'REPROOUCEO AT THE NATIONAi AACHVES O P- 1' - 54 r •-I lc1 D 5''lx1 Aft1uc c THE PRE auc r a' Cu£NCt AOVISORY COMMITI'EE •· ·· • n' • I t r ' l t'h' J Mn ii EXECUTII E OFFICE 8UIL OI NQ · ' WA StilNCTON 2 5 D C I May 21 1959 M0 - t y_ o t• $ - - 4 J 11 h- OFFICE -i mi 1 ur #E r MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY OWEN - 4 - - % Office of the Assistant Secretary for d fl- ✓-v te Policy Planning I ab 1 r 4 te Department of State Subject Residual Radioactivity and National Policy I am returning your note and the attached mimeographed material on residual radioactivity and national policy I have discussed this problem with members of the staff of this office There seems to be general agreement that the mimeographed document does not reflect a balanced or authoritative understanding of the radiation danger problem I would suggest that several of us meet with interested members of the Policy Planning Sta££ of the State Department to discuss the matter and to put it into better prospective Your attention is called to the studies that were made about a year ago in connection with the NSC consideration of the fallout shelter program particularly the AEC study of the fallout problem in the event of global war I understand that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy may soon hold hearings on this subject Please let me know if you would like to get together David Z Beckler Executive Officer Attachments K-TS-5352 K-TS-5352-a TOP SlC ET - - tJ-AA l K- T 5-b'f - L ' I -r g--J l-7 - - 3 - - - -· ·- - - - - - - ·· -·--········· ·-··- ·r - ·· -· • · ·· · ··- · - -- - ··-·-0EciAss1F1Eo · ·· · Authority IJ J P 'i5'100 I - 1 -Li gl ' l • I ' -1 By d' Ii NARA O e 5S • ' March 10 l9S9 IH·' I-' • ' • ·· 1 r • RESIDtIAL RADIO C'llvl'l'I AND NA TICIW POLICI • f til - •· I • • l I 1 __ ' '- rn all that has been said an the subject or general nuclear war il J r'F-'rr '1 t mon1 bs1 trcn the windy debates an Capital Hill and in the press- 1 f c ert l yhl stetter•s reasoned treatise on 11'1he' Delicate Balance of Texxor1 11 little il azry attention has been paid to the radiation effects which would result from a resort to 7 znassi ve nuclear attacks by e l ther side in pursuance of its nationa1 • policy Moreover this cm ssion is not confined to military philosophers Because of the capricious behavior of local fallout - and the slowness or residual radioactiviv in producing casualties these ''bonus effects as they are eupbemisti referred to have been almost entir ignored as a factor in military plarndng But a brief look at the scale of the nuclear exchange wich might occur in a general wr in conjunction dth the a•ndJab1e information on the maxilllum pend ssible concentration of residual radiation suggests some sobering conclusions state the proposition in briefest terms it may be possible that in the near future the total number or nuclear weapons llhich would be required to elim1na e the nuclear retaliatory cape bilit v of either the tbited States or the Sovit Jnion Jllight produce enough residual radioacti vit to jeopardize the lives of most of the warld•s population ffar y or the premises which· form the basis far such a conclusion are controversia1 or have been inadequa 1 mrestigated Yet the illlplications for national policy which it poses are so manentous as to w rrant the attention or all whose duty it is to insure our national survival To Writing in the Novanber l 9$8 issue or the Marine Carps Gazette Dr F dgar A Parsons whose field is military sc 1 ence and strategy has made sane cogent observations on residual radioactivity as it relates to Jd litary planning The folJ owine paragraph StllllllarUe8 sane of Dr Parson's main pointe • The maidrn11111 permissible concentration MPC of radio stronti'lll II Sr90 a product of nuclear eJCPlosions • for· the standard IIIBJl is · one microcurie • Nuclear explosions in the megaton range produce radioactive isotopes are produced as the result of nuclear explosions at these on 13' radiostrontium Sr90 Caesium JJ7 · Csl37 are 1mpartant in connection 111th residual radioacti vitv Their long half'•lite 28 years far Sr90·and 0 years tor CslJ7 JBmits them to T'fflMin in the stratosphere for lll8Jl Y' years gradualJ r returning to earth as long tenn fallout caesium ' 37 has a biological half'-1 l fe or· about 140 s and is chi a genetic hazard Radiostrontium1 the main 1lla1n1 has a biologica1 hal t life of 7½ years and produces bone lesions and sarcomas aswell as J eulcaemi es TOP SECRET - zzou I A T THE NA110NAL ARCHIVES 2 stratospheric allout of radio strontium on a wrld wide scale which continues descending to the earth's surface for periods or 10 years or more As an exampl e of the effects or this fallout the AEC has calculated that the CASTLE series in 1954 created enough Sr90 in the stTatosphere to cause the concentration frcm this series alone to reach 0l2$MPC or l¼ percent or the permissibl e maximum by 1970 liter 1970 the rate o descent or the radioactive 1113 teria l fran CASTLE will be substantially lower than its rate or decay and the concentration v i 11 begill to decrease 'l'hese calcula• tions are based on a total or 24 megatons or fission products in the stratosphere By extension it might be argued that i t 24 megatons 0£ fission pr'oducts pr'oduce an amount or radiation equivalent to l¼ percent of the MPC then 1900 megatons or canparable detonations will cause the concentration to reach lOQ The problem or calculating the megaton equivalent o£ the world MPC has been the subject or considerabl e contl'OVersy since the thermonuclear break• through In 19$3 the world MPC ws placed at 7551 000 nar tdnel KT bombs or 151 000 Mr Earq in 1957 in a speech at Northwestern University Dr I i bby or the AEC described his method or calculating a revised MPC or ll1 000 megatons Dr Ralph E Lapp took exception to Dr Libby•s findings and on the basis or some or Dr I i bby1 s 'V-own statements inclwting thoee about the CASTLE series cited above _ estilnated that the MPC is 2600 MT Further noting that the MPC concept is restricted to a healthy adult work illg under controlled •• illJ and supervised conditions Dr Lapp reduced his calculation by a ✓ factor of ten to make it app jcable to prolonged exposure by large pr l r populations in accordance with the recamnend tions or the Inter0 national Cotmlittee on Badiation Thus Dr Lapps• resultant figure t is an MPC or 26CMT or about one-fortieth or Dr Li bby•s MPC • li tJ 't efr _ 1 t The important point in all this is that regardless or the llide range o£ opinion as to its exact value there is a finite upper llmit on the concentration o£ residual radiation which the world can tolerate It remains then to estimate where we would stand in rela• l ti on to arr ot the MPC1 s 'Which have been mentioned i t we vere to 11 OJ' becOllle involved in a nuclear war within the next rew years A very · rough estimate of' the total yield of the pr'esent Soviet stockpile J or nuclear weapons based on current estimates would be about 1000 MT £ The current figure would pr'Obabq be tripled by 1962 and would -A continue to rise r a thereafter It is important to note that w• ' the range of etzor in our estil'llates of the Soviet stockpile is rom ' 0 0 o tr one-half to twice the stated figures f l J111l w • vr· 1 l' J t 1 '- · L _u lY' j -7'A 'fl' There is no information ava1lahle on the size or the US stockpile However Dr Parsons made an approximation based on the SAC strength figures given to the Senate Committee on Air Power last year SAC was described as having 1400 B-47 medium bombers and 300 B-36 heavy bombers which were in the process of being replaced with sane 500 to 850 B-S2•s Dr Parsons assumed that this force would be able TOP SECRET • - -··-···•- - • - DECLASSIFIED ' 1 Authority WJ iJ 'fSC oo 1 Jf NARA O i 1· · • By nm• NAnaJf ' REPAOOOC£0 AT THI AACNYl S l to fly a total or J 500 Jlli ssions deliverillg an average or 10 MT per mission ror a total yield or J 51 000 MT1 an amount in excess or Dr Libby-ts MPC ' Dlis calculation cli d not include 8113' fissionable materials which might be delivered by- the Tacti cal A lr Command the Arary the Navy UK forces ar by missiles Another approach to the question or what quantity or radioactive material might be released into the atznosphere during an all out nuclear war is through the study or US target systems Here again there is wide divergence or opinion as to the numbers or targets which would have to be destroyed in order to neutralize or eliminate our retaliatory- striking power According to an Air Farce study made last summer in connection w i th a Soviet requirements estiJnate there will be same 373 priJ1lary targets located in North Alllerica by mid-1962 Neutralization ot these targets would require 2 521 ICBM•s ·asmnning that each carries a 1 5 MT warhead plus follow-up attacks with 578 bCIJlbs or 5 MT each The total yield required therefore would be on the order or 6500 MT This figure is undoubtedcy' excessive since it makes no allowance ror overlap and includes attacks with both missiles an banbers on targets which would be ot marginal importance in an initial attack Making adjusbnents or these actors might allow us to halve the number or weapons required r n Europe and the UK the Air Force calculations i roduced a requiranent tor 592 missiles and 194 bombs while in the rest or the world the total came to 335 missiles and 72 bombs or a total or about 2700 MT in additi on to North American requirements Again this figure is probal cy high It has been reported that an investigation by the Stanf'ord Research Institute made to determine US anti-ballistic missile requirements led to the conclusion that in 1962 the Soviets would need up w • •· 2900 ICBM• s over target to neutralize the US retahatory capability The Stanford study assumed characteristics for the Soviet ICBM which were canparal le to those estimated in NIE ll-5-56 Making allowance or unavoidable errors and the bias which have crept into these estilnates or Soviet requirements it is stil1 reasonable to conclude that radioactive material 'ran several thousSlld Jnegatons or nuclear explosions would be released into the abnosphere by an attack on retaliatory- targets in North America alone These figures do not take into account explosions resu1ting frCllll wild shots or attacks against targets at sea The total potential residual radiation which would result from a worldwide attack on Western ret Ji atory targets should c give pause to even such a presumab cy callous group as the SoViet planners The long term dangers to the Soviet Union would be great even though not a single Western nuclear weapon were to explode TOP SEamT 4 AsS'Ulll i ng that these conclusions are correct there are a n llllber of important inplications for US policy llhich come ead f 13 to mindo • • • Arly' method or increasing the number or weapons which the Soviets would need t o destroy our retaliatory- capability- would increase the danger t o the USSR i tsel Two means of raising Soviet requirements are by dispersal and by hardening instaJJa J ons Air bases must be dispersed since they are di Iicult to harden · But missile launching sites control centers and weapons storage facilities can be hardened with spectacular results in tams or increased requirements for weapons t o knock them out lbe Canadian position paper for the recently- COlllpleted US-canadian estimate of the Soviet threat t o North America contains the followillg calculations based on US data concerning the effects of nuclear weapons Assuming an ICBM with a warhead of one megaton and a CEP of 5 nautical miles three such weapons would be required l'ler -target to g l ve 90% assurance that a sort ICBM site would be knocked out Ir the site were hardened to 100 PSI overpressure 257 ICBM•s would be required to render the site unusable Ir the CEP of the missile were reduced to 2 nautical miles the figures would be one and 1 1 •respective lbe significance of these calculations is too Cl1mi ous to belabor • • • Assuming that a large scale hardening program were carried out and that Soviet requirements could thereby be raised to a level which would cause the resulUng radiation to exceed the MPC important changes in plamd ng by both sides would be indicated a lhe Soviet planners would be faced with the eJCPellsive and complex task of mounting a simultaneous attack with thoW1eDds of weapons without prejudicing surprise - ding to these considerations the knowledge that the resulting radioactivity would exceed the MPC might force them t o adopt a strike plan which would contemplate concentrat ing their offensive weapons against cities and contt'ol centers rather than against rPtali at ory targets Such a plan would not give any assurance against the USSR•s receiving Dlaccept able damage in return un1ess a near airtight defense could be devised In the absence of such a defense the temptation to t be Soviets to strike first would be sharp reduced b Since the danger ot war by miscalculation 'Would be ever present shelter against the radiation hazard would have to be con- · structed for the entire population of the us Cities would require much greater protection as they might be the prinary targets • • Cn the principle of what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander our own war plans should be scrutinized with an eye to the residual radioactivity which would result from their execution As has been ampl 3 demonstrated there is a wide area or disagreement among the experts on the subject of radioacti Vity It is possible TOP SECRET ' --·····-oEcLAss1AEo · • · Authority WJ P 'i5'100 1 · 1 By l'Jf NAR i e • • 0 55• 5 that both Soviet and US war plans could be executed without causl ng the extinction or crippling of most of the human race through long term fallout Nevertheless ii' the limit of radioactivity which mankind could tolerate is anywhere near even the higher est l ma tes which have been mentioned the e£fects on our national planning would be enormous A thorough study by an il11partia1 and quaJi NAd boct in order to arrive at the best possible determination of the 11 egaton equivalent of the MPC should be undertaken immedia as a first step in what may prove t o be a tru ly agonizing reappraisal of the concept of massive retaliation TOP SECRET -1 State--FD1 Wash 25 D C