0 AT -- A __ This material contains informolion offecling the notional defen1e of the United Stare wilhin the meaning of the espionage lows Tille 18 U S C Secs 793 end 79 lhe lronsmiuion or 1he rcvcla1ion of hich in any manner lo on unauthorized person is prohibilcd by law DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONS · - ·- '- - _ ' Nol suitable for diatribution lo foreign governmenls or foreign nolionafs - i•lc emb J 5 -·1954'· Not 1uiloble for di11ribution lo indu1trlol conlrodon or commerclal orgonizalion1 Nor suilobfe for distribution by the Armed Services Technical lnforma• lion Agency ASTIAJ Authority AFR 205 J -·· L - SEE INSIDE COVER FOR DISTRiBUTION RESTRICTIONS_ · · ' xior AL · raoM W o - · -· o i ·1-mtJ _ L 41-- _ · • ' · ® 1D1 f · - 7 • •••• t t •-• • ' ••• c• - u u a••••---·- - I --- R E 5 T R I C 1 E ll--lLA I A Qtt C I i•·t l HOi AU O f Ml4 U'P r fl · i •'I · ' PROJECT RAND Conrrocf No AF 33 038 -6 CIJ A STUDY OF COMPLEX TARGETS MOSCOW DAYTON AND GENEVA STEEL Olaf Helmer Norman Dolkey ond Frederid B Thompson November 15 195 C R-272 - • · ·- ··_c· - -- J · · - · · · -·- - - -· - - · - --· · · · '-- ---- · - - -- ___ _ COPY N O fh• •I•••• co11clu1iant and fH0•••11dotio111 ••· P HHd 9rel11 do II04 Reuuarily rilled the olfi- dol •i•ws or poli i11 of 1h1 U11il1d 51011 Ait f«u n _ '· c • l __ _ _ _ _ _ 7 R- l De µ- · t ' _ • ••• 0 E tc 11 1 c · -· • - c i o e tie •-i 1 o m - C b a declc s1 1 tio r ·- • 0 ' 0 '' '• - - - - - - - · UNC SflED SUMMARY This report is a compendium of facts concerning urban and industrial vulnerability to atomic bombing The analysis is based on an examination of thl'C'C' specific targets i e the cities of Moscow and Dayton and the Geneva Steel Plant The tabulations and graphs presented here may be of aid to the pWU er in such areas as civil and industri a l def strategic tar8eting strategic rccon naissance and intelligence and Jong-range Air Force planning as reflected in weapon and delivery system specifications UH l SS f Ell ill UN A l ltU CONTENTS SUMMAkY •••• ••• •••••• • ••• • •• •• •••• •• •••••••••• iii INTRODUCTION •••••••• •• • • ••••• •• •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • RfUABILlTY' ••• •••••• •••••••••• ••• •••••••••••••••• •• • 3 METHODOLOGY •••••• • ••••••• ••••••• •• ••• ••••• •• • • • • DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS ••••••••••••••• ••• ••• ••• • ••• • 9 9 9 10 10 Yield Requirements • • • • •• •• •• ••• • •••••••••• •• • • Diminishin8 Returns • • • • ••• •• D unage to Population • • •••• • ••• •••••••••••• ••••• • • • • • • Dun age to lndustiy • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Compua tivc Dmuge to Population Housing and Industry Effect of Ground Z ro and CEP Air Bunt versus Ground Burst • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • cOst of Confidence • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • •• • 12 12 13 13 Su p r Bombs • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 13 APPENDIX •• •••••• • • • • •• ••••• ••• 1 Vuln nbility As sumptions • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Basic Target Input Data • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Sumnury Tabuutions and Maps • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Results oa Mort litics ••••••• ••••• •••••• ••• • • • • • • • • • • Results oo c apit11 D slruction • •••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Results on Dc tiuction of Dwellings ••• • i • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Sp«ial Comp uuons • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Sensitivities • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 19 29 39 '' 73 97 103 II 7 Sup r Bombs • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 127 V UICl SS f Ell ' 9 I I ·-l' INTRODUCTION This report pr ents a compendiwn of facts gained from a study of urban and industrial vulnerability and state some general conclusions regarding both offensive and defensive planning • It is hoped that the facts assembled here will provide guidance to decision•makers in such areas as civil and industrial defense targeting intelligeoce and reconnaissance requirements and long-range Air Force planning as reflected in weapon and delivery system specifications An indication of the methods used is given to provide a rational basis for the application of a similar methodology to the analysiS- ither offensive or defensive-of target entiti other than those specifically studied here Three specific targets have been considered a medium•sized city a large city and an industrial installation For the latter the U S Steel Plant at Geneva was chosen and for the dtie Dayton Ohio and Moscow re pectively • Because of the availability of high·speed computing machine our study compared with earlier studie of such targets carried out by others has _been hie to introduce for the first time a great deal more detail into the analysis Each of the target was in £act divided into a large nwnber of parts the eHect on each of th e sections by each of the bombs dropped was then recorded and the over-all d mage to the target was e stimated by a proce ss of integr ation aver all of the e sections Altogether the re sults of about 2 000 bomb drops were computed th e drops were both slngle and multiple and comprised a whole spectrum of yields and bombing errors · What types of que stions may the results of this studjtbe expected to answer These might include Just how big a bomb is neded to take out a given city How doe s damage vary with bomb size umber of bombs height of burst and aiming error What difference doe s it make if bombs are aimed at population or at industry How much can casualtie s be reduced through warning and shelters For what type of target is an air burst preferable to a ground burst and vice versa How sensitive are the results to faulty target intelligence arid •11wll ue due to Mark Peter Jr for basic estimatts of sttuctural 't'Ulncrabilitift to Murin Hoff for apitaJ cost ntim to lot the indunriet of Dayton a ad Moscow to Bob 11 wmc and Pat luW'fflT lot btiag clfecti tt iattrmediuies bctwttn the authon aAoCI the IBM 701 tad lo Nariaa Cetus for • nriety ol coatribvtioos coo numerow to Jin erroneous vulnerability assumptions This list could be continued but these examples should· suffice to indicate the type of information this study c n be expected to provide UffGlA IHtU The reader should not expect on the other h nd to find out how the pre- dieted mortalities will affect the continued operatbn of an urban community or how the predicted capital destruction will affect the continued operation of RELIABILITY A few words should be said regarding the reliability of our results There arc so many basic uncertainties involved espcciaJJy with regard to the accuracy the national economy An analysis of such over-all consequences taking into consideration the interaction of a multitude of OOmbing effects and the cumulative disruption of the life of the nation may be undertaken in the future of target intelligence and the vulnerability assumptions that it has often been suggested that this is an area in which reliable prediction of the outcome is well-nigh impossible We have been well aware of these uncertainties throughout this study and we have made a special effort to find out how sensitively the results depend on the accuracy of the basic assumptions What we found has been rather encouraging For instance if the assumptions on physical vulnerability are changed throughout by either raising cir lowering the overpressure requirements for any given kind of damage by as much as 20 per cent the over-all damage does not change by more th n 9 per cent The same may bes aid if ocr target intelligence involves a comparable error i e if the distribution of population and industry is in error by some comparable amount It turns out that even for so large an error in basic inputs the amount by which the estimated outcome might be in error is at most of the same order of magnitude as the amount by which it is apt to be in error due to such operational factors as bombing errors variations in yield and errors in burst height We therefore feel jwtified in claiming that our results in spite of possible errors in basic assumptions are reasonably correct by which is meant that they are accurate to one and possibly two but certainly not three significant figures Moreover we believe that the results for other targets of similar configuration would not be far lifferent t' • · i NClASSIHED 2 • 3 UNGlASSIFIED · METHODOLOGY A major difficulty in analyzing complex targets such as at es or large industrial installations is their lack of homogeneity In a city large and small industries intermingle in no mathematically neat pattern with commercial and residential structures Population is distribu ted in an irregular if not entirely haphazard fashion wide-open spaces being juxtaposed to densely crowded blocks These many diverse elements of such a complex target respond in very different ways to the destructive forces of a bomb To deal with this complexity we dissected the target into subregions so that each section formed a homogeneous unit For Moscow there were 1400 such divisions none being larger than about 1 2 n mi on a side The sections were located on a standard coordinate grid so that it was a simple calculation to find the distance from any point in the target area to the center of any one of the 6ections For the city studies each section was characterized by five quantities population number of dwelling units square feet of industrial roof cover an index of industrial capital and predomirant building type In the case of the U S Steel Plant at Geneva Utah each major production unit was considered '•·· a Rction and was characterized by the total cost of above-ground construction c wruch was further broken down into cost of labor structural steel refractory - if brick electrical equipment and machinery in addition the total time for above ' · - ground construction was determined ·· To calculate the expected damage from a single bomb with a given desig• nated ground zero DGZ and bombing error circular probable error or CEP a random sample of ground zeros distributed with the properCEP about the given DGZ was selected In most C 'SCS• a sample of 200 ground zeros was -used For each ground zero the damage to any particular section was determined as a function of the size of the bomb qeight of burst the type of structure in ' ie section and the distance from the ground zero For the city studies damage was expressed in terms of population killed dwelling units destroyed and two mC2SUrcs of industrial damage namely indwtrial structures and industrial • capital destroyed The distinction between the two is that industrial capital · I f' ' nNt s RED '·' ·• °' '°' '' • ' _ _ _ ' ' ' sfJff e _ 'uuu uuu u umpauson with more conventional methods of calcu-1HCtAS J lating damage the square feet of industrial roof cover destroyed was computed w J on a 'cookie utter • basis In the case of the U S Steel Plant study damage was calculated in terms of the five capital indices mentioned in the preceding paragraph The damage functions on which these calculations were based are given in the Appendix pages 21-28 The influence of the drag effect was taken into account in scaling for various bomb sizes A uniform 0 3 7th-power scaling Jaw was employed for all of the indices I This series of computations furnishes the damage to one subsection from a bomb landing at a given ground zero To determine the damage to the entire ttrget area the damage to ea ch of the sections was summed over the target and to determine the expected damage for a given bomb size DGZ and height of burst the damage was averaged over the sample of ground zeros For the case of more than one OOmb on target a similar procedure wa5 followed in which the percent damage for each succeeding bomb was applied to the capita I or population remaining in each section For the two cities Moscow and Dayton the calculations described above were run for six bomb sizes ranging from 100 KT to 25 MT for five bombing errors ranging from a %-n-mi to an 8-n-mi CEP for a number of bombs on target ranging from I to 10 and for two different heights of burst a ground burst and a 600-ft I-KT equivalent The same spectrum of cases was considered in the case of the_ U S Steel Plant except that the number of bombs on target was confined to one and that the influence of the angle of the blast was taken into account the assumption being that a sideways blast was about 1 8 times as effective as an end-on blast for intermediate angles it was assumed that the effectiveness of the blast was sin 8 1 8 cos 8 times the effectiveness of an end-on blast where 8 ranges from 0° for a sideways blast to 90° for an end-on blast A summary of the basic data for the thjee targets is given in the Appendix pages 31-37 ' The U S Steel Plant is an intermediate-sized mill turning out about 1 500 000 tons of steel per year It was constructed during the last war and is somewhat more spread out and rugged in construction than the average steel mill of its size The target which we have called Moscow is in reality the Moscow metro6 1 t- · r '•H H a co1 1 m cg1u11 mvolved covers more than 700 w OU and is much - than the CJty of Mosc_ow proper The percent damage figures quoted refer iJhts large area and_ not 1ust to the ty of Moscow A glance a' the_ reg' onal reakdown Appendtx page 5 w' ll s_how that the populat10n IS highly concentrated around the Kremltn which JS at the center of the map In fact a region 4 mi on a side centered on the Kremlin includes 42 per cent of the population Industry is less concentrated Some of the largest plants are on the very fnnges f the area Nevertheless one region to the east of the Kremlin and 4 mt on a side contams more than 25 per cent of the indu trial capital of the entire area The city of Dayton is a medium-sized industrial city having a population of about 300 000 It is considered nineteenth in the li t of American indu trial cities The regional breakdown Appendix page 33 shows that population is not nearly so heavily concentraced as it is in Moscow and that industry is more uniformly suffused throughout the city Highly useful tools in analyzing targets such as these are equidamage maps Appendix pages 68 and 69 and 89--92 they give a picture of the damage to the entire target resulting from a bomb falling at any point within the target The contour lines are to be interpreted in the following way A bomb falling at any poin_t o a contour line does the same amount of damage namely the per· centage mdicated at that contour to the tntir target as a similar bomb falling at any other point on that contour If the bomb falb outside the contour it does less damage if inside it does more The contour lines are obviously helpful in determining the optimal ground zero for a single bomb If one wishes to maximize a partiru ar index it is interesting to note that for almost all cases and for bomb sizes greater than 500 KT the contour lines dosely approximate a set of concentric circles This would indicate that for hasty computation of aggregate indices uch as total capital destroy or total mortalities the complex target can be closely approxhnated by a model consisting of a point target hzving a damag_e function falling off smoothly from some point of maximum damage Of course this function will depend on the size and shape of the target as well as on the types of structures within the target The mortalities due to fallout which are incorporated in the tables on pages and 50 of the Appendix were bav d on the following assumptions I the fallout pattern is circular about the ground zero with a diameter equal td the « UNCtASSlflfD 7 crosswrnd diameter tound experimentally this assumption approximates the actual hot spat around ground zero but neglects the secondary hot spat farther out 2 p 'rsonnel remains expased virtually without protectio for 8 hr 3 fallout occurs 40 min after bomb burst A more careful ana ySJs of fallout 0 effects has recently been completed atRAND •s M Grecn idd W W Kdlogg F J Krieger and R Ripp 'Tnrupolt a ad Eulr_Dq oc ition o R dioact iTC' Debris rom Atomic Explosions Proi«t Aurcok The UNO Co poraboo R rt a 261-AEC July 1 19H Sccrtt-R ictt'd D1 ta Limitt'd Distribution lASSIHtD DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS The results of this study are recorded in det il in the App 'Ddix It is difficult to single out any major conclusions In fact the purpose of this effort as emphasized before- was not viewed primarily as aiming for any conclusions The following commc-nts on and sample conclusions from our results are offered merely to paint up some of the patential uses of this material and to emphasize certain factors which seem to be of Sp 'Cial interest YIELD REQUIREMENTS ' - The yield required lo take out a city such as Moscow with a single ircraftdelivered bomb is no greater than 10 MT in the sense that a 10-MT ground burst delivercd with a ' 2-n-mi CEP or less can be expectcd to destroy about half the city's capital assets and to Jdll two-thirds of its people Appendix page 44 not counting the effects of radioactive fallout of the remaining thitd most would be either Jdlled by fallout or seriowly injured To achieve a similar effect with a mwile delivery system having y a I-MT warhead and a 3-n-mi CEP it would be necessary to deliver about 10 such missiles For a city of the size of Dayton similar percentage losses could be expected from a single I-MT aircraft-delivered bomb or from four I-MT missile-delivered bombs having a 3-n-mi CEP ' In as cssing the implications of a 0 p 'r ccrit destruction of the capital assets of these cities it is well to keep in mind the severity of the capital-destruction index used here which includes machinery and equipment Thus collapse of an industrial building is associated with only two-thirds destruction of the capital involved in building and equipment It may also be noted that the effect of what we now consider a small bomb having a yield of 100 KT when dropped on the center of a city as densely papulatcd as Moscow is rhaps greater than might be expected It s likely to kill about a half a million p 'Ople _ · - '- D • _ __ _ a c - - r·•-·-- -J DIMINISHING RETURNS Once a certain yield or a certain number of bombs has been reached the additional damage obtainable from an increased yield or an increased number 9 8 NCLASS f Ell 01 l umbs dunmishes rapidly This is exemplified dearly by the curves on pages 70 and 71 and pages 94 and 95 of the Appendix Thus if we examine the Moscow case discussed above vie find that the aircraft-delivered 10-MT bomb compared with an 8 MT docs only slightly better producing 68 instead of 65 per cent mortalities and 50 instead of 45 per cent capital destruction Similarly in the missile-ddivcry case if 10 instead of 8 bombs of I MT each arc delivered mortalities increase from 59 to 65 per cent and capital destruction increases from 47 to 52 per cent DAMAGE TO POPULATION In interpreting the examples of mortality figures given above the reader should keep in mind on the one hand that they refer to the case of an attack without warning and on the other that fallout will kill additional people and that many of the survivors will be seriously injured In the case of Moscow we also considered two degrees of warning-one for short warning and one for long In the case of short warning people were '· - - · · c ·· • assumed to seek shelter in the baserttent or at least to go to other relatively safe parts of their building People the street were allowed to go into the -4 ' -- •·-•I nearest building In the case of Jong warning people were allowed to move c · « ' i _ ' as far as 1 mi from their pla ce of residence to seek hcttt-r shelter such as the basement of a more blast-resistant structure Also 5000 people were funneled through each subway entrance Altogether about 1 000 000 people were moved from one building type to another which might offer better protection More people could have lxffl moved within the I-mi limitation had more shelters been available The number of Jives sa_ved in the Jong-warning case increased about 6 per cent more or less independently of the yield of the bomb and increased about half that amount for the short-warning case These are small percentages yet represent very sizable absolute numbers of people The shortwarning case was also run for Dayton and showed similar and slightly improved survival results See Appendix page 113 ' on lflf esuJts throw some light on means to obtain either of these objectives ith regard 10 the effect of bombing individual plants the tabulated results Gmeva Steel Plant Appendix page 54 speak fairly well for themselves · ' However two comments may be made First while the mtthod1 are directly ···•ppUahle to other plants the rw 11 are not because a steel plant by virtue of size and construction is a much tougher target than the average industrial · n and any attempt at extrapolation must take this into account Sec T the recuperation time which-as might be expected-always dominates apital destruction should be interpreted as the time which would be • for recuperation if one could go to work immediately after the blast all the needed resources of the economy intact Of cour site contamina widespread damage to adjacent housing and pulatio_n and the fact that '· · Dir«toratc- for Tuic-ts Tht' chart prt'diru tht' t'U«tJ over sn-c-ral months of a 1-UT attack city of D trton and shows th 1 many months •ouJJ be requittd bdott the- city 1 ·loolc Ufa itJ own tmngmcy 1tnict1 with induslriaJ tthabiJit tlion in the- djSW'lr future- l•ul t-4 IIIOnlfll •a • - ao1 01ui • uc c o _ • C2 t•u1ucr w • DAMAGE TO INDUSTRY Depending on the over-all bombing strategy the interest in indust iaJ damage may be centered on the fate of specific plants or on over-all capital destruction 10 II tlla t ' 'mini mu recuperation times have little chance of being met Nevertheless the stated recuperation time gives a pict ure of what it would take to get the plant back into operation once resources could be poured into that task Xlith regard to over-all damage to industrial capital the differential effects of various numbers and sizes of bombs can be seen from the graphs on pages 108 and 109 of the Appendix and in the case of Moscow from the maps on pages 34 and 41--43 of the Appendix lo The curves on page 110 of the Appendix gave a slight spurious advantage e air burst with respect to mortalities-spurious because again the addifallout fatalities which are significant foe ground burst only have neglected For capital he ground burst dominates eventually but for as large a city as Moscow not until a yield of about 17 MT has been reached The reason is that the payoff here is in terms of over-all capital destruction in a widespread but rather soft target This contrasts sharply with an attack upon a steel mill page 11 I where the ground burst is dominant throughout Ss'Flmlt' · •· r - COST Of CONFIDENCE COMPARATIVE DAMAGE TO POPULATION HOUSING AND INDUSTRY __t J ----- 7_#·- · c - x _ _J --- -• · --- M -- Jl --•• In carrying out a bombing strike it may be important not only to achieve a certain effect on tht a11uagt but to be reasonably sure that _in 11 1 a ccrtain damage level has been achieved To assess the value of special reconnaissance operations the planner will have to know what damage level he can expect with say 90 per cent confidence in the e that in 90 out of 100 similar strikes at least that much damage would be achieved Our results show Appendix page 106 that in attacks against cities the damage on which one may count with 90 pee cent confidence is not much lower than the average or · ·expected damage unless the CEP is excessively large Hence if the attack is aimed at destruction of population or housing or generalized capital it will rarely pay to engage in costly cecoMaissance operation On the other hand u shown by the graphs on page 107 the variance of the outcome of a strike again t an individual plant is so high that_ the damage which one may expect rwith 90 per cent confidence is quite coruiderably below the average damage · Thus the reconnaissance requirements depend essentially on the specific Damage to dwelling units and mortalities are not only highly correlated see charts on extreme right of page 116 of the Appendix but destruction of dwellings is always slightly in excess of mortalities Note however that the mortality figures used here do not include deaths from fallout There is naturally much less correlation between mortalities and capital destruction see charts on extreme left of page 116 In the cise of Moscow foe instance the contour lines foe mortalities Appendix page 6S and capital destruction page 89 ace centered on points several miles apart so that it makes quite a difference whether a bomb is aimed at population or at industry For example a I-MT bomb dropped on the center of population will kill about 26 per cent of the population but will destroy only about 12 per cent of industrial capital A bomb of this yield dropped on the center of industry while killing only 20 per cent of the population will destroy about 30 per cent of capital EFFECT Of GROUND ZERO AND CEP SUPER BOMBS ·'i Our results seem to indicate that even for large bombs the location of grouod zero and the expected bombing error have a greater influence on the outcome of a strike than is generally expected Foe example in Moscow in the case of long warning a 5-MT bornb having a ½-n-mi CEP is expected to kill H per cent of the population A similar bomb having a 3-n-mi CEP is expected to kill only 34 per cent of the population The same is true to an even greater degree foe a smaller city such as Dayton Multidrops do not change the situation For example four I-MT bombs having a ½-n-mi CEP ace expected to destroy 83 per cent of Dayton· capital assets while similar bombs having a 3-n-mi CEP destroy only 55 per cent on the average S Although it would appear from the Ifigures presented here that yields of - ' ' ' 25 MT and under suffice to carry out the more commonly envisaged bomb' g we have included on page 129 of the Appendix some graphs bowmg - -'expected results on Moscow of dropping bombs having yields up to 1000 MT · ·_' If for in •tance a 1000-MT bomb were dropped at the uranium refinery at - · Noginslc which is 25 mi from Moscow we would gain as bonus damage the •- · - ·missions ll#Cl Flffi 12 a of''° ro ptt of M- 13 APPENDIX NClASSIHtO VULNERABILCIY AsSUMPTIONS l L ' - ' ' 21 22 23 Angle af Incidence Open Hcutli • •• • •• • • • • 27 28 BA 5 1cT u GET INPUT DATA IIt· - • • f I MortaJitics vs Dis nce by Building Type Unwarned Mortalities vs Distance by Building Type Warned Morta Ji tics vs Overpressure Comparison of Warned and Unwarned U$S Lethal Radii for Collapse of Industrial Roof Cover and for Morttlities Due to Fallout Radiation Dun age to Structures vs Distance by Building Type Capit J Dc troyed vs Disl nrc by Building Type • • • • •• • Industrial Vulnerability Curves lor Geneva Stcd Pla nt Showing M tn-bours Required for Rep zcement vs Overprcuure by Plant Component Ex ample of Vulnerability Cwve for Geneva Steel Plant Showing Oepcodcncc on Map of Geneva Slee Plant • • •• • •• • • • • • ••• • •• Map of Dayton Map of Dayton Showing Gross Distributioa of Population and ladustrial Capit J Map of Moscow • • • •• • •• • •••••• • •• •• •• Map of Moscow Showing Gross Distribution of Popuutioa and lndwtrial • Capittl • • • • • ••• • •••••••••• • •••• • •• • • ' · Populatioa and c pital Distributioo by Buildiag Type for Mosa w and Daytoa 'Capital Costs of Above-ground ConsllUdion and Minimal Constructioa Tune for ' Plant Compaacnt s of Geneva S ccl ••••••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••• 'i z -· • Y TABULATIONS AND MAPs ' '·Map of Mo cow Showing Danugcfrom One MT Bomb ••••••••••••••••• llooan Swrun y Tabu atioa of Single Bomb Drops Ground Bunt Unwarned ' ' Aiming Point-Kremlin ••• • ' •• •• •••••••••••••••••• •• • llooanr Summary Tabulation ol Multiple Bomb Drops Ground Burst ·•· Unwarned '· • • • • • • • • · • · · • · · · Map o Dayton Damage from One MT Bomb Dropped oa City G ntcr •• 5ummuy Tabulation of Single Bomb Drops Grow d Bw t Unwarned •• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• JIOn 5ummuy Tabulation of Multiple Bomb Drops Ground Bun 'T·umnmed llNGlASSIFIED 33 H 37 f • · Map of Mo a Showing Damage from One 10-MT Bomb •••••••••••••••• ' · ' Map of Moscow Showing Damage from Fi c ½•MT Bombo ••••••• •••••••• Aimui Po at--Oty G ntu 31 32 •1 •2 •3 « •6 •9 • •• It I L It Air Bursts • • • • • · · • · · · · · · · · • · · • · ' RE5UL TS ON CAPITAL nuining • •• •• •· • •·· • ·• · · · · · · · · •· · · · · • •· • • • · • •• ·•• ·•••• · Moscow Frequency Distributions for 200 Multidrops l•n-mi CEP Capital Renuining •• • •••• ••••• Moscow Frequency Distributions for 200 Multidrops 2-n-mi CEP Capital Reuuining • • •• • • • • • ••••• •• •••••• Moscow Frequency Distributions for 200 Multidrops -n-mi CEP Capital 6 s 60 61 62 63 64 L t lI ' -· f t p· M j i i - ·w i i 87 88 89 90 91 92 u - ' · - · _ c ' ···· Dayton Capital De troyed vs YidJ by Number of Bombs Ground Bunt •• • • ' 0 Remaining • •• •••• • •• •••••••••• ••••••••• •• Moscow Contours of GZ's Produdng Equal Capital Destruction •• • • ••• •• Dayton Contours of GZ's Producing Equal Capit J Destruction • • • •• Genen Steel Plant Contours of GZ's Producing Eqw J Capita J Destruction •••• Genev 1 Sled Pbnt Contours of GZ's Produdng Equal Minimum Rccupcntioa Time •• • •••• ••• • •••••••••••••• • Genev 1 Sted Plant Minimwn Recuperation Time vs Yield by CEP Ground a nd Air Bursts • • • • •• ••••• • ••• •• •• •••••••••• RE5ULTS ON DESTRUCTION OF DWELLINGS Moscow and Dayton Dwellings Destroyed vs Yidd by CEP Ground Burst ••• 67 68 69 70 71 7' 6 77 78 99 _D Moscoyt w DDwe11 ng _ '1ro d v YYieJdd bbyNN r off BoBombsmb ••••••••••••••• 11 1 on we 1ngs stray vs ac 1 y u 1 uvcr o s • • • •••••• SPECAL CoMPAklSONS 100 IOI Moseow Cost of Confidence in Number of Bombs 1 MT ½- and 2-o-mi · CEP Ground Burst • •• •• ••••••• • ••• ••••••••••••••••• '•·' Moscow Cost of Confidence in Yield ½- and l•n•mi CEP Ground Bunt •• 10 106 107 108 ' Geneva Steel Plant Cost of Confidence in Yield Groood Bunt • ••••••••• · 11 fo cow Trade Off-Number of Bombs vs Yield b7 Capital Datro ed Da 1oo Trade Off-Nwnber of Bombs vs Yield by Capital Destroyed • ••• • -Da7bo and Mos« w Compuuon of Afr Bunt and Ground Burst Showing 109 Mortalities and Capiw Destroyed •••••• • • •• • • • • • •• • ••• 110 Genna Slee I Plant Compui on of Air Bunt and Ground Bunt ••• •••••••••• Ill OSCOw and Dayton Eff ct of FaUou ½-n' mi CEP Ground Bunt Unwamed 112 and Dayton Efferts of Warning and Shelter ½•n-mi CEP Ground • ·························································· 79 80 81 and Dayton Trade Off-Yield vs CEP by Capital Destroyed • ••• Trade Off-Nwnber of Bombs Ts CEP by Capital Destroyed •• ••••• Trade Off-Nwnb r of Bombs YS CEP by Capital Destroyed • •• and Dayton Satter Diagrams Showing Correlation between Typ s of 113 114 11 11 82 Damage ·······················'-····························· 83 and Dayton Sensitivity to Cube-root Scaling Showing Mortalities and _'Capital Destroyed ½·n-mi CEP Ground Bunt • • • •• •• • 119 and Dayton Sensitivity to Changes in Vulnerability lsumptions · Showing Mortalities and Capital Destroyed • • ••• • •• ••••• ••• 120 and Dayton Comparison of Industri J Dam ts Indices ½·n•mi CEP • -·Ground Burst • • ••• • • ••• • ••• •• • • • • Remaining •• ••• • • · · • · • • · • • • · • · • · · · · • · • • • • • • • · · • • • • • • • · Dayton Frequency Distributions for 200 Single mb Drops U itaJ Rema fo ng D 1 yton Frequency Distributions for 200 MultidroP1 1-n•mt CEP Capital 8' Remaining • • • · • · • · · • · · · · · • · · · · · · · • · · · • · · • · • · · • • · · · • 86 16 7 DonucnoN Moscow Capital Destroyed vs Yield by CEP Ground and Afr Bunu • Dayton Capiu l D stroyed vs Yield by CEP Ground and ur Bunts • · Geneva Steel Plant Cost of Recuperation vs Yield by CEP Ground and Air Bursts • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Moscow Capii J D su yed vs CEP Showing Stmdud Dcviatioa and 90 Per C nt Confidence Ground Bunt DGZ--Kremlin •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • O yton Capiu l D stroyed v CEP Showing Standard Deviation and 90 Per Cent Confidence Ground Burst DGZ-City Center • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Geneva Steel Plant Capital Destroyed vs CEP Ground Burst •••• • •• • •• • • • Moscow Frequency Diitributioru for 200 Single Bomb Drops pita Re- -· 0 u in q ·o i f · RESULTS ON MoRTALffiEs Moscow Mort alities vs Yield by CEP Single Bomb Drop DGZ-Kremlin • • • Dayton Mortalities vs Yield by CEP Single Bomb D p _ DGZ--Gty Center · Moscow MortJ lities vs CEP Showing St andud Deviation and 90 Per Cent Confidence Ground Bunt Unwarned IX Z-Kremlin - • • • • • • • • • • • Dayton Mortalities vs CEP Showing Standud Deviation and 90 Per Cent Confidence Ground Burst Unwarned DGZ-City Center • • • - • • Moscow Frequency Distributions for 200 Single Bomb Drop Survivors ••••• Moscow Frequency Distributions for 200 _MuJtidrops 1-n- CEP Su 1vors • MOS ow Frequency Distributions for 200 Multidrops 2-n•m CEP Surv vors Moscow Frequency Distributions for 200 MuJtidrops -n-m1 CEP _Survivors •• Dayton Frc quency Distributions for 200 Singl Bomb Drop Survivors • • ' Dayton Frequency Distributions for 200 Mu1t' drops l•n•m CEP Surv von • Dayton Frequency Dinributions for 200 Mult' drops 2-n- CEPi Sun YOrs • • Dayton Frequency Distributions for 200 Multidrops -n-nu CEP Surv1Yors • Moscow Contours of GZ's Producing Equal MortaJitjes • • • • • • • Dayton Contours of GZ's Producing Equal Mortalities • • • • • • • • • • • • • Moscow Mortalities vs Yield by Nwnber of Bombs Unwarned • • Dayton Mortalities vs Yield by Number of Bombs Unwarned • • lot 200 Multidrops 2-n-mi CEP Capital y lj'lOn t· c-qucncy Distnbutioru Geneva Steel PJu1t Summary Tabub tion of Sinsfe Bomb Drops Ground a nd 8 116 121 17 Moscow Sc nsitivity to Sc lection of DGZ's 1 MT l•n-mi CEP ••• ••• ••••• • Moscow Sensitivity to Sd«tion of DGZ's 1 MT 2•n-mi CEP •• •••••••••••• Moscow Sensitivity to Selection of DGZ's MT 2-n-mi CEP •••••• •• • • 123 124 12' SUPF I BoMes ' 'Scow C1pitll 0¢stroyed vs DisU ncc from GZ to Kremlin by Yield ••• •• 129 NClASSIHtO ' i ' __ I VULNERABILITY ASSUMPTIONS n• - iL 18 NClASSIH O 19 -- 1 10 0 1 Z 11 l 1 2 0 I 0 l • 0 10 - ' 0 0 10 • 10 II 10 Dlt IIIU ''0' ouPld uro Pl • I Fig 1--Mortalilies vs distance by building type ground burst unwarned II II 17 II --UICl SS HEO N N 100 10 o fa•o 1 l ' • 1112 • 0 I • • • 0 -•• •0 10 0 •• ll 2 • • z 0 • • • • • • • • • I • T • • 10 IZ II DlttoCI f o n 1round 11ro l fN I T 10 14 II 10 IZ II • IT II Fig 2-Mortalities vs distance by building type ground burst warned •• M11IHll011 11urf 0111 ' ' rei11lorud concr111 -- c ✓ ' - - - - -- _ -- _ - _ - wor11td 10 •• 40 •• o l 1e·MT 14111 1 111 ul •• TO fig 3-Mortalitles vs overpressure comparison of warned and unwarned cases llNClASS f EO •• N Tobie 1 LETHAL RADII' FOR COLLAPSE OF INDUSTRIAL ROOF COVER AND FOR MORTALITIES DUE TO FALLOUT RADIATION In nautical miles Bomb Yield MT Type o Dama Type of Bunt Grouod bunt Type of Structure Wood frame Load-bnring walls Li ht•stctl frame Hnvy stecl frame C Cllapsc or industrial roof cover lo ½ 1 18 0 91 2 22 1 71 10 2' 6 48 • 01 oo 9 10 •7 02 4 01 6 1 4 3 22 2 69 J ll 4 70 1 24 2 2 91 4 09 l 55 7 7 10 90 17 00 l 52 6 61 02 0 1 98 8 24 6 26 4 12 2 47 11 '7 1 54 1 92 2 70 20 2 77 o n t H 2 l 1 71 0 61 1 1-4 rnmc 0 l I OD 1 20 2 Woodfnmc 1 0 1 14 2 82 2 14 Multistory steel _ _ Mortalities due to fallout Air burst 600-h Collapse of industrial HCT equi•almt roof co cr Load-bc1 tin1 wallJ l ight-stttl frame Heavy-steel frunc Multistory steel frame •ncsc cook iHUtter ndii were ustd in the alculation of r o n O • 5 o a 2 67 l 76 1 0 0 5 0 66 0 82 1 u 8 79 18 47 and RC in Tables 4 and 6 00 Wood fro' ' Laod-horln1 woll• i o i u 1 1 trom Htcrt' '•llttlfroll lt tto y 20 -·- --- ' '-' 1 Z 1 2 0 I 0 I 1 2 • 0 0 DL 0 ''°' ' O'ld nh1torttd tonc n1 40 •· • I Dl11uu t 10 11 12 I 11 '''' l 111'14 V Fig 4--Damage to 1frudur 1 vs distance by build' • II • I ing ype ground burst IJ L URClASS f Ell ' 100 10 W•M lrolftl LHd- tieorir -n• too Lloht•IIHI lrGffll HMfr-tlHI hMII l i• f•o MlltlllOIJ 1INI ll IIIM ol'd nlftlorud concnt1 · o IM 0 1 Z ZI Z 11 Z 1 2 • 0 I • 0 • • 10 0 • 0 • 6 ' • • 4 4 • • 4 0 4 4 7 • • • 1 I t 10 II IZ Dl tollCI r Ol 'I ground uro l11lflll 10 14 ti 10 11 • I des troyed v1 distance by building type ground bunt Rg 5--Ccpita e • ••1111 Ofllu Ho j i 1 r o--------- ® j Conny S11htollo11 10 l - 10 40 zo lflfYIOI tl1p111d t • 40 10 IO 10 10 100 O o u 1 ro •o 10 eo 100 o 20 fig 6--lndu1trlal vulnorabllity curves for Geneva Stool Plant showing man-hour roqulred for replacement by plant component UNGlASSlfltD 40 YI IO overprem -KREJ 4QlD DATA - A 0HIC fNOOY 40 1'-'' it ii Cit D Tl 00 j i' BASIC TARGET INPUT DATA 00 l •'IO l 1 40 zo zo 0 40 o 60 TO 00 90 ONrp HIUrl pt fig 7-- ampl• of vulnerability curve for Geneva Steel Plant showing dependence on angle of lnddence1 open hearth HCl tSS FIED 110' IC Offl i -······ · ·· _ i_-· • ··· · '· - ·• 1• •·•'''' · ·- ·· ·· _ ·' · ·· omcu -- - _ DL•· Co•1n111 ea • - 1 llelf hu1Hct - t ' - -- '••111h7 olalmn S l'IHIMil 0 4 •• Sc11 ht•t 111 1 T • Fig 8-Mo p o I Geneva Steel Planf ' o llNC jSSIFIED ffe«H Ui H - £CUT e 11u • 411 IC '1Nii¥ iiil JC C tc r Ctlt t OHIC f 'flOY • Cl TIU CeAt '- C • •f rn 1 111 u11ll • I r•fl•• Q l' 11 c 4 - 1-4 I Rg 1 - p of Dayton howing gross dlatributton of populotton and Industrial copltal r Jet •• •1111 ftl Do 2ffl - · ·· 1- 0 750-1 O00 0 Z I I Seel• I • •I UNCl ASSIFlfD HCtASSIFIED Table 2 BY BUILDING TYPE FOR MOSCOW AND DAYTON POPUIATION AND CAPITAL DISTRIBUTION Masco pe ol Struc iutc xi frame J-bcsrin 1 wall it-stttl frame vy-stttl frame tistory OTAL Dartoa PopuhG a in thowand1 PopuJaLioll in thousands C pitd Unwuned 2 % 1'00 H22 169 66% 2% lo% 31¼% l028 109 27 U million Loa Wuninr 667 3667 ' ll% 73% 2% 1¼% Ill¼% 109 27 5'8 1572t 311 ' ······ 02a 3124 % a 2« 28%7' ID% 71 % 9 0 I 290 C pital S m illioa M%·· 121¼% 3% 6 3 67 ' 0 160 1¼% ······ ' I% 1 7o o49o o 3' o% •Data bucd on target mosaics prcpucd bJ the Aft llcsnrcb DiYisioa of The Librar of Congrns monitored by the Deputy Directorate of et l q rtmtnt of the Air Force 1 lnda dcs oil rdiftny and other soft iodustriaJ tar cts Tobi• 3 CAPITAL COSTS OF ABOVE-GROUND CONSTRUCTION AND MINIMAL CONSTRUCTION TIME FOR PLANT COMPONENTS OF G EVA STEEL• Casu in uniu of $10 000 time in months ubor Componcr it st fu naccs 1 296 800 1 800 90 crhoUtt hearth ppcr kin pit om in mill rem ill pm ill 3 n c O'YCQI 1 no 240 ' 492 d CODTtfOtS l70 C'001'CJC r1 00 uidty • chant frlitl hiac lbop 'ices ·austcr and booster uildia 156 ' 270 120 statioa TOTAL Structunl Steel ' 100 Bride ' 227 ll 3l 1l 27 31 69 ll6 19 22 26 3S ' 60 l 11 979 1 00 642 Elcrtria l Equipment Construe1ion Machinery 113 lOO 113 ' ' ' I l 169 102 110 l7 298 ' '·' 80 HD 870 9l0 24 Total Cost 2 184 2 220 l 31l 1 7 m l90 1 5-4• SO 1 18 2 009 370 440 300 1 0 '39 l7l 9 104 2 077 1 17 6l9 36l t 117 '16 3l Time ll 12 I 7 8 II ll 12 16 6 7 ' 12 7 7 140 310 ····· 1• 3° 6 6 '·' ·26 413 NOT • Rrcupcr ation costs were computed accordin to tbc lollowiag formula Jt«uptttition Cost - D Labor Structural Stttl Brick Jt Elcrtrical Equ lpmcot Machinery where Dis the d 11'11JC mcuwr-d br the p ¢1Cent1ge of original man-hours necessary comp rc charts paae 27 This lom iula u well u rccupcnUoa•ti me nthn ta utcd ia this study i1 b scd on material supplinl br the 1ta£ of the Gcnn-1 I Pl1ot 'Sec S M Manhall A ltt ricw of the Stttl JDdustrJ of the United States 'fht lAND Corporation Research Memorandum RM 1091 April 19'3 UNClASSlfIfD D1 ' 'I I UNGIASSIFIED IUU i1t I tt IIQ'TIC l SUMMARY TABULATIONS AND MAPS UG¥ '3 1111 _I ··---- - - - ------- -------- C t N' ' ts r P'Wftrrrn rrrtttrrr trnrtrtthf z -· _ l k 1 r _ J li d ttrr PtrCfftlOff d11tr1tJlf 1 0-20 zo-00 0•100 - o1cow showing dam ag from one S•MT bomb IIYPI A l l n A -• - ti - a Ybz· I ----·• 111d111lrJ e r•dl o-io l0-80 0-100 MopotMosco w h • s owing dama ' J ' I 'TI ' • 14 •• '· • I __ • - go from one 10 -MT bomb ' - 't O 0 ·-· _ · ' ' ' nur t ifitrr• p of Moscow showin d J ' ½-MTbombs 2 ' • ' HeRH•hllil tb DAf t Ai 'S FtCX ICT Lt•• '··ClASSlFIED _ 11 -en111eiu1 • 5EC REJ IC l IIUGJ ICI IIU ' MOSCOW Table 4' '• SUMMARY TABULATION OF SINGLE BOMB DROPS GROUND BURST UNW AIMING POINT-KREMUN In p«c nt El p «tcd Dun ge 9 16 f • If · f · ff If • If • 26 6 3l • • 10 36 8 6 I I 3 2 2 2 2 2 27 7 36 2 23 3 32 8 19 12 I 9 82 I I I 68 3l l 3l ' • • 3 3 68 90 • 60 82 68 36 • 3' 69 91 78 l8 60 I • 3 3 I 0 72 I 2 79 99 87 73 7 • 68 I 3 9 ' ' 3l 33 • J • '7 82 66 28 1 32 • 68 90 o n •6 78 98 87 72 72 6l • l • 9 3 3 2 18 12 3 I 2 7 82 67 3 • •• 3• • 67 2 90 76 I • 9 79 99 87 71 73 16 I ' 2 7 • ' I I I 2 2 • ' 2 2• •• 33 • 10 lO n 1 • 8 18 ' 1 12 9 82 68 3l II ' 2 •• 3• 68 90 77 6 H l8 9 • 79 99 87 72 7 • ' lO 10 3 2 1 6 •• ••' •' l 2 2 7 6 3 7 16 11 • 1• I • •2' II • 9 I I I • 31 l nd •• 4l 711 98 68 70 ' ' •I lO l9 ll l 6 ' 2 2 2 • • • o' 'o 90% Erp«t d r d l nd Danuge I 2 0 l 2 I l 2 2 ' 8 16 12 7 16 32 23 l 9 7 • o 8 22 l2 I 14 12 ' ' 6 II l 10 9 8 7 ' 2 8 • ' 16 9 6 • 82 6 30 33 78 47 18 28 l2 20 •8 •I 8 71 6 n 6 90 7 6 • 7 6 II •J 10 2 7 10 9 8 3 ' 12 27 18 7 II 8 ll 71 l 20 29 22 • •• 88 87 0 •o • 31 33 68 62 ijN llA f f 91 90 72 0 z 8 29 2 • •I • • • • • ' I I '' 13 10 10 S•n-miCEP C n-tniCEP l-o-mi CTP a% 2 3 2 ll •2 6 36 9 6 9 18 12 I 7 •• • • 10 0 0 I • I 2 2 2 2 2 2 • I I I 7 79 99 87 9 13 0 I l9 9 I o 10 17 I I I I 2 n fapmed Dun ge I • I L d 90% l n i 2 - 1-n-nu'CEP oro ion f - pop kj Jed including fa Hout r-poP J D - dwelling uruu demoycd t _ ¼-n-miCEP RC - indwui d roor co cr dntroJcd J - ind u stti 11 1tructura dntrorcd C - indwtri al c apiul de stro7cd 1 iion killed excluding fallout 1 31 I 7' 0% l nd 3 I •'2 2 2 2 2 2 I 8 I ' • 10 • • 8 8 3 6 10 20 9 22 l 6 10 8 I ' l • 6 7 6 17 16 19 12 907'0 l nd I I I I I I I 3 6 2 l • 78 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 I 1 4 lO l 1 2 o 9 7 ' 13 II 18 6 18 46 89 63 82 • 31 l 13 •3 3l 16 2 13 17 68 98 81 ll •2 • • l7 20 9 • 21 8 29 12 22 16 • l8 28 I ' 8 16 II 19 9 I 2 ' II 37 3 •l 8 30 II 23 l 3 2 ' I 2 •2 4 I 07 • 10 7 3 10 7 l I 19 lO 22 13 Eq acl Dim age • • 3 87 7 26 ' 1 ' l nd 90% 1 n 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I l l I l 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 1 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 16 32 21 ' 0 lO II I II 4 1 13 8 6 0 0 0 21 12 3l 6 •2 16 10 I I 28 9 10 • 2' 16 18 16 26 20 28 2l 22 • I I 0 l 18 • ' I I ijNClASSlflf0 j 6ECREflfJiliC • UC11U tilUCI I Uf• uu1cu0 1 e UCRE Ill El Ur 1111 I UII ' Table 5 P - popu tioa lulled excluding a Jlout MOSCOW SUMMARY TABULATION OF MULTIPLE BOMB DROPS GROUND BURST UNWAR In pm nt CEP ½nmi Numbo-of Bomb ½oMT f MT IMT f ur lOMT 2lMT • 6 8 10 II 16 22 16 20 27 27 3' 32 30 64 ll 67 67 7 65 71 77 68 9 JI • oO 20 H •O i •8 58 « 61 61 •6 68 30 68 n 76 Bl 68 •• 6 • 85 90 77 • 86 92 78 93 97 86 76 83 83 78 90 9 97 99 9l 31 29 • •• • 6 8 11 16 8 22 39 • • o1 31 21 II I 20 27 18 2J 16 8 2J 3l •9 58 •1 • 2 • o1 60 97 90 96 99 92 7 82 6 99 J 100 97 100 98 • 86 92 78 • 8 89 77 91 86 6 ' 21 29 l 31 J 2• ' 8 89 81 8 89 93 8 93 96 89 91 99 99 l00 96 76 82 67 7' 66 74 82 86 7' • 67 93 87 6l 7 • 92 2 I 61 2 69 28 86 91 8 • 9• • nmi 2nmi 1 ami 2 17 D - dwelling uniu deruo7td C - industrial c apit al dcstroy«I 9 I 9 9' 9 10 10 98 • • I• 18 II H J 26 • 36 6 8 10 2 • 6 • 20 30 •7 1 20 9 • 2 ll H •• 6l 31 19 o 60 o • •9 8• 89 7• • 91 9l 60 71 80 87 Bl 96 86 68 98 100 UNClASSlf tO u 61 l8 96 98 91 76 6 70 19 6 92 95 38 8 26 10 28 19 •6 88 92 19 90 21 28 17 • 86 92 19 82 87 7l 60 7' 69 78 70 6 - r 56 '• 80 3 9 7l 80 61 61 70 22 9 1 6 99 100 91 78 86 69 91 82 • 8 10 18 26 22 31 12 •• •6 I 26 J2 •9 8 70 79 87 66 8 90 87 92 76 90 9 81 96 98 88 98 99 99 100 9 61 36 •• • 72 • 92 36 • •9 6 7' 16 92 7' 92 96 8 • • NClASSlflEO lfHI · 3 C RET LO p x c1 C WfrGt AC 111411 0 u•l•t• 1t1 J - o-zo - 10-10 10-100 1111111 C •llllt11 fl I Do I 0 I Z I el II el I h1l1 1 • I I I Ji _ 'Rtffl' • JIUU e UD Cllltl IO•n ' - ClASSlf IE• UCU f •cz MtUl 'ff I 0Af-aT'OMl '1ifllo IUf 1l - 'l f - ' Tobie 7 DAYTON SUMMARY TABULATION OF MULTIPLE BOMB DROPS GROUND BURST UNW In percent CEP 2 • •2 • I • 1 ll •9 f 80 ¼¼Mr 60 81 80 9 • lMr 72 9 93 I omi 6 8 10 2 66 70 Bl 66 26 78 62 •2 • 96 70 90 98 8 • 9 99 100 89 93 99 100 100 9 99 Bl 98 100 100 90 9 96 100 100 100 100 100 22 62 82 o 80 9 6l 96 99 IOMT 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 • 80 93 66 •7 89 97 76 100 89 98 • H 2 • 6 30 •7 •1 26 13 23 60 ll 37 u 81 89 9l 9 98 99 63 70 76 •l 93 82 · 9 • o 70 10 2 6 76 •8 • 17 l0 10 • l • 1• 9 13 3• '3 20 • 9 91 99 76 100 82 100 •• 99 86 18 36 l 93 99 100 100 100 100 9 100 92 100 100 98 66 99 99 • 99 99 86 2 100 100 9B 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 82 100 100 99 100 100 100 1 78 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1 1 I 98 100 89 · i - 99 NClASSlf lED loo 96 96 100 7l ll 66 100 100 97 6 22 Bl 9 98 100 •91 8 '7 77 96 7' 67 86 61 l2 98 s 99 100 100 6 80 n 100 100 100 100 '4 60 36 91 100 100 •1 99 97 100 91 2'Mr • 8 • nmi 2ami ' 6 • ur 99 p - population illtd adudi cg Callout D - dwdfin unib destroyed C - indwtrial apital dctroytd ' 1 rarni Numbtt ol Bomh 76 • 71 99 100 100 100 9 •9 71 8 29 0 l7 6 86 10 i 20 7' 93 •o • Bl 9 9 • 91 98 100 Bl 100 100 89 100 100 9l 100 100 100 100 9 96 100 100 98 100 100 100 100 29 71 89 •9 99 •• 99 66 100 100 100 • • • • t•• t4¥m I lr't 'T'I UNClASSlflED Tobie a GENEVA STEEL PLANT SUMMARY TABULATION OF SINGLE BOMB DROPS GROUND AND AIR BURSTS Percentage of total required for reconstruction Air Bunt• Ground Burst j llem 1 ua 1 o r Stnictunl sted Brick EJcdriaJ tquipmcnt Machinery Total R«upcntion time MJJ 1 o Structural steel Bride Electrial equipmrnt Machinery Total Recupcn tion ti Man-hours Structunl steel Brick Elcctrl I cquipu cot Machitiery Tot • I Rccupmtion time i 00- 1 CEP 3000-ft CEP 6000-ft CEP J 00-lt CEP 3000 t CEP 6000-ft CEP 78 63 6 61 61 69 6 40 9 32 ll 18 6 •9 JO Jl 1J i 22 Bl 6 49 71 • 98 96 96 98 96 91 91 8 81 82 80 99 94 100 --- --- •o • 100 99 100 100 27 20 19 4 6 BJ • 9 • 2 70 60 64 94 91 87 89 87 91 97 JO ' 6l '3 71 99 99 0 -- --- -- o ft t-Ki equinlent UNClASSIFIED ·1 rt 1· sent iChirril rtti Jiti et ·· «· «H 'm C 0 z 3 0 ' m ·- 1 12 9 8 18 6 76 60 2 9 l 60 80 l7 86 76 6 67 62 7l 87 80 67 l7 • • 71 JS Jl 2 2• 40 62 66 BJ SECRET ldittC C UNClASSIFJEO ra t Ot IC JllftCK •a ' ' - u uo cu• unwrr rMflGJ tict nu C - vn r buul- 1IMHI Int o I _____ ' G ovn r bvn1-11n J1ot• iae lude - uu to ftHl uou1 I - IO JO s E '° f • E 0 0 40 w • 0 - 0 o c - r __ -- -- 1 - ---- -- -- Y11I IYT Yield MTJ Air _11_1'11 H 10 r o 0 • 40 i 0 o 10 · - - 00 i J ii ° to § --- -- -- n 14 MT Fig 17-Motcow mortalitio1 YI yield by CEP 1ingle bomb dr KSS f E • oo 10 -If••· ---M••• tr l• '° I w --- -- 40 IIIOYT o of --- --- - 0 WT I MT '- -- --- I MT o •i • fig 19-Mosc ow morlolitie vs CEP showing standord deviation and 90 per c enr confidence ground bunt unwarned DGZ-Kremlln a a 1 _ --•M••• I • 1 10 MT 40 w ---- IO i I 40 00 ' ' II I I I zo ' • w -- IOMT 00 2 cu• 4 1• 11 '' '' '' ' ' '''' • ·w · ' ±r ---to'- c lih n •ii ' •· • 0 '' ' ' '' ' ' _' • CCI 1111111 4 tHIT '' • 0 4 • C I 111 l'liJ Fig 20--Dayton mortalities vs CEP showing standard deviation and 90 per cent confidence ground burst unwarned DGZ--city center LiLL LLl LlLLiL LLl _JL LLJl Ll JUUl ILl lUUULJbl I 2 3 • 5 10 I 2 3 4 5 10 I 2 3 4 5 10 I 2 3 4 5 SO I 2 3 4 5 10 I Fig 21--Moscowz frequency distributiont for 200 single bomb drops survivors 0 N w a 0 r• j lo f-N •r 2 3 4 5 I L Fig 23-0ayton frequency dislributions for 200 single bomb drops survivors y' i •l r p PiCll ijffClASS FIEO EtlU S 0 1 ll oliH dl Fig 2 -tb-Oayton frequency distributions for 200 multidrops 2 n•mi CEP survivors IIIA i 5 5 65 alJ46 - t 'f 1 U ClASSIFIED p'I D'I o g ' ' p' o r 0 Q tl a 0 ' IOlilT J0164ZO246110 I 1111 l II e I I Scol• lnltli 1 I I I fig 25-Moscow contours of GZ'1 ·producing equal mortalities percent VIOMT ' ' 1 2 MT S4l21O1234S SI I I I I I I I I I Fig 26--Dayton conloun of GZ's producing equal morlalilies percent IINP l ASSIFIEO J '- -- ' ' 0 ClASSlfIED ICl0 10 2 10 i 40 w to 2 20 0'----------------1 10 1 2 10 2 1 10 112 Ylttd MT I Yltld MT 10 Fig 27-Moscow mortalities vs yield by numbei- of bombs unwarned numbers on curves show number of bombs oo 00 2 eo i 40 ½ CEP '' w 20 o ---------------- 100 00 2 Zn ' I CEP 0'----------------1 10 1 2 10 z Ylfld MTJ 1 10 ' I Yltld MTI Fig 28-0ayton mortalities vs yield by number of bombs unwarned numbers on curves show number of bombs IINf I ASSIFl n UNCJ ASSlfltO ens ct SXik-AiDMIL IC 61 DESTRUCTION RESULTS ON CAPITAL llrtCtt SS f EO UH LASSlflfil winer- 00 Ail bi rtt ao to 0 00 Gto 11 d burl l 80 f ' i tiO w o uNClASSlHEO 0 l 00 ' o Yi d Ml UNGlASSIFIED 1een1 5 II MIC Et'frl CCPriJ tEJ aJ• • 100 K O Alrbuut e eo i - r QOtt CEP ii • 8 40 AirW t w oL------- oo 00 u 10 • ··-· MClASSlrltD 0 Yitld n Fig JO-Dayton coPitol destroyed vs yield by CEP L______u -- ------ --- o -- 1 10 ornr ---·' l 2 'r'itid IMTl oo - ---MH•J ---90' c••ficllnu IIIOlirt' ------- --- ----- ----------- - oo0 112 MT ' ' --- - -- --- --- IOMT - --- ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '' ' ' ''' ' -- • t P 1111111 Fig 32-Moscow capitol destroyed vs CEP showi g 1tondord deviation and 90 per mt confidence ground burst DGZ--Kremlin ' ' • • ' • • ' i • • • ' •• • • • oo f 10 -w 011 --- •• ± --- to- to111idlnct ' 1 IOMT 1 2 MT --- ---- -------• MT --- ' '' ' '' '' __ • 'I' ' ' __ _ I ' ' '' ' ' ---- ---- ---- - - - ---- o ----- --- -- --- o--- --- ' ----- - - - 00 C l llll111i c ci-11u11II C 1 11111111 Fig 33-0oyton capii• destroyed vs CEP showing standard deviation and 90 per cent confidence ground burst DGZ--dty center • • • lptCIM capltol dUl '71d 1' 41 0 00 f •Pttlld capitol d111 o d _ 0 oor--- --- -ll-r_ il 0 t• 0 j ' • ' n 0 0 a - I • i I f 0 ' a • n n 0 C 0 • C a ' ' I I II I I ·c r • --r ' - ' - c c - r- er A ' I 0 I 0 n u U2VT 0 0 'II I ' 0 1 10 MT •P1tl1d copllol d 1 071d 141 0 rr t J I I I I I lOMT lLLLL LLl lLLLL LLl LLLLLlLLL LLL LmL Ll • ' LL' LL' _L to 40 100 o •o 00 zo 40 100 20 o10 Coplltl 11mol111 4J 1100 111 llolla 1 roo 20 o10 -c- Tf 90 ' canlid1 t l J UW - --'-'---'l roo o 40 60 Fig 35-Mosc • frequency distributions for 200 single bomb drops capilal remaining NClASSlflf il -M diol'I r I ' '' UNClASSIFIED • ELRti • Eillitjt - I t 1 NfSCX IS c N IP•• ¼ECKL itzaf 1'46 Ll ll J lluL lLI lllLLL1 lLULLLl ltLLLLl lLLILLLl j lLLLLI lLLLLi 60 - aoLL L ' L '' oo -40 O 10 1 0 lO 400 10 10 lO COO 10 20 lO Mto11 - coftfodel'Oa T -90%tol'I L- L--1---'-'1 400 10 20 JO 40 LL' L ' L' · _ 40 O Ko cc ntidienc 90% coi r o -c '° OO 10 20 Xl 400 10 20 Copdol _ I001111llio I d0Uot1I Ag 36o-Moscow frequency dilfribulions for 200 multidrop1 1-n•mi CEP capitol remaining - - I W rJSSrnrrruency I itu l• I • I ' -- I 30 'bo 10 20 XI 400 10 203 040 d' 1 buHo • _lo 200 mu Hd op 2-n•m CEP cop1tol remommg 1 T l - Q ' I ritKbi fig 36c-Mc scow1 frequency distributions for 200 multidrops S-n-mi CEP capital remaining Ii IA EI I l ·' 8 Ck£1L • dllilltb C 1U6 NClASSff ltD WSiiC t 1c was C 1'1 Eili ca LLL i i LLL l LLL l 1 LLL l '°LL 60 -u o -w ci an I -to•- - j 0 Fig 38a-Oayton1 frequency distributions for 200 multidrops 1-n-mi CEP capital remaining 7 198 IO 20 30 40 0 600 10 ZO Xl 40 50 4100 10 20 30 40 iO 600 Cl 20 JO 40 50 60 fig 38b-Doyton frequency distributions for 200 moftidrops 2-n-mi CEP capitol remaining UNClASSfFIED ·-- - -·· l0814202411 l I I t I el 1 I I I t I I I tO I Sctlt 111t11 Fig 39-Moscow contours of GZ's producing equal capital deslruclion per cenl capitol deslroyed 10 MT 112 MT IMT 0 10 MT 54 Zl01 234 1 I 1 I I I I I I I I Scolt 111 nlJ Fig 40--Dayfon contours of GZ's producing equal capital destruction percent copitt il destroyed 'I I MT @· v· M V o Air bur I IMT ____ I 0 Scol hlol mil J• 41-Geneva Steel Plant contours of GZ's produclng'· tqubl Ccpl_rol_diStiJcl n percenl capitol destroyed ··1·11 ' 1 •' j l ' d l1 lJ UUl i-ril r _I I · I I IQ MT I MT ---- --· u our ----- 0 Gre und bur1t I '----' Scal • l tol1T1il fig 42-Geneva Steel Plant contours of GZ's producing equal minimum recuperation time lime out in months n·r·r D 1 11 'u ' r • cup orlon ' 11 1111 1T1onU • ·· ' ' ' Minlfflul I cwp1ntlo11 '' l1110111h 7 G 0------- ------ ----N ------•0 -----·---- ------ -- ------ I I' J2 c- r--- _ er c r --- rr - N p - NH ·i '· _ ·_ ·l '• ' '_rin ·U Cij 1· I · · · · i I II _ oJ -•• 0 11 - 100 C p i •o i ISO h o - ----- -- -'l'i 1d MT 10 25 1 10 1 Z F' g 44-Moscow copilol dest oyed vs yield by numbe of bo b db curves show number of bombs dropp d S groun Yl ld IMT 10 '1'1 d IMTJ 1 2 urst numbers on 10 Yltld IMTI Fig 45-0ayton capital destroyed vs yield by number of bombs ground burst numbers on curves show number of bombs dropped IT 11 1' ' l f • ·r ' ff-' 'l' Iuh't1Lf J J ' i U ' · ' _r· t I I I I I I ' • • • I ''I' II 1· RESULTS ON DESTRUCTION OF DWELLINGS I '' 'I iii' I I · ' - • 1'• j _ I 97 ' Cit-ound bo lrlt o C C' rC CP 1l r 1r t· r1 i•r I 'U L f - 11 1 - • 000 o Ciro ldburaf 10 · - 20 o i o - - --- ---------- -0---- YitldlMT lI II fig C6-Mo1cow and Dayton dwellings de1froyed vs yield by CEP ground bunt p• r ·f '· 99 0'----------------- 00 o'----------------1110 1 2 I 10 25 o ' ' 1 10 Yl1ld IMT Yl1llf lllllT Fig 47-Moscow dwellings destroyed vs yield by number of bombs numbers on curves show number of bombs dropped --···-· tt •i - ' r J - 7 ' ·- -· ' i fr1rM 1 if '' 1111'11 5°20 1111111 CEP ctP • o ------ - -- ----------Y1 1 MT 0 4 5 10 25 1 10 1 2 I Yltld fMTl 5 10 Fig 8-0ayton dwellings destroyed vs yield by number of bombs numbers on curves show number of bombs dropped - l'ff SPECIAL COMPARISONS · l ' _a l - t- _i_ a OJ 10 I Z11 1ct P 10 40 0 --c ut 11 u111• - - 10% c e11tl1111111c11 IZ 10 10 l II 1 CEP fig C9--Moscow cod of confidence in number of bombs 1 MT ½· and 2-n-mi CEP ground burst 10 120 uu UNCI ASSIF tO 80 80 1 ioo-11 cu• 40 ro - - c c d ya u - - 90 co111fMf ct • -40 0 rzo -j'o 20 3000-11 C I 0 roo --E• pec d valut - - 90• c otifid • 'ICf o-------------------------------120 00 Znllfli CEP 10 1000-rt C P 40 0 J o ---------c o ----------- - roo Y 114 MTJ fiQ 51-Geneva Steel Plant cod of confidence in yield ground burst Fig 50-Moscow cod of confidence in yield 1 1 - ond 1-n-ml CEP ground bunf 107 106 ii ii 0------------------------ 10 ' i i I • I • · _ · · ··_ - - 1 Z Yitld MT Fig 52-Moscow trade off-number of bombs desfrr iyed 108 v1 yield by capital 0 0 ------ --- ---------- ---- ------- Yitld IHI Fig 53-Dayton trade off--number of bombs vs yield by capitol destroyed 109 I ''-' '''-' t o llfiClt SSlf-ltO 1 § 'I 60 CICfih6 t Ci Q f • u 40 20 100 Q · 0 10 I C 2 - - Q E au l' 2 • • • 0 C l' --·· 0 h oo II V g IJ bwtt•600-tf l·J f1qUfY011nl 11 t z I O Yt1ld J ' ' o o zz fMTJ fig 5 -0ayton and Moscow comparis n of air burst and ground 0 ---- --- 2 ----- ---c •--- --- i- buw showing mortalities and capital destro 'ed llO irg 4J p1l 011up 101100 11fll 1sr-1prD lllHJLf Ju IL_ 1 Ill oo o oo UflGl ASSlfltD MolcO• o Mo co• 60 0 ii ' •0 lncludil'IO tollovf w _ _ s110 1 •on ino - - Lo111 1 20 worn no 20 OL--------------------- O'---------------------- 00 10 i 10 E -0 w zo 0'-------------------- o ' o L- 0------- - ----------- -- - o----c- 56--Moscow and Dayton effect of fallout ' rn-ml CEP ground burst unwarned Fig 57-Moscow and Dayton effeds of warning and sheller ½-n•mi 1 10 Ti•ld UT Yield WTI Fig CEP i d 112 Nound burst s1 •1 tn tL fih r 1 h JJ 11 • 1 l i ·r 113 1 10 MT ' ' • 0 - t V C 0 • i 0 MT 10 MT 25 MT 0 E •t £ 10 •o 40 CEP nfflil -· t 2 CEP 111 mil 4 0 ' CEP fl 3 roll 4 Fig 59-Moscow trade off--number of bombs vs CEP by capital destroyed numbers on curves show percent of expeded capital destroyed - · ' • c 0 l i C 9 g 10 MT • 3 1 15 MT 0 m -- ---- --- ------ - - ----- u u 91A 0 0 CEP lt1 INI 114 CEP lt1 lni C P fl mil Fig dO--Oayton trade off--number of bombs vs CEP by copitol destroyed numbers on curves show percent of expected capitol destroyedJ 115 -· o' 0 0 '° i I ' -✓ •• •• 50 i 0 1 o 2 • ·· r 10 •✓ j' l i 40 40 lI '° 0 zo l '° I fl 10 100'-------vv oo '° 0'-- -0-- -o-•-0-- -0--0 '00100'-- -- --40--zo--o i - ----- o ICO ao '° •o zo o 90 60 10 Copllol O trroyfd 'Y Gopi1ol Ol'IIIO 'tdr J 0 0 0 0 Z0 i • 40 i o I 100- -------•o zo IOO flO a C api 'ol cint 11p1d 20 0 0 t'Ywl IOO100 80 60 •0 10 0IWTIO ' I dwdlt IQ C fig 61-Mos cow end Dayton s catter diagrams showing correlarion between types of damage eoch dot reptes enh one bomb m z m 0 00 UNClASSff Hl 60 10'--------------------------Comoorlaon ot c o nq 11 m 0 3 and 0 37 o_ ' ' ' ' _ _______________ no o 112 2 Yilld MT fig 62--Moscow and Dayton sensitivity to cube-root scaling showing mortalities and capital destroyed ½•n-mi CEP ground burst UNClASSlfltD 119 --- -·· - oo N 0 •• o i • •• i Ir••• li•n 111 lu•• ruull t ou 1111 u 111twru 1111•' ' i fet 1in11 •lhct •1 to'I o '------- c c c- c ------ oo _ c r __ __ __ nc- u c -- r ·- Fig 63-Moscow and Dayton sensitivity to changes In vulnerability assumptions showing mortalities and capitol destroyed C C ·· -- - - rr ' - °J lo • N C ' 0 -_-1 f 0 E1p1cr1d Of'l' Qgl lg lllduJlrJl%1 0 s 0 2n n· o i •- a s 0 1 - II I nn mo ' J 3 -g g 0 a · · n i f i f i I - a C a 0 3 a • - N 0 ' ' Th1M IIIGpl tho- l w1 dUl 1111 leltcloant of DGZ't fr 10 IIOffibl Motto• Fr Jo u l•MT I II nu C P tM Fi9 66 I• MT 211 II CtP IH f'it 67 -MT Zn ml C P N F l9 68 101 16420246810 t I I I el II el I I t 1 1 1 l I Sear nml Fig 65-Moscow sensitivity to selection of DGZ's showing five different selections ct DGZ's for ten bombs on Moscow oo cu o -- 100 --- - - o •n 20 20 oL----------------0 ' N 4 6 Hu1T111tr of bOfflbl o o'------------------ o 0 4 6 N11mt11r ol bombt Fig 66--Moscow sensitivity to selection of DGZ's 1 MT 1-n-mi CEP _ oo oo c i o o ' 0 0 o o---- ---- ---- -------- o 0 o ---- ------ ----- ------ -•--- -o NUlnbtr of boll'lb1 lllnblr ol bomb Fig 67-Moscow sensitivity to selection of DGZ's 1 MT 2-n-mi CEP oo r-·--·- Con 10 __ oo 3 -- ao ' o o 0 0--- ------ ---••---- ---- o Fig 68-Moscow sensitivity fo seleclion of DGZ's 5 MT 2-n-mi CEP o SUPER BOMBS y · - -- UMClASS F EO 127 @' • SECkli I • S11pu bo bt 011 i 60 2 40 zo oL_ _ _ _ __ -- oo F -- 10 Ct•u11d HfO due IOU of Kre111li11 zo fig 69-Moscow copilol destroye vs distance from GZ to Krerr lin by yield 1 W t i 'i 'fi rnr ·· __ I ------l r 1- 1 129