediate exterior lla8 po trolled by 'lllil'd J from the user country 111 force In contrast to the Bituation at the Air Force facilitioa United Stlitea personnel at tbeoe Jlrmy facilities re regarded as responoiblc for guar ling the vcapona ve vere infomed that the United Statezs interior zsecurity gu rdtt verc ·auppoaed to use their veapons to prevent Dlauthorized acceoa to the veapons On the other hand i rUJy custodial personnel vere reqUired to i ve only a Secret clearance vherea s a Top Secret clearance is reqUired by the Air Force And it m 11 not un 14U l to find that it bad been neceasuy to give interim Secret clear cmcea because the man ho d o rrivcd vithout the clearance proceee completed or etllrtcd 1n sane cases SECRB'l' ------ REPROOOC£0 AT THE NATlOWJ ARCHIVES SEeRE'P- - 23 Timely clellJ · r t' cen l o· o problem in both scrvice11 Nei thei· on ha a separate i 1os or clo ooif i ce tion for cuetodial personnel The eata bliabmcnt of one 'll'Ould be one vr y of overc0141 ng tm t1 problcm Another notevorthy dif1'crence iG that the 1 r ny does not require E O D men to be with theoc Ullita 11t doeo the Air Force The Army 11ettle11 for having m m trained in diearm techniq_ue In oocne cases hovever E O D men o re near by e s is the ca oe 11 t the 3BTAF site 'llb ich can ca ll on ten· E O D • men 'llho I I'e eisht miles a twenty-minute drive ' aw y nuclear capa bili ty since the have not been r uthorized t o receive the necea riry Rcotricted Data Ars long as they lmov how to hnndle the conventional w rhea d t hey could h11 11dle o nucloo r w rhe111d i ucl udillg niating The Re i'tricted Data iis oigni t'icant only becauoe the firing tableG for the tcmic 'ln1rhe d unit are different thll ll those for the conventional wrhead unit atomic tables illvol Restricted Do to · The targett lltg of the user country forces From aircr i't rather th fixed the Oer couutry forces do missiles would therefore be hendled by the that stt nd O ir t tbe le llliaoiles are like cuumcd tu-get oystcms such a6 the Jupitcrs for 11bich not have a gottiug capability With respect to deployment the preoent plan is not to deploy these syetema in mated form beyond the geographicnl point vhere United Statei personnel vould Mvc direct communica tione vith CINCEUR until after R-hour authorization to rele e the wrhea do for use hao b een received from CINCEUR Furthermore preoent pl o n11 call for retention of the firing plug in United Statea ha ndo until that time And if t he warheads s bo lld be 111Ated before that time the r llied unit -would have to turn over to the Uait ed state8 cuotodial unit the closure end igniter plugo f'rOlll the rocket booster the nelT boo1Ster doea not ha ve a eepar blc clo11ure plug so the pl11 11 is to have the closure a ppcrture locked l n an open poaition vi th the key retained by Ua1t ed St teo personnel · Since the fac111tiee ·o r for the upport of user country f or cen e nd th lS more like the aforcnot ed Air Force fo cilitiea than that at SETAF it secme vortb reviewing briefly the more oign U'icant a specto of tho6e opcration11 ·· ·· · · · situated inaidc o World Wu II large German ftDIIJlUJlition storage area It is c mouflaged uo vcll tho tit wa one of the fev not spot t ed until it ws overrun Since the fae ility however docs not meet current criteria for nuclear storage units it 1a too wooded for example several hundred thousand dollars iei zcheduled to be apent to build o nev p ermo nent facility · • ' ' ------ ·S E 9 RE 'P - · REPROOUCEO AT THE NATIONAi ARCHIVES -e E 'CR B P - 2 - - The vas recently con stn1cted and meets NATO criterie Doc ZL '-l United Stnte s r adre is compoaccl of three off coro Do' 1 21 and thirty-five enlisted recu et o re three officero forty- c 6 1 0 three enl iated men end three ciVilian re die operA-tora At ·both inatillations one of the three officers is nlwaya on duty he is either 1n the orderly room or et the S A S area· U1 1wal y tho officera pull three day shifts Both of the llrea6 nre aituo ted vitbin r- IGer country base and hence it is neceasary to paai tln•o11 $h o reas controlled by 'U l · country forcev vhen going to or frOlll the S A s arec These s 1 s u eu • ao elsewhere are under United States control vlth the entrb nee gi tes llllmned by United Statea personnc1 ' f'ou cuatodia na ini ide the fCllce •t 11 l l tilllci 'l'IIO llIUISt al ways be l Nke and on poBt They have r direct telephone linr back to their orderly room 001d are checked every f'iftecn minutes • R£cli c CODllllunications manned by the rman force Qt-e vs i table outaide th6 fe lce The Germans bn e e l x guardzl outoide the fl lll ce Phoneo run from cc ch poot to their guard ho ee · md each guard Ls required to report every thirty minutes on a 1' 1 -minutc otaggcred interw J oo the t every five minutes one guard ill cheeking i l The ie gua rda l'J l'c supple mented vith dogs md trip vircs 11 t ni ht Each nuclear 11torage bunker ha A tvo locl r one of vhich ii •11 combination lock Thio helps to insure the preaence of t ro men both united Staten The bunker ia not to be opened 'Witbout u officer vithin the fenced area Furthermore the firing plug i o kept in• a spe ia l combination safe were United State· s cumod1ue1 a re al' 'ay11 prer cnt These men wr - - ·-·· least v1sib111ty are on duty in ide the fence at all times 1 1 t ts outside the fence there a re al'l ll ys at - Fo lr more are dded at t l meo of poor Y e- 6•'2 l All of the Dutch personnel 11 t lc 11 ot oome sort of· ye 1 o secu rity check The guelfd peroonncl mWJt h11 ve a NATO Coltl'identiu clear 111ce and the delivery unit pereonnel a re required to be Ye a N Secret clea r 111cc Evacuation be o ccompliahed 1n o lx ut tvo boure ' Vitll uaer nti tion t osi11tance Ooe 6-2 l It vould take a bout o lY hours hovever ___ ___ 6-£CRE P-- REPROO JC-EO ATTtE UATlONM ARCHIVES SECRET- - 25 to get the veapons on their vay out of the country t f z tc estimate is that it vould take four hours to get everything on t he road to a uaable airfield located about one hour avay - • ' • • ' • ' ' I Deotruction via an electrical YJltem DoE b -i o already set up could be accompliahed '11 th traited Ste tea personnel only in about tvcnty minutea estimated at tventy-five minutes c p e- 6 'L '- but this echedule requires more pereonncl than the O D and tvo custodians on duty at the s A S area la As indicated earlier the An4y does not requ1re i uuy-que lti'ied E O D men to be etationed with these custodial units They settle for men qualified to disarm backed up by E O M sevhere in the general area 'hovever is six hour• ave y Some of O €ib lo 1 those in the group v1th t echnico l competence indicated concern about this kind of arrangement the t1£dted States units regarded the ot zlo United Ste tea cuatodius inside the S A S area as genuine guards 'Who had authority to use physical force and their weapons if necesa y in dealillg '11 th anyone vho 11tatis to take action not authorized by the United States At both facilities ve vere advised that a Hilman SUitabllity program na in effect It did not a ppear hovever that i t vaa as systematic or t horough as the one Air Force briefero described to ua a a being pursued in Air Force units Discussions at USAFE During our stay in Weisbaden some of' the group met vith Lt General Illness Deputy c rncUSAFE There vaa a dieCUBsion in general terms of' our survey to that point General Alness indicated that in the near future we vere likely to be faced vith even more difficult problems qoncerning security of these veapons since there V3B a dire ' ced to achieve greater disper• al of Air Force resources particularly the Q R A aircraft He gave the impression that aquadrons wuld be broken up and dispersed one or tw at a time to isolated makeshift airstrips The vriter stated tba t vhile it wuld appear that many of our unita vere highly vul nera ble in the event of sudden all-out strike by the Soviets the current t b1nk1ng in Washington v1u1 that the c mm na and control over our currently dispersed nucleo r re11ources ve s already too attenuated General Ab ess said he w o O ' lll I'e of this vielT CEElPET v • Ra'RO t C£O AT THE NATIONAi ARCHIVES SDCRE'f ------ - 26 Deb -iefing 1 t EUC_E -¼ · I The rer u ne of the Dep 3 rtment of D fenne-Atom 1 c Enci·gy Co nmiaaion members 1niticu vie'ITD a cs hl lldlcd pr1 ily by 11 r D2k of the AEC He indicated thl'l t tho ie uho h ui v ici tcd unito i 'bout a yeiu- eei •lier - re e fe voro bly iJnpreeoed with the progress tlmt had been made in improving the sitll-' t1on the personnel llllllaglng the progr11111 for the services 1U1d gcnero l ly the peraonnel in the field On the other h12nd he indic ted there 1-n I concc ' l about certun 11 11pect such lt lJ the 81ngle custod11111J1 indi vidu e l 11 being 111igned to cuatodial unite uuclenrcd the need for ·bettcr d atruct techniques 11nd the dif f'crencea bcween the l'TD Y and Air Force a a to t ic ne d for o Secret vn a Top Secret clea ra ice Mr Dk also stated that o t leut the AEC members wore concerned about the philosophy underlying the cuatodiu 1 11 role l 4 X't1cularly at the Air Force units Mr Jcmec d the witer the Stiltc observers both indicated i ppreciation for the opportunity to b ve firat-h d information tbo t ve vere glad to i cc the lMgu ngc trl 1ning proe rome now in e ffect for the United States personnel nnd thn t it 'lnlS encoursging to ace vila t appeared to be excellent working rele tio1111hips b ct veen the t'ious United states units and the othar NP TO force ·they vcre·cup porting The vriter a loo indic11 ted that the i ctutl custodial arrarigcmento in certun uitua tioXlll vere rather different tlla n ha d heretofore been understood nnd tbe t this ma y be of ZOlllC aignifiCQllCC to the Deportment Conclusion Anide from the point3 noted e t the outtiet the f'olloving wuld seem to merit conoidern tion 1 The need for 11 quick deotruct ca pa bility 'llhich Ullited States personnel could carry out unilo tero l ly and un obtrunively 'Would seem vitcl to aoirure the reliability of the pnuae concept -- ---- -- - ------ - - - --------- ---------- Mr Jemes EUR RPA prep ired o nd a opect h110 circula t ed o dcto iled report on thin -S -E -g -R E- -T- ilEPROOUCEO AT lHC UATIOr'-'L ARCHIVES - 27 2 'l'he Ait •Force cui todinl arrongcmento for ted aynteu111 oeem to be better dc91gnei to leter nttewpto to obts n veapono i formation by tbe oupported force as veil oa other all ieo thnn to prevent unauthorized use by such forcE s Ye·t unauthorized eei ure or wie of the veapono 'l 'Ould pose much mere dire consequences for u a The 111 in r1ok e o I see it 1s premature but deliberate seizure or uoc o-J the 'UCllpon by the oupported force in the face of o serious East -Wcst crisio in vbich there migbt not be complete agreement with tbe other o Uy on bov to dea l Vith the· oituo tion If ve nre concerned about commnnd and control of United States unito I should thi Dk ve voul d be a1l the more concerned about tbeoe eituatione invol ving foreign unite 3 As a min mlllJI I vould think tbe t 't l ens-t un•l il the vnr1ous permissive li Dko o rc insta1led ve 'Would wnnt the 't' t-'orc11 cuotodinns to be genUine guards not juet S ll lbolo 'I bat the au-craft should have some dev l ce under United Stci tea exel u iv control preventing tokeof ' that plano and temporary devices for quick destruction of Jupiter consoles and the aircraft be vorked out urgently 4 We might consider ilnving all custodial unitA r eporting on a regular schedule to o nother unit in much the oame manner that the personnel on otation report in 5 I should think 1t vould be c very wefu l adjunct to our educntionaJ progr to have NATO country Foreign Ministers ond Defense J liniotero vi it Air Force inotaJ le tioos to oee and appreciate ho· 1 reody their un1 to s re to go o nd hov little they need be concerned obout 'Whether they could effectively order those units into action 1£ they f elt t ho tit vao neceooary for them to go Thie might dampen any drive for even more exotic o rrangemento 6 If t he Q R A oyntem for llircrnft malceo oense and it IOUld oecm to if the mo t ing of misoileo is 'IIU lTllnted 1t uould seem tho t ve should so nrm ao mnny planes as possible not just tvo or four per base Of course f'our pl llues per F-100 or F-lOli- oquadron mn y be o JJ high no ve con go bearing in mind ma 1nteno nce nnd training needs oince on the average ve cnn count on having oa ly about 01 lcty-five percent of the eigbteen planeG in nn F-loli squadron twenty- five in tbe cnse of the F-84 ready to go lllld oome of these have to be available for flight vithout the veapon 7 Ia order for us to ore ue thut the mated weapons oyotClll l are de loyctl otrictly in accord 11th the letter of the ori gina l ·mderst anding on Cl Ultody and control it seema necesoa ry to have the mated aircraft and rnissileo set aside 1n a United States only o rea vhere the United States controlled aeceoo o nd maintllined at lea at an interior guard o peration ao is still the case at the Army s A s areao In that connection it ohould be remembered that SECRET REPROOVCEO AT THE HAT ARCKV'EG ·SECRET - 28 the Executive in 1958 Juot11'icd its propoool for omendmenta to Section 9l c in po rt on the ground tho tit ould cno ble us to mo te the veo pona oysteruo and only keep lllder United States guard the actuo l nucleo r portion of the wrheo d But the Congreoo did not give UG ol l the authority ve requcoted So ve bo ve n situo tion vhere in a oenoe IC seem to be going beyond vlui t ve indicated to the Congress ve 'IIOuld do Wlder requested authority it refused to give See Attncb Glent 2 8 The standards vhich ve have set for o NATO mult114tera J force notably the requirement for mixed lllo ll lins could mi limizc and perhnpo even obviate the risko present in current e rre lgements The posoibility of applying s0111e fonn of the m L ed rnenning concept to the exiot ing typeo of deployment might therefore be -worth consider rt voUld seem qUite feasible at lee st from a purely op it1_ al stand' Oint to utilize for example Germon peroomel r it- he R A or J'upite r L P for the German oites etc This reciprocal c npect of sucb an arrangement -which· eJ1m1nat ed the uoe of n country's force guarding it lclf oo to s1 ieak 111 ight make this politicc lly as veil no militarily fenoible --SBeRB'P ------ REPnOOUCEO AT THE N TK HAL ARCHIVES ATrACHMENT l Itinerary 1962 April 9 Briefi11g Headquarters EUCOM 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21-22 23 24 25 Debriefing Headquarters EUCOM · REPROOVCt' O AT THE NATION ARCHIVES -C B O R B -- Attachment 2 D cerpto f rom ocr1pt of Executive Session Hee ring of the Joint Committee on At0lll1c Energy Januo ry 31 1958 Afternoon · At I'nge 2l1 At Pe geo 24 and 25 At Page 29 General Loper Thnt iB right We n re opeaking culy of the old typco in lh1ch the nuclear ce poule io completely separabl e Our purpooe 1o to reduce the requircme12t z •••• on the nu nbero of united Ste tea troops that are required to mainte 1 n custodv or this material o nd to - it · · ··- ' Mr Quarles ••••• If you did not tranof'er the nonnuclear 5'o and 7'o to let us say Britioh cuotody then lfC wuld have to have not only custodians for the nuclesro but ' l vould a loo ho veto ho ve the much greater l1IIIOUJl t of cUGtody md maintenance for the nonnuclear elcmenta of the 5 ' i and 7 1 11 General Loper ••••• OUr purpoae i l tranoferring the non-nuclear po rte in addition to the se vi ng of our ow personnel for -the custodiru arrangements and for the mo inteno nce of theoe Cnpono 1o to enable them to handle t hem and to loo d them into their aircraft into their missiles ho ve them all ready to go llith one exception This exception is the nuclear component llhich we hold in our poosession o nd custody and vbich io not delivered to them until authorized by the Preoident under bis Constitutional authority -6--i3-e-R-E-'l - --- - - NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu Read related article The U S Nuclear Presence in Western Europe 1954-1962 Part II 2020-09-17