• • - •• _ _ ••• ••-• 11v1-l 'll vfKW'-'1 '-_ DECLAS D AuthontytlJ fS J -- By NARA Date -- i - CONTIIO S S r REGl5TER OF PEIUONHEUt HDI IHG CUHIFIED DOCUMENT OATS SC I IYSD 9 Sept 63 RETUIIN TOI REShd'-' i-L· • t• •' -t __ Office Chaitma11 JCS Room 2-E 865 TLe Pntagoa - CO Y NU - •• DOCUMa'NT HUM 9R Memo for Chm NESC •v•-- OOD J OQll• on lJ11'1 - uw bJ CLA tP'fC ATI OH n · l 'l •'I Lv · n ' · OATK OP' QQC UJl4 NT orig w cy 7 of repo rt 27 Aug 63 NJ i cb 3 Tran• mittal of 110ral Report of the NESC Study for Meetinga i Aug 6 n aboT• •acrtbetl doc-t ha• ban recelff I In tlol• oaice CJrcalatloa of thla d o c - d i be ll '1tetl to lndlYidula Indicated below The dOO-llt wW et-• d IO u AdoalalslntlH Ofllc• ror reco d polor to dl•p•teb to aaotllat afllc• o i1• 1 1T '• l'O#UII 9'JU IIOT' • • l IIOVSD I'll OIi •w••cr DOC --rn- ot- TO INIYIAI MAME ftl MAflltl ' CMAIIIM N JC• SANmZED COPY 'SENSITIVE INFORMATION DELrnn ·••C ITIYK - fl IP• CIAI AllllaTANT P tla r t CNAIJIU1MH•• 8TAi 'I' efllOUJI MU ITAIIY M•l• TA '4T PA ·· -- • WILll'AflY U•l• TANT IA JJ I _ J II I ADMINJaT ATIV AHi TANT 11 C l TAfllY TO CMA• IIMAN Fila D ' · 'I · · Decl assified SD 349 '1 uthority l i 1 G 9 1 27323 lly Alan Lipton Date 06-02-2006 ' __j Bv DECLASSIFIED 1 0 12968 Bee 3 1 i ic '-It -- z T' - - rn -r i ' '1 11 11 it · DECLASW'fED Authority ft - -J fS Byn NAR ' Datev -0' -- I r L • J - • ' ' - NATip • ii- t - I i s•j rtf• NCIL NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE OFFICI OF lHE DIIECJOI au n _ 2E -ilcagan Wmhinglon 2S D C August 1963 MEMORANDUM POR THE CHAIRMAN NET EVAWATION SUBCOMMITTEE The attached 1B an_exact copy of the Oral Report or the NESC study which the President will use ror w r $ I the Security Council meeting scheduled forLJ 9 Jwgust General USAF 1 Incl Cy 7 of 8 - Oral Report -- - _ ' r Director ' -·' f I' -- - - - r ··-1 - _ • ' - - r · _ D J1 - r' By NARA Date ·-- · - m l' i VALUA1'ION SUBCOMMI'i i'EE NATIONAL SECUHI'l'Y COUNCIL OHAL PRESENTATION OP SECREr i S ft 8lf'S 81' l J TS-NES-21' i-a-63 ORAL PRESENTATION I l THE PROBLEM Mr President • • 1n accordan e with your dlrectlve the 1963 Net Evaluation was_ baaed upon the following The NESC will develop studies ot a series or general wars initiated yearly during the period 1963 through 1968 _ CoDJParative results in each war will be determined with e nphasis on the degree of da111age sustained by the TT3 and an analys l s will be 11111 de to identify significarit trends in national defense capabilities 11 2 Based on this directive the Net Evaluation Subcommittee war gamed a series of general wars occurring as year from 1964 to 1968 or 1 July each These wars were initiated alternatively by a united States pre-emptive attack and by a Soviet pre-emptive attack each of which in turn generated a retaliatory attack Using progrrumned US forces and estimated Soviet forces Id th projections for both where ·necessary each war game was completed through to the end or the initial nuclear exchanges To maintain comparability ot results certain key parameters were defined and held constant throughout the problem--the strategy employed by both sidee their conditions or alert stra egic warning and targeting philosophies Other parameters relating to forces reaction times and weapons systems character1st1ca were permitted to vary over the years in keeping with estimates of capabilities The results or these wars were expressed in terms or weapons and megatons down on each side by target categories 3 · 'lbe National Military command System support center using the weapons and megatons down on the various categories or targets calculated the casualties fatalities and percentage of industrial capacity destroyed 4 Based on these results the committee compared the degree of damage sustained by each side and analyzed the trends in national defense cJ pab111ties y Defined as the complete exchange of strategic nuclear offensive weapons in their initial attacks and does not i nclude restrilce1 reserve or rea1dual oapab1lit1es WP SEGRE ftB8' Pft E81J Si n qi D E Authonty J 4 fS By Date - OP 5 REI ™1 1CtED DAiA II 5 ASSUMPTIONS Forces a US forces mployed throughout the evaluation were based on currently approved pr-ograma and cstilllftted proJ t1ons thereof for the five-year period 1964-1968 b Soviet ro ces used were based on cm•rent national estimates covering the period 1964-1967 with project1ous through 1968 reflecting a conM nuation of the trends indicated 1n the estimates 6 Alert Conditions In all or the attacks studied the forces of both the United States and or the soviet Union were in a high state of alert · 'Ille world situation and event leading to the high state of alert were not defined a ' be forces or the United States had been 1n Defense condition 3 approximately seven days and in Defense condition 2 for a period of 72 hours prior to the attack I I b ' be soviet forces were in a comparable state i i oy readiness with 90 per ent of the heavy bonibers of Long Ranlte Aviation on alert all medium bombers committed to 'the a a ck on the united States on alertY and all o rational m1 os1 s on 11ax1nlm alert status In the years 1966 through 1968 0 per-cent or the nuclear powered missile firing submarines werei on station off the US coasts 1'he remaining operational m1ss1 submarines 7 were at sea 7 Missile warning ·The USSR first ach1ev d a ballistic missile early warning capability in 1966 which pfovided 15 minutes I of warning of an ICBM attack at the operational level I or command y -- s o ·v l e·t Long Range Bomber forces we1•e co idered to have a significantly slower reaction capabil1tfr than SAC forces in a comparable state of alert I i- a l'OD C 1 OID Jae' RiOliDiiP PO'CO -2- UIC atA Col C1J CCI Atca1c IMCff ON DECLASWJED AuthoritytLI-' b f 4 1$ - -Byn_ NARA-Date resp sncun 8 General a Neither the US -nor the USSR launched its misaileo as a result or the warning provided by early warnin systems but wc11ted until an enemy weapon had rletonated in their homeland before order1n3 the launch or miss l les in retaliation b The USSR wa3 the only Sino-soviet Bloc nation possessing a nuclear s X'ike capability during the years 1964-1968 c ' he US knew the location of at least 90 percent of the soviet ICBM launch sites throughout the period 1964-1968 'il9P Bil9RB'f As88'ffel 9'i18i Di 1111 • - - DECLASWIED AuthontyN N f J I$ By NARA Date III DISCUSSION FORCES EMPLOYED 9- 'lhe follow1ng chart shows a comparison or the strategic weapons and megatons committed to the 1n tt1al nuclear exchange in each year or the study i -1' IIPAl#'M' FW l#P $ IJ T 11 F IIIF IIF lhl N ITIIW u ll'Ul'NS' p S'N 'FT AFdATt'll 11 i 11 r L 1-f o G 19 '1- 77- IZI 19 r -119 It - '' 4'15'1 1169 ilt f ' K IZZ9 - q _ IZZt ft-t 1 I 1-0 1 1 19'8 2 s r 'J · C I 1 II ·-· --- ·------ -----· - 10 It 1e to be noted hat although ie number or soviet weapons remains almOst constant the megatonhase rises dramatically This rapid increase in megatons s t from be 1ntl Oduct1on or I 100 Ml' weapons 1nto the S v et inventory oofncing in 1965 and the application or improved nuclear weapons technology to increase · the yields ot all pons - 1n • • - O S efflff H 'S'ffl 9 'BB 9 JW ily a-••• increase roi 1b11 -4- oeo l'OZl bll - G UIC UOI l•I 11 IC no atmlc IDergy k t OID dfef· - ilOIUlT A • ' JEQsJ m 9 ll'A 12 The trend in these forces is for a growing ICBM and SLBM force with a reduction in the bombe1· force In the US forces the bombers delivered four-fifths of the megatonnage of the attack 1n 1964 phasing down to approximately one-half in 1963 l In the Soviet 1·e-empt1ve attack the bombers delivered over one-half of the attack in 1964 phasing down to one-qUal'ter in 196d In Soviet retaliation the bombers delivered about one-third of the attack i n each of the years 14 By 1968 the Soviet hardened ICl 'lMB had increased to about two-thirds or the total ICBM force OBJECTIVES 15 ·l'he us war obJective bol h in pre-emption and retaliation was to •limit damage to the US and to destroy the ability of the USSR and China to wage war The numerical superiority and the structure of the US st1•ategic fo1•ces permits the US to always target counterforce with high assurance that we can follow through t o ui-btm• -t ndut4t i•J al 0P ot 1•trntic-n if necessary 16 vJAw The soviet war objective were from the r point or 1m1lar to those 01• the 118 within the limitations 01' their capabilities In pre-emption the Soviet objective was to achieve a high level of d st 1 1r t ion to the US urban-industrial cOlJi lex and t o limit t' ltAHatory damage to the Soviet Union In retaliation the Soviet objective was solely to inflict maxi uw destruct ion to the urban-industrial complexes of the United States It should be emphasized · that in c-ur Judgment the Soviet force otructure throughout the period reade it illogical for them to execute a controlled response attar k--eithe1• in retaliation 01 pre-emption · Hence in all attacks the USSR fired at all targets £rom the outset OF BEBMf fl ffl el'Be mtl'lt SOVIET INITIATED EXCHANGES 17 soviet Pre-emption a ' he world situation and events leading up to the Soviet pre-emption were not defined beyond the assunption that conditions existed which resulted in US and Soviet forces beii'lg brought to a high state or alert several days prior to the attack b The Soviet planners concluded that a m1 se1le attack timed for BWIIUltaneous impact followed by a bomber attack launched coincident with the ICBMs was the best tactic to employ even though they had a capability by 1966 to initiate the attack with SLBMs Such SLBM initiation was not atteJll ted since the USSR considered that with the US bomber dispersal and the existence of SI BM warning the disadvantages outweighed the benefits to be gained c In the accomplishment of the primary soviet objective of a high level or destruction to the us a large percentage of the megatonnage available was scheduled against urban-industrial targets 1n each or the years 1964 through 1968 The illlprovements in Soviet missile reliability CEP and warhead yield Justified assigning an 1ncreased nwnber of missiles against U ICBM forces to limit the retaliatory destruction in the USSR The weight or attack against additional military targets was essentially constant throughout the period 18 US Retaliation In spite of the Cirst salvo of Soviet missiles having been fired the US retaliatory attacks included targeting of soviet missile sites in an effort to minimize further damage to the US and its Allies from reload missiles reserve missiles and missiles that had failed to launch F ach year this portion or the attack required an increasing number of US weap·o ns as the nwuber ot hardened sites increased known m1sa1le s1 tee part1 cularly Selected urban-industrial targets in the USSR were targeted each year with adequate weapons to 111sure n h 1sh level of damage rer 01 18f1Bil Rlllil'ilRH BB MW Long Range Aviation bases and -6- DECLASWUD Authonty b f 4 J5 - -By NARA D a t e OP Ml'f other milit ry targets were attaoked with a large proportion ot the ·scheduled weapons to deny to the soviets the capability to further damage the US ·and its Allies 19 The weapons and megatons delivered by each side 1n this series of changes are shown below °wEAPONS MEGAlONS DELW£UO I I 20 i Not Ji _gradual increase in del1vdred Soviet weapons I - u raobed with the rapid rise in delivered J aegatons US weapons I and megatons delivered reflect the 1ncrea 11 US inventory and the inability of the USSR to ettect1vely de ade our strategic j forces 21 I I In evaluating the results of thes exohanges 1 fatalities i were used as the primary yardstick by muc to measure the ef£ect of the attacks I 'Itiis chart shows the fatalities resulting from the Soviet pre-emption and the US retal1atfon I I I U 11 080 MIC f'OD Clt J - G UIC' ZlA el CU AU le - - • kt oeD 'f8F BH6ftB'f ft ffl'ftt O PBB 911 i'i ti -7- CJ nm DECLASS»1ED Authontytl N fJ I J$ 1 Byll NARADate - ----'·- - 'l'8P SBOftM MHRi811 11ii8 g ft 9M -- FATAi iT £$ -·- $'tJYIFT'1 FIIPTS' WKO fu t1 ·j • I • I I I' •I ' r I f I i I t- • ' i ¼ l • •' 22 f ' -· • • · • i - · 11· - · · The trend or increasing US casualties is evident d arting with the 93 IDillion fatalities intl1cted in 1964 by 409 Soviet weapons yielding 2584 megatons and rising to 134 million in 1968 Soviet fatalities are relatively oonstant at about 140 million representing that degree of urban-industrial damage sought in the current National Targeting and Attack Policy US INITIATED ElCCHANOBS 23 US Pre-emption a In the US pre-emption- targeting philosophy and execution generally followed that contained in the current National Targeting a d Attack Policy Enemy forces targeted were in consonance with current national es imates b 'lbe US strategic forces were launched at B-hour or as soon thereafter as the characteristics of each system permitted Heights of burst were 1nf'luenced by oons1derat1ons h SrftIGt'ED DA1' -8- DECLASSJ YIED Authonty N t - 4 J$ Byn NARA Date Mf 'it Mftll ·ns ift crm mm of target oharacter1st1os and delivery tactics In order to reduce the USSR to industrial impotence a high level or damage was sought against selected urban-industrial complexes 24 Soviet Retaliation In retaliation the Soviet attack was launched with the object of inflicting maXimUm possible destruction -on the US In view or the relatively small number ot Soviet strategic weapons and their vulnerability to destruction before launch a retaliatory philosophy of targeting urban- industrial centers offered the highest assurance of inflicting this maximum damage In the later years of the pedod with an increasing number of hardened ICB4s the USSR was able to target a few additional US m1litacy forces and installations as a means of further reducing those elements ot the forces which could contribute substantially to post-attack reconstitution 25 In the tollow1ng chart showing the weapons and megatons delivered 1n this series or exchanges the effectiveness or the US pre-emption in reducing weapons and megatons delivered against the US is of particular note US weapons and megatons delivered in pre-emption increased only slightly over those delivered in the US retaliation since the US had not suffered significant losses to its strategic forces 1n the Soviet pre-emptive attack 'HP BB8Rill' MS'fft O BB lWff DECLASS fIED Authonty N - f J4 J$ By l l NARA D a t e eP SBSAMI RliflfilQiliQI P 'I IJA - 111' MnlH NwK· -- -- -·- -··- - - - - - - ·26 - -I I The -eault1ng fatal ties are shown b11ow -- •I r II · r 1 • - - • r • • I ·• I II i j · - i Ii 1 Fl - 1_ Ii - ' iij· % - 1 ' I 1 - 5 w 1 • j rl I# I FATAl TIEG W 1W'at 1' Ml'lffJ'FYtfUAT# l --✓ •--- • r I i I -' t i -----·- ---- - - -r - llJ t 'IIIIT FAT-AL TIE'' I _G l IIOC ' OP 8B8Mllfl ftBS ft 8'DB B W t a -10- roDQ J • v e HM Atcaic rff lid OID t• c1 tct DECLASWJED '-1 $ Authonty I f - Byn NARA Date sper SBRi ftBSEftlJ M'BB Bi'Jf Noteworthy is not only the trend ot increasing US 'it' ratal1t1es but also the 63 million ratalities resulting trom the 1964 Soviet retaliation wh1 ch delivered only 108 weapons and 662 megatons Soviet fatalities remained almost identical to those produced by the US retaliation 'l'h8 increase i numbers or us weapons delivered during the period was employed against the growing Soviet missile forces and since these were iocated 1n relatively isolated areas these additional weapons did not significantly affect the number or Soviet fatalities 28 The following charts compare the results ot the fore• going Soviet attacks in terms of megatons delivered and US fatalities This chart shows the etteot1veness ot the US pre- emptive attack in reducing megatons delivered o the _ #MJ'lffll ' 8P Sia ftBSffl ftD MW -ll- us · •- DECLASSJ 11F' D Authority b J J fS l Byll N D a t e 29 striking though it may be the reduction in Soviet megatonnage achieved by a US pre-emption does not accomplish a corresponding reduction in US ratal1t1ea - ' 1 I ·II - I I I I '• 1· • lfH NU c i •1111r MT' fl lAT'W IIIYIIT nr utn'I 30 I I I Ml IH1 111• - · - ------- The roregoing represents onl y the weight of attack applicable to the 1n1t1al nuclear exchanges both In every caae the US and USSR withheld a reserve ot SLBMs or hardened ICBMs Each was also able to' reconstitute a residual capability from out-or-commission repairable missiles and recovered bombers allot which were available for subsequent attacks In all cases the US residual strategic forces were larger than those or the USSR '19PEiiEJRM RJI QGJiOIJIBB BNH 10P lilii9WI iA 8111AiE9PDB Bffll ' SUBSIDIARY STUDIES 31 In addition to the r1ea of yearly exchanges studies were made to test the et£ects or the hypothetical introduction · of additional active and passive defense programs 1n the US In the first of these an analysis was made of attacks against 23 cities which were assumed to be defended against attack ballistic missiles by These attacks were designed to defeat or circumvent the missile defenses The cities and the maximum theoretical defensive envelopes provided by a NIKE-ZEUS SPRINT type defense are shown on this map •aVIIIIDUIPI UNIUI r------------------------- ---- 1 ---··--··----·-·- ---------- _ _ 1 I - _ 1 · f '--· ··· - · ' ' 4' i 32 - - _-- _ The shaded portions represent the areas within which Soviet ICBMs could not impact without risk of interception Against a defense ot this type we examined the effectiveness of a A direct ICBM attack b An attack using weapons delivered clandestinely c Two attacks employing ICBMs surface burst outside the defensive envelopes one ot these utilizing very high yield weapons 'iOF Blil9RB RB8'i1Wi91 »I J t -13- G --- -- JI DECLASW'JED Authority N 4 f5 · By NARA Date eP BB8all' RBSilRl il MW 33 The fataiit1es resulting from these attacks were calculated both for existing civil defense capability and for an improved civil defense posture provided by a modest program ot fallout ·shelters and training ot _the population 34 The tatal1t1es in the metropolitan areas ot the 23 defended c1t1es from these tour attack are depicted on this chart --·· 35 The ·first set of bars shows the result or a direct attdck deai gnod to defeat the detenees ot these cities attack required the delivery of some Thia 3600 warheads or re-entry bodies to e xhaust the defenses followed by the firing ot sufficient ten megaton warheads to result in ' TO Ml' arriving directly on the cities It is apparent that this attack was very -effective since 63 or the 69 million people were k1lled - The 11llproved civil defense program waa ot little benefit because the casualties were produced mainly by blast l O Sf enB ffl Sffl e fflB BAW -14- _ J- DECLASW'JED fJ I f5 AlljiQntyN N By'X 'l ARAOatev r - ---- - -----RH XC'J 11 DOTO 36 In the olandest1ne attaok1 48 megatons were utilized 1n the 23 cities and produced heavy casual ties Here again the improved civil defense program did not substantially reduce casualties This attack employed four 100 MT devices lowered from neutral flag merchant ships to the harbor bottom in Boston New York City San Francisco and Seattle seventy-six agents emplaced 33 one megaton weapons and one 15 megaton weapon in Washington D c 1n the remaining nineteen cities 37 The remaining attacks circumvented the def'enses byemploying attacks utilizing aiming points outside the defended areas as illustrated on the following map ·-- - _ 1111111111ffl11II- r - - - - - - - - - - - - aniNiiiMii I --- - - - ··-· f - - ' 'I I - '-· f I -- - - ifr r- - r· t'lf - 1 • 'v I f· 11 ' • • e ·· • -···• I · I _ I l ' '- f'· --'1-- ' ·• I I I IIIIUIII C ll I - ' I - - nII C • I • ' I I I L------------------------- - - _ 38 ·-·--·-· -- ·- -·------------··· The f l-rot -ou -J at t R ck delivel'ed 136_ ten megaton war- h ada surface burst to produce 47 million fatalities with the ourrent civil defense posture Since the ratal1tiea resulting from this attack were almost exclusively from fallout an improved civil defense fallout progra111 would have reduced the fatalities in these oitiea by 30 million or eeefft Pl' RBS Jilfli91iii 'IJJ • 15- -Au1nn t if° f5j -ayn AMADatev · -·- ---·- -----• er eaeAIIJ M 3 ft e1B9 Dfl 'la 39 The second offset attack utilized 100 Ml' warheads and the delivery or forty-two of these weapons caused sooiewhat higher fallout casualties within the cities With the higher- levels or radiation intensity the effectiveness or the improved shelter program was somewhat diminished 40 In considering the effectiveness ot a limited anti- ballistic missile defense in combination with a shelter program a note of warning lllU8t be sounded Although survivability in the urban areas themselves does increase the nationwide effects of' offset attacks remain severe On this chart alongside the fatalities suffered 1n the 23 cities· attacked are shown the total nationwide fatalities resulting from the foregoing attacks against these cities h •• • Al - TOI i QRIRI w11u m ap DOTA - 16- - - - - - - M Au1iorityW N '-f tS -I ayn ARADate ie - -ft 'ffl el'l 8 MW These maps show the fallout pattems which produced 41 the foregoing nationwide fatalities 1n the case ot the two offset attacks --r----------------------------- 1111111- ana•HIIIIU I I -----··- ---·-··-·-- ·- ·- ··-··- -'----- •' _ I -• i- · ·•'· · 11 r- y_ j • ' rJ - - - - · - · ·- 1 · '- ·s¼'l _ I _ - ·- - - r' ·---- · '•• • t J- ' _ '-- J' - • I-• • L-- - - _ I•• •I• •• ' 1 -i w 1t••- I - -- - _ - - - - - - ·-- - --·····-· ·-·-- - - - - - - - - - __ ·--- i - L----------- --------- - -- ----- ' MP SB9llillf M 41Ai81fBB e1'1 2'1 -17- OP e eeNW 42 As a final excursion we war gamed a hypothetical situation with augmented US 1968 foroea and progr8 118 employed in a US pre-emption against the 43 1968 Soviet toroes The augmentation consisted of a Sufficient us oftensiv missiles to destroy a11 but one percent or known Soviet soft missiles and all but two percent of Soviet known hard missiles b Improvements in US air defenses such that only five percent of Soviet bombs and ASMs reached targets c An AICBM deployment to 23 cities that was adequate to deter the Soviets from direct missile attac against these cities d An improved nationwide civil defense p ogram that included -30 psi blast protection for 34 million people in the 23 defended cities 44 The Soviet retaliation that followed the US attack em- ployed bombs and ASMs against the defended cit1es 1 SI BMs aga1nst undefended cities and ICBMs directly against undefended cities and in a fallout attack against the defended cities This retaliation delivered 106 weapons for 950 MT Ji and inflicted 51 million fatalities in the united states 45 The Atomic Energy Cormlission reported on the long term effects of fallout using as a basis the attack of l J J ly 1966 They made certain conclusions but the gist of their report was that more study is needed or the combined effects of radiation bums blast 1 fires floods substandard diet and sanitary conditions and lack or medical care V 29' ' of the MT down on the US oame from SI BMC 4 from ICBMs wh e location had not been well enough known to penni t targeting them or 1'1•om the one percent or two percent of lalown weapons not destroyed 2 trom weapons delivered by aircraft e TOP eM'f fti 3 ft C'Hffl 1111 -18- - 'i'91 8BORBr R lfft Cf fi 1 'TA IV 46 CONCLUSIONS The following conclusions appear inescapable as a result of our studies However it should be noted that only the currently •known and assessable effects of nuclear weapons could be utilized in determining the results or the nuclear exchanges a In the years of this study 1961-l-19 56 neither the US nor the USSR can emerge f1 •om a full nuclear exchange without suffering very severe damage and hlgh casualties This holds true whether the attack is initiated by the US or the USSR b Soviet strategic forces throughout the years 1964- 1968 possess at best a limited capability to degrade the US strategic force Since the Soviets cannot ma tariallY reduce the weight of US attacks their most likely strategy would be 1 deterrence and 2 if deterrence fails one which will cause the maximum injury to the US c The US strategic force is so constituted that if deterrence fails the US can exercise the full range of a controlled response strategy either 1n pre-emptlo 1 or retaliation with assurance that if necessary the objective or urban- industrial destruction 1n the USSR can still be achieved d Both sides will possess substantial 1•esidual strategic nuclear ·forces after each initial exchange however 1n all oases the US forces would be the larger The ability to use these residual forces effectively depends upon survivable comnand and oontrol and an effective post-attack reconnaissance intelligence capability e US defensive sydtems must be made more effective -' a Ahtot t ho gamut 01' Soviet o i 'fensive weapons However it appeers that the achiev ment of an effective nationwide ballistic missil defense WDUld do more to alter the results of a nuclear exchange thai1 ry otll er s f ngle 111111tavy development - ter BtJRBf ABOfit 8 188 Bs lilA -19- - _DECLASWUD -•Authority f jj f$ - -l3Yll - ·- - - NARA Date - M Ellfftf8'f8f M'fA f us weapons systeo s of tile type currently programmed including improvements t ereto will not by themselves reduce to an acceptable level the damage or casualties resulting from a i'ull nuclear exchange It Collows therefore that there is a need for the development of new offensive and defensive systems beyond those presently being pursued RESIRZCie ftTft