r - j - 6p-'a 3 T s m ·1 _ J V 4 - - - II A I f f-1 B - -sc _r REFO T BI T U AD nOC Co r IITTEc consisting of Ov 1111c klU - A- -6olh j J JA 6 Lieut General H R Har i on USA i Brig General J K Rice USA · Rea - J dmiral T B f ill USN Colonel H 1ioK Roper USA Colonel if L Kennedy USA _' ' Capta inG 'f Anderson Jr USN fto the JOI HT CHI3F3 O STAFF on Ei ALUATION OF EFFECT ON SOVI ST WA q Et' YORT RSSULTING a01I THE ST AT G l C AIS OFFENSDi' S References a J C S 1844 32 b J C S 1974 J C S 1952 Series ci J c s 1953 c THE PROBLID l 1 To evaluate-the effect on the war effort of the U S S R of the Strategic Air Offensive contemplated in current war plans including an appraisal of the psychological effects of atomic bombing on the Soviet will to -rage war Enclosure to J C S 1953 FACTS B SARDJG ON T fZ PRoBI 1 2 General TROJAN J G S 1844 32 is the currently effective war plan bei n g used by the United States for plannii g purposes J Soecific The plan for the strategic air offensive in support of TROJAN eontemplates t· ro distinct phases • A initial phase consisting of a series of attacks primarily with atomic bombs on 70 target areas presantly planned by the Strategic Air Co nraand to be acconplished in approx ilnately 30 days b A second phase consisting of a continuation of the ir itial attacks ·with both atomic and conventional weapons 4 This evaluation is based u on the initial phase of the air offensive here Pter refBrrer l to in this report as 11 t he initial a tome offer S i 7eu - -- - - l ' t lJj -- - - rr - n · L U ' j - -- -- -- - ''- ' • v- 71 'm 1jvl' J J4 5 a The co 1du ct of the irUti l atom• offer- si te as plal nad by the Strategic Air Co 'll and vd 11 result in placing on target the full number of bombs specified in J C S 19 4 The chances-of success of delivery of this atomic ofte_ 1 si re a c spac fic3 ll t e ar ipt from this ·probl m b Bombing accuracy as repr sented in a 3000 f eet ci -cular arror probab 7 ity CSP-3000 1 n ill ob ain 6 a Evaluation of intelligence is a responsibility of the Joi t L telligence C0n1rrdttee4 b The estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions contained in ABAI 5 of Soviet economic strength and industrial position made by the Central L tell igence Agency and of target information by the Air tntelligence Division are appropr iate bases upon which to proceed with this evaluation see Discussion DISCUSSION • See Enclosure 11 B11 • CONCLUSIONS 8 It is conciuded that complete and successful execution of the initial atomic offensive against the U S S R • as planned would probably affect the war effort and produce psychological effects upon the Soviet will to wage war as set forth below Should it be planned or concluded in related studies that a lesser or greater number of atomic bor abs would actually be delivered on targets that different basic conditions would prevail or tl -iat ix1telligence as to the level a nd distribution of So riet L ldustry has changed substantially a re- evaluation would be necessary EFFECT ON INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY 9 Physical damage to installations perso1u el casualties concentrated in industrial communities and other direct or i ndh•ect cur 'lulativ-3 effects would result in a 30 to 40 percent reduction of -- - Underli 1 d for e 1· -hasi n·v1 D l t l r n o -•m •-11' A 1 l -- -·- - --- - _ _ - --' - - f • • J __ · _ _ •-- l 70P S CrGT Soviet - nciustrial capacity 'I'his loss would not be permanent and could either be alleviated by Soviet recuperative action or augmented dependi lg upon the ·weight and effectiveness_ of· follow-up attacks 10 Of outstandi g iruportance is the prcspect that tha petroleum industry in the U S S R would suffer severe darn age especially in refini 'lg capacity The supply of high test av i ation gasoli r1e would become rapidly critical PEP SONNE I Ct SU LTIES The n ti al atomic offensive could produce as ma71y as 11 2 700 000 mortalities and 4 000 000 additional casualties depending upon the effectiveness of Soviet passive defense measures A_large number of homes would be destroyed and the problems of living for the rernainder of the 28 000 000 people in tne 70 target cities would be vastly complicated PSYCHOLOGICAL EJ ECTS 12 The atomic offensive would not per se bri 71g about capitulation destroy the roots of Conmunism or critically weaken the power of Soviet leadership to dominate the people 13 o Fo the majority of Soviet people atomic bombir1g would validate Soviet propaganda against foreign powers stimulate resentment against the United States u_riify these people and increase· their w' ll to fight Among an indetem inate minority atomic boi ibing might stimulate dissidence and the hope of relief from oppression Unless and until vastly more favorable opportunities develop for them the i '1fluence of these elements will not appreciably affect the Soviet war effort 14 A psychological crisis will be created within the U s s R which could be turned to advantage by the Allies t hrough early and effective exploitation by armed forces and psychological warfare Pail- i r1g pro npt a d effective exp J-oitation the opportunity would be lost and subsequent Soviet psyc ological reactions would adversely affect the accomplishment of Allied oojecti7eso 3 • r •rT J r1 1 __ _ J • 15 The capability of Soviet armed forces to advance rapidly into selected areas of ·f est3rn Europe the r Iiddle East and Far East would not be seriously i r rpaired but capabilities thereafter would progressively dil ri n ish c ue to the follo· ri ng fact ors The supply of petroleum products of all types will a rapidly becorJe c itical to all branches of Soviet armed f'orces resulting i '1 1 Greatly reducing the mobility of the Army 2 Reduci -ri g t he scale of operations by the Soviet Navy and merchant shipping although submarine warfare would probably be unaffected 3 Seriously reducing air operations involv L 11 g traini lg transport support of ground and naval forces and independent offensiYe action although proper allocation of fuel ' ould a llo t continu-ad operations by air defense forces NOTE The point at which capabilities of Soviet armed fore as would diJninish to a critical degree would depend upon many variable or unpredictable factors most iruportant of which is the level of stockpiles prevailing a t the initiation of hostilities b After consumption of initial stocks of basic equipment and consumable supplies -p rogressive shortages of a v ide variety of items particularly aircraft would handicap operations and affect 1corale of the a -r- ned forces c Logistic support would be handicapped due to disruption of planning i pa r ment of controls dam age to industry and inter- ference vr i th transportation 16 The Soviet Eigh Comruand wo'lld be forcad quicl d y to re-estllllate their strate ic pos ition and made iruportant dacisions raga ding ·opArational plans under difficult circumstances They would proba b ly · - •- · _ vV p -1 d ict v hat s p ciiic dacisio11s 1'iould b8 lade - - - _ _ __ ' U - • -- - -·· Po ' - ' '1 J U J · i --- -r- ' - '- TOP SEC ET 17 Atomic bombing would open the field an set the pattern for all adversaries t o use any ·weapons of mass destruc t i on and result L l maxi mwn -etaliatory measures within Soyi et capabilitieso G6N- ' rU L 18 Atocic b ombing 11 ill produce certai n psychological and retaliatory reactions detr i Jaental to the a chieveIBent of Allied war objectives and its destructive effects will complicate post-hostilities problems However _ the atomj_c bomb would be a major element of Allied military strength in any war_with the U S S R and would constitute the only means of rapidly inflicting shock and serious damage to vital elements of the Soviet war- making capacity In particular an early atomic offens ive will facilitate greatly the appl ication of other Allied military power with prospect of greatly lowered casualties ·Full exploitation of the advantages to be obtained is dependent upon the adequacy and promptness of associated military and psychological I opera ions I From the standpoint of our national security the advantages of its ·early_use would be transcendiP g be devoted to provid L g the mear1s F ery reasonable effort should to be prepared for prompt and effective delivery of the maximum numbers of atomic bombs to appropriate target systems RECQi- V BNDATIONS · 19 It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff a kpprove the foregoing concltisionsff b Forward th e memorandwn in Enclosure 11 A11 to the Secretary of Defense 5 • r _ I ' - - - - - -- - - · - - ' -- _ · _ ci - -1 1 D ' I' • Ln RE'I' ·•w ·n i ijx RSP0RT BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE TO THE JOINT CHIEFS - OFSTAF i O ''EVALUATION OF EFFECT ON SOVIET WAR EF ORl' J $U TTNG FROM THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE Enclosure A B Appendix A Enclosure Annex Draft of Memorandum to the Secretaxy of Defense The Di scussion U S Plans Bomb Allocation for Initial Atomic Offensive RESTRICTED DATA Appendix B Basis of Evaluation Appendix c Methods of Analysis Appendix D Discussion of Intelligence Appendix E The Soviet Military Pos i tion Annex A Stockpile s and Expenditures of Essential War Materials by the U S S R Tab Stockpiles of Raw Materi als Annex B Soviet Industrial Position Appendix F Appendix G Annex Appendix Passive Defense Measures Discussion of Da mage Effect of the Different Atomic Bombs as to Blast Fire Radiological Damage Tabl es RESTRICTED DATA H'' Annex Method of Target Selection and Determination of Aiming Points Report of Weaver Board on Method of Target Selection and Determination of Aiming Points Tab Appendix ic I Determination of Material Damage and Personnel Casualties Annex A Petroleum Annex B Soviet Steel Industry u s s R Tab A Known Tab Bir Estimated Production u aer TROJAA Program A-Bombs JCS 19531 Steel Plants 1 - i - V' -- -u··d Enclosure B Appendix I Conb 1 • ' 11 Annex C Chemicals Tab A Known U S S R Tetraethyl Lead and Concentrated Hydrogen Peroxide Plants Tab B Known Soda Ash Plants U S S R Tab C Known U S S R Synthetic Ammonia Pl ants Tab D Known u s s R Synthetic Rubber Plants Annex D Tab Annex Annex Soviet Aircraft Industry Including AircrB f t Engines Soviet Aviation Industry E Tab Machine Tools Known U S S R Machine Tool Plants llpll Electric Power - U S S R Tab A'' Electric Generat ing Facil ities Structurally Damaged in Plan TROJAN Tab B U S S R Electric Power Plants Tab C U S S R Electric PoweT Grids and I s olated Power Plants Tab D Size Distribution of u s s R Electric Power Plants Tab E Electric Power Grids Annex G Rail Transportation Tap A Vulnerability of Railroad Equipment and Facilities to Damage by Atomic Attack Tab S Vulnerability of u s s R Rail Transk rtation Facilities Under A- Bomb Attacks Tab C vulnerability of u s s R Ra l Transportation Facilities er A- Bomb At tacks Annex IIH Appendix J Appendix K Enclosure '1i Synthetic Rubber 11 c1t Un Determination of Damage to Soviet Industry and Populat ion Losses on a n Area Basia An A raisal of the Ps ' cholo ica Effects of Atomic om 1Jng Upon the Soviet Will to Wage War I Effect of the Initial Atooic Offens ive Agains t t he q S S R Upon the Sovie t Armed Forces · Selected Data AssembleJ for the Harmon Committee- ofi the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the ICentI'll 1 Int elligence Agency j Si R i J CS 1953 1 - ii - Repcodoa d lrom the Undasslroed Ded3'Sif ed Holdings ol lhc National Aldii os • TOP SECRET TOP SECRET ENCLOSURE 11A II DR-AFT MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE In accordance with the request of the Secretary of Defense dated 25 October 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have had a joint evaluation made of the effect on the Soviet war 1 1ffort of the initial atomic offensive contemplated in current war plans This evaluation includes an appraisal of the effect of atomic bombing on the Soviet will to age war The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in general with the conclusions as stated by the Ad Hoc Committee in paragraphs 8 through 18 of the attached report With respect to paragraph 9 of these conclusions the target systems for the initial atomic offensive have been carefully selected to insure that certain vital ' industrial elements receive maximum damage The ·30 to 40 per cent reduction cited is a valid measure of damage to over-all Soviet industrial cape city Ho rever certain target s-ystems selected for attack such as the petroleum industry would receive appreciably greater damage Furthermore this magnitude of the destruction and the brief time span in ·which it occurs should retard Soviet recuperative action to an indeterminate but considerable extent As for the Psychological Effects referred to in paragraphs 12 13 and 14 the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that sucll te actions are not susceptible to a firm evaluati on These con- clusions while probably the best estimate generated to date i 1I should be regarded as informed opinions on a n admitted y abstruse and co n troversial matter lfl0 P 5El OflE'f' JCS 1953 1 - 9 - Enclo ure A Page revised by Decision On - 28 July 1949 ·1 TOP SECRtf Reprodvred from lhe Unciass 'icd Declassilled Holdings of lhe Nallooal rtlwes TOP SECRET With reference to paragraph 17 the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that this conclusion has validity however they consider that such mass destruction weapons as are available to the UBSR would be used to achieve their objective s regardless of an Y action on our part With reference to the fi11st sentence of paragraph 18 the Joint Chlefs of Staff desire t9 point out that all means of warfare invol ve destruction in varying d egrees and that the objective during wartime of al armed forces is the destruction of some part or another of the · enemy's resourc_es These conclu- sions therefore while applic ble to atomic bombing are also to so lle degree applicabl e to aJl forms of warfare It is v be noted that the attached evaluation has been predj ted upon successful deli very of the initial atomic rfensive The chances of success of delivery of the air offensive are being examined separately Upon completion of that study it is the intention of the Joint Chlefs of Staff to re - evaluate these conclusions in the light of estimates as to the percentage of bombs considered most 11 ely to be delivered to selected targets 'l'OP SEGREi' JCS 1953 1 - 9a - Encll sure A - Page added by Decision On - 28 July 1949 TOP SECRET ROj rod ° from 11 o Uno1'3$$i11ed 'Oeclassiried Holdings of Ille Nafiooal An hiveS -· lr - - - ' - · Ji • _'_ j 11 B 11 ENCLOSURE DISCUSSION 1 U S Plans The Joint Outline War Plan TROJAN has be-en accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for planning purpose to p ovide a basis for developing the initia1 operations of U S ahd Allied forces in the event that war has been forced upon the United States by acts of S ggression by the U S· S R and or her satellites during the f'iscal year 1949 The over-all strategic concept of t hat plan provides among other operations Initially to launch a powerful air offensive designed to exploit the destructive and psychological pbwer of atomic weapons against An the vi ta l elements of t he Soviet wa·r -making capacity _ • _ • Annex to this plan and supporting 'plans of the Strategic Air Command U S A ir Force provide for launching an initial atomic offensive from available bases against selected targets in u s s R seventy urban areas of the a a soon as practicable It is planned to follow up the initi l atomic attacks with coni tinuing air offensives utilizing 9onventional bombs and mines ig ' i addition to atomic weapons Pert hent details of the foregoing plans are set fbrth in Appendix 2 Basis for Evaluation A 11 to this Enclosure In order to evaluate the effect of the initial atomic offensive on the u s s R it is firs t neces- sary to establish an acceptable basis upon which results can be measured The problem may be divided into thNie parts a An evaluation of ma t erial d l lllage and personne l casualties b An appraisal of p3ych9logical ef fects ' c The application of the foregoing to the mifita ry capabilities of the u s s R in the light of conflicting war I li obje ctives of the U S and the U S S R 'i'ef r Cfffi JCS 1953 1 - 10 - Enc osure 1 B Reprod cx d from lhe Unclass ed I Dedassme Holdings ol lhe Na IOOal Arthi w - The first involves o nalj it and determination of expected material damage to industry th p dspective number and concen- tration of casualties and amo g what categories of p ople these ' casualties will occur From such examination deductions can be made concerning the ef'fects of'· all of this upon the provision of · necessary equipment and cons ble supplies to the armed forces and for a minimum civilian economy The second involves an appraisal of the psychological effect of the atomic bombing upon the government the people and the armed for es--particularly Yi th regard to the -effects that it may have upon control attitudes and will to fight or to support warfare The third involves eonsi9-eration of the ext e nt to which the atomic bombing will affect oviet military capabilities and influence strategy in the ligh-t of estimated Soviet aims in opposition to Allied wa r obje ctives Underlyj ng the exa minatiqn is the prevailing recognition that the air offensive is but part albeit important of the whole or military psychologiC I J l political and economic operations tba •t will be required tq defeat the lJ S S R For details in respect to the Ba sis of Eva_J uation see Appendix B to this Enclosure 3 Method of Analysis a In or der to approach a solution to the problem it was necessary to examine critically broad and specific matters of intelligence regarding the u s s estimates of soviet capabilities and intentions and U S plans particularly those for the initial atomic offensiv Examina ion was made of targets of the methods and data being _used in the selection I I and aiming points While chances of success of jdelivery und evaluation of intelligence were specifically exeiµpt from this I study it was necessary to consid er pertinen mo t ter principally for purposes of obtaining backgrou nd ft rm tion I JCS 1953 1 - 11 - Enclosure B I • I I I Rcproduec J lroo Ille Unclassified I Decia ssifred Holcf ngs or the National Alchi es ' - _ -· _ - Consider£ble tinle and effc#t were devoted to the acquisition f of information r garding Soviet stockpiles industrial es tablishments and public utilities Target maps and objective data were examined to detennine insofar as practicable the installations tog ltber with their productive capacities which would be liable to destruction and the probabilities of obtaining such destruction b In appraising t he effect of bombing on the Soviet will to wage wa r the Connnittee digestetl a great deal of written ma terial on the historical development characterists traits and reactions of the people or tbe u s s R eviewed psycho- logical studies and interviewed many individuals whose positions or e -perience qualified them to give evidence or to express opinions bearing on the problem By appraising the sub- stance and merit of the evidence the Connni ttee was able to express an 11 infonned '1 opinion on an admittedly abstruse and controversial suoject For details of the method and sources consulted see Appendix 4 Intelligence or analysis c to this Enclosure The Connnittee noted that the task of· asses- sing the adequacy and validity of intelligence related to this problem is properly the responsibility of the Joint Intelligence Committee However the validity of any evaluation of the e f- fects of the initial atomic offensive on the Soviet people and their war effort is in -large measure dependent upon the supporting intelligence Append ix D to this Enclosure contains comments on intelligence ma tt rs made solely for the purpose of describing the extent and de il to which it was possible to proceed in solving the proble n md the extent to whi ch 1 t is practicable at this time to derive valid conclusions QP BGRE'i' JCS 1953 1 - 12 - I closure B i eprodl OO l lrom lho Unclassified I Oeciassifieo licild of lhe tla tional Archives - 'p T - - --- J · ' •- i J 5 The Soviet Military Posit ion a The strategic intenti ons of the Soviet Union in the event of' a war between Anglo-American powers and tb e U S S R in 1949 are estimated in ABAI 5 to include as early ob j ectives SeizuJ e of the Middle East and its oil resources destruction of all forces of the Allies on t he Eurasian land mass se-izure or neu tra liza t ion of those areas from which the Western Powers might swiftly and effectively strike at the U S S R neutralization or seizure of the United Kingdom expansion and consolidation of posi_tions in China _Manchuria nd Korea disruption of all ied war ma king capacity by subversion and sabotage disruption of vital allied lines of communication by aggressive submari e warfare mining and air operations and accomplishment of diversionary attacks in Allied-held territory for the purpose of causing maldeployment of A 1lied forces ABAI Detail s of this· estimate a re set forth in 5 and significant phasing is summarized in Appendix E to this Enclosure An important qualification relative to the phasing of Soviet offensive operations is quo ted from ABAI 5 Although tbe United States and the United Kingdom may employ weapons of mass destruction the Joint Intelligence Committee have not been informed of the timing sc ale and effectiveness of possible Allied attacks using these veapons In weighing Soviet capabilities it baa been impossible therefore to assess the effect of the use of these weapons on the Soviet Union However it is emphasized that employment of them could be expected to affect the progress of Soviet campaigns The heaviest commitments and expend1tures of ¥-1 itary sup- plies--for Soviet ground forces would be from D to i bout D 90 and might then be markedly reduced provided the U s -s R overrun Western Europe 1 Italy except i 1I· has by then Sicily ·_scaridinavia I IP0P SECrtlll'f' TCS 1953 1 - 13 - Enclosure B Reprodua 4 from 11 o Unclassiied I o c d Holdings of ll1c Natiooal Archives • r ' J ·i 1 Turkey except the Alexandr t'ta area the Middle Ea st except for the Palestine Jordan Valley a nd Suez areas _ and the Far East However heavy drain on U S S R • resources will continue even prior to the development of an Allied surface of'fensive f'or normal s pport of large ground forces on extended fronts to meet combat requirements at points of contact and in internal areas to consolidate positions and cope with underground movements Continuing demands also will be placed on Soviet air and naval forces to cope w th the increasing tempo of Allied attacks as well as for Soviet offensives by these services In particu- lar air operations in the defense of the U S S R offensives against the United Kingdom or at long range against the United States and operations in support of ground force will require continuing supply of petroleum roduc ts replacement airc ooft engines and equipment spare parts and nmnitions Soviet sub- marine operations while requiring relati vely small quantities of fuel will necessitate re-supply of torpedoes engine parts and electronic equipment e s well as new craft to sustain the tempo of widesp 0ad operations Elaborate training programs will be require d for ull services with attendant demands on fuel and equipment As fronts ure extended requirements for transporta- tion both within and beyond borders of the u s s R will increase to a degree depending upon the scope and tempo of operations b Stockpiles Reliable inf'ormation on the level and location of Soviet stockpiles of military suppl i es is limited However it has been estimated ABAI 5 and CIA that adequate supplies of tanks guns small arms rum nmition vehicles and food ould be on band to support in r easonable measure the I ini tia l Soviet opera tlons to accomplish their initial objec • ti ves evident In basic equipment for ground forces no shortll ges are I It has been estimated that substantial uanti ties of aircraft are maintained in ope at iono l uni ts aid in storage The available stockpile of petroleum produc s s r onsldered eor SEGRE'l JCS 1953 1 1 - 14 - 11 En4Iosure B 11 reduce the impact on vital elecents ot their 1-ra r- ki_'lg cspacicy MOJ Y passive derense measures could be imple ented quickly - - _ -__ · i • -Enclosure B'' 'r J POP BEORE4' c Underground constructioa has been provided in a number of cases for important command posts coinmunication centers and some emphasis has be n placed on such construction for fortifications supply depots and critical indust rial establishments Aircraft hangers and command posts are known to exist underground at some of the important air rorce i nstallations d Location of' supply dumps a nd stoch -piles on which in- f'ormation is l1m1ted follows a logical pattern for the support of the armed forces consistent with transportation facilities available and with evidence of dispersion 1x reduce vulnerability from a l l types of attack e Substantial accomplishment of measures specifically de- signed to minimize materia l damage or provide shelters for the urban population as a whole from atomic attack is not yet in evidence in the u s s R 7 Destructive Effect of Weapons The damage to be expected from each of the types of weapons to be employed in the initial atomic offensive is set forth in detail in Appe11dix G to this Enclosure This data was compiled from reports of the At omic Energy Commission of author itative sources on the various atomic explosions that have taken place up to the present time and the pertinent reports of the U S Strategic Bombing Survey The estimated areas of given overpressures f or each type of bomb and the overpressures required for Class 11 A11 damage to various type2 of s true tures is contained in the Res tr1c ted Do ta Annex t o Appendi X G to this Enclosure Major casualties to personnel and collateral devastation by f'ire should on the average but varyi ng as to local conditions a pproxima te the area of tur al damage s true- Radiological effects are well within the se areas Significant is the fact that the atomic bomb is a weapon particularly e ffective against built-up populated areas such s cities Toot which renders a building or installation uns itable for intended use unt l major reconstruction is accomplished OP SEGRB'P- JCS 1953 1 - 16 - Enclosur e B11 11 ReprQdV e i fJQm lhe Um lassifioo I Declassified HokliO JS ol tho Nafional Archires that if us-ed against selected isolated targets of limited size although it might be effective against the target itself much of its destructive effect may be unused 8 Target Selection and Determination of Aiming Points Responsibility for target analysis determination of strategic vulnerability and recommendations in regard to aiming points on selected objectives is vested in the Air Intelligence Division of the Air Force Details of the methods and principl-es involved are set forth in Appendix 11 H11 to this Enclosure The Committee determined with th advice of a panel of mathematicians selected by the Chai rmen of the Research and Development Board that the computations and methods are formally correct this panel is set forth in Appendix The report of H tci this Enclosure 9 Determination of' Material Damage and Personnel Casualties It was originally planned that the evaluation of effect of the ini t i al atomic offensive on the Soviet wa-r· effort would be based fundamentally on an exact analysis of a significant portion of the facilities likely to be damaged by each bomb compared with available productive capacity in each industry and contrasted with stockpiles expenditures Bnd requ1rements revealed that l ack Investi gation of up-to-date basic information on a suf- ficient number of vital industrial complexes and progress in target analysis on the bullc of installations in most of the Soviet cities which would be attacked together with other unknown or variable factors precluded a solution along such lines at this time The following approaches were adopted as alterna- tives a An exam ina tion of seven specially selected systems on which available information and analysis data indicated the feasibility of determining on them the effeots of the initial atomic offensive These systems are · Petroleum stee l air- craft synthetic rubber and inorganic chemicals 'Jli'achine tool 4'0P SEOllifi' JCS 1953 1 - 17 - Enclosure B achieved The probubil ty i-8 ctor 70% was derived from the assumed verage error in bo - ng1 _ lth dis tan of th targe t ins tall- i tion from the predicted er plos on p int o f'the • - ·-•- '· -' bomb 1 s bla st boab and the estil in ted - · - ' ' ' i _ T _ 2r i tt1t 1 ' ' '° - _- -- ·i_ 't ••' · · b ombs · i -fJ Sinc ' Bi - ' a ttf ft •is e large ·var1a tf t · the product cap i ty of' the · ' t'••v --- - - - -· - _· i · - · · • T • -· · · • · i nstallations te ken under- attack t otal damage to industrial ··· • - ' - • -•• • • ••' • •• ' '-j • - • I • J • · _ r i· p roduction will ' ne·ces'sartly v cy-widely- -ii the ·b si'f •- · _ 0 - • • · •• ' y _- _ - • • •• i- ' ·• i r- • -• ' · ❖• 1-i 1 •• H'' ° • of th - per- ' ' · - · _ _ - - i t take of h·t _J - a ir in fui 1 al · i i - tik tJ zr rt · r t P P e t f - _ · a -c count · - · - i ½ _ i- · - - j · - · _ - · - ' 1 l - r_ 1 _ i forma nce or-· ind ividual ·bombs · -Although·- t may- be possible to - _ _ - ' · • • • • • • _- • • • -ii' • ali 'a' ti o · · _ ' · • •• • ' • - - · • s ·• ·-• ff • · • ' _' ' 0 ar y - _ ft - f ' - ' - - · method ·o t ·e ssessing it' e fter e LrboI ibs·' e re asswned -to · have been · ······· ' w ' ii 'l fi1 itrii¾1 i J iii 13 ¥ $ i l F-1 ' 0 1 -- - fE _ · - ' ' ¥j f f fj t r J1I f lfli 0 · t s ' · _·· _- _' t '1 1 i D - _c o us_ oi_iS-c 0 1- these_ _13 t di s extracted £ro_ r i - ·• -- - - t - - ift t - -· t 1 Jit i i 1 r ❖ - • ✓ 1r · r t tAm en d i x - - · I to · '-this•· Enclo mre ' •-are · _ _ ' _ '· · · · - · i - i - c _ 1 - i ✓ -t - • - _ · J ' Su cessftil execut on o f • the ini tial'· atomlc of' fensive as · ' •· -'·- · · · _ - • -' -· a -Resul tr in ac - 0% ci- - be t ter probability of' Class-4 d'ariia ge · t · o ' 1 % -t ' f s ' thr ugi o -• - ' ' •- •• ' or • - - '- _ o· -- · _• ref1ning--- 1 •-•• l '• · -- - • •t J f•-• •• · - ·-' --· ·-'' · · b ·- Result in a · 70% or be tter proba b1lity of' Class ·A· damage - u ··•f- 0 - · · •· · ·- -- - _ f - ' ' rf•· J • - -' ' i · 'ltl _ • r - ·-· ·l f 4r - - 2 ta 'i'I '0o% of the u s s R'l tRi s 1 09 t n e a- gas ref'1 1i g - P 8 - Y- ii iJ -11 ' •r - · · • ··- - - -s -·•· - ·t '·' •i - • f' J if - - - • - -z- _ '--' • -- ' r·_- '' - ' -· ·• fo _· - 1- _£ ' 'Result in a striu g_en t' reducti_o_ i·· in _-tbe s ppl r f · _ _- ¥- t f f-l - l' f r- Yi - - - j· ·ft ·- -ift 1 t1r tt J it t · · - 1 1 t · ·· • - - • · -- l i ¼ - · · i r t e iietro-Ieuin produc ts to 'the Sov let armed forces and in ' 'l O ' -·' · •· ·· - - · t - -· ' _ · · · ···· ·· t -· ft•i t· · • - ' • • - -_ ' 7 - 0 · J ' ' - · T • · - Mi · respond 1rig·' reduc tion·'· in rof ei a 11· Sti'viet _ military- capability ·J· t · - -··· 2 1 - · ' - - - ·- ' rr· - _ -v _ · - · · · · · - · · ·_ · i' _ _ -- d ' Result · in a ·'criti_cal' ' shortage ·of high octane -aviation ·'· ' ' ' - · - - r ·--·· - - ·· i f f - · t _· - • -• -- · • · ' · •1 •·- --- - - _ ·· - i - -- - • · - - - I 0 · • • ' · - ' i'•- ' t'- ·_ · · · ' •-- i - i- 1 The e shortages · etrc eum products for the Soviet armed forces becomes critical will depend largely uuon the l e vels of POL stockpiles prevailing at the initiation of hos tili tics and the ef'ficiency- wi th which the · u s S R is able to exploit r emaining refinery capacity including that fo synthetic fuels OP ' s acRE JCS 1953 1 - - 19 - Enclosure B 11 f £i1 i i r -- · •- ' · -- · gasoline· vith ' L ·correspond 1ng '_reductior i in the · combat eff'ec• _ • 4 _ •• • _ • _ • j - r_ - _ t't • • - '_ •• ' _ -v• • tiveness · of the-• ·Sov1et air f'orce • -NOTE i $1 Rqmx uceo from Illa Uncia sified I llcdassir od Holdn J ' ot the Nallonal Archives D• • - 0 - t - TOP SECRET •I 2 The Soviet oil refining industry appears to constitute a most lucrative target and serious consideration should be given to making it the primary •Objective with either atomic or conventional bombs of the initial atomic offensive STEEL 1 The successful execution of the initial ae planned has a 7et c atomic orfensive or better probability of reducing the pro- ductive capacity or raw steel in the Soviet Union py 45 5% or approximately 7-1 4 million tons per year leaving a reme ining capacity of about 10-3 4 million tons per year pending restoration of damage or augmentation from other sources 2 An indetenninate but substantial portion of Soviet steel processing facilities would be destroyed or damaged This would adversely affect capabilities to restore damage both in the steel industry and other industries and would result 1n directly reducing tl1e output of war m i terials 3 Damage inflicted would be serious but the effect on the war effort would be pr i Mo rily of a long-range nature in creating shortages of 1·1r i hod ·110 1• na tsria ls Given time much or tbe damaged produciwg end processing mc chinery can be salvaged repaired or restored to operations 4 Partial relief of steel shortages should be possible from satellite countries and conquered areas but time in excess or one year will be required to exploit substantially such sources SYNTHETIC RUBBER 1 During the first year of war the Soviet war effort will not be critically affected by t he dllJllage to the synthetic rubber industry caused by the initial atomic offensive Although there 1s a 70% or better probability of Class A damage to 57% of synthetic rubber capacity the civilian economy should be able to absorb such shortages as may elCist • ' POP S 60RE'f' JCS 1953 1 - 20 - Enclosure 11 B Reprocucod from Ille Unclossillod I Dcofasslliod Holding cl Ille National Altiiivc TOP SECRET ·I 2 During tbe second and succeeding years of war shortages would become critical and would be reflected in decreased mobility of the Soviet armed forces and in the civilian economy unless damaged facilities are restored or replaced by conversions AIRCRAFT AND AIRCRAFT ENGINES l Successful execution of the a'tOmic offensive as planned would result in a 70' or better probabil1 ty of' Class A damage to 5% of Soviet aircraft assembly capacity and to 68 3% of aircraft engine capacity In addition indetenninate· damage of a serious nature would be inflicted on sources for production of aviation equiPll ent a nd accessories 2 Damage to the two known plants producing long-range bombers would progressively reduce Soviet capability for long-range air bombardment With the reductipn in flow of replacement aircraft and engines to operational units and for training the U S S R will be forced to reduce progressively air power for independent cooperative o nd supporting operations 3 Coupled with the shortage of aviation gasoline the reduced production of aircraft will force extreme selectivity in air operations and constitute a serious deficiency in Soviet military capabilities MACHINE TOOLS 1 Neither the ll llchine tool industry nor inventory stocks provide appropriate targets of themselves for inclusion as primo ry targets in the initial atomic offensive 2 Successful execution of the initial atomic offensive as planned will - Provide 70' or better probability of Class A damage to 23 9% of the plants of the ma chine-tool industry E • Effect considerable but an indeterminate amoill1 t of destruction or damage to me chine tools either instal ed or stocked incidental to the destruction of i ndu tr 'jl pl nts to which they pertain S OP SEGRM JCS 1953 1 - 21 - Enclos ure B 11 Reproduced from the Unaa slrcl Oeela$sif ed Holdl gs of b'le Naliollal Atd1ives r •'- A · -· 7- f t' - -r-_- _ i t · y • ' • - t tJ ' • • - ·1 i1i i t••tt fi ii f • ••i • • • 2 'J c • I _z •• -'5- J o· i esU r t· o --the inftial · a tomic ·o rfensNe against 70 urban area s rm - t - _ - · -_ _ i ¥ t 9 t ·t j• '_- · · · ' -- -·- r - · - _ I S J ' t·i · ' i t · · ·__ _ ' be liml ted in· sc o pe• •·and gene 'a lly- suscept tbl -to rapiiT·repc T_r- by -- - i · · t i i L · · • ±t f1 i±f 11 IZt tt t will b inf' ctfa' _-on control i'acil tie and rolling stock that ey be located u lder i n marshalling and classification - yards in areas attack • - -_ -'i' 'J - OECR T JCS 1953 1 ' ' ' - - _· ·' - ' Rell Odua d from Oie Undzssite J Oeclassirl d Hcldi gs of lhe National Arthives planned · would - Result in dl l lll l g e to Soy Let urben arees es L'ldic ted in -· the following te ble · _ · - ' • ' ' t Enclosure B · ·· · i ·1 Reproclucod from lhe Uncla$$iliod I Ocdas mod·Holdings al Ille Notiof alAlthiY POP SEGRB l' Damage Depending Upon Type of Structure Minimum Lbs sq in Overp r-es ure Approxima te Sqhe re Milos of Soviet Urban Areas Destroyed or Damaged Approxilna te Percentage of Total Soviet Urban Areas 50 000 or Greater Des troyro or Damaged Destroyed to Heavy Damage 8 320 13 Destroyed to Medium Damage 6 460 19 Destroyed to Light Damage 5 650 27 Destroyed to Superficial Damage 11 840 35 1_ Be liable to inflict Class A Damage on about 20 - 30 per c e nt of the SoVl et industrial establishment as a -Whole • £• Produce as ma ny as 2 700 000 mortalities 4 000 000 additional casualties destroy a large number of homes and vastly complicate the problems of living for the remainder of the 28 000 000 people in t he 70 target cities depending on tbe effectiveness of Soviet passive defense measures _g Based upon the Soviet industry as it is known at the present time the following table indicates the approximate damage of the initial atomic offensive likely to be inflicted for various percentages of the numbers of atomic bombs contemplated in TROJAN which might actually be delivered on targets These percentages were derived from precise calcula- tions rounded off in the light of the many variable and unknown f0 ctors -'roP l EG RE4' JCS 1953 1 - 24 - Enciosure 11 8 11 Reprnduced om lhe Vnclasslr I Oeclassified Hoklillg ol tho National Aftll --ifl D ·· - ' U'lol • 0 l I • f ' ••• • KNL O ---- rfOF DEORB'f 22 20% DAMAGE 100% 15% 80 160 240 320 115 230 345 460 165 325 490 650 210 420 630 840 6 i 9 15 20 27 12 20 26 35 1500 2000 2250 3000 3000 1 000 APPROXIMATE Per'centage of TROJAN Bombs Actualll Delivered to Targets A • S UARE MILES OF SOVIET URBAN AREAS DESTRO'YED OR DAMAGED l Destroyed to Heavy Damage 8 # sq in overpressure 2 Destroyed to Medium Damage 6 # sq in Overpressure 3 Destroyed to Light Damage 5 lf sq in overpressure 4 Destroyed to Superficial Damage 4 # sq in overpressure B CORRESPONDING PER CENT OF TOTAL URBAN AREAS DAMAGED AIID PROBABLE EXTENT TO WHICH INDUSTRY AS A WHOLE rs AFFECTED 1 Destroyed to Heavy Damage 2 Heavy to Medium Damage 3 Heavy to Light Damage 4 Heavy to Superficial Damage 3 5 7 9 C OORRESPotIDING PERSONNEL CASUALTIES In Thousands Mortalities 2 Addi tiona-1 Personnel Casualties 750 1000 10 CUMULATIVE EFFECTS The wide distribution of damage on urban areas throughout the U S S R with associated shock con fusion and casualties to personnel as well as the rat_e at which damage and casual ties are inflicted Will have an additional cumulative effect on industry essential to the Soviet war effort Although aiming points are selected primarily -to focus the damage on specific industries and industrial concentrations it is inevitable that actual damage Vill be indiscriminate as to types and functions of other installations within the target areas This will af fect ad- versely all phases of Sovie t economy and the ability of the Soviet people to carry on effectively with work necessary for the prosecution of a war _ 'fOP 3ECHE1' JCS 1953 1 - 25 - Enclosur e B I _ a r -- - - OE -- ' •· · - TOP SECRET ·I The amount and rate at which da ge and personnel casualties are inflicted will also have adverse effects on recuperative measures which will need to be taken to res tore order and production essential to the war effort Immediately after each atomic eicplos1on the surviving population in the affected area will be posed many complicated problems such as simultaneously caring for casualties extinguishing fires restoring essential utilities providing food and shelter and clearing rubble The people will be called upon to meet these problems im llediately and at a time when shock and fear are prevalent leadership is handicapped many key personnel are killed or missing and controls are dis- rupted Ea ch operation will place heavy demands on the available manpower and the effective accomplishment of each will be dependent upon the others The destruction of l rge numbers of homes vill impose lasting hardships on an urba n population already overcrowded and existing on a marginal status All of the foregoing tasks will have to be f'aced before reconstruction of industrial facilities can be undertaken and production restored in whole or in part In the reconstruction of facilities or the restoration of production it is to be remembered that dependence must be placed on other industries and utilities many of which may have been concomitantly damaged or are suffering fTom the collateral ef'fects of damage elsewhere The interdependency of all industries and services is a factor of importance in nonnal production in the restoration of damage and in reestablishing production from previously damaged plants The damage personnel casualties and effects therefrom have been estimated on the basic assumption that tbe initial atomic offensive contemplated in current w r plans TROJAN is successfully executed as planned This applies both to the quantity of bombs and the period in which they ar delivered Should a le ser nUl1lber of bombs be ctually del ivered on targ ts or the li'0f S sO RE'f JCS 1953 1 - 26 - Enclosure B Roflll dlloed IIQm lac UndasSifJed I Ded mille J Holomgs orlhc Nallonol An llivas • -- · -0§ ' a· 1 ' · i ror SECRE'll 1 - ·J· rate of delivery be substantially slower the damage casualties and effec t s would be less delivered on the targets Should a larger numbe r of bombs be and the rate of delivery the same or greater the damage casualties and effects would also be greater In either case re- evaluation should be made SUMMARY Physical damage to installations personnel casualties concentrated in industrial concentrations and other direct or indirect cumulative effects would result in a 30 to 40 per cent r eduction of Soviet industrial capaci t y This l oss would not be permanent and could either be alleviated by Soviet recuperative action or augmented depending upon the weight and effectiveness of follow-up attacks 10 Attacks on Atomic Energy Installations At this time suf'- ficient confirmed knowledge does not justify the assignment of any of the bombs reserved for Soviet atomic installations nor does evidence indicate that any significant portion of installations identified with the Sov iet atomic energ_y program will be destroyed by the bombs planned to be delivered on the first 70 urban areas 11 Recuperability of Industry • • Much evidence has been accumulated by the United States Strategic Bombing Surveys as to the measures taken by the Gennans and Japanese to maintain industrial production face of Allied air attacks in the Study has been devoted to the levels of producti on whi ch were a chieved in the sa rne selected target systems of tlle Germ1 1 n and Japanese industrial establishment which are included as targets in current war plans applicable to t he U S S R The Oennans and to a lesser degree the Japene e depended on the following action to moet vital war production requirements OP SECRvtpJCS 1953 1 27 - Enclos ure B - - • - I f ·' •✓ 4• 1 Repair and res tore tiA ijl ot damaged plants l I 2 Accelerating prodtiction in plants not working at full productive capo city previous to damage to other plants in the same industry 3 Conversion of plants from production of' non-essential or non-critical items to meet more important needs 4 Construct io of new facilities either as replacement for or in anticip tion of losses The action U S Strategic Bombing S rvey shows tha1 by such the Ge 'm' l ns were able to maintain production and even to increase production rates in essential war materials until the weight and rate of Allied air attack attained overwhelming proportions in 191J IJ at which time GeI llllan recuperative powers could not match the scale of attack and the pace of the advance of Allied armies _g It is to be anticipated that the U S S R would adopt although not with the same degree of eff iciency at this time the same measures proved to be effective by the Germans Evidence indicates the traditional ability of the Russians to accomplish much with little to undergo extreme hardship improvise to repair and to in their working conditions This was best demonstrated 1n the Soviet rehabilitation of the transporta ti on system which was destroyed in areas occupied by the Germans Soviet ca pabilities to restore bridges rail l nst J llations and railroad equipment amazed even competent American engineers However such ability does not extend to the same extent 1n highly complicated facilities or installations dependent upon precise engineering performance they a re relatively inferior In this Cape city and efficiency com- parable to that of the Germans i s not to be expected • £· There is valid evidence that certai n Sovi et industries basic to either peacet1me or wartime economy are presently strained to t heir maximum ca pa city to meet curr eRt n 1e ds I J qi ep 'tCMT JCS 1953 1 - 28 - 11 Enclosure B r - 4i - · · · - --'i i - J r I Notewor thy among these are s ' t i oil and rail transportntion Efforts to increase capacities in these categories are sharply limited by the time required to produce necessary tools facilities or raw materials It is doubtful vhether such capacities could be augmented significantly in time of war or whether replacements for damage sustained would be' practicable in any reasonable period of time Some industries now operate within limits imposed by the supply of steel o od availability -of petroleum Cushions in productive capacity which exist in these industries would afford the U S S R some flexibility in the absorption of war damage Experience has shown t hat the effectiveness of in- dustrial recuperation depqnds a mong other things upon tho following factors 1 Simultaneity of attack on all elements of any one system or supporting systems 2 The rate at which d6lll8 ge is inf'licted 3 Frequency of subsequent attack 4 Repair or replacement of damaged plants ond tools 5 Supply of raw materials 6 Availability of essential utilities 7 Availability of industrial Engineering talent 8 Adequacy of manpower With due regard for the widespread destructiveness of the contemplated offensive the relatively short time in which so ouch damage is inflicted the shortage of steel and petrolew i the number of personnel casualties and the shock and confusion on the population as a whole it is considered that the U S S R would experience great difficulty 1n recuperating from the effect of the initial atomic offensive and restoring production to necessary levels Refer to ·Para- graph 9 p ige 17 1'0P SEGRE'f JCS 1953 1 - 29 - Enclosure B 11 Reproduced from lhe une1as s1r e 1 I Decla sifie Holdings ol lhc Naliooal _- Aroh ' _ 'OP gECRE'I' 12 The Soviet Will logical e ff'ects of the initial a omic offensive on the Soviet will to wage war is contained ih Appendix J to this Enclosure The significant conclusions of this ·study are as tollows • It would seriously disrupt temporarily and impair indefinitely the mechanisms of civil and military control It probably would not destroy the roots of ColllliiUnist ideology or critically weaken the power of Soviet leadership to control and dominate the people £• It would not turn the majority of the people against their _gove rrunent but would in general unify them and intensify their will to wage war It would validate in the minds of the majority Soviet propaganda with regard to the intentions of foreigners to destroy the U S S R Intensified resentment would persist for an indeterminate period • £ • The will of n indeterminate minority to wage war Will undoubtedly be weakened and ·certain eleme n ts will attellJPt to to take advantage of the situation but neither of these influences would be like ly to develop to such an extent as to produce critical effect upon the total Soviet war effort -9 Temporarily it Will create a widespread chaotic situation among the people particularly in the urban areas This situation may -well cause a high degree of absenteeism and disorganization in industries essential to the war effort This would force modification of Soviet i n vasion plans and 1 n time adversely affect the morale of the Soviet armed forces • It will create within the U 'S S R a psychological crisis which could be turned to advantage by the Allies through early and effective exploit ation by armed forces and psychological warf-a re Failing prompt and effect ive x-ploita- tion the opportunity would be lost and subsequent Soviet psychol ogical reactions would adversely affect th accomplishment of Allied objectives ffP SE@Eq' JCS 1953 1 - 30 - 1 En c 1 osur B Rep odllo d from lhe Unelassif Cd I Ded0$SifL8d Holdi gs or he NaUonal ArdllYes ' i·· · - _ h • i f• -1 'r-- ii - ' 'l'6P SBGflE4' -cf l An y demoralizing effect among Soviet invasion troops will be of a delayed no ture and will be dependent upofr the rruits of their early invasion efforts g As reports of results of the atomic offensive reach the people ot Soviet satellite countries both their sabotage of Soviet control o nd military effort and their partisan cooperation toward Al lied obJectives can be expected to increase with t he hope of t h rowing off the Soviet yoke 13 Effect of the Initial Atomic Offensive Upon the Soviet Armed Forces The phasing of possible Soviet operations in the early phases or a -war was discussed in Appendix E to this Enclosure The effect of the tomic offensive on the Soviet armed forces as a result of d8 J l l ge to Sov-iet industry and t he psycho logical impact on t he Soviet people and governr tent is set forth i n Appendix K to thls EL-closure s ign tf'iccnt conclusions of which are s1 llnlt' arized below Successful execution of the initial atomic offensive as planned - Would not per se seriously impair the capability of the Soviet armed -rorces to advance rapidly into s elected areas or Western Europ e the Middle East and the Far East but capabilities thereafter in those extended areas would progressively diminish due to· the following 1 The supply of petroleum products of all types will rapidly become critical to all branches of the Soviet armed forces with principal effects of a Greatly reducing t he mobility of the Army b Reducing the scale of operations of the Soviet Navy and merchant shipping although sublll l rine arfare would probably be unaffected c Seriously reducing Sovi t air operati ons in- volving tr ining transport support of ground c nd - 31 - Enclosure B Reprodll ed from ti UnciassiflOQ I Oodassiflcd Holdngs ol lhe NaliOnal Archives -·- i - l -· 1 r t • 'i'Of SEORB'P r ' naval forces and independent offens1ve action although proper allocation of fuel would allow continued operations by air defense forces I _ ' Q' ' • The point at Which capabiiitios of Soviet armed forces woul diminish to a critical degree would depend upon many variable or unpredictable factors most important of which 1s the level of stockpile s prevailing at the initiation of hostilities • Q A fter consumption of initial stocks of basic equipment and consumable supplies progressive shortages in a wide variety of items particula Tly aircraft would handicap opera- tions and affect morale of the armed forces £ Logistic support would be hand capped due to disruption of planning impairment of controls damage to industry and interference with transportation _Q The Soviet High Command will bo forced quickly to reestimate their strategic position and make important decisions regarding operational plans unde r difficult circumstances They would probably limit postpone or abandon certain campaigns but it is i mpossible to predict what specific decisions would be made • The a tomic offensive would open the field and s et the pattern for all adversaries to use any weapons of lllB Ss destruction and result in maximum retal iatory measures within Soviet capabilities 14 General Atomic boobing Will produce certain psychological and retaliatory reactions detrimental to the achievement of Allied war objectives and its destructive effects will complicate posthostilities problems However the atoClic bomb would be a major element of Al lied military strength in a ny war with the U S S R and would constitute the only means of rapidly inflicting shock and serious damage to v ital elenents of the Soviet war-lilB king capacity In particular an early atomlc offensive_wil facili- tate greatly the o ppUcatl op of other Allied milita r ppwer with POP 6EOOE'3 JCS 1953 1 - 32 - Enclosure B Reptodtlced from lhe Unclassified Dedassifoed Holdings of lhe National Ardli cs 1 ''if ' I 'i'OP SECRET • - o - 'f 11 • 'r J ' t j t prospect of greatly lowered casualties Full exploitation of the advantages to be obtained is dependent upon the adequacy and promptness of associated military and psychological operations From the standpoint of our nati onal security the advantages of its early use would be transcending Every reasonable effort should be devoted to providing the me ns to be prepared for prompt and effect'ive delivery of the maximum numbers of atomic bombs to appropriate target systems tPOP 5EOflE9 JCS 1953 1 - 33 - Enclosure I 11 B 11 Reprt dua l from 1he nclassilicd I DcdassirlCd Holdings of Iha Naliooal Archives --u · a -· t ' · £ OECL ASSIFlt O Aulhorlly APPENDIX 11 AII TO ENCLOSURE B wn fus 3 B y NARA O'dte UNITED STATES PLANS 1 The joint outline war plan TROJAN has been accepted for planning purposes to provide a basis for developing the initial operations of United States and Allied forces in the event that war has been forced upon the United States by acts of aggression by tile U S S R and or her satellites during the fiscal ear 1949 2 It is the over-all strategic concept of this plan To destroy the will of the U S S R to resist by a rnain offensive effort in Western Eurasia and by a strategic defense 1n the Far East Initially to launch a powerful air of ensive designed to exploit the destructive and psychological power of ato ic weapons against the vital elements of the Soviet war-l l Sking capacity to secure the Bering Sea-Japan Sea-Yellow Sea line and selected base area or areas to secure the essential lines of communication to provide essential aid to our Allies to reduce the Soviet war potential by conducting political psychological and underground warfare and to prepare for such later operations as may be necessary for the attainr tent of our national objectives 3 In furtherance of this concept tentative plans have been developed by the Strategic Air Command in accordance with directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide for delivering an initial powerful offensive utilizing atomic boC1bs against selected industrial units in seventy Ul·ban areas of the u s S R These objective areas are those which available intelligence i ndicates to include the heart of known inoustry most essential to the war-1 1aking capaci y of the U S S R They are listed in J C S 1974 AtOL'liC Weapons _Suppl ement to TROJAN It is planned to follow up the initial attack with a continuing a'OP SRCHE'l'- JCS 1953 1 - 34 - Appendix A to Enclosure B11 ie V 'l'OP 8£ 0ftE'¼' air o ffen s ive both with atomic bombs and conventional weapons--bonbs and mines--further to reduce he Soviet warmaking capacity and to police the areas damaged as a result of the initial phase of t he attack 4 The details of the plan to deliver the initial atomic offensive are not essential to this particular sti dy inasmuch as an evaluation o f tl1e chances of success in delivering the strateg'ic air offensive is specifically exempt froi i this problem It is sufficient herein to note that TROJAN envisages basing t he planes involved in the intial attack at suitable available airdromes in the United Kingdom the Cairo-Suez area Ale ska and Okinawa Plans of the Strategic Air Con nd con- template that attacks are to be delivered by oediurn bombers B-29 and B-50 and heavy bombers B 36 Prir iary- reliance for medium bomber bases will be the United Kingdom with use of Cairo-Suez Iceland or Okinawa as deemed necessary at the tim Initial movenent of essential personnel and naterial to the forward operating bases will be by air ana Subsequent continuing logistical support will be in the main by sea Heavy boobardnent units equipped with B-36 aircraft will operate from the United States via bases in Alaskl 5 The initial ator lic of fensive is to be del ivered as quickly as operational and logistical considerations permit and is to be distributed over a wide area of the u s s R proper No atonic attacks are contenplated at present· on targets outside the Soviet Union The purpose is to hit hard a nd to attack a large nUl' 'lber of Soviet urban areas in the shortest possible tine It is hoped thus to exploit the affects of surprise and shock to provoke the spread and cor 1pounding of disaster Underlin d for eophasis €'OP BBOR'ifi' JCS 1953 1 - 35 - Appendix A to Encl osur e E' Reproduced from the Uncia fiedI Declassified Holdirl s of the NationaJ Arthives • - - · J r - - -' ' - ' I i1f I' rumors and by widespread dall111ge to interdependent industries to cor iplicate and retard processes of recuperation Operationally it is reasonable to expect that the untried Soviet air defenses will be least effective against initial attacks The selection of nw erous widely separated targets will tend to cause dispersion of Soviet air defenses and antiaircraft weapons While the Chief of Staff U S_ Air Force is the Executive Agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the strategic air offensive operational details are in the main vested in the Col lI Ulilding General Strategic AiT Cor n 'land U S Air Force Operational plans are subject to continuing revision particularly with respect to the development of target information and objective data At the moment tentative plans a re available for the initial atOl'lic offensive but plans for follow-up phases have not yet been sufficiently developed to warrant evaluation in this study G At the present tir1e the irlitial atomic offensive r iay be considered as having two stages The first to be accomplished prior to D plus 14 days plans to attack 30 selected target cities ·considered to be of greatest inportance and on which availabl e turget infori lation is believed to be adequate for uttack without prelil inary reconnaissance During this stage it is planned to ·conduct aerial reconnaissance of the re0 0 ining 40 target areas which are objectives of the initial atomic offensive with a view to supplementing available infomation as to these objectives The second sta ge envi sages attack on the remaining 40 target areas Conduct of this attaclc will be influenceµ by operational expe rience and in fornational data gained during the first stage It is antici- pated t hat the second stage will be completed by D plus 30 days at which tii e the najor _portion of the stockpile 6r I atomic Underlined for enphasis ffOP 8 SGflB3 ' JCS 1953 1 - 36 - Appendix A to Eng lb sure B ' 1 Reprodo ed om lhe unc1assmeo I Ocdassif od Holdings ol lhe Nalional Atthlves • weapons available been expended In the Outline War Plan it is emphasized t hat the course of action to be followed in subsequent periods wiH depend in large mes sure on the rate of production of ato• ic boobs and on the results ootained froa the initial ato• ic offensive particularly with regard to the effects of the atol'lic attack 7 Annex A to this Appendix sets forth the cities in which targets are located for each of the two stages of he initial atomic offensive together with the number of atomic bombs tentatively allocated to each urban area PO P 613 ORm JCS 1953 1 - 37 - Appendix A to Enclo ure 11 11 B BASIS OF EVALUATION In the effort to e valuate the ef£ect of the initial atomic offensive on the u s s R it is first necessary to establish an acceptable basis upon which results can be measured The _problem may be divided into three parts a An evaluation of material damage and personnel casualties b An appraisal of psychol•ogical effects • c The application of the f oregoing to the military u s s R in the light 0£ u s and t he u •s s R capabilities of the objecti 'ves of the conflicting war MATERIAL DP MAGE AND PERSONNEL CASUALTIES From the material s t andpoint the war effort of a nation involved in total war is dependent on the ability of its industrial establishment to replenish initial stockpiles of essential supplies in or•der to meet the vital requirements of t he armed forces and to provide for the minimum acceptable level of civilian requirements This industrie l establishment includes the entire complex of systems involved in the provision processing and transportation of raw materials in fabrication transportation and assembly of manufactured components into finished equipment and in tr·a nsportation of finished equipment and operating supplies to consumc rs 'rl1e industrial establish- ment may also be con sidered a s composed of management labor plant facilities and materials Partial or complete elimination of a ny of the parts o f the complex or components of' the este blishment will reduce or negat e the utilit y of' the whole ' It is app1•opriate the1'efore to evaluate the extent to vhich the initial atomic offensive will reduce the industrial establishment It is desirable to evaluate the effects on as many specific systeins or components of systems a s av 11Ej ble information will permit the derivation of valid concl usions 1f or SEfJR1 f JCS 1953 1 - 41 - P ppendf' x 13 11 to Enclosure B - Repmdu'8 1 trom the Undasslfoed I Oedassllied Holcf1 gs or Ille N alional Amir1es • resultant personnel Damage inflicted on Wl'bllil casualties should al s-o be considered as they will have significa nt effects on reduc i n the war-making capacity of the U S S R end in retarding i ts subsequent restoration PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS An evaluation of the psychological effects should include the impact of and reaction to the bombing and the consequences thereof on the government the civilian population directly affected the civilian population not directly affected the In the armed forces and the popu lace of satellite coUlltries final anal ysis it should be determined to what degree the initial atomic offensive may ffect a Soviet control b The attitude of the people c The ¥ill of the armed forces to fight MILITARY CA PABILITIF S OF THE u s s R IN THE LIGHT OF CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES OF THE u s AND THE u s s R • The reduction of the industrial establishment should be reflected in reduced capabilities of the armod forces to carry out required operations individually and in concert These capabilities are dependent upon the adequacy of basic equipment tank guns aircraft ship_s etc and the supply of essential consumables food clothing POL ammunition etc These items must be available at the right place at the right times in uantities corrunensurate with the type and scale of operations Denial of either basic equipment or essential consulll£ ble supplies -will reduce the fighting ability of the armed forces The degre e of the reduction end the q uestioh of whether or not it is critical or decisive is in turn dependent upon the objectives to be attained et the time 1d the type megn J tude and timing of enemy opposition It is appropriate tbersfore to evaluate the extent to which reduct1o Jr ·dcnlal of essential items of soviet armed forces -will affect their JCS 1953 1 - 42 - Appendix B to Enclosure B nl ' TOP SECRET r i1' tfl abilities to conduct effective ope ations in the light of ¥ probable objectives and allied opposition The strategic aims of the U S S R have been considered in agreed intelligence estimates and or the outline war plan to be a Ultimately world domination by the u s S R _ and b Immediately to seize control over key areas of the Eurasian land mass including specific areas of Western Europe the Middle East ind the Far East The National Security Council has stated that the general objectives of the United States with respect to the u s s R in time of peace as well as in war · should be To reduce the power o nd influence of the u s s R to liDUts which no longer constitute a threo t to the peace national independence and stability of the world family of nations Q To bring about a basic change in the conduct of 11 international relations by the government in power in Russia to ·conrorm with the purposes and princi ples set forth in the charter 11 UN 11 War aims supplemental to our peacetime aims should include 11 Eliminating Soviet Russian domination in areas outside the borders of· any Russian state a llowed to exist after the war g Destroying the structure of relationships by which the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party have been able to exert moral and discipl inary authority over indivi dual citizens or groups of citizens in countrie s not under communist control • AssUJ ing th 1t any regime or regime s which may exist on tradition al Russian territory in the aftermath of a war 11 1 Do not have sufficient military power t o wa ge aggressive war 11 2 Impose nothing resembling the present ir m curtain over contacts with the outside world Enclosure to J c s 1903 3 ll'OP B E Cv JCS J 953 1 - lt3 - Appendix 11 B11 to Enclosure B T'Of SECRET 11 £ -' In addition if any bolshevik regi ' e is left in any part of the Soviet Union insuring that 1 does not control enough of the military- industrial potential of the Soviet Union to enable it to wage war on compar tle terms with any other regime or regimes vhich may exist ou traditional Russian territory Seeking to create posti ar conditions which will l Prevent the development of power relationships - dangerous to the security of the United States and international peace 2 Be conducive to the successful development of an e ffective world organization based upon the purposes SJ ld principles of the United lat ions 3 Permit the earliest practicable discontinuance within the United states of wartime controls These aims and objectives considered i n opposition one to the other aro fundamental Although the initial atomic offensive under consideration is but a part albeit important of all the military psychological political and economic operations necessary for the prosecuti m of a war of the nature and scope envisaged consideration of its effects should be related to these conflicting aims and objectives This should be with the view to expressing the degree to which the initial atomic offensive clight influence strategy mid contribute to Allied ability to counter Soviet aims and to Soviet ability to oppose the atte irunent of Allied object ives IFO' P Sl3GRB4' JCS 1953 1 - 44 - Appendix 11B 11 to Enclosure 11 B11 ji SP cihc · _ -- i -1· · •- -··• - - J· - ·i ' 7' J Y -· J · t ' · -lo - · - - - _ - - - ·fl· _ -- ·r gi ie- fo-_ver 7suboitte o hese 'i li telligence acti'vi tieS' -f er _ -· · 1 f'S2 · · ' · f · i• - li ·r·· - - - - r i - _ ¥ · - - - - l - - - - - - · _ t - l· - i - - t t t - -- p J 1 on · e itf n_l i tO t -- s tudy- '0 ' 1 ¥ Cox n 11 te d b e ·- ' 1 - ---- t ·' - - _ ·-· -- -r- - •• - --- i ir i a f - 1 w¥ if i 7l• f · f li Itl il -- l J ' ' e asseub-ly 01' iJ iforoatioii ' basic t o' thc · ··a etert rl la tf o n 1'' 'the'- _ ' - · ·•· · · · ·- - · _ _· _'-- -- · _ 1 -· · f _1 · _ i ·_ -' - - · scope- and c s1-tion of Sovi - - i nd _A l capoc t · - -- - H ·• •• 1 • • o• •• • M O · -_' tft - •••• t •t - ' • ' ' if r' To ro c·1u tutc dete ination_ ·o e -expected daoage _ - · ffcct and tM caoabilities and linitations of atonic weapons the Cornittee referred to docu oents end publicntioh of ·tlie Atooic Energy- Col 1l lission the reports c the U S Strategic ' Boobing Surveys of' Cer-pc ny o nd Jupn n and pertinent pa ers 01' the Joint Chie fs of Starr All oeubers of the Cotn dttee _v ere· j _ Reproduo d from lhe Unclassified Declasslied Hol fings of 1he National AK liYo • - · - a· r •IM · ' l'Of' 3ECRES Exar iination was made of the -methods of t arget selection and deterr iination of airiing points used by the Strategic Vulnerability Branch in the preparation of the target folders furnished to the Strategic Air Cot11 1and The services of a group of outstanding cathema ticians were obtained through the cooper tion of the Head of the Research and Development Board These consultants assisted the CoJ 10ittee in its exar rl nation of the methods of the selection of aic 1ng points and the calculations involved in deteroination of probability of dal lage to selected targets The Comiittee was furnished torget folders prepared by the Strategic Vulnerability Branch for the urban industrial areas of the Soviet Union These were cxanined as to aining points buildings facilities and installations located in the areas of anticipated danage for each air ling point and installations outside the areas of anticipated danage The Strategic Vulnerability Branch also suboitted available datlllge estir iates for the urbll Il objective areas in terns of the percentage of known Soviet cepacity for selected systeas or seg• ents of the industrial establishoent Spot checks were • ade s to the adequacy authenticity and accuracy of this infornation in order to deter• ine a neasure of the evall l8tion as a whole As a result of the foregoing procedures es ti ma te s were nade as to the reduced industrial capacity of the u s S R selected iteos essential to their war effort in certain EstiDates were linited to a s • all group of selected vital co plexes because intelligence data concerning other c0t1plexes were either inco• pleta or it was 1Dpract1cable for the intelligence agencies to sunn iariz available data within tine to be of benefit to this Cot Illlittee Refer to Annex A through G to Appendix I'' to Enclosure B ll'-OP SB Hm'f JCS 1953 1 - 46 - Appendix c to Enclosure 11 B - · •·' -· a- I I _- 3 • • I Of SEGfffi'F- The Co t lI littee gathered such ini'omation as was available fro c intelligence sources as to the extent of Soviet stockpiles of essential nilitary eguipcent and supplies and as to the requirenents of the 8oV1et arned forces to neet anticipated operations This was evaluated in terns of production require- oents and the extent to which production reguireoents could be net fron a reduced production froo within the U S S R fron satellite countries fron captured territory sources likely to be available 01• froo other Sepaiate studies were i iade on specific basic naterials such as oil steel cheoicals and basic utilities transportation and power endeavoring to translate the direct effects of tbe boobing into iopact on the war econony and nilitary capabilities of the Soviet amed forces As a separate approach t he Oormittee detornined the total urban area of the u s s R of cities of 50 000 known population or greater in which it is generally accepted that practically all of Soviet industry is located This area was coops red to the total areo likely to be danaged by all of the boobs planned to be delivered to the selected aioing points provided for in cur 'cnt plans There was thus obtained an estirlate of the percentage of total Soviet industrial capacity likely to be destroyed or danaged o nd the casualties to personnel Refer to Annex H of Appendix I to Enclosure B By the nature of the second part of the proble --appraisal of the psychological effect of the boobing on Soviet will to vage war- -the Co ittee was forced to proceed along different lines • It was first necessary to acquire a background knowledge of the history traditions traits and characteristics of the people of the U S S R to conside the salient fe tures of CODDunist doctrine and the depth and character of· its penetration anong the peopl e the neans and aethodiJ l'us d in the lPOP SDGRm JCS 1953 1 - 47 - Appendix C to Enclosure B Reprodui ed from the Une aSSifii d I Oodassi icd ttcidings of the NolionalArctuves _- i s f I J f J' -· _ Pf ·- 1t _ it C ·-· · ·- _ _it f t _ _ tr OF - fEN -- r -t · - • · - - tha _Ms - - se - - ' R 'V _ - - - r ha o d ''- - j f t °'' ·- •· · · - - ·fti--·· adeci1 ia cy na yalidity of i ntelligence related ·to this problem ··-- - · ·-' _•- '_ _ 5 ' '' ' - · ' _ - -' - · 'J _- ••· _ _ tfe is P Perly _ 't lj respo lbJHty of 'the t' Joint _Intelligen_c ir C om - '1f ' · c - c -·z ti · i lr -- - tf 1 t ii t F fi - y· _ eval i Ji of_ f r itt -oi ' c ··· or a the ·1ru t1 a a toniic ot t ensive _on - the Sovie t people and' -their• · ' f l - - -t - ¥ 1 f ft ' _ - • • - • -' l - i'- · · - ·- ' 7 - - · ¥t ' c - • c- war- e1' f'o ct- is_ - in a arg e measure de-pend nt- _upon the •s u_pport - ·· ' 2 - · _ __ f f tM£ - iI - _ _ · - · 4 • 0 r·- - i 7rr-c f__ f · · -' - _ ·- j 'l l e lige n q t _H n a comment i µ _this · e_ction· e· _m ade - i - r -- -- _ · ·· 1 _ -- ¢ ' •- - r- - ·_-- -- · - - - k r t W t - -· ' - 1%t f t1 _r - J 4 it - - - t _Y toi 't ha' purpo s e --9¼4 d s o·i ibi ng t_ ¥ t·e nt - a na '5 ¥1 r ·t -•· - -- 1- r t t - ½ - 1· ' t -- 1 r h e pro le - _ l e_t P O Ce ci - I - s-ol i iV- 4 - t r x-4 l - t i l 1 O_c JDJJ_t e _ -· __- - -extent' ' t'O' Whi chtfi -'tt '1s- practical- at' tn s---t i '1'f ' a n - _- _• · c P 1 i- - J tf il 162 - _· i genbe- agei ic les r 1r c·1 udU1g' 'the -Int _Ugence· I i v 1 sion uJ t Axr zy f J - _ - - § · ' ' - _A ' - - - - - f-_ -- - - -i F • · t ---· ·· _ _ - ' ---_' ' --- ·i _ ' ' • - -- '- - · - - ' L - · ' i' j _' r -0 -- - - t h- · ·0ffice _o - ' N v8 l ell1gence S· Navy _the Air· In t _l li- · · - j _i _ 1_· t__I tr- __ _ _ _ _t_ _ _ i ff · · - - i it _ y_ _£ _ f_ -' _ j· ' __ - · -7 t-- _ _ - - -- · Iand on ir ' ie ti'wa l ' fi rni shed specific ' -informatfo'n· t L tt -- d ' $ -- tv -- rf Y -_ z r 1 it - - _ j i tt • _' -• t z •• _ ' ' - ' • · W p e rt'ine'r it· to' t jd i c e'x i Qbservri t'i'6ns · or tlie Comm1 ttee indicate· - _ · · ' _ t 1 ft -J ' _ · _ · - · f h · f t t- f - d _ ' - f 4 ' ' 1 j - 1 -# ' _ - 1 · - ··_·'_ · - -11 · ·' ·_ _ _ amonk tnese a'g i i ci'e i a igh 'degree 6r coope r a hon a ncf tbat the · · f __ _ ·r·f ·-· - v- ' f i it r - '1 iflif-·-_ - · - -T- ---- - - -- - -- · ·· -- t - · t 3 - · · -_ 5 t - ' -· -' me thods • used i'zi- ·c·ompiling · fil ing·· and utilizing tbe available - · - -· · _ ··-- - - -· _ - -i ri · i - k · - n - - - -- · · - - · _ · -- - · - i-' -· - ·· _· · - -· - - • t t J 'f · 1riformat1611' -c frfSoyi Y 1naus triar-capacit y ii f ef Jfj' i itl r -· 1 are ' ·s ound - thorough - - - -f -- f t -re _- i @ ic f ' · · · c-1 rif'6t uo·ri kii' be ·a tt b ted to he ' 'dj f f1cul tles inh r rit in -·- · i - - J • • - ¾ r r --- - -- 1 - - - r t - _ - ·--·· · 4 - z - - · ·· ' - - •' '···sorting and -d rstributing- the large _volUDle data invol ved ' - is' · j ng ple ce d on cards f'or · i · f c · - -' --'· ·· G ted h t infor t·i n or _ • 0 specially designed business machines · When co pleted this' system should fac1 litate greatly the ma1 ntenance of records C and ·t he utilization of information for 'future estimates of this nature • · · A free exchange appeq l'_S to be continuous between ·' • 1 -· B 1 _t 1 sh and American ag cies thU ubstantialJ y b roadening · ' · - · - _ ii _ -' i_ iri _ ·-_1 __ i_ _e_ _ ·_ _ i_- ifi - - i li f_ _ _ - ir i · _ l-B I · --- - - - - - ·· •-- 8 th - _ · _-__ - _ _ - _ ·• f- - · - · - ------ - --·- - lt r i - · 1 E Reproduced rc n lhe Unclassified I Declassilied Holdings ol lho National An 'f Of SEGRE' P-' The Cotll littee gather e d uch infornation as was available fro• intell igence sources as to the extent of Soviet stockpiles of essent ial ni litary eguipoent and supplies and as to the reguirenents of the Soviet arned forces to neet anticipated operations This was evaluated in terns of production require- ments and the extent to which production reguirenents could be met fron a reduced production froo within the u s s R fron satelli te countries froo captured territory ·or fron other sources likely to be available Separate studies were riade cm specific basic naterials suc11 as oil steel chenicals and basic utilities tramiporta tion and power endeavoring to translate the direct effects of the boobing into inpact on the war econony and nilitary capabilities of the Soviet arned forces As a separate approach the Co ittee deterttined the total urban area of the u s S R ' Jf cities • f 50 000 know population or greater in which it is generaJ ly accepted that practically nll 'Jf Soviet industry is located This i irea was co pared to the total arec likely to be dannged by all of the bonbs planned to be delivered to the selected air iiog points provided for in c ur •cn t plans There was thus obtained an esti late of the percentage of total Soviet industrial capacity likely to be destroyed or danaged ond the casualties to personnel Refer to Annex H of Appendix 11 1 11 to Enclosure B • By the nature of the second part of the problen--appraisal f the psychologi cal effect of the bonbing on Soviet will to wage war--the Cor inittee was forced to proceed along different • lines It was first necessary to acquire a background knowleage of the history trad i tions traits and characteris tics of the people of the u s s R to conside the salient features of I Cor u iunist doctrine and the depth and character ofj its penetration anong the people the neans and ne t l iod·g us d in the JlO P SBGfl B'P JCS 1953 1 I - 47 - Appendtx C11 tofEnclosure B I q ep 5ECRE'f U S S R and the satellite countries to force adherence to Co unisn and to Soviet control through disci pline police control propaganda censorship and fear tendencies and opportuniti es t o resist or overthrow this control This back- ground was acquired by reading books r eports aJl d studies bearing directly on the problen This included 1 1inute1 of a seninar under the auspices of the Institute for Advanced Studies rinceton University and a research study on Soviet society in process at the Universi·ty of Michigan The CoJ 10ittee also interviewed a nunber of individuals who it was considered by reason of their qualifications positions or experience night furnish the Co ittee inforoation of value in studying' this problen These included the recent u s Ar bassador to the Soviet Union Lieutenant General Walter B Snith the present Naval Attache to the U S S R Rear Adniral L C Stevens Mr Durbrow of the State DepaTtnent foroerly on duty in t he u s S R Mr Thayer of the State Departnent in charge 01' Voice of Anerica broadcasts Dr McDowell of the Departnent of the Arny and nunerous officers of the Arey Navy and Air For-- e l'hc had s e rved in the U S S R in one capacity or an- thEcr ou oing or since 1 forld War lI _ ip OP iJEGRE'l'- JCS 1953 1 - 48 - Appendix C to 'Enclosure B ReprcdlJC8d rOfll lhe Unclassified Oedassified Holdings or lhe Nalional Archli 1 $ · · i t - -- f _ i jj Eit It ENCLOSURE S -· · - - · -· - 11 iJ r i tr ' t t · 1f -- DISCUSSION OF INTELLIGENCE · ·- - · - _ _ - •--· _ j t r - __ ' tt · f- ' _ · f fo W ·- ' ' ' - e1i -9 ha -1 dtha - s ass_e_s e ___ · _ iJ · · adequacy and validity of intelligence· related to this probl-eni · - --- - -'_ · if f- -_ 1s ie t 1f spo i l1iy of -t efJo1jt-·_rnt n1 et b ' ir if _if- t ii t 1 f y- izJt i i · -o It r i ot' ' tb e - tnl a1 a- toni1 ci off ensi ve on the Soviet _people _anct-_ their '- · · f_ - · - o 0 i __ • -j • tt'5 ti - __ _f _• - - · •_ _'_ '• •L -- f - ••_ -'- j 1 •- ' t-° i £' war -e foi t-_ i s- -- ·in a large mea sur de pendent upon the -·s upport-' - ' - -••2 -•- · •• ••• t -l-_f - f - ••• t i• - ·z - _ _ • t - r' • - • - • ' •-• • • • -- •_'t '•' ' - L · -1 ig _io te_lJ igen e a lienca N c om ine nt j p t his_ ·e c tion are· _made ll · - · i- i - _ - tl _ i ri f - r W -i 4 - e J v f' N- - 'h1f 'pkpos'a '6 desc r i o· rng -£ tiiJ e± t· ntta o ' - -- 't d'c - - · j $f i f $ t -i i 1#i J1 1I ommi ttee· wa · -ab1 e tozproceed 1n · sol v1 · no - - t i r - ff i1t s ·i f f en -t o whic · -· 's ' ·pr ac 'tica l ·at tfil s l t · e itiIK i t L f# L - s- r• it - · - i'' -'-1 ·• llle-· comm Lt tee was assisted by-_e 11 pertinent U S • in te111 - ' _ I tf If f Jit · - -- 'f ftr 'f - 1 - t il''· _-__ ' - -- - y r- - · -i 1 t3·• 5 - t • -§1 f _ _° g ence·a a gencies including __the Inte- Fl ge nce Di vision · u _ § _fo rmy - i - q _ _ ·· - • -- _ - - - 5 - J i t S - - '' _- ff- -· - '· --'•- i s · i 1 o f1 e 9JiJ n f geric p s Navy _the Air· Int l l - ' i t' - i- '· · · - l1 i • - ij -i e i _ · ---·-··I i f% ff f - · _ _ -' - s and on · 'Ter ueat -- was·· furnished specific a nformati·on·-' · ff - - $ -rr tr irt - _ _ % i 7 •• -t 1 ·· · - - t # - - f- · -f J_ i - · _- - _ - '-7· f 'P el' t·t nent·7 to tb 3-'•' 'zy ttf Observ t tons or - tti •90mmi tteeo t ndicate· - · _ · - -- - - - r _ L -·· _ ·• r t · J 1J f_t 7 '' -' ' 't t -i 1- --- -_· f · · -· - T r' · - l - · - - - Jw -- - • '- •among · tliese a g·enc i 'e s· 'a pgh ·degre e of coope-ratiqn and - ttiat the · _·- i - tff - - - - -·' i ig ··_ _ · - 1r 7 ° i1 - 5 t JY ·-··· - - _- - - ·v - · - - · r - - - · · - - - _ - · 1 1 ' J ·rethods i used_ - ' j r£ c·omp Uing · fil1ng0 d ut111 zi b g the _avai le ble · - · f -- -t JtL - - - J_ _ -t • · - r - •• · - -·- · ··y-_ · -- - - · - - t - t 1A -i··-· - '-- · 0 7• _ • • • • - · _ ·· - • • i - · - • • · · 1 • •• --- ' f- · '' j _ ··1nrcirmat1onfon spvi 't ''i austri l §apaci ty 'are' sbund • tliorough · ·· ll' 'S ' 1 §ii i ii i t r _ ¥¥ Ce' i s _- • ' --·· 0 • _ in 'orma tio·o can b e ·attributed· to the cU ff'iculties inherent in ·· t - _ - • - i i- - - - 1 # - _ -· · f _'i i f · - _ 1 _ t · _- ' t· · - - ···- · · Zf · • ·t- '·'- · ·· ·sorting ·ancr df'stributing- the large vol lll le of' data involved '• · ' ' _' 1 l • • ' •• •• M • ° • • • ' _ 0l•t• i • • • • - - •-• r t· was noted that l nformation is being placed on specially dasigned business machines ' • j• - - • cards for Wnen completed this ' sy item should facilitate greatly the maintenance of racords _ · and· ·the utilization of _information for futur-e @s titnates of - this nature_• ·A _f e e ex h nge a pJJecµ _s to be continuous between -· -i - B1 _1 t 1 sh and American agencies thus sttbstao tiall$ broadening -· _·· - - __ 1 _ •• • - - i ' _ · •• vi- -· · the scope •q·¢ ' e l'ue' of' f'ito· c·Q uiat_e 12 1 - - · ·· · · ·- i t - r -- • f t ' % __ c l c·- ' l' #- • ¥- ·l-·• c• slJ ih-- · •'•' •' t · c _ _ -_ J _ - ·__· __ · _ __- 7 _ _ - • ·_ --_ r_ r - -- · '·· • - · · _ - • - -- ' ' i ' ·c ''· j - - - f • · r ·· · v 1 rt i 2slf i _ - - -· - -- ···• '' ' ' ' t _ i _ J - ·- - - ' _ tr ·- 7 • - - • _ r t - l - s - • · s or - - • _ · l •- ' i_rrt i's · - 0 un 11 lcely that the · psycholo gic'iit es e f n· · -· r-- · - - - - - -'- ·- _- _ _ _ 'the So viet and Saty11te structure would produce serious consequences un ess t'' • a Tbe Soviet orb it were subjected to ·- 1 -- intensive and effective aeria l attack from the -fest - ' _ • __ ·· - · - a·- l Nii if _ _· I 'POP 5BOl1E4' _ -1 ' 411' ' f 11 b The prospec t t'dr ultimate victory further dimin i sbed because of the continued pressure of sea power as exercised through blockade and commerce destruct1on although a sea blockade of the Soviet Union would not be as effective as against a more insular power c Or 1 t seemed to them that tbe Soviet Union was faced 'ti th a pro tree ted war doomed to end in Soviet defeat 11 It is concluded from consideration of Soviet political economic and military strength and weakness factors that against probable opposing forces the Soviets have the combat power to overrun key areas in Europe and Asia The primary s ource of Sovie t combat power is the Soviet Army which is s upported by a numerically strong tactical air arm a small surface fle et and a relatively strong submarine a rm An additional s ource of cornbat power is the small but expanding strategic air arm Following the seizure of certain key areas in Europe and Asia the capabilities of the Soviet Union to occupy hold and exploit thes e a reas would to a great extent depend upon the ability of opposing forces to exploit successfully those weaknesses enumerated above 11 The operations of Soviet military forces the direction and extent of their offensives and the opposition expe cted t o be encountered has a direct bearing on the e xpenditures of military supplies and material and t he e x tent of Soviet gains to be deri ved in immediate b ooty resources and industrial capacity for f u ture possible exploitation Hence it is pertinent to digest for reference the estimated ti me schedules for Sovie t operations as set forth in ABAI- 5 In considering this estimated time schedule the following quotation from ABAI-5 should be borne in mind 11 Although the United States and tbe Uhited KingcJ om may employ weapons of mass destruction the Joint Intelligence Connnittees have not been in1'orD1Bd of the ti ming scale and effectiveness of pos sible Allied attacks using t hese weapona In weighing Soviet ca pab111ties it bas been imp9s iblo therefore to asse·ss the effe c t of tbe use of' these- we apons on t he Soviet Un ion However i t is emphasized that employment of' them could be expected to affect the progress of Soviet campaigns l'OP ECra 'l' JCS 1953 1 - 58 - Appendix 11E 11 to Enclosure B ' -· 'P· ' • I 1 '' J Subject to the foregoing the phasing of Soviet operations • estimated i n ABA I- 5 is Western Europe Soviet operations in Western Europe could involve simultaneous attacks to overrun Western Gennany France tho Low Countries and Denma rk The Soviet Union will deem it necessary to advance to the Pyrenees and the Mediterranean Coast in order to cut off retreating French forces secure the Spe n i sh front i er and to seize ports in Southern France It he a been e s timated that these operations could be completed to the Rhine by D 5 to 10 days to the Meuse-Somme line by D 15 to 20 to the Seine by D 25 to the Pyrenees the Mediterranean and the Atlantic by D 50 to 60 _ Italy and Sicily A campaign could be undertaken against Italy and Sicily simultaneously with that against other porti ons of Western Europe It has been estimated that the offensive could reach the Rome-Pesca ra line by D 45 to D 60 complete the occupation of Italy by D 75 and Sicily by D 100 £• Scandinavia The Soviet Union might conduct a campaign against Scandinavia concu rrently vi th other opera_tions beginning approximately 40 days after D-day Using Denmark as a base the U S S R could attack southern Sweden then southern Norway and simultaneously i n the north against Norway and Sweden It has been estimated that the foregoing operations could be completed within 35 days or about D 75 _g_ Greece The Soviets could conduct operations in Greece and the Aegean Islands simultaneously or in near concurrence with offensives in the Middle East and Western Eu rope It bas been estimated that Greece proper cmtld be overrun by D 70 to 75 All estimates a re in days 'llOP SEGJillql JCS 1953 1 - 59 - Appendix E to Enc J o u re E 11 Rop odoo d fi lffl the Ur classilled Deol lssified Holdings of lhe Na1ional An llves • - _ _11¥ 'i - ii • The Middle ast -lain thrusts in the Middle East could be directed at the vital Allied oil resources in Iran Iraq Saudi Arabia and base areas and lines of communication terminating in the Suez Canal Area To gain objectives quickly the operations might be conducted s imul ta neously with those in Western Europe and Greece In summary it bas been estimated that these areas could be seized by D 60-80 with the exception of the campaigns through Palestine and the Jordan Valley to Cairo-SuezAlexandria which would not be secured until D 175 • Turkev The Soviet Union -would probably consider it necessary to attack Turkey simultaneously with their general offensive in the Middle East It has been estimated that the Ankara- Ismir line could be consolidated by D 90 and depending upon progress of the separate campaign for the Middle _East the Alexandretta area by D 120 to 150 E• Far East Soviet operations in the Far East would probably involve the seizure of South Korea and key strategic positions in North China Operations could be primarily to deny areas to the U S to neutralize threatening forces and for harassing and diversionary purpo es The ma in effort in the Far East could probably succeed in overrunning South Korea by Df20 and other operations could be kept -well within Soviet logJ stic capabil1-ties - The United Kingdom No detailed estimates are included in ABAI-5 of the nature and scale of operations against the United Kingdom inasmuch as the type and phasing wo1J ld be dependen-t upon the progress oi' other campaigns However neutralization or seizure oi' the United Kingdom would involve the heavy and sustained application of Soviet air power possibly including guided missiles V-1 V-2 type TGP gE Qffi'f JCS 1953 1 - 60 - Appendix E to Enclosuije B a · i vi lit MNll 'D li • and Soviet sea pO'W'e and submarines A contemplated invasion of the tJnited Kingdom would require large-scale logistic support for all types of Soviet armed forces • • Sea and Air Offensive Against Anglo-American Sea Communications The main attack on sea 001m11unications will probably take the form of continuing operations on ports and approaches by mining torpedoes bombing and sabotage Such attacks would be carried out in the main by both aircraft and submarines allocated to those areas where the tactical situation indicates the targets to be most profitable and the opposition least effective It 1s to be presumed that maximum available effort would be devoted to this campaign on a continuing basis SUMMARY Summarizing these estimated objectives and capabilities The heaviest commitments and expenditures of military supplies - for Soviet ground forces would be from n · to about D 90 and might then be markedly reduced provided the u s S R has by then overrun Western Europe Italy except 'Sicily Scandinavia Turkey except the Alexandretta area the Middle East except for the Palestine Jordan Valley and Suez areas and the Far East However heavy drain on U S S R resources will continue even prior to the development of an Allied surface offensive f or normal support of large ground forces on extended fronts to meet combat requirements at points of contact and in internal areas to consolidate positions and cope with underground movements Additional continuing demands will be place·d on Soviet air and naval forces to cope with the increasing temPO or Allied attacks as well as for Soviet offensives by these services In particular air operations in the defense of 4'0P SEGRE4'- JCS 1953 1 - 61 - Appendix E t o Enclosure B11 11 Reprodue«l from tile UndasMICd I Dedassifieo Hokf4 gs of the NalloMI Arcnives -· - - A __ J i ' ·4 - f the u s S R r offensives against the Uhited Kingdom or at long range against the United States ahd in support of ground orces in t he Middle Eastvill require continuing supply of petroleum products replacement aircraft engines and equipment spare parts a nd munitions Soviet submarine operations while requiring relatively small quantities of fuel will necessitate re-supply of torpedoes engine parts and electronic equipment as well as new crat't t o s ustain the tempo of' widespread operations Air ground and naval forces will require elaborate training programs to support the operating elements of these services f'or protracted campaigns Of necessity these pro- grams will have to be prosecuted largely within the u s s R proper and will in turn require substantial expenditures of fuel and equipment All Soviet military forces within and especially outside the u s S R will impose heavier demands on the transportation system in the territory u s s R and in occupied As the fronts are extended requirements for transportation will increase to a degree depending upon the scope a nd tempo of perations Details in regard to stockpiles and expenditures of e s sential war materials by the u s s R are set forth in Annex A to this Appendix and information relative to the SGJviet industrial position in Annex B to this Appendix '4'0P SEORB'i' JCS 1953 1 - 62 - Appendix E to Enclos1 re 11 11 B -- - 0 ' I · - · I _ ' •• ' ANNEX _'1B1' TO Af PENDIX E TO ENCLOSURE B SOVIET INDUSTRIAL POSITION Section I of Appendix A to Enclosure c ' shows in summary form the Central Intelligence Agency's estilllB te of' current annual production of selected items in the Soviet Union the Satellite countries and other parts of Cont inental Europe The Central Intelligence Agency has indicated the margin of error to which these estimates are subject They vary from 10 to 25 percent The estimates contained in Enclosure production hence subject to marked change C are of current JO the event that the U S S R increases measures for industrial mobilization for war In considering differences between curr•ent annual production and productive capacity it_ should be noted that adequate time must be allowed for manufacturing or processing establishments to a Convert from peacetime to wartime production b Accelerate production of war supplies and c Adjust to wartime conditions Furthermore actual production of war equipment munitions and supplies will always be limited by the production and processing of raw materials the output of basic industries availability of production personnel and the capabilities of essential utilities such as electrical power and transportation Underlined for emphasis 'fOP 8EGRE4'- JCS 1953 1 Annex B to Appendix E · to Enclosure i B APPENDIX 11F 11 TO ENCLOSURE B PASSIVE DEFENSE MEASURES The chances of success of delivery of the initial atomic offensive is beyond the scope of this study therefore it is inappropriate to consider herein the active defense measures which the Soviet Union might adopt On the other bandJ there is a broad f'ield of passive defense measures which can be adopted prior to and during hostilities to minimize t he errects of air attack either by atomic or conventional weapons Included in this category are such important measures as 1 The exercise or security- and deception on info rmation 2 Dispersion of industry and redistribution of the population 3 Underground construction for important racilities 4 Construction of personnel shelters 5 Development of civil defense organization and controls 6 Education training and J ropaganda 7 Provision of equipment for disaster control and recuperation 8 Elimination or protection of vulnerable installations in transportation and communication 9 Dispersion of stockpiles of food and essential war materials Substantial accomplishment of such measures would serve to reduce material damage and personnel casualties improve ability to control the population before and after attacks and facilitate restoration of essential facilities Underlined ror emphasis 1 P8P SEO JCS 1953 1 - 66 Appendix F to Enclosure B ' 11 f s tit J J i •f • J • a _ - - - - • • j _ · · - · • - - a The U S S R was forced to adopt passive defense Second measures over much of its terr1to J in the past war C In addition the U S S R has had the opp rtunity to profit h r German British and Japanese experi ence as well as -publiohed materia l in tho Uni t ed States on the -effects of tomic bombs _· ' - __ · • • ' ' - - '• • --• Tr c- - -0 · · 0 ' -r i Third The general pattern of industrial construction and postwar reconstruction in the u s s R provides for the development of seven self-s ll'ficient industrial areas and a degree of d1spers1on within t bese a r eas Fourth Norma l efforts now being made to improve the transportation system of the u s s R par ticularly the railroads p rovide for reducing its vulnerability to air attack Fifth The organization for police control propaganda and indoctrination constitute an existing framework for education t raining and execution of passive defense and disa ster control measures on short notice Sixth The U S S R bas been maintaining a strong military posit ion and is capable of mobilizing quickly for total war Analysis of a vailable intelligence leads to the conclusion that a Information is available to the U S S R as to passive defense measures which would reduce material dama ge and personnel oasoolties f rom atomic bombing and facilitate maintaining or regaining control of the population and in r estoration of de mag b The government of the U S S R is aware of the threat to them of a tomic attacks and trend s are evident that steps are being taken within limitations of time and r esources to r educe the impact on v ttal elements of their war-making capacity Many passive defense measures could be implemented quickly 'llOP SEO 'lffi'- JCS 1953 1 68 - Append l x F to Enclos ure 11 B 11 Reprodured from the Unclassiied I Declassified Holcflflgs ol lhe Naliooal Alcluves • •1• · 1 'li l - ifrj r -i t ' c Underground constructibn bas been provided in a number of cases for 'important command posts communication centers and some emphasis bas been placed on such constructi on for fortifications supply depots and critical industrial establishments Aircraft hangars and comman d posts are known to ex 1 st undergrouhd at some of the important air force installations d Location of supply dumps and stockpiles on which information is limited follows a logical pattern for the support of the armed forces• consistent with transporta tton facilities availabl e and With evidence of dispe rsion to reduce vulnera bili ty from all types of attack e Substantial accomplishment of measures speci fically designed to minimize material damage or provide shelters for the urban population as a whole from atomic attack ts not yet in evidence in the ' FOP 1 loGRE'i' JCS 1953 1 u s s R - 69 - Appendix F to Encl osure B Reproduced from Ille Ulidassilied I Oedassified Holdi gs ol lhe National Atthl'ies APPENDIX G TO ENCLOSURE B DISCUSSION OF DAMAGE EFFECT OF THE DIFFERENT ATOMIC BOMBS AS TO BI AST FIRE RADIOLOGICAL ASPECTS In evaluating danage effects great care must be taken not to either over- estiP ate or under-estinate the effects of the bomb or t he physical vulnerability of the target Evaluation of the effects of the initial atonic offensive against the U S S R requires a Sutn lary of the danage to be e xpected frori the type of a toni c weapons currently availabl e in the stockpile It is the purpose of the ensuing paragraphs t o present such a surinary in non-technical forn and to describe the effects which would result as indicated by t he two bonbs which have been dropped over Japanese urban areas and by the characteristics of the bo cbs now available The effects fall into two najor categories a Danage to naterial b Pe rsonnel casualties Experience in War with Japan The U S Strategic Boobing Survey exanined aree s in Japan wbich had been subjected to a tonic bopbi T g and conven- tional boo bing This Survey concluded that the sane dar iage which resulted fron a Nagasaki-type boob could be obtained by the use of 2700 tons of conventional boobs with the proper proportion of high explosive incendiary and fragnentation types Many factors prevent direct conparison of conventional bor 1bs with a tonic boobs and there ls wide variation in the -e'stinates of the atonic bonbs which would be equivalent to the 1 989 979 tons of conventional boobs which were directed at target systems of' Axis Europe A substantial proportion of the tonnage dropped in Europe did not fall in urban or built-up industrial areas and was delivered over a period of two a nd one- half ye rs Danage est J i ated for J p nese cities JCS 1953 1 - ' 0 '- Appendix G- to Enclosure 11 B Reproduced kom tlleUndass fic l I Oeciassified Holif 9s ol the NatiooalArthiV would not apply strictly to cities of different construction chara cteristics For instance nearly all the hones in Japanese cities were of light frame construction or even a nore fragile type and were built closely together while it has been estiLlated that a large percentage of the hones in the -0 S S •R are of the log cabin type and are probably at least equivalent in strength to heavy frane buildings There is another d i sparity in the case of dar iage to be expected fron secondary fires inasouch as the Japanese construction was nore inf laor mble and generally in ru ban o reas aore closely concentrated than that in the Soviet Union It is not possible to in flict extensive danage as rapidly with conventional bonbs as with atonic boobs The rate of attack factor is discussed under Recupe rability paragraph 11 of Enclosure B In the case of the Japanese citie-s the fire dm age was lergely contaiued within the blaet danage area so that the fire conpleoented serious daoage already existing f oo blast This ouy not always obtain in the f'utu •e The conclusion of the Strategic Bonbing Survey was that the ar·ea of destruction at Hiroshina was 4 7 sgUB re miles and at Nagasaki 1 8 square niles However the area of danage at Nagasaki was lioited by the soall size of the ather isolated section of the city over which the boob exploded and the fact th11t sectio ns of the city were protected by intervening hills Otherwise cons i dering the equivalent energy release o_f these two boJJbs the Nage sc ki boob being the oore powerful the destroyed a rea in Nagasaki would have been several tines lnrger Such variations in dru ia ge will be discussed lnter 4' OP SEGRE' ' JCS 1953 l - 71 - Appendix G to Enclosure B Damage to Material In current plans the aining point of each bomb is selected so that the position of the bomb burst will have at least a 75% probability of produc·ing Class principal targets of attack 11 J danage to the Class A danage is that which enders a building 0r mstallation unsuitable for its intended use until najor reconstruction is acc ot pli shed In some cases it ill result in total destruction of the contained supplies furnishings and equipaent in other cases the prinary equipocnt may renain undaoa ged notwithstanding wall collapse nissile effectsand fires because of the ruggedness o r indestructibility of th e contents Areas of Olass A danage a r e shown 1n Table II of the Annex to this Append1 Jt Personnel Casualties The most striking effect of the two Japanese bonbs was the great nunber of personnel casualties which were inflicted A plaus ibl e estiDate of t h e va rious causes ·o_f dee th vould be as follows Flash Burns 20 to 30 per oept Other I11j urie s 50 to 60 per cent Radiation Sickness 15 to 20 per cent Many of the people who died were subjected t o several types of inj uries anyone of whi h -would have been fatal Flash Burns It has been estil Ja tcd that the ground tenperature at 1500 feet f ron ground zero at Hiroshina had an instantaneous value exceeding 2000°0 and that the f ollowing heo t wave ext anded over a large area r eaching great intensity within a radius of froo 3000 to 4000 feet The degree of burns varied with the protection afforded individuals by buildings and clothing_ 'PO P SECR l 'l' JCS 1953 1 - - 72 - Appendix G to Encu osure 11 B R lroducoo from Ille Vndassified I Declassified Hol llngs cl the National Archives - Other Injuries Effects produced by over- pressure alone on Japanese personnel seen to have been rare there being anong survivors very few cases of ruptured eardrUl ls at Hiroshima and Nagasaki Most of the inju1•ies were f' ror i secondary causes which resulted fron collapsed buildings and flying nissiles Secondary burns probably accounted for a con- siderable nunber of deaths in Riroshioa and Nagasaki these being caused by structures being blown down upon people and shortly thereafter catching fire Many people who were injured and pinned beneath debris succui 1bed to the eff'eots of heat from the burning collapsed buildings Radiation Sickness fron Primary Fissi on Products Radiati n effects fron pri l lary fission products were not sufficient to produce casualties under conditions such as those which existed in Japan and it is believ ed that the deposit of prii ary fi ssion products will not be an nportant factor in air bursts which are planned in TROJAN Radiation Sickness fron Radiation During Fission Ganma rays and neutrons liberated by and during the fission process produced nearly all significant radiation injury Doses of neutron and gamna radiation sufficient to cause severe cases of radiati on sic1m ess extended to a radius of abotJ t 4500 feet 1'ror i the point of explosion not measured from ground zer o De ath f'rom radiation sickness although C elayed was almost certain to those exposed explosion survivors up to a distance of 3600 feet from the point of explosion The danger fron nuclear radiation to unshielded and exposed persoILDel was neglig ible at about one mile rroo ground zero In general it i laY be expected that i n the case of air bUl 'sts the pos ibility of · being killed by blast heat nissiles a nd fires wou d cover ' J the rad ius of danger spec l fied for death r e sulting fron radiation 9 '0i' SEGF EIP Jes· 1953 1 - 73 - Appendix G to Enclosure Bn Reproduced ran Ille Undassified I DedasSilied Holdings ol lhe Na60flalAn lfl'o'eS -- -' f 1 • '' - h j - lf lf01' SECRET This Committee considers tlie above described effects are a resonable index of atonic l lomb da r iage in the future Current Data in Use Table I of tbe Annex to this Appendix as used by t he Strategic Vulnerability Branch of tue Air Intel ligence Division lists the cor JDon types of buil ding construction with the corresponding over-pressures pounds per square inch above atnospheric pressure to cause Class A danage This Conllilittee has obtained data from the Atomic Energy Corunission as of 1 lpril 1949 as to l µat areas would be Jm der an over-pressure of four six and eight pounos per square inch for b 01 1os of e11ch type at the burst heights shown These values were calculated for flat target surfaces without a target· array See Table I I of the Annex to this Appendix Data Used in Annex H to Appendix I to Enclosure Area Study 11 B 11 - The proper values of Tabl es I and II of the Annex to this Appendix conbined with burst heights which we re consistent with those selected by the St1 ategic Vulnerability Bvancb 11 wer e used in the estimates 1 1ade in Annex H to Appendix I to Enclosure Bh of this report for estimates of damaged areas and personnel casualti es In those estimates t he area of dal ia ge was calculated on the basis of damage which would result from 5 psi thus insuring danage to donestic wood frame and single - storY load beari TJ g wall buildings • In connection with natcrial dal lage variati ms may be expected in area and on the targets withi 11 areas as was demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki The following table shows dar iage and pez sonnel casualties for Hiroshma and Nagasal i l 'OP SEGID 'l' J'CS 1953 1 - 74 - J ppendix G to Encll oi n1re 11 B 11 Reproduced lrom lho Undassified I Declassified Hol fiags ol lhe Nal o ial Attt lv0$ -- TOP SEORE'f Hiroshit ia Nagasaki 35 000 65 000 4- 7 1 8 70 80 000 35 40 000 Injured 7 0 000 40 000 Mortality rate per square mile destroyed 15 000 20 000 Casualty rate per square mile 32 000 43 000 Popuiation dens it1 per square ·nile Square oiles destroyed Killed and ttiss ing The average population density of the 70 cities considered 1n TROJAN is est1I iated to be 10 000 per square mile and i t should be noted that in detemining the oortality 'and casualty figures 1Jl Anne-x H' to Appendix I to Enclosure B di1°ect proportions of densities of population were used in spite of the fact that both Japanese explosions occurred at tines during which the regular daily routine oax l ntized the nlll Jber 1 of casualties and nt Hiroshi just after the all cleer ' release following an air raid warnmg Estioates of casualties for future atooic explosions are difficult to l lake since effects would vary with the tine of attack nornal routine ·of tJ Ie people concerned in the attack and passive defense Eeasures which J ight be taken Therefore it is felt that the estinate in Annex H to Appendix I to Enclosure B as derived frol l the above figures nay be the upper linit of casualties to be expected Qualifications i n Use o f Data for Deternining D noage Substantial variations in danage result -rroo oany factors which Should be considered in using any theoretical or· empirical data s uch as have appeared in this Appendix In genera l these factors tend to reduce the expected danage The topography 0f the· ground variations i n weather conditi0ns the pl an forn and structural characteristics of the target l 'W SEG JCS 1953 1 -' 75 - Appendi x 11 G t o Enclosu re 1'B a r re y a re examples · Wind conditions ma y result 1n focusing the shock wave _increasing the pressure 1n unexpected directions with corresponding decreases in other directions Inforoed opinion is to the effect that large amounts of moisture in the air such as f og or rain will substantially reduce the blast ·effect -Danage nay be decreased depending upon the degree of effectiveness of passive defense neasures in the bombed area - See Appendix F to Enclosure B _ 4'0P SEGRE' ' JCS 1953 1 - 76 - Appendix G to nclosure ' 11 B11 ··o§· i · · -· 0 ler '°' -- ' · • ✓ 1' - ' APPENDIX I TO ENCLOSURE B DETERMINATION OF MATERIAL DAMAGE AND PERSONNEL CASUALTIES Annexes A t o G inclusive to this Appendix are separate studies on the estimated e ffects of the initial atomic offensive on selected segments of the Sovi et industrial establishment Annex H to this Appendi c consists of a study on the e stimated damage whi ch is liable to be inflicted on Soviet industry as a whole and the personnel casualties which might be experienced by Soviet urban populati ons of Annexes A O Sigmf'icant conclusions to H to this Appendix are as follows PETROLEUM 1 Successful execution of the initial atomic offensive as planned would • Result in a 701 or better probability of Class A damage t o 76 4% of the USSR throughput refining capacity Q• Result in a 70% or better probability of Class A damage to 100% of the USSR high octane avgas refining capacity _g_ Resul · i n c stri ngent r eduction in the supply of petroleum pr·oduots to the Soviet armed f'orces and in e corresponding reduction in overall Soviet military capability Result in a critical shortage of high octane aviation gasoline with a corresponding reduction in the combat effectiveness of the Soviet air force Note The time at -which shortages of petroleum products for the Soviet armed forces becomes c ritical will depend largely upon the l evels ' of POL stockpiles prevailing a t the initiation of hostilities and the efficiency with which the USSR 1s able to exploit remaining r efinery capacity including that for synthe tic fuels Jf'BP SEGRE JCS 1953 1 - 90 - Appendix I to Enclosure B' 2 The Soviet oil appears to constit ute a most lucrative ta get and serious consideration should be given to making it the pr imary obje ctive wit h either a t omic or conventional bombs of the initial ato11U c offensive STEEL 1 The successful execution of the initial atomic offensive as planned has a 70% or better probabili ty of reducing the productive capacity of raw steel in the Soviet Union by 45· 5 or app oxim tely 7-1 4 million tons per year l eaving a remaining c P city of aboµt 10-3 4 million tons per year pending res orAtion of damage or augmentation from other sources 2 An indeterminate but substantial portion of Soviet steel processing facilities would be destroyed or damaged This should adversely affect •capa bilities to res tore damage both in the steel ind stry and other industries and would result in directly· reduc ' ng the output of war matel'ials 3 Dama gE i nflict13c WO' lld be serious but the effect on the war effort vcu ld iJs µrilJla rily of a long-range oa ture in creating shortnges r f f n i a 'l· i war materials Gi ven time much of the damaged pr09-u i e su - - ccessing me chinery can be salvaged repaired o ss cr d to operations 4 Partial lief of steel shortages shoul d be possible from satellite countries and conquered areas but time in excess of one year will be required to exploit substantially such sources SYNTHETIC RUBBER l · During the first year of war- the Russian war effort 11 not be critically affected by the damage to the syntheti c rubber industry caused by the initial a tomic offensive Although there is a 70' or better probability of Class A do lJ age to 57% ·of syntheti c r•ubber capacit y t be civilio n economy should be abl e t absorb such shortages as may exist ' -'MF SECJ IE'P JCS 19 53 l - 91 - Appendix I to Enclosure B - - · -a I• lily I •• ••1 _ 9 AAW I _ _1 ' ' I 2 During the second and ucceeding years of war shortages would become critical and would be r eflected in de creased mobility of the Soviet armed forces and in the civilian economy unless damaged facilities are restored or replaced by conversions AIRCRAFT AND AIRCRAFT ENGINES 1 Successful execution of the atomic offensive as planned would result in a 70 per qent or better probability of Class A damage to 59 per cent of Soviet aircraft assembly capacity and to 68 3 per cent of aircraft engine capacity In addition indeterminate damage of a serious nature would be inflicted on sources for production of aviation equipment and accessories 2 Damage t o the two known plants producing long-range bombers would progressively reduce Soviet capability for long-range air bombardment With the reduction in flow of replacement aircraft and e ngines to operational units and for training the USSR will be forced to reduce progressively air power for independent cooperative and supporting operations 3 Coupled with the shortage of aviation gasoline the reduced production of aircraft will force extreme selectivity in air oper ations and constitute a serious deficiency in Soviet military capabiliti es_ MACHINE TOOLS 1 Neither the macp1oe tool industry nor inventory stocks provide 8ppropr1ate t rgets of thomselves for inclusion as primary targets in the initial a tomic offensive 2 Successful execution of the initial atomic offensive as plahned will - Provide 70 per ce t or better probo bil1ty or Cla s A damage t o 23 i9 per cent of' the plants of the ma ch ine- tool industry 2 Effect coosiderable but· an indeterlil Lnate amount of dest uction or dalllll ge to machine tools either installed or I FOP Sl30ffi3'i' JCS 195371 - 92 - Appendix I to Enclosure B' manpower largely unsld lled - ' 3- but esti1J1D ted t6 be considerabie damz ge il · •· y rds in areas ·_under - _ ' ' · • _tt J '- - - ---· · • ' __ _ __ -- 0 --' ' ' • u 1 • r I •• 4 Heavy damage the facilities f or building maintaining and repairing railroad equipment This is b ound to be serious since this portion of Soviet industry is already functioning at maximum capacity AREA BASIS l Successful execution of the initial atomic offensive as planned would - Result in damage to Soviet urban area as indicated in the following table Damage Depending upon Type of Structure Minimum Lbs sq in Overpressure Approximate Per Approximate contage of Total Soviot Orron Square Miles of Soviet Urban Area a 50 000 Areas Destroyed or Greater Deor Damaged stroyed or Damage Destroyed to Heavy Damage 8 320 13 Destroyed to Medium Damage 6 460 19 Destroyed to Light Damage 5 650 27 Destroyed to Superficial Damage 4 840 35 12· Be liable t o foflict Class A damage on about 20 - 30 per cent of the Soviet Industrial Establishment as a whole _s _ Produ'ce as many as 2 700 000 morta lities 4 000 000 additional casualties destroy a large number of homes and V11 stly complicate the problems of living for the remainder of the 28 000 000 people 1n the 70 target cities depending on the effectiveness of Soviet passive defense measures Note The foregoing results should be adjusted up or down in dire t proportion to the total numbe r of bombs actually delivered on target areas -' 'OP 8EGREi r- JCS 1953 1 - 94 - Appendix I to Enclosure B' Reproduced from Undassi iod Dodassif od Hoi fr gs of he Nalional Althlves - t· - •• CUMUl A$' E EFFECTS - -l ' ·The wide distribution 0 1 10a mage on urban areas through mt the USSR with associated shoe conf'usion and casualties to personnel as well as the rate at which damage and casualties are inflicted will have an additional cumulative effect on industry essential to the Soviet war effort Although aillling points are selected primarily to focus the damage on specific industries and industrial concentrations it is inevitable that actual damage will be indiscriminate as to types and functi ms of other instal- lations within the target areas This will affect adversely all phases of Soviet economy and the ability of the Soviet people to carry on effectively with work necessary for the prosecution of a war The amount and rate at which damage and personnel casualties are inflicted will also have advel'se effects on recuperative measures which will need to be taken to restore order and production essential to the war effort Immediately after eacq atomic- explosion the surviving population in the affected area will be posed many complicated problems such as simultaneously caring for casualties extinguishing fires restoring essential util ities providing food a nd shelter and clearing rubble The people will be called upon to meet these problems immediately and at a ti me when shock and fear are prevalent leadership is handicapped Jan y key personnel are killed or missing and controls are disru pted Each operation will lace heavy demands on the available manpower and the effective accomplisl unent of each will be dependent upon the others The destruct ion of large numbers of homes will impose lasting hardships on an urban population already overcrowded and existing on a marginal status All of the foregoing tasks will have to be faced before reconstruction of industrial facilities can be undertaken and production restored in whole or in part In the reconstruction of facilities or the restoration of production it is to be remembered that dependence must be placed on oth r industries and utilities many of which may have· been concomitantly damaged 'fOP 8EGRE1' JCS 1953 X - 95 - AppendiX I to Enclosure B Rcprod Jood om lhe UndassifJOd I Dcciassifllld Holdings of the Naliooal Archr es ¥ '' _ i1 ' - 1il ' Ii 1 or a re suffering f rom the co iiateral effect of damage ei-sewhere The i nterdependency of a 1 1 industries and services is o factor of importance in normal production in the restoration of damage and in reesta blishing production from previously damaged plants The damage personnel casual ties a od eff ects therefrom have been estima ted on the basic assumption that the initial atomic offensive contemplated 1n current var plans TROJAN is successfully executed a s planned This applies both to the quantity of bombs and the period i n which they are delivered Shou Ld a lesser number of bombs be actually delivered on targets or t e rate of delivery be substantially s lower the da mage casualties and effects would be l ess Should a larger number of bombs be delivered on the targets and the rate of delivery the same or greater the damage casualties and effects would also be greater In either case reevaluation should be made · 'POP SEORB'l' JCS 1953 1 - 96 - Appendix I t0 Enclosure 0 B Reproduced r ' ' lhe Undasslfledl Dedassified Holdn gs of the National Ardlives ' J TO ENCLOSURE ANNEX 11 811 '·· DE'fEBl lNATION OF DAMAGE i'O SOVIET INpUSTRY · AND POPUlill TION Lb$SE$ O AN AREA BAS S The war eff ort which a nation i s capable or · exerting is dependent upon the ability of its industry to maximize production e ssential to carrying on a war Any decrease of industrial output is reflected by a subsequent reduction 'in supply of basic equipment and essential consumable supplies to the armed forces The principal objective of the strategic a ir offensive is the destruction of essential elements of t he Soviet industrial establisbment--with a view towe rds reducing and if possible completely stopping production of essentiel supplfes and materials both required by the armed forces and civilian consumers The exact extent to which the Soviet industrial capacity would be reduced by the intial atomic offensive can not be accurately and completely determined at this time because the intelligence available is insufficient It is generally accepted that practically all aoviet industry is l ocated in or identified with Urban areas whose population is 50 000 or more If all - such Urban areas WeI e to be destroyed and appropriate steps taken to keep such areas in a s tate of idleness the _industrial capacity of the USSR and therefore its war effort uould be reduced to a negligible l evel As a corollary to t h is if' parts of these urban areas are destroyed o per centage of Soviet industrial facilities would be destroyed and many of' the skilled workers and management personnel essential to industry would be included in the over-all casualties t0 the population Notable exceptions ar 7 oil refineries electric power pl ts nd items of the transportation system While it is realized that the margin of err0r might be I I -TOP SEGRE4' JCS 1953 1 - 156 - Annex '1H to to Enclosure ''I lwproduced from he Unclassified I Dedassifiod Holdings of the Nalional Atd lves - -- 'ifi - - large if applied against a s ll number of bombs directed at a few cities i t is considered that the variables should cancel out t o reduce the margin of error to acceptable limits when the number of bombs and urban ar•eas involved is large The Intelli gence Division of the Department of the my furnished t his collll 1ittee with measurements of 53 of the 70 •u rban ureas listed as objectives in the initia l atomic offensive of plan TROJAN Ls ck of suitable maps prevented the making of accurate measurements for the others When these measure- ments were 1r a de t he cities were plotted on a density-per- squaremile bar graph and i t wes noted that all of the cities except a few old long-established urban center•s as i'or example Moscow end Leningrad showed a consistent relationship in population density per square mile From this analysis i t was foWld that o coefficient ranging between 0 12 and 0 9 square miles per thousand people could be applied to most of the cities in the USSR For the purposes of this report where it was impossible to measure U' rba n areas from a map a factor of 10 000 persons per square mile wos used The population of Soviet cities as of January 1949 as estinated by the Army Intelligence Division was used From the data furnished it was possible to obtain a reasonable estimate of the Urban area and population of the cities of the u s s R having o popu lation of 50 000 or more An estimate has been made as to the percentage of industry l ocated wi t hin the TROJAN cities and the amount in other • in cities these percentages Two methods were used in det ermining First a relationship between the area of the TROJAN cities to the total areas of all cities in the U S S R of 50 000 population or more and second by a population ratio l It is interesting to note that these two est tma tes vary only by 10 per cent 'f9P S E ctlET JCS 1953 1 Annex nH t r ' end1x 11 1 11 Reproduced from the UnclassiflC I Oedassified ioldngs of lhe Natiooal Archives t t - t l'OP OBCRE'l' _ ✓Jf r I -'i i ' ' The destruction area of'' each bomb -was estiniated as previously liscussed in Appendix 'IJ to Enclosure ''B and totaled A detailed study -was made of each target and it was noted tha t t he area of expected destruction of each bomb in many cases includes considerable water surface In arriving at the total dest1 uction area these non- p1 oduc t ive water c reas approximately 5% were excluded The estimated destroyed area divided by t he total Urban area within the TROJ cities was taken as an index of the destruction which might be expected on the Soviet industry -within these cities and of Soviet industry as a whole In reaching its conclusion the committee used an overpr essure of 5 pounds pe r square inch as a measure for the area of Class A damage An estimate of 20 000 persons killed per bomb was used to arrive at an estimat e of the total dcc ths which -will result from the atomic offensive The figure of 20 000 is felt to be reasoncbly conservative in the light of experience at Hiroshima and the computed population densities or average sov10t cities Corresponding cesualt1es to personnel by burns wounds or other causes would be abou t 30 000 per bomb The e rates might be subject to downward revi sion depending upon t he effectiveness of Soviet po ssive defense measures which are discussed in Appendix F to Enc l osure 11 B11 • AREA AND POPULATION Square railes of UrbmJ A rea Popu lat l on TROJAN C i ties Other Ci ties 50 000 or more Population l 751 866 28 080 000 8 660 000 Pounds per squurc inch overpressure is the pressure in the blast - wave in excess of c toospheric i • e 4 pounds per squa re inch psi overpressuro equals 576 pounds pressure 'ill ' s quare foot 1n excess of normal pressure on a surface f'o cing a b I st wave 8 psi e quals 1152 pounds per square foot overpressure etc i · 4'0P 8 SGR E'f- JCS 1953 1 - 158 - J p nex 11H11 to Appendix t Enclosure 11B 11 1 Reproduced fral lho Unclassified Oedassifle I Hokf l s of I le Nailooal Arthivcs a -- llfet ASSI - -l A t'h 11 L ' - M IMfD Jt · _· ' - _ _ -r - ' • 'l'O P SECRET ENCLOSURE B THE AW APPRAISAL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ATOMIC BOMBING UPON THE SOVIET WILL TO WAGE WAR In this appraisal there e re many statements which to a NOTE degree balance e_a ch other This is necessary in order to portray the complex and frequently contrasting Russian character its history and development Hence the ap- praisal should be considered as a whole and single statements should not be considered out of context Historical Background The u s s The 11 Autocratic Tradition has developed from and is now composed of a large nlllliber of races ethnic groups and former small nations_ Individually and collect tvely they have fought seve·re battles against nature l l mong themselves and agai nst foreign powers The country has been ov e rrun by Mongols and deeply penetrated but not completely overcome by Western European nations The Russum people have underg one many transformations and they are 't horoughl y indoctrinated in autocratic trad itions The Czars introduced autocratic rule that has provided a f rame fov potential greatness and a prevailing unity for the nussnn nation which has carrieq through to the present time The physical isolation of Russin from t he t3 ading centers of Western Europe and the world has been paralleled by her spiritual· and cultural isolation Russia os u whole has been cut ofl' genevally from the influences which have enriched the life ands world rred the development of the western She has been associated with conditions which have in- fluenced the development of hard stolid and ruthless characteristics among the people and their leaders Historically the Russ ims have µiaintained strong armies to support their military position and since its advent to power the Commuriist govern- I ment has maintained strong military forces and bac ed them up with an expanding program of industrialization JCS 1953 1 I - 164 - Appendix nJ to1 Enclc s ure B RCjllllduccd fraTI lhe Uooassificd I Deciassifieo Hol lngs of 1tio National An hives - 3 - f -y r f· -- The Russ l D ns ar e-ilsenl _ iy an unsophisticated gregarious people readily susq iptible t o propaganda and rumor They are a paradoxical combina ion of primitive simplicity and stoic ruthl ess Orientalism In groups once aroused they have been cap- able of almost superhuman · tasks With their patriarchal tradit ori t he masses of the peop le have followed their leaders with childlike confidence and unswerving l oyalty This has not precluded the Upsurge of leaders with revolutionary tendencies against the gove rnment • Russia has accomplished and can accom lish again political and social evoluti ons dangerous to world peace • provided the autocratic power is preserved -- and the people remain politically passive The actual philosophy of the model n U S S -R4· is something to which Karl Marx and dialectical materialism have made a cont ribution but it is made up of other elements including those of Orthodox Christianity and traditional Russian sentiment It must be recognized that we fac e in the U S S R today two strong forces -- that of mili tant communism and that of strong Russill ll nationalism Each force would have a powerful influence on Soviet actjons in 1tie event of war The vast mass of the Russianpeople have never dreamed of enjoying democracy and freedom as enjoyed by Western peoples Their primary inter ests have been the problems of obtaining a day- to - day existence and nothing more In general they are and hav e been barred froin knowledge of better condi tions•· They desire economic security socia levelling and the prest ige o the Iluss L nnati on and these it seems to t hem they now experience in a larger measure than in the pre-revolutionary period Precisely how wide and how deep was the sentiment of GreatRussian patriotism in the pre-revolution nation it ts not easy to say nor deep Patriotism toward the State was perhaJ s nei l her wide i On the other hand atriot ism of a mysticr l entity of Mother Russia 11 has been c o n s_istently both w 1despr ead and ij ' POP SEOflfi' l JCS 1953 1 App_e ndix Jn Ehclosure B - 165 - i I I 0 ' i --iii -·_ --1 · - t_ -- TOP---SBCRET pers i s t ent - It is exemplifi a by the historical shrines of Moscow and Leningrad and the hope of many Great-Russians to ' die in Moscow see Leningrad and to live and The Great-Russ ian pe ople have formed organized and administered successfully certain primitive aggregations their patriarchal famil y village communes and even larger units Within these groups there bas been complete freedom of e xpression and argumentative debate but each group has had an authoritative head The people have normally concluded these debates without firm decisions among themselves for decisions are considered the prerogatives of their leaders It is immaterial to them that their democratic procedures are not translated from small organizations to the larger political bodies and to the politjcal problems of State since each unit family commune or region is traditionally under authoritative discipline and control In certain respects at the present time the Soviet government tolerates self-criticis At agitation meetings and meet- ings of factory-Soviets con iderable argument and debate on administrative matters are permitted but never to the pc1 1t that the policy or decis ions of the recognized leaders and the ComIn Russia there are many ex- munist Party are questioned amples of a d gree of democracy on the lower plane which might prove eventually to be the germs for democracy on the national plane h h gher So far the mass of Russian people continue to be an amenable group who are convinced of their duty of submission to their masters and their decisions They possess a blind faith 1n leaders Even though a decision is not in accord with the peoples' wishes they accept it with the conviction t hat their wishes we re considered but their leaders knew what as best and have done what was right The Soviet totalit arian sta te is firmly established upon the f oregoing historical characteristics wi th variantesI to permit ma ny traditions and Czarist customs to b adapted to mo4ern demands • I Stalin enjoys prestige and a pos i tion of greatn s comparable to I the former Czars - their Lit tle White Father 11 in tlhe Kreml t n I 'J '0P S OflE'F JCS 1953 1 - 66 Appendix ''J i o Enolosure B Reprodua d tram lhe Uoaassilled Deciasslliod Holdings of Ille Na1 0nal Arthi es - - u ' 0 - o 1 _ · uP H - • ___ - SEGRET - -- f m 1 -- ef Al though not a Great-Ru sian fie bas risen from among the working people All decisions of the Soviet government are conside d to erna na te from Stalin even though i n reality t hey_ha ve been prepared and disseminated by any government agency in keeping with Stalin's policy or the directives of the Politburo and t he Communist Party The mejority of tbe pP ople do not belong and bave oo aspiratiGns to be- iong to the- C o '11 lunist Party relieVE 3 th R'cl 3S1 1 The Communist Party 7'oq fro n the undesired burden of re- sponsibHi t I c ' d6ci ao 2nd administration on matters of State Soviet les ders bip is undoubtedly in control of both government and the pe plc P Ud has never seriously miscalculated what the people would ole ate The organization for propaganda and asitation j_s n_ _e propaganda but at the same time maintains through egi tr ti on meetings a unique nation-wide poll of the peoples 1 reaction and attitude toward government policies The governruPPt n n_ipulates its policies and executive action skillfully - e'5 npon this kno· ledge The Russian people currently have a standard of living that is low when compared wit h the West but probably higher than the conditions e xisting during pre-revolutionary times The people enjoyed a ·be tter standard of living i n 1938 but were f orced to abandon it to prepare for war They submissively accept their present conditions as tenworary while var damage is repaired and indus trial development is attained Their lives in the past and present have be-en eternally filled with many promises and the people still hope that these promises will be fulfilled The past war and their enemies are blamed for their present condition while their government 1s loyally supported for achieving victory and talcing the constructive steps to provide for tbeit we lfare • The main tbe1 1es for propaganda are deve l oped around fear hope'' love and hate 11 • The Soviets use fear and hope most frequently and effectively The Soviet regim po sl na ny soui·ces of strength but propaganda and force are the two dominating instrumen ts Propaganda conditions the people to accept l'OP---- - SEiGRE'l' · -- · 167 - I rd support tbe Appendix • 11 to Enclosure 11 B Roprod 30 from lflo Undasslieo I Oedasslfoed Hold ng or u e Na ° al Archives •·• t il Cl ASSlf - p- U 'I I - •• 1i SECFfEr - - - • - _ _ -- ·_ - rt • wnve IWIA 'o r -Ve P ent f ore_ fe fear of fo e ser ve to keep otherwise non-t onformipt'e l i lline_ to confoz trt are quickij re ovJ i and Those who complain or fail re-educated Lessons from World War II Russia was saved from German conquest not by her modern progress but rather by the vastness of her territory and the tenacity of her people The Germans underrated the Red Army German hopes of victory were bui t largely on the prospect that the invasion would produce a political upheaval in Russia_ Most of the German generals realized beforehand that if the Russians chose to fall bacl there was little chance of acbieving a final victory without the help of such a political upneaval Too high hopes were bui lt on the belief that Stalin would be over- thrown by his own people if he suffered heavy defeats The Russians have proven that they can absorb heavy casualties and extensive withdrawals in the field without having 1t cause political overturn The Germans paid a terrific price for their lack of i'oresight The Germans were outmaneuvered by the significant Russian custom of repe -tedly giving ground rather than letting themselves be drawn into decisive battles such as the Germans were seeking The Germans failed to assess properly the Rulll UD-n mentali ty and to assess properly Russ wn psy hological weaknesses Red Army officers and men were forced by discipline and haunted by a real fear which caused them to carcy out their orders implicitly OJ ' individually to suffer the conseq uenc s Impelled by courage__ ruthlessness and stringent military and political discipline the Red Army executed i ts orders to retre' to hold fast or to advance regardless of the loss of human l i fe Once the Red Army took the offensive Russian troops never failed to advance except when stopped locally and temporarily by heavy German fire for they were driven forward I under the compulsion of officers Political representatives I were rea_d y to turn their pistols on anyone who spirk 9- men were embued with an of£ensive spirit The An outstapdi g I charactJristic of the Russian soldier is his so '- 1 esf indifference to life and death troops are hard I and Red Aro y • I frequently cruel in their behavio r • JCS 1953 1 168 _ Appendix_''J to Enl losure ''B Reproduced from lho Unaossjfied Decia ol Od Holdings or Iha N31lonol rtlliVos JQP 4 l'P CBET 1 German Genf ral Manteu f'tal described the Red Army on the offensive as follows 'Ihe advance of • Russian _l rnJy Westerns can't imagine ts solllething that Behind the tank spearheads rolls on a vast horde largely mounted on horses The soldier carries a sack on his back vi th dry crusts of bread and raw vegetables collected on the march from the fields and villages Toe horses eat the straw from the house roofs - they get little else The Russians are accustomed to carry on for as longo sthroe weoks in this primitive wo y wnen advancing You can 1 t stop them like an ordinary army by cutting their connnunications for you rarely find any supply columns to strike Destruction by Bombing Industry The RUss1an people bave been continuously renu nded toot their sacrifices since 1917 are necessary in order to permit their leaders to devel op an industrial potential comparable i th thA t of the West and to prepare for var or to repair war damage Russio ns oove been led to believe that their standard of living and daily struggle to survive will be more readily solved o s the established industrial goals are attained In 1937 and 1938 Russians began to taste a little prosperity At present they are led on by the hope that real prosperity is in the offing The loss of their industry for which they have sacrificed so much would be a real blow to their hopes and future plans for personal security The perpetrator of such destruction might well incur all the hatred resentment and antagonism that Russians of the past hn ve felt toward their enemies Cities Russian history is replete with instances of a scorched earth policy sider an 1nvc ding Russian Army and wanton as synonymous I The peoples of Central jl urope con1 11 destructlon by fire Russians have readiiy set rire t heir own - I Ci ties rather than allow them to be so eked by the ermy A good example of such action was the burning of Moscow in 1812 Of all their cities Moscow and Leningrad house the symbols of 'i'9P g zO FiE' I' JCS 1953 1 - - 169 - Appeni1x J to Enclosure B l Reprodured from Ille Undassied I Dedasslfied i'lo'ol'J IS of IM NaUoncJ Arthives 0 tJl peP BEQilE 't t - - i- autocr acy and pa ter ne 11s u i which they have traditionally depended for decision and direction This has developed a degree of sacredness for these cities which is identified with their mystical entity of national patri otism - The Russians will burn their own cities to deny them to the enemy but the enemy who destroys their t owns villages a nd historical shrines can expect a violent r eaction with the result that the people would unflinchingly rally and even accept internal tyranny in preference to any abuse by a roreigncr l 1 1 n Pooulation worke s d Among the various groups of peasants artisans there are maoy differences which are esse_n ti y petty in natur e Word of wanton destruction of urban r i ·la· cms wculd quickly spread and become exaggerated by rumor t trt ' l ' lout the U S S· R However antagonism against the enen y Fn ld tend to develop e unity of purpose a loyalty to the regime £ fld a r enewed vow to defend 11 Mother Russia 11 - - a spirit of se1-i ·--p -0i 3rvation which would transcend their differe nces Tlv t mbing of seventy Russi an cities as planned may have e terr i f i c mock effect upon all t he people of Russia or in - j_c i Subjected roxi r1 ty to this bombing would be some 28 000 000 peoi lG i ' t' 5 i - · l I e-seventh of the population of Russ fa with -pc 5 t la pr os c t cf some 2 500 000 mortalities Witb 1 n t hese u ·l e n populatj ons are the technicians and the rese rvoir of rc npower upon which the success of Russian 1ndustrfal development depends On the other hand it should be borne in mind that in World War II Leningrad withstood a se1ge of two years Public utilities did not func tion for months thousands of people starved and the population as a whole survived vith the mos t meagre of consummable supplies that were indigenous t o the ar a Work went on in spite of starvation and bombardme nt In spite of over 350 000 casualties Leni ngr ad never co pitulated A sim- ilar ordeal was experienced at Stalingrad and to a lesser degree at Moscow The Foreigner Complex Russian history has been continually dominated by strong foreign in-f luences 4'0P Gflfl'f JCS 195-3 1 Since 1800 almost ev-ery generation has - l 70 Appendix r to Epclosure · B • • f p SECRET u 1I D i ' ' ' ex periEmce d an invasion·• _t J f ireign army · J l Czars 1nvl ted and permitted foreign experts tb ihold responsible positions in their regimes Russian foreign policy encouraged and condoned marriages of nobility to foreigners as a means of settling inte rnational differences and advancing the spheres of influence of the Russian empire Prior to 1917 the Russian economy and resources wcro often exploited administered and owned by foreigners Foreign capital was invested in Russia and the profits from these investments were distributed abroad Subsequent to 1917 the Co1l11 1unist Party through propaganda has convinced the Russian people that their past sufferings were the direct result both of the Czars' ineptitude a nd the intentional de igns of foreign capitalists The pernicious influence of f o •eigners on Russian progress and welfare has been emphasized t o t 13 Russian people To the average Russian Foreigner and Capitalist are synonymous and repugnant There is evidence that today those Americans who have been permitted to travel within the U S 3 R are received by the people in a friendly hospitable manner to the extent tha t these people can ove1•come fear of the police Observers a lso report an 1fu- press1on that a nti-A_m erican propaganda is not as generally effective as was the former anti- German propaganda There seems to be a noticeable skepticism regarding anti -Ameri can propaganda among the Russian people There is apparently a considerable reservoir of friendliness among the people toward the United States residual from lend- lease activities Heavy and extensive bombing by the U S vould certainiy be a valuable adjunct to Soviet aoti-U S propaganda and play into the hands of the Soviet regime The Russian peo le would more readily believe that their government has been telling them the truth with the result that Russian r esentment and antagonism would be ee sily developed and intensified against the United States Their traditional suspicions with regard to foreign ers would be confirmed and f ocused upon the United States The Communist Party and the Secret Police MVD The Communist Party controls -and dominates everything in the u s s R The ubiquitous secret-police assisted by agents and informers forces complete subjugation oft® people to the will of the leader s of the party POP SECftET JCS 1953 1 - 171 - Appendix J to Enclosure 11B11 ·· 1o- · 11-- a 1·- -1 lltM 11 TOP SECRET permeate everything appea r to kl'lo all and collect and maintain volum nous records about everyone with no distinction with regard to age class sex family or official position Within the conf'ines of the U S S R it is a serious mistake for anyone to feel that he is not observed by the MVD The more important the individual and the higher tbe position to which one is assigned the more carefully and thoroughly is the surveillance that each ind i vidual receives The MVD are quick and ruthless in execution of their duties The Politburo Central Committee of the party and the center of government in Moscow are far removed from the people The leaders of the nation nre not and must not be criticized Appointments are made and nominations for election to public office throughout the country- are approved by the leaders in Moscow Al l subordinat es expect and l ook for guidance d i rectives decisions and orders that emanate from 'Moscow' and Moscow only The regional government of the Soviet Republics are in closer contact with their people The regional administra- tions can be and arc criticized by the people The nature of t he critlcisms usually are restricted to problems of mismanagement and 'failure to execute properly the orders and decisions r eceived from Mosc ow Regional administrations authorize many community privileges as well as execute nl ll lerous governmenta l functions They work s lowly but thoroughly and are _highly dependent upon decisions from the central gover nment They must c ontinually strive to meet local · problems a nd at the same tilile to perpetrate the Moscow Party line Their use of propaganda and force is in consonance with and full y as s evere as that exercised from Moscow p SEORE'l' JCS 1953 1 i r - 172 - Appendix J to Enclosure B ' I • Reprodua d from IJ1e Unc JassllledJ Declassilied Hold ogs of lhe Nalional Aitllivcs The People The People the masses in general exist on a lllArginal basis They are interested solely in making their living and not in participating 1 n the complicated problems of a national or interna tiona l -political ideology They are grateful to their government for whatever they llia Y be granted The only prospective path toward human betterin0nt and emoluments from the cradle to the grave lies in qualifying or becoming i denti fied with and developing as a member of the Party Even at that Party membership is relatively small for many reasons With poor roads with rail as the only available means of distant travel and with police check on ever move people are generally local in their interests and lmow little except -what is told them about the outer world--perfect subjects for t otalitarian propaganda Russian character has contradictory reatures On the one hand the Russian _can be good-natured helpful loyal hospitable and trustworthy but on the other hand he is primitive suspicious cunning cruel brutal a even ferocious A Russian loves his country intensely and is easily hurt by deprecating critic ism He willingly endures severe treatment provided he - is allowed to l_ive his own life Soviet rulers are ob_v iously aware that while the Russians a re in the main loyal to their own gove rnment as against e ny foreign governmen t the regime as such inspires little enthusiasm except among ite direct beneficiaries The wartime acts of Soviet rulers have shown that these rulers knew that if they were to demand from the people superhuman efforts against the invader it would have to be in the namf of Russian patriotism and not or devotion to t he ' Communist j Party As a matter of expediency the Party was pushed into the background and t he Army exaJ ted It was _only when v-ictor_y was in sight that the Party was restored to the foreground - 1 i TOP BECRm JCS 1953 1 i - 173 -Appendix 11J'1 tp Enclosure B l I Reprod ed fiom loo Unclassifie I I Oecla ss iw Holdings ol the Nal onal An llives TOP SECRET •I to recsive the applause rfh Sovi et government appears t'o realize fully the capabilit s limitations and psychol ogical reactions of the people under its domill ation The U S Voice of Alilerica has occasioned curious interest among the people of the U S S R and there is evidence of its widespread reception- The contents of these programs which are in such contrast wi th Soviet propagande produce considerable mental confusion among its listeners To the Russian there is no proof as to which propaganda i ·s correct and the Russian is completely incapable of i Jllagining that many standards-portra yed · by the Voice of America can actually exist The Russians are interested in local matters of every-• day importance Thei r ignora n ce of tho outside world has made them submissive subjects for propaganda Exposure of members of the Armed Forces to western civiliz ation is carefully controlled and is invariably followed by re-indoctrination Other countermeasures to enforce ideological discipline a re the retention of wives and children as hostages while the husband is o broad requiring that on ly married men be permitted on certain assignments and limiting their period_s of suc h duty Even in Rus_sia itself when pe·ople in industry travel to new jobs in nev loca 1 ities their service records'' must accompany them and the police are continuously aware of their movements There is some evidence to indicate that the Soviet regil le is much vorried concerning the continued loyalty of its people The acceptance among their people of the Communist ideology ma Y be wearing th in To counteract tnis the leaders of Communist parti es abroad have been required recently to voice new oaths of feo lty to Stalin and 'World Collll lunism There is active prosecuti on of programs ' of re- indoctrination in Connnunist ideology throughout Russia i l fOf SE RE'f- JCS 1953 1 Appendix 11 J 11 o Enclosure B Reproduccl from tile Unclassified I Oedassif d Holdings ol lhe National Arc llfves ¥' - ' r ·- ·iii The fairly constant trickle of Rus lians seel ihg asylUl l 1n the West further suggests that inside the Soviet Un i on there is not the same total ignorance of conditions of the outside world tbat pr'sViously prevailed among the Russian people But on the whole it must be admitted that propa g anda and censorship exercised by the Soviet government has a better chance to continue to reach anddominate the mass of the Russian people than has pro_p l ganda fr om the Western World Control--as widosprecl d geographically' as it is as binding and hidden as it is with such widespread inertia of submissiveness traditionally ingrained ui the people with d oubtful ability on our part to get at the mass of the people 'With justifiable and understandable explanation as to our motive for so ruthlessly destroying their industry and killing their people in the hearts· of their country by strategic bombing--could hsrdly be destroyed other than temporarily and in areas of panic and hysteria Among the people there would certainly be the feeling that nothing their gover ent could have done could warrant bringing such punishment by us upon tbem Soviet propaganda has already laid the groW1dwork for this a·tti tude The goverrn ient wou1d i lllllediately seize all radios in the event of war as it did in World Wa r II and would be able to retain coml lunication initiative tbroughout·the interior of Russia This could not be overcome until by sone means or other the Allies established dominating ground control Res istance El ements Resistance groups have never seriously threatened the Soviet goverru ient 's control of any large ar ea al though they have caused occasional disruption of no rnal activi ty in Val'ious districts of the U S S R such as the Crinean ona Ukrainian movement after World War II lfOP S BORET JCS 1953 1 - 175 - _ Appendix JH to Enclosure B I Reproduce from lhe Undassirled Oeclassmeo Koloogs of the Nalioriai AldliYos - _ _-- _ ···- a r - TOl' SECRET Police countermeasure are usually very affective and expeditiously executed Planned genocide and forceful transfers of population resettlement and similar dispersals of' the ethnic groups involved has been pursued effectively by the government in al most every case of dissidence or defection among national entities In most instances these ethnic groups have been more concerned with survival than political ambitions The composition of recalcitrant bands·- is heterogeneous with the membership including many escaped PW's Soviet Army deserters criminals and political outlaws who are generally ore concerned with their own survival than with political aims Militarily il11potent in their isolation and politically uninterested these groups are too small and too poorly org ized to a ssume control of their own national area let alone the gove rnment of the entire country They would represent a liability rather than an asset in the establishment of a new Russian gover ent after a collapse of the Soviet system On the basis of available evidence there is neither an organized nor a projected un erground movement in the U S S R None co n be expected to develop in a cowitry where the ubiguitous _MVD permeate every phase of life and its most personal problems Under this sys tea an undergroUDd can only be nurtured among groups of the MVD or within the Red rey Forces Within these organizations in the past i solated cases of defection have developed but subsequently have been destroyed with innnediate drastic purges There are no signs of deterioration within the Aroed Forces or Soviet police at the present tir ie Political adainistrators within the • Armed Forces are alert to detect any evidence of defection and their surveillance is very efficient and off ctive lf'OP Sl3Gf E'±l - I - 176 - Appendix J t Enclosure JCS 1953 1 11 11 B Reproduced from lho Unclassifoed I Declassified Hokoogs of lhs Nalional Archives ' TOP SECRET - - - _ ' ' Resistance elements n qUire capable eadership and careful planning • There is little opportunity to groom leaders within the u s S R for resistance activ-ities Foreigners Russians living in exile - or Russians contaminated by 11 11 Foreigners are the only potential sources that are available for leaders However Russians living in exile have l ost close contact with internal Soviet conditions and they can be considered as no longer acceptable as leaders to the Russia 11 people who have remained at home worked and sacrificed -with the aspirations of establishing a new Mother Russia 11 as one of the dominant nations of the world The Combat Forces If invasion by the Russians into Western Europe or the Middle East is initiated preceding or coincident with mass bombing of the interior of Russia there are several inportant factors to be considered First the stockpiled military supplies within the perimeter of Russia or in satellite countries will not have been destroyed by the planned atomic offensive Second reports of widespread da ge to industries cities and people within the Soviet Union will be slow in reaching the conlbat forces through the i r own channels Reports resulting from allied efforts will initially be discounted by Russian control elements and represented to be exaggerated or var propaganda Third the Soviet forces will have been co cn iitted to invasion and the lucrative prospects of conquest will be tenpting Fourth Party representatives for execution and establishnent of political control are ever present with invading forces ' It is possib l e that with tine some defection ight occur I among Soviet troops and on some fronts there mi ht even be t1ass surrender of troops and people such as in white Russia I ond t he Ukraine during World War _IL - However i f would appear ' I 1'0 P 8ElORB' ' JC-S 1953 1 - 177 - Appendix 11 J 11 l o Enclosure 11 B1 I I I j 'I -- _ Jt - a - ' - - Of 1 that realization of ultiJ laie lack of strength and shortage of military supplies would be slow in penetrating to troops at the front Considering their practical ruthless stoical and realistic nature an their susceptibility to propaganda rrom their own off i cial sources it appears doubtful that mutiny would occur Their neechevo nothing l IB tters attitude coupled with political control should prevent initiative on the part of individuals to the extent requi red to stimulate mob action It is quite possible th l t the realization of the extent of destruction being inflicted within their own coun y combined with Soviet propaganda would spur them on in an attempt to gain control of European economy more rapidly as their ultir late prospect of salvation A balancing factor which should also be considered is the influence on the Soviet High Collll lalld of prospective shortages of essential military supplies and logistic means £or the support of planned combat operations It must be realized that the Soviet Arey would operate in accordance with directives of t he Politburo This agency would be quick to re- estimate the situation in the light of damage being inflicted on Soviet industry by the atomic offensive Advice by the military might or might not be considered by the Politburo In either event it is probable that the in such an evaluation Politburo would be forced to come to the conclusion that it would be necessary to postpone or oven abandon at least temporari ly certain planned operations and to modify the strength direction and objectives of their main invasion e ff orts It would appear that de cision as to how far the combat forces would be permitted to advance would be predtvated on a combination of military and political interests DECRE'l' JCS 1 953 1 i'Qi' ill - 178 - Appendix J tr I l Enclosure B - Reprooucea from he Unclassified I DcclasslflOd Holdings of Ille NatiOMI An h l 5 plf Q TCP SECREr - - i - -- • f Satellites Satellit e countries of the u s S -R are not targets for A-bombing in the contemplated plans Disaffection toward the U S S R is very prevalent much deeper and more widespread in the satellites than within the u s s R · Under- ground movements and s ubversive activities in various stages of deve·lopment exist in every satellite The peopl e of the satellites are now and in event of war would be accessible and to a considerable degree amenable to Allied ne s and comments They have had sufficient contact with or have b3en previously oriented to the Western World therefore they are more understanding and tractable with respect to the Allies and their objectives inertia toward 11 Rather than possess ing an l iberation the mere hope of being able to cast off the yoke of the u s s R would undoubtedly generate many overt acts to allie d advantage as the s atellite people become aware of the possibili ty of their prospective release from bondage These people are experiencing daily trials and tribulations under political oppre ssion dictated from Moscow The Collllllunists although a minority group in each satellite maintain control using the tactics of the Kremlin Large numbers of satellite citizens particularly from Poland and Czechoslovakia have been outside the con fines of the U S S R sphere of influence Some have refused to return to their own country while others have done s o reluctantly with a hope that liberation from the Soviet yoke may soon be achieved In general these people desire liberation they fear the ravages of a war Nevertheless There is an atmosphere of fear and anxiety among the peopl e who are gradual ly being reduced to a standard of liv-1 ng comparable t o that of the U • S S R When and if libe ration comes t hese people will r e quire guidance and leadership not only in world affairs but also ori domestic problems IMP 5ECHB'f JCS 1953 1 - 179 - Appendix J to Enclosure B Reproouc cd lrom 111e Uoclassified I Oeclassitled Holdings oftl e Na brlal rch es ' I - 1 ' ' - ' TOY SECRET ' Considerable evidenbe -e·£ sts to support the thought that upon receipt of reliable r eports of the destructive bombing offensive within the U s s R these people will instigate widespread sabotage a nd thatJ guerrilla movements will a rise throughout the area The destruction and confusion thus wrought would materially hamper the Soviet invasion effort The degree and rate at which these activities would affect the morale of the Russian invasion troops or would penetrate by seepage back i to the u s s R itself with possible effect upon control in such areas as the Ukraine the Balti c States etc is a question ·which is so balanced by factors of the moment that it cannot be judged at this time ·shock Psychological Effect of A-Bomb There is ma x•ked contrast between the effect or the ' bombing offensives of World War II and the intense shock and psychological effect to be pected from the atomic offensive as presently planned The armer consisted of a progress ive type of bombing build-ups with several shifts in general objectives bombing pattern and some promiscuous raids The latter provides for concentration upon industrial capacity within some seventy principal U S S R urban areas with consequent damage to the people of those area within a period of 30 days I t is possible that the shoclc and psychological effect would be so thorough and cripplj 11 g as to nullify temporarily all the factors previously discussed Certainly temporary nlJ llbness frustration chaos confusion and despair would be prevalent Panic and possibly considerable hysteria might be expected to develop Once news of the effects of bombing has been established as factual the fear o f' similar bombing would be generated in other industrial centers Thi s could precipitate a mass exodus of w·o rkers from such areas or - J JCS 1953 1 - 180 - Appendix 11J 11 to' Enclosur e B I Reproduced from tho Unclosslfied Dcdassffied Holdu gs ol tt e National Ard1h-es · __ Jt 't TOP SECRET at lee st cause potential and loss in productive Rumor and gossip once initiated would probably ex- aggerate actual damage and chaotic conditions and 1n due time it would spread to all sections of the U S S R without being completely stifl ed by gov·e rrunent a nd MVD countermeasures The U S S R with its relatively new industrial structure can ill-afford to lose its skilled workers technicians foremen plant managers and industrial administrators Technicians and plant managers appear to 'be among the weakest links 1n the u s s R industrial structure The majority of these key per- sonnel indispensable to vital industries are located in the urban centers now potential targets of the bombing offensive A large percentage of key personnel might be killed or scattered by t he direct effects of the bombs and the resultant conflagra tions Their families as well might be largely destroyed or disintegrated by maiming death or flight Death and major casualties might amount to as many as five million people who are now concentrated in the selected target areas Although these seventy urban aroas are few when compared with the total number of cities and towns ir the u s s R never- theless they are critical industrially and wide ly scattered geographically and contain 28 000 000 peop1e Rumors and stories readily exaggerated by repetition and travel would have some effect ahd co ld augment fear of further bombing of anything and everything deemed by the people to be critical or of military value The 28 000 000 people exposed in the seventy cities about one-seventh of the population of the U S S R would have experienced personal contact with the effec ts of the bombing It is a rather ghastly picture--for the moment -as we imagine the prospect of' bringing about a poss ible liquidation of the Politburo and the Communist hierarchy even though_ such 11q uida tion is highly i Dtp t Obable One of the major fears of ' I f0P 6E9flBll JCS 1953 1 - 181 - Annex J to Enplosure B I I -· c w -s · ' ·· 0 ·_ --- l f' - - - _ TOP SECRET I • - it' - - ' • the Politburo is a defeat in iwar and their subsequent rorced capitulation It is this f ear that drives them to greate1• ex- cesses against their O'll'll people ShouJ d a capitulation of the Communist hierarchy materialize the degree of change in the ingrained attitude of the Russian people toward foreigners is very problematical There is sufficient reason to believe that their innnediate resentment would be intense it might require tl a efforts of the Allies for generations to overcome this resentment and antagonism Even should this extreme result be approximated what in reality actually would be accomplished would be the principal 1nnned tate gain In essence tilne time in which to build up stronger Allied resistance to any Soviet invasion effort s time in vl hich to organize and 1mpleme nt A llied ground offense with less interference from the Soviet time in whi ch to initiate the establishment of Allied controls of some sort Assuming that the u S S R may be temporarily rendered materialzy incapable of offensive acti on while its people are in a bewildered frustrated and despairing mental condition the se factors must be cons idered • Its people will have been deprived of that which has provided them the meagr e margins of livelihood which they have so far been able to possess at great personal sacrifice _ Nei ther t he roots of Communist i deology nor the in- struments for its perpetration•-propaganda end rorce--will have been destroyed E • Communism thrives where cha os and confusion reign §_ In the philosophy of Colll Dunism t he end justifies tho means and time itself is no object in the final accomplishment or Co unist a ims • Underlined for emphasis • IFBP iEGRm JCS 1953 1 - 182 - Appendix • 11 to Enclosure 11 B11 i Rllj roduced from lho U-red I DoolassiflOd Holdir gs ol lho National An hiYos ·· -· ' · 0 t - · · --eTDF 1 fi1n' Counteracting diminish the severity of uch an extreme situation are intensive defensive training and propaganda programs within the U S S R the_ extensive police control and the stolid characteristics of the Russian people _ In reality it appears that a situation will have been created which is susceptible of ultimate development 1n one or a combination of possibly three ways • Complete anarchy 1n the absence of any dominant central control or into feudal states based upon surviving regional control elements E• Reconstitution of t he communist state based upon surviving elements of the present central and regional govern- ments and operating centrally from an undestroyed locality _E Pmenability or cooperative effort in certain U S S R areas toward types of government of the peoples' own choosing in accordance with Western Allied objectives This develop- ment presupposes interim allied ground control which would need to be established ilm lediately subsequent to the bombing before Sovie t controls could be re Ln 'orced and which would be capable of i mplementing its objectives and procedures among an initially suspicious and largely resentful people masses of them harassod by hardship and starvation Conclusions The Committee concludes thnt successful execution of the initial atomic offensive as planned will have the following psychological effects on the Soviet will to wage war • It would seriously disrupt t emporarily and impair indefinitely the mechanisms of civil o nd military control It probably would not destroy t he roots of Communi st ideology • or critically veaken the power of Soviet leadership to control and dominate the people 8ECIW P- JCS 1953 1 - 183 - · Appendix J to Enclosure B Reprodua d from hetlnclassffiod I Dcdasslrrn Holdi V S ol Ifie Naliooal M 111 les ' - - i - ·• --1 · -- '1 r _Q It woul d not turn t' '' majority 0£ t he people against their government but would in general unify them and intensify their will to wage war It would validate in t he minds of tl e inejority Soviet propaganda with regard to the intentions of foreigners to destroy the U S S R Intensified resentment would persist for an indeterminate period £• The will of an indeterminate minority to wage war will unaoubtedl¥ be weakened and certain elements will a ttempt to take advantage of' the situation but neither of these influemces would be likel y to develop to such an extent as to produce critical effect upon the total Soviet war effort •remporarily it will create a widespread chaotic situat i on among the people pa rticularly in the urban areas This situati n may well cause a h igh degree of absenteeism and disorganization in industries essential to the war effort This would force modific tion of Soviet invasion plans and in time adversely affect the morale of the Soviet armed forces • It will create within the u s s R a psychological crisis which could be turned to advantage by the Allies throt gh early and eff'ective C lXploitation by armed forces and psychological warfare Failing prompt and effective ex- ploitation the opportW11 ty would be lost and subscguent Soviet psychological reactio s would adversely affect the accompli sr ment of Allied objectives f Any demoralizing effect among Soviet invasion troops will be of a delayed nature and will be dependent upon the fruits of their early invasion efforts J i• It would open the field and se·t the patte rn for all adversaries to use any weapons of mass destruction and migb t be expected to r esult in maximum r etali a to ry measures wi thin Soviet capabilities · ' 'OF SEORE'l' Jes 195'3 1 - 184 - Appendix · J 1 to Enclosure B Reproduced Item the nc lasslied lledassmod Holdngs cl the Naoonal Archives __ _ a--- I •• t • ·w 4ioa ·L o _As r eports of result·i of the atomic offens i ve reach t he people of Soviet satellite countries both their sabotage ·of Soviet control and military effort and their portisan cooperation toward Allied objecti ves con be expected to i ncrease wi th the hope of throwing off the Soviet yoke -TOP SEO JCS 1953 1 - 185 '' l° APPENDIX K EFFECT OF THE INITIAL ATOMIC OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE U S S R UPON THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES 1 General I n Plan TROJAN and supporting current intelligence estimates the U S S R is cre lted with capabili ties and 1atentions which would involve early rapid advances into o xtensive areas of Western Europe the Middle East and the Far Eas · Such operations are portrayed as being generally c oncurrent or phased to be in consonanc e vith logistic capabilities Re er to Appendix E to Enclosure B Pri acipal reliance for the success of thes e advances is placed upon t he Soviet Army supported by the Navy and Air Force although there would be operations of more independent nature performed by the latter two services These would incl ude submarine and mine -warfare against Allied sea communications air defense of the U S S R and offensive air operations age inst the United Kingdom and to a l imited degree a gainst the United States 2 The Soviet Army _Q It has been judged generally that the- Soviet Army ls at this time the most powerful in t he world estimates indicate a s trength Intelligence of 2 500 000 men with 27 to 28 million males in the - 'l S S R fit for military service of wnich probably 11 000 000 a r e presently trained Bot h i n -·r personnel and equipment it appears that the Soviet obilicntion potential far exceeds estimated r equir emen ts for the opera tions envisaged to be necessary for the attainment of their objectiv-es In char acter of organization and equi R- a ont Sovi0t tpends have been s trongly tewnPd greater mobility and fire power with augmentation of motor transport armored forces tanks arid self- propelled artillery lPOf 3RORE'P JCS 1953 1 - 186 - J I Appendix K I -1l1 ct ASSJ - -o a-- r · - - O - - i ' RET ' - t ·-- -- --· - i _'ft - -1i 'u # These trends will place gt eater dependence upon fuel and heavy ind ustry within the U S S R Continuous training has overcome disruptive poat-war-effe ts and enhanced the readiness of comba t ano logistic support elements - Intelligence e s timates show that in most categories of weapons a nd basic equipment the Soviet rmy is well supplied and that stockpiles of basic equipment a nd consumable supplies a re located in border areas or satellite countries for intended campaigns As to industrial support of its armed f orces the U S S R includes three important industrial areas viz Russi a proper the southern o rea comprising the Ukraine and Transcaucasia and Eastern Siber ia -each in general sufficiently integra ted and self-sustaining to support military operations from those areas Thls results i n wide dispersion of industry end serves to ease the b urden from railroad lines connecting these large and widely separated areas Whiie the distribution of stock- piles and t heir level in many instance s is unknown cons idered estimates show that i n tonks guns vehicles food and ammunition available supplies are adequate to support the forces estimated to be required for the duration of -ope-rations necessary for each compaign in Continental Eu ope the Middle East and the Far East These e stimates are predicated on expenditures and wastage l i ke l y to be experienced in combat with Allied or indigenous forces which could be brought to bear in time firms and equipment either with the armed forces or i n supply dumps will not be affected by the initial atomic offensive as planned - The item estimated to be most critical from the s tn•dpoint of the Soviet Army i s fuel for vehi cles tanks and self-propelled weapons The initial atomic offensive will material ly reduce production of these f uels-wit in the 9 9-P BEOR'E'i' JCS 1953 1 - 187 - ppendix K ·v ' 11t U S S R Refer to Annex · A t o 1ppendix I to Enclosure B The actual level of Army stockpiles is unknotm With increasing emphasis on fire power and mechanization petroleum requirements for the Soviet s rmy will increase more rapidly than the cape city to satisfy them Minimum fuel requirements for the Soviet Army in West ern Europe can be met partially from Rol llll2 n1an fields These sources are not present ly targets tor t he init i al atomic offensi ve If Soviet forces overrun the Middle East they may obtain partial alleviation of fuel shor tages by exploiting oil from that area even assuming Allied damage to refineries or interdiction of sources By o nd lprge the s upply of motor fuel is expected to become critical and should force t he U S S R to be extremely _parsimonious-in their use of motorized equipment The moat critical r ail transportation bottlenecks in move ment of supplies to the vest are twelve rail transshipment points along the western border of the U S S R These po i nts a re not target for the initial sive as planned atomic offen- Critical transportation centers in cities within the U S S R would be disrupted temporarily however by t he atomic bombing and much damue e would occur to railroad equipment and repair facilities This would interfere yith mobilization and would slow down shipments of troops and supplies to t he armed f orces Refer to 1 nnex G to lppondix I to Enclosure B l · Ta ctical air support for the i1rmy plays a n important end extensive part 1n Soviet military doctrine The initial atomic offensive will infl ict severe damage on the Soviet aircraft end aircraft engine industries and to refineries for high-test aviation gasoline rnnexes 11 ll 11 Refer to and D to Jlppendix I to Enclosui-e B This dwnage will quickly force the Soviet command t9 be highly i sel e ctive and to reduce drastically omlilitnrent f of aviati on for ground support JCS 1 953 1 - 188 - Reprod '8d f om lhe Undas ifled I Declassllied Holdings of the Natiooal Archives T ---- In the longer term the Soviet Army should be increasingl y handicapped by the shortage of various cr1tica items occas ioned by t he da tnage from a tomic bombing in the USSR by interruption of transportation and 1nterference vith organization for production logistic support and flow of trained replacement personnel These effects in con- junction With the shortage of motor fuel and air support will progressively diminish the effectiveness and partic- ' ularly the mobility of the 6ov et Army The time at which tbe dimunition in effectiveness and mobility occur is going to depend on the attrition from resistance encountered in campaigns as well as from the effects of the atomic offensive on the USSR 3 The Soviet Navy i · The strength com posit i on and a iployment of the Soviet Navy are set forth in detail in ABAI-5 Surface air and submarine elements are assigned to fleets in three major - geographical areas and the Far East The Bai l ic-Arctic Seas the Black Sea These flpei S are generally balanced as to 1 composition although the f9rc0s in Northern Europe and the Far East are each about· twice the size of those in the Black Se Over- all strength is comprised of 15 large ships 123 light combatant ships 2000 miscellaneous landing craft and minor combatant types and about 275 submarines Naval f ir Force has about 2400-3000 planes The Soviet Personnel strength of the Navy is approximately 600 000 including 275 000 coast defense troops On mobilization personnel strength would probably increase to 800 000 men Significant ' augmentation of combatant ships except for submarines is likely- to be impracticable in the early phases •of a war E· The principal tasks of the Soviet Navy would be first to support the Soviet f- rmy in i ts campaigns and in defense of j the USSR and second to interdic t Allied s qommunications lI OP SEGRE@ JCS 1953 1 - 189 - ppen rx K I I I Rep OCIU 1 from lho Unr lassllicd I o - ed Hofdings of 1 o Nallooal Atchi es with submarines and mines ln initial operations against Turkey and -Scandanavia und to a l esser degree in t he Far East much reliance would be placed on the Navy to transport cover and support the Red Army Thereafter requirements would continue to develop for patrol escort of shipping mine laying mine sweeping and defense against Allied naval opera-· tions The seizure of islands in the Mediterranean or major undertakings against the British Isles Spain or Iceland would impose heavy demands on the Navy The Soviet submarine force is potentiall-y formidable and if advantage is to ken of German assistance offers the USSR possibility of lucrative returns for minimum conunitments of resources by aggressive warfare ag a inst shipping vital to the whole Allied military economic and strategic position Fuel requirements for such operations are estimated to be only about 50 000 metric tons pe·r year -- a relatively l ow expenditure easy to disperse Operating bases are World -Warn experience showed them to be difficult to destroy Submarine buil ding facilities are relatively small and also capable of separation dispersion and concealment Much of the machinery involved in their construc- tion is difficult to destroy E_ The principal effect of the planned atomic offensive oh the Soviet Navy wo1 11a be to produce very critical shortages of fuel for surface fo11ees in the Baltic-1 rctic arid Far East areas probably_ forcing a drastic curtailment of such operations On the other hand accorded proper priority in alloca- tion fuel should be adequate to pe·r mit unrestrict ed operations of Soviet submarines The Soviet Naval Air Force would be forced to be discreet in i t s employment due to the general shortage of aviation gasoline participation in aerial mining This would interfere with the r In the longer term the Soviet Navy would also be affected by damage to· shipbui_lding d'Of SEORE'f- JCS 1953 1 - 190 - Appenff i x K Reproduced kom lt e Unciassillod I Oedassmed Holdings of lhe Nalional Ardiives - ----- --· ----- - -- • - 'i k · - l' - - - - - and ship rep• tr facifit1 i 1 and by the inteJ 'ference with production d ' e1ectl'on1c e'q_uipment weapons and consumable supplies -- although the results woul d be in no way decisive 4 The Soviet Air Force § The Soviet Air Force is est l mated to be composed of some· 15 000-17 -000 planes of all types supported by about 500 000 personnel The aircraft ll I'e distributed as follows 9 000 - 10 000 in Tactical Air Armies 1 800 Fighter Defensive Force 1 800 Long Range Force 2 400 - 3 000 Naval Air Force These forces are believed to be capable of expansion to a total of 20 000 aircraft with supporting personnel of 1 500 000 within siJc months after mobilization I n addition to the above the USSR has a semi-mili tar v air organization -- the Civil Air Fleet - which may contai n some 1 000 to 1 500 medium transport planes and some 2 000 light connnunication types It is believed that in time of war 250-500 of these might be made available for military purposes Central control of the Long Range Force and the Civil Air Fleet would provide a degree of operational flezibility in that these forces might be directed to either the Western or the Middle East front It has been noted that in airborne operations air l ift capacity rather than trained troops would be a limiti ng f e ctor _Q The principal tasks of the Soviet ll ir Forc e in event of war in 1949 are considered to be First to provide the air de fense of the USSR second to support the advances of the Red Army third to conduct independent offensive operations 2gainst t be Uni ted Kingdom and within capabilities the United States I 'l OP S330HE4' JCS 1953 1 - 191 - Appen ix K · i ReprOduced om lne Unclassified I Ooclassillod Holdings of U o Nallonal Artlll cs -- ' ' d - - W · J i· £ sin the case of m or fuel for the Soviet Army reduction and consequent shortage of fuel and lubri cants for the Sov Let Air Force would be a major effect of the Allied initial atomic offensive as planped Also present stock- pil es of avi ation gasoline especi ally hi gh test gasoli ne are l i mited and t he flow time from refinery to consuming forces is beli eved to be very short of this Appendi x and Annex B 11 i Refer to paregr aph 2 11 to Appendix I to Enclosure Principal production of b igh test f _u el remaining after the initial atomic offensive would be in Roumania This source is not presently a target for t he initial atotnic 9ffensive Shortages in the Middle East might be alleviated by tappi ng l oca l sources on an expedient basis if refineri es · there are dest oyed or interdicted by Allied n otion with complete alleviation of' shortage if they a re not destroyed or interdicted Appraisal indicate s that it should be possible for the USSR to meet fuel requirements for jet aircraft from sources which would continue to be availab1-e to them modified to the ext ent that crude first cut refining on an e pedient and inefficient basis might be possible By and large the shortage of aviation fuel wil l become critical to the Soviet Hr Force rith present known stockpiles within the second month of war Thj s will force- the Air Force to be extremely discrilllina ting in the employment of its Ai r Forces training comba t and suppor t missi ons for Allocation of priority for air defense would probably force drastic curtailment of supporting operations for the Red rmy and Navy and reduction of the employment of the Long Range Air Force I t is un- realistic to attempt to de fine precisely the time at which sl ortage of products particularly petroleum will act ually result in critica l reduction of the ca pa bilities · of Soviet Armed Forces The time would depend on meny conditions some I of which are unknown or on whi ch information is tnadequn te I ' 'Of 31 CIIB'P JCS 1953 1 - 192 - · Appenlix K 11 Reprodoced born the Undassif'ied I Oeelassmed H w gs of ho Notiooal ArchNes • i -- ·- · 4 r I · i others of which a r e Vlll'iabiE o ubject to Sdviet contxloi Among the factors which would be of major importance are t he level and location of stockpiles at the initiation of hosti J ities the refining capacity damage to petroleum production and stockpiles adequacy of transportation ability to restore damage adopt expedient refining processes or exploit captured resources and especially the scope of operations and expenditures of fuel for each operation Estimates based upon agreed appraisals of Soviet petroleum stockpl les at the present time petroleum expenditures a nd damage to refineries that would result from completely successful ex·e cution of the initial atomic offensive indicate that fuel shortages would be critical within the first few months of the war On the other hand available intelligence indicates that the USSR now has three times the productive capacity for fuel and aviat ion gasoline above what the Strategic Bombing Survey shows Germ ny to have ho d at any ti me during World War II This f'act should be mllde the subject of careful analysis d Past wartime experience las demonstrated inces·sant demand for delivery of new o nd improved types of aircraft This would b e particularly true and necessary in warfare agairet the United States with its e ngineering _a nd industrial capo bilities for rapid deve opment Attrition among the 15 000- 17 000 Soviet planes now available would be rapid Successful execution of the l nitial itomlc offe nsive as planned -will inflict such severe damage upon the aircraft and aircraft engine industries as to reduce the flow of repl acement aircraft below requirements ai id to force a progressiv e curtail ment of a ir operations 1 -0'O P SBGR ggJ JCS 1953 1 - 193 - Appendix K I I j I I I ep oduced frw lhe Unclassif d I lledassiood Holdings ol ll l NatiMal Atd lves • -· 5 • The rilled _§ · 1 Lack of supplies an such reports of destruction damage and upset conditions as may reach invasion troops will ·adversely affect morale However any demora1izing effects will be of delayed nature and the degree will be dependent upon the fruits of their early invasion efforts E· Serious disruption and impairment of civil and military control dama3e to transpo r tation facilities and other effects of the initial atomic bombing will render command and logistical operation particul ll'ly from ano through the seventy target cities immediately but temporarily e ceeding-ly difficult c Central civil authority and military command will immediately be forced to 1 Determine and evaluate the extent and degree of material damage accomplished 2 Determine existing short range and long range military and supporting economic capabilities 3 Modify all of those existing plans a nd operations to many of which foroes will have already been committed which did not take into full consideration the prospect of the existent destruction and psychological e ffects of the atomic offensive This would involve r e evaluation as to attainable objectives and ability to consolidate and sustain thereon determinaxion of scope strength nnd direction of major and minor campaigns in accordance with existing capabilities and preparation of appropriate supply and logistical plans for each of these • 4 Issue modifying or completely changed orders to oommands many of which have already been committed to action and to all military and economic supporting activities OP 8BGRE'r JCS 1953 1 - 194 ppenl l ix K ' I Rep oduced from u e Undassff ed Dedassffied Holdlng ol 111o Natiooal Ali llives -crASSI · - 1· ·- · a r - °' ' ··' ___ - r - · ·- ' - - - · · - j - · J f -- It i s impossibl e to· edict exactly what decisions would be made what the S viet ability to put new piahs into operation would be and the degree of resulting demoralization upon the Soviet n rmed forces In any event the initial atomic offensi ve would force the Soviet high command quickly to re-estimate their strategic position and make important decisions regRrding op rationnl plans under difficult circumstan 68 and without z ccu ·nte knowledge as to Allied ability or _intentiori i t i acCOillJ lish 'u - ther· drastic destructiotl -within the USSR J·c i l- prL bablc that such decisions -would involve limiting pc-e·t poning or abandoning certain campaigns which might othe wise be undertaken 6 CO_ £Jusic Success ful execution of the initial atomic offensive as planned · Would not per se seriously i mpair the capability of tha E'ovi c-t a -med forces to advance rapidly into selected areas of Western Europe the Middle East and Far E Jst but capabilit ies thereafter in those extended areas would progressively dimini sh due to the following 1 The supply of petroloum products of all types will rapidly -become critical to all branches of t he Soviet armed forces with principal effects of Greatly reducing the mobility of the Army Red·Jcing the scale of operations of the Soviet Navy and merchant shipping al though submarine warfare would probably be unaff ect ed Seriously reducing Soviet ai r operntions involving training transport support of ground and naval fo ces 1 a nd independent offensive action although proper allocation of fuel would allo-w continued operations by air I defense forces F 8Rlll41 JCS 1953 1 - 195 - l Ap @§Pdr K -- · r · · u i • ' Co '· • -- ' r °' -· _- - 7- · · 4 • NOTE The point at hicQ c apabili ties of Soviet Armed · Forces muld diminish to a critical degree woulddepend upon many variable or unpredictable factors most important of which is the l evel of stockpiles prevailing at the initiation of hostilities E· After consumption of initial stocks of basic equipment and consumable supplies progressivo shortages in a wide variety of items particularly aircraft would handicap operatic 3 and affec t morale of the Armed Forces 1 - Logistic 3upport would be handicapped due to disruption of planning impairment of controls damage to industry and interfe rence wi t h transporta tion 9 The Soviet Hi gh Co nd will be forced quickly to r ee stimate their strategic position and make important decisions regarding oper ational plans under difficult circumstances They would probabiy limit pos tpone or abandon certain campaigns b ut it is impossible to predict what specific decisions would be mooe - The atomic offens ive would open the field and set the pattern f or a ll o dversaries to use any weapons of mass destruction and result in maximum retaliatory measures withi n Soviet capabilities 'POP SECRE'l' JCS 1953 1 - 196 - -I NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu