D£c JOP S CRET FOfil'IERLY RESl'R i ffiC lED DATA 4' -- UN IT ED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY C --LOA- WASHINGTON OFFICE OF May 30 1969 THE DIR'ECTOR MEMORANDUM FOR MR HENRY A KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE Subject NSSM-28 Report Forwarded in response to NSSM-28 dated March 6 1969 are 25 copies of the final report of the NSSM-28 interagency Steering Committee concerning preparation of the U S position for possible strategic arms limitations negotiations with ·the Soviet Union The report has been agreed upon by all members of the Steering Committee which consisted of representatives of the Secretary of State Secretary of Defense the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff the Director of Central Intelligence the Chairman Atomic Energy Commission the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs the President's Science Adviser and the Arms coi itrol and Disarmament Agency • 1· -vl• 1rL Gerard Smith 0 ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGEN - H J e r1fj Exc1s Deny CY - f 'e a as · v neclassify in part FOu - ht ri O a empt10ns D w r graa e 'I'S to S or - C-- -0-A_D_R_ _ _ __ Classify Class DeolassAuth · ' OADR p· ' Da When separated from attachments handle this document as CONFIDENTIAL D FOfil ERLY RESTRICTED DATA f i f ' l· j ut C fi'1L 1 ' C L NSSM-28 OUTLINE OF REPORT SUMMARY I II III PURPOSE BACKGROUND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS Introduction D IV 1 4 4 B• U S Strategic Objectives • c 1 4 The Current Strategic Situation and Future Trends • • • • • • ·• • • 6 Relationship between Unilateral Approach to Security NSSM-3 and the Arms Control Approach NSSM-28 • • • • • • • • • 15 • • 21 - E Strategic Arms Control Objective$ F Principles • G Verification Requirements H Safeguards • • • • • • - • I Negotiating Considerations • J Criteria for Evaluating Options • • 22 • • 23 • • • 26 30 • 34 AR t'1S CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS YSTEMS A • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Numbers of Fixed ICBM Launchers • 37 • • 39 ·oEC -iiICBM Survivability c Numbers of SLBM and SLCM Launchers D Land-Mobile ICBM's IR HRBM's and ABM's E Flexibility ·to Alter the Mix of Fixed and Mobile Systems • • • • • • • • • F G H v B • 40 42 45 47 MIRV' s • · ABM Launchers • • Fixed IRhfRBM' s 51 53 59 I ABM Associated Radars J Qualitative Limits K Bombers 79 L Bomber 82 M Suspension of Certain Wea ons Testing and Deployment • • • • • • • 67 Defenses • • • - Introduction • De·scription of Packages c Strategic Analysis D Verification • • E Negot'iability F Advantages and Disadvantages of Each Package • • • • • • • • • • 89 • • • • 89 • • • •• B • • 84 ILLUSTRATIVE ARMS CONTROL PACKAGES A • 63 • 91 • 94 • 116 • 119 • • 120 L - iii ANNEXES A REPORT OF THE STRATEGIC ANALYSIS PANEL iorwar led- s-ep-ara-t -e-ly-hy- DG B VERIFICATION OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS FOR STRATEGIC ARNS LIMITATION TALKS C FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS D SAFEGUARDS still in preparation ·-· _ _ - I ' This document consists of pages Number of iQ copies Series A _ 7 ACDA-3289 REPORT OF THE NSSM-28 WORKING GROUP ON PREPARATION OF AU S POSITION FOR STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS SALT May 16 1969 ARMS CONTROL AND DIS ARMAME v' ReleaBe Excise D NT AGENcY · eny FOIA P Y Declassify in part ' A E O Exemptions Dlowngrade TS to S or c o- -AD -R----• O assif C1ass Dec1ass Auth -- Date -- - l i - f 1 Declassif r_ 3 fDR - The information contained in this document may not be disseminated outside the receiving department or agency without the consent of the U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification PREPARATION OF THE U S POSITION ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIBITATION NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE s·ovIET UNION I PURPOSE To develop alternative options that _should be considered in preparing a U S position for possible strategic arms limitations talks with the Soviet Union to evaluate the strategic balance that would result and · to discuss possible Soviet responses to each option and likely U S counter-responses • The _ st·u dy includes not only a discussion of illustrative alternative strategic force restrictions packages which · might provide the basis for a proposed agreement but also a discussion of the key issues with respect to each component of strategic forces in order to provide a sound analytical base for tailoring possible new force restrictions packages which may be preferable to any of those evaluated herein · TOP c SEORiE' C ED ' f vvU '- J G ROUP I Excluded from automatic 9 owngrading and declassification Fo-rmerly ' Restricted Data As Defined in the Atomic Energy A£t of 1954 II BACKGROUND On January 27 1967 following a series of discussions which dated back to January 1966 Presid·e nt Johnson sent a letter along with an explanatory statement to Chairman Kosygin proposing bilateral discussions on an understanding to limit the further deployment of strategic offensive and defensive missile launchers - One month later Foreign Minister Gromyko delivered to Ambassador Thompson Chairman Kosygin's reply to the January 27 messages Kosygin confirmed in principle Moscow's willingness to hold talks on limiting offensive and defensive Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Formerly Restricted Data As Defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 '' ' t u T - -2- missiles President Johnson announced this understanding at a press conference on March 2 1967 In the months that follooed the United States urged the Soviets to agree to a prompt beginning of talks and indicated in broad terms the sort of agreement we had in mind Thus the Soviets were informed of three basic though generalized elements of our proposed negotiating position as it existed in 196 7-68 1 the agreement would ·involve a levelingoff 11 not an outright freeze or a reductior- of strategic missile launchers although reductions could be considered at a subsequent stage 2 it would apply to launchers not missiles for purposes of simplifying verification and 3 the United States is prepared to place ''maximum reliance on national means of verification 11 There is no ready and complete explanation of the Soviet stalling tactics during this period One point seems clear however there was considerable opposition to the idea of the proposed talks within the Soviet Government apparently centered around military authorities The first overt sign of a break in the Soviet attitude came in a speech delivered by Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov on April 26 1968 before the United Nations General Assembly There ensued exchanges of diplomatic correspondence culminating in public announcements made simultaneously in Washington and Moscow on July 1 that the two governments agreed to enter in the nearest future into discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles Following this agreement diplomatic exchanges continued on setting a time place and level of - __ - DtOOriru M'focD -3representation for the negotiations In response to a United States query the Soviet Union replied that it was_ prepared to begin talks in Geneva on September 30 However this communication was delivered shortly before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and has never been answered formally by the United States An Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals was set up on July 7 1968 for the purpose of preparing a U S negotiating position In August agreement was reached on three documents a basic proposal very similar to Option III set forth below instructions to the delegation and an opening statement by the delegation On January 15 1969 the U S Government introduced in the North Atlantic Council NAC for comment by our Allies a draft statement on objectives and principles of SALT which could be issued jointly with the Soviets as an interim measure prior to the beginning of substantive negotiations At the subsequent NAC discussion in January 23 the U S in a sense drew back from this indication of intent saying that the question of a possible agreement on objectives and principles would be reviewed by the U S Government in conjunction with a review of substantive aspects of SALT and that we would inform NATO of the results of this study when completed Some of the language of the draft statement of objectives and principles was criticized by NATO Allies on the grounds that they implied a U S -Soviet intention to establish a condominium Our Allies did endorse however as they had done earlier the initiation of substantive U S -Soviet negotiations The same sentiment of support was expressed to President Nixon by European leaders during his recent tour of the Continent - achieve others In view of the very nature of the U S Soviet competition to improve their relative strategic positions actions by the U S to achieve forces capable of significantly reducing damage to itself in the event of war are likely to provoke a reaction by the USSR in order to maintain its deterrent capability Thus significant U S actio s to limit damage to itself to a low level and provide a favorable war outcome may not be compatible with the objective of achieving and maintaining a stable strategic relationship over time Some of the actions we might take to improve our damage limiting capability both de fens iv·e and offensive could also make preemptive attack less unattractive to the Soviets and increase the probability of war in a crisis This is because a major effort to achieve forces to limit damage in the event of war could be interpreted by the other side as contributing to a first strike capability Even in the absence of such forces there will always be some pressure in a crisis to impute the worst of motives to the other side Once systems are deployed which could conceivably be interpreted as designed to make a first strike feasible it becomes more likely that each side will assume the other might strike first In a crisis then in which war seemed imminent each side would be under considerable compulsion to strike first although as long as prospective damage is high there will remain a strong deterrent to preemption even in a crisis c The _Current Strategic Situation and Fu1 _ure _Trends 1 Description of the Current Situation a Numerical Force _ 2_omparison Table I compares current U S and Soviet strategic forces The projections of Soviet _ TOP S E CRET J •I I • TOP SECRET o -- - ss f EO forces correspond to those in the latest National Intelligence Projections for Planning NIPP except that the ICBM and SLBM figures have been updated in the light of new information TABLE I COMPARISON OF CURRENT STRATEGIC FORCEs End of FY 69 ------U s Soviet Offensive Forces -------Hard Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ICBM Launchers 1 054 904-914 Soft ICBM Launchers 0 142 Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile SLBM Launchers SSBN 656 204-22o' Intercontinental Bombers Heavy 581 140-150 Defensive Forces Anti-Ballistic Missile ABM Launchers 0 Air-Defense Interceptors 890 3 100-3 400 2 112 6 750-10 215 Surface-to-Air Missile SAM Launchers See following page for footnotes 40-56 C TOP SECRET -c LASS FiED -8- The categories of strategic weapons compared in this table are those shown in Table 11-1 of the NSSM-3 report The table excludes the following Soviet weapons systems which have a strategic delivery capability either against the United States or against U S allies and U S forces in Europe 673 lR MRBM launchers 348-364 launchers for submarine-launched cruise missiles SLCMs with a likely operational range of 250 nautical miles 650-710 medium bombers and ASM carriers in the Soviet Long-Range Air Force and 40-50 long range bomber reconnaissance planes BEARS and 475-555 medium bomber reconnaissance planes and ASM carriers in the Soviet Naval Air Forces It excludes air tankers on both sides of which the U S has over 600 and the Soviet Union 135-170 which could also be converted to bombers tactical fighter bombers on both sides which could be used to deliver nuclear bombs on either side in Europe and U S carrier attack aircraft which could be used in strikes on the Soviet Union It also excludes 228-290 Soviet ICBM launchers and 208-256 SLBM launchers estimated to be under construction • Includes 78 launchers on G-Class diesel submarines I ' ll'll s _ AC tc r ED I j -9b Offensive Fo Loadings Indicators of force quality provide a better basis than force size for offensive force comparisons For example Table II compares representative force loadings of the U S and Soviet strategic offensive forces TABLE II COMPARISON OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCE LOADINGS -- End of FY 69 Basis of Comparison Warheads Megatons MT 1-MT Equivalents3 ICBMs SLBMs Bombers H Totals4 Soviet U S -Sa Jiet if s --Soviet i J- S- - - Soviet U• S • 1 065 1 723 1 182 6 138 512 563 104 125 2 629 3 540 219 1 109 4 206 5 826 1 505 7 372 1 275 2 232 537 114 2 716 489 4 528 2 835 -----_ u s and Soviet force loadings for ICBMs SLBMs and heavy bombers reflect only those weapons which would be loaded for initial strikes by aircraft operational and R D ICBM launchers and on-line SLBMs extracted from the Strategic Force and Effectiveness Tables The Soviet force loadings for IR MRBMs are high-NIPP operational and R D launchers Independently targetable warheads as one warhead Polaris A-3 considered 1 The area of effects of nuclear warheads is not directly proportionate to their yield For comparison purposes it is sometimes useful to reduce the total megatonnage of warhead stockpiles containing warheads of different yields to a common denominator of measurement of III GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS A Introduction This section describes the present strategic situation including a statement of strategic objectives and a brief comparison of U S and Soviet strategic ·capabilities ·both taken largely from NSSM-3 notes the current direction of U S and Soviet strategic deployment activities with some of their probable implications outlines arms control objectives and principles and the relationship of arms control to strategic planning discusses some of the problems related to arms control agreements such as verification and safeguard arrangements and enumerates the _criteria against which the acceptability of various alternative arms control options have been evaluated in this study B U S Strategic Objectives 1 The U S looks to its strategic forces to support a number of political-military objectives The basic ones are listed below a Deter and reduce the likelihood of deliberate attacks on the United States and its allies b Maintain stability in a crisis Deter and reduce the likelihood of a preemptive attack on the U S c Limit damage to the United States and its allies in the event of a nuclear war d Provide outcomes to the overall advantage of the United States in the event of a nuclear war D e Limit damage to the United States and its allies in the event of small Nth power or accidental Soviet nuclear attacks f Achieve stability over time in the strategic relationship between the U S and the Soviet Union g Respond to limited and perhaps protracted nuclear conflicts 2 The current U S strategy emphasizes Objectives a and b above The decision to deploy the Safeguard ABM system is an option intended to be a step toward achieving Objective e and to aid in insuring our capability to achieve Objective a The U S has not deployed forces designed primarily to pursue Objectives c and d directly with respect to the Soviet Union but certain steps such as developing MIRVs improving the accuracy of reentry vehicles and deploying area ABMs are designed in part to serve these objectives Objective f has not been attained because of the difficulty of stabilizing an unbalanced strategic force relationship when each side has the capability to try to improve its relative position and when each side determines its force programs on the basis of conservative assumptions about the threat from the other side 3 Since this study is directed toward development of a position which would seek to promote the national security by controlling strategic arms as opposed to the NSSM-3 task of examining alternative strategies for deterring or fighting wars in a situation in which there are no agreed constraints it may be noted that there are incompatibilities between certain of the listed objectives and the activities necessary to TOP JS•E Q T-· · ' r DEl D -10- effectiveness against urban industrial targets The unit normally used fo this purpose is the one megaton equivalent which permits expressing the capability of a stockpile of weapons of different yields as if they were all of one megaton weapons 4 The figures shown in totals here would be changed by the inclusion of the -weapons systems listed in the footnote to the previous table The general relationship would be maintained but the Soviet position would be significantly improved The U S would s t ill have · an advantage in independently targetable warheads deliverable on the Soviet Union as opposed to Soviet warheads deliverable on the U S as well as a slight margin in 1-MT equivalents although the Soviet Union would add to its current advantage in total megatonnage It was not considered feasible to try to include the force loadings for those excluded delivery systems because of their different missions and factors such as range and vulnerability which made it unrealistic to include them in a comparison with the systems shown In addition the Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs shown in the footnote to the previous table as under construction will not be available as of the end of IT 69 · ' c Force Effectiveness While the above force comparisons are important they do not reflect the interactions between U S Soviet offensive and defensive forces that determine whether or not U S forces can meet current U S strategic objectives Currently our basic strategic objective is to deter a Soviet attack on the United States and its allies The key to ·meeting this retaliatory objective is our capability and Soviet belief in our resolve to destroy a large part of the Soviet population and industrial base after a surprise Soviet attack on the United States In effect we hold these Soviet resources hostage to deter Soviet aggression against ourselves and our allies Deterrence is not quantifiable in any definitive sense however one measure of the effectiveness of our strategic forces in achieving this objective can be expressed as the percentage of the Soviet population that can be killed in a retaliatory attack after a Soviet first strike on our strategic offensive forces Against the high-NIPP Soviet threat our current strategic offensive forces could kill 4'3% of the Soviet population from blast effects alone This percentage of Soviets killed would result from the detonation of about 1 000 one-megaton equivalent weapons on Soviet cities If retaliatory attacks were carried out only by individual components of our strategic forces the following could result ICBMs alone could kill 39% of the Soviet people SLBMs alone could kill 29% the bombers alone could kill 30% The capability to kill 30% of the Soviet people corresponds to the destruction of the 150 largest Soviet cities and more than 50% of the Soviet industrial capacity Thus even if the Soviets could neutralize two of our offensive force EO -12components the remaining component would provide a capability for urban destruction which would provide a strong deterrent against attack Where both sides possess a high retaliatory capability the relative number of deaths that could result from a strategic nuclear exchange provides a mea·s ure of probability of war outbreak in crisis situations Table III shows the percentage of the U S and Soviet people that might be killed in a nuclear war assuming that the side that strikes first uses its bombers and a portion of its missiles to attack cities It should be borne in mind that this assumption does not necessarily reflect either U S or Soviet probable targeting either as preplanned or as would be adapted to the circumstances of an actual war TABLE III DEATHS IN A NUCLEAR WAR -- End of FY 70 Scenario Deaths J_Millions U s Soviet Soviets Strike First U S Retaliates 100 120 U S Strikes First Soviets Retaliate 110 100 In these scenarios neither side would have an incentive to strike first in a deliberate attack since it would suffer unacceptable fatalities in retaliation Neither would either side have much incentive to preempt in a crisis since it would suffer D '11'Qt'_ I I L -13about the same number of fatalities whether it struck first or second The strategic situation in the scenarios shown is therefore fairly stable If either side were able however by the deployment of additional strategic offensive and or defensive capabilities to reduce drastically the fatalities it would suffer from a retaliatory strike while the fatalities of the other side remained approximately constant the situation would be destabilized If for example the Soviet Union were able materially to reduce its fatalities from U S retaliation the U S deterrent capability would have been degraded and the U S would be impelled to undertake additional programs to restore its capabilities The situation would then also be unstable in a crisis since both sides might then have an incentive to preempt There are of course other factors besides expected relative fatalities which would influence a decision to preempt 2 Future Trends The U S is planning to deploy a limited ABM to protect a part of its ICBM and bomber forces against a possible Soviet MIRV or increased numbers of large yield ICBMs and to MIRV a substantial part of its strategic offensive missiles to cover the increasing number of Soviet threat targets and to insure penetration of a possible Soviet ballistic missile defense The U S is also considering building a new advanced strategic bomber a new advanced ICBM and a new advanced submarine-launched missile system The Soviet Union is continuing to build up its fixed land-based ICBM force and may be developing a mobile ICBM launcher as well as mobile IR MRBM launchers It is constructing additional ballistic missile launching submarines similar to the U S Polaris It is testing an improved ABM of the Moscow type Its recent tests 0 of multiple warheads on an SS-9 booster may be precursors to the development of a MIRV capability It may be planning to deploy a depressed trajectory ICBM DICBM or a fractional orbital bombardment system FOBS 3 Implications _Programs under way or planned by each side seem to be largely in response to or in anticipation of the other's actions Some Soviet programs of course may represent a Soviet effort to achieve an advantage over the U S Nevertheless the present relatively stable strategic situation with each side having an adequate retaliatory capability the U S with any one component of its strategic forces and little incentive to preempt would suggest that there is little requirement for U S response to Soviet strategic systems in being or under construction Furthermore both the USSR and the United States have now reached a point both in technology and industro-economic capability where either can defeat attempts by the other to remove its deterrent capability and can thus deny the other the prospect of achieving a posture which might give it an incentive to strike first Offensive damage limiting systems can be defeated by survivable retaliatory systems defensive damage limiting systems can be defeated by varied and complex re-entry systems Attempts on the part of either country to achieve a first strike capability would thus merely raise the ante of the game--an ante which both countries have an approximately equal capability to meet To the extent that U S or Soviet planned programs are designed to achieve a significant advantage over the other therefore they would appear to be futile To the extent that planned programs are purely anticipatory--designed against contingent threats-- E C -15they could be made unnecessary for either side if the opposing contingent threat were foreclosed The security of neither side would be adversely affected therefore if strategic arms programs could be effectively limited on both sides If programs under way or planned on either side a e carried much further however the additional uncertainties created for the other side will increase the perceived necessities to respond For example if the Soviet Union continues its present rate of deployment of SLBMs and fixed land-based ICBMs initiates the deployment of land-mobile ICBMs DICBM or FOBS undertakes flight testing of MIRVs and resumes the deployment of the Galosh around Moscow the U S will be under considerable pressure to push ahead with prudential increases in strategic offensive and or defensive programs Similarly U S MIRV and ABM deployment programs might persuade the Soviets of the necessity to expand their strategic deployment efforts beyond those already under way Thus if either side pushes ahead with significant improvements in its strategic capabilities an arms race will probably ensue The U S and the Soviet Union have therefore reached a critical decision juncture whether to agree to act bilaterally to try to curb the further growth of strategic nuclear capabilities or to pursue security primarily through unilaceral increases in strategic capabilities in competition with each other D Relationship between Unilateral Approach to Securi SM Land the Arms Control Appr h NSSM- The U S choice of a strategy and force posture will affect the prospects for strategic arms DE IB p A 11 ED C -16- 1 control and the nature and scope of a possible agreement Conversely a strategic arms control agreement which effectively limited the threat to the U S would affect the nature and size of U S forces required to maintain the national security NSSM-3 directed a detailed study of the security and foreign policy implications of a wide range of U S strategies and budget levels for strategic and general purpose forces The analysis of the several force structures examined for each alternative strategy proceeded in three steps or iterations in order to take into account possible Soviet reactions to U S -forces and strategies In the first step or initial analysis the retaliatory and damage-limiting capabilities of alternative U S strategic forces were measured against projected non-reactive Soviet threats including a Greater-Than-Expected GTE threat designed to reduce severely the U S retaliatory capability In the second step or interaction analysis the retaliatory and damage-limiting capabilities of alternative U S forces were measured against Soviet reactive threats These reactive threats were determined in separate analyses of possible Soviet responses to the alternative U S forces and strategies Although the interaction between the force posture and the possibility of arms control was considered in each case in NSSM-3 as well as the impact of each posture on U S -Soviet relations the prospect that each posture offered as a basis for an arms control agreement was not considered a governing criterion of acceptability The NSSM-3 analysis showed that current U S strategic forces are adequate for deterrence against present Soviet forces 43% Soviet fatalities from immediate blast effects alone None of the options considered significantly improved that capability against the estimated Soviet reactive threat and in some cases the U S capability was less than at present - DECI A - • - C 1'0P'sE·C'R'ET • • 1 - -17Given present capabilities and future trends there appear to be two fundamental problems with the unilateral pursuit of strategic objectives 1 Some objectives cannot be attained with any degree of confidence in view of probable Soviet reactions 2 Pursuit of those objectives that are attainable is becoming increasingly risky and expensive and can lead to long-term instabilities in U S-Soviet relations with no net increases in the security of either side or their allies Those objectives that would be pursued through extensive deployments of offensive and defensive forces are unlikely to be attained because the Soviets could respond with similar deployments to offset our desired capabilities Thus a confident U S damage limitation capability does not appear likely of attainment because of probable Soviet responses to our actions Even if the United States only emphasizes deterrence objectives the strategic situation can still become unstable On one hand pursuit of high-confidence retaliatory capabilities may lead the Soviets to take similar precautions which may arouse U S fears that the Soviets are building toward a first strike capability On the other hand pursuit of lower confidence U S retaliatory capabilities may lead the Soviets actually to pursue first strike capabilities While we are uncertain of the Soviets' strategic objectives it is likely that they have an appreciation of the problem similar to ours They TOP SECRET DECLASSiFiED ' undoubtedly estimate that we will respond to any attempts on their part to achieve first strike capabilities They probably also realize that the United States may misinterpret Soviet efforts to improve their deterrent forces as efforts to improve their damage limiting capability so as to deny us a retaliatory capability Even if the United States continues to pursue only those strategic objectives which are attainable unilaterally it may continue to have conflicts among its strategic objectives The one between high confidence deterrence and long term stability has already been discussed Related to this conflict is the prospect that in an era of unprecedented technological growth continued competition may give rise to new risks and uncertainties to threaten the strategic situation at any time These uncertainties inherent in the unilateral approach suggest that we should consider whether there is not a more acceptable alternative approach to strategic force planning An alternative way to pursue some of our strategic objectives involves possible arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union While this approach has its own special and complex problems as will be discussed later it appears to contain some advantages over the unilateral approach Even if an agreement does not alter the fundamental ideological and political differences between the United States and the Soviet Union or settle any of the existing international problems it can benefit the United States in a variety of ways It can also benefit the Soviet Union but those benefits may not be detrimental to U S interests A bilateral or arms control approach to strategic force planning may help resolve some of the · conflicts among our objectives and thereby enable the United States to attain objectives that would otherwise be impossible or risky to attain Strategic arms limitations can provide a framework within which we can maintain a stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union Agreements can constrain threats and reduce uncertainties which would make it possible to slow down both the rate of increase and some of the qualitative improvements on both sides since the chances of over-reactions and rapid growth of strategic forces would be minimized A stable strategic relationship must not however be interpreted as meaning static equilibrium Arms can be improved by presently unforeseen technology and an agreement can survive only if based on a concept of dynamic stability under which each side can remain confident of maintaining its relative position no matter what the other does Given a stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union consideration can then be given to reduction of forces leading to the possibility of reducing or at least preventing increases in expenditures without diminishing national security assuming of course that possible developing Nth country threats do not require increased expenditures for other purposes The existence of these potential advantages does not mean that the bilateral arms control approach to strategic force planning is free from p oblems In fact new problems may arise in that agreements with th Soviets may conflict with our objectives against China and our relations with our allies For example our desires to limit Soviet ABM deployments may conflict with our requirement for missile defense against Chinese attacks NATO may view U S -Soviet • l -20agreements as weakening the alliance Our allies may then seek bilateral accords with the Soviet Union that conflict with alliance goals Also agreements to limit strategic forces may affect our ability to support certain NATO objectives Aside from the advantages and disadvantages of possible arms control agreements there are possible benefits to be obtained from the negotiation process per - The U S -Soviet dialogue _that would occur either before a specific proposal is tabled or during the course of negotiations could itself have appreciable value even if no agreement is reached by leading to an improved understanding of the way the other side thinks about strategic problems On the other hand protracted discussions without agreement could strengthen opposition to prudent programs as well as lead to disenchantment of the non-nuclear powers with the sincerity of the U S -USSR commitment under Article VI of the NPT These considerations provided the background against which the NSSM-28 study has been conducted NSSM-28 directed the development and evaluation of alternative options for a U S position fo strategic arms limitations talks with Soviet Union Among the critical implications considered in the study evaluation was the impact of each alternative limitation on U S strategic capabilities to maintain the national security In the NSSM-28 analysis however the Soviet threat was seen in each case as constrained by an arms control agreement in the same way U S forces were limited Thus the objective in NSSM-28 has been to assess attainment of objectives through pursuit of a strategy that constrains strategic forces by arms control rather than attainment of objectives through increases in force capabilities which could be offset by an ' ot rto _ -21opponent's adjustment of forces as was investigated in NSSM-3 In evaluating the acceptability and long term viability of U S strategic force postures which might be acceptable under an arms control agreement we have also considered the possible nature and likelihood of Soviet evasion or abrogation of an agreement and the consequences of such actions for U S security E Strategic Arms Control Objectives We have proceeded in this study from the premise that the U S has the following strategic arms control objectives in seeking negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitations 1 To preserve and desirably to improve U S security and that of our allies 2 To achieve and maintain a stable U S Soviet strategic relationship--stable both in the sense of reducing the incentives to initiate strategic nuclear war and the sense of checking the strategic arms race 3 To limit the damage which the U S and its allies might suffer in a strategic nuclear war 4 To achieve objectives 1 2 and 3 at minimum cost 5 To improve U S -Soviet relationships by establishing a continuing process of discussion of issues arising from our strategic military relationships and to provide a basis for moving toward a resolution o conflict situations involving the U S and the Soviet Union c · 6 To support our policy of preventing nuclear weapon proliferation In selecting illustrative options for evaluation at this time we have been guided by the tollowing principles 1 Any proposed strategic arms limitations should apply to both offensive and - defensive strategic systems 2 To be negotiable any proposal for limitations probably must a Be considered by each side to be in its net security interest and compatible with national objectives b As a minimum permit each side to maintain what it considers an acceptable strategic deterrent capability Implies that offense must be able to overcome defense by some margin 3 Any agreement would have to be subject to acceptable verification 4 Any agreement should have a good prospect for long-term viability 5 Any agreement on reductions in strategic arms should be preceded by an agreement curtailing further buildups ot CL rN°' c ' u -23G Verification Requirements Several basic considerations will condition the nature and scope of possible arrangements for verification of Soviet compliance with a strategic arms limitation agreement 1 -The extent of our unilateral capabilities 2 The very high probability that the Soviets will reject any form of on-site inspection on its territory particularly in view of the fact that we have told them that we are prepared to place maximum reliance on national means of verification 3 The possibility that the use of data obtained by national means in order to document a charge of violation could adversely affect some of our intelligence capabilities It is most probable however that the general nature of most of these intelligence capabilities is known to the Soviets 4 The possibility of using the negotiations and the eventual agreement to help safeguard these intelligence capabilities Our overall unilateral capabilities are evaluated in NIE 11-13-69 and the application of these capabilities to each of the selected illustrative options is examined in Annex B of this paper We believe that we would almost certainly detect activities leading to a major change in Soviet strategic capabilities from those estimated or acknowledged at th time of the agreement C D -24Although it is highly unlikely that any large-scale new deployment of their strategic forces could go undetected the Soviets could effect minor increases without our detection And with extensive deception and concealment they could degrade our intelligence capabilities Detection and identification of the nature of the deployment would probably come later tha n in normal circumstances However in such a case the probability of the detection of at least one of a number of minor violations would be greater than that of detecting a violation of a single provision of the agreement Conclusion of an arms control agreement would probably signify that the Soviets had decided to accept at least for a time the limitations imposed by such an agreement Therefore if the Soviets should employ concealment and deception to violate the agreement we believe that their aim would be to alter the strategic balance Any smaller stakes would hardly justify the risk The foregoing presumes that the Soviets will not directly interfere with the effective operation of our unilateral collection sources We believe that they will refrain from interfering both because of the possibility of U S reaction against their own operations and out of concern for the general political problems which such interference might produce In swmnary our capabilities are adequate to verify within acceptable limits restrictions on numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs to assure detection of mobile ICBM deployment by the time some 100-300 have been deployed the number depending on Soviet concealment efforts to detect the development of MIRVs at least one year prior to IOC assuming flight testing to full range which is believed · ' to be essential to monitor fix d ABM launcher levels with high confidence if ABM-associated radars are limited There would be a 50% chance that SLBM MIRVs could be developed without detection We could not detect the deployment of MIRVs once they are developed The replacement of silo-launched IR MRBMs with ICBMs could not be detected with any confidence This would affect only 39 aim points with 135 launchers In view both of the intrinsic physical limitations of our national capabilities and the problems in relying on some of them to support charges of violations some restrictions on weapons systems which might be desirable in an agreement might not be considered adequately verifiable without some on-site inspection or other means of additional assurance Even in areas where our unilateral capabilities are considered adequate our confidence in Soviet compliance with the provisions of an agreement would be increased by additional means of assurance--e g on-site inspections unmanned sensors and test announcements • We should bear in mind however that a sustained and unsuccessful U S effort to obtain Soviet acceptance of on-site inspection would lead to unnecessarily protracted negotiations under conditions when a quickly concluded agreement other factors being equal would be in the U S interest The United States must therefore be prepared in advancing and accepting a strategic arms limitation agreement to place exclusive reliance on national means of verification This basic premise could mean There are cases in which our confidence in our ability to verify compliance with an agreement would not be materially improved by on-site inspection--e g with mobile land-based missile systems o· f __ - C · CQ -- - C C DECLqffi in the end a less comprehensive agreement than would ideally be the case At the same time the necessity for placing sole reliance on national means of verification might result in our having less than full assurance of verifying compliance with certain restrictions e g a ban on retrofitting silo-launched IR MR BMs with ICBMs which we would wish included Such risks should be weighed against the overall advantages of an agreement and deviation from the requirement for positive and assured means of verification including on-site inspection where necessary - should be accepted only after examination of alternatives leads to the judgment that deviation in a specific case is in the best interests of the U S U S willingness to rely exclusively on national means of verification does not mean that our negotiators would avoid discussion of possible on-site inspection arrangements It is anticipated that at an early stage of negotiations they would probe Soviet receptivity to provisions for selective direct observations SDO of such a nature as would reinforce verification capabilities in certain sensitive areas and thereby enhance the viability of the agreement If however the Soviets as expected opposed limited on-site inspection SDO as a supplementary means of verification our negotiators would be authorized t-0 proceed with negotiations on the basis of exclusive reliance on national means H Safe uards The capability for effective verification of Soviet corapliance with the restrictions imposed by an agreement is the first safeguard that U S security will not be jeopardized by Soviet violation of the agreement DE There remains however the possibility that Soviet actions not prohibited by the agreement could upset the strategic balance established by the agreement or that the Soviet Union might seek to gain a strategic advantage by clandestine activities permitting rapid further deployments after abrogation of the agreement Another possibility is that the Soviets might achieve a technological breakthrough which would make existing strategic weapons obsolete and produce a significant change in the nature of strategic warfare Since it is unlikely that the Soviets would enter a strategic arms control agreement that they did not consider in their net security interest it seems that they would have little rational motivation at least over the short term to violate or abrogate the agreement and incur the risks attendant upon such a course including the probability of a further arms race Nevertheless the U S must have safeguards against the contingency that the Soviet Union might be able to gain an advantage by one of the means described above The possibility of a technological breakthrough with all its implications exists independent of an arms control agreement That possibility must always be guarded against by a vigorous program of research and development to insure that we are not surprised and that we always have the flexibility to respond to possible Soviet improvements resulting from technological advance The possibility that our relative strategic position might be threatened by Soviet arms programs not prohibited or restricted by an agreement is a function of the comprehensiveness of the agreement The larger the number of options left open to the Soviets the greater the danger of a new threat and the D C DECi BASGMT CLl -28greater our need for ready options for response The fewer the options left open to the Soviets the less likely 1we will be confronted with improved capabilities that might threaten our relative position and the smaller the requirement for pursuing active new weapons programs as safeguards We have an important safeguard now against any new threat in the existence of a strong retaliatory capability in each of the three components of our strategic offensive forces The best further safeguard against possible increased Soviet threats developing within the limits of the agreement would seem to be to make the agreement the most comprehensive that can be verified and negotiated On the other hand the possibility of restructuring our forces in response to an indicated changing Soviet threat would provide us an additional safeguard under agreements in which some options are left open It can also be argued that the less comprehensive the agreement the easier it will be to verify and therefore the less vulnerable we will be to surprise and disadvantage and the smaller will be the requirement for hedges or safeguards This argument rests on the assumption that the larger the number of restrictions the greater the mathematical chance that one can be successfully evaded It is less likely however with all significant activities restricted that any one successful evasion would materially affect the balance and the greater the number of evasions the Soviets have to attempt in order to achieve an advantage the greater the mathematical chance of detection We would therefore seem to incur less risk rather than more by including in the agreement restrictions on all activities we think we can detect before they pose unacceptable risks Even in the case of Soviet systems which we have limited capability to monitor such as land-mobile ICBMs w would probably gain by including them if we have no plans for such systems ourselves merely for the inhibiting effect their inclusion would have on Soviet actions In summary an agreement which leaves various systems unrestricted would not appear to UtO' itMiS i tU -29- reduce the requirements for safeguards it would merely leave open the opportunity for both sides to hedge under the agreement so that the arms race could continue in new channels Even if possible authorized Soviet strategic arms options are severely limited by an agreement there remains the possibility that the Soviets might be able to improve their position by successful clandestine violation of the agreement or by clandestine preparation for rapid deployment of new or additional weapons after abrogation This is the basic risk against which safeguards must be provided The essence of a successful U S safeguards program in addition to a vigorous research and development program must therefore be the maintenance of a minimum lead-time capability to deploy new or additional weapons in response to possible Soviet violations or abrogation of the agreement For example if MIRVs were prohibited it might be desirable to prepare for rapid contingent future deployment of MIRVs by deploying the larger single-warhead Minuteman III or Poseidon missiles now to replace Minuteman II and Polaris missiles Safeguards programs must be planned and prosecuted with care however so that such actions as just referred to or authorized development and test activities do not provoke the Soviets to a ''hedging race or to abrogation on the grounds that we are cheating Annex D discusses the safeguards considered necessary or desirable for each option together with the estimated costs thereof -30I Negotiating Considerations This paper does not examine the tactical negotiating issues which may be involved in strategic arms talks However there are certain negotiating considerations which are germane to a policy examination based upon this study First the options analyzed in this paper should be viewed as illustrations of possible outcomes of strategic arms negotiations with the Soviets The specific initial position we may adopt will be developed after decisions are made as a result of this study as to the final outcome we seek However it should be noted that uncertainties as to the possible Soviet position suggest that the actual outcome of the talks can be expected to be different from both our initial position and the specific outcomes illustrated in this study Thus these options should be examined from the standpoint of the various issues involved in the talks and with a view to establishing a range of acceptable outcomes Second it will be necessary at an early point in negotiations to establish what in the long run we are willing to consider prohibiting or limiting so that we and the Soviets can arrive at an understanding to refrain from activities which would jeopardize agreement in these areas Such understandings would be designed to place appropriate restraints on a further deployment of existing systems and b steps toward deployment of new systems These restraints would not in all cases necessarily involve total suspension of new programs and further dPployments they might simply require a reduced pace of activity ---31- · In the first case above we might seek to restrain further ICBM or SLBM deployment while we negotiate arrangements setting limits on such forces Proposed limitations based on estimates of the strategic situation as o_f July 1 1969 the date of this study may be difficult to negotiate if further deployments substantially change the strategic situation during the talks In the second case if MIRV's and mobile ICBM's may ultimately be banned each side may have to cease MIRV-related testing activities and not begin deploying mobile ICBM's while negotiations continue -otherwise the problems of verifying such prohibitions by national means may be so great as to make agreement impossible In reaching such understandings it will be necessary to balance several factors We do not want an understanding that is so far-reaching that it is as difficult to negotiate as a final agreement Moreover we want to be sure that the restrictions on our programs and the funding planning and development uncertainties they could entail would not when consider d along with the restrictions imposed on Soviet programs pose unacceptable military risks should final agreement not be forthcoming At the same time we want to foreclose to the extent possible continuing Soviet buildups not only because of the threat to our security which they might pose but also because they might jeopardize the possibility of reaching an acceptable agreement To meet these problems and to avoid the disincentives to prompt agreement which moratoriums of indefinite durati6n might involve we might wish to consider understandings of limited duration E ' -32However such limitations could involve introducing undesirable crunch points in the negotiating process Moreover limited duration might not in the end provide the desired freedom of action1 given the political pressures which would build up as the period of the understanding neared expiration We will want to retain our flexibility on these issues until we have an opportunity to assess the Soviet reaction to the problem of restraints Finally in considering the question of restraints it should be noted that one of our principal programs--MIRV--may be a wasting negotiating asset As the MIRV flight test program proceeds an offer to suspend it may prove less and less valuable in eliciting Soviet agreement to limitations we may wish on their programs Related to the question of suspensions is the problem of establishing a cut-off date for implementing agreed prohibitions or limitations For some systems such as fixed ICBM's ·this date might be the date that a suspension on further deployment went into effect Systems or programs that are not curbed during negotiations or that are stretched out or whose deployment like ABM lies in the future will require that a cut-off date be negotiated along with the relevant limitation Third interest has been expressed in developing a position which by virtue of its simplicity might serve as the basis for reaching prompt agreement with the Soviets In considering the options in this paper it should be kept in mind that the least restrictive measures may not turn out to be the simplest in terms of their impact on the strategic balance nor prove the_easiest to negotiate It may -33be that the more comprehensive options because of their tendency to hold the strategic balance closer to its present position might prove more readily negotiable than the options which permit a substantial degree of continued arms competition In this connection it is possible that some political benefits of a prompt U s Soviet agreement could be derived from the understanding indicated above concerning the suspension of certain activities during negotiations Fourth both our allies and the Soviets can be expected to raise the question of the role of Nth country UK France China nuclear forces We will need to make clear that while a stable strategic arms agreement must take into account the threat posed by Nth country forces we would not p opose to discuss the possibility of seeking limits on such forces particularly since this would require broadening the U S Soviet talks into a multilateral discussion in which Communist China would in any case refuse to participate We should explain to the Soviets that although we will be consulting fully with our allies this does not mean that we can negotiate on behalf of the UK and France By the same token we would not expect the USSR to negotiate for the CPR How talks might actually proceed cannot be determined in advance of the talks that is until we receive some Soviet reaction The review of the optional outcomes in this study should provide well defined goals as well as a flexible basis for negotiation with respect both to the acceptable substantive elements of a possible strategic arms agreement and to the form and duration of the accords which may be reached 'OP -s EC @ T • o ll t - Uc -34J Criteria _for Evaluating Options The following were used as criteria and factors against which to evaluate the acceptability of the selected illustrative options as the basis of a U S position for strategic arms limitations talks with the Soviet Union 1 The strategic capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union as measured by the following a The capability of U S strategic forces to inflict urban industrial damage fatalities industrial capacity RV -'s delivered EMT delivered on the Soviet Union in retaliation against an all-out Soviet surprise attack on our strategic forces b The capability of Soviet strategic forces to inflict urban industrial damage on the U S in retaliation against a U S first strike c U S and Soviet fatalities in a nuclear war started by a Soviet or U S first strike for a range of war-fighting scenarios involving mixes of counterforce and countervalue attacks d The capability of U S or Soviet strategic forces to limit damage in a nuclear war initiated by the other side e The capability of U S or Soviet strategic forces to limit damage in a nuclear war initiated by itself f Cooparative numbers of Soviet and U S bombers land-based ICBM's IR MRBM's and sea-based ballistic missiles and ABM's surviving a first strike c·- DE g The difference between first and second strike fatalities for both the U S and the Soviet Union h Sensitivity of U S strategic capabilities to Soviet evasions 2 U S ability to verify Soviet compliance with the proposed limitations 3 Likelihood and nature of Soviet evasion including the nature time and cost of U S responses required to restore U S force effectiveness 4 Possible U S and Soviet military responses within the limits of an agreement based on the option 5 Possible U S and Soviet political responses within the limits of an agreement based on the option 6 the option Negotiability of a proposal based on 7 Viability over time of an agreement based on the option 8 Impact on the strategic arms race 9 Probable reactions of U S allies and other countries 10 Costs of U S and Soviet strategic programs over ten-year period including U S allowances for safeguards against Soviet cheating and possible changes in the U S general purpose forces • 0 DECl2'' - SW t D · -36- 11 The relationship and the compatibility between the proposed option and other arms control agreements negotiated in the past proposals currently under consideration or proposals which may logically follow an agreement negotiated as a result of SALT Notes 1 The base-case threat was the estimated maximum Soviet forces within the limits of an agreement based on the option plus high-NIPP ChiCom forces 2 Calculations of the impact on strategic force capabilities were made in each case using force structures anticipated for 1978 3 The results in all options were compared against the results of a non-arms-control strategic option selected from NSSM-3 IV Arms Control Implications of Strategic Weapons Systems Each strategic weapons system has characteristics which differentiates it from the others in its significance in the strategic balance and its implications for the possibility of controlling strategic arms These differences relating to invulnerability contribution to stability verifiability of limitations flexibility in use etc make it necessary to examine each strategic weapon system separately It is necessary to determin e whether each should and can be controlled and if so how and to wha t degree and to identify unresolved issues Some of the more important issues involve interaction bet e en weapons systems both tho s e that might be controlle d and those that would be exempt This section sets forth the arms control implications of the issu e s related to these weapons s ys terns By examining individua 1 weapons systems here_ we do not suggest that negotiations with tb e Soviets should be conducted on the basis of attempting to reach separate agreements on individu J l systems We recognize that asymmetries of existing U S and Soviet strategic systems and on-goj_ng programs make it likely that any agreement would involve intersystem quid pro 51uo E_ In limiting the numbers of missile systems we have considered limiting only the numbers of launchers not the numbers of I lissiles since the strategic capability of a nation is more a function of launcher numbers than missile numbers and since numbers cf 1aunchers are more vcriiiable than numbers of missiles which cannot be counted accurately A partial exception ma y be necessary in the case of ABMs see p i ra H b e low ·we have not considered ·' D -38-· I limits on the production of strategic weapons systems except for land mobile systems see para D below because verificatim1 of such a measure would require intrusive inspection nor have - c considered the implications of possible reductions in strategic ·weapons inventories For the purposes of this study strategic weapons have been defined as including all offensive lcLndbased missiles with range capabilities over 1000 lans thus excluding the U S Pershing and the Soviet SS-12 tactical missile but including Soviet IR HREMs all subm3 rine--lam1ched missiles v hcther ballistic or cruis- and regardless of their range all longand medium-range bombers all ABHs and bomber defenses We have not included fighter-bombers although the Soviets may argue that the se are strategic in that in their eyes U S fightE'r-bo nbers in Europe and those bared on aircraft carriers co' lld deliver nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union In determining which of these strategic weapons systems should be controlled and ho v they might be controlled consideration should be given to the f ollm•1 ing factors · 1 Their effect on the strategic balance Will their omission or limitation give either side a marked advantage In particul r is it to the advantage or disadvantage of the U S 2 Their effect on strategic stability Hill their omission drive the arms race by requiring responses or over-responses 3 Their effect on crisis stability Will their ·omission or limitation make the initiation of strategic war in a crisis more or less likely ED OEC uQ S ttO -394 Their complexity are the related issues to complex for early resolution 5 Their negotiability Is the commitment to th system on one side or the other such that it may not be revocable 6 Their verifiability Could compliance with a restriction be adequately verified 7 The strategic position against Nth countries Could agreements make the U S or the U S S R vulnerable to Nth coLmtry attack In identifying the 2 rms control implication of the various types of strategic weapons systems there has been considerable agreement among the agencies involved in this study but also important differences The arms control implications of each type of weapons system and the major areas in which there are differences of opinion are summarized below A Numbers of Fixed ICBM Launchers The U S has 1054 operational ICBM launchers and does not at this time plan to increase this number Hmvever the U S does plan to convert 514 of its Minuteman I and IIs to MIRVed Minuteman IIIs The latter can be accommodated in the current silos after certain internal silo edification The Soviet Union as of 1 July 1969 will have 1046-1056 operational ICBM launchers with an additional 228-290 under construction In the absence __of an arms control agreement the Soviets may well increase the number of their ICBM launchers If we were to permit the Soviets to complete silos under construction on July 1 the total number of ' 1 DE _fj SECRET -40operational silos would not exceed about 1300-1350 This Soviet differential would be offset by the larger numbers of U S SLBMs and bombers Each side should be permitted an additional agreed number of research and development and training launchers We have hi gh confidence in our capability to verify within close tolerances and with national means alone a limit on the number of fixed ICBH launchers Issue None since it is generally a gree l tha t any SALT a greement should lirc it th e nL1mber of ICBM launchers at somei hat compar ble levels B ICBM Surviv l-dJ ity_ As offensive missile accuracies and thro -1 weights improve and particularly if MIRVed sys terns introduce large numbers of accurate RVs the vulnerability of ICBMs to counterforce attacks by offensive missiles will increase There are several ways in which this problem might be han dled One way would be to freeze the current mix of large and small missiles Anoth2r way would be to cons train the development of MIRVs and other counterforce related characteristics This approach is discussed in paragraphs G J below Survivability could also be impro ecl by the shifting of strategic forces from fixed land-based systems to mob ile land or sea-based systems This approach is discussed in paragraph E below A fourth way would be to increase the harc ness of ICBM silos and command and control installations by building thy m in new hard-rock 1 ' -41locations super-harden and or to protect ICBMs with ABMs hard-point defense Whether super-hardening of ICBM sites should be p rmitted is controversial Such a move would not erode the other side's deterrent and thus would not be destabilizing However because super-hardening would require relocation of ICBM sites it would introduce verification probl eEJ s and negotiating co1nplexities It would be difficult to verify with national me ans whether abandoned silos had really been mnde unusable unless they were destroyed and cratered If it were desired to limit the size of new launchers it would be very difficult to verify that the nEt ' silo 7as not de 8p enough to accommodate larger missiles There would also be a problem in arranging the transition from old silos to new It would be necessary to assure through appropriate agreed procedures that a missile force was neither significantly larger by virtue of h2 ving old a nd new silos oper 3 tional at the same time nor significantly smaller by having periods in which neither the old or the new silos ere operational Of course even super-hardened silos could beco ne vulnerable to missiles of sufficiently improved accuracy_and throw-weight if no agreed constraints were placed on such improv2ments It should be noted that the Soviets stand to gain substantially from relocatiol and hardening provisions since they prese tly have many relatively soft co-located ICBMs Relocating these to hard dispersed sites would greatly increase U S targeting problems The vulnerability of ICBN sites could also be reduced by deploying h 1 cd-point AB M defenses Like super-hardening hard-point ABM defense E §E would not be destabilizing since it would not erode the other slde's deterrent and would be readily verifiable However in some cases hard-point defense could or could be perceived to -42provide coincidental defense of urban population and industry and hence could be viewed as a threat to the other side's deterrent See paragraph H for a fuller discussion of ABMs Issues a Should launcher replacement super-hardening of ICBi'is be permitted up to an agreed number of launchers b Should hard-point ABM defense of ICDMs be permitted up to an agreed nuailier of launchers missiles C Numbers of SLBN and SLCM Launchers The U S has no current plans to increase the number 656 of its submarine launched ballistic missile SLB Q launchers but plans to convert 31 of 41 Polaris submarines to handle the MIRVed Poseidon missile by FY 77 The U S has no submarine launched cruise missiles SLCMs The Soviets have embarked on a major Polaris-type subme-rine building program By 1 July 1969 it is estimated that the Soviet Union will have operational 108 shorter range i e 350 nm and 750 nm SLBHs in about 37 older nuclear and diesel submarines and 96-112 Polaris type 1500 nm SLBMs in 6-7 ne - 1 type submarines for a total of 204-220 SLBMs In addition they will have 13-16 of the Polaris-type submarines under construction making available a total when completed of 412-476 SLBMs It is estimated that in the absence of an arms control agreement the Soviets will continue to increase their SLBM capability so that by 1978 their total would be 656-896 launchers Hm· ever the operational av iilability on- DE 0 · $Y ED -43- station time of each U S SLBH submarine ·will be considerably greater than Soviet SLBM submarines due to the use of U S advanced bases at Holy Loch Rota nnd Guam This situation could change in the future either by U S withdrawal from these bases or by Soviet acquisition of fon ard bases e g in Cuba The Soviets also have a fleet of 60-62 nuclear and diesel subn arines equipped ·w ith from four to eight SS-N-3 250 nm cruise missile launchers each for a total of 348-364 SLCN launchers We estima te that they do not plai1 to increase the number of their SLCHs but that if they wanted to increase their capabilities they could probably develop a new lo '1ger nmge cruise missile The Soviets 1'7 ill probc bly cl2im that SLCI-1s are not strategic weapons but are intEnded only as anti-shipping weapons They may claim that U S carrier forces pose a threat to the Soviet Union equal to or greater than that posed to the U S by their SLCVis SLCHs do not have the range or the accuracy to threaten Minutema n sites but could be used to atteck targets near the U S coasts Since S LBHs are at p esent practically invulnerable to a counter-force first strike they can be considered the most stable offensive missile system in the sense of being able to wait out an attack and thus reducing the incentive to strike first The accuracy of current generation U S and Soviet SLBMs limits their usefulness in attacking hardened targets They can however pose a threat to soft targets particularly bomber bases since they can reduce warning time The U S Poseidon MIRVed missile will have sufficient accuracy to make it an excellent counterforce weapon against hardened targets Soviet SLBMs are now vulnerable to some loss to U S ASH and the current generation U S SLBM may become vulnerable to · possible future Soviet advanced anti--submarine 1•Jarfare D '· Some believe that because SLBMs contribute to stable deterrence they should be excluded from a strategic arms control agreement Others believe that an agreement intended to halt the strategic arms race should include all offensive strategic missiles In view of the large Soviet SLBN subm2 rine construction program omitting SL BMs fro m an a g reement -muld leave unconstrained a potentially serious threat to the U S which would require significRnt U S counter-measures There are also two views on SLCMs Some feel that because of the µossible linkage which the Soviets may mak e beth een SLCNs anc1 U S carrier forces it would be counter-productiv e to sugges t their inclusion in a strnt e gic arms control agreement Others believe that the potential threat of SLCMs to the U S requires that their number be limited We have hi gh cm1fidence in our national cci pability to rnoi1itor a limit on the nurnl1er of submarines and launchers of both the ballistic and cruise type We would have a good chance of detecting the construction of surface ships equipped to launch strate ic missiles or the testing of the system at sea Issues a Should a limit on the number of SLBM launchers be included in an agreement b If so what limit if any should be set on the total Soviet SLDM launchers that they might claim to have operational ancl under construction c Should SLC M launchers -be included in an agree- ment DEC L IE n- - ' LT C D Lc1 nd-Mobile ICBMs IRj HRBMs and ABMs The U S does not have any current plans to develop land-mohile strategic weapons systems The Soviets are developing a land-mobile IR ffiBM and have indicated considerable interest in developing a landmobile ICBM They have not sho-i m any indication of interest in a land-mobile ABM The effect of land-mobile offensive systems on strategic stability may be considered ambiguous They cannot be reliably targetted and could be expected to survive a first st _·ike and therefore may be considered stabilizing On the other hand mobile ICBMs could be used as a first strike weapon against the U S if high accuracies can be achieved Since ABM launchers th emselves are not norm2lly considered worthwhile missile targets the primary advE ntage of mobile ABMs Hould be to introduce uncertainty as to the distribution of the ABM defense and thus · complicate offensive targeting Hm•1ever this tactic might be ' ·JOrth •1hile only if heavy urban or 11 hard-point 11 defense ABM systems were to be deployed It would provide little advantage to small hard-point or anti-Nth country defenses The most irnportc nt problem which permitting land·· mobile systems would pose is verification since it would be difficult to verify a numerical limit on such systems We believe we ' 1 ould be able to identify a landmobile system but perhaps only when it had become operational in substantial numbers In addition it -wuld be extremely difficult if not impossible to make any precise determination of the number ··of mobile weapons in -46a deployed force although we think that we would be able to estimate the general magnitude of the deployment Thus from a verification point of view it is highly desirable to ban mobile ICBMs IR filDMs and ABMs altog e ther since in this case the identification of a single mobile launcher would be evidence of a violation of the agreement Howe er since the Soviets would be permitted to have mobile tactical missiles e g the SS-12 or Scaleboard there might be difficulties in eventually distinguishing between these and m' bile 1''m BHs A ban on mobile ICB1•1s IR HRBNs and ABHs i hould include banning their production since it othenJise would be possible to produce such weapons store them in covered areas and th2n upon abrogation rapidly deploy thE m Since confidence and c ce1•1 training firing -wuld be required for any significant mobile deployment programs the testing of missiles frow mobile launchers should also be banned There is agreement that land·-mohile IR NRBMs should be banned There are differences of opinion regarding l nd-mobile ICBl•1s md ABMs Even though the U S has no present plans to dev e lop either type of system some believe thc1t the non··tE rgetibility of landmmobile ICBMs and the tactical fle x ibility of lcmd-mobile ABNs makes it desir2 ble to retain an option to deploy such systems Others believe that the verification problems cited above require that all mobile land-based strategic missile systems be prohibited Issues a Should land··mobile ICBMs be prohibited or should they be permitted within total ICBM imits b Should l nd-mobile ABMs e prohibited or should they be permitted within total ABM limits TOP SECRET ---------· ' -47E Flexf' _ili_ y to_ lter the Nix of Fixed ·and Mobile Systems --- -------c• --- The discussion of limits on numbers of offensive missile launchers discussed above assumed that there would be agreed totals for each type system i e fixed land-based ICBHs mobile ICBMs if allowed SLE Ms SLCMs and fixed ABNs However it might _be desirable under certain circumstances to permit altering the mix of analogous - eo pon systems by substituting from one component to another uithin a fixed total number Three freedom··tomix cases h ve been examined It might be desir lJJ e to permit altering the mh of offensive missile systc rns by SL bstituting seabased offensive missiles either submarine or surface ship l unched for fixed land-based offensive missiles or vice versa The mare difficult to verify mobile land based launchers would be prohibited The purpose of this freedom· ·to··mix -muld be primc 1 rily to permit each nation to retain the option to enha nce the survivability ·of its retaliatory forces if they are threatened and to reduce the incentive for the other party to strike first Under most conditions a well-designed mix of strategic systems is more effective than any single system since each element of the mix requires a counter system of the opponent and each element tends to hedge against possible weaknesses or vulnerabilities in the others Furthermore exploitation by the U S S R of freedom-to-move-to-sea would diminish pressvre on the U S to do the same since Soviet SLBMs do not have currently the accuracy to successfully attack U S missile silos A second proposal ·w ould p rmit mobile ICBMs and freedom within an igreed total to alter the mix of fixed and mobile lC C M systems The rationale for this -48proposal is the same as for altering the mix of fixed land-based and mobile sea based systems discussed above i e increased survivability However mobile landbased ICBMs would be more difficult to verify than mobile sea-based systems In addition the Soviets have ongoing land-mobile missile programs that are unmatched by the u s Flexibility to alter the 11iix of fixed land and n bile sea-based ABM systems has also been proposed The proponents argue that in the event of an agreement limiting the numoer of ABM interceptors launchers both sides would be motivated to optimize the ir ABM effectiveness through the best mixes anrl deployments of a limited number of ABM Considerable ABM advantage can be gajned by deployjng a mid-course intercept syste1n as a complement to a terrninnl system The U S S R land arc •a is such that the· Soviets cot 1ld achieve an optimum ABM defensein-depth against U S missiles by utilizing northern land areas and Arctic Islands for mid··course intercept installations -1 hile for the United States it might be mor·e feasible to use sea areas of the North Pacific and Atlantic to achieve a comparable deployme nt Sea-based ABMs also provide the option to defend friendly countries neighboring the CPR or Soviet Union from nucleDr attacl or black-mail From the Soviet viewpoint a better case can be made for permitting the freedom to substitute seabased missiles for land-based missiles The Soviet SLBM fleet even ·with the submarines currently under construction would 'be considerably smaller than that of the United States In addition the U S forward submarine bases provide the United States a far better on-station capability thnn that which the Soviets could probabty achieve At the same time the Soviets have a number of soft ICBHs and IR HRBMs Thus if the United States were to permit the E I Soviets to substitute SLBVis for soft ICBMs or IR MRBHs the survivability of Soviet missile forces might be enhanced and an agreement made more negotiable On the other hand such ' a provision could increose the Soviet capabilities to strike those U S targets Hhich are vulnernble to Soviet SLBMs To the degree that the Soviets might reduce their IR MRBHs under this option the agreement might be more satisfying to our NATO llies This option might be proposed to the Soviets either in the form of reaching agreement at the time of negotintions 2 s to the substitutions they ·were going to rr c 1-c and i'Jhen or permitting them to alter the mix at will provided sufficient notice of the timing and extent of the alterations were provided the United States 1 Hm•-12ver those who oppoS c incorpo c2ting freedomto-mix in an agreement point out that negotiation and implem2nting such an arms control agreement would present serious verific tion and procedure problems The primary difficulty - ou1 c1 be atte1t pting to keep track of the total mix of the othei side's strategic fm ces by nation_a l verification means or for that matter even by inspection When a ne - silo coP1plex or a ne y submarine was identified a nation might not be sure if this increment was an illegal augmentation or a legal substitution If told that it was a substitution then a nation -mulc1 have to determine if the other components of the force had in fact been reduced by an e'1ual amount These problems might be alleviated to so 1e degree by establishing certain notification procedures which would precede an alteration of the mix It might also be possible to provide on-site inspection to assure that the abandoned site or submarine launcher had been rendered inoperable Hm•1ever to the extent that one side's forces shifted from fixed to mobile particularly to land mobile systems the verifiability of the total size of the force would be reduced TOP SECRET -50In addition tuch a flexible agreement with ne-w ·weapon syst ms of one type being substituted for old systems of another type might be more unstable than an agreem nt fixing the mix There would be qualitative as well as qu e ntitative uncertc 1inties which might create suspicions of violations and fear of abrogation With such a loophole in the agreement there would be heavy pr essure to exercise the option to mix a s a hedge against the other side's possible use of the option even though the gain in conf iclence in one I s dete r rcnt might be margj_nal and unnecessary The strategic arms control objective of achieving stability and balance at minimum cost would be less achievable as each side ·wonld be almost as free constra ined solely by some total number of offensive and or defensive launchers es it is today to continue strategic arms procun -r 1ent and i ould undoubtedly find its strategic bucl8ets increasing On the other hand those who favor freedom-to-mix believe thnt measures to exploit vulnerability of a frozen elemen t of Lhe force would be highly destabilizing The aFareness to both sides that the freedo l1• to -ro ix is av£dlabl to restore survivability should discoarage spending for increaE ed counterforce capabilities and hence recluce the need to exercise the freedom-to-mix option 0 Those who oppose frcedom··to-mb point out that if offensive missile systems can be effectively constrained both quantitatively and qualitatively then the current U S ICBM force could not be damaged sufficiently to prevent adequate retaliation and thus there would be no need to vary the mix If offensive missile characteristics cannot be sufficiently constrained to assure the survivability of our ICBMs they believe it would be preferable to increase ICBM survivability through superhardening rather than by trading ICBMs for the more expensive- SLBMs They also note that U S ICBM sites are closer to readily accessable open-ocean areas than those of the U S S R This could well TOP SECRE'l ' -51 provide the Soviets a significant advantage if seabased ABMs •1ere pennitted While it might be possible to limit fi x ed ABMs to a hard-point defense role seabased ABHs ·muld have ur ban defense as well as force defense capabilities and thus would erode the assured deterrent of the opposing side Issues a Should a n agrcen nt peimit altering the mix of land- and sea• •b 22e d offcinsive missiles within son1e agreed total 1·1ith ar l 1ithout mobile land based systems prohibited b Should an ngreement permit altering the mix of fixed and mobile lc1 nd-b 2 s ed ICBEs within some agreed total c Should an 2grecm2nt permit altering the mix of land and sea•·b s sed l'1B'M -1 ithin some agreed total F Fixed IR HRBMs · The U S has no IR NRBMs The Soviets have 673 IR MimM launchers about 90% of ·1hich are targeted on Western Europe 1ith the remainder primarily in the Far East Only 135 of the launchers are hard There is no evidence that the Soviets plan to deploy more IR MRBMs but they are developing new improved missiles The Soviets might claim that these weapons do not threaten the U S and are -thus not strategic However they can be thought of as contributing to the Soviet strategic posture since they do hold our NATO allies at C TOP SECRET -52risk and threaten our forces in Western Europe For these reasons they should not be left unconstrained Our NATO allies will expect the United States to seek limitations or reductions in Soviet IR HRBNs to parallel similar actions sought in regard to ICBMs Since the U S capability to counter IR MRBMs is enhanced by the fact that m8st IR ffiBMs are soft it is desirable both to limit the number of IR NRBM launchers and to ban further launcher hardening It is also desirable to limit further qualitative improvements in these systems particularly upgrading them to ICBN capabilities The Soviets may wish to relocate some of their European targeted weapons to increase their anti-China capabilities In this case the U S should not oppose the relocation provided only soft launchers were relocated to ne 1 soft sites Emd did not create additional aiming points since the net effect would be to reduce the threat to Western Europe However agreed procedures shouid be worked out to assure that the old IR HRBH sites are rendered inoperable by the time the nei•J sites become operational The Soviets may use acceptances of limits on IR MRBNs as a bargaining tool and might attempt to link them with reductions of U S tactical aircraft or missiles in Hestern Europe The U S might link increases in Soviet SLBMs to decreases in IR MRBMs With national intelligence means alone the U S can verify vith high confidence within close tolerances the number of fixed IR MRBM launchers The deployment of present ICBM systems at soft IR MIZBN sites probably would be detected We might not be § ble to detect the deployment of ICBJ s in IR MRBM silos Issues None since it is generally agreed that any SALT agreement should at least limit the number of IR MR BM launchers to present levels and to the present soft hard mix and posture G MIRVs The United States is developing 1 11 Rvs for two new U S missiles Minuteman III and Poseidon Distinctive signatur e fli ght testing of these ·systems was initiated on August 16 1968 As of 1 June 1969 14 out of a total of 52 scheduled flight tests will have been completed The first Hinutc rrD n III missiles Hre prograrmned to be ope cationa l in June 1970 and pbased into the force until a total of Sll repl i ces a like number of Minut man I's and II's by end of FY 74 The first Poseidon missiles in converted Polaris submarines are scheduled to be operational in January 1971 Thirty-one of the total of forty one Polaris submarines are progranuned to be converted to Poseidon by FY 77 The U S undertook its NIRV programs in response to anticipated large scale deployment of Soviet AB Ms--i e in order to assure a capability to penetrate these defenses in a retaliatory strike In the process of developing its MIRVs the U S has also developed new guidance systems the design specifications of which would make these weapons far more accurate than current generation missiles While the U S did not develop these accuracies for the primary- purpose of creating a first strike counterforce capability the accuracies which the· U S expects to achieve will make these systems significantly better counterforce weapons than current U S systems They have been DECIA15S-fFiED DE ASSWIED -54officially described in a public release as being far better suited for destruction of hardened silos than existing warheads Since August 1968 the Soviets ave conducted seven successful_ test flights in - rhich three multiple uarhead reentry vehicles fr Vs roughly comparable to the Polaris A-3 were deployed from a single SS - 9 booster The three most recent tests reached ranges of some 5100 nm None of these tests have demonstrated an independent targeting capability however and it is unclear whether the present program is desigi 1ecl to le ad to development of such a capability If this series of tests was limited to d velopment of a MRV payload for the SS·-9 sueh a system could be operational in late 1969 lt is unlikely that the Sovie ts conlcl achieve IOC Hith a MIRV of sufficient accuracy and reliability to warrant assignment against hard targets before 1972 If the Soviets do proceecl with a MIRV program the throw•-weight of the SS-·9 missile and the projected SS-Z-3 -muld permit the Soviets to deploy much larger yield MIRV ·warheads than those planned for U S systems If the Soviets Here then _able to achieve the accuracies which we project for our NIRv systems a MIRVed SS-9 or ss-z 3 ·would have a significantly greater hard-target destruction capability than either a Minuteman III or a Poseidon The present and projected deployment of SS-9 and SS-Z-3 boosters if equipped with accurate MIRVs would provide the Soviets a greatly increased capability to destroy U S ICBMs ap d bomber bases unless the U S responds with strategic progr2 ms beyond those nou approved There is considerable diffe ences of opinion as to the desirability and feasibility ·of banning MIRVs Some believe that l'-1IRVs will have certain inherent qualities ' TOP SECRET -55which would make them desirable in an arms control environment that permitting MIRVs ·m uld facilitate reaching a strategic arms control agreement and in any case that a ban of MIRVs wo tld be unverifiable Others believe that MIRVs have inherently destabilizing features that make them very undesirable that the Soviets uill not accept an agreement that fails to ban MIRVs and that if MIRV flight testing is stopped soon enough it will be possible to verify a ban on 1'ITRVs Due to the fr 1portance of this subject these t va vie -7s have been explored in som2 detail 1 Those 7ho oppose a 1'-ITRV ban believe tha t MIRVs may be reg2 1·dpd as stabili z ing to the e x tent that they provide for a m2rgin of superiority of the offense over the defense HIRVs provide increased target coverage as well as cross t2rgeting c c1p2 bility and if deer 1ed necessary can provide a hed g e against technological breakthroughs abrogation or che2 ting The counterforce threat which MIRVs pose can be mitigated by such me ans as super•·hardening increased force mobility or hard-point ABM defenses If the requirement for a large nunilier of independently targetable •1arheads is foreseen MIRVs would be more cost effective in achievine such a capability than singlewarhead missiles The opponents of MIRV ban believe that once MIRV deployments have started agreements to limit strategic arms vould become substantially easier to negotiate in that the number size and accuracy of warheads in each vehicle would be accepted as so difficult to verify that it will not be considered Each side would assume that the other has or could 1'-ITRV to the maximum possible extent and will be aware of its right to do likewise There will then be less incentive to attempt to match the opponent's offensive capci bility with ABM knowing its futility It would be easier for each side to ac ept ABM deployments D E the other may find necessary to cope uith Nth countries without fear that they threaten its assured destruction In the absence of MIRVs ABl-Is above certc in levels could be destabilizing since they could reduce a nation's retaliatory capability beloH levels considered necessary for deterrence In this case the motivation to preempt iri a crisis could be increased A t-ITR dispite its greater payload dll multiply the nu nber of ABMs necessary for intercept without increasing equivalent megaton age ENT On the other hand if U S -Soviet agreement were reached to prohibit AHl-' is er limit them to low levels HIRVs 1•muld not be required to pJ ovid2 t l1e U S an assured deterrent and the stability that exists today co uld be preserved AB '- S crP c te the requirement for MIRVs for penetration c nc1 Nil Vs crea te the requir ement for ABMs for force protection If both can be prohibited or ABMs kept to low levels neither may be required While banning MIRVs •mulc1 not eliminate co -n letely the counteyforce threat which offensive n Lssiles pose it would significantly reduce this threat In the absence of an early agreement limiting ABM 1 s however each side m3 y perceive a future threat to its assured destruction capability Reacting to the Soviet buildup in fixed ICB M and SLBH forces and to the future possibility of an extensive effective Soviet ABM deployment the United Sta tes has already decided to deploy 'MIRVs The Soviet Union is likely to make an analorious decision if indeed it has not already done so and in the absence of a MIRV ban will probably also continue to develop and then deploy mobile ICBMs Once MIRV deployments have· started agreements to limit strategic arms will become substantially more difficult to negoti2 te The nuI · ber and size of 1-HRVed · TOP SEGRE -57warheads deployed will be very difficult to verify Each side will assume that the other has MIRVed or could MIRV to the maximu n possible extent and ·will probably seek the right to do likewise Even if an arms limitation agreement could be attained on this ba is it would result in strategic force ceilings higher than could be set in 1969 Furthen ore because ec1 ch HIFVed missile potentially could destroy a rn 1 -nber of adversary missiles in a first strike the disincentives to strike first in a crisis situc tion would be substantially eroded Thus a strategic arms limitation agreement ·w hich limited the numb e r of launchers prob2bly ·woi lld not eliminate the destabilizing effect of fIR ied forces · ith its likely consequent increase in the risk of nuclear war In addition to increasing the risk of war MIRVed forces on both side s could result in greater damage to both sides if deterrence should fail The combination of both accurate MIRVs and high levels of urban ABMs could be pc1 rticularly destabilizing If a country could destroy its adversary's land-based strategic forces lJith MIRVs and intercept most of the remaining mobile missile ·forces ·with AB11s it might be tempted to preempt in a crisis situation particularly if it feared that its adversary would have an analogous temp·· tation to strike first To counter this first strike threat it might be considered necessary to place strategic missile forces in a 11 launch-on-·warning status wherein decisi_ons to launch might have to be delegated or in any case made in a matter of minutes based on limited amounts of information The danger of a nuclear war in such a ' 1hair-triggE'r situation is obvious Even 'in the absence of a crisis situation a combination of the proposed U S MIRV program and a medium size U S ABM deployment may well result in a Soviet ' -58- conclusion that they no· longer have an adequate deterrent If the Soviets should therefore propose that ABMs be prohibited or limited to low levels they would probably view continued U S insistance on · deploying MIRVs as indicating a U S intent to develop a first strike counterforce capability since there would be no requirement for MIRVs as a penet r-ation device and the high accuracies which the U S expects to achieve with its MIRVs are not necessary for retaliatory attacks against urban areas The Soviets could be expected to respond to this U S position by refusing to enter into any strategic arms limitation agreement until they had bu t 1 t up their strategic forces subst2 ntially higher than their present level To verify a 1-rrnv b2n we would have to rely primarily on bc nn i n g JvITRV nd related i e multiple RVs all maneuv e cing RVs m1c1 buses•• ·•-·for the implications of banning maneuvGring RVs see p a r agraph J flight tests and our cc1pability to detect violations of this ban by national verification me ns There is little prospect that ·we could detect the deployment of MTR Vs 1·1ith national means alone once flight testing has been completed Should the Soviets seek to devC lop a Mil system for their ICDl with either the hiih accuracy needed to attack targets with high assurc nce or ·Jith the ability to attack widely separated targets they would have to undertake a comprehensive test program and we have high confidence that we could detect and identify uch tests at least a year prior to IOC These detection lead time considerations ·apply both to an ·entirely new MIRV system and to an effort by the Soviets to upgrade their present MRV w·hich may be technically possible Development of the latter into_ a 1'flRV system lacking either very high accuracy oi a wide dispersal pattern would also be identified but the interval between identification and IOC would probably be shorter These estimates are based D ' - - -59on current capabilities and the asswnption that the Soviets would require the same type of flight test program that we currently plan for our MIRV development program Contrary to the National Intelligence Estimate and past Soviet practices a more conservative view holds that MIRV development without tests or -1 ithout tests v1hich we could detect and identify is technically feasible although more expensive of greater risk and attended with lower confidence The dependence of a HIRV ban verification on a ban on MIRV flight testing makes this a most timeurgent problem This problem is discussed separately in paragraph M Issue Should the U S related flight testing H S8ek a ban on HIRVs and HI RV and ABM Launchers The importance of controlling AEHs is related to the natur of their c2pabilities ABM systems whose capability is limited solely to tjefense of strategic offensive forces are not considered destabilizing in the sense that they protect retaliatory forces but do not threaten the other side's deterrent However most force protection ABM systems will have or can be perceived to have capabilities to protect population and industry as well Thit is the case to some extent with the U S Safeguard system The location of approximately onethird of the Soviet ICBM sites near populated areas means that any Soviet force defense system might also provide some protection for Soviet population and industry l TOP· ----• SEC 'P ET - - OEl3tr r uB U -60ABM systems c n also be designed primarily to limit damage to population and industry urban defense If it is deemed necessary to protect against irrational attacks from Nth countries e g Communist China and or to protect against accidentally-launched offensive m5ssiles then ABM systems with a moderate defensive damage limiting capability may _be desired The question here is -1hether the possibilities of Nth country attack either irrational or in retaliation for a U S disarming attack and or successful interception of an accidental launch are great enough to warr mt both the expense of such systems and the probable negative effect that such sys tents might have on strategic stability ABH systems 1·1hich protect population and industry defensive danege limit i ng systems can be destabilizing since they reduce the other side's deterrent capabilities and thus could cause it to deploy higher offensive force levels to compensate Once more than a few hundred urban ABM interceptors are deployed the other side will probE l ly believe that it must have MIRVs or other increased offensive means to assure penetration in a retaliatory strike The over• compensation - hich is likely to result from conservative planning could mean that in a strategic war the offensive forces 1• ould inflict more damage than -muld hr i ve been the case ·in tbe absence of a damage limiting ABN and the offensive response it had generated Since an urban ABM system would be more effective against a retaliating force which had been disrupted by an initial counterforce attack ABMs would lend some advantage to striking first Once a basic nationwide ABM system has been installed it would be easier to expend it rapidly after abrogation of a strategic arms control agreement or to upgrade SAM systems clandestinely to give them ABM capabilities DE -61The differences in the arms control implications of the force defense hard-point and the damage limitation urban ABH missions suggests that in arms control negotiations it might be - 1ortlw1hile to discuss hard-point and urban ABMs separately and to place different restraints on each type If ABM systems were limited to terminal interceptors which the Soviets do not at this time appear to be developing or area interceptors whose location and fly-out range did not provide defense for a significant portion of · the urban population then separate consideration might be possible F ut it is mm e likely that ADH systerr s designed primarily for force defense like the Safegu 2rd system would have sufficient coincident urb0 n defense capabilities to make this separation infeasible If an ABM system was intended to provide in addition to force defense anti-Nth country and or anti•·accidental lr2 unch capabilities it would have to have some urban defense capr bilities Limits on ABM systems like limits on offensive missile systems should be by ABM launcher rather than ABM interceptor missile since it would be most difficult to verify limits on the number of interceptors However it is estimated that the Soviet Galosh ADM launcher may have an effective reload ·capability p2rrnitting each launcher to launch mo e than one AB7 ··1 interceptor Since the intent of an ABN limit Houlc1 be to provide each side approximately the same capability in terms of numbers of effective ABM interceptors any agreement should account for reload capabilities To overcome this problem it has been suggested that the agreement should provide for an 11 equivalE nt 11 number of ABM launchers ·Jith a reloadable launcher counting as the equivalent of two or· more launchers No precise way in which a verifiable determination of the reload capability of an AI iri' could be determined has D D DEGtA1SSfflED -62yet been developed However if the U S raises the problem of equivalent ABM launchers the Soviets may well counter with the U S advantages which stem from our advanced SLilN bases superior air-tanker cc pabi lity and the added survivability associated with hard non-reloadable launchers Although t he U S cotild always reipond with asymmetries which favor the u s s R e g IR MRBM medium bombers SLCMs we may wish to forego this 11 eqL1i valent'' ABM laL1-ncher issue and if necess2ry provide reload c a pab i_lities for our ABMs The simplest way in which the various negative arms control implications of ABMs could be overcome would be to prohibit ABNs altogether Since the Soviets might •1 ell obj cct to having to dism- 1ntle their ex isting Moscm-1 system of 6 Ge lo sh interc e ptors the U S might ·Jish to consider permitting tbem to retain this relatively ineffective system as a partial guid _pro _guo for continued U S superiority in SLBNs If ABMs are not prohibited or limited to the current Moscm• r system but MIRVs are prohibited then stringent limits on the 11u nber of urban ABMs must be set Strategic exchang e analyses indicate that with MIRVs banned effective urban 1 BH levels above about 500 substantially erode both side's missile retaliatory capability See Section V - C-·Sa If MIRVs are permitted ABMs would probably be required for force defense and the governing criterion for the size of the ABM force might be the number needed to insure · survival of one-third of the U S Minuteman force The size and nature of the U S ABM force necessary for this task Hill depend on the Sov·iet offensive capability the dispersion and hardness of U S Minuten an sites and the effectiveness of U S ABM systems ' TOP SECRET -63Issues a Should the U S seek to prohibit or limit AB Ms b If we seek to prohibit ABMs could we as a bargaining tool accept the retention of the current Soviet Moscow defense system c If we seek to limit ABB should we seek separate limits on hard-point defense and urban defense ABM s d Should the U S propose a specific limit on ABHs or mfait a Soviet proposed limit e If the U S should propose a specific ABM limit what should this limit be f Should the U S insist on an equivalent number of ABM launchers based 011 reload capabilities I ABM Associated Radars Whether limits on ABNs should include limits on ABM-associated radars as ·w ell as ABM launchers is controversial There is agreement that ABM radars are the mo st expensive ABM component and require the longest lead time If they were limited it would increase confidence in our verification of limits on ABM systems If the construction of redundant ABM-capable radars were not limited they could contribute significantly to a nation's capability to execute rapidly a pl2 nned abrogation of the ABM limits or to provide cl2ndestinely some ABM cap s bility for its SAMs or IR MR ICBl-Is For example -64if ABM-capable rad2 rs Here not limited and addition l radars were built intelligence warning time for a significant violation could be reduced from 5-8 years to 1-2 years However there are objectionato inclusion of radar restrictiori in a strategic arms control agreement due to the difficulties --1hich som2 foresee in distinguishing un 'lmbigiously between ABH radars and _other types of r2da rs such as enrly Wctrning e g BMm· S fpace track air defense and air traffic control Large radars Hhich embody all functions are technically feasible Phased array radars are rnakine dua lity of use a feasible design and operational objective a3 in the c s se of the programmed U S air traffic control net Hhile a limitation on site radars used for local tracking and interceptor control if agreed to in a mE nner to be verifiable would provide the most effective restraint on ABM system effectiveness and grm-rl h this generally smaller type of radar is the most difficult to identify and categorize Smaller radars can be built under cover utilizing modular concepts and highly capable mobile radars are within the state of the art There are nsym netries bet veen programmed U S and current Soviet ABM radars from the standpoint of n1 nhers type function ·anc1 development 1h i ch would make an agreement on equivalent capabilities difficult Discussions may lead to disclosures of th need regarding plans intent characteristics and operational capabilities There is also concern that any ADM-associated radar restrictions ·Jhich might be imposed may inhibit other needed radar Tesearch development anc1 deployment On the other hand there are those who believe that ambigu5 ties •Jhich might exist in distinguishing between ABM-associated and other radars are not great and should not prevent constraining ADM-associated radar in an agreement The advocates of this position believe ' rOP SEClmT -65that there are specific indications which would permit us to distinguish ABN radars from other radars in most if not all cases These indications include radar location orientation elevation angle power frequency and aperture size · For example Amr-associated radars might be distinguished from spece radars by location and orientation and from ir-traffic control radars by power-apertureproduct and frequency They cite in support of their contention the very large numbers of radars of various types that presently exj_st in the So iet Union and the fact that the U S has had to date no re8l difficulty in distinguishing the ABM-associated radars from the many other types The advocates of including radar restrictions suggest that it would be possible after agreement is reaclied on allm-1ed nur ibe r s of BM iEterceptors for each side to prescribe the radar infrc' lstrncture ·w -1ich it deems necessary to support its allowed interceptor deployment neca use of differences in geog aphy Nth country considerations radar characteristics and operating doctrine there would be some differences in the radar infrastructure of the two sides These would be negotiated to assure that no gross redundanci s existed Monitoring of co pliance ' ·JOuld be by national mec- ns based on agreed te chnical definitions h -i sed on the c citeri a set forth above of what would constitute an ABM-capable radar It is also useful to observe that the problems resulting from radar ambiguities is of minor importance under ·a total ABM ban or with very lm r levels of ABM Safeguard Phase I and grows in difficulty only when the agreement provides for numbers of interceptors large enough to provide for nationwide perimeter acquisition radar coverage This results from the fact that acquisition radars Henhouse Doghouse PAR are un i mbigiously visible they are also essential to any meaningful ABM system · -66Thus under a zero AB1'i agreement where acquisition radars would be entirely disallowed clandestine construction of an ABr'i infrastructure Hould be inhibited Under a low-level ABH agreement i·1 here only partial acquisition rader coverage is provided there is again little problem becaus e of the relative vulnerability of these radars and because filling the coverage gaps ith additional acquisition radar ·muld be unambigiously observed If however the agreed ABM limits were to permi t natior 1ide defense of attacks from all threat corridors then it might not serve any useful purpose to include limits on acquisition and early warning radars If a nation is to provide an effective ABM defense of all its territory it must be able to acquire targets thBt npproach through any feasible threat corridor This for c x rtm 1 le would be done 1 i th the planned U S PARs in the complete Safeg uard system with the exception of the southe rn corridor However once all threat corridors are c ov ered by PAR-type radars redundancy with the more advanc ci type radars would provide little additional c2 p2bil Lty e cept perhaps to redL ce vulnerability to attack on th e rEdars Thus there would be little need to cc nstrain PAR··type radars in this situation In such a cc se the major r i sk from redundant ABM radars -muld corne fro m those radars - hose tasl is to guide the ABM interceptors and possibly provide finnl target tracking e g U S HSRs Soviet Tri cJds If limits on ' BM radars were confined to those radars whose characteristics provide this kind of capability both the danger of planned abrogation and or SAM upgrade and the problem of distinguishing between ABM-associated radars and other radars could still be significantly reduced Issues a Should limits on ABM systems include limits on ABM-associated radars b If th e re a 1 c to be limits on AJJ1-I-ci ssoc i P tcd radars should c' J C lL1 i si tion a nc1 O rJ y warninE rad2 rs be executed' DE@LA F ED -67Jo Qualitative Limits Weapon systems can be limited quantitatively or both quantitatively and qualitatively There are some who believe that quantitative limits are all we should seek and all we could realistically hope to achieve They believe that it is impossible to check th-2 qualitative growth of weapons technology and that attempts to constrain the use of Pe - technology in str2tegic weapons systems wonld be risky 2nd -rnuld lead to 2greements whose viability would be threatened by suspicion of violation and fear of abrogation They hold thc1 t as new weapons become more effective it m3 y be p issible to che ck unr iecessary gro 'lth in overall strategic capabilities by reducing forces to sma ller 111 1 rr lx rs of n1or e 0ffcc tive vcapons Others ho ever b e lieve that such an appronch to strategic a rffi s cm1trol would be dangerous y inaclequate They agree th t it is not feasible to prohihit research m·1d develo m2nt 011 strategic wer 1poi- S syst ms but they believe that it is feasible and desir ablc to co lstrain this activity by limiting missile flight tests and that limiting such tests_ would provide an adequate verifiable constraint on the introduction of significant qualitative improvements They hold that the uncertainties which drive the arms race and create strategic 5 nstabilities that could increase the chances of strategic nuclear war are more a function of 7eapons quality tha n weapons quantity It is the belief of this group that if venpons quality is not constrained at least in some important aspects the effect vould be not to halt the arms race but simply to drive it into new destabilizing and costly channels - Strategic force budgetary requirements ·would probably continue to groiv at an accelerating rate and significant buclzctary ' TOP SECRET -68savings would not be realized They argue that Soviet agreement 1• r ould be unlikely if a U S proposal would require tbe n to rnain tain or · increase their spending for strategic forces in order to keep up with the U S Furth2nwre they believe that the S_oviets would l e unlikely to accept an agreement ·which halted the ir quantitat i ve approach to increased strategic capabilities and left th e U S qualitative approach unconstrained Even though they would be perwitted the same option the Soviets may well believe that at least 1 the short run they would be at a dis 2i dvantage in comp 0· ting with the U S in a qualitative arms race Those who believe that realization 6 our strategic arms control ohjectives requires qualitative a s 1• ell as quantitative co11trols generally agree that a quantitativ e fre c z 2 might h l ' e preceded a comprE'hcnsiv q u aliu tiy e fre cze a year ago However they argu e that nm 1 the tim0 -·urgent MIRV flight-test problem see para M below virtually rules out this phc sed a p pr oach Furthc rmor0 they believe that a comb5_ned qu a ntitative a nd quali tath1e freeze is in some r e spects s i n pler tban J c ss comprehensive proposals and might prove to be the more readily negotiable approach and if achieved would meet our strategic arms control objective to a greater degree than would any partial freeze 1 Those 1 1 ho believe that qualitative limitations are both feasible and serve U S interests consider that the central issue in this study and in negotiations with the Soviet s is ·whether or not the U S will agree to a ban on MIRVs Ho1•1 ever they also believe that additionc11 qualit i tive restraints are desirable feasible and v e rifiable 2 nd Houlcl enhance the value of an 2 grceme nt f or tb2 U S C DE©EASSifiED -69Therefore in· addition to MIRVs and related systems ViRVs ms neuvering P-Vs and buses consideration has been given to the feasibility and desirability of including other qualitative lin 1itations in a strategic arms control agreerae -1t The most important characteristics are those that might affect a natio i 's counterforce capabilitieso _These are discussed individually and are folloi -md by a discussion of missile penetration aids pen-aids and the arms control implications of a more coinprehens ive freeze of the cha racteris tics of offensive missiles 1 Throw Wej_£rht -------- - The throi· ' -Jeight of an offensive missile in general go erns the n axirriurn yielcl of the missile warhead and the potential cap2_bility of the missile for delivering HikVs or penetrating d2fcnses The capa bility of a missile r v to c1ef troy a hnrdened target is a function of both yield and accur2cy Thus if the th ro -7 eight of offensive missiles coµld be limited the ability of a nc ttion to improve its counterforce capability would be inhibited 1 Throw weight restrictions might be imposed either with or without a EIRV ban If imposed in addition to a HIRV b n they would have the greatest inhibiting effect on the developn ent of counterforce capabilityo With a MIRV ban there vould also be less motivation to increase thrOi·l weight since the best counterforce ratio that could be achieved would still require at least one offensive missile to destroy one silo However such restrictions might be wortl-i'i'1hile even in the absence of a MIRV ban since they would limit the total weight o f HIRVs which 10uld be placed on offensive missiles · The current Soviet ICHNs possess a tota 1 thro •1 i 1ci - ht grca t c r th' 7t ll curr e ri t U S ICB ' s clue to the 12 500 b tb ro- i m ight 0£ the SS-9 If ' j -70there were no constraints on the characteristics of missiles or silos the U S could in time · overcome this advantage if it so desired If ICBM silo size were to be constrained the Soviet potential for increasing tbG thrni•7 • reight of their missiles is probably sorne 1 hat greater than that of the U S in absolute tcr1- - s particularly if the Soviets should use cold launch techniques However even with silo constrcJ int s the U S coald impro-ve on the current ratio of ICBI-1 throw • eights and ga'in in a rf_lativc sense Hoi· ever unless tbe U S intends to initicJ te a counter£ orce s trit e the tln 0- -1 • eight tlireat shoi 1ld b e vie 72d in 2b solr- te not relative te cP1s If Lhc Soviots by virtue of irr proved tbrow -1e i r h- s or oth·2r irr1 •rov cc1 cb 1 racteris tics achieve the c a p 2bility to destroy a ma jor portion of the U cS IC C1· force it -10c1ld ma ttc r little ·Jhether we had or did not haYe a thro1•1 weight advantage Therefore some b e lieve th2 t it would be in the U S interest to prohibit increases in thro v -1e ight It vould of course be wore advantageous for the U S if a thrO'i'l - €ight freeze II could be ma de effective after the iEtroductio 1 of Hinuter an Ills and Poseidons vith th - ir imprO 'ed throw weights but it is unlikely that the Soviets ·would agree to such a m-2asur8 If powered-flight telemetry is available changes in payload carrying capability of gieater than about 10 percent would be detected after on or two firings o R2 dar intelligence could detect cliang cs on the order of 25 percent in actual payload ·weight but confirmation rnight not be possible until after several firings TOP SECRET -712 Accuracy In addition to yield and number of warheads the accuracy of the warheads delivered also contributes directly to a nation's offensive missile first strike counterforce capabilities Accuracy in turn depends primarily on the Beta slra cpness- uluntness o E the RV the quality of the boost phase guidance and possibly - the post boost ma neuvering as in termin 'll guidance systems and tbe fuzing of the RV The ariT S control implications of RV ma11cuv e ring are discussed in para 3 following Beta affects accuracy in that since lo1•1er Beta mor e blunt RVs penetrE te the atmosphere at sJ o 1 12 r Ep2cc1s th t y a r 2 more su1- jC ct to atmospheric perturbations 8nd winds a nd are thus less accurate If reent1 ·y te J cn c try is av 2 i lab le to impact we can verify Beta restrictions ICfil s are the only missiles fron1 •d 1 ich c ol ta in such reentry te J emctry et piesent bnt future collection systems should allow intercept on all test rnnses Radint on Pacific firings also would allo1•1 verificatiol in lieu of telemetry The Soviet RVs generally have lower Betas are more blunt tha n U S RVs E- 1 en current U S RVs do not have the high Betas required for the accuracy we are designing into our new MIHVed systems The MIRVed RVs will have Betas significantly greater than·current RVs Thus if an agreement were to stipulate that Betas could not be improved and mRneuvcring of P Vs • ere prohibited in connection with prohibiting l1IR 7s an effective limit on achievable accuracy could be established which would r erve to restrain the silo-destruction capability -72of the missiles Analysis conducted in co inection with this study shrn-1s that if Soviet Betas could not be improved if termin2 l guidance and maneuver were not used and ICBH launclwrs 1·1ere limited to the present nurn er and mix the accuracies of their missiles could -not be improved sufficiently to prevent a bout half ths U S Minuteman force from suYviving a first strike It would be possible to even improve this surviv s l rate if in addition to Betas improve rient s in boost phasr guic1ance systems were prohibited We could expect to ohserve with national verificatio 1 systems chHn r s in tb c gu i_clance systems and or guid2nce techniques Develop cnt o high accuracy probably can be verified by n E tion- 1 1 means particula d y 1 ith fu ttn c coll€'ction systems but the dez ree of D ccur scy a ttc d ncd might not be kr1m n o Tb ere tore if ch 1ng Lng the gnicl211c e sys terns on existing missiles c nd the introduction of new missiles uere both prohibited then this elem nt of accuracy could also probnbly be effectively constra ined HOi· 'ever since tbe Soviets use radio-inertial guidance systems boost-phase accuracy ir iprovc ments might be feasible w i th no appare1-- t system change 3 Maneuvering Reent ry Vehicl Maneuvering reentry vehicles MaRVs can be used for three purposes to provide independent RV targeting as in a P-ball MTRV system to improve accuracy as in terminal guidance systems or to penetrate ABI -1 defense by making ABM intercept more difficolt The use of maneuvering RVs is not currently proz rcmrn-' d for any U S missiles o Ho -1evcr the U Sc is conducting I S D on several ne •l RVs Fhich 1- oulcl employ rn3 nenvering either for improved -73accuracy or for penetration or both The U S is not noH considering the development of a P-ball MIRV system There is no evidence thr1t the Soviets have developed or flight tested ·a ny HaRVs There would b2 no restrictions on MaRVs unless MIRVs were to be banned So ne beli 2ve tha t if HIRVs are banned then HaRVs should b2 permitted for penetration purposes particularly as a hedge against abrog2tion of tlre ADM liri1its or illegal upgrading of M systems Others believe that if HIRVs are banned it WC-i 1ld be essential to bc111 1al1 7s in order to j r1l1ibit So·v iet c1e eJ oprne11t of P·-balll type 1-UR 's Ev r n though the test i_ng of multiple - arh cads 1-111Vs - 0 _1ld prc s urn2 bly be prohibited if 1-HI i 7s are banned it might be pos sib e f or th0 Soviets to gc dn valuable test data F or a 11 P··b2 ll 11 1-n r v- S Stcr i by flight testing the 11 P-baJ l 11 HIRVnl RVs on at a tin1 e In addition tbe pro_i o-aeTJts of banninz Es RVs point out that if ABHs arc pi ohi1J1 te d or lirr i t ed to lo- 7 levels as · they rn 1st be in a MIRV ban there would be no reciui rerne nt for Ha RVs as an aid to penetrate ABM defens e s u 110 ·Jever HaJ Vs could also be used to improve accuracy or even if not designed for this purpose could be perceived to have this purpose Thus i f the Soviets i- r ere ·willing to prohibit or impose lm-1 lir lits on ABl-1s thGy might well perceive U S insistence on permitting MaRVs as an indication of a U S intent to improve its counterforce capability Furthermore if MaRVs are not prohihited the Soviets could greatly improve the accuracy ancl thus the counterforce capability of tb ir SS-lls in spite of that system's low Beta 4 Orbital Systems The U S has no plans to develop orbital offcn d_v 2 missile s 7st cr 1S u Tbe Soviets have flight D DECL WiED -74tested the SS-X-6 in a fractional orbital missile system mode FOBS and in a depressed tr jectory ICBH mode DICJ3N o While there is a better than even chance that they ·will deploy such a system no confident estimate can be made as to the nature or number that might be deployed nor in fact when the type of system being developed will reach IOC With current wRrning systeBs orbital missile systems c2n rednc e the ·h1 c1 1 ning time available to tli e attacked fore es by coming in be lo- the full range of radar coverag e or Ly attncking from directions not covered by - 2rnir 6 r c1 dcc1rs This adv a ntage must be paid for by a reduction in tl -2 total paylocid 2-nd accuracy -1hich the boo s ter c o dd othendse deliver if used as an ICBH Orbit a l systems arc not no- 1 accurate enouth to pose a thr at to hardened siloso Thus orbital systcn s would b' nsefP l pri1 1ar Lly as a counterforce 1 eapon to destroy bombers before they can take of£ othe r time ··urgent soft targets and_ ABM rad rs O Hm ever planne d improv ements in U S warning systems expected to be operational by mid-1971 will increase th8 warning time against a FOBS attacko After that FOBS missiles would probably pose less of a threat than a similar missile in an ICDN mode Ho •1ever the U oS o may wish to consider proposing prohibiting further flight testing of FOBS and related systems e g depress e d trajectory delivery as a bargain in point in connection with a discussion of MIRV limitations In any case the U S should make it clear that the agreed limits on Soviet ICBH launchers -1 0uld include any FO BS or related sys terns the Soviets may 1ish to d ploy o 5 ATNs Since the qua lity' of U S AL ·1 systems is nc t yet es t ablish d and the So iet s rqip csPcr to be 1 DE ED OECg O -75developing improved AP H interceptors it might prove difficult to place a qualitative limit on ABl- fs at this time IJ o ever if a ban on HIP Vs and other offensive missile char2cteristic·s - rere to be agreed then consideration should be given to the desirability and feasibility of placing qualitative limits on Al31-1s as • e 11 Since a MIRV ben - rould have to be acco 111_ anied by J irnitatio1 1 s on A BHs to very lou levels the most feasible qualitative lirr it might be to p r ob i bit AB -1 systems altogether If this is not fe n sibJ e tlwn teclmical lirnits e g fly out ran g e missile size woulc1 bave to be de 1 clop d wh i ch could pr-event erosion in deterrent pcr' -1er throug h the gradual qualit2tive grm·Jth in AN•' i c2 p 1bility 6 Missile Pen trRtion Aid s The U S b a s develop e d and tested penetrntio aids for Minut G n I Minuteman II and Polaris A-3 nnd is currently testing pen-aids for Minute 18 n III Exoa tmospheric pen-aid packages have been produced for the Hinutcu13 n I and II but have been clepluyed on on ly a fe v Minut eman II A new exoatmosphGri c pen - cLid sys tem for Hinuter 1an II is no under developm ent Both exo and endcatmospheric pen-aids have b2en developed for Minutern n III and are no -1 being flight tested Bo i h exo and endoatmosphc ric pen-aids for Polaris A - 3 have been developed and flight tested Hm 1ever procurement of pe n-aid pc1ckages for A-3 is not currently progran med There are no pen-aids pnckages for Polaris A·-2 and Poseidon- The Soviets are not k noHn to have penetration aids for any 0£ their missiles although they are judged to have the capability to develop them Exoatmosphcric p enetration aids ·would prov icle a va lt 12 b le- h 2 dgc at ainst tbr- erosion of either side's assur·ed deterrent through the planned abrogation of the agreed controls on ABNs or the illegal upgrading of SAf 1 systems Endoatmospheric pen-aids while they would provide a hedge against the same type threats are not as important as exoatmospli eric pen-aids Given reasonably 101 ' levels of ABEs it is ·unlikely that there would be a sienificant comm itm8nt of the permitted AB11s to terminal de Eense of cities Most 11urb nn 11 defense inte rce ptors Hould probably be area · interceptors designed with only exoatn10 - phe ric cap2 bility Any upgrad e d SAf1 system would be far more likely to have exoatmosph e ric than enc1oatmo opheric capahilities However th -' main parpo sc for excluding endo ltn ispheric pen·-aids i e decoys des ign2d to resemble RV' s during re-entry would be to preclude the possibility tbat m•J ltiple RV' s would be illegally flight tested and our national verification means ·would not be able to distinguish bet1· een HR Vs c1 ncl endoatmospheric pen-aids Tl E refore in an agreell1ent which b2 ns MIRVs it 7ould be dC 'sirable to prohibit the deployment and flight testing of endoatmospheric pen-aids but not exoatmospheric pen-aids Since th U S do2s not n J have enough cxoatmospheric pen--aids deployed it is not in the U S interest to freeze the exoatmospheric penetration-aid situation as it exists today The U S desires to be able to deploy exoatmospheric penetration-aids if it believes circumstances so warrant The Soviets might - -ell wish the same option Since exoatmospheric penetrAt ion-aids would have little effect on a nation that is abiding by the ABH limits of the agreement under the assumption that under a MIRV ban such levels of ABMs permitted ·- if any vould be essentially anti-Nth country or anti-accidental launch such an option would not be destabilizing OE • -77- 7 A Comprehensiv' Qualitative Freeze We have also considered the feasibility and desirability of seeking agreement on a comprehensive qualitative freeze to accompa ny a quantitative freeze This would involve prohibiting changes or improvements in the characteristics of deployed strategic missiles except for minor internal changes in deployed missiles or launcbers such as those design0-d to improve missile reliability or RV hardening There are differences of opinion as to the advantages and disadvantages of such a limitation Sorne belie'-1e that such a mc asure ·JOuld be too sweeping and difficult to verify Others hm·lever believe that such a 111 easure ·would provide the most secure stable and verifiable strategic arms control agi ·eement They point out that urtder such an arrangement there lJOuld be no requirement for further developmental missile flight testing and hence all flight tests except for an agreed number of preannounced confich nce firings on agreed ranges coi lld be prohibited Thus the use of national intelligence means could be focu sed on tbose fe1· permitted firings to assure that no ne·h1 cha racteristics - ere being tested If MIRVs are to be prohibited the l lOSt verifiable way to prohibit them would be as part of a comprehensive qualitative freeze • Those who support this concept point out that such a freeze would provide other important advantages While a MIRV ban alone would inhibit the development of a counter force threat to U So rcm1s a comprehensive characteristics fre - ze -would prevent it A comprehensive charaeteristics freeze would also provide greater strategic stability by reducing uncertainties as to the other side's strategic -78capabilities On the other ha nd some believe that by limiting the lee1 1 y for responses it would have the opposite effect of engendering concern on either side that secret developments could tip the balance Those • ho support a co - -iprehensive qualitative freeze believe thnt such a proposal which vould essentially involve stopping th2 strategic arms race co i1pletely may ·well be the most simple nd thus the most negotiable mcani-r gful arms control agreement It wuld be likely to hi ive greater internc tionf l political impact including encouraging adherence to the l'ff'J' than narro1•7C r technically circnmscJ ibed agrce m2nts By elimin i ting the loopholes which ·rnnlcl permit continuous incorporatio 1 of improv ements in strategic systems and thus reducing 11 to 11 1- st1c'· 11 ao-re n 1 t l-- L e -eq·1J· -e nr - _s L '--· 0' • - - _ - ' • j 1 G Lt 1- - iould probably save more resources thnn any other considered L - • ••L • - · - O i C L - Issues a o Should thJ_-0 •1 weight of offensive missiles be limited b Should improve1r ents in the accuracy of offensive r 1iss i lcs l e prohibited c Should maneuverable RV tes- ing and incorporc tion in the missile force be prohibited d be l f mited Should FODS and related systems e Should endoatmospheric pen-aids be prohi oitGd £ In addition to a quantitati e freeze should the U S f eek a co nprebcn sive qualitative freeze 0 DE mED -79K Bo nbers Bombers are a weapon system 1 7hich the U S has emphasized in the past and in which it holds a technological lead over tbe Soviets Bo nbers provide a hedge in retali s tory capability proviclcd th12y receive adeciuate mrning to ensure pre-launch survivability This 'i•Jould be Jarticu larly crucial in situations - here large ballistic missile defenses thrc '- tcmed the effectiveness of our missile forces The U S has a significant advantnge in m11 lb rs o c h2avy bon bers 581 B-52s and B-58s vs 140 - 150 Soviet Dears and Bisons and 45-55 Bisons configured as tankers and a far superior h e avy bo tJber capability due to grCco ter nuwbe rs of tankers over 600 KC - 135s and e perience in th e ir use The U S does not have a counterpart to the Soviet fleet of mediurc1 bo1 lbers 675--750 Badzers and Blinders in the Soviet Long H ange Ajr Force some of ·which could strike the U s if they - rere used on one -1ay missions UoS programs currently call for reductions in the numbers of h avy bombers during the next five years He estinv te tbat the Soviets -1ill also be reducing their heavy and r 1ediu1c1 bo -t1ber forces in the absence of an arms control agrecine nt Bombers generally do not pose-a counterforce threat in the context of general nuclear war since sufficient warning can be obtained to permit launching retaliatory forces before bo bers are in position to release their weapons An exception could be the use of bombers in connection with missile pin-down tactics It is true however that a larger percentage of a nation's bomber force could probably be launched on a first strike tban the number ·which ouJ_d probc1bly surviv2 a first strike and be available C TOP SECRET -80-· for a retaliatory strike The use bombers in an urb3 n attack role in could permit the allocation of all of a nation's missile force to the of strategic a first strike or a major part counterforce role Although they have a superior air-defense f ·orce the Soviets · ill undoubte dly consider that U S bomber superiority carries with it certain disadvantages for or threats ag2inst the Soviet Union In additio since U S public statements made lar t summer concerning Si' LT referred to our seeking limitations on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and since our 19 L Lceeze II propose• 1 include -c1 b ombers the Soviets may - ell insist that any strategic ar ns control agn ernent must lh1it boa ers as well as missile so The c1ifficnlty hith limit s on nun be -r- s of bcr bers is pr i ri r l rily one of definition Should bo bcrs include only lon g-range bon1b 2rs capable of t1 · ro ··w 1 y mi ss ions or should the term include other aircraft such as the Soviet Long Ranee Air Force m2dium brnlbers U S carrier attack aircraft Soviet naval bombers U S f igb ter hon hcrs capable of pGrform Lng a strategic mission and strategic bo nb2rs adapted for conventional wr r Eare cog U S B- 52s in Viet N2m There is also question of the possible clandestine modification of large commercial aircraft to give them l•Jeapons delivery capabilities However the number of aircraft air defense radars and surface-to-air missiles which a nation possesses are not very good indicators of bomber or air defense capabilities ·· The performance characteristics •1 hich tbe bombers and their air-to- Dt TOI' SECI ET - --·-··1- · -81surface missiles have against the opposing air defenses are more import ant Thus it can be expected that the Soviets uill seek qualitative as well as quantitative limits on strategic bombers Since the Soviets do not appea r to be developing a new strategic 1 omber and they must know that the U S is seriously considering production and deployment of AHSA it is likely that as a minimu1 1 they -10uJ l seek restrictions which wo ld p ohibit the introd u ction of ne •1 bombe r r 1odels Even t hc 1gh HC estimate that the So 1 i et s are develop Ln3 a new 350 run air-to-surface missile 1 SN for their bomb2rs they n ' l y b e lieve that th 2 U S SF Al i SCAD m1d SCTJD • rould give the UoS bomber forc e a further advantage and hence seek to lilnit ASMs as w ll The proble i S of definition and verification are even 8reater for cha racteristics than for the systc 'ms thcmsc Jves NcvertllP less bo 11bers lirnita tions might have to be considered because the Soviets might insist on it or bec2 use 1·JC might want to limit air defense rad2rs ancJ SAMs to help prevent their clandestin e use for ABM defense It is highly unl i_kely that the Soviets -w uld agree to limit bomber defense s without correspo-ading limits on bo 11bers If agreement could be reached as to what type of aircraft were to be limited it is probable that a limitation on numbers alone could be verified with ·hi gh confidence by national means alone Ho- -1 ever it ·would be difficult to verify compliance with restrictions on qualitative improvements in bombers or their armo mcnts unless tJ1ese were made as simple as prohibiting the introduction of new boillber models We would have high confidence in o ir ability to detect a Soviet bo nber or ASH development pro rc t l j th n -Ettion3 l mec'cns alone ' DEGLTor S·EGR t i -82- In vie of these definition and verification difficulties and the problems of limiting bomber defenses see para L following it may be desirable to omit bor 1b2r limitatioas fro n the initial U S proposal an l restrictiorn on these were not included in any of the options evaluated Ho- ·7ever in spite of these co 11plicc1ting issues we probably cannot long a void discussion of bomber limitations in SALT Issues a Should the U S proposal include limits on the nu t bers of strategic borrJ- 2rs b If the U S pr posal does not include limits on bombers sho __1ld the U S agre to include such if the Soviets insist c If bombertJ are to be limited should the introduction of new models be prohibited L Bomber Defenses There are tv10 reasons i - hy it might be necessary o r desirable to limit bo nber defenses First is the possibility that surface-to-air missile SAM systems could conceivably be upgraded to give them limited ADH capabilitieso Secondly it would probably be desirable to acco ilpo ny any limitation of strategic bombers with limitations on the defenses they must penetrate If bombers arc not limitec1 the potential threat ·of SA11 upgrade mAy not be sufficient to warrant proposing limitations on SAHs However if the Soviets DE -83should insist oa bomber limit2tions then the number of SAN launchers should also be limited An agreement should also mal e clear that upgrading SANs to give them ABM capa bilitiE s ·Wuld be prohibited Jlo 1eve 1 the use of S Ms for tactical as well as strategic defense Flight co nplicate attempts to lir 1 i t their mrn11 ier Both th2 U S and the Soviet Url l ·o·- 1 ll'-'e - hp 'r•e L 1 _ _ l '- Cc sf L • r 1 1 S ' i· L emc l cg • • u- s • 0 N·il-e _ ' Hercules l·J a-wl s USSR - SA-2 SA--3 for strategic air defe _1 e of their hom lan ls and tact Lca l air defense of th2ir forc e s and installations deployed outside nationt1 1 bour1d tries In foreign areas SAH system under l S or Soviet control are often interini n 0 led -i d t h s imiJ a r systems clep loyed by their allier Thus as a practical m ' tter it may be cJesii ·c 2 blf to re s trict 1 iud Ls on SAl•i c to those presc-nt in the lto ne l2 ncl of e ch cm mtry The othe r irnpOJ tc rit element of bomber defenses is the figllt r--interceptor It might be difficult to distinguish beti -1een fighter-interceptors which it would be desirable to limit if bo bers were limited and figbt r-boiUbers which we might not des ire to limit If b0111bers ar e to be limited there are differences of opinion as to whether or not fighter-interceptors should also be limited If bomber defenses •J ere limited 'l ve ·would have high confidence in our ability to verify with national means alone the order-of-battles of fixed defensive missiles SA Ms fighter aircraft airdefense radars and prototypes of new defensive missile systems He would have leGs confidence in our ability to detect the capa bilities of new defensive missile systems prior to IOC If a SAM system -Jere converted to an AJ i 1 system suc h extensive changes ·w ould be I required that some ·muld almost certainly be detected and prob2 bly identified as such before their initial operational c s pability IOC Issnes a Should the U S propose that the number of SAMs be limited regardless of whether or not numbers of bombers are to be' limited b If mrnbers of bombers are to be limited should numbers of fightE 1 · -interceptors as ell as other air defense systen s also be limited Present strategic deployments constitute a situation in ·Ji 1j_ch neither side con strike first without receJ v1 ng un a cceptable dc1 n12 ge in retaliation Hence an a sre msnt to freeze deployments close to present levels ·JOulc1 be mutually ac1v2ntageous for both the U S and the Soviet Union The time r e quired for negotiation of a strateEic arms control agreement however could well permit additional deployments which would alter this balance and make realization of an agreement far more difficult if not impossible for many years to come What must be considered therefore is whether or not certain critical testing and or deployments should be st1spendec1 until such time as negotiators have been afforded a fair opportunity to explore the prospects for agreement If it is decided thc1 t the U S ·will not seek or agree to ban -DRVs _thc n the suspC nsion fro n the U S point of vi ew need only concern the con t inued Soviet initiation of the construc tion of missile l a w1chers on which the U S prqio--c s to pl 2 ce n nr 2ric a l 1 i111its I I OE ··85- under Option I fixed and mobile ICBMs and IR NRBJ Is and ABNs under Option II and III fixed and n obile ICBMs and IR MR BNs SLBNs SLCHs and ABr-ls Soviet launcher construction starts have been rrnmin at a rate of about 200 ICEH silos and six Polaris-type subme rines per year Continuation of these progr ms much beyond the l vcls projected for 1 uly 19G9 might provide the Soviets higher levels of these types of launchers if they were allowed to complete those under co'i 1struc tion then the U S would be willing to accept While there are no indicatioriS thc t the Soviets intend in the irnm2diate futn r -e to initiate the production of mobile ICBHs or IR 1-IRBNs or to E dd to their inventory of ABMs fixed IR ViRLM silos Ol SLCM sub rn ' rines initiation of any new const ructioD in the se areas during SALT could rn ke agreement more difficult Therefore the U S should propose either prior to the initia tion of SALT or at the beginning of these negotiations that tl1e in iti2 tions of the construction of addition l offensive missile launchers fixed or mobile land or sea based be suspended Whether or not from the U S point of viei •J ABHs should be included is a moot point Hm•1 2vcr if the Soviets did not intend to initiate ADl·f deployrn- nts ·but they believed ·we did then they would certainly insist on suspending ABM launcher const uction and perhaps even ABM radcr construction If the roles -1 ere reversed then 1•1e might want to have the Soviets suspend ABM launcher and rad r construction depending on Hhat level of ABMs we sought If neither side planned to deploy any ABN launchers or radars during the period of suspension it would riot be necessary to include ABMs in the suspension However the prospects of -achieving a suspension of missile launcher construction alone are not good since with the possible exception of AE1'1s and or our PolarisPoseidon conversion program they would affect only on- ' I I D '0 SECRET -86going Soviet programs arid would not constrain U S qualitutive improvement programs If agreement could be rec ched rapidly or agreed levels of missiles established without regard for existing levels Soviet failure to agree to the suspension would not be critical But if the Soviets agreed only_ to freeze with whatever they had plus those ·u nder construction on the effective date of the agreement a Soviet failure to suspend those progrc1 ms could seriously jeopardize the _prospects for agreement One vie of Soviet intentions concludes that 1· ha t the Soviets - ould probably demand in return for a construction start freeze would be a HIRV flight test freeze Even if the U S should decide th s t a MIIN ban should not be included in the opening U S position the Soviets rr ay •Jell insist thc t HIRVs be dealt with in any formal 8 greernent Thus the prospects for §- strat e gic anns control agreement may rest on our 1·1 ill i 11gness to de 2 l with ITRVs Whether or not the U S should seek a suspension of MIRV flight testing and if so -1hen is controversial Some believe that failure to complete U S tests ould forclose a U S opportun i ty to achieve an advantage that ould be possible if tests were not banned until after the U S had developed its MIRV technology They contend that the advanced stage of MIRV development within the Poseidon and Minuteman III programs may represent a negotiating strong point for the United States and believe that a U S initiative to place a moratorium or ban upon fiRVs may have an ill effect upon the progress of negotiations They hold that such a proposal if considered necessary should be placed in a context to force the Soviets to early reasonable negotiations This may best be served they believe by continuing the present MI RV development including flight testing and possibly offering U S discussion of the problem when and C£ c ·-•- ' ' _'1 n __ _ _ - ·- J • • ED -87if certain other substantive progress has been made Others believe hmvever that if the U S continues its HIRV flight testing program to the point at which - e -muld attain a dq loyable HR 7 capability or suf ficierttly to be perceived by Soviet planners to have attained such a capability then the Soviets would be unlil ely to 2 gree to halting l-J P V flight testing until they could achieve a similar c ep ability If a Soviet 1-ITH V fligltt te s t progrElrn were to proceed to the point here we mi ght perceive a dt p oyc ble Soviet MIPJ caps bility then our confidence in depending for verific2tion on a ban of further 1 flRV fl j_ght testing 1·J0L1ld be significc1 ntly eroded The proponen ts of an C EJ -ly HIRV flight test suspension believe th a t U S ITl flight te ting has proceeded too far to permit the U S to use this as a barg a i_ni1 1g tool once n cgo· - iE d ons h av e begun There are sorr e of ficiE ls connected wi t11 the U S MIRV program who beJ ieve tho t if the U S continues its current MIRV test schedule through July it might be 21le to echieve a cnp2 bility to deploy l·ITRVs The Soviets IC ight perceive such a U S capability at an even e a rlier date Some competent U S authorities believe that development could be completed sELtisfactorily without further flight testing although with some deley and additional expenses In addition if the U S carries out its scheduled MIRV tests an apparent acceleration in the rate of testing will occur in the near future The Soviets might view this as an indication that the U S did not intend to deal with MIRVs in SALT that the U S was trying to pressure them into early or unfavorable agreement or that the U S was trying to complete as many MIRV tests c s possible before an agre ement could be negotiated This could cause an unr ortunate r e action in the Soviet attitude to ·1ard S ' LT _in their m m deployment and testing pro gr a ms or both • • TQP £-ECfH J1- -88The Soviets have been flight testing multiple warheads for their SS-9 ICBM While it is generally considered that 1 hat the Soviets have tested so far is not a NIRV it could conceivably be the precursor to a fiRV testing prcgram However contrary to the National Intelligence estimate some believe that the payload recently tested on the SS-9 could be a crude redimentary MIRV b a sed on HRV techniques A 1 rrr v development suspcn s ion therefor should as a minimum include furt he r MlRV flight testing by either side It is also desirable to suspend further flight t e sting of the Sovi e t SS- 9 nmltipl e re e mtry vehicl e 1nissile l RV If possible the suspension should not include all t · nv te s t flights sir1ce this -wuld · preclude confidence firings of the currently deployed Polaris A-3 missile However if the Soviets should insist on suspending all HRV flight tests it rnigbt be possible to flight test the Polaris A- 3 with a single re-entry vehicle Issues a Should the U S unil2terally suspend or stre tch out its NIRV flight testing program either with or without asking for Soviet reciprocation b Should tlie U S propose a joint suspension of flight testing and or launcher construction If so what elements should be included in the joint suspension or in the request for Soviet reciprocatioi1 c d If the U S is to unilaterally suspend or stretch out its HIRV flight testing or to propose a joint suspension when should this be done e If a joint suspension is to be negotiated • hat duratio 1 if any should be specified TOP SECRET • SECTION V A ILLUSTRATIVE ARMS CONTROL PACKAGES INTRODUCTION The preceding section of this paper described the salient elements that should be considered for inclusion in a strategic arms limitation agreement and highlighted the key issues on which decisions must be made in order to develop a U S negotiating position In order to present information on the inte actions among these elements this section exam nes several alternative packages incorporating various combinations of strategic arms limitations The weapon system limitations described in Section IV could be combined in a great many ways Since it was feasible to analyze only a limited number of thes·e combinations we designated four packages of offensive missile limitations with three variants to illustrate the implications of a range of resulting force postures These packages are not being presented as the only alternatives from which a preferred U S position might necessarily be selected in fact the analyses made after the initial designation of these packages may well indicate that a different combination of elements woul be preferable to any of them None of these four illustrative packages includes the following elements Missile throw-weight and accuracy restrictions bomber limitations air-defense limitations and force reductions None of the packages includes a specific designation of ABM level although a range of different ABM leyels was analyzed for each package An additional ABi i variant the option to vary the mix of land-based and sea-based ABM launchers was analyzed This additional ABM variant is implicit in Packages I and II and was examined as an additional excursion to Package III-B A package leaving ABM's completely unconstrained and limiting offensive systems only was considered but not evaluated for the 0 SECRET NOFORN OECLA SS F ED 90- follO'wing reason Although it may be possible in theory to design a strat gic balance in which both sides have such strong defensive capabilities and such limited offensive capabilities that neither need fear attack we are u able to set forth any feasible arms control scenario vhich could accomplish the transition to such a relationsl iip during the next several years without excessive risk to U S security during the transition period Consequently we have exa ined only possible arms co trol force postu es designed to preserve strategic stability by maintaining a deterrent with a retaliatory capability on each side Four illustrative packages of offensive missile limitations · with three variants are described below along with advantages and disadvantages of each A more detailed description of each ·package is conta ned in Annex ·A Tab A The statements on advantages and disadvantages are based largely on the strategic analyses political analyses and verification capabilities summarized in this section and described in greater detail in Section IV and in the annexes to this report ·_ Throughout this report the term retaliatory capability refers to a capability to destroy urban and industrial targets in a · second strike See Section C-2-a below ' DEUf S tr n 1l B1 B DESCRIPTION OF PACKAGES Package I Freeze of Numbers of Land-Based Offensive Missile Launchers This package concentrates on land-based strategic missile systems and puts no constraints on sea-based offensive missiles It -would ban mobile land-based strategic offensive missiles and freeze the numbers of ICBM and IRBM MRBM launchers at existing levels including those under construction There would be no restrictions on MIRV's or on any other improvements of ICBM's or their launchers Silo superhardening and silo relocation would be permitted There would be some limit on the number of ABM launchers but no restrictions on the· characteristics of ABM systems Package II Freeze of Numbers of Offensive Missile Launchers This package would be more restrictive than Package I in that the number of sea-based strategic offensive mi sile launchers would be limited to existing levels including those under construction However it would be less restrictive than Package I in that mobile ICBM's would be permitted within the total number of permitted ICBM launchers Mobile IRBM's MRBM's would be prohibited but MIRV's and other qualitative improvements would be allowed as under Package I Silo superhardening and silo relocation would be permitted There would be some limit on the number of ABM launchers but no restrictions on the characteristics of ABM systems Package II-A Variant Freeze of Sum of ICBM and SLBM Launchers This package is identical to Package II except that the total combined number of ICBM and SLBM launchers existing or under construction would be frozen Within that overall ceiling each side would be permitted to vary the mix of mobile or fixed land-based and sea-based submarine or surface ship offensive ballistic missile launchers as desired • Package III Freeze of Numbers and Certain Types of Offensive Missile Launchers with MIRV's Allowed This package would freeze the respective numbers of landbased and sea-base strategic offensive missile launchers at existing levels including those under construction Mobile land-based missiles would be prohibited MIRV testing and deployment would be allowed but there would be a b an on enlarging existing silos changing the basic external configuration of silos and other launchers and the relocation of launchers Seabased and land-mobile ABM's would be ·prohibited There would be no 9ther restrictions on the characteristics of ABM systems There would be some limit on the number of ABM launchers Arrangements would be negotiated for replacing submarines after five years Package III-A Superhardening Variant This package is identical to Package III except that hardrock superhardening and relocation of ICBM silos would be permitted Package III-B Variant Freeze of Sum of ICBM and SLBM Launchers This package is identical to Package III except that the total combined number of ICBM and SLBM launchers existing or under construction would be frozen Within that overall ceiling each side would be permitted to vary the mix of fixed land-based and sea-based offensive ballistic missile launchers as desired Package IV Freeze of Numbers and Certain Typ e s of Offensive Missile Launchers with MIRV's Prohibited This package is identical to Package III except that multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles MIRV's would be totally - '-- 93_ prohibited There would be a ban on further flight-testing of MIRV's including any post-boost maneuvering and the testing of any multiple reentry vehicles maneuvering reentry vehicles MaRV's fractional and mLiltiple orbital weapon systems FOBS and MOBS and depressed trajectory ICBN's The improvement or flight-testing of other offensive missile system characteristics would not be_ restricted While this package would prohibit deployment of MIRV' s · it ·would not prohibit deployment in launche r s of the above-listed non-MIRV missile systems for which further flight-testing is prohibited ' SECRET NOFORN l c SummaLy of Strategic Analysis 1 Introduction • This ection suITmarizes an analysis of the four arms control packages and their variants to determine how they might ·affect U S and Soviet strategic force capabilities A primary objective ·was to determine whether any of the packages would offer the Soviets an opportunity to increase their capability significantly by building up their forces under each package Additionally U S capabilities were analyzed · to see whether they would be sensitive to Soviet cheating or abrogation The -selective results are intended to show both th extent to which bjectives identified below could be met and the confid nce we would have in so meeting them The detailed calculations and force structures are in the appended Report of the Strategic Analysis Panel hereafter P inel Report Annex A 2 Criteria Several complementary measures were used to assess the capabiltties of U S and Soviet forces a Deterrence Measures of the deterrent capability of U S and Soviet' fcirces help us assess the likelihood that a nuclear war will start These include 1 The capability of U S strategic forces to inflict ·urban industrial damage on the Soviet Union in retaliation after a Soviet surprise all-counterforce attack on U S strategic forces We assume that Soviet forces are generated while ours are on day-to-day alert and that the Soviets use all their missiles in the counterforce strike When ABM's are deployed the U S is assumed not to use ' · pen aids in retaliatory in terms of destroyed order to provide a pessimistic estimate of its capability We evaluate urban industrial damage prompt deaths and in terms of industrial capacity We term this measure our retaliatory capability 2 The capability of Soviet strategic forces to inflict urban industrial damage on the United States in retaliation after a U S surprise all counterforce attack on Soviet strategic forces This is termed the Soviet retaliatory capability In this case U S forces are generated the Soviet forces are on day-to-day alert and the U S uses all its missiles in the counterforce attack We assume that the U S uses pen-aids in its preemptive strike in order to provide a pessimistic estimate of the Soviet retaliatory capability 3 The relative number of U S and Soviet deaths in a nuclear war started by either a Soviet or U S first strike We do these calculations for a range of scenarios involving mixes of counterforce and countervalue attacks by the side striking first and an all countervalue attack by the retaliator The forces of both sides are assumed to be generated 4 Stability in a crisis We measure this by the number of people either nation can save by making a preemptive first strike designed to maximize the difference in fatalities as compared to first undergoing a similarly designed first strike by the other side b Damage Limiting Measures of damage-limiting capability for U S 2nd Soviet forces h lp us assess the capability of these forces to fight a nuclear war if deterrence should fail They include the following 1 The capability of U S strategic forces to limit damage in a nuclear war initiated by the Soviets in which they attempt to maximize the difference between U S and Soviet fatalities 2 The capability of U S strategic forces to minimize U S fatalities by initiating a nuclear war c Military Targeting The deterrence and damagelimiting measures discussed above provide estimates of theoretical abilities to cause and or limit fatalities in hypothetical scenarios which assume that each side targets its entire weapon inventory either aga_inst the other side's urban complexes or against strategic nuclear weapons which pose a direct threat to its own cities In the event deterrence were to fail it is unlikely that either side would allocate all its weapons in this fashion Each side would doubtlessly allocate some weapons to military targets other than strategic weapons such as command and control sites defensive sites and targets threatening its allies Also each side would like to have if possible some nuclear forces remaining at the termination of hostilities The capability of U S or Soviet strategic forces to accomplish objectives such as these can be partially measured by determining how many nuclear weapons would be remaining fter first setting aside a minimum number needed to cause a preselected amount of urban industrial damage This measure is expressed in terms of numbers of RV's and Megaton Equivalents remaining and in the number of military targets which these numbers might be able to destroy 3 Assumptions and Limitations In interpreting the numerical results presented the reader should be aware that these results are dependent on vario 1 1s assu ' pti ons SOP le of i -rhich a re explicitly stated and some of which are implied in the computer models used Consequently these results· do not measure precisely the absolute levels of damage which could be expected to result from a nuclear war rather they should be used as approximate indicators of magnitude of damage and to reveal trends which could be expected as the force postures levels of -97defense and clandestine deployment of weapons are varied The damage criteria used in these calculations are due to blast effects only and do not take into account secondary effects such as fallout which could be expected In those calculations involving ballistic missile defense the models employed assumed a high level of effectiveness for the ABM systems and thus biased the results in favor of the defender Hm·1 ever it is judged that the results show the trend of the impact of varying levels of ABM on each side's retaliatory capability The detailed ssumptions and models used in making the calculations are for the most part the same as those used in the Department of Defense Report on Analysis of Alternative Nuclear Stretegies and Force Postures tn response to NSSM-3 Tabs Hand I of the Panel Report explain these models and assumptions and discuss some limitations For purposes of this analysis CIA provided projections of Soviet forces ·w hich as·su111ed that the Soviets would seek to maximize their offensive missile capRbilities within the constraints of the package to the extent that they could do so without actually increasing the levels of expenditure for strategic forces Underlying these pessimistic projections was the assumption that actual Soviet force levels would probably fall well b low these levels particularly if the agreement appeared to offe the Soviets an opportunity to avoid major new programs v1ithout weakening the relative strength and capabilities of Soviet forces These projected Soviet forces were matched against currently programmed U S forces as constrained for the various force packages No effort was made to take account of possible changes in the U S force posture in reaction to the high Soviet force levels projected I '' In order to arrive at results which would be illustrative for the packages under consideration a number of assumptions were used Since bomber forces were not limited in any package it was assumed in the analysis that U S strategic bombers levelled off at the presently programmed 345 while the Soviet strategic bombers levelled off at the high NIPP estimate of 50 by 1978 The U S SLBM force at sea was considered invulnerable during the period In many cases BMD effectiveness would be sensitive to· the defense employed and the effectiveness of missile penetration aids While no Soviet forces were set aside for Nth country contingenci_e s DE -98- ----- the U S forces set aside for the CPR are some·what less than that in current targeting plans In our counterforce calculations only the SMIPET model included IRBH's MRBM's ·-· and medium bomber bases ·a s targets Since we address specific packages and variants we can expect that as the ·range of packages is narrowed or as features of the various packages are combined further analysis uill be required 4 Summarv of Packages and Forces The following table SUITu'llarizes the limitations for each of the arms control packages Table C-1 SUW-1ARY OF ALTERNATIVE AP lS CONTROL PACKAGES I - -' G ICBMs SLBMs IR MRBHs HIRVs BO -IBERS 1· DEFENSIVE WEAPONS ABM Fixed Mobile Fixed 'Mobile SLCMs I II b III b IV Key a b £I dt F F Fe F B L d B B u F F £ F AIR DEFENSE F F F F u u u B u u u u L L L L L L B B u u u u F - Numbers frozen at current levels B - Banned L Limited to agreed numbers U - Unconstrained Various levels of ABM ·ranging from Oto 5000 interceptors were examined for each package A variant of these packages allowed freedom to mix between ICBM's SLBM's within the total number of allowed missiles Relocation of the missiles to new launchers was prohibited under the basic package but allowed as a variant to this package Mo ile ICBM's would be permitted within the totaL number of 'permitted ICBM launchers D --'-'--'-'- C-6 ED The following two tables compare presently programmed U S forces with pessimistic projections of the strategic forces which the Soviets could develop by 1973 with and without an agreement Table C-2 COMPARISON OF U S AND SOVIET STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES End of Fiscal Years Operational Forces United States Programmed Force and All Packages 1969 1978 Long-Range Bombers 581 Soft ICBM Launchers 0 Ha r d ICBM Launche i -s 1054 Mobile ICBM Launchers 0 0 Soft IR MR BM Launchers 0 Hard IR MR BM Launchers Mobile IR MRBM Launchers 0 656 SLBM Launchers 0 Long-Range SLCM Launchers 0 Short-Range SLCM Launchers 397 0 1027 0 0 0 0 656 0 0 Soviet Union 1969 High NIPP 150 142 914 0 538 135 0 208 0 365 TOP SECRET 1978 Packages I 50 50 0 0 1346 1296 150 0 · O 538 485 135 200 0 896 1262 0 0 64 330 --1 L 50 0 1198 100 538 135 0 462 254 64 _ I _ S III · IV so so 136 1164 0 538 135 0 462 254 64 136 1164 0 538 135 0 462 254 64 C-6a Table C-3 U S AND SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES 1978 Sovie·t Union United ·States Operational ADM Launchers Area Terminal Phase I Programmed full SAFEGUARD SAFEGUARD 60 56 465 414 Packages I II III Level Varies IV No Agreement High and Low NIPP Projections 464-1064 0-600 Under Agreement Packages I II III Level Varies IV · -101- · 5 Specific Issues We discuss below several issues vn1ich are common to all packages considered in this study This discussion is intended to provide a framework to assist in evaluating the four packages and their variants Tables C-4a and C-4b summarize U S and Soviet retaliatory capabilities for each of the packages and variants for a range of ABM levels a Level of Ballistic Missile Defense Both the U S and the Soviets should become less confident of their retaliatory capabilities as the allowed level of ballistic missile defense increases While a part of each side's retaliatory force is considered to be invulnerable to a first strike by offensive missiles all of the offensive missiles launched in retaliation are subject to attri ion by area or terminal ballistic missile defenses of cities For this reason limitation of ABM levels is one of the most critical issues in evaluating a proposed arms control agreement When MIRV's are banned and missile penetration aids are not relied upon U S retaliatory capabilities would be reduced to below 30% with bombers and 26% without bombers if there were ABM levels of the order of 500 Higher ABM levels approaching 1500 would reduce the U S retaliatory capability to 25% with bombers and less than 10% without Medium and high levels of AB 1 deployment also jeopardize the Soviet retaliatory capability when U S programmed and CIA postulated Soviet MIRV's are used This indicates that the Soviets may be interested in keeping ABM's at a low level If a MIRV ban is achieved both sides should consider the desirability of a low ceiling 200 or less on ABM deployment so as to preclude the necessity for heavy reliance on missile penetra·· tion aids or bombers to maintain retaliatory capability It should be emphasized that Table C-4 does not indicate that the Soviets would have a significantly greater capability to limit damage to themselves by a first strike if there is a MIRV ban For example in the damage-limiting scenario with 500 ABM's permitted under a MIRV ban Package IV the Soviets lose 124 million in prompt fatalities if they strike first with the same number of area ABM' s permitted without a NIRV ban they lose 132 million see pages G-20 and G-35 of Panel Report DEUt A1S fi IED · -102- ------ Table C-4a • U S RETALIATORY CAPABILITY a - 1978 Percent of Total Soviet Population Killed by Prompt Nuclear Effects Under Agreement Level of Area AB Ms 0 200 500 1000 2000 No Agreement U S Programmed Forces vs Soviet High NIPP Package I Package I with 192 ULHs added to US SLBM force Package III ckage III-A superhardening of silos permitted Package III-B freedom to replace 384 ICBMs with SLBMs Package ·111 with 1920 terminal interceptors defending silos Package IV MIRVs banned 40 39 37 34 43 40 · 42 42 40 39 37 34 44 42 25 24 b 41 41 44 38 33 43 29 Defined at pages C-1 - C-2 above Only strategic bombers make this contribution The missile forces were negated by the random nationwide area AB model used in reality ho·wever we could expect some additional fatalities due to missiles If missile penetration aids we re assumed to ·w ork there would be yet more deaths from missiles For the 1000 area ABM level under Package IV bombers contributed 42% ·of the U S equivalent mcgatonnage delivered on the Soviet Union D Table C-4b · SOVIET RETALIL TORY CAPABIL TTY a_ - 1978 Percent of Total U S Population Killed by Prompt Nuclear Effects ·under Agreement Level of Area Al3Hs 0 200 500 1000 2000 No Agreement ---- - - - - U S Programmed Forces vs Soviet High NIPP Pa ckage I Package I •J i th 192 ULMs added to US SLBM force Pacliage III b 1ckage III-A superhardening £ silos permitted Package III-B freedom to replace 384 ICBMs with SLBMs Package III with 1920 terminal interceptors defending silos Package IV MIRV's banned a b £ I · 33 51 47 49 45 37 43 36 23 57 41 25 4 c 4 £ I 4 s 54 40 54 49 38 40 15 4 Defined at pages C-1 - C-2 above It should be emphasized that the higher Soviet retaliatory capability at low ABM levels under Packages I III-B superhardening and IV does not indicate that the Soviets would have a greater first-strike capability or a more sig-nificant damage-limiting capability than they would with Package III For all war-fighting cases examined under the packages the Soviets lost 110-140 million people after striking first Only strategic bombers make these contributions · · Ct li 5Si¼EOm m y 0£ ------- _104 _ TieGtr i otN1 Data_ As Defined in tno Ltomio Energy Act of 1954 b MIRV's The U S program to deploy MIRV's was formulated in the mid-60's in response to the requirement to be able to penetrate with higher confidence the large Soviet terminal ABM deployments which were s timated by the Intelligence Community t that time The reasons for the Soviet initiation of their SS-9 MRV program are not known Their tests followed our testing of ABM's and our initial decision to deploy the Sentinel ABM system They could be taking the first steps toward developing a MIRV capability For retaliatory attacks against cities the primary use of MIRV's is as a means of penetration against BMD However it is possible and even likely that advancing missile technology will enable both sides to develop accurate MIRV's With this increased accuracy it may be possible for both the U S and the Soviets to increase the counterforce capabilities of their ballistic missile forces Although improved accuracy will also increase the kill probability of single warheads against hard targets the MIRV capability allows a relatively small number of _large payload missiles to threaten a larger number of hard targets and also rovides for cross tqrgeting · For the force projections used the Soviet retaliatory capability would be degraded more by MIRV's than the U S retaliatory capability This is because a large number f the launchers in which we would deplG Y- MIRV's--namely Poseidon submarines which carry 10-14 warheads per booster-· would be invulnerable to a first strike even one in which the Soviets used MIRV's The Soviet forces projected by the CIA for the mid-70 1 s period do not include such large numbers of invulnerable MIRV's · rt should be borne in mind however that the Soviets might eventually deploy large numbers of MIRV's on both their land-based and sea-based forces As shown in Table F-1 of Tab F of the Panel Report the Soviets at the present time have a greater missile throw OR JERLY nestricted Data - • _ i DE lJ weight capability than the United States does _By using advanced launch techniques both sides could increase their missile throw weight by a factor of two to three within the·- constraints of present silo configurat1 ons as shown in Table F-2 of the Panel Report This thrm•1 weight capability could be used to iricrease the MIRV paylo3d ·within any of the first three packages If NIRV's were banned as they are in Package IV there would be mnch less incentive to increase missile throw weight This is because ·it would be extremely difficult for either side to acquire a first-strike capability merely by increasing the size of single warheads c Pre-launch Survivability of Force Cor 1ponents The vulne_rRbili ties of the corr ponents of our strategic forces should be carefully considered as we prepare to negotiate an arms control agreement As discussed above advancing MIRV technology could rr ake a lai·ge porti on of our land-based missile silos more vulnerable to a counterforce first strike unless -1e took appropriate c ounter·ineasures This is illustrated in Table C-5 which compares the pre-launch survivability' of Soviet and U S I CBM's ' assuming that the other side makes an all-counterforce f-irst strike In these calculations the assumptions · were biased against the retaliator in order to furnish a conservative estimate of the opponent's capabilities If MIRV's are · permitted the survivability of both countries' fixed ICBM forces is significantly lm• er than under Package IV In · order t _o increase the survivability of fixed ICBM forces threatened by MIRV's the missiles would have to be superhardened made mobile or defended with medium to high levels of hard-point ABN defense Under P ckage IV which prohibits HIRV's the achievement of an effective counterforce capability by either side against fixed ICBM' s ·would be far less likely to occur by the mid-1970's Possible additional restrictions on missile accuracy and throw-weight ' I Table C-5 SURVIVABILITY OF L ND-BASED ICB'M' s Area HPD Inter- Interceptors ccptors 0 200 500 • Percent of Land-Based ICBMs Surviving a First Strike 1978 Package III a · 'Packnge III a 1 Package III ·a Package IVE Hard Ro Gk Silos Hard Point Def U S Soviet U S Soviet U S Soviet U S Sovi I 0 4 1000 0 0 0 7 10 18 0 200 500 640 1280 1920 24 27 ·27 25 77 35 78 30 34 49 77 28 16 28 48 62 63 64 71 30 33 35 a b U S CEPs for this case were ICBMs 25 SLBHs 16 Soviet CEPs were ICBHs 25 SLBNs 75 Soviet CEPs for this case were the same as under Package III u s CEPs for this case were ICBMs 35 SLBMs 80 improvements designed to further limit potential counter- · force capabilities against U S Minutemen are discussed in Section IV-J Thus the prohibition of fIRV's can increase U S and Soviet onfidence in their retaliatory capabilities assuming a low level o area ABM's deployed by the other side If permitted under an agreement the survivibility of missile forces could also be increased by increasing ABM effectiveness through survivable sea-based mid-course interceptors or by replacing existing fixed ICBM' s with mobile land-based or sea-based missiles Analysis of these variants shows that they · could provide increased survivability comparable to or greater than that shown in Tab1r ' 5 for hard-rock silos and hard-point defense C r DP SID RE T t TOP SECRET -107- The vulnerability of our SLBM's is quite different from that of ICBM' s They might eventually be sensit•ive to advances _in Soviet ASW or possibly to attacks on the cornmanQ and control system Our alert bombers on the other hand depend on adequate warning to ensure their pre-launch survivability Thu·s we have high confidence that the Soviets could not take action to destroy all three of our retaliatory components before launch Our present approach to attaining our strat gic objectives Ls to maintain a strong strategic capability to inflict damage with each of our three major force components independently of the others Planning conservatively we do not wish to allow the vul nerability of even one system to provide a possible inducC ment for the· Soviets to strike first If an agreement allows HIRV's ·our land-based ICBM 1 s could become vulnerable unless the agreement also permitted our eventually taking steps to maintain their survivability d Sensitivity to Soviet Cheatint Fears will inevitably arise that the Soviets can make us vulnerable to attack by secretly improving their offensive or more jmportantly their · defensive forces They could o course take the same steps in the absence of an agreement ·under an agreement we would still pursue -our own hedges to protect our retaliatory capability as we do now without an agreement An agreement would reduce but not eliminate the uncertainties against which we would have to insure in any case It could also reduce the range of hedges we could take to react to these uncertainties Table C-6 lists some hedges that are available to us and the packages under which ·· they are permitted ' 0£Cf - EO -108- Table C-6 Hedges Increase bomber alert rate Increase number - of SCADs and SR 4Hs on bombers Deploy improved exoatmosphcric pen-aids Deploy improved endoatmospheric pen-aids Increase number of RVs on Poseidon Increase number of Hinuternan III within agreed ·ICBM lirni ts ° Put Hinuteman in Hard Rock Silos Move missiles to sea Deploy more SLBMs 1alitative Improvement Permitted for Packages • All All All I II III I II III I II III I II III-A I II-A III-B I All except where pecifically prohibited The Report of the Verificat i on Panel indicates that we would almost certainly detect activities leading to a major change in Soviet strategic capabilities froFU those estimated or acknowledged at the time of the agreement Although it is highly unlikely that any largescale -new deployment of their strategic forces could go undetected the Soviets could effect minor increases without our detection The Report of the Verification Panel estimated upper bounds on the level of undetected cheating for offensive and defensive weapons and the time within which this cheating would most likely be detected In the analys s which - SESRET -109- -- follows we have tested cases in which both Soviet offensive artd defensive cheating were first detected at higher levels and at a later time than indicated by these upper bounds and which include reasonable coniliinations of cheating in more than one area These assumptions are judged to represent a very conservative analysis of the impact of possible Soviet ch2ating We found that our retaliatory capability is net significantly degraded even by th2se higher levels of detected Soviet cheating For certain force levels possible within these packages it would be prudent upon entering an agreement to pursue available hedges ·in order to be able to respond to evidence of Soviet cheating within the lead time required to maintain our retaliatory capability An excursion showed thnt at the 1500 ABM level the U S second-strike capability with mis iles only with the forces for Package III could be reduced to less than 5% if the Soviets should be able to develop and deploy effective midcourse ABM i nterceptors and were undetected in adding another 500 interceptors and if U S penetration aids are assumed not to work There ·would of course be an additiona 1 contribution to our retaliatory capability by our alert bombers OE D 6 35' F ED -110- Summary of Results by Package a Package I This package left the SLBM forces on each side openend8d The CIA projected a force of 1262 Soviet SLBM' s for • this package vice 716 for Package III The U S SLBN force was kept at the programmed level of 656 except for an excursion where 192 ULMS launchers were added Under arms control Package I both the Soviet Union and the United States have a high retaliatc ry capability for levels of ballistic missile defense BMD up to 500 ABM launchers For higher levels of EHD the Soviet retaliatory capability drops rapidly although they could maintain their retaliatory capability Rt a high level i they executed appropriate missile hedges permitted under this pac age or ncreased their strategic bomber force Neither side would have a distinct advantage in relative fatalities in a nuclear war except at very high ABM levels where the United States would have the advantage provided the Soviets did not execute appropriate missile hedges or increase their bomber force Under this package each side has little incentive to strike first in a crisis provided the ABM level is 500 or less For very high ABM levels the United States could save 30 to 40 million people by striking first again provided the Soviets did not develop effective missile penetration aids· execute appropriate missile hedges or increase their bomber forces The U S damage limiting capability for a Soviet first strike is small even at a very high level of BMD we could lose up to 95 million people On the other hand if the ABM level were very high and the U S struck first U S prompt fatalities would be about 40 million provided the Soviets made no increase in strategic bombers and did not execute missile hedges permitted TOP SECRET -111- The addition of 192 additional SLB 1 1 s to the U S forces which is allowed under the package increased the U S retaliatory capability by three to four percent and reduce the Soviet retaliatory capability by about the same amount b ·-· Package II The Soviet forces projected by ·the CIA for Packages II and III had very similar force levels and characteristics except that those in Package II included 100 land-mobile ICBH's In our analysis of Pack2ge III we also examined an evasion case in ·w hich the Soviets deployed 500 · land-based mobile ICBM' s We also examined several variations in the mix of sea- and land-based missiles The results from these examinations would bracket those · for Package II and Variant II-A c Package III The retaliatory capability of U S forces is high for all levels of BrID examined even without missile penetra- tion aids At the higher levels of B ID where our missiles suffer greater attrition from Soviet defenses our bombers play a large role in carrying out the retaliatory strike On the other hand Soviet retaliatory capability • hich include_s only limited bomber force·s is high only if the ABM level is less than 500 launchers Because there are fewer Soviet SLBM's in Pacl age III as compared to Package I the Soviet retaliatory capability is more sensitive to the ABM level in Package III than in Package I assuming they do not execute permitted missile hedges or increase their strategi°c bomber force This same sensitivity of Soviet capabilities to ABM level is seen in the war-fighting results In these scenarios the Soviets received about the same level of damage from U S retaliatory and first strikes at all ABM levels · On the other hand the United States saves 60 to 70 million lives by striking first in a crisis if there are more -than 500 ABM launchers permitted by the agreement and if the Soviets did not develop effective missile Penetration aids and did not increase their strategic bomber force If the Soviets struck first tOB -SECRET -112- attempting to maximize the difference in fatalities we could not limit fatalities to less than 90 million deaths even with a large B1'1D However by striking first the United States could limit damage to 20 million deaths if very high levels of ABM launchers were permitted and the Soviets made no increase in the strategic bomber force or did not execute permitted missile hedges • In contrast to these cases if large levels of ABM launchers were permitted but only for hard-poin defense of ICBN's the United States cannot limit damage belm_v 100 million _d aths even if we struck first Similarly the Jnited States uould have little incentive to strike first in a crisis if most of the allowed ABM launchers were used for hard-point defense The U S _and Soviet retaliatory capabilities both remain high in these cases For ABM_launcher levels of 500 or less neither side's capability to infl ct fatalities in retaliation was affected significantly when superhard ICBM launchers were permitted Variant III-A or when there was freedom to vary the mixture of land-based and sea-based offensive missiles within a fixed overall level Variant III-B The contribution of measures of this kind is to hedge against circumstances other than this base _case situation If the Soviets retain _ their current post ure ·we could take steps such as hard-point defense hard rock silos or movement of ICBM's to sea that would reduce the number of U S missiles lost to a Soviet first strike As a result up to five times as many soft Soviet military targets could be destroyed in a U S second strike after holding back adequate weapons for 25% fatalities The capabi lity of either side to retaliate with missiles could -be reduced if thi side striking first had as many as 500 survivable mid-course interceptors and 1000 terminal interceptors and the side striking second had 500 nationwide area interceptors and 1000 terminal interceptors On the other hand if both sides deployed 500 survi vable mid-course interceptors and 1000 terminal interceptors DE OEWA f EO -113- --- -- the Soviets would experience a significant reduction in secondstrike capability but the U S would not It should be noted that the Soviets could chieve a mid-course intercept capab lity under Package III only if they should develop and deploy a forward peripheral land-based ABM system A U S mid-course intercept ABM capability would require sea-based ABM permitted in Packages I and II only or sites in Canada or Greenland which may not be available to the U S In general if either side decided to develop this area of technology we do not expect that deployment of effective mid-course intercept ABM systems could occur before the mid- to late 1970 1 s Several cases of detected Soviet cheating were examined ·including deployment of additional ABM launchers deployment of additional ICBM's and conversion of air defense systems to a B MD The U S retaliatory capability was adversely affected only in the case of a large-scale deployment of BMD systems at levels of chenting which we have high confidence of de tee ting and to which ·we made no response Where our missiles suffer greater attrition from illegally deployed BMD sy'stems the U S retaliatory capability is significantly dependent upon the bomber force d Package IV No MIRV's In most cases examined the computed measures of U S force effectiveness are not as good under Package IV as are the corresponding results under Package III On the other hand U S retaliatory capab'ility still remains at least 25% for area ABM levels as high as 1000 and above 30% for ABM levels up to 200 Although Soviet retaliatory capability is better under Package IV than under Package III the Soviets would not have the capability to limit damage to themselves under this package by striking first These differences are enumerated in greater detail in Section IV of the Panel Report Annex A The U -S and Soviet retalia·tory capabilities both become marginal if there are more than 500 area ABM interceptors and neith r side depends upon missile penetration aids However at levels of 1000 ABM if the U S • strikes first using effective penetration aids and the Soviets do not have penetration aids the Soviets retaliatory capability is degraded significantly • On the other hand in a similar case with the Soviets striking first the U S would retain its retaliatory capability_ At high levels of permitted ABM defense under Package IV the U S retaliatory capability would rest on significant contributions from our bomber force if our missile penetration aids did not ·w ork With 1000 area ABM' s under a MIRV ban nearly hilf of the detonating U S equivalent megatonnage is carried by bombers With 2000 area ABM's permitted under a MIRV ban 24% of the Soviet people could be killed with prompt nuclear effects but bombers alon·e· would make this contribution TI1us at high levels of permitted ABM deployment we would have lmver confidence that there was redundancy in our retaliatory forces But ·with low ABH levels under a MIRV ban we would have greater confidence that we had redundancy in our deterrent forces This is because with NIRV's banned a significantly higher percent of our land-based missiles survive than under Package III • At low ABM levels the United States does not have any significant damage-limittng capability when there are no MIRV's regardless of which ·s ide strikes first At the higher ABM levels we could save up to 30 million deaths by striking first At low levels of ABM neither the Soviets nor the United States can save large numb rs of people by striking · first in a crisis Under Package IV U S retaliatory capabilities are more sensitive to Soviet deployment of accurate ICBM's in excess of agreed limits than they are under Package III particularly if the agreed level of BJ ID is _more than 200 ABM ·1aunchers DE t Cl - -o ·-115- For an egreed ABM level of 200 the computed U S retaliatory capability d opped only from 33% to 29% under an assumption that the Soviets cheated by adding 700 accurate ICBN's before the U S could respond For an agreed level of 500 Am-i interceptors the same of fens i ve cheating caused the U S retaliatory capability t o drop to 22% with a greater reliance on bombers However for a Soviet ABM level of 1500 interceptors achieved either through agreement or cheating the same assumption on Soviet offensive cheating reduced the U S retaliatory capability to below 10% On the other hand the assumption of Soviet cheating by adding 500 less accurate ICEM's caused no change in U S retaliatory capability at 200 ABM's and reduced it to 23% for 1500 ABM' s In general under Package IV our retaliatory capability would be someHhc t more sensitive to ABM cheating than under Package III Our retaliatory capability ·would not be significantly degraded as a result of examined cheating however if ABH levels are kept low under Package IV - -116- D Verification of the Proposed Pacblges ' _ The study of verification by national means of the provisions of each of the four alternative packages has led to the following observations We assume that Soviet violations would be accompanied by attempts at concealment and deception · Package I Since this package concerns only fi xed and mobile landba secl strategic offensive missile launchers it could be verified with high confidence provided there ere clearly defined procedures for s lo replacement Without such procedures replaced silos could not be verified as inoperable Other than this the major difficulty would be some uncertainty in verifying a ban on land-mobile strategic missiles Under this package for example it is possible although unlikely that a Soviet attempt to build a force of 200 to 300 land-based mobile strategic launchers could go undetected for two to three yea rs 1 A detailed assessment of our overall verification capa'l _ bilities is provided in Annex Band SNIE 11-13-69 The assessment on the packages provided here does not include ABM because the force levels are as yet unspecified within the packages A limitation on the number 9£ fixed land-based and sea-based ABM launchers could be verified with hi°gh confidence If land-mobile ABM's ·were permitted within the overall limit our confidence of detecting a violation would be somewhat lessened The primary effect of not limiting ABM radars would be to shorten the lead-time available to the U S in the event of a Soviet violation • TOF S ECRET -117- Package II WhLl-e the basic package ·w ould be verifiable there would be a considerably lower level of confidence than in the case of Package I The chief difficulty ·with this package would be the verification of the permitted mix of mobile and fixed relocatable ICBM's The verification problem would be further complicated by the restriction on the number of SLEM launchers without a concomitant restriction on the number of submarines Regarding replacement of fixed land-based and sea-based launchers the verification complexities could be mitigated through clearly defined procedures for launcher replacement There would be far greater d-ifficulty in d_e tecting a violation in a mixed ICBM for e than would be the case if mobile ICBM's were banned The variant to this package ·which allm·JS an interchange of land- and sea-based launchers would further complicate this verification problem by extending the above weapons launchers mix Package III The basic package could be 'verified with high confidence It minimizes-the difficulties of Packages I and II by prohibiting land-based mobile strategic launchers the replacement of fixed silos and further construction of SLBM launchers or submarines The most difficult task in this package would be verifying the ban on land-mobile strategic launchers the uncertainties surrqunding which would be the same as that in Package I The two variants to this package would increase the verification difficulty owing to the land- and sea-based launcher mix and superhardening provisions Despite the verification complexities we still have high confidence of determining the eventual force levels in a mix of fixed landbased and sea-based launchers as would be permissible under oEdt1ASSW EO -118- ------ Variant III-B Accordingly the launcher mix in Variant III-B would be easier to verify than that in Variant II-A because it excludes a land-mobile system as part of land·-· and sea-based launchers The difficulty of verifying the first variant superhardening is the same as that associated with launchet' relocation and would be mitigated by clearly defined procedures £or launcher replacement Paclrnge IV The only differences from Package III are bans on testing and the deployment of HIRV's and the further flighttesting of all other specified reentry systems Our capability to verify the test ng of these reentry systems at present is good and should improve over the period under cpnsideration Even with present verification systems we have high confidence of timely detection of MIRV testing for ICBM 1 s and a somewhat lesser level of confidence regarding shorter-range missiles The chances of · our detection of MIRV's for SLBM's are only' about even At present Package IV as it applies to MIRVed ICBM's could be verified ·with high confidence If the Soviets complete PJ T E of a NIRV system prior to an agreement verification of a ban on actual deployment of NIRV's would be difficult if not impossible by national means As noted above Package III could be verified with high confidence C- E Negotiability Despite the provisions in Packages I and II which would permit the Soviets to proceed with deployment of two of their important strategic programs SLBM and land-mobile ICBM respectively the Soviets would nonetheless probably prefer Packages III and IV as being more comprehensive in reducing the costs uncertainties political tensions and military risks of continued arms competition If the Soviets prove to be interested in a MIRV ban they would prefer Package IV between the two because it contains such a provision On the other hand if we decided to consider a MIRV ban along the lines of Package IV there might be a tactical advantage in entering negotiations with Package III which asks maximum restrictions on Soviet offensive systems without restricting our MIRV program If we were prepared following initial negotiations and an exploration of Soviet views to accept a restraint on MIRV testing while negotiations proceeded on an overall agreement we would be in a good position to get the Soviets to agree to a conditional suspension of their own on-going programs e g hold up construction starts on ICBM launchers and missile-launching submarines The delays possible in such an approach could however render our MIRV program useless as a bargaining element should the MIRV testing program carry us past the point where a MIRV ban could be verified by national means Package IV would avoid this problem We will not know the extent to which MIRV's may be critical to a successful outcome of negotiations until the Soviet attitude on MIRV's and particularly on their relation to ABM is better known -120- F ADVANTAGES AND DISJ DVANTAGES OF EACH PACKAGE NOTE In considering the advantages and disadvantages of each illustrative package it should b borne in mind - that a wide range of possible ABM levels was analyzed in each case A key issue for decision is what level of ABM the U S should seek to negotiate This decision is basic to evaluating the alternati es an determining a U S positi6n This decision both affects and is influenced by the other elements of each package __ _______ · ___ _ _ Except where noted below Soviet compliance with the various packages is verifiable with high confidence by national means alone In some cases however an evasion might not be detected until some deploym nt had occurred see Annex B PACKAGE I FREEZE OF Nm-mr ns OF LAND BASED OFFENSIVE MISSILE LAUJ-JCHERS Effect on Arms Race PRO - By prohibiting land-mobile missiles and limiting fixed offensive missiles and ABM's this package would create confidence and could be a first step toward curbing the strategic arms race without disrupting present U S military programs CON - Would cu b the strategic arms race in only three major weapons cat gories thereby probably channeling the race into other areas Unless low limits on ABM levels could be agreed to ABM's would drive offensive force buildups in unconstrained areas and thus create uncertainties and instabilities - in the strategic relationship Strategic Balance PRO - Would permit U S to take the actions necessary · to retain a secure retaliatory capability at all ABM levels - Allowing each si de to build more survivable systems SLBM's could increase stability CON - By permitting MIRV's and other missile improvements would increase uncertainties and fail to reduce the counterforce threat to fixed ICBM's which is foreseen for the mid-197O's See points under Package IV - By permitting silo relocation or enlargement this package would fail to prevent the Soviets from introducing SS-9 1 s or a new generation of ICBM's in place of their small ICBM's - By permitting larger numbers of Soviet SLB t-I' s · would increase the Soviet threat Negotiability PRO - Could lead to a quick agreement because it is relatively simple would permit the Soviets to continue their SLBM program and would freeze only numbers of ICBM launchers in which the Soviets would have more than the U S ' CON - Would probably not be negotiable because a the Soviets would be unwillL1g to limit ABM' s and two important potential Soviet offensive force programs more ICBM's and land-mobile missiles without limiting any projected U S offensive force programs particularly MIRV's · b its limited scope would not meet Soviet desires to save money and to reduce potential strategic uncertainties c the Soviets would not want to pay the political costs entailed in an agreement with the U S in exchange for so little arms control Verification CON - Verification would require agreement on clearly defined procedures for fixed launcher replacement thus increasing the difficulty of the negotiations Without such procedures replaced silos could not be verified as inoperable Other Factors PRO - Minimizes incentives to cheat since substantial increases in force capability can be made within the constraints • - TOP SE€R EWP FORN SECRET NOF'ORN -123- PACKAGE II FREEZE OF NIB1DERS OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE LAUh'CHERS Effect on Arms Race • PRO - Advantages similar to Package I although Package II would not ban land-mobile ICBM's and would limit SLBM's CON - - By allowing land-mobile missiles sea-based ABM' s MIR V's etc Package II would have only marginal effect on slowing the arms rc ce and would lead to dynamic buildups in both offensi e and defensive strategic systems Strategic Balance PRO - Advantages similar to Package I although Package II limits SLBM totals CON - Disadvantages similar to Paclrng2· I except for SLEH limits with additional disadv3ntage that land-mobile missiles would add to strategic uncertainties Negotiability PRO - Could lead to a quick agreement because it is relatively simple and permits the Soviets to deploy land-mobile ICBM's as a counter to U S MIRV's CON - Probably less negotiable than other packages because of its limited scope complexities of tradeoffs lack of a MIRV ban and allowing the U S to deploy mobile land-based and sea-based ABM systems ' _ u a E iQFPJ9V '2 'f F 5 Verification CON - More difficult to verify than Packages ·I III or IV because land-mobile missiles are not banned It would be far harder to determine the number of land-mobile missile launchers than to detect violation of a complete ban Verification would require agreement at the time of negotiation on clearly defined procedures for replacement of SLBM fixed ICBM and mobile ICBM launchers thus increasing the difficulty of the negotiations Without such procedures replaced launchers could not be verified as inoperable - The permitted mix of fixed and mobile ICBM launchers further complicates the verification problem PACKAGE II A VARIANT FREEZE OF SUM OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS This variant differs from Package II only in that it permits each side to build more sea-based missile launchers as a one-for-one replacement for ICBM launchers or vice versa which is unlikely PRO - Could enhance survivability of retaliatory forces - Permitted force flexibilities would discourage attempts to build counterforce capabilities - Otherwise advantages are similar to Package II CON - Introduces an additional source of strategic uncertainties since future force structures would be less predictable - Larger numbers of Soviet SLBM's could increase the threat to the UaS - Would add to verification difficulties because of the land-sea mix Otherwise disadvantages are similar to Package II · -126- ·- P ACKl GE III FREEZE OF NlTI ·IBERS AND CERTAIN TYPES OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE LAUNCHERS WITH MIRV I s ALLG JED Effect on Arms Race • PRO - Hould provide more comprehensive restrictions on arms _race than Pa-ckazes I and II by banning land-mobile ICBM's and by limiting all ategories of strategic offensive and defensive missile launchers CON - Would permit MIR V's and some other missile improvements the responses to which would probably lead to a continuing qualitative -arms competition within the constraints of the agreement see Section IV-G trategic Balanc_ PRO - Would allm·J each side to maintain adequate retaliatory capability provided ABM levels are kept low - Would allow U S to maintain adequate retaliatory eapability at all ABM levels considered - Would allo·w the U S to proceed w'ith all its presently planned programs for improvement of its offensive strategic forces while denying to the Soviets continuation of the ongoing increase in the size of their offensive forces Would prevent Soviets from overcoming the current U S - advantage in numbers of SLBM' s and from deploying landmobile ICBM's - Would allow application of new technology to each side's offensive missile force to enhance its effectiveness in target coverage and penetration and provide hedges against cheating or abrogation Df@t2A-SSfRED -127- -- CON - By permitting MIRV's and other missile improvements this package would increase uncertainties and fail to reduce the counterforce threat to fixed ICBM's which is foreseen for the rnid-1970's See points under Packaie IV · - Would not allow U S to deploy sea-based ABM Negotiability_ PRO - I -might be a good negotiating opener because it is sufficiently broad in scope that the Soviets would conclude that we are serious about SALT They might be prepared to accept an agreement along these lines as a means of maintaining an acceptable strateiic po ture as measured by their standards CON - The Soviets might reject Package III because a Would limit most Soviet programs but leave our principal program MIRV untouched They probably would not see the ability to proceed with an MRV MIRV program as sufficient compensation for this b At medium and high levels of ABM's Soviet retaliation capability could be degraded well below current levels - On the other hand Package III might also make it diffi- cult to negotiate low ABM levels because of MIRV's not being banned and interest in hard-point defenses etc thus leading to increased uncertainties in the strategic balance See Sections IV-G and IV-H l D PACKAGE III-A SUPERHARDENING VARIANT •-· This variant differs from Package III only in that it permits ·ICBM silo superhardening PRO - Would improve the stability -of the strategic balance by making a counterforce attack more difficult - Would allow· u s to increase its ICBM throw weight more than under Package III - Otherwise advantage s a_re similar to Package III CON - Soviet superhardening could result in replacement of smaller silos with silos large enough for SS-9 1 s or new generation missiles This could threaten the survivability of the U S Minuteman force even if the latter were superhardened ·· Verification would require agreement on clearly defined procedures for silo replacement thus increasing the difficulty of the negotiations - Would have other disadvantages listed under Package III above ✓• - PACKAGE III-B VARIANT FREEZE OF SUM OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS Package III-B permits varying the mix of land-based and sea-based offensive strategic missiles as desired similar to Package II-A Hence it has consequent advantages and disadvantages similar to those listed above for Package II-A Package III-B would be easier to verify than Package II-A however because the former bans land-mobile missiles Since Package III places more restrictions upon offensive systems than does Package II the advantages of the· freedom to mix are greater under Package III-B than under Package II-A In other respects Package III-B has advantages and disadvantages similar to Package III C PACKAGE IV FREEZE OF NUMBERS AND CERTAIN TYPES OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE LAUNCHERS WITH MIRV's PROHIBITED Effect on Arms Race PRO - Because Package IV ·would ban MIRV's on both sides it would prevent a major escalation in the offensive nuclear force levels on both sides - Would also eliminate pressures to respond to MIRV threats with land-mobile ICBM's hard-point ABM defense hard-rock silos more SLBM's etc - Package IV is the only one of the four which breaks the MIRV-ABM escalatory action-reaction cycle described in Section IV-G If MIRV MRV testing is not stopped soon it will probably prove impossible to ban MIRV's later because of verification difficulties see Sections I G and IV-M CON - With no restrictions on improving missile accuracy or throw weight this package permits non-MIRV improvements of offensive missile performance which could eventually threaten the survivability of each side's land-based missile force See Section IV-J for discussion of additional restrictions designed to solve this problem Strategic Balance PRO - Would allow each side to maintain its assured destruction capability provided ABM levels are kept low and the latter would be much easier to do under a MIRV ban - litigates the destabilizing counterforce threat to survivability of fixed ICBM's which is foreseen for the mid-197O 1 s -131- - A ban on MIRV at the present time t muld l ave the U with a considerable technological lead which --· the Soviets could have only limited success in narrowing ·with testing banned Since a breakdown of the agreement would enable the U S to capitalize _on this lead and unless the Soviets have chosen a more limited approach to NIRV's and are satisfied with it this consideration would add to Soviet incentives to live up to the terms of the agreement - An agreement based on Package IV would be a key step toward a quantitative and qualitative freeze of the strategic ·status quo By suspending MIRV MRV flight testing n both sides it would avoid loss of the option to negotiate an agreement later for an essentially complete qualitative freeze CON - The ban on rnul tip le and maneuvering RV' s ·would reduce each side's capability to develop flexible means for ensuring penetration of ABH's For example it would preclude further development of decoy RV's This could create uncertainties in the strategic balance and require significant hedging particularly unless ABM capabilities are effectively limited to low levels - If the Soviet area ABM level were to exceed about 1000 effective interceptors MIRV's were banned and U S penetration aids were assumeq ineffective then the U S retaliatory capability would depend significantly on bombers - A low ABM level and a ban on SABMIS in conjunction with a MIRV ban could place constraints on U S ability to protect its population from possible future Chinese ICBM attack - -In banning MIRV's the U S would be failing to exploit a current technological lead over the U S S R -132- - Under Paclrn3e IV the U S retaliatory capability is more sensitive to possible Soviet cheating or technological advances than under the other packages -· - Would not allo·w U S to deploy sea-based ABM Negotiability PRO - Would probably be more negotiable than the other packages because it comes closer to maintaining the st·r ategic status quo which the Soviets have _indicated they wish to do The U S ·w ould be more like·ly to succeed in persuading the Soviets to suspend ICBM and SLBM launcher construction early in the negotiations if we were prepared to link this with a simultaneous suspension of NIRV MRV flight testing Assuming the Soviets desire a MIRV ban they may prove more willing to agree to limiting numbers of SLBM's and ICBH's and banning land-mobile ICBM's s a quid pro quo 'for banning MIRV' s · - With MIRV' s banned the Soviets might hav_e strong • strategic and economic incentives to agree to low limits on ABM's CON - The negotiations could take longer because of the additional provisions · o n restricting certain types of flight tests - Our desire to halt Soviet MRV fltght testing soon could be an additional negotiating complication ·DElil$ ® l- -1 1 -F lq - If the Soviets want a MIRV to ban MIRV's would forego tial without any assurance the rest of the Package IV ban a U S initial proposal significant bargaining potenthat the U S S R would accept restrictions - On the other hand the Soviets may not want to accept a MIRV ban until they have developed their own MIRV capability especially since they could feel confident that the U S would not evade a MIRV ban at a later date - The Soviets may prove unHilling to limit ABM levels to low enough levels to satisfy U S requirements for a MIRV ban If the U S decides to complete its current series of MIRV tests Packa3e IV may become impossible to negotiate because the Soviets may prove unwilling to accept a J viIRV ban 7hich they can not verify by national means alone Verification CON - Would not be verifiable if the Soviets had developed and tested MIRV's sufficiently to warrant deployment before an agreement were reached - Some believe the Soviets could achieve certain stages of MIRV development without flight testing however it is highly unlikely that they would deploy any such system without a full-range flight testing program which we would identify • Other Factors PRO - U S budgetary savings could be greater than for the other three packages - Our European allies might prefer Package IV on the grounds that it is the one they consider most likely to prove negotiable and thus •the one most likely to head off potential developments they fear CON - Our European allies might be concerned that without MIRV's we will not be able to target all the Soviet IR MRBM 1 s and other time-urgent NATO targets with missiles These factors may be _outweighed by other military and political concerns of our allies See Part II of Annex C I DE IT' P SECRET iNOFORN D jc DA- REPORT OF THE STRATEGIC ANALYSIS PANEL NSSM 28 May 10 1969 ANNEX A AR M 8 00 1 l'l'ROL AND m s _T1Y A11 LE1 11' AGEN f 0 · •L 1 •Jlce Dc 1y ·_y -· ' · · ' ·J··-1q_ · rt F - - · _ - ' ' - · - · l 1 ii - - - - - - - - - r - - v ' ' t c or J G ' Dlii _ u· 1 - - • • • • • '• ·- _J _ J ' T C1 au·· 'f - - - -- --- --- _ t __D t i _ 7l Clas D 'class Auth r -w1 · a -e REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED 'EXCEPl' WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE OSD Control CCS X-2440 SA Control 69-142 9 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING DOD DIR 5200 10 DOES NOT APPLY Page 1 of 145 pages Copy 61 of 100 copies REPORT OF THE STRATEGIC AHALYSIS PANEL I INTRODUCTION This report analyzes the capabilities of U S and Soviet strategic forCies under the four arms co·ntrol options which the NSSM 28 Steering Cormnittee directed that we study a Additiorrally U S ·capabilities are analyzed to see whether they would be sensitive to Soviet heating or abrogation The selective r esults are intended to show both the entent to which objectives identified below could be met and the confidence we would have in so meeting them The forces which are examined and their costs are shown in Tabs B through E Several complementary measures are used to assess the capabilities of U S and Soviet forces We use two major criteria deterrence and damage-limiting A Deterrence Measures of the deterrent capability of U S and Soviet forces help us assess the likelihood that a nuclear war will start ' These include l 'The capability of U S strategic forces to inflict urban industrial damage on the Soviet Union in retaliation after a Soviet surprise all counterforce attack on U S strategic forces We assume that Soviet forces are e enerated while ours are on dayto-day alert and that the Soviets use all their missiles in the counter-fo rce strike When AP-M's are deployed the U S is assumed not to use pen-aids in order to provide a pe2simistic estimate of its retaliatory capability We evaluate urban industrial damage in terms of prompt deaths and in terms of industrial capacity destroyed We term this measure our retaliatory capability 2 The capability of Soviet strategic forces to inflict urban industrial damage on the -United States in retaliation after a U S surprise all counterforce attack on Soviet strategic forces This is termed the Soviet retaliatory capability In this case U S forces are generated the Soviet forces are on day-to-day alert and the U S uses all its missiles in the counterforce attack We assume that the U S uses pen-aids in its pre-emptive strike in order to provide a pessimestic estin1ate of the Soviet retaliatory capability 3 The relative number of U S and Soviet deaths in a nuclear war started by either a Soviet or U S first strike We do these calculations for a range of scenarios involving mixes of counterforce and countervalue attacks by the side striking first and an all countervalue attack by the retaliator The forces of both sides are assu ned to be generated 4 Stability in a crisis We measure this by the numuer of people either nation can save by making a pre-emptive first strike designed to maximize the difference in fatalities as compared to first undergoing a si ilarly designed first st rite uy the other side These O tions are deccr i b d in detail in Tah A DE L l _ Ci - · 1 r - • -_i 2 · B Damar e Limiting Measures of damage-limiting capability for U S and Soviet forces help us assess the capability of these forces to fight a nuclear war if deterrence should fail They include the following 1 The capability of U S strategic forces to limit damage in a nuclear war initiated by the Soviets in which they attempt to maximize the difference between U s and Soviet fatalities 2 The capability of U S strategic forces to minimize U S fatalities by initiating a nuclear war c Military Targeting The deterrence and drunage limiting measures discussed above provide estimates of theoretical abilities to cause and or limit fatalities in hypothetical scenarios which assume that each side targets its entire weapon inventory either against the other side's urb an complexes or against strategic nuclear weaJ Ons which pose a direct threat to its 01-m cities In the event deterrence were to fail it is unlikely that either side would allocate all its weapons in this fashion Each side would doubtlessly allocate some weapons to military targ ets other than strategic eapons such as command and control sit e s defensive sites and targets threatenin i its allies Also each side would like to have if possible some nuclear forces remainin g at the termination of hostilities The capability of U S or Soviet str ategic forces to accomplish objectives such as these can be partially measured by determining how many nuclear weapons would be rernaining after first sei ting aside a minimum number needed to cause a preselected amount of urban indus t rial damage This measure is e 'J l·esscd in terms of numbers of RVs and r egaton Equivalents r maining an 3 in 1 he n · ber of military tars ets • hich these m1 mb rs might be able to destroy In interpreting the nmnerical results presented in this Study the reader should be 21• 1re that these results are dependent on various assumptions some of vrhich are explicitly stated and some of which are implied in the computer models used Consequently these results do not measure the absolute levels of d@Jlage which could be expected to result from a nuclear war rather they should be used as approximate indicators of magnitude of damage and to reveal trends which could be ex·pected as the force postures levels of defense and clandestine deployment of 7ea pons are varied The damage criteria used in those calculations are due to blast effects only and do not take into account secondary effects such as fallout which could be expected In those calculations involving ballistic missile defense the models employed assumed a high level of effectiveness for the ABM systems and thus biased the results in favor of the defender Ho rever it is judged that the results show the trend of the impact of varying levels of ABM on each side's retaliatory capability The detailed assu liptions and models used in making the calculations are for the most part the smne as those usec1 in the Department of Defense Report on Analysis of Altsnrn tive Jluclem Strate g ies and Force Postures in response to NS3M 3 Tab I e ' 'J lains these mcclels and assu 1 ptions and dj scusses soii e lj mi t ations 'l'a1J JI dc scribes the Sf IPET 1ucdc l which was used in rnakin some of the calculations for HSSl f 28 3 In order to arrive at results • hich would be illustrative for the options under consideration a number of assumptions were used Different results might occur if the assumptions and estimates were different For example the Soviet threat was predicated upon CIA estirr ates of Soviet capabilities and responses ten years hence The US SLBM force a t sea was considered invulnerable during the period In many cases BMD effect vene ss would be sensitive to the defense employed and the effectiveness of missile penetration aids While no Soviet forces were set aside for Nth country contingencies the U S CPR 11 package 11 used is somewhat less than that in current targeting plans In our counterforce calculations only the SIHPET model included IRBl i s MPBl-1s and medium bomber bases as targets Since we address specific options and variants as specified in Tab A we can C ' _ ect that as the range of options is narrowed or as features of the va1·ious options a re combined further analysis will be required Section II discusses several issues 1·rhich are co1r non to the options such as MIBVs and AEI 1 levels The next section presents a su1r rnary of results uncler each option ancl Section IV summarizes the calculations T11e tabs in the appendix include a description of the four options U S and Soviet forces for each option their costs some static cor iparisons of U S and Soviet forces tile detailed results of the w-a1·-fishting calculations and an analysis of fo1 ·ce capabilities when considering military targeting II SPECIFIC ISSUES In this section we discuss several issues which are common to all options considered in this study This discussion is intended to provide a f1·ame - ork to assist in evaluatinr the four optio S and their variants Table II-1 suri-Jnarizes the featm·es of these options A Level of Bdlistic t- issHe Defense Both the U S and the Soviets sllould becorr c less confident of tl eir retalia t or r capabjlities as the allo • cd level of ballistic missile defense increases A part of' each side's retaliatory force is considered to be invulnerable to a first strike by offensive missiles whereas all of the offensive missiles launched in retaliation are subject to attrition by area or terminal ballistic missile defenses of cities For this reason limitation of ballistic missile defense is one of the most critical issues in evaluating a proposed arms control agreement vn1en MIRVs are banned and missile penetration aids are not reli'ed upon the U S retaliatory capabilities would be reduced to below 30% with bombers and 261 without bo nbers if' there were increases to ABM levels on the order of 500 Higher ABM levels approaching 1500 would reduce the U S retaliatory capability to 25% with bombers and less than 101 4 without Increases to medium and high levels of Am1 deployment also jeopardize the Soviet retaliatory ca1J 0J ili ty when U S prograrrnned a ncl CIA postulated Soviet MIRVs are used This indicates that the Soviets may be interested in kee1 ing Af ll-1s at a J ow level If a MIRV ban is achieved both sides should cons Lder the desirability of a low ceiling 200 or less on ABM deployment so as to p cecluc1e the necessity for he av-y reliance on missile pcnetratj on aids or ·oom1 e1·s to n1ctintain its ret2 liato1·y cs p c J d lity 0 ·- - fl ''· - -a-·· --··n DECI · - µ ' • • '1 c' 4 1 Table II-1 SUMJl'iARY OF ALTERNATIVE ARMS CONTROL OPI'IONS OPrION OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ICBMs SLBMs DEFENSIVE WEAPONS IR MR Bi-ls MIBVs BOMBERS ABM Fixed Mobile F F F CI F I II b III IV - B F B B SCBMs u F F F F F FE I F u u u Fixed MobilE u L u L L 9 _ L L L B B u u B Key F B L - Numbers - Banned - Limited u - E I E I §_ frozen at current levels to agreed numbei s Unconstrained Various levels of AP -1 ranginc from O to 5000 interceptors were examined for each option A variant of these options al lo· · C d freedom to wix between ICBMs SLPMs within the total number of allo' • ed missiles Relocation of the mjssiles to new launchere was prohibited under the basic option but allO' · ed as ci va 'iant to this option A variant to option III al lowed freedom to mb between land and sea-based ABMs i·1ithin an agreed total level Table II-2 U S Al 1D SOVIET RF TALLATORY CAPAf ILITY IN RELATION TO ABM LEVEL Percent of 'l'otal Population Kil led by Prompt Nuc1 ear Effects Level of Area ABMs a U S Retaliatory Ca pability Both Sides Deploy MIEV Option III MIRVs Banned Option IV 4o 38 Soviet Retaliato ry CaJ aMli ty c Both Sides Deploy MIRV Option III MIRVs Banned Option IV E 25 4 -0 15 4 4 U S missile penetration aids are not relied upon Only strateg ic bomber s make this contribution The missile forces wei e nee ated by th e r an dom n atiomli de area AEJ j model used hO' •Jever we could expect so •2 r d l itio n al fate lit cs due to mi s Gilcs If missile penctr e t lcm o iclc 1· e r f as s1 1r1 2ll to rk th rc would be addition al d c r t 1 f r-JL 1 ic i l c• r There are no Soviet i s il e penetr at ion aids 1 4o 39 37 33 29 25 AIR DEFENSE u u u u 5 B MIRVs The U S program to deploy MIRVs was formulated in the mid 6os in response to the requirement to be able to penetrate with higher confidence the large Soviet terminal ABI-1 deployments which were estimated by the Intelligence Corrmmni ty at that time The reasons for the Soviet ini ti at ion of their SS-9 J' iRV program are not kno m Their tests followed ou r testing of ABMs and our initial decision to deploy the Sentinel AB 1 system They could be taking the first steps toward develo11ing a MIRV capability Fbr retaliatory attacks against citi s the primary use of MIRVs is as a means of penetration of BMD However it is possible e nd even likely that advancing missile technology will enable both sides to develop accurate MIRVs With this inc1·eased accuracy it may be possible for both the U S and the Soviets to increase the counterforce apabilities of their ballistic missile forces Although improved accuracy will also increase the kill probability of single warheads against hard targets the MIRV capability allows a relatively small number of lare e pa rloe d missiles to threaten a larger nm111 er of tart ets e nd also provides for cross targeting For the force pro jections used the Soviet retaliatory capability wou1d be der raded more by MIRVs the n the U S retaliatory capability This is because a large number of the launchers in which 1·1e would dep1oy MIRVs -- namely Poseidon submarines ·which ca1·ry 10-14 warheads per booster -- 1• ou1d be invulnerable to a first strike even one in which the Soviets used J' ffRVs The Soviet forces projected by the CIA for the mid-70 period do not include suc h large numbers of invulnerable MIRVs As shmm in 'I 'able F-1 of Tab F the Soviets at the present time have a greater missile thrm-1 weight capability then the United States does By using advanced launch techniques both sides could increase their missile thrm·r weit ht by a fac' or of hro to three within the constraints of present silo configurations as shown in Tab le F-2 This throw weight capabi1ity could be used to increase the MIRV payload vd tl· in any of the fi rst three options If t-llRVs were banned as they are in Option IV th re ould be rncli less inccnti ve to increase missile throw wejght This is because it wuld be extremely difficult for either side to a c·quire a first-strike capE-bilj ty merely by increasing the size of si11gle 1• rar 1eads c Pre-launch Survivauility of Force Comrionents The vulnerabilities of the components of our st cateJic forces should be carefully considered as we prepare to negotiate an arms control ac reement As discussed in the para ra1-1hs above advancing MIRV technology could make a large port -on of our and-based missile silos more vulnerable to a counterforce first strike unless we took appropriate countermeasures This is illustrated in ta1Jle II-3 which compares the pre-launch survivability of Soviet and u s ICr I·-Is assun in 6 that the other side makes an all-counterforce first strike 6 In these calculations the assumptions were biased against the retaliator in order to furnish a conservative estim ate of the opponent's capabilities Under Option III which allows MIRVs the survivability of fixed ICBM forces is lower than in Option IV In order to increase the survivability of the fixed rem forces under this Option either the missiles would have to be superhardened or defended with medium to high levels of hard point ABM defense Under Option IV which prohibits MIRVs the achievement of an effective counterforce capability by either side against fixed ICB 1s would be far less likely to occur by the mid-70' s Thus the prohibition of MIRVs c an increase U _s and Soviet confidence in their retaliatory capabilities assmning a low level of area ABMs deployed by the other side Table II-3 SURVIVABILITY O r' L£ 1 JD-FASED ICBMs Area Interceptors HPD Interceptors 0 200 500 1000 0 0 0 0 0 200 500 640 1280 1920 I E I Percent of Land-Based ICBMs Surviving a Fj _rst Strike 1978 Option III _ Option III Option IVE Option III I HRS HPD Soviet U S Soviet Soviet u s Soviet U S • U S l 7 10 18 24 27 27 28 25 77 35 78 30 34 49 77 16 28 48 30 33 35 U S CET's for this case were ICBHs 25 SLB1'1 s 16 Soviet CEPs were ICB s 25 SLB- s 75 Soviet CEPs for this case were the ser e as un ier Option III U S CEPs for this case Kere ICB is 35 SLB s 80 The survivability of missile forces could also be increased by increas -ng AB v1 effectiveness through survivable sea-based mid-course interceptors or by replacinc existing fixed ICBMs with mobile or seabased missiles Anal ysis of these variants shows that they could provide increased sur-vi vabili ty comparal le to or greater than that shown in Table II-3 for hard rock -silos and hard-point defense The vulnerability of our SLBI'-1S is quite different They may eventualJy be sensitive to adve n es in Soviet PiSW or possibly to attacks on the co ul' innd and control system Our alert bombers on the other hand depe nd on adequate warning to en sure their pre-laun h Sl1n rivab iJity Thus ·re hs ve h i bh confidence that th Soviets could not t l e action to destroy all t ll c ce of our ret o J i ai o ry co po icnts before launch Our 11rc s nt f'Ilriro nc h to 62 63 64 71 6a ' attaining our strategic objectives is to maintain a strong strategic capability to inflict dainage with each of our three major force components independently of the others Planning conservatively we do not wish to allow the vulnerability of even one system to provide a possible inducement for the Soviets to strike first If an agreement allows MIRVs our landbased ICBMs could become vulnerable unless the agreement also pennitted 1 our eventually taking steps to maintain their survivability I DE r - - - r ' r- ' r• J t DECL 38 uF • D 7 D Limits on Strategic Bom1 ers and Air Defenses The pro r osed U S position on strategic arms limitations excludes consideration of bombers and air defenses for the follmring reasons 1 We do not believe that bombers a re a major threat to stability since they would not normally be planned for use in first strikes against time-urgent targets It is easy to obtain several hours warning of a bomber attack -- enoi l gh time to launch strategic weapons before the bombers could damage them 2 Defining 11 strategic bomber in a way which simply and clearly distinguishes it from other t 'Pes of aircraft is a very difficult problem There are similar difficulties in distinguishing strategic air defense forces from tactical air defense forces 3 Even if there 1· ere agreement on the bomber and air defense forces to be li mited verifying cor 1pliance would be difficult without some on-site inspection because of the rr obility or the aircraft 4 The actun l nu111ber of aircraft air defense re dars and surfaceto-air missiles which a nation possesses are not very good indicators of bomber or air defense capabilities The perfonnance characteristics of the bombers including air-to-su dac e mi ssiles against the opposing air defense systems are very import ant in determining net capabilities The probler s of definition and v erification arc even g1·eater for performance characteristics than for the systsms themselves Nevertheless the U S might hai e to discuss bomber and air defense limitations d -Ch the Soviets We r 1ie ht have to because the Soviets might insist on including such liL'li tations on the agenda in the negotiations or they mir ht require that bom1jer limi tat ions be discussed if we want to limit systems in 1· hich they may be interested Although the uncertair ties inherent in predicting the capabilities of futm·e air defenses prohibit precise quantification of the effects of such agree rnents one can state the follm· in conclusions with reasonable confidence 1 Previously calculations have shmm that prohibiting qualitative improvel lents in the borilber force would mean that an advanced lookdmm shoot-down interceptor defense could effectively limit the fatalities either side would receive to 5-10 million by FY77 in an attack using only bombers 2 If qualitative improvements are allowed previo'l ls calculations have shown that new Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoys SCADs Short-Range Attack l'-Iissiles SRAJ· s Bomber Defense l-'l issiles BDi1s and Electronic CouJ1terrneasures ECI-1 i·rould provide each side with the capaliility to kj 11 30-60 million 11eople in an atto ck nsing only bombers even against the most sophisticated defenses either d de might deploy in tl1e next ten years ' ·- -' · ·- - r--_ t• DECLAS rH O 8 Bombers are a weapon syste r i which the U S has emphasized in the past a 21d in which it holds a technological lead over the Soviets · Bombers on alert provide a hedge in -retaliatory capability since they require only warning in order to be survivable This would be particularly crucial in situatio 1s where large ballistic missile defenses threatened the effectiveness of our forces E Sensitivity to Soviet Cheating Fears will inevitably arise that the Soviets can meJ e us vulnerable to attack by secretly improving their offensive or more importantly their defensive forces They could of course take the same steps in the absence of an agreement Under an agree -nent we would still pursue our mm hede es to protect our retaliatory capability as we do now i-Ti thout an agreement An agreement would reduce but not elfr1inate the uncertainties against v7hich we would have to insure in any case The following table lists some hedges that are available to us and the options under which they are permitted Hedges Increase boll ber alert rate Increase nmnber of SCADs and SRA1 'is on bombers Increase numl cr of RVs on Poseidon Incree se number of J inuteman III -1· j_thin agreed ICBJ limits Put Minutern m in Hard Rock Silos Move missiles to sea Deploy more SLBMs Qualitative Improvement Permitted for Options All All I II III I II III I II III-A I II-A III-B I· All except where specifically prohibited A special intelligence analysis indicates that we can with high confidence detect relatively low levels of Soviet cheating in numbers of offensive or defensive we a pons In the analysis which follm•rs we have tested cases in which Soviet cheating was detected much later b nd at higber levels These assum _ itions are judged to represent an upper bound on detected Soviet chee ting cases to include reasonable combinations of cheating in more than one area We founcl that our retaliatory capability is not s ignificantly degraded even by these higher levels of detected Soviet cheating For certain force levels possible within these options it would be prudent upon entering an agreement to pursue the hedges that are o vailalJle in o cdcr to be able to respond to evidence of Soviet cheating within the leadtjme required to maintain our retaliatory capability An excursion shm•rea that at the 1500 ABM level the U S lv issiles Only second strike c 2 p3 bili ty with the forces for Opt i on III v ould be reducec1 to less than 5 if the Soviets used midcourse interceptors and ·were undetected in aclc1 ir g anoth T 00 in t0 rce ptors 'l'here would of course be an adcli tion11 l co 1t1· i b1 1tio1 to our r e tQli atory c p ibili ty by onr alert bo 1 b er0 9 III Sill- J· iARY OF RESULTS A Option I This option left the SLBB forces on each side open ended The CIA projected a force of 1262· Soviet SLBMs for this option vice 716 for Option III The U S SLBi--'i force we s kept at the progra 'TI l1ed level of 656 except for an excursion where 192 UU1S launchers were added Uncler arms con-crol Option I both the Soviet Union and the United States have a high retaliato ry capability for levels of ballistic missile defense JHD up to 500 AH1i launchers For higher levels of BHD the Soviet retaliatory c J abili ty drops rapidly although they could maintain their retaliatory capability at a high level if they executed appropriate missile hedges permitted under this option _o r increased their strategic bomber force Neither side -muld have a distinct advantage in relative fatalities in a nuclNu- rnr except at very high ABI 1 levels where the United States muld have the advantage provided the Soviets did not execute ap ropriate JRissile hedges or increase their bomber force Under this option each side has little incentive to strike first in a crisis provided the ABr-1 level is 500 or less For very high AE•l levels the United States could save 30 to 40 million people by striking first a ga in provided the Soviets did not develop effective missile penetration aids or increase their bomber forces The U S de age li L iting capability for a Soviet fir$t strike is small even at a very high level of Bl-ID we could lose up to 95 million people On the other hand if the ABM level -ere very high and the U S struck first U S pro -npt fatalities would be about 40 million provided the Soviets made no increase in strategic bombers or did not execute missile hedges pennitted The addition of 192 additional SLBMs to the U S forces which is allm-red under the option inc cE ased the U S retaliatory capability by three to four percent and reduced the Soviet retaliatory capal ili ty by about the same amount B Option II The Soviet forces projected by the CIA for Options II and III had very similar force levels and characteristics except that those in Option II included 100 land-mobile ICBI-1s In our analysis of Option III we examined the case in ·which the Soviets added 500 land-mobile ICBMs We also exrnnined several variations in the mix of sea- and land-based missiles The results fro11 these examinations would bracket those for Option II and Variant II-A 10 C Option III The retaliatory capability of U S forces is high for all levels of Bl-ID examined even wi thou t missile penetration aids At the higher levels of R-ID where our missiles suffer greater attrition from Soviet defenses our bo bers play a large role in carrying out the retaliatory strike On the other hru1d Sbviet retaliatory capability which includes only limited bomber forces is high only if the ABM level is less than 500 launchers Because there are fewer Soviet SLBMs in Option III as compared to Option I the Soviet retaliatory capability is more· sensitive to the ABM level in Option III than in Option I assuming they do not execute pemitted missile hedges or increase their strategic bomber force This same sensitivity of Soviet capabilities to ABM level is seen in the war-fighting results In these scenarios the Soviets received about the sa me level of damage from U S retaliatory and first strikes at all AB-1 levels On the other hand the United States saves 60 to 70 million lives by striking first in a crisis if there are more than 500 ABM launchers perm itted by the agreement and if the Soviets did not develop effective missile penetration aids and did not increase their strategic bomber force If the Soviets struck first attempting to maximize the difference in fatalities we could not l iJnit fatalities to less than 90 million deaths even with a laxge EI-ill However by striking first the United States cm J ld limit damage to 20 million deaths if very high levels oi' ABI-1 launchers were permitted and the So- riets made no increase in the strategic bomber force or did not execute pennitteu missile hedges In contrast to these cases if large levels of AB -1 launchers were permitted but only for hard point defense of ICBMs the United States cannot limit darriage below 100 million deaths even if we struck first Similarly the United States vould have little incentive to strike first in a crisis if most of the allowed ABM launchers were used for hard point defense The U S and Soviet retaliatory capabilities both remain high in these cases For AR1 launcher levels of 500 or less neither side 1 s capability to inflict fatalities in retaliation was affected significantly when superhard ICBM launch·2rs were permitted or when there was freedom to vary the mixture of land-based and sea-based offensive missiles within a fixed overall level The contribution of measures of this kind is to hedge against circumstances other than this base case situation If the Soviets retain their current posture we could take steps such as hard point defense hard rock silos or movement of ICBMs to sea that would reduce the number of U S missiles lost to a Soviet first strike As a result up to five times as many soft Soviet military targets could be destroyed in a U S second strike after holding back adequate weapons for 25% fatalities If there were freedom to vary the mixture of land-based and sea-based ABMs the capability of either side to reta liate with missiles could be redl1ccd if the side striking first had as many as 500 survivable midcom·se interceptors Emd 1000 terminal i nterceptors and the side striking 11 second had 500 nationwide area interceptors and 1000 terminal interceptors On the other hand if both sides deployed 500 survivable midcou cse interceptors and 1000 terminal interceptors the Soviets would e -c_pe cience a significant reduction in second-strika capg_1Jility but the U S would not It should be noted that the Soviets could ach2 eve a mid-course intercept capability only if they shoul_d develop and deploy a forward peripheral land-ba ed or sea-based AEM Several cases of detected Soviet cheating ·were examined including depioymenof additional ABM launchers deployment of addi tiona l ICEvis and conversion of air defense s rstems to a Bllffi The U S retaliatory ce pabil5_ty was adversely affecte i onl in the case of a large scale deployment of B vJD systems at levels of cheating which we have high confidence of detecting and to which we made no response Where our missiles suffer greater attrition from illegally deployed BMD systems the U S retaliatory capability is significantly dependent upon the bomber force On the other hand an excursion showed that at the 1500 ABM level the U S second-strike capability with missiles only would be reduced to less thari 20% if the Soviets used midcourse interceptors and were undetected in adding another 500 interceptors D Option TV No MIRVs In most cases examined the computed measures of U S force effectiveness are not as e ood under Option IV as are the co2·responding results under Option III On the other hand U S retalie tor-y capability st ill remains at least 257 for area ABM levels as high as 1000 and above 303 - for AB •l levels up to 200 Although Soviet retaliatory capability is better under O ption IV than under Option III the Soviets would not have the capability to limit de r ia ge to themselves under this pac age by striking first These differences are enu_rrierated in greater detail in Para graph 3c of Section IV The U S and Soviet reta liato2·y capabilities both become · marginal if there are more than 500 area AE i Lnte ccepto cs and neither side depends 'upo 1 missile penetration aids However a t levels of 1000 ABM if the U S strikes first using effective penetration a ids and the Soviets did not have penetration a ids the Sovi ets retaliatory capability is degraded significantly On the other hand in a similar case with the Soviets striking first the U S would retain its _etaliato cy capabilit At high levels of permitted AEYi defense under Option IV the U S - retaliato r capa bility would rest on significant contributions from our bomber force if our missj penetration aids 'did not rork With 1000 area ABl 1s under a MIRV ban nee rly half of the detonating U s · equivalent megatonnage is carried by bombers With 2000 area AB permitted under a MIRV ban 24% of the Soviet people could be killed with prompt nuclear effects but bombers alone would make this contribution Thus at high leve of permitted ABt I dep loyrr ent we would have lower confic ence that there was redundanc in our retaliatory forces But with low ABM levels under a MIRV ban we would have greater confidence that we had redundancy in our deterrent forces This is because with MIRVs banned a significantly higher percent of our land-based missiles survive than under Option III ' · 0 At low ABM levels the United States does not have any significant damaa-e limiting capability when there are no MIRVs regardless of which side strikes first At the higher ABM levels we could save up to 30 million deaths by striking first low levels of A_R -1 neit_he · the Soviets nor the United ftates can save _large numbers people by striking first in a crisis Under Option IV U S retaliatory capabilities are more sensitive to Soviet deployment of ICBMs in excess of agreed limits than they are under Option III pa rti ularly if the ae reed level of K D is more than 200 ABM launchers In general under Option IV our retalia' ory capaliili ty - ould be more sensitive to ABr-1 cheating than under Option III Our retaliatory c pabilit y would not be signj_ficantly degraded as a result of exa1iined cheating hm-re--rer if AP M levels are kept low under Option IV DE 12 For an agreed ABM level of 200 interceptors the computed U S retaliatory capability only dropped f'rom 33 percent to 29 percent under an assumption that the Soviets cheated by adding 700 accurate ICBMs before the U S could respond For an agreed level of 500 ABM interceptors the same offensive cheating caused the U S retaliatory capability to drop to 22o o with a greater reliance on bombers HO •rever for a Soviet ABM level of 1500 interceptors achieved either through agreement or cheating the same assumption on Soviet offensive cheating reduced the U S retaliatory capability to below 101fo On the other hand the assumption of Soviet cheating by adding 500 less accurate ICBMs caused no change in U S ri caliatory capabili t r at 200 AR·ls and reduced it to 32% for 1500 ABMs 1 IV A SlJ1 TI• 1A Y OF CALCULATIONS OF VARIOUS APJ m COHTROL OPI'IONS Effectiveness of U S Progrwi ned Forces vs High NIPP Ffl978 In order to compare results for the anns control options with expected results in the event of no agreement the follmdng information is presented for U S progr8lmned forces versus the high NIPP forces 1 Summary of Forces Total Forces FY1978 Intercontinental Bombers UE ICBM Launchers Hard SLBM Launchers Fighter Interceptors Effective 2 U S Soviet 345 1027 656 266 50 1446 830 2300 Retaliatory Ca pabili ty U S Retaliatory Capability Soviet Drunage a Fatalities Industrjal Damage Soviet Retaliatory Capability U S Damage bf FatalitiesIndustrial Damage a E _j 33% 34% Neither U S nor Soviets use missile penetration aids U S uses missile penetration aids Soviets do not DE 13 3 War-fighting Results Crisis Stability u s Soviet Damage Li mi tation b U S First Strike Soviet First Strike Relative Fatalities pj B 32 Million u s Lives Saved -9 Million Soviet Lives Saved 87 Million U S Fatalities 139 Million U S Fataliti_es 4 Million Lives which can be saved by striking first in scenarios in which the side striking first atter 1pts to maximize the difference bet - een its fatalities and those on the other side U S first strike missiles attack weapons only Soviet first strike maximizes difference between U S and Soviet fatalities Difference between U S and Soviet fatalities in a scenario in which Soviets strike first to ma ximize this difference Negative values indicate Soviet fatalities are greater than U S fatalities Option 1 1 Su trr lary of Option Freeze on the mur ber of land-based ICBJ-1 and IR MRBi 1 launchers Ban on land-mobile offensive strategic missile launchers Conversion of IR lIBE 1 launchers to ICBM launchers prohibited The allowed numbers of ABM la mchers and interceptors will be agreed upon The nu rnber of SLBM launchers will not be frozen No limits on manned bombers and air defenses 2 Suni 'lary of Forces U S Total Forces FY1978 Intercontinental Bombers UE ICBM Launchers Hard SLBM Launchers Fighter Interceptors Effective 345 1027 656 848 266 Soviet 50 1296 1262 2300 This excursion examined the effect of adding 192 additional SLB Ms to U S forces 14 3 Effectiveness a Retaliatory Capability ABM Level a b § _ Area TenninaJ 0 200 500 500 500 1000 0 0 0 1000 2000 4000 U S Retaliates Soviet Dmnage % Deaths Ind Dam 41 41 39 37 36 32 Crisis Stal ility Deaths a Area Tenninal u s Soviet 0 200 500 500 500 1000 0 0 0 1000 2000 4000 3M 3M 1 -2 -7 -8 -9 51 47 41 16 23i _ 10- 19 4 I8 62 60 55 30 27 20 War-fighting Results - U S Uses Missile Penetration Aids ABM Level No Interceptors E Soviets Retaliate U S Da i -ia ge % 2I Deaths Ind Dam Neither U S nor Soviets use missile penetration aids U S uses missile penetration aids Soviets do not When two numbers are shm-m the first represents the percentage of people killed when the attacker is required to kill at least 2 3 of the population in the defended cities An asterisk indicates that it is not possible to meet the 2 3' s requirement the number shmm then represents the percent of fatalities in the defended cities The second number is the percentage of the population killed if the 2 3' s requirement is removed b 60 60 59 58 57 55 I 6 11 29 49 39 Damage Limitation U S Deaths 'b Soviet 1st U S 1st Strike Strike 127 123 117 94 70 39 M 142 M 141 140 139 137 95 ·Relative Deaths c 12 M 11 9 7 2 - 40 Lives which can be saved by striking first in scenarios in which the side striking first attempts to maximize the difference between its fatalities and those on the other side U S first strike missiles attack weapons only Soviet first strike maximizes difference between U S and Soviet fatalities Difference between U S and Soviet fatalities in a scenario in which Soviets strike first to maximize this difference Negative values indice te Soviet fatalities are greater the n u S fatalities 15 4 Effect of Adding 192 ULMS Missiles to U S SLK1 Force a Retaliatory Capability AB '½ Level a Area Terminal 0 200 500 500 500 1000 0 0 0 1000 2000 4000 I I U S Retaliates Soviets Retaliate Soviet Darnage % a U S D age % b ·'--Deaths Ind Daiu Deaths Ind Darn 62 62 61 60 57 57 43 43 42 4ci 36 36 48 3 35 12 19 7 16 2-x- I4 49 45 37 24 24 13 Heither U S nor Soviets use missile penetration aids § _ U S uses missile penetration aids Soviets do not b War-fighting Results - U S Uses Missile Penetration Aids J Pl 1 Level No Interceptors Area Terminal · 0 200 500 500 500 1000 0 0 0 1000 2000 4000 Crisis Stability Deaths a U S Soviet 13 M 17 24 23 61 51 -5 -5 -7 -8 -9 -8 M Damage Lirn i tation U S Deaths b 1st Soviet 1st U S Strike Strike 122 M 118 110 85 63 32 143 M 143 144 143 137 95 Relative Deaths C I - 7M 7 7 6 0 -41 Lives which can be saved by· striking first in scenarios in which the side strikinB first attempts to maximize the difference between its fatalities and those on the other side E f U S first strike missiles attack weapons only Soviet first strike niaximizes difference between U S and Soviet fatalities 2 Difference between U S and Soviet fa tali ties in a scenario in which Soviets strike first to maximize this difference Negative values indicate Soviet fatalities are greater than U S fatalities I -l C 16 Option III 1 Summary of Option Freeze on number of land-based and sea-based strategic offensive missile launchers including ICBMs SLBMs SLCMs and MR IRBMs Ban on land mobile strategic offensive missile launchers Changes in external silo a d or launcher configuration or relocation of launchers is prohibited Conversion of IR iYIRB 1 s to ICBMs prohibited The number of ABM launchers and interceptors will be agreed upon No limits on manned bombers and air defenses 2 Force Sunnnar-y- 1978 U S Total Forces Intercontinental Bombers UE ICBM Launchers Sof't Hard SLB -1 Launchers Fighter Interceptors Soviet 345 50 0 1027 656 266 136 1164 716 2300 17 3 Effectiveness a Retaliatory Capability · ABM Level Area Tenninal U S Retaliates Darnage to Soviet Union % Deaths Industrial Damage MO ·ct TF C TYC J i 0d Soviets Retaliate Damage to U S % Deaths Industrial Dsmage 0 200 500 500 500 1000 1000 5000 4o 40 39 37 36· 32 37 36 43 36 25 fri - 12 4-r 10 YI h a 0 0 0 1000 2000 4000 0 0 38 · 59 37 59 36 58 32 57 28 56 10 - 20 55 57 58 l Crisis Stability Deaths a Area Terminal U S Soviet 0 200 500 500 500 1000 0 0 0 1000 2000 4000 18 M 24 31 67 70 56 OM - 3 War-fighting Results - U S Uses Missile Penetration Aids ABM Level No Interceptor s 'E 42 37 24 19 19 5 Neither U S nor Soviets use missile penetration aids U S uses missile penetration aids Soviets do not Total force including bombers Missiles only b 53 52 50 47 45 23 - 5 -11 - 7 - 8 Damage Limitation u s Deaths b Soviet 1st U S 1st Strike Strike 111 M 105 95 58 44 18 142 M 141 140 142 132 88 Relative Deaths C I - 12 M 10 8 6 - 3 -47 Lives which can be saved by striking -f irst in scenarios in which the side striking first attempts to maximize the difference between its fatalities and those on the other side u S first strike missiles attack weapons only Soviet first strike maximizes difference bet - een U S and Soviet fatalities Difference between U S and Soviet fatalities in a scenario in which Soviets stril- e first to maximize this difference Negative values indicate Soviet fatalities are greater than U S fatalities _-1 ·- -· ' - I ·• DF · r _r -- t J • l • • · 1· I _ I __ - ·- •• ' r 18 c Military Targeting Results H1ssiles Only us - ---··- ABM 1L evel Area Terminal 0 200 500 500 500 1000 0 0 0 1000 2000 4000 Strike s First El Damage to Soviets RVs Arv RVs A rv %l iil on Cities on l iil Tgt Tgt Dest 521 553 487 90 J 794 967 4139 4035 4020 3024 3183 2484 24 3 23 1 22 2 15 2 16 5 14 4 Damage to us RVs A rv RVs Arv on Cities on Ifri l Tgt 201 225 242 310 527 366 Soviets Strike First Damage to Soviets b ABM Level A rea Terminal 0 200 500 500 00 1000 0 0 0 1000 2000 1 000 RVs A rv On Cities 601 622 610 755 715 983 · RVs Arv on Mil T t 2815 2728 2618 2054 2051 2094 %Mil Tgt Dest 15 4 15 3 15 1 13 3 14 2 13 9 RVs-Arv on Cities 70 141 118 439 653 765 El Mil Tgt Dest 834 35 7 20 1 667 411 17 4 166 7 6 22% fatalities iOC 2 fatalities Damage to US b RVs Arv on Mil Tgt 2726 2515 2327 1849 1440 333 %Mil Tgt Dest 73 7 70 6 66 8 67 5 41 7 15 2 In ord r to highlight the effects of changes in Ballistic l iissile Defenses calculations were made as to dam ge capa bility achievable through·· only ··- -- · ICBMs and SLB v s Damage producing capabilities of the total strategic forces of each side -rould be higher than that shovm The amount of damage increase achievable by adding bombers would be dependent upon the size and effectiveness assumed for the respective bomber and air defense forces Both the side striking rirst and the side striking second attempt to maximize military damage -with missile weapons over and above those needed to inflict 25% fatalities Unless otherwise noted RVs arriving on cities achieve 25% fatalities · 19 4 Violations a Sovj ets Deploy ABM Launchers at the Rate Shmm in the GTE Threat DeF age to Soviet Union Total Force Without Peri Ai is With Pen Aids Deaths Ind Dar11 Deaths Ind Dam ABM Level Year Area Terminal 1974 1976 1°78 12 5 680 12 1 5 0 lOOO 40 34 30 40 59 54 50 % Missiles Ori_ly Wimout Pen Aids Deaths Ind Dam 38 59 5 50 35 31 29 19 See DoD Strategic Force a nd Effectiveness Tables March 3 1969 for definition of GTE Threat and the rate of ABM deployment b Soviets Deploy 500 SS-Z-10 Mobile ICB i is AB 1 Level a ' § Area Ten 1ine l 0 200 500 500 0 0 0 1000 4o 40 38 36 3e 37 -36 32 59 59 58 57 53 52 50 47 Heither U S nor Soviets use missile penetration aids U S uses missile penetration aids Soviets do not c Soviets Convert 700 IR nRBl-ls to SS-Z-9 ICrn s ABM Level Area Ten inal ' a Da 9£e to Soviet Union it Nissiles Only b 'l'otal Force e Ind Da r 1 Deaths Ind Dam Deaths 0 200 500 500 I Damage to Sovj_et Union % Total Force of I Missiles Only bl Deaths Ind Dam Deaths Ind Da -n 0 40 39 37 35 0 0 1000 58 58 57 56 37 36 35 31 52 52 50 44 Neither U S nor Soviets use missile penetration aids '§_ U S uses missile penetration aids Soviets do not D · - j - - 't • · • ' f' S r 11-T · • 53 44· 27 r ' f 1 t_ 1 D- 1 ' • 1 d c C · S- ' · J _ 20 Up 2 rading of the Tallinn SA-5 System The possible u11grading of the Tallinn SA-5 air defense· system was considered under a range of assuri1ptions 1 That the upgraded Tallinn would be deployed at the low NIPP rate with one interceptor per Jauncher In 1973 1800 launchers are projected 2 That the upgraded Tallinn would be deployed at the high NIPP rate with one interceptor per launcher yielding a total of 3000 launchers in 1978 This case also approximates that of a deployment at the low NIPP rate with two interceptors per launcher 3 That the upgraded Tallinn would be deployed at the high NIPP rate wi thone reload per launcher yielding a capability of 6000 interceptors in 1978 ceptors It was assumed that each side was allm- ed 500 area interThe U S retaliatory ca _pabilities are as follows ABM Interceptors 2300 3500 6500 lfo U S missile 2300 3500 6500 Hith U S missile Pen-aids Pen-aids Damage to Soviet Union % Deaths Industrial Darnage 31 21 13 - 14 52 4o 35 37 33 21 62 58 40 5 Excursions To illustrate possible sensitivities to asymmetrical conditions excursions were conducted using the military damage criteria calculated with the SMIPET computeT model In each excursion calculations included dam age capabilities using only missiles and each side attempted to maximize military damage with missile weapons not needed to inflict 25 percent fatalities Each excursion is sunnnarized below and detailed results are shm-m in TAB H a Mix of Area and City ABM Defenses The purpose of this excursion was to investie ate the sensitivity of force capabilties to the ratio of area and terminal ABM defenses used by each side The base case utilized was the 1 500 ABM level in which the mixture was 500 area and 1 000 terminal city defense interceptors for both sides Three variations were investigated 1 he Soviets have 1 000 area 500 city interceptors and the the United States has 500 area 1 000 city interceptors 2 The Soviets have 500 area 1 000 city interceptors and the United st tes ha s 1 000 area 500 city inter eptors 3 Both si ies have 1 000 arC'a 5 00 city interceptors 21 The United States is able to achieve at least 25 percent fatalities in all cases The Soviets are unable to achieve 25 percent fatalities in the retaliatory strike made against the ·u s 1000 area a '1 d 500 city ABM U S capability against Soviet military targets is about the same in all cases in both the first strike and retaliatory modes Soviet second strike capability against U S military targets is reduced to zero in all cases When the Soviets strike first their capability against U S military targets remains high b Improved Soviet Tec1mology In this excursion we improved the Soviet force in MIRVs accuracy and yield beyond the basic CIA estimates for the Option III three t Specifically the SS-Z-3 was considered to have 10 RVs each with a yield of 2 0 J iT and a CEP of 0 16 I%i the SS-Z-9 -ras considered to have 3RVs each with a yield of 0 5 MT and a CEP of 0 16 NM the SS-Z-10 was considered to have 3 RVs each with a yield of 2 0 MT and a CEP of 0 25 NM the SS-N-5 yield -ras increased - There is no reason to believe that these improvements could not be -achieved if th Soviets were to decide to make irDprovements of this type There was no counter improvement in the U S forces This excursion was tested only at the zero ABM level At this level the Soviet tecJ nolo l ical improvements in offensive forces had very little effect upon the ce p3 bili ties of the U S to inflict m ili tary de mage on the Soviets after achieving 25 percent fatalities regardless of which side strikes first In the base case of 1500 ABM interc eptors the Soviets first strike capability against military targets 1· as 75% destruction of the ICBM rorce and 55% of other military targets The postulated increases in Soviet technology increased these fi€ -ures to 99'7 and 987a respectively In this case the U S would be dependent upon the alert bomber and SLBM capability for retaliatory capability c ASW Imp2·ove r1 0nts This e cursion was designed to illuminate the sensitivity of force capabilities to advances in antisubmarine warfare capability The capabilities of both US and Soviet base case offensive forces were examined in th cee cases each at an assumed ABM level of 500 area interceptors on each side 1 The United States loses 50 percent of its SLBM force 2 The Soviets lose 50 percent of their SLBM force 3 Both sides lose 50 percent of their SLBM force In all cases regardless of which side strikes first 25 percent fatalities are achieved If the Soviets strike first the U S second strike capability ranges from 10 to 18 percent against hard rnili tary targets and from 5 to 10 percent against sof't military targets in all cases Damage to U S military targets when the Soviets strike first ranges from 75 to 85 percent for hard targets and from 36 to 52 percent for soft tare ets I D • I • • ' r--_ -c J r-- •- • l 22 d Cheating This excursion 1 ras d signed to extend other cheating investigations in the report by including ABM cheating and b r targeting the US forces without knowledge of the cheating The purpose of the excursion is to show US force sensitivity to the postulated Soviet cheating instances separately and collectively The latter case may be of most significance because it can be argued logically that if the Soviets cheat they 11 cheat in as many areas as they believe they can do so covertly Several cases were examined 1 he agreed ABM level is 500 area and 1 000 terminal interceptors The Soviets covertly add 500 a 'ea interceptors The total 1 000 Soviet area interceptors are deployed as 600 midcourse interceptors effective agai -iSt ICBMs and 400 midcourse interceptors effective against SIJ 3Ms The United States has 500 area intercept9rs ' i 'he s e results can be com 9ared with the 1 500 ' Bl- level 500 areo 1 J J terminal base ce se 2 The agreed ABH level is 500 area interceptors The Soviets cove1·tJ y add 500 mobile land-based ICBMs These results can be compared with thase of the 500 ABM level all area interceptors base case 8 nd with the as1 u red clestnlction calculations shown on the 500 Am-1 line of paragTaph 4b above · 3 The agreed ABM level is 500 area int erceptors The Soviets covertly replace 0 IR 11 RB M with ICBMs These results can be compared 1-Titb those of the 500 ABM level all area interceptors base case and the 500 ABM line of paragraph l c 4 Combining cases 2 and 3 5 Same as 1 and in addition the Soviets covertly add the 500 mobile land-based ICBMs and covertly replace 700 IR MRBM with ICBMs In case 1 the u- S is able to achieve only five percent fatalities with missiles in the retaliatory mode If the U S strikes first Soviet fatalities are 25 8 percent and there is slight damage to the Soviet military targets Regardless of who strikes first the Soviets maintain their ability to achieve 25 percent fatalities They have a significant capability to _damage U S military targets when striking fi r st but in retaliation this capn bili 'ty is greatly reduced • In cases 2 3 and 4 both the US and Soviets maintain their ability to achieve 5_percen fatalities regardless of which side strikes first The US capab -lity against the Soviet military tarr ets remains essentially the same as in the base case except for a slight drop in damage to hard m·1·t 1 1 targets when the Soviets add 500 ICBMs ru Y oE5fWss · F1t o- 23 In case 5 the U S is unable to inflict 25 percent fatalities with its missiles when retaliating When the U S strikes first Soviet fatalities are 25 percent and there is a fair capability against Soviet military targets Regardless of which side strikes first the Soviets maintain good effectiveness against U S military targets e Penetration Aid Failures This excursion was designed to illuminate sensitivities which might exist if the U S were to experience a situation in which its missile penetration aids failed in an at tack originally planned under an assumption that they would function properly It was found that at an ABM level of 500 area interceptors and 1000 tenninal city defense interceptors unexpected failure of U S missile penetration aids had no significant effects upon the U S strategic nLi ssiles only effectiveness regardless of which side struck first B Option III - Superharden i ng Varian t 1 Summary of Option Same as Option III except superhardening and relocation of ICBM silos allowed 2 Force Svrnmary All Minuteman III ICBI- s relocated in superhard silos and 501 Soviet ICBi 1s including all soft missiles were relocated in superhard silos 3 Effectiveness a Retaliatory Capability ABI--1 Level 'l 'ennj_na 1 Area 0 0 500 a 0 U S Retaliates DaJna e to Soviet Union % a Nissiles Only Total Force Ind Darn I Fat I Ind Dam Fat 44 42 63 62 43 41 I 59 58 ' Soviets Retaliate Darna e to U S % b Total Force Ind Da m Fat 57 54 63 62 Neither U S nor Soviets use missile penetration aids §_ U S uses missile penetration aids Soviets do not E Option III - Freedom to Mix Sea Land Forces 1 Su rmnary of Option Freedrnn to relocate ICBI-1s to SLK s within the constraint of the totn l mmiber of missiles 24 2 J i'orce Summary 192 and 384 Minuteman II ICBJ Is and the same number of Soviet ICBMs were assurned to be dismanteled and this nu rfrber of additional SLB Ms deployed 3 Effectiveness a Retaliatory Capability 192 Missiles Relocated Druaage to Soviet Union Total Force Fatalities Industrial Damage Missiles Only Fatalities Industrial Damage 42% - · 6o°fo 44% 63% 42% 6o'fo Damage to U S Total Force Fatalities Industrial D2 mage 4 284 Missiles Relocated 39% 33% Excursions in 1-Uxinz Sea Land Offensive Forces a Cases Ex YJ ined Several asymmetrical sea la r1d offensive force mixes were examined through the military da2 1age criteria In each excursion calculations included damage capabilities using only missiles and each side attempted to maximize r Li li tary damage with missile wea-_flons not needed to inflict 25 percent fatalities • The excursions were suranarized belm·r and detailed results are shm- n at Tab H 1 Both Sid• S with Lorgcr Seo-Based than Land-Based Offensive Forces Each side had a lar er proportion of its offensive forces at sea than at land Also the sea land raix for each side was made to be about the same This was accomplished by assuming the Soviets replaced 592 SS-Z-9 I CBMs with SS-NZ-1 SLBMs and the U S replaced 384 MM II ICBMs with UIMS SLBMs 2 Soviets Larger Sea-Based than Land-Based and U S Lareer Land-Based Soviets e s in Case 1 but U S replaced 192 Poseidon missiles 12 SSBNs with MM III ICBMs 3 U S Has Larger Sea-Based than Land and Soviet Larger La lldBased Soviets had their base case forces but the U S replaced 592 ICBI is with Uil-lS SLBl-1s Lf J ot '1 Sj c s A bc 1- t Equ ally Dj vidc 'cl l-m c1 Sea Forces side replaced 192 IC 2i 3 - it h SIL-l s ·c··L s ·t ·Il - · · - DE Each ' DEEEASS f tED· b 25 Effectiveness Regard less of which side strikes first in all cases 25 percent fatalities are achieved If the Soviets strike first U S retaliatory damage on Soviet hard military targets ranged from about 19 percent 296 targets damaged out of total pf 1 566 in the base case to about 40 percent 386 targets damaged out of total of 974 in the case where both sides have large sea forces and small land forces Against other military targets the U S retaliatory damage on Soviet other military targets is about 8-10 percent 63 to 78 targets drunaged out of total 808 in all cases except large Soviet land force versus large U s sea force in which case it is about 78 percent 631 targets damaged out of total 808 5 Excursions ii1 Mixing Sea La rid B'-ID Forces a Agreed Level of 1500 AJi 1 Interceptors These cases were based upon a fixed level of 1000 lru1d based tenninal city ABM and 500 area interceptors Cases examined were 1 The 500 Soviet Area ABI-1 were all midcourse interceptors effective against land-based ICBJ s and the U S u'ea ABM were deployed natiorndde 2 The 500 U S Area ABJ· 1 consisted of 300 mid course interceptors effective Etgaj_nst lancl-based ICB1-lS a rid 200 midcourse interceptors effective against SLB1-1s The Soviet Arca ABM were deployed nationwide 3 The 500 Soviet Area AE-1 consisted of 300 midcourse intercept ors effective Pvgainst land-based ICBi'-1s and 200 mid course· ·interceptors effective against SLR-Is The U S Area ABM were deployed nationwide Each case was tested by the military damage criteria calculated with the SMIPET computer model using missiles only and requiring 25 percent fatalities Regardless of 1·rhicb side strikes first the 25 percent fatality objective was achieved In the case of the Soviets striking first the U S capability is insensitive to ABM mix except when the Soviets deploy midcourse interceptors against both ICBJ 1s and SLBMs In this case the U S has only enough weapons to achieve the 25 percent fatalities but has none left for use on military targets b ceptors Agreed Level of 1000 ABM Interceptors These cases were based upon a fixed level of 1000 ABM interCases examined were 1 The base case in which each side has 1000 area interceptors effective agaj_nst all offensive missile weapons 2 The 1000 Soviet interceptors are used as termin al city defem1ers 1'he l0CCJ U So JI El 1 consisted of 600 midcourse inte cce-ptors effective ac ainst IC B -ls and 400 mid course int ercq tors effective- against SLBt-1s i l Q v -r·--I'·ED DE LrtV 7 t ' _ -f J i l ' - • 26 3 The 1000 Soviet ABN consisted of 600 midcourse interceptors effective agajnst ICBMs and 400 midcourse interceptors effective against SLBMs The 1000 U S interceptors are used as tenninal city defenders Effectiveness In case 3 the U S is unable to achieve 25 percent fatalities in retaliation In all other cases both sides are able to achieve 25 percent fa tali ties regardless of wbich side strikes first In a11· Soviet first strike cases they are able to inflict signific_ant military damage to the U S When the U S deploys the midcourse interceptors the damage to hard targets is reduced from 80 percent in the base case to about 72 percent and the other military da-r iage is reduced from 40 percent in the base case to about five percent If the U S strikes first the Soviets are unable to damage U S military targets in retaliation except when they deploy midcourse interceptors In this case they achieve about 55 percent damage to the U S bard militar y targets and ·do not damage U S other military targets F Option IV 1 Summary of 0-otion Same as Option III except that the deployment and flight testing of NIRVs goBS and FDBS are prohibited 2 Force Surnnary 1978 u s Total Forces Intercontinental Bombers UE ICBM Launchers Soft Hard SLBM Launchers Fighter Interceptors OECL 1 - r - - ·'' '- Soviet 345 50 0 1027 656 266 136 1164 716 2300 27 3 Effectiveness a Retaliatory Capability ABM Level Terminal Area 0 0 0 1000 0 200 500 500 a b c ' § 38 33 29 25 Interceptors Area f 54 49 40 12-Y 20 63 60 56 39 57 52 4o 28 War-fighting Results - U S Uses Missile Penetration Aids ABI-i Level Ho £ 64 61 59 56 37 31 26 7 17 Soviets Retaliate U S Da age % £ Fatalities Ind Darn Neither the U S nor Soviets used missile penetration aids U S uses missile penetration aids the Soviets do not Total Force including bombers Missiles only b I U S Retaliates Soviet Damage % Fatalities Ind Da111 TF c_ MO TF MO d_ Tenr inal Crisis St ability Death s a u s Soviet - 6 M -9 - 8 -12 0 0 5 200 500 500 0 0 12 19 29 1000 M I Damage Li mi tation U S Deaths b u s 1st Soviet 1st Strike Strike 130 122 107 63 M 141 M 140 13 5 101 Relative Deaths C 17 M 15 11 -22 Lives which can be saved by striking first in scenarios in which the side striking first attempts to maximize the difference between its fatalities and those on the other side U S first strike missiles attack -reapons only Soviet first strike maximizes difference beti·reen U S and Soviet fatalities Difference between U S and Soviet fatalities in a scenario in which Sovi ts strike first to maximize this difference Negative values indicate Soviet fatalities are greater than U S fatalities c Comparisons with Option III Resuli s 1 For each level of ABM i nterceptors exrunined the Soviet retaliator y c apability is larger with Option IV than w ith Option III but the correspond i ng U S retaliatory c aiiabili ties are smaller '1- i th Option IV than with Option III 2 For l cv J 3 of Af'iI -1 of 500 are a interceptors and below the Sov iet retaliatory c apability with O rJt ion IV is signific antly larger than - - - - l • · • - • 4 · 28 the U S retaliatory capability with Option IV However with 1000 city terminal interceptors added to 500 area interceptors the U S retali tory capability becomes significantly la r ger than that of the Soviets 3 The nuinber of lives which the United States could save by striking first in a crisis is larger at all ABM levels with Option III than with Option IV Although the Soviets would actually lose lives by strking first with either Option III or IV these losses would be smaller with Option III than with 0-_ption IV particularly at lower levels of ABt-1 4 U S druuage limiting capabilities computed in a scenario with the United Stat es making · an all com1terforce first strike are better with Option III than with Option IV 5 U S damage limiting capabilities computed in a scenario with the Soviets striking first to maximize fatality differences are about the same id th Options III and IV if AH-1 levels are low but for higher levels this measure of effectiveness is better with Option IV than with Option III 4 Violations a Soviets Deploy ABi 11s at Rate Shown in GTE Threat Beginning in ·1973 Year ABi -1 Level Terr j na _ Area 1974 1976 1978 125 680 1125 - U S Retaliates r e 1 - 9 e to Soviet Union Industrial Da r age Fa talities o 62 38 34 8-x- 14 1or · 14 1000 3000 37 In order to test our ability to respond to this violation we assumed that the U S would bec in to deploy MIRVs at a rate 50o o greater tha 11 is currently programmed We exarrined two cases 1 R D on the Minuteman III and Poseidon was not cornpleted and 2 MIRV R D programs had been completed and the systems were ready for deployment The U S retaliatory capabilities under these two assmiptions are shmm in the following table U S Retaliates Soviet Do mage ° __ Deaths I Industrial Damage ABM Level Year Area Terminal I 1976 1978 980 1125 1976 1978 6t'io MIRV mm not completed 1000 3000 I 10' 0 I 24 29 I 51 54 MIRV R D corr pleted J 112s - o o r O c u 2CJ I 53 54 29 We also examined the ca se in which the Soviets deploy an additional 300 area interceptors at an agreed level of 200 interceptors The resulting damage to the Soviet Union was Deaths Industrial Capacity b Soviets Deploy 500 SS-Z-10 Mobile ICBMs ABM Level Area Tenninal 0 0 200 0 0 500 500 c 1080 U s Retaliates -· Damage to so- riet Unio % Deaths Industrial Dema ge 64 63 56 53 38 34 7 23 Soviets Convert 700 IRLMPJ3 1s to SS-Z-9 ICBi 1 s AI'- H Level Areo Tenninal 0 200 500 500 d 25% 54% 0 0 0 1000 u s Retaliates - Damap - to Soviet Union De _ Industrial Ds nage 34 29 22 - 18 60 55 47 4o Soviets Deploy MIRVs on 221 SS-9 ICBMs Three 3 5 -MT Warheads No Arn • Damage to the Soviet Union Deaths Industrial Capacity e Upgrading the Tallinn SA-5 System The possible upgrading of the Tallinn SA-5 air defense system was cons dered under a range of assmnptions 1 That the upgraded Tallinn would be deployed at the low NIPP rate with one interceptor per launcher In 1978 1800 launchers are projected 2 That the upgraded Tallinn would be deployed at the high NIPP rate with one interceptor per launcher yielding a total of 3000 launchers in 1978 This case also approximates that of a deployment at the low NIPP rate with two interceptors per launcher 30 3 That the upgraded Tallinn would be derJloyed at the hiGh l TIPP rate with one reload per launcher yielding a capability of 6000 interceptors in 1978 It was assumed that each side was allowed 500 area interceptors The U S retaliatory capabilities are as follmrn ABM Interceptors Area f U S Retaliates Darnage to Soviet Union % Deaths Industria l Daracge 2300 3500 6500 13 14 13-x 14 13-x 14 2-300 3500 6500 33 28 17 36 36 36 62 58 38 No U S tv tissile Pen-aids With U S Missile Pen-aids Excursions in Undetected Cheating _'f'hP cnpooilities of the U S r 1issile forces of Option IV MIRVs banned in the face of undetected cheating were exarnined for three levels of ABB o 200 and 500 area interceptors and three types of ABM cheating addition of new midcourse interceptors effective against SLP1-1s conversion of 501 of their land-b- - sed ICBi Is to have a dual capa bili ty for offense and area Bl'lD and conversion of 50 of their land-based ICBMs to have a dual capability for offense and terminal city defense Each case was tested in terms of the capabili t i es of the U S missiles to inflict both fatalities arid military daJnage in a second strike after undergoing a combined city military first strike by Soviet roissiles A scenario was used in which both the initiator and retaliato1· attempted to achieve 25% fatalities and then maximize military damage with niissiles not required for attacking cities When there was no Soviet cheating U S missiles were able to achieve 25% Soviet fa tali ties and destro r about 10% of the available military targets For the lm- agreed levels of ABM tested t 1e no-cheating results were relatively insensitive to the actual level of ABM because the projected U S missile force included about 13 000 area ABM decoys For all three agreed levels when the U s targeted assurning no cheating but encountered the cove i -t addition of 200 midcourse interceptors effective against SLBMs Soviet fatalities were reduced to 17 or 1817 and military damage was lowered slightly At an agreed level of 500 ABM covert addition of 100 midcourse interceptors did not lower the fatalities below 21% but adding 400 brought them dmm to 8° o The latter result was not changed significantly when the Soviets covertly added both the 400 midcourse interceptors and 400 land-mobile ICBMs Covert conversions by the Soviets of half of their land-based ICBJ js to have a dual capability as area ABM interceptors did not have much iJnpact on the U S missile perietration and the U S second strike carnbili ti es remained virtually unchangecl Hm- ever when the U S targeted 30a assuming no cheating but encountered the covert conversion of half the landbased Soviet ICBMs to dual capable terminal city defenders there was ·a significant difference in U S capabilities For each agreed ABM level examined the Soviet fatalities were reduced to 17 or 18% again and military damages were increased by small a ounts In view of the strong influence of U S missile penetration aids on the above calculations excursions were conducted to examine situations in which the U S did not use its penetration aids Under these circmnstances with no Soviet cheating U S missiles were still able to achieve the 25o o fatalities against an agreed level of 500 area ABMs but the damage to military targets becarne almost negligible When the Soviets covertly added 100 midcourse interceptors to this no penetration aids 500 ABM case Soviet fatalities decreased from 25o o to about 2l'fo Detailed results are shmm in Figures 11-A and 12-A of Tab H 5 Excursions in l-' ixing Sea Lancl E m Forces These excursions were conducted to examine only the 1000 ABM interceptor level Cases exa-rnined were a Both sides deployed their interceptors as nationwide area interceptors b The Soviets deployed their interceptors to provide terminal defense of cities and the U S deployed theirs as 600 midcourse interceptors effective against land-based ICBI is and 400 midcourse interceptors effective e gainst SLBl 1s c The Soviets deployed their interceptors as 600 midcourse interceptors effective against land-based ICBMs and 400 niidcourse interceptors effective against SLBr 1s and the U S deployed theirs to terminally defend cities Each case uas tested by the military damage criteria calculated with the SMIPET computer model using missiles only and requiring 25 percent fatalities U S retaliatory capabilities under the sy1rillletrical conditions of case a were not much different from what they were with zero ABMs and were not appreciably affected when the Soviets used terminal city defenders in case b However when the Soviets switched to midcourse interceptors the U S missiles could achieve only 20 percent fatalities in retaliation On the other hand the Soviet second strike capability was only about 13 percent fatalities in the synnnetrical case 25 percent fatalities plus destruction of only a few hard military targets when the U S used midcourse interceptors and 25 percent fatalities plus about 300 hard military targets when the U S terminally defended cities 31 G Additional Analysis In addition to the above calculations the following excursions were analyzed to test their possib le impact on a possible agreement The analyses were conducted for the force postuies under Option III for 1978 1 Hard Point Defense H PD The effects of defending the ICBM silos with terminal ABMs was investigated a Arca --0 200 500 500 9 1 a Retaliatory Capability AB -1 Level Terminal 0 0 0 0 E'PD U S Retaliates Soviets Retaliate Soviet D 11· a£7e I U S Damae e % E Deaths Ind Dam DeathsnDa -- 640 J280 1920 640 43 43 43 41 43 44 38 3 3 0 60 65 61 neither the U S nor Soviets used missile penetration aids '§_ U S used missile penetration aids the Soviets did not b War-fiGhtilig Results - U S Uses Missile Penetra t·ion Aids ABM Level Area HPD 0 200 500 500 800 2000 Crisis Sta1 ili t r Deaths a Da ' nage LL'lli tation U S Deaths b Relative U S 1st Soviet 1st Deaths _ Strike Strike ------Soviet u s -----· - --·--- ----15 M 21 27 -3M -8 -7 113 M 108 103 J 142 M 143 144 9M 8 8 Lives which can be saved by striking first in scenarios in which the side striking first attempts to maximize the difference between its f' tali ties and those on the other side U S first strike missiles attuck weap0ns only Soviet first strike maximizes difference between U S and Soviet fatalities Difference between U S and Soviet fatalities in a scenario in which Soviets strike first to maximize this difference Negative values indicate Soviet fatalities are gren ter than U S fatalities 32 2 Variation in the Mix of Area aY1d Tenninal ABM Interceptors The effects of various mixe$ of area and terminal AE 1 intercept ors in the U S and Soviet retaliatory capabilities was investigated at the level of 2500 interceptors The results a ·e shom1 in the following talJle U S Second Strike Capability u s ABM Level Area Tenninal Soviet ABM Level Area Terminal Total Force Soviet Fataliti1 s % w o U S with U S Missile Missile Pen-Aids Pen-Aids Mis'siles Only Soviet Fatalities % Withovt U S Missile Pen-Aids 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 500 500 500 500 500 500 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 26 26 30 33 36 39 - U S Fatalities 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 e 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 500 500 500 500 500 500 03 - 4 ox- 4 03 -f 11o-x- 4 4-x 10 11-x-I 20 30 30 32 34 36 39 o a E 28 13 19 llf 18 1 19 cy- 20 13- - - I 20 There - ere no Soviet rniss ile penetration aids U S used missile p netralion aids Soviets did not Z'1 If' r • al - - ' J ·· tt · 4 18 20 22 24 28 lCJli- 30 33 NUMBER OF MISSILE RVs OPTION I ABM T evel Area 0 200 500 500 500 000 DETONATI NG ON SECONU STRIKE us Terminal RV's SU RV's 0 2401 2272 2095 1720 1516 1108 1072 905 658 228 208 110 0 0 1000 2000 4000 DPTIOH III SU RV's RV's 2378 2247 2068 1694 1487 1076 OPTION IV us SU RV's RV's us 606 462 216 116 117 0 512 400 308 243 HARD OINT DEFENSE Terminal HPD 0 200 500 6 -1-0 1280 1920 2505 2550 2522 676 542 316 SUPEllARDENil'lG 2726 2489 0 500 1758 1346 FREEI OM TO MIX 500 192 missiles movecl to sea 500 38 mis s ile s t o s ea mred 2914 3864 168 193 - Results obtained from retaliatory capability calculations ·r- I 4 • r H D 818 6 7 399 151 • 34 TABLE IV-2 _ EMT DETONATING on SECorm STRIKE a Using 'l'otal Forces vs Ci ties - _ABM Le __ usowo -· 1---i UQ 1- --- fsION Area Terminal 0 200 500 500 500 1000 0 200 500 0 0 0 1000 2000 4000 Er✓rr EMT EM r Elv 1T 500 513 487 443 419 392 903 764 560 213 185 96 489 481 472 429 404 379 515 398 186 109 99 578 620 633 591 481 281 Terminal HP D 61 0 1280 1920 i ·- ·- --•0--•·1 EMr E rr 695 1022 567 819 471 511 403 - 239 1 0 SUPERKA RDENII TG 619 607 0 500 1794 1376 Freedom to MIX I II -'a 7 500 192 Missiles moved to sea 500 384 Missiles moved to sea 567 649 121 125 __L -- ·--------·· From retaliatory capabiJ i ty calculations in which the side strikin6 first uses all missiles in a counterforce role and the side stril ing second uses all surviving forces including bombers against urba industrial complexes ' r•· _ -- ' • DE tA -s F Lo I 35 TABLE IV-3 Ei-lT DETOHATIHG ON SECOl'ID STRIKE Missiles Only 25% Fatalities Plus Military Targets OP TOY TTI us 0 0 200 0 5co 5co 0 lOJO 500 lCOJ 20 0 l OJO 1000 0 OP IO IV US E - T Fs tso rv il l • ' i ' 0 1 e so l' il 7 1 -J l 4 11 0 L Lo ' ' 21 8 282 238 44T 246 304 597 347 153 156 - - 115 125 130 I 171 471 192 936 180 797 60 157 3 io 553 326 - 1 0 -- 5co o c 0 c O e 1' 9 500 Of 112 500 soc 99 97 160 150 -7 1 0 1 31 159 J 337 241 a 7 FR3 00 ·- TO '- IX DE S'EXSIVE FO i CES r 166 h 122 432 21% 183 -·BL·r 0 328 854 212 199 390 a F co ·11 j ili ta ry Ta rgeting Results Both initiator and retaliator as i'c e rt iss iles to achteve 25% f tali ties and use all remaining b missile on mili ary targets Un ·2s s ot ' ieri• 'ise inci icc ted E ·fiT in Fa ts column acnieved r• r _ r • c_• · _ --s i 7r ·A · - sea force c 1 BCo 1 d So iets large S Ga force US large land force J e ' - Sov iet s l8 r 6 e l s nd fOi'Ce US lar 6 e sea force 3o t sides abo t eq ally divided la d sea ' Sov ets 1000 ter nal US 1000 midcourse intercep ors n Sov· c - s 1000 r c oi c se int ircepto cs 1 S 1000 te c na l I - - · - 257j 9 38c set D APPENDIX -------TAB A - Possible Alternative Options For Strategic Arms Control TABB - U S Forces TAB C - Estimated Costs of U S Forces TAB D - Soviet Forces TAB E - Estimated Costs of Soviet Forces TAB F - Static Comparisons of U S and Soviet Forces TAB G - War-fighting Calculations TAB H - Analysis of Force Capabilities Considering Military Targeting TAB I - Analytical Methods and Models Used in Calculating Warfighting and Retaliatory Capabilities -TAB A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS FOR STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL ' JOP·'SECRE A-1 ' POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE OP 'IONS FOR STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL BASIC OP 'ION I FREEZE OF NUMBERS OF IAND-BASED OFFENSIVE MISSILE IAUNCHERS In this option the U S would propose a freeze of the number of fixed land-based strategic offe sive missile launchers with no constraints on sea-based missiles Mobile land-based strategic offensive missiles would be completely banned There would be no restrictions on MIRVs on any other improvements of IC or on ABM characteristics In this and other options land-based strategic offensive missiles would be defined to include all land-based missiles with a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers This definition is intended to exclude U S Pershing missiles and Soviet Scaleboard SS-12 tactical missiles For each of the basic options a range of ABM levels will be considered this range is described after the description of the four basic options A Fixed Land-Based ICBM Launchers This option would require cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive fixed land-based missile launchers as of July 1 1969 except to replace launchers on a one-for-one basis The Soviet Union would be permitted to complete the launchers which it is constructing as of that date Under no circumstances would either side be permitted to deploy more than 1300 fixed ICBM launchers excluding launchers for R D T E and training No restrictions would be imposed on one-forone replacement or relocation of ICBM launchers with new or improved types No restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed including increasing the hardness of existing silos and deployment of MIRVs MRVs or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles The prohibition on additional construction applies to the deployment of new launchers f 2r_p_a ial or multiple orbit strategic missile systems although deployment of such weapons -in launchers would be permitted within the allowed total number of ICBM launchers B Fixed Land-Based IRBM MRBM Launchers Further construction of fixed land-based launchers for IRBM MRBMs ranges greater than 1000 km would be prohibited The retrofitting of existing IRBM MRBM launchers to accommodate ICBM missiles would be prohibited The installation of ICBM missiles on IRBM MRBM launchers would be prohibited as would the conversion of IRBM MRBM missiles to ICBM missiles Building of additional IRBM MREM silos enlarging of existing silos changing basic external configuration of silos and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles ot intermeditate or medium range -E R Tv i 0R1l l C A-2 Mobile Land-Based Offensive Missile Systems This option would impose a complete ban on deployment testing and production of mobile land-based strategic offensive missile systems ranges greater than 1000 km Missile systems with such ranges carried by waterborne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited Any such existing systems would be destroyed Flight testing of strategic offensive missiles in a mobile system configuration would be prohibited D Sea-Based Offensive Missile Systems No restrictions would be imposed on strategic offensive missilelaunching submarines or ships or on additional or improved sea-based launchers E ABM This option would ban the deployment of more than a set and equivalent number of antiballistic missile launchers and associated antiballistic missiles including reload missiles a nd associated radar'FJ There would be on the characteristics of the ABM system deployed See no constraint Alternative ABM Variants below F Aircraft and Antiaircraft Systems This option would not include limitations on aircraft or antiaircraft systems G R1 D T 1 E Launchers Land•based missile launchers for research development testing evaluation and training would be ermitted but their total number on each side could not exceed an agreed Lnumber percentage of that side's permitted number of operational land-based missile launchers H Technological Improvements There would be no prohibition of technological improvements I BASIC OPl'ION II DECL M FREEZE OF NUMBERS OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE IAUNCHERS A-3 In this option the U S would propose a freeze of the numbers of land-based and sea-based strategic offensive missile launchers respectively There would be no restrictions on MIRVs on any other improvements of ICBMs or on ABM characteristics Mobile ICBMs would be permitted within the total allowed number of ICBMs In Basic Option II the provisions in Sections A B E F and Hof Option I would apply and the following provisions would be added Mobile I and-Based Offensive Missile Systems Mobile ICBMs would be permitted within the allowed combined total of fixed and mobile ICBM launchers either 1300 or the number under construction on July 1 1969 whichever is less Mobile IRBMs MRBMs would be prohibited · Sea-Based Offensive Missile Systems This option would limit the numbers of SLBM launchers and SU M launchers respectively to the number of each type which are operational or under construction as of July 1 1969 - subject to agreement on the numbers under c_o nstruction There would be no other restrictions on the replacement of SLBMs or SLCMs or their launchers by improved versions but SLCMs could not be replaced by SLBMs SLBM launchers could be replaced by surface-ship missile launchers on a one-for-one basis R1 D T E Launchers Land-based or sea-based missile launchers for research development testing evaluation and training would be permi1ted but their total number of each side could not exceed an agreed Lnumber o'f percentage of that side's permitted number of operational missile launchers VARIANT II-A FREEZE OF SUM OF ICBM AND SLBM IAUNCHERS This option is identical to Basic Option II except that the total number of ICBM and SLBM launchers existing or under construction as of July 1 1969 would be frozen Within that overall ceiling each side would be permitted to vary the mix of land-based and sea-based offensive ballistic missile launchers as desired L A-4 BASIC OPl'ION III FREEZE OF NUMBERS AND CERTAIN TYPES OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE IAUNCHERS WITH MIRVs ALLOWED In this option the U S would propose a freeze of the numbers of land-based and sea-based strategic offensive missile launchers respectively as well as certain limited qualitative restrictions and a ban on mobile land-based missiles MIRV testing and deployment would be allowed A Fixed land-Based ICBM Launchers This option would require cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive land-based missile launchers as of July 1 1969 The Soviet Union would be permitted to complete the launchers which it is constructing as of that date Beyond that date however it would not be allowed to initiate further construction of fixed ICBM launchers Under no circumstances would either side be permitted to deploy more than 1300 ICBM launchers excluding launchers for R D T E and training Building of additional silos enlarging of existing silos changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers -and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed including increasing the hardness of existing silos and deployment of MIRVs MRVs or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles The prohibition on additional construction applies to the deployment of new launchers for partial or multiple orbit strategic missile systems although deployment of such weapons in launchers would be permitted within the allowed total number of ICBM launchers B Fixed I and-Based IRBM MREM Launchers Further construction of fixed land-based launchers for IRBM MRBMs ranges greater than 1000 km would be prohibited The retrofitting of existing IRBM MRBM launchers to accommodate ICBM missiles would be prohibited The installation of ICBM missiles on IRBM MRBM launchers would be prohibited as would the conversion of IRBM MRBM missiles to ICBM missiles Building of additional silos enlarging of existing silos changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles of intermediate or medium range C Mobile Land-Based Offensive Missile Systems This option would impose a complete ban on deployment testing and production of mobile land-based strategic offensive missile systems ranges greater than 1000 km Missile systems with such ranges carried by waterborne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited Any such existing systems would be destroyed Flight testing of strategic offensive missiles in a mobile system configuration would be prohibited l DECLBIIW D A-5 Sea-Based Offensive Missile Systems 1 This option would ban the construction of additional strategic offensive missile launching submarines or of additional launchers in xisting submarines This prohibition would apply to all submarines with ballistic missile or cruise missile launchers Such submarines under construction as of July 1 1969 could be completed subject to agreement on their number There would be no limitations on the characteristics of SLBMs or SICMs or on retrofitting existing missile submarines with new or larger missiles of the type with which they are equipped i e ballistic or cruise-type missiles The fitting-out of surface ships with facilities for firing offensive strategic ballistic missiles would be prohibited 2 There would be no replacement of operational ballistic or cruise missile submarines within the first five years of the agreement During that period the two sides would undertake to reach agreement on rules governing subsequent -replace ent of submarines In the absence of a supplementary agreement on such rules each side may replace submarines after five years from the date of the initiation of the agreement provided that replacement does not increase the total number of submarines or of launcher tubes for submarine-launched ballistic missiles or cruise missiles E ABMs This option would ban the deployment of more than a set and equivalent number of fixed land-based antiballistic-missile launchers associated antiballistic missiles including reload missiles a£ d associated radar 'ff A total prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems both land-based and sea-based would be imposed There would be no other constraints on the characteristics of the ABM systems deployed See Alternative ABM Variants below F Aircraft and Antiaircraft Systems This option would not include limitations on aircraft or antiaircraft systems G R D T E Launchers Land-based or sea-based missile launchers for research development testing evaluation and training would be permitted but their total number on each side could not exceed an agreed jiumber o i percentage of that side's number of operational missile launchers H Technological IllIJ rovements There would be no prohibition of technological improvements other than those specified l OFORN A-6 Hard-rock superhardening and relocation of ICBM silos would be permitted VARIANT III-B FREEZE OF SUM OF ICBM AND SLBM IAUNCHERS This option is identical to Basic Option III exceptthat the total number of ICBM and SLBM launchers existing or under construction as of July 1 1969 would be frozen Within that overall ceiling each side would be permitted to vary the mix of land-based and sea-based offensive ballistic missile launchers as desired L SECRET BASIC OPI'ION IV NOFORN A-7 FREEZE OF NUMBERS AND CERTAIN TYPES OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE IAUNCHERS WITH MIRVs PROHIBITED This option is identical to Basic Option III except that the U S would also propose that multiple independently targetted reentry vehicles MIRVs and certain types of flight tests be prohibited I In addi tioa to al l the restrictions lis ted in Option III the deployment of MIRVs would be totallyprohib ini as would further flight-testing of MIRVs including any post-boost maneuvering and the testing of any multiple reentry vehicles maneuvering reentry vehicles MIRVs fractional and multiple orbital weapon systems FOBS and MOBS and depressedtrajectory ICBMs There would be no restriction on the improvement ·of flighttesting of other offensive missile system characteristics U S ability to verify an agreement based on this option should be evaluated both with and without a provision i-n the agreement that all strategic missile and space firings both military and non-military would be pre-announced and conducted on agreed ranges SE-CR l NOF'ORN A-8 ALTERNATIVE ABM VARIANTS Along with each of these four basic options for offensive missiles consideration should be given to alternative variants with respect to ABM levels as follows ABM Level 1 All ABM launchers j nd associated radarif would be prohibited and any such existing systems would be destroyed except that an agreed limited number of R D T E launchers and radars would be permitted ABM Level 2 Each side could deploy up to 100 BM launchers and 100 associated missiles including reload missiles Lalong with associated radarif ABM Level 3 Each side could deploy some agreed level of missile defense up to a maximum of 1000 area ABM launchers and up to a maximum of 1500 terminal ABM launchers and associated missiles including reload missiles _a long with associated radar'FJ ADDITIONAL ABM VARIANT For the various cases studied under ABM Level 3 each side would be permitted to vary the mix it deploys of land-based and sea-based ABM launchers with associated missiles and radars This is implicit in Options I and II and would also be examined as an additional excursion to Variant III-B In performing analyses some assumptions must be made regarding types of ABM interceptors and their locations It is suggested that the calculations be carried out for the various levels as follows This is only a suggestion for consideration by the Working Group and Systems Analysis 1 No ABM 2a U S S R - 100 area ABM launchers with associated missiles and radars optimally deployed for population defense U S - Same 2b u s S R - Same as 2a except that the deployments include the present Moscow system Additional deployments up to agreed limits are of the same types already deployed and are for the purpose of completing the existing system L A-9 I U S - 3a 3b 3c - ·- L Same as 2a except that the facilities are located in North Dakota and Montana and are for the purpose of providing protection for Minuteman sites This is essentially the Phase I deployment of the Safeguard System Various levels and mixes of urban and hard-point defenses will be analyzed in the ranges 100-1000 area ABM launchers and 100-1500 terminal ABM laun_c hers with associated missiles and radars TAB e U S FORCES L B-1 DECL ijS ED t U S Forces This Tab presents the baseline U S forces and weapons characteristics for the various options The forces and characteristics are as close to the currently approved program as the option constrainta allow In parti- cular the Minuteman III FB-III and SRAM program were adjusted to conform to recent revisions to the FY 70 budget Since the options do not place any constraints on bomber forces or air defenses the programmed bomber and air defense forces are used throughout for comparability No ABM deployments were specified in the force tables since these were varied in the analysis L DU S 1f jGPAPERS B ' sel i ne Forces 01' ltion I ' Inter ontinental Bombers UE B-52 E-58 FB-111 Titan 'iinutcman I l inutcman II Minutemun III 2 RV Minuteman III 3 RV In Mocii rnization l 941 Subtotal Sea Based Missile Launchers On Line Polaris A-2 Polaris A-3 Poseidon In Conversion Overhaul Subtota l Tot al ICBM and SLBM Launchers FY72 -FY 73 F'f 4 FY75 345 75 30 285 75 60 285 75 60 285 285 75 60 60 54 450 494 5 5 46 · 54 350 494 55 · 55 46 54 207 494 120 120 59 45 54 47 487 480 204 257 203 257 6 59 FY76 FY77 FY78 285 285 285 285 60 60 60 60 45 36 36 27 473 261 260 6 466 264 264 6 459 268 2676 452 271 271 6 1054 1054 1054 1054 1045 1045 272 16 176 320 144 0 160 352 144 0 128 368 160 0 96 ·368 192 0 0 128 16o 368 352 16o 144 656 656 · 656 656 656 656 656 128 192 160 656 1710 1036 1036 1027 ll 128· 144 176 208 368 128 ---- - -- ' FY71 64 1710 · 1710 1710 1701 1701 ADM Levels will be varied in excursions to the Baseline Forces i FY70 Land Based ICBM Launchers • On Line -- 656 1692 1692 1683- ' SLBM levels will be varied in excursions to the Baseline Forces t P I I o# SECff D Option II • FY70 FY7l Intercontinental Bombers UE B-52 3-58 FB-111 Yiinutcr ian I ir utcman II Mfouteman III 2 RV Minuteman III 3 RV In r- otlernizution t 94L Subtotal Sea Based Missile Launchers· On Line Polaris A-2 Po laris A-3 Poseidon In Conversion Overhaul Subtota l Total ICBM and SLBM Launchers --- ·- --------- i FY 73 FY 4 FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 345 75 30 285 75 60 285 285 285 75_ 75 ·60 - 60 60 285 285 285 285 60 60 60 60 54 450 494 5 5 46 · 54 350 494 55 55 46 54 207 494 120 J 20 59 45 54 47 487 480 204 257 203 257 6 59 45 36 36 27 473 261 260 6 466 264 264 6 459 268 2676 Land Based ICBM Launchers · On Line 'I·itan FY72 PAPERS 1054 1054 1054 1054 1045 L045 • 452 271 271 6 1036 1036 1027 I _ 128 368 160 128 192 64 272 16 128· 144 176 176 320 208 144 0 160 352 144 0 128 368 160 0 96 368 192 0 128 368 160 0 160 352 144 656 656 656 656 656 656 656 656 656 1710 1710 · 1710 1710 1701 1701 1692 1692 1683- AB 1 Levels will be varied in excursions to the Baseline Forces b 1 I w I -- -----· -- -· - ·· --- ·· - -- -- - ------ --- - -- - - - - oa riffJf-s t ti - APERS U S · Basel i ne Forces o etion III· • Intercontinental Bombers UE B-52 B-58 B-111 FY 70 FY 71 FY72 FY 73 345 75 30 285 75 60 285 75 60 285 285 75 60 60 285 285 60 60 60 60 54 450 494 5 5 46 ·54 350 494 55 55 46 54 207 494 120 120 59 45 54 47 487 · 480 204 257 203 257 6 59 45 36 36 27 466 459 264 268 264 267 6 6 452 271 Land Based ICBM Launchers ·· · On Line 'I'ita '1 ff inuteman I i inutc na n II Minutemun III 2 RV Mim tcman III 3 RV In rt otlernization 494L Subtotal Sea Based Missile Launchers On Line Polaris A-2 Polaris A-3 Poseidon In Conversion Overhaul Subtotal Total ICBM and SLBM Launchers _ _- - · i I FY 4 iFY75 473 261 260 6 1054 1054 1054 1054 io45 1045 FY 76 FY 77 FY78 285 · 285 271 6 1036 1036 1027 __ 128 368 160 128 192 64 272 128 144' 176 208 16 176 320 144 0 160 352 144 0 128 368 160 0 96 368 192 0 128 368 160 352 144 656 ·656 656 656 656 656 656 656 656 1710 1710 · 1710 1710 1701 1701 AR Levels will ·be varied in excursions to the Baseline Forces 0 l6o 1692 1692 1683· ' · The mix of land-based and soa-based offensive missile launchers -will be examined as a variant to SECRET I I O tion IV' · • - - · i ' FY70 FY7l FY72 FY73 Intercontinental Bombers UE B-52 B-58 FB-111 · 345 75 30 285 75 60 54 450 504 p50 6o4 46 46 FY 4 FY75 FY76 · py77 TI78 285 285 28·5 75 · 75 ·60 - 60 60 285 285 285 285 60 60 60 60 45 54 47 894 ' 994 45 36 36 27 94 -994 994 994 6' • 6 6' Land Eased ICBM Launchers ·On Line 'I itan liinuteman I Xir utcman II Minuteman III 2 ·RV Minuteman III 3 RV In Mockrnization 1 941 Subtotal Sea Based Missile Launchers On Line Polaris A-2 Polaris A-3 Poseidon In Conversion Overhaul Subtota l Total ICBM and SLBM Launchers 54 54 207 734 59 59 6 1054 1054 1054 1054 1045 lo45 160 128 192 64 272 128· 16 144 176 176 320 208 144 656 656 656 128 368 6 1036 1036 ·1027 0 160 352 144 0 128 368 160 0 0 096 128 16o 368 368 352 192 160 144 656 · 656 656 656 1710 1710· 1710 1710 1701 1701 656 656 1692 1692 1683- ABM Levels will be varied in excursions to the Baseline Forces to I J1 • - ECL f ED - _ · B-6 B-52 Bomber Loadi s Dey--to-Dey- Alert a B-52 with SRAM SCAD Average No SRAMS per Alert B-52 -- FY 72 D 3 9 20 20 74 75 1§ 77 78 9 15 27 33 33 11 8 6 5 5 Average No SCADS per Alert B-52 3 4 5 5 5 Average No Unarmed SCADS per Alert B-52 6 8 9 10 10 a It is assumed that 60% of the SRAM SCAD inventory is required for day- to-day alert loadings B-52 and FB-111 and that 80% could be available for generated alert loadings For generated alerts all alert FB-llls are loaded with 4 SRAM with the B-52s utilizing the remainder I l DE SECREf SIFIE-D u s WeaEon Titan Minuteman I Minuteman II ¥ inuteman III Minuteman III Polaris A-2 Polaris A-3 Poseidon MIRV Poseidon A-3 WH rJ ULMS Alert B-52 w Bombs Alert B-58 w Bombs Alert FB-lll_ljw SRAM SCAD E f § § lj_ j_ E 1 3 2 1 1 10 1 10 5 2 5 4 1 - Force Characteristics Number Independently Target able Warheads Yield 1 1 - CEP 9 0 90 80 1 2 1 2 35 25 17 17 25 1 1 1 0 1 1a 80 o 16 80 1 r o 16 20 1 37 20 1 96 2 33 2 09 Area Aim Points 1 1 9 15 12 1 1 10 9 10 NA NA NA NA Terminal Aim Points 1 1 1 3 12 l 3 10 6 10 NA NA NA NA Alert Rates Genera ed Ilay- o-Day 95 95 95 95 95 0 72 72 72 72 83 40 40 40 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 80 80 80 NA NA 95 95 95 95 95 l 0 Reliabili t y Launch if In-FlightE 95 · 95 95 95 95 · • 95 95 95 95 95 98 98 98 90 Probability of successful launch of an alert weapon Includes warhead reliability Prior to FY 74 MMIII with 2 RVs will have 15 area aim points and 2 terminal aim points Polaris A-3 and Poseidon with A-3 have 3 MRVs each with a yield of 225 MT The equivalent yield of the 3 warheads is 1 1 MI' Polaris CEP is 25 prior to FY 74 In FY 70 71 the FB-llls each carry 4 bombs with an average yield of 54 Mr per bomb Includes the Antelope penaids For B-52 with SRAMs the in-flight reliability is 0 87 DE 6 ECL i · FIED 82 · 89 89 · 86 86 90 90 87 90 87 97 97 87 0 93 DECL I' FIED B-8 · · U S Base Line Air Defenses Fixed for all Options FY70 FY71 FY72 FY73 FY74 • Aircraft AAI Air Force F-101 F-102 F-lo4 F-106 F-106X Air National Guard F-102 SAMs on Site IOMARC Nike Hercules and Ajax Army ANG HAWK Regular SAM Batteries IOMARC Squadrons Nike Hercules and Ajax Army ANG HAWK Regular 134 29 26 238 FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 134 134 134 134 26 238 26 238 26 219 19 26 238 238 238 238 238 107 28 28 28 28 861 861 717 717 288 288 861 717 288 861 717 288 861 717 288 50 47 8 50 47 8 50 47 8 345 285 285 285 148 140 132 124 861 717 288 861 717 288 861 717 288 861 717 288 6 6 6 6 50 47 8 50 47 8 50 47 8 50 47 8 Equivalent to deployed operational missiles SECRET 50 47 8 50 47 8 Excludes training launchers TAB C ESTIMATED COSTS OF U S FORCES _ - 11 t -r- f •• • __ · 1nc IL J - J orr f l uFIED l8BJR1E u s ESTIMATED COST - NSSM 28 OPI'ION I-III a '$ in Millions - FY 70 FY 71 FY 72 FY 73 FY 74 FY 75 FY 76 FY 77 FY 78 BOMBERS 1900 1850 1500 1350 1350 1350 1250 1200 1200 ICBM's 1600 1400 1100 550 500 500 500 500 500 SLBM's 2250 2400 2250 2000 2000 1750 1250 1250 1250 ABM's 900 1150 500 300 250 200 150 150 150 AIR DEFENSE 900 1350 1400 1450 1750 1750 1750 1750 1750 2450 2550 2500 2500 2550 2 n00 2750 2650 2650 TarAL STRATIDIC FORCES 10000 10700 9250 8150 8400 8150 7650 7500 7500 mooRAM IIIY 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 ffiOGRAM VI 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 · 1150 1150 16150 16850 15400 14300 14550 14300 13800 13650 13650 arHEREI TarAL y Includes SAFEGUARD PHASE I Costs Includes BOS Training Command Family Housing and Allocated Portions of Programs VII ij_ Allocated Portion of Intelligence and Ccmnunications Y Allocated Portion of Research and Developnent Average Average FY70-78 FY 71-77 8600 8550 14750 14700 VIII ' I I-' lJ Lli J r-·· • ·sEC' f l'ff -r l LI u -OE L cF-S flED SECRET y U S ESTIMATED COST-NSSM 28 OPI'ION III - VARI ANT $ in Millions FY 70 FY 71 FY 72 FY 73 FY 74 FY 75 FY 76 FY 77 FY 78 FY70-78 Average FY71-77 15000 15400 14600 13750 14050 13850 13300 13150 13150 14000 14000 0 ABM 15700 16050 15200 14250 14500 14250 13750 13600 13600 14550 14500 200 ABM 15850 16250 15750 14900 14850 14450 13900 13700 13700 14800 14800 500 ABM 16100 16600 15800 14900 15200 14800 14100 13800 13800 15000 15050 1500 ABM 17050 17800 16500 15400 15500 14800 14100 13900 13900 15450 15450 2500 ABM 17250 18700 18100 17500 17000 15700 14950 14750 14750 16500 16650 5000 ABM 17300 19000 18700 18400 18700 18100 16650 15500 15300 17500 17850 Average BASELIN FORCE PLUS y Includes Programs III and VI J Does not include SAFEGUARD PHASE I ' I I • r '7- - u s c r8ECR' 1 F EO ESTIMATED COST - NSSM 28 OPI'ION IV in Millions FY 70 FY 71 FY 72 FY 73 FY 74 FY 75 FY 76 FY 77 FY 78 BOMBERS 1900 1850 1500 1350 1350 1350 1250 1200 1200 ICBM's 1450 1250 1100 700 500 500 500 500 500 SLBM's 2250 2400 2250 2000 2000 750 1250 1250 1250 ABM's 900 1150 500 300 250 200 150 150 150 AIR DEFENSE 900 1350 1400 1450 1750 1750 1750 1750 1750 aumiEJ 2450 2550 2500 2500 2550 2600 2750 2650 2650 TarAL STRATEGIC FORCES 9850 10550 9250 8300 8400 8150 7650 7500 7500 ffiOGRAM III 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 PROGRAM VI 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 · 1150 1150 16000 16700 15400 14450 14550 14300 13650 13650 Average FY70-78 Average FY7l-77 8550 8550 14700 14700 TarAL y_ • 13800 Includes SAFEGUARD PH ASE I Cost 'ij_ Includes BOS Training CODDD and Family Housing and Allocated Portions of Programs VII VIII Allocated Portion of Intelligence and Communications '§ Allocated Portion of Research and Developnent 0 I w D TAB D SOVIET FORCES TOP SECRET D D - • ' SOVIET FORCE a OPI'ION I Intercontinental Bombers UE BEAR BEAR with ASMs BISON Total UE Intercontinental Bombers FY70 FY7l E FY73 FY74 72 FY76 II FY78 30 80 30 llio 30 80 30 140 30 8o 135 25 80 20 125 20 8o 20 5 8o 120 0 70 10 100 Bo 0 6o 0 'Go 0 50 0 50 142 0 6o 0 30 0 0 0 0 b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 69 9 198 30 0 0 0 800 0 50 69 0 156 90 24 0 0 Boo 0 100 0 69 0 126 120 24 24 0 700 100 100 30 0 126 120 24 0 0 0 •O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 126 246 0 800 0 100 0 0 0 0 24 126 246 0 800 2 W Land-Based ICBM Launchers On-IJ ne f t ICBM Launchers SS-7 8 ss-Z-3 Retrofit Hard ICBM Launchers SS-7 ss-8 SS-9 SS-9 MRV ss-Z-3 Single RV SS-Z-3 MIRV ss-Z-3 Retrofit MIRV SS-11 SS-Z-9 Retrofit SS-13 SS-Z-10 Retrofit Mobile ICBM Launchers SS-13 ss-z-10 Retrofit Total Land-Based ICBM Launchers On-Line 0 0 0 0 0 0 298 1299 1293 0 0 96 0 500 300 100 0 120 24 126 30 300 500 70 30 36 120 24 126 90 100 700 0 100 800 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96 96 24 126 150 0 129b 129b 129b 129b 0 100 0 0 0 0 129b 1296 Includes only those Soviet weapons used in the force effectiveness calculations The NIPP estimates E that SLB s on diesel suumarines and submarine-launr hed cruise missiles would not be used against CONl JS These weap0ns were not used in the calculations Does not include R D or treininc launr hers ED I ifftiED ·--· - SOVIET FORCES Cont'd i OPl'ION I SLBM Launchers a On-Line SS-N-5 SS-N-6 SS-NZ-1 Retrofit MIRV In Conversion Overhaul Total SLBM Launchers on SSBNs FY70 FY71 FY72 FY73 FY74 FY75 FY76 24 208 24 336 24 4 0 6 30 528 24 432 16o 134 750 24 384 320 150 24 320 0 0 6 238 6 3bb 494 0 64 622 '8'78 FYTT FY78 24 24 208 272 1 80 640 Boo 182 198 230 100b ll34 1262 Includes only those Soviet weapons used in the force effectiveness calculaiions The NIPP estimates that SLIMs on diesel submarines and submarine-launched cruise missiles would not be used against CONUS These weapons were not used in the calculations t t I I -- TOP RE Ji -- - SOVIET FORCES af_ I OPI'ION II FY70 Intercontinental Bombers UE BEAR BEAR with ASMs BISON Total UE Intercontinental Bombers Land-Based ICBM Launchers On-Line E Soft ICBM Launchers SS-7 8 SS-Z-3 Retrofit Hard ICBM Launchers SS-7 ss-8 SS-9 SS-9 MRV SS-Z-3 Single RV SS-Z-3 MIRV SS-Z-3 Retrofit MIRV SS-11 SS-Z-9 Retrofit SS-13 SS-Z-10 Retrofit Mobile ICBM Launchers SS-13 SS-Z-10· Retrofit Total Land-Based ICBM Launchers On-Line ij 2 FY71 30 80 30 1 30 80 30 14 142 0 74 0 69 9 198 30 0 0 0 800 0 50 0 69 9 156 90 24 0 0 0 0 1298 -FY72 · 30 25 8o 8o 25 135 20 125 20 80 20 120 0 0 0 30 0 30 0 126 120 24 78 0 50 0 69 0 126 120 24 24 0 700 100 50 0 20 0 1292 50 0 1293 50 0 1278 Boo FY74 FY73 Q 0 0 96 120 24 ·18 ·o 500 300 50 0 I FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 0 70 10 0 60 0 100 Bo bO 0 50 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 78 246 0 800 0 50 0 0 0 0 24 78 246 0 800 0 50 0 0 100 100 1298 1298 0 100 5 80 15 IQ 36 120 24 78 30 300 500 20 30 90 100 700 0 50 50 50 1298 0 100 1298 96 24 78 150 0 Boo 0 50 l29E Includes only those Soviet weapons used in the force effectiveness calculations The NIPP estimates that SLBMs on diesel submarines and submarine-launched cruise missiles except for the long-range cruise missile would not be used against CONUS These weapons were not used in the calculations but were included in the overall level of frozen Soviet missile launchers Does not include R D or training launchers TOP SECRET · i t J I w --- ---- - SOVIET FORCES Cont'dl i OPI'ION II FY70 y SLBM Launchers On-Line SS-N-5 SS-N-6 SS-NZ-1 Retrofit MIRV Long-Range Cruise Missile In Conversion Overhaul Total SLBM Launchers on SSBNs y 24 208 0 0 6 238 FY71 FY72 FY73 FY74 FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 24 336 0 0 6 24 416 0 0 22 30 352 0 14 80 36b 462 IW6 24 272 80 70 86 532 24 192 160 ·134 86 24 96 240 198 102 596 b60 24 32 320 240 100 716 J 24 0 336 208 148 716 Includes only those Soviet weapons used in the force effectiveness calculations The NIPP estimates that SLBMs on diesel submarines and submarine-launched cruise missiles except for the long-range cruise missile would not be used against CONUS These weapons were not used in the calculations but were included in the overall level of frozen Soviet missile launchers • • t 1 I L SOVIET FORCES -- ·- OPI'ION III Intercontinental Bombers UE BEAR BEAR with ASMs BISON Total UE Intercontinental Bombers FY70 FY71 FY72 FY73 FY74 FY75 FY76 30 80 30 140 30 80 30 140 30 80 25 135 25 80 20 125 20 80 20 120 5 80 15 100 0 70 10 'Bo FY77 FY78 0 60 0 bO - 0 50 0 50 Land-Based ICBM Launchers On-Line El Sof't ICBM Launchers 0 0 0 106 26 108 142 128 56 SS-7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 0 SS-Z-3 Retrofit Single RV 128 102 128 128 22 20 0 0 72 ss-Z-3 Retrofit MIRV Hard ICBM Launchers 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 69 69 SS-7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 ss-8 0 0 0 126 126 36 156 198 96 SS-9 0 0 96 30 90 120 120 120 120 SS-9 MRV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SS-Z-3 24 0 219 315 315 0 69 159 99 SS-Z-3 Retrofit MIRV 0 0 100 0 800 300 800 700 500 SS-11 809 809 809 0 109 509 709 309 9 Retrofit ss-z-9 0 0 0 0 4o 20 40 40 40 SS-13 400 40 40 40 20 0 0 0 0 ss-z-10 Retrofit Mobile ICBM Launchers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SS-13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ss-z-10 Retrofit 12BE 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 Total Land-Based ICBM Launchers On-Line Includes only those Soviet weapons used in the force effectiveness calculations The NIPP estimates that SLBMs on diesel submarines and_ ubmarine-launched cruise missiles except for the long-range cruise missile would not be used against CONlJS These weapons were not used in the calculations but were included in the overall levels of frozen Soviet missile launchers £1 Does not include R D or training launchers t J I J1 TOP SECRET ' -- - SOVIET FORCES Cont'd I OPl'ION III FY70 FY71 FY7'2 FY73 FY74 FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 SLPM Launchers On-Line SS-N-5 SS-N-6 ss-NZ-1 Retrofit MIRV Long-Range Cruise Missile In Conversion overhaul Total SLB f Launchers on SSBNs 24 208 0 0 6 238 24 336 0 0 6 3Gb 24 30 288 352 0 0 0 14 22 80 3§8 412 24 208 80 70 86 4bfJ 24 192 160 134 86 596 24 112 240 198 86 b6o 24 32 320 240 100 716 24 0 352 2o8 132 716 Includes only those Soviet weapons used in the force effectiveness calculations The NIPP estimates that SLB fs on diesel submarines and submarine-launched cruise missiles except for the long-range cruise missile would not be used against CONUS These weapons were not used in the calculation but were included in the overall levels of f'rozen Soviet missile· launchers t I I 0 ED • SOVIET FORCES a OPl'ION IV Intercontinental Bombers UE BEAR BEAR with ASMs BISON Total UE Intercontinental Bombers rrI2 1 30 30 Bo Bo 30 140 30 140 Fi72 FY73 m4 30 80 25 135 25 80 20 125 20 Fi75 Ff76 F 77 ma 5 0 70 10 0 60 0 50 0 50 Bo Bo 20 120 100 2 l3o 0 Land-Based ICBM Launchers t0n-Line E Soft ICBM Launchers 142 SS-7 8 128 lo8 106 26 0 0 0 56 SS-Z-3 Retrofit 0 28 8 80 30 110 136 136 136 Hard ICBM Launchers SS-7 0 0 69 45 0 0 69 0 0 ss-8 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 228 246 SS-9 246 246 216 156 0 0 96 0 0 SS-9 MRV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SS-Z-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 SS-Z-3 Retrofit 0 69 99 159 219 315 315 SS-11 800 800 700 0 0 500 300 100 0 0 SS-Z-9 Retrofit 109 309 509 709 8o9 809 809 9 4o 40 SS-13 4o 20 4o 0 0 0 0 0 SS-Z-10 Retrofit 0 0 4o 40 0 20 40 4o Mobile ICBM Launchers 0 0 0 SG-13 0 0 0 0 0 0 ss-z-10 Retrofit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total Land-Dosed ICBM Launchers On-Line I2B8 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 l 300 Includes only those Soviet weapons used in the force effectiveness calculations The NIPP estimates that SLPMs on diesel submarines and sutmarine-launched cruise missiles except for the long-range cruise missile would not be used against CONUS These weapons were not used in the calculations but were included in the overall level of frozen Soviet missile launchers Ef Does not include R D or training launchers y t-J I -1 AqrR- o E ril sr er LU J L 11 SOVIET fOBCBS r ont I rl OPl'TON IV SLif-1 Launchers On-Line SS-N-5 SS-N-6 SS-NZ-1 Retrofit Long-Range Cruise Missile In Conversion overhaul Total SLBM Launchers on SSBNs Fi70 FY71 FY72 FY73 Fi74 FY75 FY76 FY'iT me 24 2o8 0 0 6 238 24 336 0 0 6 24 352 0 30 288 0 14 8o 24 2o8 8o 70 86 24 192 24 112 240 198 86 24 32 320 240 100 716 24 0 3bb 0 22 398 li12 46S 16o 134 86 m 352 2o8 132 716 Includes only those Soviet weapons used in the force effectiveness calculations The NIPP estimates that SLBMs on diesel submarines and submarine-launched cruise missiles except for the long-range cruise missile would not be used against COMJS These weapons were not used in the calculations but were included in the overall level of frozen Soviet missile launchers ' J I ' ' SOVIET AIR DEFENSES OPl'IONS I-IV FY69 FY70 FY71 FY72 FY73 FY74 FY75 FY76 Fi77 FY78 Fighter Aircraf't Fresco Fanner nashlight Fitter Fishpot Firebar Fiddler F1agon Foxbat 1825 1225 350 0 1625 1200 500 1325 1175 650 1000 1150 800 --22 J12 425 1075 950 250 150 1050 975 325 50 1025 975 350 0 975 975 400 0 925 975 21 100 675 1125 925 Total Fighter Aircraf't 3400 3350 3200 3050 2900 2700 2500 2400 2350 2300 10 0 20 0 30 0 35 0 35 0 35 0 35 5 35 10 35 15 20 Ground Radars 'i5 0 J Gee 'i 70 J 7r o 1qo0 'i700 4700 4600 4400 4000 SAM Launchers SA-1 SA-2 SA-3 SA-5 SA-Z-1 SA-Z-4 700 5100 600 750 700 5000 700 700 4900 800 1400 60 500 4700 800 1700 150 350 4500 800 1900 450 200 4300 800 1900 900 4300 800 1900 1200 4300 800 1900 1350 4300 800 1900 1500 60 4300 800 1900 1500 300 7760 7850 7950 8100 8200 8350 8360 8500 AWAC Radars Flat Jack Overland AWAC Radar Total SAM Launchers 7100 1100 7400 -- 400 35 High NIPP air defenses for ull optionJ t J I '-0 --RJp_C J ro0ti o 'r i rr t f -- I _v i SOVIET FORCE CHARACTERISTICS Weapon Number of Independently Tergetable Warheads Yield Ml' Lnnd-Based ICBMs SS-7 ss-8 SS-9 SS-9 MRV ss-z-3 SS-Z-3 MIRV ss-u ss-Z-9 s-13 ss-z-10 SS-13 Mobile ss-z-10 Mobile 1 1 1 ly l 6 l l l l l 1 SLBMs ss-N-5 SS-N-6 SS-NZ-1 SS-NZ-1 MIRV Long-Range Cruise Missile Banbers BEAR BF AR with ASM BISON l 1 1 3 l 2 1 2 crea CEP NM Aim Points Points 1 0 1 0 0 5 0 5 0 25 0 25 1 0 0 25 1 0 0 5 1 5 1 0 1 1 6 l l l l l l 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 75 0 75 1 0 l l 1 3 l 5 5 5 0 2 1 0 0 2 3 5 c · 3 5 E 12 25 3 5 40 1 2 1 2 1 2 o 6 1 2 o 6 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 o 4 a Probability of successful launch of an -dlert weapon c 3 MT when on sort launchers and 5 MT when on hard launchers Terminal Aim 1 1 1 1 1 3 l 6 1 1 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 l 3 1 Alert Rates Deyto-Day Generated 85 0 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 rJ I y 0 o 30 I_ 30 if 30 30 if 30 i v 0 0 0 95 Reliabilitl InLaunch Flights 90 Bo 90 90 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 85 85 95 95 90 81 86 86 86 n 90 90 86 86 95 90 90 95 95 87 87 82 82 90 86 85 85 85 85 81 • 81 81 81 98 98 98 82 62 82 50 50 50 50 50 67 67 67 J i if i s b Includes warhead reliability 'Y_ Half of the SS-9s have 12 MT and half have 25 MT when there are no MRVs on the ss-9 e The SS-9 with MRVs carries three 3 5 MT warheads These warhends cannot be targeted to more than one target Hard launchera only There are no ICBMs on day-to-day alert in soft launchers - This alert rate applies to the total SIJl 1 force including those in conversion and overhaul after 197 4 ii See lITPP-69 for SLIM alert rates in 1970-74 ' r p S tGRET I I-' ' I TAB E · ESTIMATED COSTS OF SOVIET FORCES r Table • L Estimated Soviet Expend i tures for Strategic Offensive Defensive Forces NSSM-28 Basic Option 1 Calendar Years 1969-1978 Billion 1966 Dollars NSSM-28 Strategic Attack Bombers Intercontinental Bombers Peripheral ICBMs SSBN Submarines Subtotal 1969 -1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 19-75 1976 1977 1978 Average Annual 1969-78 0 37 0 62 2 96 1 18 0 34 0 54 2 75 1 21 0 34 0 50 2 53 1 36 0 34 0 43 3 00 1 52 0 32 0 30 0 39 0 35 3 22 3 00 1 55 1 68 0 27 0 34 2 53 1 61 0 23 0 32 2 15 1 70 0 19 0 30 1 42 1 46 0 16 0 25 0 72 0 68 0 29 0 40 2 43 1 40 5 13 4 84 4 73 5 29 5 48 5 33 4 75 4 40 3 37 1 81 4 51 2 06 2 65 0 20 0 73 2 39 2 63 0 20 0 77 2 67 2 73 0 20 0 84 2 47 2 86 ·o 06 0 91 2 15 2 82 0 03 0 94 1 84 2 59 0 03 0 94 1 80 2 47 0 03 0 95 0 97 2 56 0 04 0 95 0 9 6 2 78 0 04 0 90 0 95 · 2 92 0 05 0 88 1 83 2 70 0 09 0 88 5 64 5 99 6 44 6 30 5 94 5 40 5 25 4 52 4 68 4 80 5 50 10 77 10 83 11 17 11 59 11 42 10 73 10 00 8 92 8 05 6 61 10 01 NSSM-28 Strategic Defense excluding ABMs h Interceptors SAMs AWACS Radar Subtotal NSSM-28 a b Total Strategic Expenditures Excluding expenditures for nuclear weapons For ABM expenditures see Alternative Variants of ABM levels in Table 5 t I I t-' - · - I Table Estimated Soviet Expenditures for Strategic Offensive Defensive Forces NSSM-28 Basic Option 2 Calendar Years 1969-1978 Billion 1966 Dollars NSSM-28 Strategic Attack Bombers Intercontinental Bombers - Periphe r al ICBMs SSBN Submarines Cruise Missile Submarines e Subtotal Strategic Defense excluding ABMs ij Interceptors SAMs AWACS Radar Average Anuual 1969-78 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 0 37 0 62 2 93 1 25 0 34 0 54 2 62 1 19 0 34· 0 50 2 55 L78 0 02 0 34 0 43 2 76 0 32 0 08 0 32 0 39 2 90 0 62 0 15 0 30 0 35 2 98 0 62 0 19 0 27 0 34 2 60 0 62 0 22 0 23 0 32 2 18 0 62 0 19 0 19 0 30 1 45 0 58 0 14 0 16 0 25 Q 73 0 34 0 14 0 29 0 40 2 37 0 79· 0 14£ 5 17 4 69 5 19 3 93 4 38 4 44 4 05 3 54 2 66 1 62 3 97 2 06 2 65 0 20 0 73 2 39 2 63 0 20 0 77 2 67 2 73 0 20 0 84 2 47 2 86 0 06 0 91 2 15 2 82 0 03 0 94 1 84 2 59 0 0-3 0 94 1 80 2 47 0 03 0 95 0 97 2 56 0 04 0 95 0 96 0 95 2 78 · 2 92 0 04 0 05 0 90 0 88 1 83 2 70 0 09 0 88 5 64 5 99 6 44 6 30 5 94 5 40 5 25 4 52 4 68 4 80 5 50 10 81 10 68 11 63 10 23 10 32 9 84 9 30 8 06 7 34 6 42 9 46 NSSM-28 Subtotal NSSM-28 Total Strategic Expenditures a Excluding expenditures for nuclear weapons b Cruise Missile Submarines because of their assigned mission in this option are included with Strategic Attack and comprise only outlays · for conversions follow-ons missiles and operating costs 1c Average annual expenditures for 1971-78 d For ABM expenditures see Alternative Variants of ABM levels in Table 5 -Table Estimated Soviet Expenditures for Strategic Offensive Defens ive Forces NSSM-28 Basic Option 3 Calendar Years 1969-1976 1 Billion 1966 Dollars NSSM-28 Strategic Attack Bombers Intercontinental Bombers Peripheral ICBMs SSBN Submarines Cruise Missile Submarines 1 Subtotal Average Annual i969-78 1969 - 1970 -- 1971 1972 1973 1974 · 1975 1976 1977 1978 0 37 0 62 2 72 1 25 0 34 0 54 2 05 0 98 0 34 0 50 2 07 0 44 0 02 0 34 0 43 2 58 0 29' 0 08 0 32 0 39 3 02 0 77 0 15 0 30 0 35 3 23 0 82 0 19 0 27 0 34 2 87 0 62 0 22 0 23 · 0 19 0 32 0 30 2 32 1 44 0 62 0 62 0 19 0 14 0 16 0 25 0 79 0 40 0 14 0 29 0 40 2 31 0 68 0 14£ 4 96 · 3 91 3 37 3 72 4 65 4 89 4 32 3 68 2 69 1 74 3 79 2 06 2 65 0 20 0 73 2 39 2 63 0 20 0 77 2 67 2 73 0 20 0 84 2 47 2 86 0 06 0 91 2 15 2 82 0 03 0 94 1 84 2 59 0 03 0 94 1 80 2 47 0 03 0 95 0 97 2 56 0 04 0 95 0 96 2 78 0 04 0 90 0 95 2 92 0 05 0 88 1 83 2 70 0 09 0 88 5 64 5 99 6 44 6 30 5 94 5 40 5 25 4 52 4 68 4 80 5 50 10 60 9 90 9 81 10 02 10 59 10 29 9 57 8 20 7 37 6 54 9 29 NSSM-28 Strategic Defense excluding ABMs Interceptors SAMS AWACS Radar Subtotal NSSM-28 Total Strategic Expenditures a Excluding expenditures for nuclear weapons b Cruise Missile Submarines because of their assigned mission in this option are included with Strategic Attack and comprise only outlays for conversions follow-ons missiles and operating costs c Average annual expenditures for 1971-78 d For ABM expenditures see Alternative Variants of ABM levels in Table 5 M I 0 · -r - -r n 1 •n · -if - c • - - ·-5 • 'li U l -'· · i · J I lAl - Table Estimated Soviet Expenditures for Strategic Offensive Defensive Forces NSSM-28 Basic Option 4 Calendar Years 1969-1978 Billion 1966 Dollars NSSM-28 Strate ic Attack Bombers Intercontinental Bombers Peripheral ICBMs SSBN Submarines Cruise Missile Submarines Subtotal 'Strategic Defense excluding ABMs Interceptors SAMs AWACS Radar Average Annual 1969-78 1969 1970 1971 19 °2 1973 1974 1975 1977 1978 0 37 0 62 2 66 1 25 0 34 0 54 1 89 0 98 0 34 0 50 1 85 0 44 0 02 0 34 0 32 0 43 0 39 2 36 · 2 81 0 29 0 66 0 08 0 15 0 30 0 35 2 96 0 71 0 19 0 27 0 23 · 0 19 0 34 0 32 0 30 2 59 2 06 1 35 0 51 0 51 0 51 0 22 0 19 0 14 0 16 0 25 0 79 0 36 0 14 0 29 0 40 i 13 0 62 0 14£ 4 90 3 75 3· 15 3 50 4 33 4 51 3 93 3 31 2 49 1 70 3 56 2 06 2 65 0 20 0 73 2 39 2 63 0 20 0 77 2 67 2 73 0 20 0 84 2 47 2 86 0 06 0 91 2 15 2 82 0 03 0 94 1 84 2 59 0 03 0 94 1 80 2 47 0 03 0 95 0 97 2 56 0 04 0 95 0 96 2 78 0 04 0 90 0 95 2 92 0 05 0 88 1 83 2 70 0 09 0 88 5 64 --- -- 5 99 6 44 6 30 5 94 5 40 5 25 4 52 4 68 4 80 5 50 10 54 9 74 9 59 9 80 10 27 9 91 9 18 7 83 7 17 6 50 9 05 1976 NSSM-28 Subtotal NSSM-28 ·Total Strategic Expenditures a Excluding expenditures for nuclear weapons b Cruise Missile Submarines because of their assigned mission in this option are included with Strategic Attack and comprise only outlays for conversions follow-ons missiles and operating costs c Average· annual expenditures for 1971-78 ttj d For ABM expenditures see Alternative Variants of ABM levels in Table 5 I D €j i -- --- NSSM-28 Estima ted Soviet Expenditures for Alternative Variants of ABM Levels a Calendar Years 1969-1978 - Billion 1966 Dolla s Average Annual 1969-78 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 ABM Level 1 0 lchrs radars only · 0 11 0 20 0 17 0 12 0 09 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 12 0 13 ABM Level·2 Three Variants 64 lchrs ABM-1 System 100 lchrs b 128 lchrs - 0 22 0 28 0 37 0 22 0 43 0 71 Q ll 0 43 0 71 1 28 0 13 1 41 1 67 0 23 1 90 1 80 o • 76 2 56 1 51 1 23 2 74 1 06 2 07 3 13 0 89 2 58 3 47 0 92 2 78 3 70 2 03 0 27 0 49 · 0 78 1 35 1 14 1 04 0 38 0 38 0 38 0 38 0 66 NIPP-69 Lo ABM 0 14 0 20 0 22 0 38 0 61 1 02 1 15 1 21 1 10 1 16 0 72 NIPP-69 Hi ABM 0 28 0 54 0 81 1 51 2 14 2 47 2 40 2 31 2 37 2 50 1 73 NIPP-68 Hi-Lo Intermediate Level 0 21 0 26 0 24 0 32 0 55 0 84 1 40 1 53 1 32 ABM Level 3 Two variants 1000 area lchrs ·1500 terminal lchrs Total£ 64 lchrs 550 area lchrs 5 j a b c d e Excluding expenditures for nuclear weapons Beginning in 1975 replacing 100 ABM-1 launchers with 100 ABM-Z-2 launchers on a one-to-one basis Expenditures for 64 ABM-1 launchers 1000 ABM-Z-2 launchers and 1500 ABM-Z-1 launchers 64 ABM-1 launchers from 1969 to 1972 and beginning deployment of 550 ABM-Z-2 launchers in 1973 Average annual expenditures for 1969-77 trj I V1 SECRET -TAB F STATIC COMPARISONS OF U S AND SOVIET FORCES f F ·l DECLA Ta r' e - IED COMPARISON OF U S AND SOVIET STRMEGIC FORCES 1978 Total Intercontinental StratefljiC Forc e Loading Weapons Bombers Land-Based Missiles Sea-Based Missiles Total Weapons Megatons Bombers Land-Based issiles Sen-Based Missiles Total 1- egatons Equiva1ent Megatons 'EJ Bombers Lar d-Based Missiles Sea-Based issiles Total Equivalent Megatons Missile Payload Kilopounds Land-Based Missiles See-B sed Missiles Total Missile Payload United States Programmed Force Ql tions I 1II 1III ion IV lcrt In ucontinental StratefljiC Fvi·c e Loading 5 W-a apons Boi bers Land-Based Missiles Sea-Based Missiles Total Alert Weapons J-1egs tons Bom'bers Le d-Bast d Missiles Sea-Based Missiles To- al Alert Megatons Eq_w vul ent Megatons Bc nbers Land-Based Missiles Se -Based ll issiles Total Alert Equivalent Megatons Missile Payload Kilopounds Land-Based Missiles See-Based Missiles Total Alert Missile Payload y E f E 2300 1900 3800 8000 2300 1050 500 38 5 2200 1100 300 3600 2200 1500 550 Soviet Union Hife Ni11R ion I 3o o mo 50 3700 1300 5050 50 1500 600 2150 250 5500 250 4400 1200 5850 250 4300 700 5250 250 4600 700 5550 250 11000 700 11950 100 3500 100 4100 3950 100 3800 1100 5000 4400 5000 100 3200 650 3950 7100 1400 8500 6200 2100 8300 5800 1100 6900 6600 1200 7800 0 2000 200 0 2800 0 2600 500 3700 3100 0 2500 500 3000 1200 0 3900 450 0 3700 0 3000 250 3250 0 7000 250 7250 0 2700 300 0 2700 300 3000 0 2100 250 2350 4400 450 4700 450 Boo 100 3100 3500 1900 1200 550 3650 1800 1400 1400 600 2000 1000 1700 2700 5400 1000 1000 400 2400 950 1000 200 1r 400 2750 mo 800 1000 400 122 2200 6 4400 250 -222 mo 0 2600 200 0 3200 550 Boo ° 95 2200 800 1100 400 2300 mo J750 3000 1700 1000 1300 450 6000 400 5200 750 5950 4900 450 5350 2700 1750 Ql tion IV 50 3100 1200 4350 '6 oo 3200 Ql tion III 50 3300 2600 50 2300 700 mo 1900 1000 600 Q1 tion II b400 Boo li855 Includes AAI aircraf't ICBM launchers on-line plus research develapnent and training launchers and those in modernization and on-line SI BM launchers Equivalent yield is calculated by taking yield to the one-halt' power t'or warheads greater than one me gaton and to the two-thirds power t'or warheads less than one megaton It is a meaaure of the capability of a warhead to cauae urban induatrial dllllll6e Day-to-day alert DE 7200 1200 '84'oo 0 1000 200 mo F-2 Table F-2 COMPARISON OF U S A' D USSR POTENTIAL ICBM ' I 'IIRU l W EIGH'f KILOPOUNDS WITH HARDEi•JED LAND-BASED LAUflCHEH J u s USSR Hot Launch Option I Option II Option III Option IV 6800 6800 6000 6000 7900 7150 6750 6750 Cold Launch Option I Option II · Option III ' Option IV 9800 9800 91 50 9450 18 300 16 550 15 650 15 650 I ' I ' TAB G WAR-FIGHTING CALCULATIONS i OECL IIS G-1 NO-YEAR CALCULATIONS Use the 1978 U S and Soviet forces for no-year calculations except for the SI IJ is which are treated as shown below The number of aim points for Soviet multiple-silo ICBM launcher groups are also summarized below SLBMs a Soviet SLBMs The NIPP gives Soviet SLBM alert on-station rates as fractions of total inventory including those in conversion and overhaul Using 1978 inventories as a base the following table shows Soviet alert and non-alert SLBMs SOVIET SLBMs 1978 Dar-to-Day Alert 30% Alert Non-Alert Generated Alert 50% Alert Non-Alert Option I SS-N-5 SS-N-6 SS-NZ-1 9 130 240 21 302 560 15 216 400 15 216 400 Options IILIIILIV SS-N-5 SS-N-6 SS-NZ-1 Long-Range Cruise Missile 9 0 130 76 21 0 302 178 15 0 216 127 15 0 216 127 b U S SI IJ is · For no-year calculations apply the following multi plier to total SLBM inventory to obtain the day-to-day alert on-station U · SLBMs alert rate 1 - fraction of time in·overhaul onversion x at-sea rate for on-line SSBNs 0 77 X - ··- ··· • t · 0 72 55 For generated alert all on-line U S SLBMs are at sea - i The following table shows alert and non-alert U S SL Ms in 1978 U S SLIMs 1978 tions I II III IV Polaris A-3 Poseidon iJ y Day-to-Day Alert 55% Alert Non-Alert 88 72 273 223 Generated Ale r-t 77% Alert Non-Alert 123 37 382 114 SLBMs for targets in China are included in these figures It SECREl -' n G-2 Soviet ICBM Aim Points Soviet soft ICBM launchers are grouped with two launchers per site and their hard SS-7 8 launchers have three launchers per site Since the launchers on one site are close enough together that they present one aim point in a counterforce strike appropriate adjustments must be made to the data base for the constrained Soviet forces in which ss z-3 and SS-Z-9 missiles are retrofit to these silos These adjustments are shown for 1978 in the· following table SS Z-3 SS-Z-9 1978 Number of Weapons Number of Aim Points QI tion III SS-Z-3 Single RV Soft SS-Z-3 MIRV Soft SS-Z-3 MIRV Hard SS-Z-9 8 128 315 809 64 269 Option IV SS-Z-3 Single RV Soft SS-Z-3 Single RV Hard SS-Z-9 136 315 809 4 803 68 269 803 i • f OP ·SECRET G-3 AEM WAR-FIGHTING CALCULATIONS FY 78 U S Programmed Forces vs High NIPP Forces Deaths 106 Soviet u s Soviet First U S First CF CV MD 14 139 139 131 135 135 CF CV 87 139 135 78 107 MD 126 War-fighting Curves Deaths in Millions from Prorr - t Rffects l--- J-- ---t-i- --i-- -- -' -L4- -64% - - - -i- --l--1- q-L - ft·-t •- ·r·- --' i t-r • L '1'--L - - ---- ·· -r• -• -- tt1 t ·r L - 150 -j-'-r - --'E· rr I --r- - ' ' I I • I i I I i I I i i 1 • · I I I 1 1 I I 1 1 L i-1 J-- -i -l--r1---i 1-' I I • Soviet 1st Strike • 1111 • v S 1st Strike a aa 1----i - -u_J 1--- f7 T I II i I I I I 1 -i -T- -rtt- -r 100 Li- - I I I I ' I I I I • I 7 • I ' I ii ' IT 1 I I I I' - 50 21% I I i A'' I i I T I I I I 1 f - _j_ ' I 1 I 0 i I 1 1 I I- I i l I I I i I I I I ' 1- i I · I I I I I - l - -i - LL t t - LL ·r'__ _I_ rH-- -'- __ _L 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I 7 I I I Ii'' r-ri 7 rr I 7 i _ ____ _ ___ __ __ I - i I J _ __ 7 l I - -- -- - _ - c- _ ___ J_ 1 I • - 1 -r-r-i- Trn -r 1 43% H- I II I II I T LJ t' i--i-t -W I 1' J_J_ J_J__ 1 1 1 1 I U S Deaths -I--'-' I I I I ' I ' I I I 1 I I I I I i' - I ' ' I I i I 1 I ' ' I I I '1 '1 rJ L I ·rrr • i ' j I I 1 l i Li__i_J ·r11 i I I I I T T '7 I ' I ' I I ' I I I i I I I I I I I I I i I - I I I I I I l I -l I I ' i I • I • · _l · I 7 t- 1 _ __ _ __ i-i - -f i ' I I 1 · 7 10 3 7j Soviet Deaths · 10 I r--t fT ·ti -j j 'j 1 c o 56% - D· - - - - t - l·- - - -t i t - Jff t r ' - l lj 11iflf 1 0 7· ' I ---- Baseline Forces with 0 Deaths 106 U S Soviet CF CV 14 127 Soviet 144 136 First MD 142 130 U S First CF CV MD 127 144 139 78 136 133 Area ABr--I O TeIT' ir al Aliv Cities Attackine RVS lo2 - UoS Soviet Attacking E CT lo2 u s Soviet 41 4 41 12 29 49 65 52 39 9 4o 13 27 17 26 18 19 41 25 50 15 65 24 41 14 4o 21 14 12 26 3 23 Detonati lg RVS lo2 Soviet 33 1 33 36 10 23 39 5o Detonating fil'lT u s 1o2 Soviet 31 2 32 11 21 15 33 44 4 11 50 32 20 21 29 17 9 17 11 11 4 17 2 15 Wa •-fighting Curves Change to Baseline Case Soviet Deaths U S Deaths 150 64% CF Soviet CV First MD u s Soviet 1st Strike • This is the Baseline Case for Option I U S 1st Stri ite 1 100 43% CF CV First MD -j - cm icuma 1 1 # U S Deaths If two figures appear in a column the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets a 'ld the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets D ------- --'---· - - I g i I 50 21% Q I 0 ¼L ' J Soviet- Deatl s n o J Baseline Forces with 200 o A l - Termi al ABi'-i Ci ties Atta eking 106 Deaths Area RVS Attacking J C2 El' T 102 Detonati lg RVS 102 U S • Soviet Detonating EMT lo22· u s Soviet u s Soviet UoS• Soviet U S Soviet CF Soviet CV First MD 14 144 141 126 136 130 4l i4 39 12 29 49 65 53 13 27 17 26 19 31 1 31 9 22 35 50 39 30 2 30 10 20 CF 123 144 135 78 136 130 19 41 23 50 15 65 28 37 15 40 20 14 12 26 3 23 14 31 17 44 4 50 25 25 10 30 14 U S First CV MD 9 17 11 11 4 17 3 14 War-fighting Cur •es Change to Baseline Case U S Deaths Soviet Deaths CF Soviet CV First MD CF U S CV First MD o 7 1 7 3 6 Deaths 150 64% 1 3 o 1 1 - 4 1 - 2 0 U S Deaths · 50 21% If two figures appear in a column the first represents RVS or EMT for weapou targets and tne second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets D Q I V1 -- - -· ' ' • - · ' ' -··· ' - · · -· · I IED -- ·- 0 Soviet Des chs 500 Baselir e Force with 10° Dee ths 0 i1Tea JIB-' Terroir al iffiivj Cities Att ckir Att ickir g RVS 102 -x- 11 1· u s Soviet 1 70S E oviet F • C' I Setona tir RVS 102 -K· U S • Soviet 102 - c Soviet Soviet First CF CV rvii l 14 144 140 125 136 131 41 4 41 11 30 50 65 54 39 9 40 12 28 17 26 19 U S CF CV 117 144 FiTst -Q 129 78 136 129 19 41 23 50 15 65 30 35 15 40 19 14 12 26 5 21 29 1 10 2 ·X· SoYiet 27 2 28 11 17 9 17 11 43 4 49 25 24 9 28 12 u 4 17 4 13 8 21 11 EI-' T U S 34 49 38 2 29 15 DetonatL1z War-Yi r tinrr Curves Change to Baseli e Case U S Deaths Soviet eaths Soviet First u s irst CF CV MD CF CV MD o 4 1 8 - 10 0 4 - 10 2 - 1 5 li ___ 3 1 0 Soviet 1st Strike KS a U S 1st Strike ---- o 100 43% 1 - 3 9 lf t• -m fi 5-l lres ap1 ear i 1 a -t r t --_Lt D rths in YdfilcE •g -_ r'2 - ec s _'--t---'- -1- r ---• ----T--- - U S Deat js col the f cst rcp1 c3e n ts R·vs or N T O°J wef _JO 'l ta gets a i i tee second for c -cy ta i·gets 1 only one figure appears it is ' for city ta ·g v s i - - - _-· ·-· -· - ___-·_ --· I ----- - -· - -- -i -- - - - _t · ·- - --' I -·-· ___·- - -- · - -- --·• •••••• • __ ·i ·· • '- i ---------- I ' -✓ 0 I -· - -- · J - ' -·- _ CF ·--- · - - _ r - - _ -- · ·• · • -' · D -- Ci i'IO ·J I Baseline Forces with Deaths CF Soviet CV First MD U S First CF CV MD 500 Area AEH 1000 Termir al 106 Soviet AB Cities Attackin RVS 102 - u s Soviet U S Soviet Attacking Fi lT 1o2 Detonating RVS lo2 · f u s • Soviet Detonating E -Tr 1o2 -xU S Soviet 14 143 139 123 136 132 41 4 41 7 34 50 65 55 39 9 40 8 32 17 26 22 29 1 21 6 16 30 47 38 27 2 22 6 16 8 16 12 94 78 136 125 19 41 23 50 15 65 32 33 15 40 19 14 12 26 4 22 5 21 8 42 4 47 27 21 4 22 7 n 4 16 4 12 143 110 War-fighting Curves Change to Baseline Case U S Deaths Soviet Deaths CF Soviet CV First MD u s CF CV First MD - o 1 7 3 3 33 3 1 7 - 29 3 - - 3 9 5 2 1 Soviet 1st Strike 11 1 ca • U S 1st Strike • · • u o 100 43% 5 - 7 4 U S • Deaths If -two figures appear in a 50 21% colu nJJ tne first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets 0 JI uc D · ' A- - nrncv Baseline Forces with - - 500 A rea ABM 2000 Tenninal fil Cities Deaths 106 U S Soviet Attacking RVS 1c2 UoS Soviet Attacking EMT 102 Soviet Detona ti ig RVS lo2 u s • Soviet Detonating EMT 102 -xu s Soviet CF Soviet CV First MD 14 137 137 120 135 135 41 4 41 41 50 65 65 39 9 40 40 17 26 26 29 1 14 14 28 46 46 27 2 15 15 '8 15 15 CF CV 70 137 88 78 135 127 19 41 ' 24 50 15 65 29 36 15 14 12 26 3 23 6 14 8 42 4 6 15 8 n 4 15 3 12 U S First MD 40 20 4· 24 22 War-fighting Curves Change to Baseline Case U S Deaths Soviet Deaths o CF Soviet CV First MD u s CF CV First MD 7 3 4 9 56 4 7 3 - 51 7 - - 6 2 7 5 3 150 64% Soviet 1st Strike 1st Strike U S m 1S1111 100 43% o -7 - 6 U S Deaths 50 21% a column the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets If two figures appear ia q I X Dt·r 1- i -• ·--- - -- l l u · LJ· -· -·- • •· - a r c ML 0 · -L ' ' Sovie Deaths 70 C SS Baseline Forces with RVS u s Soviet CF Soviet CV First MD 14 95 95 118 135 135 · u s CF CV First MD 39 95 56 135 126 4000 ' i 'enninal ABM Cities ABM Attack ne 106 Deaths 1000 Area 102 · Soviet 41 4 51 41 65 41 65 78 19 41 24 50 15 65 27 38 Attack ing EMT 102 u s Soviet Detona ving RVS 102 U S Soviet u s Detonating EMT lo2 Soviet 39 9 4o 40 18 26 26 24 1 10 10 26 44 44 23 2 10 10 7 14 14 15 40 21 14 12 26 3 23 4 10 7 4i t4 22 22 4 10 7 1 44 3 11 War-fighting Curves _Change to Baseline Case Deaths Soviet Deaths u s CF Soviet CV First MD o - 49 0 - 46 6 - 8 4 - 1 2 4 8 CF CV 88 1 49 0 - 83 6 1 2 - 6 7 u s First MD o U S Deaths If two figures appear in a column the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If only one fi -ure appears it is for city targets 50 21% t I • 0 D Soviet Deaths 0 i O J _ L_ Baseline Forces with 1000 Area ABM 4000 Terminal Attacking RVS 102 -X· UoS Soviet Deaths 106 U S Soviet CF Soviet CV First MD 14 95 83 93 128 110 u s CF CV 52 128 First MD 39 95 65 J B 1 1 Cities GTE Soviet SAM Defense Attacking EMT lo2 U S Soviet Detonating RVS lo2 U S Soviet Detonating E _ f r U S 1c2 Soviet 117 War-fighting Curves Change to Baseline Case Deaths Soviet Deaths u s CF CV Soviet First MD u s CF CV First MD - o 49 0 58 8 88 1 - 49 0 - 74 0 - 33 6 8 o 19 8 150 64% Soviet 1st Strike U S 1st Strike 11 1 - • uaa1 100 43%· - 25 5 8 o - 15 6 u s Deaths 50 21% If two figures appear in a column the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets Q I 5 r · t - '- t_ ·- • - · · ' 56 Soviet Dec ths - --------- _·1- Baseline Forces with u s 106 Soviet CF Soviet CV First MD 14 144 143 133 137 136 u s CF CV First MD 122 144 130 78 137 131 Deaths •j -o rs - 11 HO 'fF_ l 1 11 FORC SS O Area ABM O Terminal ABM Cities U S adds 192 SLBMs Attacking RVS 1o2 -xu s Soviet Attacking 102 U S Soviet EMT Detonating RVS 1o2 U S Soviet Detonating EMT 1o2 · U S Soviet War-fighting Curves Change to Baseline Case U S Deaths Soviet Deaths CF Soviet CV First MD o o 1 6 6 4 8 5 6 CF CV 4 9 o First MD 9 5 ' 8 1 6 u s o 150 64% Soviet 1st Strike • 1m1 1 1st Strike u s 100 43% U S Deaths If two figures appear in a column the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets • If only one figure appears it is for city targets 50 21% r - - t 1_ _- __ Soviet Deaths '--' ✓- _ c J'l C I Baseline Forces with 200 Area AB l-vl O Terminal AB 11 Cities U S adds 192 SLBMs Attackinc RVS 102 u s Soviet Deaths 106 U S Soviet CF Soviet CV First MD 14 144 143 133 137 136 CF 118 144 126 78 137 131 u s First CV MD Attacking EMT 1o2 u s Soviet Detonating RVS 1o2 U S • Soviet Detonating EMT lc2 u s Soviet War-fighting Curves Change to Baseline Case U S Deaths Soviet Deaths CF Soviet CV First MD o 1 2 6 1 8 5 5 CF CV 9 0 o First MD - 13 0 u s 1 1 150 64% Soviet 1st Strike • a a • U S 1st Strike amau 8 - 2 0 If two figures appear in a column the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets 100 43% U S • Deaths 50 21% 1 m s - JI EM W ll - FIG1ITDfCr C UL - 1 Baseline Fo ·ces with FQRC SS m YEPJ ' 500 Area AB l i 0 Terminal AR vI Cities U S adds 192 SLBMs Attacking ___ RVS lo2 UoS Soviet Deaths 106 U S Soviet Attacking E T 102 u s Soviet CF Soviet CV First MD 14 144 144 132 137 137 CF CV 110 144 MD 120 78 137 130 U S First Detonating RVS lo2 u s Soviet Detonating EMT 102 · u s Soviet War-fighting Curves Change to Baseline Case Deaths Soviet Deaths u s CF Soviet CV First MD u s First CF CV MD o 4 2 0 5 8 7 6 7 - 16 6 4 - 19 1 7 - 2 5 150 64% o If two figures appear in a co1Ul 1Jl the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets U S Deaths 50 21% 0 Sc·riet Deaths ·- - • 0 • • ' I -ff r ' Jft A EM ' r - FI GHTING c _1 'l i CO JS - NO y ' fu°1 FO CES 0 l' ' 1 Baseline Forces with L 2 106 Soviet CF Soviet CV First MD 14 143 143 131 137 137 u s CF CV First MD 85 143 100 78 137 129 Deaths - - - 500 Area ABI J 1000 Terminal ABM Cities U S adds 192 SLBMs Attacking RVS lo2 U S Soviet Attacking EMT 1o2 U S Soviet Detonatir g RVS 102 Soviet Detonating EMT 102 · U S Soviet War-fighting Curves Change to Baseline Case Deaths Soviet Deaths u s 150 64% CF Soviet CV First MD o 1 7 7 4 o 6 6 6 Soviet 1st Strike • aa • U S 1st Strike a mm CF CV 42 1 1 7 - 39 8 0 100 u s First MD 43i 6 - 3 9 If two figures appear in a column the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets U S Deaths 50 21% Soviet Deaths D Baseline Forces with Deaths Soviet CF Soviet CV First MD 14 137 137 129 137 137 u s CF CV First MD 63 137 128 137 128 • - · _ - r-- XI 500 Area AEN 2000 Terminal AR¾ Cities U S adds 192 SL™s Attacking RVS 102 · u s Soviet 106 u s Attacking EI T 1o2 u s Soviet Detonating RVS lo2 u s • Soviet Detonating EMT 1o2 Soviet 78 War-fighting Curves Change to Baseline Case U S Deaths Soviet Deaths CF Soviet CV First MD u s CF CV First MD - o 7 3 4 9 63 8 7 3 - 63 3 - 150 64% 2 4 5 6 5 o 5 - 4 3 u s Deaths 50 21% If two figures appear in a cohnmi the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets Q I n · ' t ' w - rt i· • Soviet Deati s lJt 0Lh ' _j --- vdb-1 -· u Baseline Forces with 1000 Area AB 4000 Terminal AE·' Cities U S adds 192 SLBMs Attacking RVS 102 u s Soviet Deaths 10° U S Soviet ' CF CV Soviet First MD 14 95 95 128 136 136 CF CV 32 95 44 78· 136 128 U S First MD Attacking EMT 102 U S Soviet Detonating RVS 102 · u s Soviet Detonating EMT 102 · U S Soviet War-fighting Cu Ves Change to Baseline Case Deaths Soviet Deaths u s o CF Soviet CV First MD - 49 0 46 6 CF CV 94 5 49 0 - 95 3 u s First MD 1 2 3 6 3 150 64% Soviet 1st Strike • - • U S 1st Strike IIEl al 100 43% o 3 5 2 If two figures appear in a column the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets U S Deaths 50 21% 0 SoYiet Dea t 1s 1- - _ fi - ' -Y -_T c cu1_ i ·_ 'IOI'I3 - 11 10 Y J 1 1 'C· 0 SS Ci_ - - ' II Baseline Forces 1 i th Deaths U S CF Soviet First CV MJ Cl U S CV First MD 0 C 10° Soviet tu ee AH O Terminal Ali '-' Ci-ties Ji t t acl i g El T 1C2 Attn cki r c F VS 102 x- Soviet UoS u s Soviet Detonating RVS 102L u s • Soviet Detonatir g - v •m l 1·· 1 2'L'T '·· So- riet V 14 144 140 127 136 132 32 4 33 10 23 49 65 53 33 9 34 11 23 17 26 19 26 1 26 8 18 37 50 40 27 2 27 9 18 10 17 114 144 128 78 136 130 12 33 16 50 15 65 31 34 10 34 14 14 12 26 4 22 10 26 13 44 4 50 27 23 8 27 u 4 11 11 17 3 14 W r-fig_ r in_g_ Curves Change to Baseline Case U S Deaths Soviet Deaths Soviet First CF CV MD ·150 64% This is the Baseline Case for Option II Soviet 1st Strike r 1 U S 1st Strike Dea- hs in Eill ons · r rqr r t f f t£_ts -l - - - ii f-2---'-- ITT- f - 7 100 43% CF iJ S First CV -r 1•W -- -j--• --tL U S Deaths 50 I ' two figures appear in a col- -- m· tr1e t'irst represents RVS or EMT for wea pon targets n nd 217 tl1e see or cl for city targets If on i y one figure a 9pears it is fo r- ci t r targets c l I t-' - i t ·'1 · f F Fi ED 'i' ' H · 't - 1 -Y i-· M n b ·t L1Pi I C' --·------ -- ------j ----·-- Sc 1 riet ti s 5 ' ' Baseline Forces with o Area ABv Deaths 0 - - Tenninal G v Cities Attacking RVS 102 · UoS Soviet Attac ing EMT lo2 U S Soviet Detonating RVS 102 · U S • Soviet Detonating K•lT lc2L u s Soviet 30 1 30 30' 2 30 11 19 u s 10° Soviet CF Soviet CV First MD 14 144 142 126 136 130 37 4 37 11 26 49 65 52 37 9 38 13 25 17 26 18 u s CF CV First 78 136 130 11 37 14 50 15 65 30 35 9 38 MD 111 144 124 14 12 26 4 22 13 10 20 9 30 12 36 50 39 44 4 50 27 23 7 30 10 9 17 11 11 4 17 3 14 War-fighting Curvas Change to Baseline Case U S Deaths Soviet Deaths Soviet First CF CV MD u s CF CV Fir t This is the Baseline case for Option III 150 64% Soviet 1st Strilte U S 1st Strike MI a Deaths in illions f'rcm Pronmt • 100 43% u s Deaths If two figures appear in a colt m ri the first represents RVS or EMT for wea on targets and the second for city targets If only one figure ap ears it is for city targets 50 21% Q I co r --- - • • l· t l - · • OPI'IOi' I III Baseline Forces with 106 Deaths CF CV Soviet First MD U S CF CV First MD 200 Area Soviet 14 144 141 126 136 105 78 136 128 Attacking RVS 102 ·X· Soviet UoS Attacldnz EMT 102 U S Soviet 37 4 37 49 65 53 37 9 38 12 26 50 15 65 34 31 9 38 12 11 26 131 144 117 0 Terminal AR Cities AB vi 11 37 14 17 26 Detonating RVS 102 U S Soviet Detonating EMT 102 u s Soviet 28 1 35 50 39 28 2 19 28 9 19 14 12 26 7 28 · 4¥c 4 4 22 10 29 21 6 29 8 9 29 17 10 19 11 nL4 17 3 14 War-fighting Curves Change to Baseline Case U S Deaths Soviet Deaths CF Soviet CV First MD o CF 6 5 2 - 7 5 u s CV First MD 2 8 150 64% 8 1 3 o 1 - 2 3 U S Deaths · E- If two fiGU-res ap pear in 50 a colu '1ln the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets 21% - - - r _ _ - - ' i J ' · ' G 1· - ' ' Soviet Deaths 1 r 5c• J Baseline Forces with I' 10° Deaths u s Soviet 0 Teminal AE Ci ties Attacking RVS 102 u s Soviet Attacking E '-1T 102 u s Soviet Detonatine RVS lo2 U S • Soviet u s Detonating EM T 102 -xSoviet CF Soviet CV First MD 14 144 140 125 136 132 37 4 37 10 27 49 65 54 37 9 38 11 27 17 26 20 26 1 26 8 18 34 49 39 26 2 26 8 18 9 17 11 CF CV 95 144 107 78 136 127 11 37 14 50 15 65 34 31 9 38 12 14 12 26 4 22 5 26 7 43 4 49 28 21 4 26 6 11 4 17 4 13 U S First MD War-fighting Curves Change to Baseline Ca se Deaths Soviet Deaths u s CF Soviet CV First MD CF CV First MD u s o - 6 2 1 16 8 6 - 17 2 1 7 3 1 2 o 3 - 3 3 U S Deaths If two figures appear in a colu inn the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If 0 1ly one figure appears it is for city targets Q I ' 0 Soviet D a tns O EOH III Baseline Forces with 500 U S First CF CV MD C CV XD -- 1000 Terminal Attacking RVS 102 u s Soviet Deaths 10° U S Soviet Soviet First Area AB A '-1 Cities Attacking E T lo2 u s Soviet Detonati 1g RVS 102 U S • Soviet Detonating EivIT 1o2 U S Soviet 14 142 142 122 136 136 37 4 37 37 49 65 65 37 9 38 38 17 26 26 26 1 18 18 30 47 47 26 2 19 19 8 16 16 58 142 75 78 136 125 11 37 14 50 15 65 32 33 9 38 13 14 12 26 4 22 3 18 4 42 4 47 27 21 3 19 4 1t 4 4 12 War-fighting CU- 'Yes Change to Baseline Case U S Deaths Soviet Deaths Soviet First CF CV MD U S CF CV First MD o 2 6 2 - 53 2 - 2 6 - 49 7 4 2 5 5 3 100 o 5 - 4 8 If two figures appear in a colu nn the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets ar d tt e second for city targets I f onl r one figure ppears it is for city targets 43% U S Deaths 50 21% ·-_ -· - · - - -_· - - - _ j I v · • I - -- · 7 J • •• o ' ' Q I I-' AE WAR-FIGi ITING C Al CULATIO XS 0PIIO N III Baseline Forces with Deaths u s 14 CF Soviet CV First MD 132 132 u s CF CV 132 First MD 44 62 500 tree ABM 2000 Terminal A EM Cities Attacking RVS lo2 ·X· UoS Soviet 106 Soviet 120 135 135 37 4 37 37 78 135 128 37 15 11 Attacking E 1T u s 49 65 65 37 9 38 38 50 15 65 27 38 9 38 14 102 Soviet 17 26 · 26 14 12 26 3 23 Detonating RVS 1C2 u s • Soviet 26 1 12 12 3 12 6 28 46 46 42J4 22 24 Detone ting EMT u s 102 - - Soviet 26 2 13 13 8 15 15 3 11 '4 15 3 12 13 6 War-fighting Curves Change to Baseline Case U S Deaths Soviet Deaths CF Soviet CV First MD u s CF CV First MD o - 11 9 - 9 5 67 3 11 9 62 5 6 5 7 5 1 100 43% o 7 - 2 0 If two f' e rures appear i 1 a colmm the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If or ly one figure appears it is for city targets U S Deaths Q I I r 1- nr · _ 't ' • lf 'A l ' 16 t• 11 Jl EM WAR-FIGrITIIX°G CJl LCuLATIOI S - ''Im YEAR F'ORC i S 0PI'IOilJ III Baseline Forces with 1000 Area Deaths 106 U S Soviet Soviet First U S First MD 88 118 135 135 CF CV 18 88 32 78 135 127 CF CV MD 14 88 AI ¾ 4000 Terminal A3i l Cities Attac inr RVS l02 -xu s Soviet u s Soviet 37 4· 37 37 51 65 65 37 9 38 38 18 26 26 21 1 9 9 26 44 44 22 2 10 10 7 14 14 50 15 65 26 39 9 38 14 14 12 26 3 23 1 9 4 41 4 44 21 23 1 10 4 10 4 14 3 12 12 37 16 Attacking Detonati J g RVS 102 U S • Soviet EMT 1c 2 Detonati ng m rr 102 u s Soviet WEl '-fighting Curves Change to Baseline Case Deaths Soviet Deaths u s o Soviet First CF CV MD - 56 6 54 2 - 8 7 - 1 2 4 6 u s CF CV 93 4 - 56 6 - 92 2 - 1 2 - 3 4 First MD o If two figt res appear in a col mm the first represents RVS or I MT for weapo i targets and the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets Q I I •W · ··- • · ·-·- ·- ' C L - - -- AEM W LIB-FIGHTING CALCULATIONS - NO YE1 R 11 FORCES OPI'I0N III Baseline Forces with u s 106 Soviet CF Soviet CV First MD 14 88 76 93 128 111 u s CF CV First MD 18 88 43 52 128 117 Deaths 1000 Area ABM 4000 Terminal ABM Cities GTE Soviet SAM Defense Attacking RVS _02 ·X· u s Soviet Attacking E T 102 u s Soviet Detonating RVS 102 U S Soviet Detonating 1o2 · - u s Soviet War-fighting Curves Change to Baseline Case Deaths Soviet Deaths u s CF Soviet CV First MD u s CF CV First MD 150 647 o 56 6 66 o - 33 9 8 o 19 3 93 4 - 56 6 - 81 5 - 25 5 8 o - 13 2 Soviet 1st Strike 1st Strike U S Ema• 100 43% u s Deaths If two figures appear in a colunn the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If only one figure appears tis for city targets 50 217 q I I 1 1- ------ -----·- -·--·· ---------__ I I • • J ·- · - - • • • _ - · - - _ ' _ - f ED ·- - i'' O - - · - 11 J ··1 1' 0 ' 1 G III Baselir e -'O2'ces with Soviet hrst s F•i rst C C-' G C C -l iO Area AB ✓ 0 Terr linai A5M i ies Attac i 12 106 Deaths u 0 VS 102 -i U c• E o-riet Soviet P ta c - ir c F - ·1 102 LS sc r et 500 Terminal ABM weapons Detor a t ng RVS 102 - U S Soviet 14 144 142 127 136 133 37 4 37 11 26 49 65 56 37 9 38 12 26 17 26 20 26 1 30 7 20 42 113 144 127 78 136 130 11 37 15 50 15 65 30 35 9 38 13 14 12 26 4 22 9 30 13 41 4 50 23 24 37 50 Detonating Ti I'J 102 - 1 Li SW Soviet 26 2 30 8 20 10 17 7 30 11 4 17 3 14 11 11 War-figflt ir tg c- D ves C - ange to Baseline Ce se U S Deaths Soviet Deat s o o c1i' Soviet First vi u s C C T First CV r u o 4 o 2 5 1 5 o o o 2 2 3 I f t m fir ur0s ap pea r 1 n a co 11 tl- e f'irst r'e 'Jrese tr R 'S or T for 1 e i 11011 t _ cts a 1i t 1 econc for city tlu ' c-cs i f' cn i y· or g 1re appears ' t is 101· city tar 6 ets Q I I Jl J --·--------- -- • v - - ' J 1 nr ··• '· ·-· ' - • AEM WAR-FIGHTIKG CALCtJI l TIOr- S - I·i O YE l R FORCES OPI' LO III Baseline Forces with 200 Area ABt f 0 -- - · - Tenti al ABl - i Cities ° 800 Terminal ABM weapons Attacking Attackinr t' RVS 102 - C UoS Soviet Deaths 10° U S Soviet EI T u s 102 - Soviet Detona ti11g RVS 1 • U'- U S • Soviet Detonatir g EI lo2 - D S Soviet CF Soviet CV First MD 14 144 143 127 136 135 37 4 37 5 32 50 65 62 37 9 38 6 32 18 26 22 21 1 28 4 24 36 50 46 21 2 29 5 24 10 17 13 u s CF CV First MD 108 144 122 78 136 127 12 37 15 50 15 65 33 22 10 38 14 14 12 26 5 21 8 28 36 4 50 22 22 6 29 10 10 4 17 4 12 11 War-fighting Cu res Change to Baseline Case U S Deaths Soviet Deaths CF Soviet CV First MD u s CF CV First MD o 6 1 4 7 3 0 2 - 2 4 o 2 1 5 100 43% 1 - 3 0 u s Deaths 50 21% If two figures appear in a colu -rn n tLe first represents RVS or EMT for wea on targets and the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets D I L -o ' - - - - _-y ' -· · •- 'jJ u' • I'- _ - • • -- · · -· i - - - -·-·-·-·-·- ------- -·-· ' - -_ 1 · _ ✓- ·_- ' · · ·- ·-· - a P EN WAR-FIGETIKG CP iCvLt 'rICa 3 - NO Y S AR FO C SS O I'IO J III Baseline Forces with 0 Terminal AB V Attac ine RVS lo2 -xUoS Soviet 106 Deaths u s 500 Area Soviet -' B vi Cities 2000 Terminal MM Weapons Attacking EMT 102 U S Soviet Detonating RVS 102 Soviet 15 1 26 2 25 Detonating Ei· l 1c2 U S Soviet 15 2 26 2 26 11 16 5 26 8 8 4 17 3 13 •· CF Soviet CV First MD 14 144 144 131 136 136 37 4 37 13 37 55 65 65 37 9 38 13 38 u s CF CV 103 144 First MD 117 78 136 129 13 37 16 50 15 65 29 36 38 15 11 19 26 25 14 12 26 5 20 6 26 9 40 49 49 31L4 49 19 25 17 War-fighting Curves Change to Baseline Case Deaths Soviet Deaths u s 647o o 4 4 Soviet First MD 1 8 5 4 u s CF CV First MD 8 1 6 - 7 5 0 3 - 1 4 CF CV 6 150 3 Soviet 1st Strike U S 1st Strike a a lOC 43% U S Deaths - - 50 21% J f two £'iQ1r s appear in a column tr e first represents RVS or EM T for weapon targe s a 1d the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets Cr·'r' 1 0 -- 0 I I -- J - _ _ • __ - _ · -J - •• fi- n • _ if U' - - L' _H C · - '--· OFTION III i3aseline Forces wi Gll 500 A rea A£V - - 0 Ternir al AEJ Cities 192 ICBMs exchanged for 192 SLBMs on each side Att acldn Def- ths 2-00 U S Soviet CF CV Soviet rirst MD u s CF CV First MD RVS 102 - - U 0 c• CJ Soviet Attac 113 Detor a ir1 g 7 · i' C'I' U - u s R-vs 02 Soviet Detonatfr1g EI 'lT U S • Soviet u s 102 Sovi£ t 14 143 143 132 137 137 3 -4 34 68 81 81 32 9 33 33 19 26 26 23 1 23 23 49 63 63 22 2 22 17 · 17 98 143 1o6 78 137 129 13 34 15 66 15 81 45 36 9 33 12 i4 12 26 5 21 6 23· 8 57 4 63 38 25 4 22 6 li 4 4 13 11 22 w r-fighting Cu rves Change to Baseline Case Deaths Sovic t Dec ths u s o GJ Soviet CV First D u s CF CV First KJ 1 7 7 - 13 6 1 7 18 1 5 5 5 6 3 15 64·Jb Soviet 1st Strike U S 1st Strike c 2 o 5 9 i r tJ- 3 i r1 l1 illi_9E_ _ · c n- _ _l _9 t_- - -_ 'fects •f - t--T '_J-•---7 • iJ s Deaths - - fi si res appear in a col - U ul t he 1'irst r• Jrresent RVS or Ei ' i' for wea on targ ts and tha seconci fc c city targets I f only one figure ap ears it is fo city targets If t1-10 50 21 c i I I · ·-·· CF ·__ _· - I · -· ·· - I · CX j - rr f• 'ii' - r -c ED I J • • A li WM -Yi l - 'lil G CJ LCUL lT r oxs - '' m - ' i A Ba t line 3'orces with 500 Area i' BM 0 Terr li1 al Ai i1i Cities 384 ICBM exchanged for 384 SLBM on each side At'tacki - 10° Det· t hs CF Soviet First CV MD U S C CV First lvIT RVS l r-2 -li· L - tJ S _ _ Soviet ttJ i lb T J_02 · f l' S Sovie-c U S Soviet 14 142 142 135 137 137 36 4 36 36 85 98 98 32 9 33 33 101 78 137 132 16 36 18 83 15 98 47 51 10 33 12 142 108 o 1 8 6 Soviet First Cl I J c 10 3 UoS c·1 First 11 1 8 - 16 2 -- 8 J 7 6 5 o 7 2 3 ti1e sac0n6 or city tc rQ Gtf f o r ly cr e 'iz ure a -_ ears it is fo city targ ts vs 102 DeT one ting El'-' T 102 · - Soviet u s 21 26 26 25 1 25 25 64 77 77 22 2 22 22 12 17 17 14 12 26 5 21 8 25 71 4 77 39 38 5 n 4 10 Soviet 22 17 5 12 7 Deatts in Yiillic r1s i rc y -rc1r ct - 'fects ···--- Soviet 1st St -ike U S 1st Strike f'i f u r s appear in a cu J -c n t l1e t Ts-r i-·2 o ese11t R1lS or Er' t T for 1-reh V 1 ar6ets a 1d --- -10 etonati 1g U S • Cl1ange to Baseline Case U S ·DccJ ths Soviet Deat s CF 'o ct 3 · _-·j U S Deaths 50 2 ' ·- - -- i - L- - I · ··-- · ---·-·- ·· -·- -- -·--· · --------···__ _··- i - - _· - - - __· -- - - _ _- ° · - - - -··· ·--- - ---- · - -- ---- ½ _ _ ·' _§ ' ' -· - - -- ·· - ·- ·-- · · 3c c l I I 0 - AEM WAR-FIGHTING CALCULA IONS - l'IO YEAR FORCES - -· - 0PrI0N III 500 Area AB '1 CJ Te nal - Cities Each side has about 500 Ha rd Rock Silos 3000 psi Baseline Forces with Attacking RVS 102 u s Soviet Deaths 106 U S Soviet CF CV Soviet First MD U S First CF CV MD 14 144 144 130 136 136 129 78 136 135 144 143 Attacking E T u s 102 Soviet Detonating RVS 1o2 u s • Soviet Detonating EMT 1o2 · D S Soviet War-fighting Cu M 'es Change to Baseline Case Deaths Soviet Deaths u s CF Soviet CV First MD o 6 3 5 1 8 5 5 CF u s CV First MD 17 4 6 18 3 - 3 - 3 o 5 2 If two figures appear in a column the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets U S Deaths 50 21% Q I w 0 Soviet Deaths ED AEM WAR-FIGHTING CALCULl TIO S - NO YE AR i'ORCES OPrION III 500 Area AEtl 0 Terminal ABM Cities 1000 Terminal ABM Weapons Ea ch side has about 500 HRS Terminal ABM defends other silos Baseline Forces with u s Soviet CF CV 14 144 144 133 136 136 u s CF CV First MD 131 144 143 136 135 Soviet F'irst MD Attacking RVS lo2 · u s Soviet 106 Deaths Attacking EMT 102l U S Soviet Detonating RVS 1o2 u s • Soviet Detonating EM T lo2 u s Soviet 78 War-fighting Curves Change to Baseline Case U S Deaths Soviet Deaths CF Soviet CV First r-m u s CF CV first MD o 6 6 3 - 3 1 8 5 5 19 8 6 18 3 - 3 o 5 2 U S Deaths 50 If two figures appear in a column the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets 2F 4 Q I w t-' fJECJ -u °l _ Full C 0 I l ' J - - ··• • •• P E M W lill-FIGHI·rnu c T U ' i 'IC3S - NO Y 212 F03 CSS 0PIIOi'J III Baseline Forces with Deaths 106 U S Soviet CF CV Soviet First MD u s CF CV First MD O Area AB -Vi 1000 Terminal AE Cities 528 SABMIS Attackine RVS lo2 ·X· UoS Soviet Attacking u s EMT 102 Soviet Detonating RVS 102 u s Soviet Detonating EI-iT 102 u s Sovie-r 14 142 141 114 134 132 37 4 37 3 34 49 · 65 60 37 9 38 3 35 17 26 24 26 1 18 2 16 23 39 35 27 2 20 2 18 7 15 14 68 142 89 78 134 124 12 37 16 50 15 65 32 33 10 38 15 14 12 26 5 21 3 18 4 34 4 39 20 20 3 20 4 10 4 15 3 12 Wa --fighting Curves Change to Baseline Case Deaths Soviet Deaths u s Soviet First C CV MD - 12 3 2 6 1 4 - 43 7 2 2 35 2 2 6 6 1 l i' u s CV First MD o 2 2 1 1 - o - U S Deaths ·X· 50 21% I f two fit res appear in a colu m the fi c st represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If only one figu -e appears it is for city targets Q I w I -· ·• ' i ·- ··- ' CF - C Suvict I se thz ·-·· -· - AEM W A q-FIGh' Il G GALC-JL 4' 1'IOHS - · O I SAR'' E'OR0ES GPI' ON IV Baseline Forces with 0 Deaths 106 U S Soviet Are a AR ll 0 Tenninal AB Cities Attacking RVS 102 • UoS Soviet Attacking EMT 102 u s Soviet Detonating RVS 102 -i- U S • Soviet Detonati r g u S 28 2 29 3 26 EW ' 102 Soviet Soviet First U S First CF CV MD 14 143 141 115 126 124 15 4 15 3 12 20 27 26 35 9 36 3 33 18 27 24 13 1 13 2 11 CF CV 130 143 136 78 126 118 11 15 12 12 15 27 6 21 14 36 17 15 12 27 7 20 9 13· 10 MD 11 18 16 12 4 18 6 12 11 18 16 12 29 46 12 4 18 6 12 War-fighting Curves Change to Baseline Case U S Deaths Soviet Deaths CF Soviet CV First MD u s CF CV First MD · This is the Baseline case for Option IV U S Deaths If two figures a p pear i 1 a colul 'J1 the first represe ts RVS or EM 7 for we pon ta ' 'gcts and the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets Lev 1 it' LLJ 50 21% Q I w w 0 ------- • I -·• • l ' ' • · CF ·-· -··- l ----- '°• ' JC' -' EM WA R-FIGE'I'IKG CALCULA' i'Io s - m YEAR ' 0 C S 0PI'I0N IV Baseline Forces with 200 U S CF CV First MD 14 0 Terminal ABM Cities AttackinG RVS io2 U S Soviet Deaths 106 U S Soviet C Soviet CV First KO Area ABM Attacking EMT 102 u s Soviet Detonating RVS 102 U S Soviet 15 4 15 3 15 21 27 27 35 9 36 3 36 19 27 26 11 1 140 116 125 125 122 141 128 78 125 116 10 15 12 12 15 37 7 20 15 36 17 15 12 27 8 19 7 11 9 141 11 2 11 12 18 18 12 4 18 6 12 ·Detonati -1g EMT 102 u s Scviet 25 2 25 2 25 11 18 18 12 4 18 7 11 9 25 11 War-fighting Curves ChA nge to Baseline Case Deaths Soviet Deaths u s CF Soviet CV First Mil c r U S CV First MD o 2 2 7 8 0 - 2 2 7 8 9 5 8 0 5 - 2 1 U S Deaths If' two figures appear in a col the first re prese its RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets L I ¾ •·o U · • tr L· b C ··-' -' ' _r- _ _ I I -- G' J OF'l'IvN Bas line Forces with 500 14 135 135 CE' u s First CF 118 124 124 107 135 116 CV 1-8 0 Termir al AE i 1 Cities Attacking RVS 102 -liu s SoYiet Deaths 106 U S Soviet Soviet CV First 1-ID Axea AB ¾ rv 15 4 15 15 78 10 124 15 12 116 A tta kin6 1 MT 102 u s Soviet Detonating 'VS 102 U S • Soviet 27 27 35 9 36 36 21 -27 27 8 1 8 8 12 15 27 7 20 15 36 17 15 12 27 8 19 4 8 6 22 13 18 18· Detonating EJ r r 102 - u s Soviet 19 2 19 19 12 4 18 6 12 13 18 18 12 4 6 19 8 18 7 11 i ar-fightir Cu rves Change to Basejine Case U S Deaths Scviet CF CV First •I u s First - CF o 8 3 6 5 22 8 - 8 3 - 20 4 CV -0 Soviet Deaths 2 6 1 3 8 l5C 61 Soviet 1st Strike El U S 1st Strike r c 1 r - _J DeeU s i n Yd llions ' 're T-1·c17- t El' c cts · _ u J- - l 1 ------ ·r -- ·t· - -- _ __-t ___ ·-··· - o 1 3 2 7 U S Deaths ·X· f gt1res ap pear i 1 a column tl e f rst represents RVS or EMT for weapon tar 6 ets ar d t seco d for c ty ta i·gets If only o e figure Ei J P· a ·s it is for city targets Ll' two Q I w J'I ·- - • • I •• J ·-· CF ··- -· ' - ·-· - - - - -·- -------· - JO' - • _ - i - _ AEM WAR-FIGHTIJ' G CALCULATIOI'JS - NO YEAR FORCES OYlION Baseline Forces with u s CF CV First MD 14 101 101 63 101 72 · ·- - 500 Area ABM 1000 Terminal · AR vI Cities Attacking RVS 102 -l · u s Soviet Attacking El T 1o2 u s Soviet 115 123 123 15 4 15 15 27 27 27 35 9 36 36 27 27 8 1 3 3 78 123 10 15 111 11 • 12 15 27 8 19 17 36 19 15 12 27 8 19 2 3 2 Deaths 106 U S Soviet CF Soviet CV First MD IV 21 Detonating RVS lo2 u s • Soviet 12 16 16 11 14 16 7 9 Detonating EMT U S 102 -i · Soviet 19 2 13 13 4 13 5 il 16 16 12 4 16 7 9 War-fightirig Curves Change to Baseline Ca se U S Deaths Soviet Deaths CF Soviet CV First MD o 41 8 4o o -3 3 2 - 1 1 CF CV 66 6 - 41 8 - 64 2 o - 3 2 - 7 4 u s First MD If two figures appear in a coltun rt the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets U S • Deaths 50 21% Cl I w Soyiet Jaaths · AEM ·-- WAR-FIGHTING C J ll8ULA' i'IO S - 11 1110 Y EAR FORCES OPI'ION IV Baseline Forces with 500 Area ABM 1000 Terminal AK i Cities GTE Soviet SAM Defense Attacking __ RVS 102 · U S Soviet Deaths 106 U S Soviet CF Soviet CV First MD 14 101 101 u s CF CV First MD 63 101 73 0 Attacking EMT 102 U S Soviet Detonating RVS 102 Soviet Detonating EMT 102 u S Scviet 115 122 122 52 122 111 War-fighting Cu rves Change to Baseline Case U S Deaths Soviet Deaths o CF Soviet CV First MD -41 8 -40 0 C1'' CV -66 6 -41 8 -63 1 u s First MD 150 6 1•c - 7 -3-3 -1 2 Soviet 1st Strike • 11111 • u s 1st Strike D2illDI -25 5 - 3 3 - 7 1 If two figures appear in a colu 'D l'l the first represents RVS or EMT for weapon targets and the second for city targets If only one figure appears it is for city targets Deaths in Millic 'ls fro ' rol' t E fects J IbWEfj l rJ f l· f I- ---- - ·····- - J-- --t-· - t · -t--r-1- - i j ' l I I 1 I t • 1 I I I ----- - - - · • ' ' 100 43% U S Deaths 50 21% l I --- ·- --·-·--- - ·-' ·---r · _ - · - -- ·-· • - r 5 j sc riet TAB H ANALYSIS OF FORCE CAPABILITIES CONSIDERING MILITARY TARGETING i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page A Introduction B Option III c H-1 Figures 1 thru 8 A B BMD Base Cases H-7 Mixed Sea Land Offensive Forces H-9 Mixed Sea Land Defensive Forces H-11 Mixed Area City ABM H-15 Soviet Improved Technology H-17 ASW Improvements H-19 Cheating H-21 Penetration Aid Failure H-23 Option IV Figures 9 thru 11 A B BMD Base Cases H-25 Mixed Sea Land Defensive Forces H-27 Cheating H-29 DE TAB H ANALYSIS OF FORCE CAPABILITIES CONSIDERING MILITARY TARGETING 1 The following graphs summarize the results of analysis designed to examine relative force effectiveness of US and Soviet strategic missile forces using scenarios in which both the initiator and retaliator optimize their attacks to inflict both military and urban damage In each strike the attacker determines the minimum number of its missiles needed to cause a preselected percentage of fatalities and uses the remainder to cause maximum military damage If availability of weapons precludes attaining the preselected fatalities military targets are not attacked and fatalities are maximized The preselected percentage of fatalities to be achieved by missiles was arbitrarily set at 25 percent In an actual attack of course bomber forces would be used by both sides In that case the magnitude of fatalities and military damage achievable would be increased over that shown in the graphs but the magnitude of those increas·es would be depende·n t upon the assumptions made concerning the size and effectiveness of bomber and air defense forces for each side 2 The computer model used in this analysis was the Strategic Military Interactions Program for Evaluating Targeting SMIPET which has been developed by the Office of the £0 H-2 f Assistant to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff for Strategic Arms Negotiations ACSAN As in Code 50 and the AEM the model utilizes Everett's method- of generalized Lagrange Multipliers to find a weapon allocation which maximizes the total value destroyed The measure of value for urban industrial targets is population and remains fixed during all iterations · to determine an optimized allocation achieving 25 percent fatalities Relative values for military time-urgent nuclear threat targets are determined by the same mathematical formula used in the Code 50 model Relative values for military targets not posing an immediate threat to each side's major cities are assigned as arbitrary fractions of the threat targets In this analysis Soviet IRBM MRBM sites were assigned a value approximately equal to the value of an ssi9 silo bomber bases were given half that value and all other Soviet military targets were assigned one-fourth the value of an ssi9 Similarly US submarine bases bomber bases and other military targets were assigned respective relative values of three-fourths one-half and one-fourth of the value of a MINUTEMAN II silo Relative values of military targets with respect to each other remain fixed during iterations In each iteration the value of the entire set of military targets · is adjusted with respect to the fixed total value of population targets Then a set of TOP SECRET H-3 OECLASSi 0 weapon target allocations is determined so as to maximize the total value destroyed using the currently adjusted military values The iterative process is continued until the maximum total value destroyed either includes the proper percent of fatalities or excludes all military values without achieving the proper fatalities 3 Military targets used in these scenarious include for each side a variable number of time-urgent nuclear threat targets as determined by the strategic w apons being used in the scenario plus a fixed number of other military targets These fixed other military targets consisted of 388 IR MRBMs and 770 mixed targets in the Soviet Union and 655 mixed targets in the United States The mixed targets were added so as to represent such things as command and control communications defense suppression and nuclear storage targets from estimated 1978 data 4 In all scenarios the forces of both sides are assumed to be in a generated alert status The composition and char- acteristics of the forces are listed in Tabs Band D except as specifically indicated for each case a The mixed land sea offensive forces used in Figures 2-A and 2-B are summarized below were applied to all SLBM forces TOP SECRET Appropriate at-sea rates H-4 1 Both Sides Large Land Force - Base Case see Tabs B and D 2 Both Sides Large Sea Force - Soviets replace 592 ssg ICBMs with SSNgl SLBMs and us replaces 384 MMII ICBMs with ULM SLBMs 3 Soviets Large Sea Force US Large Land Force Soviets as in 2 but US replaces 192 P0SID0N SLBMs 12 SSBNs with MMIII ICBMs 4 Soviets Large Land Force US Large Sea Force Soviets use Base Case and US replaces 592 ICBMs with ULM SLBMs 5 Both About Equally Divided - Both sides replace 192 ICBMs with SLBMs b The technological improvements assumed for the Soviet forces in Figures 5-A and 5-B consisted of 1 ssg3 MIRV has ten RVs each with a yield of 2 megatons and a CEP of 0 16 nautical miles Base Case has 6 RVs at 1 2 MT and 0 25 run 2 The ssg9 has three RVs each with a yield of 0 5 megatons and a CEP of 0 16 nautical miles Base Case has 1 RV at 1 2 MT and 25 nm 3 The ssg10 has three RVs each with a yield of 2 0 megatons and a CEP of 0 25 nautical miles has 1 RV at 1 2 MT and 0 5 run Base Case H-5 has a single RV with a yield of 1 5 '- megatons Base Case has 1 RV at 1 2 MT 5 The SSNil MIRV has a yield per RV of 0 5 megatons I 5 Base Case has 3 RVs at 0 4 MT Three types of BAllisticMissile Defense have been used in this analysis a Terminal BMD - The SMIPET model uses the same no leakage terminal BMD used in the CODE 50 model This is an analytical technique in which it is assumed that defenses are overcome by targeting sufficient terminal oojects RVs plus decoys to exhaust 85 percent of the interceptors stationed at the target and RVs used to exhaust cause no damage When assigning interceptors to cities the numbers assigned per city are proportional to city population subject to the constraint of having a minimum of 17 reliable interceptors 1 e 20 each with reliability of 0 85 at any defended city A limited test case indicated a more efficient deploy- ment would be to have a minimum of 4 25 reliable interceptors 5 total at a defended city However it was considered that comparability with all other analyses in the paper in which the larger minimum was used dictated use of the same number in this portion b Nationwide Random Area BMD - In this type defense each attacking missile RV has a probability of being H-6 destroyed equal to the ratio of the total number of reliable interceptors available divided -b y the total number of objects RVs plus decoys expected to arrive at the Area Defense c Mid-Course Area BMD - In this type of defense the interceptor is targeted against a missile booster rather than the individual RVs and decoys It is assumed that a successful booster intercept wil result in destroying either all or some fraction of the objects RVs plus decoys carried by the booster In this analysis it was assumed that a mid- course interceptor could defend against only one type of missile booster either against land based ICBMs or against SLBMs but not both Those defending against land based ICBMs could each destroy half the objects carried by a booster but those defending against SLBMs could destroy all objects carried in a booster BASE CASE 1 OPrION 3 DAMAGE 'ro SOVIET ARR ARR NO MTE R V 'roTS 100 -- -- 3958 31 181 I i i I i 'I --3 ll§_ 808 i I 1566 --32- J XL I I I aoa ' I ll 12 L · J L 3 QQ' L -3 L l16 _ eoa ' ' _gll_ I rgc _ ' _J 2_ - -' I I I 808 II I I i I I I i I i i --- I I ' i l iI I I I i I I i I •---POPULATION I i j ' --·-- 500 Area ABM 1000-Terminal ABM at Cities I I 500 Area ABM 2000 Terminal ABM at Cities 1000 Area ABM 4000 Terminal ABM at Cities · Ii iI FIGURE 1-A l il 223_ 2 22 1031 6 5 1 J ll -2Qli I I l 26 a2 I 3§§_ m · Ql I i I Ji _ _ J5 i 3J2_ _3lQ I i j ' ' I I -- I -· I I i I I I ' I i I I __a_ _ a_ 5 5 3 _ jz _ 0 Jl_ _o_ i I 1031 1i 5l j ' I J 82 J 6Q 0 - l OTHER MILITARY __Q 1Q 3L _Q_ __ a 651 _Q_ i I - - - • HARD MILITARY _gQJ I i NO -- I ARR R V 'I ' ARR M'1E 23Q l Q 3 _ 1 22 32 I r 500 Area ABM 100 140 •-i- 8o I 200 Area ABM l -1-- 60 I __ _ ' a t- 40 r r I 20 ·-- 0 ABM I ' co -- I I 0 DESCRIPTION i I i uo 487 -· uu 3- 36 i i 9Q§_ i i i 0 - II I 20 • I 3l J l2 8o8 140 40 i 1566 Jg_ 223 1032 3856 1566 60 I - 1040 80 US STRIKES FIRST 1 DAMAGE 'ro US J OPI'ION 3 SOVIE-r STRIKES FIRST BASE CASE 'f DAMAGE 'IO SOVIET ·No 'mTS 100 80 6o 40 ARR ARR MTE R V 113 431 13 601 2702 _ ll3 808 20 J g1 435 12 1566 _ 22 8o8 1566 105 8o8 •-- _J 2 _ Qi - ·-· --· ' 8o8 __ i_ ·t 7ll ill§ J 6 li7 lli _ 288 238 - 500 Area ABM 12 lo4 I- 8o8 · 500 Area ABM · · 1000 Terminal ABM at Cities - 500 Area ABM 2000 Terminal ABM at Cities · ••I I 4CX O 1000 Area ABM Term nal All at Cities - A tffi R V 110 I -- 246o 2246 1031 28o 48o fil 1 §Q_ · 276 2051 651 2089 1907 1 24 · @_ 651 --I 121 i 1031 152 _ L 1616 304 l il2_ 1031 374 · 22 _ 21Q_ l ' in_ l 39 Z lQJ _ - i 1£i I - ' - I ' a 221 • ARR It TE 2247 - ---- --• 1 • - - • POPULATION -- all 'A I i _2§1 - 1566 100 QI J2- --- tr- --• Bo f I I 2 r · - I · 6o - _ 200 Area ABM r 111 • all - ·-· · • - 40 'IO US • 0 ABM ·248 _g 3 1566 o O 610 rn DESCRIPTION 0 -·-- 622 2619 'p DPJ GE 1 1 m_ Q3l_ --2 0 - - - HARD MILITARY FIGURE 1 - B I X J SECRET MIXED SEA LAND OFFENSIVES Both Sides 500 Area ABM US STRIKES FIRST OPrION 3 Al lR M'IB DAMAGE ro SOVIET NO • ARR R V TGTS 1o_o_ _a_o_ _6 0__4_0__20 __ 0 -·--- JJ Q ±§1 1013 3844 1566 --1 _ 176 8o8 102 626 §21 2ill I I •1-i- CII I I w i - --- Soviets Soviets- US _ll l2Q _ i - -- _L 80 ARR 100 ARR NO R V 'IGTS 242 336 1031 75 651 - MTE 22 --••· 368 41 Large Sea Force Small Land Force Large Small Large Small Land Force Sea Force Land Force Sea Force 271 86 242 446 Large Sea Force Small Land Force Both Sides About Equally _ D ivided Between Sea and Land i Ar' r Ar'- ' •--••POPULATION ----HARD MILITARY 150 244 155 141 1223 276 · 5o8 65 1 -- I APLAP A · ----• -- i ' iI ' '' 167 241 i ' 0 ' I i ·60 160 US 8o8 2 32 4268 uZ _ 40 Both Sides Large Sea Force and Small Land Force i l1 102 653 902 6121 1566 101 757 8o8 I US I 337 24 177 Base Case Both Sides Large Land Force and Small Sea Force 0 ro ' I -• ••• a • • - - r-r l1 _lli _§2§ 110 I l DESCRIPTION DAMAGE I I I 1 i 274 220 fil_ O 651 I I I • - OTHER MILITARY FIGURE 2-A r I 0 C REr MIXED SEA LAND OFFENSIVES Both Sides 500 Area ABM SOVIErS STRIKE· FIRST OPrION 3 i A iIB A 1' ffi NO • l flE R V 'lGTS 100 610 2513 105 435 12 -·- DAM GE 'IO SOVIET 6o 80 40 I i 1566 -- O · --- li ··-· r' il I --- - Soviets US - Soviets- US Large Smal l Large Small - ---jAF Large Sea Force I - Divided Between Sea and Lan4 118 420 651 ld ill i • J 2g_ NO • '10'15 1797 - - 846 145 265 2344 0 0 651 --r Smal l Land Force ARR R V 124 135 1785 1630 -- - I • - • 1POPULA1'I II --- - ARR M - - 100 ·2oa9 Sea Force Land Force Land Force $ea Force Large Land Force Small Sea Force Both Sides About Equally 8o · 6o - Both Sides Large Sea Force and Smal l Land Force I 40 ·-· ··- I 97 7f37 596 5o85 _ Q§_ ill 0 DESCRIPTION Base Case Both Sides Large Land Force and Smal l Sea Force 0 8o8 8o8 J L_ Ql 20 DAMAGE 'IO US - - I • ' ·• 151 122 2004 1 30 - J QQ 839 651 - - - • HARD MILITARY FIGURE 2-B aI A f-' 0 ED OPI'ION i ARR ARR M'IB R V 356 777 21 3 'IGTS 100 80 468 1529 2662 l ill 8o8 I 1423 I - - 176 808 1218 1702 1566 8o8 _ g1 493 389 1 26 144 40 I iI II I i i i I II I 8o8 i I ' I I I I I I ' II I I i I - I I I iI i i I 500 US Area ABM Are i 500 Soviet Area ABM Are 'I 300 Mid-Course VS ICBM ' 200 Mid-Course VS SLBM r --I i I I I iI Both Sides 500 Area ABM Are 300 Mid-Course VS ICBM 200 Mid-Course VS SLBM ----•HARD MILITARY other side has 500 nation-wide area ABM FIGURE 3-A SSIFIED 40 60 80 100 ARR NO - R V 'lllTS ARR MTE • ---· - - 217 1 198 1031 2 651 i --t - 328 g§ L 307 244 --1 221 Jg ±_ 32Q I I I --· ' I 300 Mid-Course VS ICBM ' 200 Mid-Course VS SLBM - -l- • www • POPLULATION ' 500 Soviet Area ABM Are Mid-Course VS ICBM ' J I I Base Case 1500 ABM 1000 Terminal City and 500 Area Nation-Wide I I i ' ·c I I i DESCRIPTION 20 0 II I I I 0 - I I - 20 610 lli 2 £I 6o i _g2 2§ _1566 % • -·356 777 21 US STRIKES FIRST DAMAGE 'IO US DAMAGE 'IO SOVIET NO 1423 1566 176 808 MIXED SEA LAND DEFENSES Both Sides 1000 City ABM ' _- ·- I I ' ' i --·· _Q_ I i i l I 465 0 I i I ' iI - E i 370 12 I l i l 'I ·I '' M 338 1031 22 651 ' i iI -__o I i i 424 0 1031 'I - OTHER MILITARY ±22- 22 0 0 0 1031 0 651 MIXED SEA LAND DEFENSES Continued OPl'ION DAMAGE ARR ARR NO MTE R V 'IDTS 100 104 411 994 3787 1566 ln 8o8 • 3 'ro 80 J 6a 182 I 60 40 I i I 8o8 3Q5_ 1566 lQl --··-·-20 0 I I l I I I I II I I JQ_ lo46 _l 2_ i SOVIET • 136 ' 834 952 3055 US STRIKES FIRST I ' I I l i • -- - - - - POPULATION DESCRIPTION Base Case 1000 Area Nationwide AI M Both Sides Soviets 1000 Terminal City AIM US 6oo Mid-Course vs ICB-1 400 Mid-Course vs SLIM Soviets 6oo Mid-Course vs ICEM 400 Mid-Course vs SLBM US 1000 Terminal City AI M __ _ 0 20 DAMAGE 'ro US Afu'q 40 6o 80 100 ARR NO R V 'IDTS 1b5 MTE _ ill 0 1031 0 -- - I -- - I I I I ' i j ' I I I I I I i l I ' I I I '' ---•HA ID MILITARY I -- -r - I _ J _ Q 183 0 _ill 167 - - - 0 1031 0 --221- J 11 1031 ·_ 2 ·---3 _§1 OTHER MILITARY D FIGURE 3-A Continued r I I-' I SECREr MIXED SEA LAND DEFENSES Both Sides 1000 City ABM OPrION 3 cf ARR 1-1TE 476 22 150 1284 1566 _§_ • ___a 8o8 -l- I l II 808 20 0 ·-· Base Case 1500 ABM 1000 Terminal City and 500 Area Nation-Wide t- I - 0 1566 0 8o8 1028 56 DESCRIPTION 0 ll 1 222 1803 181 1551 1566 12 103 8o8 206 20 _ 40 60 i I· iI -I i I 1· I t I 483 1566 _4_ _§S l • - - - - - POPLULATION - L I 300 Mid-Course VS ICBM 200 Mid-Course VS SLBM Both Sides 500 Area AB '-1 Are ----•HARD - I CIL SECREI' ll'ri 11 - A ' vu D -·- - ---- ·- ·- - - -· _F' I _ E 3-B ·- --- - __ ___ --- - I i ·- J 22 3' 1031 _ £2 473 -31Q 1386 _g§_ 651 I I other side has 500 nation-wide area ABM - ---- 'IUTS 414 -U ± 2 428 1518 OTHER MILITARY MILITARY - - _m 473 1593 1031 _g_ --2§ 651 I i -- • NO 414 1745 ' I 300 Mid-Course VS ICBM · 200 Mid-Course VS SLBM ARR R V 341 397 1411 1288 1031 26 I 500 Soviet Area ABM Are - l I i AR MTE I 300 Mid-Cours·e VS ICBM 200 Mid-Course VS SLBM 100 Q3l _ § •-- - 500 US Area ABM Are 4-I I I I 80- US U ±2 J 5 93 • -• •• 500 Soviet Area ABM Are Mid-Course VS ICBM 'IO 414 I g2 _ gQ _L 366 0 0 40 80 60 2216 386 cf DAMAGE D l MAGE 'IO SOVIET NO • 'IGTS lCO A lR R V SOVIETS STRIKE FIRST - - ·-- - -·- - - MIXED S'EA LAND DEFENSES Continued OPfiOJ j DAMAGE I ABR ARR NO MTE R V 'IDTS 100 lQ 686 J 3§ 2172 1566 ll 8o8 166 'ro 80 SOVIETS SfflIICE FIRST 60 0 _Q_ 0 1566 I 8o8 i 1566 8o8 40 iI _1 gg_ _ig§_ SOVIET I 901 419 III06 _y_ 113 3 I I I I 20 0 t _ L-i - i 'I Ii ii-- • - - - - - POPULATION i 1 I DESCRIPTION Base Case 1000 Area Nationwide AIM Both Sides Soviets 1000 Terminal City Ail 1 US 6oo Mid-Course vs ICBo1 400 Mid-Course vs SLJl 1 Soviets 6oo Mid-Course vs ICB-1 400 Mid-Course vs SLB-1 US 1000 Terminal City A1f 1 ' -- ARR 20 0 DAMAGE 'ro US 40 60 80 I I ' I i I I i Jr - I ' - - - - HARD MILITARY FIGURE 3-B Continued ARR R V - NO 'IDTS l QJ 1830 2Il- I I 159 1521 132 1389 1031 19 _§g I J2Q 1031 la -312 _fil I MTE _m • -- 100 I I I 21 407 · 1 7 U 1031 414 § 2 ED MIXED ARFA CITY ABM OP rION 3 ARR DAMAGE NO R V 'IDTS 100 9o8 · 2847 1566 ARR __ MTE 140 _3g_ 140 - 2 L _Jg_ m 8o8 177 1566 8o8 74o 3227 1566 _3g_ _ l1 §2§ 23ft 1566 _Jg_ 80 6o ·40 J I I I ' -118 ue SOVIET l1 _J Q§ II I i I I iI i I II I i I I i I' ' ' I 0 -·--- - --• 1-- I II I I 20 I 908 2847 'IO US STRIKES FIRST I ' I I 1 I i l •• I ··-- • - - - - - POPULATION DESCRIPTION Base Case Both Sides Have 500 Area 1000 Terminal ABM Soviets Have 500 Area 1000 City ABM US Has 1000 Area 500 City ABM Soviets Have 1000 Area 500 City ABM US Has 500 Area 1000 City ABM i I I _ Both Sides Have 1000 Area 500 City ABM HARD MILITARY 0 20 ·---- 40 DAMAGE 'lO US 6o 80 100 ARR MTE 33b ILi 182 ----- o ARR -- NO R V 'IOTS 310 166 0 651 ·-•1iI I I I i --__ i I I I I I I II I I i I I I -0 0 I l i 295 II i i I I I I '' 'i 464 0 0 '24o --00 333 0 0 1031 651 452 0 1031 O · 651 274 0 1031 0 §2 I _ _ OTHER MILITARY FIGURE 4-A IEO r I I-' n - u• t-u MIXED AREA CI'IT ABM SOVIETS STRIKE FIRST OPTION 3 %DAM1 GE A lR •ITE ARR R V TO SOVIET NO 6o Bo 'roTS 100 - 1566 J Qi 808 _gJ _ _l g_ Jg_ J Qi o -- -- l -t l 79 a mQ l5 6fi _ _ _ 22_ _ Q§ I l2Q 12§_ _J§2 yigr 1566 11 20 r Jfil 121 1873 1566 m 4o ·-- 1ii L - 1- _ 2§_ I - - --- - • POPULATION ' II DESCRIPTION Base Case Both Sides Have 500 Area 1000 Terminai ABM Soviets Have 500 Area 1000 City ABM US Has 1000 Area 500 City ABM Soviets Have 1000 Area 500 City ABM US Has 500 Area 1000 City ABM 20 0 ·-- - ------ - ·- 40 DPJ IAGE-'1 1 US 60 8o •• ·-· - - - - - - - - H A R D MILITARY - --·-- -- ---- · · -· ····· - - --------- ···-··-··· ---- NO TS 439 385 443 llJ66 JJ2 _ 1113r 40 - 32 i ·1 lI -AFAll AF_ ARR R V m 1616 1475 1031 _ _ i___ I -397 l21 I -A llR MTE - I Both Sides Have 1000 Area 500 City ABM 100 1616 1475 1031 304 374 651 Ir FIGURE 4-B - ----- - ------ i · I OTHER MILITARY - 31 l m 1466 JJ2 1031 __Jill __1 _651 ____C s · AS SOVIET IMPROVED TECHNOLOOY US STRIKES FIRST OPrION 3 I A lffi i NO 'IGTS 100 A l t - - I llTE DAMAGE TO SOVIET R V 120 -521 80 6o 1 •• 40 ' · - IJ Q Q 395a __ l 181 8o8 m 3m 1032 4012 i566 8o8 I I 14o -2 _3 2 111 _§Q§_ ·- I tI - - - _ I I -I i I I I I I • - - - POPULATION __ DESCRIPTION i I I Both Sides Have No ABMs - Improved MIRVs Accuracy and Yield BASE CASE Both Sides Have 1500 ABMs 500 Area 1000 Terminal 'A l --· ---20 0 BASE CASE ---- ' 32 _ ill fil 33l9 15 62 ' __J Q_ J 2I _ 8Q6_ 0 2847 1566 ___ 20 40 DAl-tAGE ro us Bo 100 6o ARR R V 53Q lQ3l 22 m §2 l 11'9 148 1oo6 1480 - _g 182 i 166 1031 _Q_ _Q_ I ·-- · i - - - HARD MILITARY FIGURE 5-A I I 628 I J2 i ' ' I -221- W a 65 ' L i I 1031 J Q_ i I I Ma -221- Improved MIRVs Accuracy and Yield l'iO • I 'IG73 l O 201 AA 1 - TE I I _ _ OJ'HER MILITARY ·' 1031 £2 _ SS r-rtO SOVIET IMPROVED TECHNOLOOY SOVIETS STRIKE FIRST OPTION 3 i ARR MTE AJ 1R R V D I MA GE 'l'O SOVIET NO • TGTS 100 80 ll 3 15Ei6 _ll lll 808 ' - 20 0 t --- -l I 755 _a_ l9la Jg_ __ Qi lJ 1 40 1- fill 2467 l 566 _ll _ Q_ 808 248 6o DESCnIPTION BASE CASE Both Sides Have No ABMs Improved MIRVs Accuracy and Yield P BASE CASE Both Sides Have 1500 ABMs 500 Area 1000 Terminal 146 1566 I • - I I I al-I - • POPULATION 1I I o 20 40 Improved MIRVs Accuracy and Yield P' MILITA Y 60 Bo 100 ARR MTE ARR NO R V 'lGT 3 _ Q1 --19 2460 2246 1031 280 -- •• I I __ 2 ·480 fil 82 3852 1031 1337 651 m I ' 439 1616 1475 _ 1031 -r _ m _fil •-- - I I _ _ - • _ - CYI'HER I _I '·' I 4o8 __322 3oaI 1176 J Q3l R I --22 1 ' MILITARY FIGURE 5-B • I I I i 4494 925 rr-__ I I - - - HARD DAMAGE 'IO US I I 1007 t ·• i I I-' CP ASW IMPROVEMENTS Both Sides 500 Area ABM i Alt -q ARR MTE R V DAMAGE NO 'lGTS 100 US STRIKES FIRST 3 OPI'ION 'IO 80 487 3844 1566 31 176 808 110 1013 SOVIET I 60 40 ·• 782 2389 _19 16 101 8o8 _3l li2 _§Q§_ ill - I i 782 1566 -1Q ili 0 t- - 1----r •----•POPULATION o 0 DESCnIPTION -- Base Case 4o --- I - i566 473 -3§ 51 · 1566 -- 20 -·- ill 3a3 $ DAMAGE I• US Loses 50 Percent SLBM to Improved ASW ·6o ·ao - - · 332- 1031 __kL 65l 150 230 Ji53 _J Q3l_ I I i - - - OTHER MILITARY lli 177 182 216 -166 _Q_ JL 2 il · 1031 gQ3 _ 31 1 _ 3 i2 - J Q3l -1 0 -1 8 6SJ__ I I FIGURE 6-A - - NO 'IGTS 12§ 161 i i A ' ffi R V 242 I -- i ----•HARD MILITARY ARR 100 -MTE --2Q J1 - Both Sides Lose 50 Percent ·SLBM to Improved ASW US Ji9fi I Soviets Lose 50 Percent SLBM to Improved ASW '10 Af5W IMPROVEMENTS Doth Sides 500 Area ABM ft R -q 11 TE D 'U iAGE TO SOVIET ARR NO R V 'IGTS _JZ5 _6J Q J 32 -12 • 10 5 SOVIR S STRIKE FIRST 3 OPTION 100 80 ' 60 40 20 • · - 1566 Bo8 -96 822 l5 66 ----6 --1 g_ 808 - 1 16 628 ·- 365 2395- 1 5 66 104 0 - ---- --- us 683 _g_ _§Q§_ - P I --- - I i I• POPULATION l - - DESCRIPTION 0 - Base Case - o -- · 60 Soviets Lose 50 Percent _SLBM to Improved ASW - -- ·----__ - - I I I • P i i r- _ _ arHER NO • 'IOTS 118 l 9Q1 1031 13 5_ _22 _ 2109 1 2s5_ 112 0 _ m- J l3_ 1031 -651 lQ3l - i A -q_-q R V 2hlL i2Q i • _ ARR 100 - MTE 2089 - Both Sides Lose 50 Percent SLBM to Improved -SW ·ao 12a_ I US Loses 50 Percent SLBM to Improved ASW - - - - • HARD MILITARY 40 DAMAGE TO US 2Q9 • 281 -6 5 J I MILITARY FIGURE 6-B SECRET --------------·- - - - - - - ----·-·---- - _ - ·-· I I 0 -- · -- • r 1 CHl 0PrI0N 3 US STRIKES FIRST DA GE TO SOVIET A Ai 'm NO • I TE R V 'IDTS lCO 80 60 110 -1013 _l -1 2 _1004 i566 J 76 8Q6_ _1'8J_ -112 Jl8L ---1 i4o 1566 8o8 2Q 3_ 2li 2847 _Jg_ IL ----- 1566 8o8 152 553 1166 26 5 ··213 m 1566 8o8 DESCRIPTIO l 500 Area ABM --- 500 Area ABM Agreement Soviets Covertly Add 500 Mobile Land ICBMs loa I I ·-4-- 500 Area ABM Agreement Soviets Covertly Replace 700 IR MRBM with ICBMs L __ I I I ·1 I I I I I i II ·r- r j I I 1 500 Area ABM ft greement Soviets Covertly 1 Add 500 Mobile ICBMs 2 eplace 700 IRLMRBM wLICBM Base Case 500 Area 1000 Terminal· ABM - _ '' i 0 Base Case I 0 i 176 • --3 u6- · --8a8 1004 20 A ' 487 3844 40 - ·-- 110 487 1013 3844 1566 _J _ • J 76 Baa DAMP GE TO US · 500 Area and 1000 Terminal ABM Agreement Soviets Covertlvdd 500 Area ABMa 500 Area and 1000 Termina1 All -- i-- - 6o 40 20 80 • --- J ---- AF-- - -- FIGURE 7-A 'Il'¾TS - - -162 452 - · 150 412 428 I J li 2l 2 Q5l I _j_ 7 9 12§_ - _g8g_ I ' ' I - I i - · 336 182 0 - I --11111 I I i J 03 3 5l Ji97_ I i --221 8Q6 J Q3l - I 1 -- - 1031 15L · 121 I y NO J i_ I A 'IIB R V l S6- 2k2_ 36li -336 l 03l i --• Agreement Soviets Covertly I §J 1566 I - 1-AddJOO Area ABM Deployed a8o8 i I l bovea 2-Add 500 Mobile ICBM A _§Q I I I I 3-Re 2lace 700 IRLMREl f __ d I@ L · - - · ·-·------ - •ww POPULATION - - - • HARD MILITARY OTHER MILITARY lO O Soviet Area ABM Deployed 600 Mid-Course VS ICBM 400 Mid-Course VS SLBM I ARR MTE 100 - · 275 831 13 I J Q 0 1031 651 296 759 24 1031 651 £12 ll2 1578 1436 _JQ_ 2Q 1031 651 i I I I-' CJL SOVIETS STRIKE FIRST cf D 4_V AGE TO SOVIET I 'IB NO 'IGTS fu'1 R V --- J 25 -6 lO lCO 80 60 40 J 3 5 1566 _la • 1Q5 arr _Jg_ 1Q3 ' 1566 aoa· I I 2 - 354 2339 1566 -12 J 03_ __aoa I I I 248 ill 1566 J2 1Q5 __§2§ I ·I ll 112 _ _Jg_ 2 ·-71 272 1566 _ o_ _o_ - -- i-·- Base Case 500 Area ABM i 500 Area ABM Agreement Soviets Covertly 1 Add 500 Mobile ICBMs 2 eplace 700 IR MRBM w ICBM Base Case 500 Area 1000 Terminal' ABM I I' I I I ·-· r- -- 20 0 40 --- 60 80 -- I -- I I ' i - I I -'· J 2 Q1 1031 w 118 2 232 1031 624 _fil r I I m § 1031 2611- 436 · 651 -1 §J 2818 1031 25 l 1616 1475 1031 31t 22 ----• I500 Area and 1000 Terminal ABM Agreement I I Soviets Covertwdd J a 500 Area AB a I 500 Area and 1000 Terminal - Agreement Soviets Covertly ·1-AddJOO Area ABM Deployed a I I IAbovea 2-Add 500 Mobile ICBM -- 3-ReElace 700 IRLMRBM _wLICBMs_ I - - - - POPULATION - - - • HARD MILITARY - OTHER MILITARY 10 0 Soviet Area ABM Deployed 600 Mid-Course VS ICBM 400 Mid-Course VS SLBM FIGURE 7-B 122 _ J21--1 J2 - I NO 'IGTS -W--2 l - r ' I ARR R V 118 r I r - - 1 ARR NTE - I 100 _ill --t· I I · 500 Area ABM Agreement Soviets Covertly Replace 700 IR MRBM with ICBMs r I Soviets Covertly Add 500 Mobile Land ICBMs -I I I I I 500 Area ABM Agreement - I 1566 8o8 DESCRIPTION I ' y i I I -22 __aoa 320 0 0 0 p J JJL 6lJ L - 20 J 2_ 12§§ 8o8 _11 110 DAMJl GE 'I ' US ' 1 _§QI_ -- JG _9PrION 3 A__q__-q I · _m J ru lm 1Q 3l _3Q i fil m _ DQ gm 2140 1031 -3§2 ·484 Ml i I I I OPI'ION 3 i A l 1 MTE A i '1R R V US STRIKES FIRST %DAMAGE TO US ARR 80 60 40 20 0 DESCRIPTION 0 20 40 · 60 80 Base Case 914 2847 1566 --_jg_ IL 8o8 136 OOQ _lg_ ill - y DAMAGE TO SOVIET NO • 'IDTS 100 Jl Q PENAID FAIWRE • J3i -_3Q i lll- J S 8 l0 3l --J- m 5 US Pehaid Failure 1031 4 fil 2· ' I 1· i ' • - w w w POPULATION _3J 156 •· I Ji ' LGTS --0-_Q_-65 l lli 90 l - NO Terminal AEM 8o8 2740 A -q -q R V --3 Q 182 QJ 1566 llL 2 t - MTE 500 Area and 1000 100 US Penaid Failure l 1 12 8o8 100 100 US Penaid Failure ' be 500 Soviet AB4 are Mid• course intercepting ICBMs • - - - • HARD MILI'l'ARY ' I l 122 176 u 161 1031 21 § g_ - OTHER MILITARY ·• US targets assuming PERAIDS work but they fail Soviet Penaids work Both sides have 500 Area 1000 City A1lf FIGURE 8-A -r I I J w • OPI'ION 'I A lR MTE 248 AIIB R V 3 PENAID FAILURE a SOVIETS S'ffiIKE FmST D ' MAGE 'IO SOVIET NO • 'roTS 10 0__8_0__ · 6_0_ _1 _0_ 2_0__ 0 TO US ARR MTE A lffi R V t--- - -----P-- _m 1132 - - 0 DESCRIPTIOl1 Base Case 755 _ $ DAMAGE I• o 4o ·60 _80 100 ll 12R- l 566 _l2 • l Q2 __aca 500 Area and 1000 Terminal ABM J 6JB- J Is J2 i 3lL 698 looj US fen aid Failure _321 ll L fil§ J 12 179 _gJQ_ 12 -1229 lli2 103 3o4 8o8 lJU1 1031 -651 _fil __ ru 5oi us P imia - sll 19113 1566 __ g_ _lC ¼ 374 NO • ' roTS aca 1616 1031 Fail 11re '_32 t' I• -'37 'i 65 l i I J£6_ --9 13 · _gn_ --1266 I i _u_ _aaa i 1ooi-us Penaid Failure The 500 Soviet A1f 1 are Mid course intercepting ICBofs --r- 'I I _Jl1_ il9 3o4 ' - ----• POPULATION US - - - • HARD MILITARY _ J81'AI'_ OTHER MILITARY ·• targets assuming PENAIDS work but they fail Soviet Penaids work Both sides have 500 Area 1000 City AJl 1 FIGURE 8-B -- J 6J 6 l U5 1031 374 651 • BASE CASES US STRIKES FmST OPI'ION 4 i DAMAGEI TO SOVIET DAMAGE TO US ARR ARR NO MTE R V WTS ARR ARR NO MTE R V WTS 100 _ lg_ 161 _ 2g_ 150 Jtli Ill 1566 882 680 1031 --22 651 m lll e 3 ll2 80 60 40 214 0 DESCRIPTION OAB-1 184 20 1566 __ __ POPULATION 1000 Area Nationwide ABM Both Sides 0 0 40 6o 80 100 -- _§Q_ 0 0 0 0 1031 651 - - - • HARD MILITARY FIGURE 9-A I I r' ut I n ' t· BASE CASES SOVIETS STRIKE FmST OPI'ION 4 1 DAMAGE I ARR ARR NO MTE R V 'IGTS 100 1566 ll 8o8 141 'IO US ARR 80 60 l o 20 0 DESCRIPTION 0 20 40 60 80 100 MTE ARR NO R V 'IGTS - J 7l _l6J £ll 33Q 1 DAMAGE 'ro SOVIET 2587 0 Alf f - - - • HARD MILITARY FIGURE DECLJ SSIFIED 1031 ill ill §2 1000 Area Nationwide A™ Both Sides -aw w - - POPULATION -2 @ 9-B 200 886 _gz_ 347 1031 J L 651 OTHER MILITARY r I I °' MIXED SEA LAND DEFENSES OPl'ION ARR NO R V 'IGTS 100 184 ID 1 2_ 214 US STRIKES FIRST DAMAGE 'ro SOVIET ARR MTE fill 4 80 60 40 20 Base Case 1000 Area Nationwide 1566 Alf 1 Soviets 210 321 JJi 1566 l2 2 ilJ- JiQ6 • - - - _ POPULATION II 20 40 6o 80 100 -- Both Sides 1000 Terminal City ABM US 6oo Mid-Course vs IClll 400 Mid-Course vs SLEM 8o6 m_ 1566 JJ 2 6 QB ' 246 DESCRIPTION 0 0 DAMAGE 'ro US -t --· Soviets 600 Mid-Course vs ICFM 400 Mid-Course vs SLBM - - US 1000 Terminal City ABM ----HARD MILITARY FIGURE 10-JI OTHER MILITARY ARR MTE AR -q NO • R V 'IGTS - -1l5 200 886 _o_ 1031 _Z _ _Q_ 651 122 1 1 23 §2 1031 _Q_ _Q_ 390 668 - -· 38o 751 1031 _Q_ _Q_ --6il • SECRET MIXED SEA LAND DEFENSES S DAMAGE I ARR M'ill ARit 'NO R V 'IUTS 100 'ro SOVIET 80 60 40 _ I 52 i Q 1566 206 122 I i 282 I 1 m_ 2tJ 1566 ID -21 8o8 2l2 2§ __Q_ _o_ 1566 __Q_ _a -w I i l I I I r I j i I 1· I I i I w -- • PQPULA TION __ 20 J L Jg§_ SOVIETS STRIKE FmST 4 OPl'IOB -__ Ir I l i E I -I I DESCRIPTION 0 Base Case 1000 Area Nationwide Allot Both Sides Soviets 1000 Terminal City AIM US 6oo Mid-Course vs JCB f 400 Mid-Course vs SIJM Soviets 6oo Mid-Course vs ICB f 400 Mid-Course vs SLIM US 1000 Terminal Ci y AIM -- 20 0 40 DAMAGE 'ro US 6o 100 ARR MTE ARR NO R V 'IUTS - · - _I y 7 _ ld31 -2il 200 • 886 -_g r I --- • 8o ' ' l r I I iI i I l I I _2 _J_ 441 m 10 1 --2 _§ g 2 JJ L _o_ _Q_ 1031 - - - - HARD MILITARY FIGURE 10-B r I I co vJ_J 0 StF ED - I ' -- OPrIOH 4 ·rra· D ' t AGE 'IO SOVIET A q A i MTE R V - 171 1' 0 WTS 100 161 80 60 22 _§2 264 1566 84 ' I· I ICll c I I i I • I i I 8o8 · I I I I · 124 118 · 636 558 1566 162 153 - I I I I · 171 158 389 351 1566 142 _ 32 8o8 I I I II I · ' ' i 191 lTI iI I 435 385 1566 163 ·-aos-· ' I I I I I I I I I I --11 1 139 _j 3_2 -3§_2 1566 _ g_7 8o8 r I I Ii I· · 110 cl i I ' I II I i I I ' i I i I l _ it __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ l J L1 'JIJa I I I ' l t3 iI 1 Base Case 200 AH I 200 i llllljr 2 I JJWUP i $51 ' A i I 1 ---- CJ7' ' i i I i I 119 53 416 138 II I I - - ··-- - -- --- ™ ™ HARD J LITARY - - - - - - - - - - - - · - - - - - - - - - - - -- I i ' I ' gQg2 I i i I - 163 I I 151 I i I I I ' i 163 _J2 22 -5 1Q31 i I ·1 I ' I· I I I i i ' 'II I 141 129 _ §21 i53 67 ' ' i' I -- 141 10· n 651 39 852 10 1 129 651 2245 i l 1031 157 651 I I m· --15 0 --2l 21§ 1Q Th 172 157 651 2587 172 i IO -- I i 1 I A 'l' ffi R V 29 I t 'IllD 1113 I 500 area AUI I covertly e dd 100 MIDCf --'- _ _ _ oviets ' j I i ' I AR q MTE 100 150 1 a J£ i lt 1L t S DI 500 area APl-I i ' Jl L7'4 Cl r J J ll Bese Cas_e II i mes O A P' I· i c u 31 Ell 200 AR-1 covertly conv 680 ICBM Soviets to terminal AIN I· i i E SJ l i 80 i Ail•l ovicts covertly add 200 ---1 ' i·i • l I 6o l ' dCl C'a I __ _ __ _ _ • ___ -··- __ ___ · __ _ ·- - 0 AfM I lmrn 13 11 a POPULATION ____ I i I 200 MIDCS d i rovie-f s covertly conv 680 ICEM to terminal AJJ 1 i ii I 1 4 I i s m·c I l 584 1566 153 808 I c 7' 0 AJ ll Soviets covc1·tly I u6 I t m J '3 1' 3 t 121 659 162 40 1 I i 'I 20 ' O_AJM I I I j s i Base Case i' I I 0 SD121111C DESC3IPTION I I - o 20 I 33 Q __ 11 1566 11 1 - 134 808 ·-•- - 4c 15 Q - I lli3 1031 112 102 164 1750 31 651 665 1031 88 651 --21 164 -2 2 - 665 1031 88 651 1750 I _'l1 ' rr nr O'l' dER mLITARY - _FIGl J ' E l_-A __ - --·-·--·----- '· _ -- ____ ··-- _ • ·-· ____ - --· _ ··-··· - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - ·• •· - - - · ··- - - --- - --- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - · - · - · · - - - -- - -- - - --- - -- • --- - -- • ··- - oE·CtASS f EO-- _ C · r -·I it1 --- O TIOi 4 'f _A -q _-q 1-iTE A '1 R V 102 1 28 379 1566 ---21 -2J 8o8 35 418 ·wo 1566 _g_§_ 22 JK 60 60 I o 189 ii - • II 500 ea I rz J I i i ' i ii 1 · I FIF 1' I f I 500 area AEH fF 5 area AE-1 Sov 1ets co '- - tly add 400 MIDC and 400 mobile ICPI-1s 500 area AIM rn ci o 1 ·· c c•-s q - ti _ l iI I j · · • I ll l f I ·500a reaAB-1 -- j ' -- --i- - -- • CllEU l j·Soviets covertly conv 680 1 c•g r · r · to terminal AfM · · · •_ _ •• - ________ t II - ARR NO • R V ' fGTS 164_ g_ 1750 665 1031 97 se 164 1750 51 651 88 188 1875 321 58 48 258 1283 7 8 1· 66 1011 -2J 258 1283 FCJl rm E -•-t3oviets vcrtly conv 680 ICP1- to area AEM · I _ I i c r a A -q 1- TE I --E J I r 100 ir eo 6o f a _L ' 11 - ----11 _-- I___-___ cove l 'tly add 400 MIDCS _ r EE §1- 564 1566 · 162 · 12i 8o8 135 _2QQ 1566 165 8o8 Soviets u l o Soviets covertly ec d 200 MIDCEFT 1---- ---1 ___-- -- -1------1 20 0 71 - 1 DESC3I TI0N 0 0 -F c--- - 341 1566 _gz_ 8o8 -- 2C --- ---1--l_-- · -- · 385 26 • E i ·1 cr nr lt 29 _ •- - DA - GE 'IO SJVIET NO 'ID·l'S l0C 112 --- --· · 716 293 651 1031 651 115· 260 1031 44 651 115 260 1031 44 651 ------------- MliAi'filMkHQ E AIU MILITARY MIDCS denotes m1 dc s- interceptors effectivt 01a ly ee ainst SLR--1s in FIGS ll and 12 I i I 1 - • z wI 0 FIGURE 11-A cont'd r --' ' i DECLASS FIED I ' NO US M SSILE PBrV lD3 ARR AaR -- R V lJ TE -12 435 170 NO WTS lCO rn 385 1566 -·-8o8 16 ·- - 3o8 286 ·· 80 tO I I J j 240 I 223 --32 --30 l5f6 j --12 ·_fil 8o8 DESCRIPTION 0 t T i II ' I r 0 4o 'IO 6o Bo US 100 i I I· I I I 500 area ABM with PENAIDc - c r i '7 ' - I I Ui'B' IOt i MM• HARD HI LITA t Y c r arA I NO - 'roTS 651 51 1-13 660 1o·n lQg_ -23 651 175 f m r ar ll 500 a ea Alli I 1£-t E i3 2 - JD no PENA IDs I I Soviets covertly e dd 100 0 DCS c r A I ' I 88 _21 I r -_ o -- R V ill £ 665 1031 o u t µ ' 500 area AIN no PENAIDs ARR ARR MTE _l§_ _21 TI ll l U r JI Base Gase I I'l 20 c _32 _ll 1566 - 40 DAMAGE -1 li 17 4 102 _21 660 10·-n 651 __21 I Oj i£ - -0 LITA - y t FIGURE 12-A - - -- -------·- -- -- ----·---- -·------ - - - - --· ··-·- · -·------·-------- -- - - •- •·• •· · - ----- --- --·-· ·-- --- ---•---- ' I utCTOP SEGREl J TAB I ANALYTIC METHODS AND MODELS USED IN CALCULATING WAR-FIGHTING AND RETALIATORY CAPABILITIES I-1 TAB I ANALYTIC METHODS AND MODELS USED IN CALCULATING WAR-FIGHTING AND RETALIATORY CAPABILITIES SCENARIOS I Retaliatory Capability Scenario In calculating the retaliatory capability of U S forces we measured their capacity to inflict damage upon the Soviet Union under the assumption that they had sustained a surprise Soviet first strike We made the unlikely assumption that our forces are on day-to-day alert and the Soviet forces are fully generated We assumed the Soviets launch their entire alert ICBM and SLBM force in a surprise counterforce attack which catches all our ICBMs and non-alert bombers on the ground and all our SSBNs which are not at sea at their tenders The Soviet bombers were withheld from this first strike since the time from their detection to the time they reach their counterforce targets would be more than enough for U S missiles and bombers to be launched The surviving U S forces then are launched at Soviet cities in a retaliatory second strike The resulting damage to the Soviet Union is measured in terms of prompt fatalities and industrial damage Since the purpose of this calculation is to evaluate our retaliatory capability we do not calculate U S fatalities Similar assumptions were used in measuring the Soviet retaliatory capability II War-fighting Scenario In an actual war the side striking first probably would use part of their strategic force against cities To evaluate the damage limiting and war-fighting capabilities of the U S and Soviet forces we used the following scenarios 1 Soviet Union Strikes First - Both sides are on generated alert The Soviets launch X% of their ICBMs and SLBMs in a counterforce attack against the U S strategic offensive forces This attack is made so as to minimize the damage that the surviving U S weapons could inflict upon Soviet cities All the surviving U S forces strike Soviet cities in retaliation Finally the Soviets strike U S cities with all their bombers and the missiles withheld from their first strike As X varies from afo to 10 counterforce the resulting fatalities to both sides generate a curve which is a measure of the war-fighting and damage limiting capabilities of the u s forces 2 United States Strikes First - Both sides are on generated alert The United States launches X% of their ICBMs and SIJJ 1 s in a counterforce attack against the Soviet strategic offensive forces This attack is made so as to minimize the damage that the surviving Soviet weapons could inflict on U S cities All the surviving Soviet forces then strike U S cities in retaliation Finally the United States strikes Soviet cities with all their bombers and with the missiles withheld from their first strike As X varies from to 100% counterforce the resulting fatalities DE I-2 to both sides generate a curve which is a measure of the war-fighting capability of the U S forces This curve together with the curve obtained when the Soviets strike first is also a measure of tne damage limiting capability of offensive forces • A point of particular interest on these war-fighting curves is the maximum delta point This point repres·e nts the mixture of counterforce and countervalue effort which maximizes the difference in fatalities between the side striking second and the side striking first If the side striking first gives equal utility to fatalities on either side then this point is the optimal allocation of the first strike when fatalities are the only measure of effectiveness In all scenarios we withheld 65 B-52s a nd 128 Polaris SLBMs for targets in China ALLOCATION TECHNIQUE We used two computer models in our analysis Code 50 and the Arsenal Exchange Model AEM Both are strategic force exchange models which allow multiple strikes targeting of weapons on urban-industrial complexes bomber defenses and AIM defenses The technique for allocating weapons in both models is the same This technique makes use of Everett's method of generalized Lagrange multipliers to find a weapon allocation which maximizes value destroyed In an attack on urban-industrial complexes we used population as the measure of value In a counterforce attack the objective is to minimize the urbanindustrial damage which the other side can inflict in a retaliatory strike AEM achieves this objective by iterating the counterforce retaliatory strike sequence until the urban-industrial damage to the side striking first is actually minimized Code 50 does not presently have this capability Instead a value is assigned to each weapon which is a measure of its effectiveness against cities The counterforce strike is then allocated so as to maximize the total weapon value destroyed Weapon value as a target is computed by the following formula which takes penetration capability as well as warhead yield into account Weapon Value Number of warheads X equivalent megatons per warhead X area aim points terminal aim points 2 Equivalent megatons is a measure of the capability of a warhead for urbanindustrial damage It is computed by raising yield in megatons to the twothirds power for warheads less than one megaton and by taking the square root of the yield for warheads greater than one megaton DAMAGE ASSESSMENT U S and Soviet fatalities are calculated from a 1978 data base supplied by the National Military Command System Support Center NMCSSC iFOP SECREt DE I-3 There are 144 million U S people in 466 cities in the data base This is 61 3% of the total 1978 u s population of 235 million and includes all U S cities with population greater than 23 000 In the Soviet data base there are 137 million people in 2151 cities This is 50 9% of the total 1978 Soviet population of 269 million and includes all Soviet cities with population greater than 5000 and many of those with a population of 1000-5000 • When calculating the U S retaliatory capability we were conservative and assumed that a 10 psi overpressure is required for destruction of Soviet cities Moreover since the Soviets were assumed to be generated in the retaliatory scenario we assumed that most of their urban population was sheltered from fallout and assessed their fatalities based only on prompt effects from air burst weapons These fatalities were calculated in Code 50 with a square root damage law For war-fighting calculations we were less conservative and assumed that an 8 psi overpressure is sufficient for severe damage to cities of either side Again since both sides were assumed to be generated in the war-fighting scenarios we assessed only prompt fatalities Industrial damage was not computed in either Code 50 or AEM Instead we used Soviet industrial damage response data provided by NMCSSC to correlate industrial damage with prompt fatalities The following table shows this correlation as computed for the 1978 Soviet population data base Table I-1 RELATION BETWEEN DELIVERED EMT FATALITIES AND INDUSTRIAL DAMAGE Delivered U S lMT Warheads 100 200 400 800 1200 1600 %Soviet Fatalities 16 24 32 40 44 45 %Industrial Capacity y Destroyed 32 44 56 70 70 Manufacturing Value Added MVA • ABM DEFENSES We assumed that Soviet area defenses defend all urban and military targets so they cannot be by-passed Local defenses deployed around a city can defend that city only Soviet area defenses were represented by a random defense model The defense might be able to do better by pre-committing interceptors to specific targets and keeping that pre-commitment unknown to us However I I-4 J against a mixed bomber missile attack where the defense does not know which targets will be attacked by bombers such a pre-commitment can be less effective than a random defense · We assumed that if a Soviet terminal interceptor fails another can be reprogr8lllllled against the same incoming warhead thus to penetrate we must exhaust the supply of reliable terminal interceptors 75% of inventory We cannot use current intelligence to project the deployment of Soviet terminal defenses for the next ten years In our calculations local ballistic missile defenses are deployed to the largest Soviet cities in proportion to population We determine the number of cities which are defended by constraining the minimum ABM defense of a city to 20 interceptors U S • AlJ 1 firing doctrine is based upon replacement of launch failures rather than firing multiple interceptors at the same time at the same target We assume 85% of the deployed interceptor inventory is effective in accomplishing intercept and kill Area ABM defense effectiveness is based on a random intercept of area aim points We assumed that the area ABMs defend both military and urban targets Terminal ABM effectiveness is based upon the sequential intercept of terminal aim points The battery will engage each threatening object until exhaustion 85% of the inventory The Sea-based Anti-Ballistic Missile System SABMIS was modelled as a forward-based system capable of intercepting ICBMs in the middle portion of their ballistic trajectory before their RVs or penetration aids are fully deployed We assumed that only half of the area objects were presented as aim points to the orward-based SABMIS SLBMs cannot be intercepted by a forward-based SABMIS Other SA™IS ships were assumed to be deployed where they could intercept SLBMs but not ICBMs in their boost phase before deployment of their RVs or penetration aids In both cases we used a random nationwide intercept model and assumed that the SABMIS ships were not attrited by a submarine or bomber attack AIR DEFENSES The Air Force Bomber Penetration Study was used to determine the effectiveness of U S bombers and penetration aids against different Soviet interceptors We assumed that each type of Soviet interceptor is brought to bear against the whole penetrating force and that the Soviets do not preferentially attack any one type of bomber e g if the Soviets have three types of interceptors the probability of a bomber penetratir g these defenses is the product of its probability of penetrating against each type of interceptor Soviet SAMs used as area defense were considered to have no effectiveness against low alt tude penetrations I-5 Based on NIPP estimates we assumed the Soviets have two tYIJes of effective terminal bomber defenses deployed around their large cities the SA-Z-1 and SA-Z-4 a SAM-D class of interceptor The currently deployed S AMs SA-1 SA-2 and SA-3 are estimated by the NIPP to have little capability against low-level aircraf't attacks The SA-Z-1 cannot intercept a SRAM and therefore can be suppressed with SR AMs One-fourth of the operational sites around any given city must be suppressed each with a kill probability of 0 95 before the city can be attacked with SR AMs SCADs can be used to exhaust an SA-Z-1 site provided nine reliable SCADs are targeted to that site If the SA-Z-1 site is not suppressed or exhausted it has a unit kill probability against each bomber attacking the city prior to weapon release Since the SA-Z-4s are assumed able to intercept SRAMs they must be exhausted with SCADs or SRAMs In order to exhaust the battery the number of SCADs or SRAMs shot at each SA-Z-4 defended city must equal one-half the simultaneous target-handling capability of the SA-Z-4 sites deployed at that city since not all of the sites are capable of engaging all the SCADs and SR AMS due to range limitations If the SA-Z-4 site is not exhausted it has a kill probability of 1 0 against bombers prior to weapon release Penetration probabilities for Soviet bombers and Air-to-Surface Missiles ASMs engaged by the U S air defense system were computed external to the programs and used as input data SOME LIMITATIONS The damage criterion used in all these calculations is the prompt fatalities due to overpressure It is assumed that the weapons are detonated at an optimum height in order to maximize this damage Even assuming such air bursts however this criterion neglects the damage and fatalities which would be expected to result from other effects such as direct nuclear and thermal radiation fire storms fallout epidemics and starvation Thus this assumption tends to underestimate the resulting fatalities In those calculations involving ballistic missile defenses the area interceptors are modeled as a random defense and each interceptor is assumed to have a range sufficient to engage any weapon which threatens the nation regardless of where it is deployed These models also neglect the possibility of using tactics such as attacks on radars by SLBMs and the use of precursor nuclear bursts to blackout the radars Consequently these assumptions cause an overestimation of the capabilities of the ABM defenses It was assumed in the calculations that the Soviets did not employ penaids in either their pre-emptive or retaliatory attack because such a capability was not credited them in the CIA force posture estimates However if the U S deployed an extensive MD capability there would be a strong incentive for the Soviets to develop and deploy area penaids oJf SEGREJ r-6 I In the computer models used all attacks were optimized to achieve maximum damage using the Generalized Lagrange Multiplier technique developed by Dr Hugh Everet Thus the initial counterforce attacks were programmed to minimize the damage that the surviving weapons could do in their retaliatory attacks and the countervalue attacks were programmed to maximize the damage which could be done to the urban industrial base of the nation It is doubtful that actual targeting would be done acdording to the schemes used in the models Finally in all cases the results are dependent on the imput data such as weapon CEPs reliabilities target hardness etc For the highly complex systems considered it would be surprising indeed that the estimates used for these parameters were precisely corrected • In spite of the limitations discussed above and others not specifically mentioned the models and assumptions used are believed to be sufficiently descriptive of the real world to enable one to use the results as approximate indicators of magnitudes of damage and to reveal trends which could be expected as postures change A-c l A --· ANNEX B VERIFICATION OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS FOR STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS Refer to the following 1 SNIE 11-13-69 2 Summary Report of the Verification Panel Verification of Possible Alternative Options for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks dated May 1969 · and 3 Code-word version of the Verification Panel Report TCS-4228 69G dated May 1969 AP 8 CO ITROL fil ID DISA t MA1IBNT AGENCY 0 3 T - r ✓ • - -1 • ___- • J - r' ' ·· D DC -Y ' · y - i-n u T - J • V -- ·- ·· - · _ - -- --- -___ -1_ - _· __ · ' I J1 ' •_ ·-----· -• - ' - l C i • _ __ - ---J D i 3 - -· c r a s Lh l J kt • l I - Ji J - - • v- - GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic dmmgrading and declassification - REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 28 ANNEX B VERIFICATION OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS FOR STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE VERIFICATION PANEL Copy J o TS-199023B May 1969 22 TOf SECRET S-E-N-S-I-T-I-V-E TS-199023B 26 May 1969 Verification of Possible Alternative Options for Strategic · Arms · Limitation Talks NSSM-28 Conclusion of an arms control agreement would probably signify that the Soviets had decided to accept at least for a time the limitations imposed by such an agreement Therefore if the Soviets should employ concealment and deception to violate the agreement we believe that their aim would be to alter the strategic balance Any smaller stakes would hardly justify the risk In such a case we believe that we would almost certainly detect activities leading to a major change in Soviet strategic capabilities from those estimated or acknowledged at the time of the agreement Although it is highly unlikely that any largescale new deployment of their strategic forces could go undetected the Soviets could effect minor increases without our detection And with extensive deception and concealment they could degrade our intelligence capabilities Detection and identification of the nature of the deployment would probably come later than in normal circumstances However in such a case the probability of the detection of at least one of a number of minor violations would be greater than that of detecting a violation of a single provision of the agreement Note This document summarizes the report TCS-4228 69G prepared by the Verification Panel of the NSSM-28 Working Group and disseminated on 26 May 1969 This panel included representatives of the Department of State the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency the Defense Intelligence Agency the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency The report is an assessment of our capabilities to verify Soviet compliance with an arms control agreement now and for the next five years or so It should be read in conjunction with SNIE 11-13-69 US Intelligence Capabilities to Monitor Certain Limitations on Soviet Strategic Weapons Programs TCS-1043-69 TOP SECRET Controlled Dissem Limited Distribution TOP SECRET 1 The foregoing presumes that the Soviets will not directly interfere with the effective operation of our unilateral collection sources We believe that they will refrain from interfering both because of the possibility of US reaction against their own operations and out of concern for the general political problems which such interference might produce In assessing the verification tasks we have separated the general conclusions into three broad categories These are summarized in the following paragraphs High Confidence of Verification We have high confidence in our unilateral capabilities to verify within close tolerances a limit on fixed strategic offensive and defensive launchers The deployment of present ICBM systems at soft MR IRBM sites probably would be detected We are equally confident in our abilities to monitor a limit on the number of submarines and launchers of both the ballistic and cruise type We would have a good chance of detecting the construction of surface ships equipped to launch strategic missiles or the testing of the system at sea We have high confidence of verifying the number of ABM launchers The possibility of clandestine evasion of a limit on ABM launchers or preparations for evasion would be decreased if radars were limited and mobile launchers were banned If a SAM system were converted to an ABM system such extensive changes would be required that some would almost certainly be detected and probably would be identified as such before their initial operational capability IOC We believe that any significant improvements to ICBMs--such as MIRVs--would involve full-system flight testing to ICBM range Our unilateral capabilities provide us with high confidence that we would detect the testing of MIRVs and other special re-entry systems for ICBMs before roe - DE 2 - 01 E on ' -- h f r'QP SECRET Lesser Confidence of Verification We have lesser confidence in our unilateral capabilities to monitor a ban or limitation of the deployment of land-mobile offensive and defensive strategic systems In the case of land-mobile offensive systems we believe that we would be able to identify the system but perhaps only when it had become operational in substantial numbers In addition it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to make any precise determination of the number of mobile weapons in such a force although we think that we would be able to estimate the general magnitude of the deployment In the case of development of MIRVs for MR IRBMs detection would probably occur late in the test program and possibly not until the system was tested to full range The chances of our detection of MIRV testing for SLBMs are only about even If ABM radars and launchers were limited but mobile launchers were not banned we would be less confident that the agreement could be verified Low Confidence of Verification We have little or no confidence in our unilateral capabilities to determine the extent to which MIRVs if developed and flight tested MRVs or special re-entry systems FOBs MOBs DICBMs RICBMs and MaRVs had been deployed at offensive missile sites We might not be able to detect the deployment of ICBMs in MR IRBM silos If ABM radars were unlimited and additional ABM radars were actually built by the Soviets as part of a contingency hedge we would have confidence in detection of ABM launchers if they were constructed but intelligence warning time would be reduced to a year or two prior to full operational capability of the system Some modifications to give a SAM system a limited ABM capability e g point-in-space intercept might be difficult to detect or could escape detection completely Other Verification Considerations Any agreement which permits a mix of sea- or land-based mobile and fixed offensive launchers - 3 - TOP SECRET TOP SECRET l E DE within a specified ceiling would seriously complicate the verification problem the more complicating factor being the land-based mobile system A related problem involves verifying that excess launchers declared inactive are in fact not operable Unless specific provisions were made in the agreement concerning procedures for the deactivation and activation of launchers it would be difficult to verify that a launcher had been deactivated or to determine when a replacement launcher achieved operational status Adjuncts to Means of Unilateral Verification Our unilateral collection capability could possibly be enhanced by supplemental arrangements For instance an agreement to pre-announce all strategic and space firings and to limit them to agreed ranges would facilitate and extend our collection coverage In particular such an arrangement would improve our ability to verify a prohibition on flight testing of specialized re-entry systems In certain cases more intrusive measures such as an agreement for selective direct observation SDO could contribute to our total verification process The more significant application would relate to bans on upgrading the SA-5 air defense system to an ABM system the retrofit of IR MRBM silos with ICBMs the destruction of replaced missile silos and the status of decommissioned submarines The table on pages 7-9 summarizes by level of confidence the items that could be identified for the various strategic weapon systems Verification of the Proposed Options The study of verification by national means of the provisions of each of the four alternative The assessment on the options provided here does not include ABM because the force levels are as yet unspecified within the options - 4 - options has led to the following observations We assume that Soviet violations would be accompanied by attempts at concealment and deception Option I Since this option concerns only fixed and mobile land-based strategic offensive missile launchers it could be verified with high confidence provided there were clearly defined procedures for silo replacement Without such procedures replaced silos could not be verified as inoperable Other than this the major difficulty would be some uncertainty in verifying a ban on land-mobile strategic missiles Under this option for example it is possible although unlikely that a Soviet attempt to build a force of 200 to 300 land-based mobile strategic launchers could go undetected for two to three years Option II While the basic option would be verifiable there would be a considerably lower level of confidence than in the case of Option I The chief difficulty with this option would be the verification of the permitted mix of mobile ICBMs together with fixed relocatable launchers The verification problem would be further complicated by the restriction on the number of SLBM launchers without a concomitant restriction on the number of submarines Regarding replacement of fixed land-based and seabased launchers the verification complexities could be mitigated through clearly defined procedures for launcher replacement There would be far greater difficulty in detecting a violation in a mixed ICBM force than would be the case if mobile ICBMs were banned The variant to this option which allows an interchange of land- and sea-based launchers would further complicate this verification problem by extending the above weapons launchers mix Option III The basic option could be verified with high confidence It minimizes the difficulties of Options - nq JP lJHF t· fl JJ 5 - - I and II by prohibiting land-based mobile strategic launchers the replacement of fixed silos and further construction of SLBM launchers or submarines The most difficult task in this option would be verifying the ban on land-mobile strategic launchers the uncertainties surrounding which would be the same as in Option I The two variants to this option would increase the verification difficulty owing to the land- and sea-b a sed launcher mix and superhardening provisions Despite the verification complexities we still have high confidence of determining the eventual force levels in a mix of fixed land-based and sea-based launchers as would be permissible under Variant III-B Accordingly the launcher mix in Variant III-B would be easier to verify than that in Variant II-A because i t excludes a land-mobile system as part of land- and sea-based launchers The difficulty of verifying the first variant superhardening is the same as that associated with launcher relocation and would be mitigated by clearly defined procedures for launcher replacement Option IV The only differences from Option III are bans on testing and deployment of MIRVs and the further flight testing of all other specified re-entry systems Our capability to verify the testing of these re-entry systems at present is good and should improve during the period under consideration Even with present verification systems we have confidence of timely detection of MIRV testing for ICBMs and a somewhat lesser level of confidence regarding shorter range missiles The chances are only about even that we would detect the testing of MIRVs for SLBMs At present Option IV as i t applies to MIRVed ICBMs could be verified with high confidence If the Soviets complete RDT E of a MIRV system prior to an agreement verification of a ban on actual deployment of MIRVs would be difficult if not impossible by national means As noted above Option III couZd be verified with high confidence - 6 - ·Table 1 Confidence Levels of Timely Identification of Limited Weapon System Items System Limited High Lesser Low ICBM Additional fixed launchers Flight test program Mobile launchers Accurate estimation of mobile launcher levels MR IRBM Additional fixed launchers Deployment of present ICBMs to MR IRBM soft sites Flight test program Mobile l aunchers Deployment of ICBMs to MR IRBM silos Accurate estimation of mobile launcher levels Submarine Number of units and launchers Replacement with identifiable destruction Number and location of flight tests Replacement with mothballing ABM Fixed ABM launchers Sea-based ABM launchers ABM radars Long-range interceptor flight tests Land-mobile ABM launchers Accurate estimate of mobile ABM launcher levels Short-range interceptor flight test without new col lee tion system Note This tabLe is based on our p esent capabiLities The confidence LeveLs are defined as foLLows High High confidence of detecting the reLevant activity prior to IOC or before substantiaL depLoyment Lesser Confident of detecting the reLevant activity but possibLy not untiL substantiaL depLoyment had occurred Low Detection of the reLevant activity cannot be assured or inteLLigence warning time of the activity couLd be short Table 1 continued Confidence Levels of Timely Identification of Limited Weapon System Items System Limited High SAM upgrading Conversion to ABM MIRV and special re-entry systems Development flight testing for ICBMs Surface ships Outfitting for strategic missiles System testing at sea Fixed-mobile force mix Fixed land-based and sea-based launcher levels Launcher replacement Number of launchers if destruction identifiable Test range New construction or location Lesser Low Minor upgrading for point in space intercept Development flight testing for MR IRBMs and SLBMs Deployment Fixed and mobile land-based launcher levels Fixed and mobile land-based and sea-based launcher levels Number of launchers if destruction not identifiable Table 1 continued Confidence Levels of Timely Identification of Limited Weapon System Items System Limited Lesser ASW units Numbers and types of ASW vessels and aircraft Long-range fixed submarine-detection systems Bombers Additional strategic bombers Bomber and ASM development program Type of bombers if hangars constructed Deployment of extendedrange ASM Air defense units Order-of-battle of fixed defensive missiles fighter aircraft and radars Prototype of new defensive missile system Capabilities of new defensive missile system prior to roe Betas payload weights and CEP improvements Significant changes in these parameters ci High Low I 0 The systems listed on this page are not now part of the specific options but have been added here for aonvenience and comparison A discussion of intelligence capabilities related to these systems is provided in section II-B pp 29-32 NSSM-28 I FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS Soviet Reactions to Negotiations and Agreement A Initiation of Negotiations 1 The primary conclusion the Soviets ·w ould draw from the initiation of strategic arms limitation talks SALT would be that the Nixon Administration is serious in its declared intent to enter an era of negotiations with the USSR This impact would not necessarily make· ·the-Soviets more forthcoming •in • sub- stance in other problem areas but could create a -more · conducive atmosphere where negotiations were involved especially those in which the USSR is a direct participant _2 A US decision not to enter negotiations under present conditions would produce more clear-cut Soviet reactions The Soviets must recognize and believe that we do too that the strategic arms competition bebveen the US and USSR represents a very serious problem which directly concerns both countries A US decision not to enter SALT especially given the background of persistent US advocacy of SALT in the past could leave the Soviets with the impression that the US not only was not interested in negotiated settlements but was girding itself for a period of sharper contests with the USSR The result could be a certain hardening of the Soviet __fo eign policr line The information contained in this document may not be disseminated outside the receiving departm2nt or agency without · the consent of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ARMB COllTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY v Release Excise Deny ybeclassify Declassify in part FOIA PA E O Exemp ions - - - - - - - Downgrade TS to 8 or C OADR ClassifY----- ----rr- • OADR Olass Declass _Auth 2 Z 1 M Date 1-·J GROUP 1 Excluded from autom3tic downgrading and declassification - 2 - 3 The Sov ets under conditions of negotiation almost c·ertainly would reject any explicit linkage of SALT with other political ssues which tied their hands or indic·ated concessions on their part on these issues ·· They would argue as they - do now that an arms limitation agreement of this portent is of great importance and that both sides have an equal stake in its succes-sful outcome · 4 The Soviets might attempt to exploit the in itiation of negotiations in Eastern Europe and elsewhere -· ·by citing it as evidence of US acquiescence in Soviet-- - ·style normalization in the area Depending upon -how adroit the Soviets are this c ould Ill 3 ke it more · difficult for the US effectively to continue to emphasize displeasure and concern over the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia However barring failure of the US to react to · a major new blow-up in Czechoslovakia · it is doubtful that the Soviets would be entirely successful in this endeavor The Czechoslovaks thew elves as well as the Romanians apparently are convinced that other factors being equal they have a better chance of escaping or withstanding Soviet pressures under conditions connoting a lessening of East West tensions 5 The Soviets 'tvould be prepa·red to face the ·almost inevitable Chinese Corrnnunist charges that the initiation of SALT provided further evidence of Soviet revisionism and US-Soviet collusion against Communist China The Soviet leaders would probably calculate and welcom2 the fact that SALT might make even more remote than is presently the case the lessening of Chine_s e Conrnunis t intrans i gence toward the US B Likely Soviet Negotiating Tactics 6 Soviet Motives - The present Soviet interest in arms limitation talks appears to reflect a combination of strategic and economic considerations - After close to a - 3 - decade of effort and expense the Soviets have recently surpassed the US in the number of deployed ICBMs and are well along with a SLBM program which in time could produce comparable results Despite a continuing deficiency in bombers they can thus for the first time negotia te from a position of rough parity in strategic forces and have their status as the strategic equal of the US openly a knowledged a factor which they would se k to exploit p6litically 7 At the same time the USSR faces the - anger of having the US move ahead again as a result of both planned irnprovem nts in US forces and possible further US reaction to the Soviet build-up in the form of additional programs At this stage the Soviets would probably find such an erosion of their present position to be intolerable Arms control would offer a possible means of averting such a developm nt The alternative would be a new round of heavy expenditures on strategic forces--an outcome which would hurt not only on civilian investment and production but also competing military programs such as thos_e for refurbishing and enlarging general purpose forces Moreover the Soviets may be concerned that with the · end of the Vietnam war major additional resources will become available to the US for possible expenditures on strategic forces In addition the Soviets would have doubts of their ability to match the US over the whole range of technological development for more advanced systems 8 The im ortance of these considerations to elements in the leadership varies Some probably have grave reservations about the possibility of obtaining a satisfactory agreement with the US and are coTIL itted only to exploring the possibilities Some may even view talks m rely as a means of delaying the introduction of new US strategic weapons systems some elements in the military apparently have never accepted the idea of arms limitations and are continuing to oppose it ·However on the basis of Soviet acceptance and promotion of SALT there is reason to believe that the present consensus iri the leadership favors and looks to SALT as a means of achieving a strategic arms limitation agreement 9 General Objectives - The Soviets would strive for an agreement which at a minimum gave them continued rough parity with the US however they IIJ 3 Y calculate it preserved their ability to inflict unacceptable retaliatory dam 3 ge on the US limited US capabilities to inflict da118ge on the USSR and offered the prospect of avoiding increased levels of expenditures If they believe it possible to obtain an agreeID nt that would assure a degree of superiority over the US they would doubtless prefer it but there is no reason to believe that they think this is feasible That they TI8Y as a matter of tactics if nothing else see how far they can go in this direction should not be discounted · 10 As a negotiating tactic arid pos ibly as a maxim im objective they probably would choos_e to ignore asyrrnnetries in strategic weapons in vhich they have an advantage ICBMs IR MRBMs and argue for US-Soviet parity in those weapons systems in which the US is ahead _ SLBMs possibly strategic aircraft However this estimate of an initial tough negotiating stance may be misleading as som2 signs point to a Soviet willingness to accomm date Moscow seems genuinely interested in •reaching some sort of an agreem nt--which would inevitably involve compromises on both sides Moreover the Soviets over the past year have accepted the US proposition that the first aim of SALT would be an agreem nt on limiting not reducing strategic arms This implies a willingness to stabilize arms on both sides at roughly present levels perhaps with allowances for an agreed limit on AB s If true this in turn implies · Soviet willingness to accept present asymmetries in US-Soviet strategic forces rather than to de Il 3 nd num2rical parity in all of the components of these forces and satisfaction that the build-up of Soviet offensive strategic forces has brought the Soviet Union sufficiently close to the US to - 5 - consider a halt in the strategic arms race Nevertheless past experience in negotiating with the Soviets indicates that they will initially try for the most advantageous position possible ·in an attempt to make subsequent minor concessions appear signi icant 11 For propaganda purposes at least the Soviets will probably insist on couching arms limitation talks and an eventual agreement in terms of being a first step towards a mutual reduction of strategic arms They m iy even view a reduction as a desirable long-term goal However it is not believed that they will demand a firm commitment to undertake subsequent reductions as a precondition to an agreement Their initial negotiating position may not include proposals for reductions though one directed at reducing aircraft is a distinct possibility 12 Little is known of Soviet views concerning the preferred scope of a strategic arms limitation agreement except that it should apply to both offensive strategic delivery vehicles and ABMs The Soviets would presumably favor an agreement of broad application rather than one which could prove to be unviable by permitting large loopholes for continuation of the strategic arms race in nonrestricted fields H9wever the Soviet position on a given restriction or loophole would depend primarily on the Soviet assessrn2nt of its relative impact on US-Soviet strategic forces Thus we cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviets would find a narrow agreem nt acceptable 13 There is also little concrete to go on in judging Soviet views on the desirability of maintaining a stable m·Jtual deterrence They obviously want to maintain an effective deterrent against a US first strike While so n ·in the government--presum 3 bly the feeling is strongest am ng the generals--might desire in theory a first-strike capability we have no evidence from Soviet public or classified statements that they believe this is a feasible course We would assum that they m Jst recognize the ED - 6 - futility of pursuing this goal given the present stage of the US-Soviet strategic relationship and the action-reaction characteristic of the competition in the strategic arms 14 There is no way of judging exactly how the Soviets measure a state of deterrence and hence the impact of new weapons systems on IITJtual deterrence However the Soviets probably recognize the theoretical possibility of developing new weapons systems to such a degree that they would erode mutual deterrence and give eith r or both sides a first-strike capability 15 US-Soviet diplomatic exchanges on SALT have clearly specified bilateral talks and the Soviets have clearly accepted this principle fro the beginning · This would indicate that the Soviets do not envisage any agreement which would place limitations on British and French strategic nuclear forces As a bargaining device however they may argue that the British and French forces should be taken into account in calculating the forces available to the two sides They may raise the question of British and French forces as a counter-argument to a US proposal to freeze the deployment of Soviet IR MRBMs It is somewhat less clear how they will react to US theat r nuclear forces They 1113 y attempt to blanket these forces into the discussion especially since they have not in the past 1113 de as harp a delineation between classes of nuclear weapons as the US has seeing them all as applicable to general strategic nuclear war 16 vt1ile the Soviets have a multitude of anxieties about Com unist China it is doubtful that the prospective development of a Chinese nuclear delivery capability will affect significantly the Soviet negotiating position in regard to offensive systems However the Soviets will undoubtedly wish to m 3 intain the opt ion to deploy offensive ballistic missiles against China The impact of the China question on the Soviet attitude toward defe sive systems is not entirely clear The Soviets have not demonstrated the same concern - 7 as we have about buil4ing an ABM system to cope with the Chinese threat of the next decade but this would be one reason the Soviets might wish to have an ABM force 17 Soviet Views in Regard to Key Issues - At least in the initial phase of talks the Soviet negotiators could be expected to set forth positions which protected weapons systems where the Soviets enjoy an advantage narrow or close the gap where the US is ahead in deployed weapons and inhibit technological developments in which the US has the lead Indeed the Soviets would be likely to regard almost any US proposal as an 11 opener 11 and would attempt through criticism or counterproposal to whittle down alleged or real advantages accruing to the US 18 Beyond initial debating points it is difficult to say with any certainty what would be the final Soviet position on an overall package · Much would depend · on the 11 mix'' of the package as well as on the dynamics of the negotiations In the following discussion of particular issues the stress accordingly has been placed on likely initial Soviet response to US proposals a Verification - Moscow almost certainly would insist on exclusive reliance on national m ans of verification in any agreement and would oppose proposals for even limited on-site inspection This judgment is based on the past record of Soviet opposition to on-site inspection on Soviet territory the effectiveness of national means of verification which we have indirectly acknowledged in our own coIIL unications to the Soviets we have said that the US is prepared to place 11 rnaxim 1m reliance on national means of verification and the fact that on-site inspections would be most effectively applied to check on possible qualitative changes in Soviet weaponry concerning which the Soviets be most sensitive It is conceivable that the Soviets would accept token on-site inspection if this were the only obstacle standing between them and an agreement which they considered highly favorable But this possibility seems DEGk - 8 - remote The Soviets might however respond favorably to a proposal to establish a joint commission to examine complaints and adjudicate differences stem ing from the agreement out of such an arrangement could arise the possibility of informal not institutionalized on-site inspections b Moratorium - One of the most difficult negotiating points would be to gain Soviet acceptance of our proposal a key element in all options that under the terms of an agreement both sides should cease the initiation of the construction of offensive strategic missile launchers as of a given date July 1 coterminous or nearly so with the initiation of talks They would view this as a US effort to halt the current build-up of Soviet · offensive strategic forces without offering the USSR any assurance that a final balanced agreement could be reached They would probably argue that a cut-off proposal if acceptable on other grounds e g the disparity of SLB forces should set a date coterminous with the successful completion of talks They might couple this argument with an offer to slo· r down deployment rates The Soviets might have an incentive to accept the US approach outlined above if the US were willing to introouce an im 2diate moratorium on MIRV flight testing If they were anxious to stop MIRV development and were willing to accept the risk involved in our testing leadership a test moratorium might be an incentive sufficient to overcome Soviet objections to a m ratoriurn affecting their programs c ICBMs fixed - Since they have recently surpassed the US in total numbers of ICBM launchers deployed and under construction it should be possible to induce the Soviets to accept a freeze on the deployment and further construction of fixed land-based ICB s as of a given date provided that satisf ctory agreement on other elements of an overall agreement were reached Options III and IV D - 9 One immediate problem is that Soviet ICBMs are deployed in groups of six in the case of the SS-9 and groups of ten in the case of the SS-11 and SS-13 The Soviets would almost certainly deIIl3 nd that they be allowed to fill out groups under construction even where all silos had not been started by the cut-off date At this tim2 this would involve only a small number of ICB' 1s The Soviets would see som attraction in the provision to permit replacement of ICBM launchers on a one-to-one basis Options I and II Variant III A in that it would permit them to replace their older soft ICBMs over 10 percent of their present ICBM force with new ICBMs in hardened silos On balance however they are more likely to oppose this proposal They would be suspicious of US intentions in advocating this loophole in a strategic arms limitation agreement being aware of US studies of new superior ICM's They might believe and contend that this proposal would permit a continuing and costly co petition in strategic missiles under the sanction of an agreement The Soviet reaction to a proposal to freeze merely the sum of ICBM and· SLBM launchers Variants III Band II A would be much the same They would perceive some advantage in being permitted to build additional missilelaunching subrn3 rines in exchange for the vulnerable soft ICBMs But their concern about the uncertainties and pote tial costs of leaving the missile competition open-ended in this manner would probably be overriding d IR M _RBMs fixed - In-response to the proposal to freeze the deployment of IR MRBMs all options the Soviets probably would initially argue that these weapons should not be limited bj the agreement They would probably maintain that these weapons are part of the USSR's European theater forces and might even argue that they are not strategic weapons Alternatively or successively the Soviets might take the view that an agreement covering Soviet DEGE fffiID -10IR MRBMs should also deal with American British and French nuclear weapons in Europe including Pershing missiles which by our definition a range greater than 1 000 km are not MRBMs Either approach would of course raise serious problems for the US particularly with our NATO Allies However it seems unlikely that this question would be one on which the Soviets would insist on having their way to the point of preventing an otherwise desirable agreement e Mobile ICBMs and IR MRBMs - The Soviet Union has placed considerable emphasis on the development of mobile land-based strategic missiles It has already tested though not deployed a mobile MRBM which will probably have a 1 500 nm range appears to be developing another mobile IRBM of up to 3 500 nm range and is expected to develop a mobile system of full ICBM range within the next few years The Soviets could be expected ·initially at least to argue strongly against a total ban on land-based strategic mobiles as would be proposed under Options IV III and I especially since they know the US does not have a comparable system and might not deploy one even if the Soviets continue with their own deployment The Soviets might argue that a disparity in SLBMs should be made up with their mobile IRBMs and ICBMs since the systems have mobility in common The Soviets might view a ban on land-based mobiles as a tradeoff for a ban on MIRVs However it cannot be predicted with any certainty whether or for what price the Soviets might eventually agree to a ban on iuch weapons The Soviets would see advantages in the provision of Option II permitting the deploym-2nt of m ile land-based ICBMs because of their advances in developing such weapons systems This provision would give them an incentive to argue for a higher ceiling or no ceiling than 1 300 ICBMs in luding both fixed an3 m Jbile launchers as -11- their force of fixed ICBMs as of July 1 will be about that number They couJd ·of course substitute mo iles for older generation fixed ICBMs They _would also exploit this proyision to bolster their case for permitting mobile IR t-LIIBMs which would be banned under the terms of this option f -SLBMs and SLCMs - The initial Soviet response to cease the initiation of construction of new SLBMs Options IV III II would probably be to reject this US approach and to propose a ·formula which would allow the Soviets to match the current US Polaris force by continuing their present construction program It is not possible to predict how firi11ly the Soviets would stick to this position Perhaps the tactical intent of this likely initial respo se would be limited to the aims of obtaining 1 U3 acceptance of a high estimate of Soviet SLB s presently under construction and hence p2rmitted under the ter ns of this proposal and 2 US concessions in other areas It is possible that the Soviets would in the end be won over by arguments that under the U3 proposal the US advantage in numers of SLBMs would be counterbalanced by the slight numerical advantage f Soviet ICBMs ' the Soviet SLC 1s for which the US has no counterpart and the large force of So· riet IR MRBMs also unmatched by the US The Soviets might well question the inclusion of SLCMs subaia rine-launched cruise missiles under this limitation on the grounds that these are not strategic weapons but are intended for use against naval craft As a bargaining ploy the Soviets might ask or -a US concession in exchange for this provision such as a limitation on carrier aircraft The Soviets would regard with some suspicion the failure in Option I _to place any limitation on SLBHs SLCMs In view of the declining US lead in SLBMs as the Soviet build-up continues the Soviets might suspect that the US had ulter or reasons for not wanting to freeze the status quo and had plans to expand its own SLBM force They might also be concerned about the economic iin lications of leaving this significant element of the strategic arms relationship open ended However the Soviets would see distinct advantages over the short run at least in the absence of a limit on SLBMs as it would allow free rein to their current construction program This short-term co sideration could prevail over Soviet suspicions of us· long-term intentions as far as S LBMs ·are concerned g MIRVs - Evidence regarding Soviet intentions and attitudes to rard a ban on NIRVs is rather ambivalent -Soviet officials have on occasion questioned US interlocutors about the US MIRV program in a manner suggesting concern Soviet military planners probably conclude that the US is ahead of the USSR in dev2loping MIRV technology They IIl 3 Y be concerned that the US MIRV program given sufficient accuracy of reentry vehicles could give the US a first-strike capability regardless of an expansion of Soviet ABM defenses The Soviets may also be persuaded of the argument that MIRVs deployed on both sides would destabilize the strategic balance and hence be detrimental to their interests Now that the Soviets have a MRV testing program under way our judgment that they might press for a MIRV ban is less confident There are several factors which could provide the Soviets motives to develop their own MIRVs The dominant interest could result from a large ABM level where the Soviets might perceive MIRVs as necessary for penetration Another factor could be to provide some damage limitation although damage -denic l is not likely to be a serious Soviet goal given the US SLBM and bomber forces And a third factor could be a perceived advantage resulting from the SS-9 greater throw weight Furtherm-Jre the Soviets may at this juncture be about at the point of concluding that the US MIRV tests to date might per nit deployment of an operational system DE Gt A15SUitE9N -13- If ori bilance the Soviets preferred a MIRV ban they would probably insist on an innnediate moratorium of MIRV flight tests Even though they may have concluded the testing had already reached a point which permits deployment they would want to check the accruement of US technological knowledge gained through further testing--especially if they were not confident that an overall agreement could be reached They would probably accept a ban on MIRV tests and possibly on associated flight tests as a means of enforcing a ban on deplqyrnent under the terms of Option IV However they would be less concerned than the US about an airtight ban on all associated tests because of their higher degree of confidence of detecting--through public sources--possible US attempts to circumvent the agreement The fact that the US already has MRVs deployed could cause the US difficulties in establishing a ban on associated MRV testing CIA believes that Soviet concern about the potential threat posed by planned US MIRV deployrn2nts is probably far greater than the above discussion·suggests and may well have been a key factor in the Soviet decision in favor of arms control negotiations The Soviets are presumably well aware of US statements that introduction · of the Poseidon and the Minuteman III will increase Ill '3 nyfold the number of independently targetable US warheads thus again tipping the balance in favor of the US in this important respect They IIl 9 Y well be concerned from their observation of US MIRV tests to date and from recent public discussions in this country that the US may be seeking to develop MIRVs which had the accuracy to be used against hard targets While the Soviets have within the last year begun testing of a simple multiple warhead co parable to the Polaris A-3 it is still unclear whether this presages an effort to develop a MIRV and i any event the Soviets must recognize that they are presently well behind the US in this field -14Accordingly in CIA's view the Soviets would appear to have strong incentives to press for a moratorium on further MIRV testing during negotiations and for a ban on MIRV deployment in any agreement US insistence that such weapons as FOBS or DICBM be included in any MIRV test ban would complicate matters for the USSR However given the halting pace of the FOBS-DICB test program to date and the apparently limited number of targets for such weapons there Js probably a good chance that the Soviets would be willing to sacrifice the FOBS-DICBM program for a MIRV test ban Indeed there is some possibility that they II13 Y have also intended the MRV program to provide some additional trading material in ar ns limitation negotiations h ABMs - All options provide for an unspecified mutual ceiling on ABMs ranging from Oto 2 500 Traditionally the Soviets have shown a penchant for strategic defense In the early sparring over the initiation of SALT they II13 de much of the point _that talks would have to deal with both offensive and defensive weapons suggesting reluctance to limit ABMs without get ing something in return However now the roles are some·w hat reversed in terms of the strategic weapons programs each side is actively pushing Moreover planned deployment of launchers for the Moscow ABM Galosh system has been cut back and there is no evidence that new generation ABM system is ready for deployment Even so the So'liets are continuing to develop and deploy large BMD acquisition and tracking radars and are engaged in a program which could lead to improvements in the ABMs or a completely new system in time It s possible that the Soviets wo ld be disposed at this juncture to ·accept a low ceiling on ABM deployment which would leave _the Moscow deploym nt in place block the presently planned full US safeguard deployment and spare the Soviet Gove nm2nt the heavy expenses involved in deploying a large-scale AB system SECRET - NQE QB N DECfASSIFIED of questionable quality But if the Soviets feel that they have sufficiently promising follow-on s·y stems coming they may want a higher ceiling ····· --- There is in any event no evidence of a Soviet willingness to dismantle the Moscow Galosh system--i e to agree to a total mutual ban on AB s A desire to protect against a small-scale irrational Chinese attack or threat of attack in the coming decade would be a factor im elling the Soviets to oppose a ·· total· ban The Soviets would probably oppose the allowance of sea-based ABM systems under Options I and II because they have shown no inclination to follow this path · in developing defenses against missiles and have little incentive to do so because they enjoy natural advantages in deploying forward-based fixed ABM systems i Strategic Aircraft - The Soviets could be expected to seize on the failure of any of the options to provide for a limitation on strategic bombers Whether the Soviets would insist on some sort of °limitation or would merely raise this issue as a bargaining point for gaining concessions in regard to other disputed points is not clear The extensive Soviet efforts to provide for anti-aircraft defense demonstrates their concern over the potential threat of the US bomber force in terms of both the present clearly superior US force and the possibility of a qualitative or quantitative strengthening of that force On the other hand the Soviets recently have shown no inclination to expand or replace their own force of intercontinental bombers This points to a Soviet position to be held to at least initially which would either impose a qualitative and or quantitative freeze on present forces -16The Soviets have indicated that they would resist coupling ·restrictions on air defenses with restrictions - on bombers If the latter restrictions were considered however they agree to a limit on air defenses because of the interrelationship of the two problems and their existing extensive defenses 19 Summary Evaluation of Options - In the following summation of probable Soviet reactions to the individual options emphasis once again is given to likely initial reactions The fact that the Soviets are judged likely to find a particular proposal acceptable or objectionable is not necessarily an argument for or against the proposal other factors such as the scope and viability of a proposal and its net effect on US security interests must of course be weighed against its relative negotiability a Option I - The singular characteristic of this option is that it offers the least restrictions on the strategic forces of both sides It would limit the number of ICBMs on each side but would not restrict the placement or the hardening of these weapons Moreover -it would place no limitation on sea-based offensive missile systems nor would it restrict MIRVs On the other hand it would limit IR MRBMs and ABMs and would completely ban mobile land-based systems The absence of any limitation on seabased offensive systems would be the most attractive feature of this option to the Soviets Over the short term at least they would see advantages in the opportunity provided under this option of continuing the expansion of their SLBM fleet to the point where it might equal or surp ss the present US Polaris force On the other hand there are features of this option which the Soviets clearly would object to _ in particular the ban on land-based mobiles and the provision allowing ICBMs to be moved and super-hardened They might also object to the lack of a ban on MIRVs The open--ended nature of this option might cause the Soviets to question the viability and economic costs of an agreement based on it -17CIA would add that the Soviets might well consider that Option I was lopsided in its effect--that it called for a cessation of Soviet ICBM deployment which the US had no intention of trying to match but left the US free to carry· on with its plans for MIRVs an advanced manned strategic aircraft superhardening of ICBM silos and other qualitative improvements Thus the Soviets might feel that acceptance would force them to continue an expensive arms race but on terms even more favorable to the US than at present As in all options the Soviets would probably press for a resolution to their satisfaction of the bomber issue Because of the lack of a ban on MIRVs they might be inclined to seek a higher ceiling on ABMs than would be the case with a MIRV prohibition The Soviet view of the ABM-MIRV relationship is unknown however While· they may seek higher ABM levels where MIRVs are allowed they might equally conclude that MIRVs make an extensive ABM deploym2nt useless b Option II - This option wo id be more restrictive than Option I in that it freezes the numbers of sea-based offensive launchers SLBMs and SLCMs It would be less restrictive by permitting the deployment of landbased mobile systems Common features include the following an upper limit on the number of ICBMs but with permission to replace existing · launchers with new ones thus permitting the substitution of super-hardened and mJbile launchers in place of them a freeze on IR M BMs no ban on MIRVs and a ceiling on ABMs The one distinctive feature of this option which would probably ·be attractive to the Soviets would be the provision permitting mobile ICBMs which the Soviets would quickly exploit to press for a similar provision pertaining to mobile IR MRBMs However they might be suspicious of US motives and might prefer to trade their advantage in developing mJbiles for US concessions in regard to other DE SSl t DE iASSf fl -18weapons systems As in Option I they probably would not favor however the license granted to substitute fixed ICBMs on a one-to-one basis thus permitting superhardening and other qualitative improvements of launchers on the ground that this would create uncertainties within the framework of the overall agreement As in Options III and IV they would press for parity in SLBMs though they might be persuaded to settle for the proposed freeze permitting the completion of submarines under construction They might also seek a ban on MIRVs as · in Options I and III As in all options the Soviets would probably press for a resolution to their satisfaction of the bomber issue Because of the lack of a ban on MIRVs they might be inclined to seek a higher ceiling on ABMs than they would under Option IV which calls for such a ban The Soviet view of the ABM-MIRV relationship is unknown however Whey they m y seek higher ABM levels where MIRVs are allowed they might equally conclude that MIRVs make an extensive ABM deployment useless Variant II A permitting each side to vary the mix of land-based and sea-based offensive launchers within an overall ceiling would probably not be attractive to the Soviets because of the uncertainties it would create regarding the disposition of US forces c Option III - This option is characterized by the freeze it would impose on all offensive strategic missiles launchers no substitution permitted limited restraints on qualitative improvements in ICBM and IR K RBM missile launchers a ceiling on ABMs a ban on mobile landbased strategic systems but no ban on MIRVs Viewed in regard to its separate components · this option might be the most difficult to negotiate At the same time it is an example of an effective negotiating opener especially if the US were to consider alterations -19in its position in the course of negotiations Also viewed as an entity the Soviets might prefer the broader scope of this proposal as compared to Options I and II as it would leave fewer uncertainties regarding the disposition of us· strategic forces permitted under the agreement Soviet objections to this option would probably center on the freeze on SLBMs submarines under construction could be completed the ban on land-based strategic mobile systems and though there is less certainty on this score the failure to provide for a ban on MIRVs As noted under Option II they would almost certainly press initially for parity in SLBMs but might settle for the provision under this option in a trade-off for Soviet advantages in other strategic systems If the US were willing to consider a ban on MIRVs coupled with a m ratorium on flight testing following the initial presentation o_f this option this might prove to be a useful bargaining device in gaining Soviet concessions in other areas e g in accepting a moratorium on the initiation of construction of ICBMs and SLBMs As in all options the Soviets would probably press for a resolution of the bomber issue to their satisfaction Because of the lack of a ban on MIRVs they might be inclined to seek a higher ceiling on ABMs than they would under Option IV which calls for such a ban The Soviet view of the ABM-MIRV relationship is unkno- -rn however While they may seek higher ABM levels where MIRVs are allowed they might equally conclude that MIRVs make an extensive AB '-1 deploym mt useless See CIA paragraph page 13 SECRET - NOFQfu'-l' l OECt A-S IHED 22 As for expanding areas of cooperation the obvious lesson of a strategic arms limitation agreement would be that if the US and USSR can reach accord on a matter of this scope affecting their vital security interests then further steps in this direction as well as new cooperative ventures on matters of lesser importance were fully possible This would apply m ist directly to the field of disarmament On the other hand there is a singular degree of uniqueness in the mJtuality of interests in reaching strategic arms agreem nt which might not be present in other potential areas of US-Soviet cooperation Clearly failure to reach an agreem nt through negotiations could produce adverse reqults for agreement in other areas Much would depend on the manner in which negotiations were broken off 23 In any event all of this would not mean a whole new era of US-Soviet relations Even the m ist comprehensive strategic arms agreem nt which can be envisioned would not rule out all im rov2m nts in military forces and agreement per se would not end the arms ace Soviet ideologica corrrnitments and political aims change slo· rly sometimes not for the better Conflicting interests would persist An agreement might also reinforce certain current or potential trends tending to stiffen Soviet behavior Apart from being bolstered in advancing p·ropagandistic claims of military and political parity with the US the Soviets might feel encouraged through an agreement codifying rough parity to be bolder in pursuing political goals through pressure tactics It is difficult to see however how an agreement would in this respect alter the world as it presently is or is likely to be Mutual deterrence has been a fact of life for some time and is likely to remain so The essential question posed for US-Soviet relations is the level of strategic ar naments and the degree of stability from which this deterrence will be derived D tlEO -23- II Reaction of NATO 'Allies 24 Our NATO Allies have declared that they would welcome the · initiation of 'SALT and this would almost certainly be their reaction when the talks actually began However the majority of them have also made clear that they expect the US to consult closely with them both before and during the negotiations and some of them have al-ready signalled some of their underlying concerns in NATO consultations They recognize that the talks would be bilateral and essentially would deal on y with US and Soviet forces but they sense that the outcome of the negotiations could affect vital security interests in European NATO members This feeling is reinforced by an inarticulate fear in some NATO countries that the US and USSR could reach a deal at their expense The President has recognized these attitudes by his pledge to hold close consultations before and during the course of negotiations 25 A foremost concern of NATO Allies would be the manner with which the US handled the issue of the Soviet IR MR BM force targeted on Western Europe Some might hope that the US would press for a reduction of this force However given the nature of the proposed agreem2nt a limitation not a reduction and the fact that we would ask the Soviets no m ire in regard to ICBMs and SLBMs than in regard to IR M BMs our Allies would support the proposal contined in all options to freeze the USSR's fixed landba sed IR MRB11s and to ban m ibiles in this category Another concern would be to exclude NATO forces stationed in Europe from the terms of the agreement None of the options contemplates limitations applicable to these forces There would still rem 3 in a concern expressed in some NATO quarters that an agreement could affect indirectly the prospects for a united European nuclear force t 1- S tED -24- 26 A deeper NAT O concern would be the maintenance of an effective US deterrent upon which the security of NATO as a whole rests We have told our Allies that they need not be worried on this score as we obviously would not enter into any agreement which would affect adversely US security interests and the effectiveness of its deterrent We may however have to return to this point on many future occasions 27 A US-Soviet agreement would probably produce con- tradictory reactions in Western Europe Doubtless the majority of Europeans would welcome it as heralding a more m2aningful detente in East-West relations · Som of them might be encouraged to press for a reduction of NATO conventional forces The latter impulse inherent in any period of detente would have to be faced by the US when and if that time arrived Other Europeans inclined to be suspicious of US-Soviet dealings affecting their interests a suspicion which the Soviets might feed might see the US as less willing and able to meet its NATO com itm2nts Our ability to head off or dispel this latter reaction would depend in large part on the effectiveness of our consultations within NATO This latter it should be noted may constitute a difficult problem given the need for secret discussions with the Soviets if SALT is to be fruitful III Com nunist China 28 One certain result of the initiation of negotiations and an eventual agreement would be to elevate to a new peak Chinese Co Ilnunist charges representing part propaganda part conviction of US-Soviet collusion against ConmJnist Caina Sino-Soviet relations would suffer--though it is difficult to imagine a deterioration of their present low state The impact on S-Chinese relations is less clear it would probably not be decisive one way or another D2partm2nt of State Nay 1 1969 I- I 1 I p '- This document consists of 38 pages Number _J_ of 30 copies Series· S -# 93JOD-ACDA-3332 A--c OANSSM-28 FINAL REPORT PREPARATION Of THE U S POSITION ON STRATEGIC ArJ1S LIMITATIONS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ANNEX D S AFEGUARDS ARMP cor OL -ntsARMAMENT AGEE _- _-· e i 1 °E oisa Deny D 1- y 1' - eclasaify in part FO L P 'i K O B rn _ · tions _ _ __ __ __ Dcv m 6r d0 TS to d or C OADR ClassifY- - - - - - - - - • OADR Class Deola ss Auth Date 2 t f' June 11 1969 The information contained in this document may nnt be disseminated outside the receiving department or agency without the consent of the U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 'I REST l r-- l '-l rt nu Di- - h I - I A tora1c E 1e rgy Act - 1954 ·TOP SEGREr GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification 1 o DE -· ·' i - • TABLE OF CONTENTS • ·l INTRODUCTION n · · PRINCIPAL CONCERNS AND CURRENT PROGRAMS • A ·B ABM Penetration c · SSBN Survival D Bornbe·r Prelaunch Survival E Bomber Penetr a tion F Defense G -Sum_m ary of Current Program III fixe·d Sil' Vulnerability ASSESSMENT A - Criteria B Safeguards Require _d for NSSM-28 Packages t ·1 ·• ' D I INTRODUCTION In order to assure that the U S strategic forces are able to perforrn their assigned missions in the face of a developing but uncertain threat the U S maintains a safeguard program vi hosc function is to provide technological options to meet the threat and to provide a high confidence in our ability to monitor it as it develops Under an arms control agreement it is also necessary that the U maintain a safeguard program which · 1 s l Provides a capability to respond to changes in the threat to the U S and its allies as may be required by Soviet actions both within the treaty restrictions and in abrogation of the treaty and as may be required b_y possible developrnents of other powers 2 1 1aintains under the provisions of an agreem cnt a broad technological base in both weapon systems research and development and programs of fundam ental r _e search to support this R D 3 Insures high confidence of monitoring Soviet compliance with the terms of the treaty · _I In an arms control environment the function of an extended safeguard program is to insure that under the agreement there would not be developments ·which would have an adverse effect on the strategic capabilities of the _ u S and the viability and utility of its alliance c·ommitments It is necessary to be able to provide responses to a wide range of possible deveio pments in th th e t hi- h- _ight arise ithin ·tl - limits of an agreement or from cheating or abrogation The current safeguard program is designed for a set of contingencies which may arise in the absence of an agreement and this program may have to be modified to cover those new contingencies which may adse under agreement an •' The Safeguards programs are designed to meet if necessary -potential Soviet threats to the survivability and penetration capability of our strategic forces No attempt has been made in this paper to quantify the likelihood of these threats which are assessed in intelligence estimates An overall evaluation based on agreed intelligence projections of the efrect under various options on our retaliatory capability measured wHh urban industrial damage is to be found in the strategic exchange analysis sec Anne - A and Section V 1 Ii ' -This annex is primarily focused on Objective l above with the view of ascertaining the safeguards which would be required to support each of the arms control packages considered in the body of the r port Objective 3 has been discussed in NIE ll-13-69 and the NSSM-28 Verification Panel Report The Working Group notes that the maintenance of an assured capability to monitor Soviet co1npliance with an agreement will be a continuing important safeguard and recormnends that an ad hoc group be asked to examine this question further at the appropriate classification level - 2 r -- J rl llp ' 'i • J - •fl 1 -f DEC 'ASSIFI ED C JI PRINCIPAL CONCERNS AND CURRENT PROGRAMS This section discusses our present R D safeguards program Our R D safeguards program would be affected by arms control in several ways We might increase our emphasis on programs permitted under the agreement which · would help maintain our · strategic capability for two reasons 'First the Soviets might cheat on the agreement or abrogate it unexpectedly and we would need to be ready to complete development or proceed with deployment of these systems Secondly the agreem ent will probably require rene·w al after some specified number of years and we should be ready to complete development or proceed with deployment if either we or the Soviets choose not to renew We would also need to continue some R D efforts on weapons programs which could not reach deploy1nent under the agreement It is important to note that the lead time between beginning R D on a weapon system and deploying it is quite long For this reason ve must design the initial stages of our R D programs against a threat which is quite pessimistic this will allow us to proceed with the later stages of R D and deployment if the Soviet threat exceeds even the high side of our intelligence estiinates Our present R D safeguards program is designed againsCan unc-onstriined Soviet threat in the absence of an arms control agreement Even for this unconstrained environm ent the pess_ilnistic threat discussed are not to be t° ken as intelligence ·estimates In the presence of an arms control agreement we would still need to be quite conservative in our assessment of the Soviet threat for the purpose of designing our R D safeguards program but an arms control agreement could give us a more distinct picture of the ranges within which the Soviet threat might fall · The SNIE 11 - I 3- 69 indicates that the Soviets would be unlikely to cheat on the agreement un_less they aim to alter the strategic balance and any other goal would probably not be worth the risk Under an agreement we could plan our R D safeguards program to insure that we could have any needed new syste s ready to deploy within the time required to maintain our retaliatory capabiiity given the time we would have behvecn the date when we learn of a Soviet violation and the date of the deployment of a 3 IED sufficiently large Soviet force to threaten our deterrent Any realistic planning of our R D efforts under a specific arms control option will require more specific work including a coi itinued review and updating than appears in this Report A FIXED SILO VULNERABILITY With the rapid Soviet ICBM build 'up since 1966 there has been a gro' ving concern for Minuteman survivability Currently there are over 1200 ICBM's and SLBM's in the Soviet operational inventory With the continued deployment of the SS-9 SS-11 SS-13 and SS - N-6 the thr at to Minuteman silos could evolve fro1n several sources an increase in the number of high yield weapons an increase in missile accuracy or an accurate MIRV capability The SS-9 with its high payload and relatively high accuracy is already suitable for use against hard targets and is a good candidate for a MIRV system Conceivably the SS-ll SS-13 and SS-N- 6 could be developed into hard target weapons through development of greater accuracy and possibly through a MIRV system as well To meet this threat there are two principal R D programs for improving the survivability of the land-based missile force -- Minuten an Defense The Safeguard ABM deployment could provide a light _d efense to _four of the Minuteman Wings Grand Forks in Jan 1974 Malmstrom in July 1974 Whiteman and Warren in 1975 This defense could be increased to cover all Minuteman sifos by the addition of more MSR radars and Sprints Hard Rock Silos A program to demonstrate the techncil gy for hard_ rock missile facilities is c_urrently in progress A 3000 psi silo_ and a 6000 psi launch control facility ire the goals A prototype launch facility test is planned for May 1972 If successful and site surveys determine that adequate hard rock is _a vailable an IOC in mid 1974 would be possible 4 The hard rock silo is vulnerable to high yield or very accurate RV' s Consequently the re are several alternatives involving hard rock silos and defense un ler revie v at the present time Against accurate or high yield warheads defense is attractive Against sniall multiple RV' s with CEP' s greater than 0 25 NM· the super har l silo is attractive The alternatives are - 1 Increase the defense of the pr sent silos beyond that programmed in the Safeguard deployment 2 Relocate all or a fraction of the Minuteman force to hard rock silos 3 Add m ore Minuteman in hard rock silos 4 Relocate and defend the force thus taking a _d vant i ge of both the characteristics of defense and hardening to make the development of many small highly accurate RV's a requirement for a successful attack against Minuteman To support this latter alternative special hard point defense systems are being studied within the advanced BMD development program Other Alternatives Since the developn ent of small highly accurate RV's is within present _D s technology and may be within Soviet technoiogy other alternatives are being examined for their effectiveness in providing a long t rm solution to land-based survivability Among these are systems that employ deceptive basing or mobile ICBM launchers B ABM PENETRATION Since 1962 when construction of the Moscow ABM system was initiated the credibility of U S missile penetration has been of concern to U S planners This concern involves the possibility of change in four areas which involve differing response requirements 1 Expansion of the Moscow Galosh system for protection of other SoYict ci t ies 5 - ' 2 The extensive Tallinn system deployment and a possible point-in-space o 'ABM intercept capability for this system 3 Deployment of a new long range intercept sy'stem a second generation one to replace the Galosh Such a system is currently projected to have a possible 197375 IOC 4 Deployment of a short- range terminal defense system with a high acceleration interceptor like Sprint for endo-almospheric intercept One of the most important factors in assessing the Soviet ABM capability is to provide sufficient lead time to permit adequate U S reaction and response Cur rent Soviet A-BM deployments involve the ABM-1 network around Moscow and the various large phased array radars being constructed throughout the USSR It has taken the Soviets five to six yea rs to build an A BM-1 complex Any initial construction of new A BM-1 complexes would be detected well before IOC The deployment of a new ABM system could be more difficult to identify If the ne v system were tested at a known range in its operational configuration the U S would be a-hie to identify it at least two years bef IOC fu the ca e th t testing could be carried out on an ABM system under conditions of concealinent and deception detection of a deployment program would s_till occur rather early but identification as an A BM system might not be possible more than a year prior to IOC Any high perforn1ance SAM system with a nuclear warhead of sufficient size has an inherent potential for point-in- space RV interce'pt Conversion of a SAM to ABM would be dependent on the system sophistication If SAM systems such as Tallinn can receive and process data from long range radars they could provide a point-in-space defense against pallistic missile attack This capability would have only a low probability of being verified by national means The threat of this type of fotercept capabilfry 1 _ e c_ t ·ec - i i e-ffe iye xo m- s-ph_ - iC _ pe e t_1 at on aids With_a point-in- space intercept capability the dcfcnde r cannot track the attacking RV with a missile site radar He can only estimate thctin1e al which it would arrive at a point in space b2 sed on d d a frorn his acquisition radar This capability has only a very low kill pr obab ility even against single RVs without penetration aids It W0 1ld be unsophi Liquite unsophisticated con1- ll-r-nt4 · d -• · · _Ij' A w q V i · ATO - o is tOiENOED 'SIPJ£o There are bvo primary programs to insure that a possible expanded Soviet A BM defense th rough the 1970 to 197 5 time period can be penetrated the · Poseidon and Minuteman III Poseidon The Poseidon will car y l O k - 3 RV's nominallX with a capability for 14 The planned force is 496 Poseidon missiles on 31 boats The conversion from Polaris is currently underway with a Jan· 1971 IOC for -the first boat By mid 1973 20 Poseidon boats will be operational The conversion is scheduled for completion by the end of 1976 v hen the · 31st boat becomes operational Minuteman III The Minu t eman DI is p r o g r a m a June 1970 IOC Half of the force will have 3 Mk-12 RV' s and half 2 Mk-12 RV I s both will have 15 chaff puffs as exoa tmosphe ri c decoys Ii the Soviets deploy a terminal defense 10 terminal decoys can be added to the 2 RV configuration By mid 197 3 the re will be 400 MM III and by mid 1976 528 MM III In the event that the Soviets deploy a terminal defense that could discriminate endoatmospheric decoys the MM III together with Poseicfon n ay not be adequate There are a number of programs and options for this contingency Increase Poseidon to 14 RV's This option would sacrifice range and hence target coverage to inc reasc the penetration · capability of the force Increase the number of RV's on the The Mk-18 is a proposed design carrying warhead Alternatively the Mk-3A a modification 'of the · Poseidon Mk-3 could be used to increase the number o RV 1 s on Minuteman Increase the Total Offensive Force The possibility of heavy Soviet AB vl defenses can be countered by improving the survivability of Minuteman deploying larger missiles with advanced reentry systems increasing the number of landbased missiles or increadng the number of sea-based missiles OECLI SS f ED 7 In addition within the ABRES program a broad research and developn ent effort is being conducted on reentry physics maneuver technology RV a d decoy design and other modes of improving · the penetration capability of a given missile payload C SSBN SURVIVAL In the past few years the Soviets nave steadily increased their ASW forces Though we have no evidence of any present' or prospective Soviet breakthrough in AS•N that would sharply· increase the threat to the Polaris Poseidon syste1n w cannot ignore the possibility that an ASW threat may emerge in the 1970's The two areas of concern which effect strategic plannj ng for future security of the submarine force are 1 2 A general improvement in Soviet surface and air ASW units through both an increase in capability and number could deny confident deployment of the SSBN 's in current ope rating areas With the range limitation of Polaris and Poseidon loss of the Norweigian Sea and the Mediterranean would seriously restrict the target coverage of the force For Poseidon this may require a reduction in the number of Mk- 3 RV's that can be deployed With the deployment of follow-on Soviet attack's-ubmarines the prospect of an SSBN trailing capability for the Soviets must be considered In time this could effect orce survival in all ocean areas As a safeguard against the sc possible develop1nents measures for SSBN self defense are currently being pursued As a long range counter ULMS Underwater Long Range Missile System is in concept formulation Actual de sign is expected in FY 70- 71 There are two options for the ULMS missile systen at ICBM range a new missile or a modification of Poseidon which adds a new first-stage motor uncle r the existing two stages Current funding concent a tes on the design of the submarines the long leadtimc item in the system IOC ' vould be in seven years foJlowing design formulation To expedite the program the building of an R D ULMS prototype is being considered ' 8 J 0 U·· 1 I JI L ' l'• D BOMBER PRE LA UNCH SURVIVAL Currently 40 percent of the strategic bomber force is on alert capable of being airborne within 10 to 15 minutes following BMEWS warning With the · threat of depressed trajectory SS-X-6 and with the increase in Soviet SLBM capability 1500 NM range for the SS- N-6 the viability of the bomber force depends on an improvement in tactical warning ancf increased dispersal of the force to additional bases _both to give _more targets for an attack to cover and to decrease the number of alert aircraft at each field Programs for improving tactical warning are The 440L forward scatter 0TH radar system has an interim operational capability for warning of mass ICBM launch 35-40 mhmtes prior to impact Full design capability is expected by mid 1970 The 949 synchronous satellite system will detect booster burn with infrared sensors With a satellite in each hemisphere individual or multiple ICBM FOBS and SLBM launches can be detected Operational capability is planned for mid-1971 The SLBM threat presents the greatest problem for tactical warning Even vith launch detection only those bombe1 -bases in the ·north central U S would have adequate tactical warning time for the alert force to escape a well coordinated SLBM strike With seaward PAR and MSR radar coverage the Safeguard ABM deJense will provide b'oth warning and protection of the bomber force With-the pre sent deployment schedule this system will have an FOC by early 1976 if approved E BOMBER PENETRATION The primary air defense penetration mode is a 10 v altitud flight profile that avoids early radar detection and compounds the intercept problem The Soviets have been working on this problem for some time It is · believed that some 400 n1anned interceptors now have an all-weather interceptor capability down to 1000 ft altitude It is expected that the newer Soviet long range interceptor Foxbat may be given a l ook-dO vn and shoot-dO vn capability In addition the Soviets have been testing an A 'l A CS aircraft airborne warning anc1 control syslcr - Dased on our OY• n experience its long- ra1i gc surveillance rctdar is unlikely to li vc a signjf icant capability for detecting lo v altitude -penetration over and However such a ' system may have a good capability over water and thus would extend the Soviets intercept range beyond the land mass Currently there is an extensive SAM defense net throughout the s·oviet Union Ther·e are about 10 000 SAM launchers deployed both as a barrier defense and as a local defense in or about cities Once again it is the low altitude detection and intercept capability of these systems that is critical With proper siting the SA-2 system is believe_d to have coverage as low as 1000 altitude In a few areas the coverage may be as low as 500 feet The less extensively deployed SA-3 system may have a capability down to about 500 feet I ' To defeat the SAM defenses either by penetration or exhaustion the SRAM bomber-carried missile with standoff range of 25-30 NM is uncle r clevelopment This system will allow a bomber to attack SAM defended targets without flying directly over them Several techniques for improving the penetration capability against an advanced Soviet area defense are under cleveloprnent SCAD Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy is in concept formulation and propulsion development This system is expected to have a range of approximately 1000 NM at 1000 ft and be equippecl with bomber simulation aids Thus both a long- range stand•off capability and an area defense saturation capability n1ay - be obtained BDM Bomber Defense Missile - This syste is curre·nt1y under investigation as both a bmnber defense weapon against manned interceptors and as a terminal defense penetrator To maintain and improve the capability of the strategic bomber force the FB-11 lA will have an October 1970 10 C if pre sent goals are met AMSA could have an IOC in 1976 F DEFENSE There are four possible objectives of strategic defensive systems developn cnt l l Provide tactical warning and protect the command function to insure retaliation ' I 2 Protect retaliatory forces from Soviet attack 3 Deny damage to a potential CPR nt1clear th1 ea t 4 Protect population and industry · It is the objective of the Safeguard syste1n to _meet the first three Phase will have an early 1974 IOC with a full operational capability fen the total syste1n by early 1976 if approved r Without an ABM defense of U S cities it is not currently possible to meet the four h objective vith a balanced high confidence damage limiting program Should a city defense be required in the future there are the following R D programs supporting the overall damage limiting goal 1 Advanced BMD Developm ent This program consists of a broad effort in in1proving ABM systems effectiveness An1ong these a re development of a ren1ote launch Sprint an Improved Spartan vith a loiter intercept mode iinproved radar resolution long wavelength infrared sensors for defeating chaff horning interceptors using IR 2 A WA CS for extending surveiliance and bomber · int rcept control to ranges of about 500 NM off-shore 3 F-106X with an advanced look-down fire control system 4 SAM-D and Hercules Hawk Terininal bo1nber defense improvement This includes an assessment of using SA M-D together with the Safeguard system to assist or complement each other in the air defense and A BM roles 5 Civil Defense Research including studies of both blast shelter and evacuation feasi9ility 6 SA Bl US an early mid course sea-based ABM intercept system is under study JI --- i D G SUMMARY OF CURRENT PROGRAM The major elements of the current safeguard program are -summarized in Table I and Table II Many are applicable as responses within the various option though deployment of some is outlawed or constrained by the options These must be maintained within the R D program against possible Soviet abrogation A particular option will require a review and reorientation of the relative priorities that have been assigned No such attempt is given here TABLE I MISSILE FORCES SURVIVABILITY SAFEGUARDS POTENTIAL THREAT Land-Based ICBM's Accurate MIRVed SS-9 Sprint defense of Mim1teman Accurate SS-11 13 Hard rock silos -i n-c-rease-ln ntimbe-rs· of missiles • Increase --- ------- - - ------- -'ip _ _SS- 9 11 1 3 Mobility or deception Overall ASV I rnprovement Sea-Based SLBM's -- - - · SSBN defense developn1ent • Deployn1ent of nuclear attack sub1narines • ULMS PENETRABILITY SAFEGUARDS POTENTIAL THREAT -- - - ·· · - -- -- -- - - -· -· --- - -- - -- -- A 1 l_itiona_l Galosh deploy ent _ ' • MM III Mkl 2 MIRV MM s·urvivability options • Tallinn ABM ' capability • Increased land-based ·-throw weight with adv · re ntry syste1ns ABRES • New long range ABM New short range ABM Poseidon Mk3 MIRV • 14 Mk3 on Poseidon Pe11 aid discrimination • Increased Sea-based throw weight with adv reentry systems 13 D BOMBER FORCES POTENTIAL THREAT Pre-launch survival SAFEGUARDS • SLBM increase • ABM defense of SAC bases • FOBS MOBS DICBM • Warning dispersal alert -n -••-- -• • Penetration • Soviet AWACS and improved manned interceptor J• • SRAM • FB-111 SCAD BDM • Pe1ietration aids • AMSA • SAM low altitude intercept capability DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS ABM POTENTIAL THREAT SAFEGUARDS CPR ICBM dev Safeguard AB Increasing Soviet missile force Advanced BMD program • SABMIS MIRV pen aid Bomber Defense • Low altitude penetrators Long range AS M F-106X Supersonic bomber Civil Defense • AWACS • SAM-D HA WK • Incrf asing Soviet offensive 1ncgat onnage Shelter survey Warning I f 14 ' IV A ·' ASSESSMENT CRITERIA Each NSSM-28 package requires R D safeg'uards that will let us protect our strategic capability_against possible qualitative and quantitative improvements in Soviet strategic forces The possible Soviet force in1proven1ents that arc of concern were described in the previous section The permitted improvements in Soviet forces that present significant threats are different for each NSSM-28 package anc l Variant -The following sections describe the important threats for each package list the R D safeguards that are applicable and identify threats for which no safeguards are available within the agreement Certain safeguards would have to be maintained even though an agreen1cnt w ould lin1it certain Soviet systems but the stage at which the development of the U S safeguards must be kept would dcpe11d upon many factors -- our confidence in detecting specific sorts of cheating the leadtimes of the Soviet systems the lcadtimes of our own etc As ha_s been previously indicated these questions must be reviewed in detail in a later study • 15 IJ l7 'r • l I - · E••u pN •· ED 'i Ill _P A C ½_ 9ES SUMMAR ¥ ' TA BLE -- ICBM MIRV SLBM Fixed Freeze Number ' I • · _l ack_age· I i I -- - ---- - i• Freeze Number i I I · Package II - l' ' - i - --- - · - Mobile Ban 1 Freeze Number - ' I II i I• i l I I •• Variant IIA - F1·eezc Number l ' Packc_tg III Freez Deployrnent Freeze Deployincnt Freeze Deploy mcnt Freeze Number Ban iI T l ' I Variant IIIA i ' '• Ii I t q Variant IllB - Freeze Nun1b_e r 1 I ' t I -- - -- ·- - Definitions Ban Freeze D ployment Freeze Deplc ymcnt IR MR BM Freeze dcployn1ent ban mobile SLCM Fr eze deployment _ e x cept Package Bombers and Air Defense No restriction · ABM with agreed numbers and basing Ban _IL - · Ban No deployment no testing Freeze Number Total nwnber of launchers fixed replacement of launchers allowed _ Freeze Deployrr1ent Freeze vith current nur nber deployed or un d e r con struc t i o n s_ubma 1 in e s c an be repl a ced a fte r s p ci fi c d ti me 16 j' I - Ban· -P k- ge IV All Packages ·1 '- 't ii Ban D ' B SAFEGUARDS REQUIRED FOR NSSM- 28 PACKAGES The options considered in this review are sum marized in Table III With the exception of Option IV which imposes a ban on MIRV there are but two central issues that clomin'ate the u pique safeguard requirements for these packages I The flexibility that is permitted in each package for improving the survivability of offense-forces 2 The level of ABM permitted Since the level of ABM is considered as an open parameter for these packages the essentfal features of ABM restrictions are reviewed first independent of the offense limitation The safeguard requiren ents for the various offense limitations are then developed follO ving this A BM review In assessing the safeguards required for each option only those required in addition to the present program are discussed General Consideration of A BM Restrictions · The effect of various levels of ABM restrictions on U S safeguard requirements arc illustrated by considering three _specific levels of defense 100 Intc rceptors With a limitation at this level the U S forecloses the possibility of achieving within the treaty either a CPR defense or any damage limiting capability against the Soviet threat There are two issues associated with a deployment at this norninal level apart from the fact that such a restriction freeze the Soyiets with appr_o xi'mate_ly their pi·csent deployment 1 What 1nilitary purpose would be served by only 100 A BM interceptors and 2 Could a deployment at this level serve to reduce the leadii rne to IOC of a 1norc extensive system should it be required at son e later tin e wouid • 17 If the response leadtime to IOC is to be kept as low as possible to provide a safeguard against a future ABM requirement current Safeguard c01nponents must be programmed for deployment at the 100 interceptor level With these components the re are four possible deployn1ents -- - - - - · - ---- --·- -- - l National Command Authority Protection 2 Some Protection of Major Population Centers 3 Lhnited CONUS Coverage 4 Phase I Safecruard R ---- With the radar coverage of deployment option three the leadtime to an ABM response should it be required is primarily dependent on the rate at which Sprint and Spartan production can be initiated Without the radar cove_rage of deployment option three this leadtime is from three to four years depending on the degree wfrh which prclim inary site preparation has been accomplished and long leadtime radar c01nponents have been stock- piled However if the Soviets a re permitted the radar coverage of deployment option thre e the threat of an upgrade of SAM systems to ABM would be in creased Furth_ r - though U -S reponse time is reduced the Soviet opportunity for either covert interceptor deployment or rapid abrogation is enhanced At this level of defense it may be possible to obtain better CONUS coverage against a CPR ICBM threat than that of deployment option three if a forward based early mid-course intercept system can be deployed or a CONUS based system with interceptor flyout capabilities approaching l 000 NM coverage can be obtained Programs to develop these capa- 1·i - - X_ _b t2 s s_h o i e · _co sicl r - - o-_s pplf _r_e_pi _c_e --t e - -· -_ '' _feg 1ard ABM OJ' lpo_nents __ _ _ ---··-- _ ______ · ·-· __ _ _____ _ ---·· Without A BM cove rage of the SAC bomber fields an SLBM surprise attack on these bases is of concern There are three operational safeguards for this contingency 1 Rebase the entire bomber force inland to the northern midwest to increase SLBM tactical warning tin1 ' and rely on 9-19 for wan1ing of a DJ CBM c r FOJ S allacl • 2 Stand a continuous airborne alert with the force About 50 bombers could be kept continu9usly in the air against increasing Soviet air defense this number would be of _questionable value 3 Disperse the force _to fields beyond those normally used as military bases - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- ·- ···-·-· 200 500 Interceptors Within this range the U S could as a minimum install Phase I of·the Safeguarc1 ABM to provide protection of up to four of the ix Minuteman wings plus the National Command Authority at' Washington Alternatively we could deploy a nationwide · area A BM system which ·would give some protection to SACb_o ml er ·bases anc1 accidental launch protection At 200 inte rceptor_s a na tion vide system coulc1 provide significant damage limitation against the micl-70 ·Chinese ICBM threat espe 'cial y in scenartos involving a U S · counterforce strike At 500 interceptors nationwide area protection would be comparable to that _a ssociated with Safeguard However allocating all our interceptors for nationwide protection would result in only mi i um ICBM defense capabilities At any _level of nationwide defense our bombers would receive improved early warning 1 In the event _the Soviets cheat or abrogate the agreement and improve heir capabilities to attack our ICBMs we would want to he Jri a position to rapidly increase our ICBM and bomber protect-i on We could deploy additional Sprints at our Minuteman fi lds with th e leadtime determined mainly by the existing radar _-net Existing MSRs could support additional Sprints With PARs deployed across Northern U S the deployment leadtime would be for needed additional MSRs and could be about 1-1 2 to 2 years given stockpiling of components Construction of additional PARs would take 3- 4 years Safeguard ABM System Level 600-1000 Interceptors At this level the U S could proceed with the Safeguard deployment achieving 1 Protectfori against a future CPR missile threat throt g 1 the 1970's 2 Pre-12 unch protection of the bon1ber and tanker force ' 19· T snl 'I f J li t '•rn ' t • l-' _ • I 3 Protection of the NCA 4 A thii1 defense of a fraction of the Minuteman force -- ---------- - ---- -- -- - Since radar component c nd interceptor production facilities would be functioning thr_ough 197 3 in direct support of the deployn1cnt schedule a relatively rapid response would be available in the event that an in easc in ABM protection in excess of the treaty level is required As a safeguard beyond this time thes c facilities could be maintained at a n1inin1um restart tiin-e 1500-2500 Interceptors For this level of A BM there arc two basic altc rnatives 1 CONUS coverage with a Safeguard ABM level of interceptors plus either a Sprint defense of the curreJ1t 11h1uteman force or defense of a relocated force if permitted ·within the treaty 2 CONUS coverage with a Safeguard lE yel of _ interceptors plus a Sprint urban defense of major cities For the latter alternative some damage limiting posture against the Soviets might be achievable within the treaty and with current ABM components Fo z_- the previous ABM restrictions this is not the case The only alternative for population protection will be that of civil defense In general with a lin1itation on defense level · the only alternatives for the ·defe11sc if it is to keep pace with offense in1provement s is to improve interceptor performance and threat discrimina t ion capability Both of these characteristics are - -·- - - ---------------···-··- ·· ··- -·---· ------ -- ··- - - - -- - - - -- -·-- --- - - - - - ·- - currently being pursued by the Advanced BMD development program and should continue · to receive attention 20 i 1 ' J _ Effect of an ABM Limitation on U S Penetration Safeguards It appears that the Soviets arc now actively working on a new · or improved ABM system All those r _ p __ a f egnarcl __ ot-· ohibi-t _d_- y the tcnns of the treaty and which are curi ently available must be retained against the possibility of a Soviet deployment of a sophisticated next generation system l · It would be difficult to conceal preparation for a_ large deployment and some yea rs warning voulcl be available before the system would have a significant ABM capability ' In this tim the U S could initiate deployment of a ballistic missile ship with Poseidon or rapidly deploy additional Minuteman missiles ·- ' • EFFECT OF OPTION I SURVIVABILITY SAFEGUARDS POTENTIAL THREAT · Accurate MIRVed SS-9 Land-Based lCBM's Re'stricted or prohibited Prohibited· Accurate SS-11 13 • Hard rock silos ' Re strict ec'i Sea-Based -·sLBM's Overall ASW Inprovement ·• · _ peployment of nuclear attack submarines Bombers SSBN defense development ULMS ------ Increase in SLBM SLCM Dispersion • Increased A le rt i Upgrading of SLBM SLCM platforms and missiles Warning A BM defense of SAC bases --' PENETRA BI LITY POTENTIA ½ THREAT SAFEGUARDS • MM III Mk12 MIRV By repla_ cement only · i I • Poseidon Mk3 MIRV 14 Mk3 on Poseidon • Pen aid disc rim in a ti on DEC 22 D • Increased Sea-based throw weight OPTION I MINUTEMAN SURVIVABILITY Soviet Threat The option outlaws further Soviet increases in ICBM launchers Within the limit of total launchers permitted deployment of the SS-9 could continue as a replacement for the older SS- 7 and SS-8 systems and even the SS-11 Thus the Soviets could greatly increase their ' ' SS-9 force Further their sea based offensive m issile force which is unconstrained could also threaten MM given improved accuracy Hence with this option the eventual threat to Minuteman might be no less than that without the restriction of Option I Restrictions on U S Response Addition of more 11inuterna n or relocatio11 to a 1and i-n 0-b ile or -- -- -- - ceptiy -a·ep ci 'men fo _ ncj a s_ ·surviyabi ity ar t -p i tted ·-· Defense of Minuteman would be limited by the ABM agreement Possible Safeguards Relocation of Minuteman to hard rock silos is permitted e -e -· o i_se s l s am -y __be -p·o·ssi Jle- depe di_ g-_o tl_ii 1 1 Some 1 e tri -___· Ji 9 J S -_ ___ ---- -·· -- ----- Alternatively the Minuteman force could be left as is reduced or phased out with an increase in the sea-based force MORE MISSILE THROW WEIGHT The Soviet total n1is sile throw weight could continue to increase by either retrofitti11g the SS-11 and SS-13 silos with larger missiles or replacing thc _s e silos with new and larger ones The Soviet SLBM force could continue to increase The U S could add more Poseidon ULMS and retrofit vith a larger Minutc111an missile PENETRATION - - -·· - - nun bcr- There is n- - -r -st ictio l othc than- the --constra1 nt -on· of ICBMs __ on the U S cq ci bil i ty L -n- a respons e to incrc8 sc missile penetration capability sho1 i 1c1 it 1 n ·c1 -ire c1 · ' SUMMARY No aclditional safeguards to those currently available or within the present R D program ·are indicated at the present time With this option there is the flexibility to switch to a predominately sea-based offensive force if the threat against fixed land-based systems should so indicate Against the possibility of an increasing threat to sea-based system switching to a predominantly · land- based force would not be permitted Thus the long range offensive system safeguard requirements would depend on possible Soviet AS1 V developments in the '7 0's ' The threat options left open to the Soviets such as increasing SLBMs make necessary continuing U S progran1s in response to or in anticipation of increasing Soviet capabilities • 24 · EFFECT OF OPTIONS II IIA SURVIVABILITY POTENTIAL THREAT Accurate MIRVed SS-9 and-Based • Accurate tCBM's SS-11 13 SAFEGUARDS Restricted or prohibited Prohibited • Hard rock silos '0 Hncreas ·e 1 ___ _----- i n num- · YtueJ _ s t rvJ$ $ te t · Increase · Restricted rr · r - r_ -7 rr in ·SS t 9 l' 1·1 1 -· Mobility or ' - -1 • 171 • I ' L J Prohibited - - - - - - ' tlcff•- fitb - ' 'tf t l -r • Sea-Based I s ·_L BM's Overall ASW Improvement As replaceme nt only· ' ' · l %_ 1 - D J • SSBN defense • · development I I· • Deployment of nuclear attack submarines B o_m_b_e_r-'-o--- - n l - ri 4 -- - l- -7-7'1 - - ______R_e_s_t_r_i_c-te_d_ _ __ ST BM SLCM ·- - - - - - - • Disp eraion • ·Increased Alert _ Upgrading of SLBM SLCM platforms and missiles PENETRABILITY POTENT IA L THREA' I' SAFEGUARDS • MM III Mkl 2 MIR_V i j 1· t 1 Increased land-base throw weight ·i 1 A I i • ABRES I 1 i --- - ·- -- • Poseidon 1vfk3 MIR • Pen aid discrimination 14 Mk3 on Poseido1 25 • creased Sea-base throw weight OPTION II IIA · These options differ from Option I in that they restrict the SLBM force b t permit land mobile ICBMs From the standpoint of safeguard response flexibility this · option differs from Option I in the following Minuteman or a new larger Minuten1an could be relocated to a mobile _launcher system in addition to a ard rock silo If an increase in total U S throw weight is required this increase must _be by replacement not by increase in additional sea- based missiles SUMMARY No additional safeguards to those currently available or within the present R D program are indicated at the present time ' • For option II the _current division of offen_s ve missile forces between ·land and sea-based is maintained For option IIA there is complete freedom to ·alter this mix within the constraint of a fixed number of offensive rnissile launchers With this option the long range offensive system safeguard requirements could be adjusted to accomplish the most cost effective re ponses as the Soviet threat evolves -- A$ in-Option the· threat options left open· to the Soviets such as 'land mobile · IC_ Ms make necessary continuing U S programs in r esponse· to or anticipation of increasing Soviet capabilities -- I i 1 i D _ °t EC L - - - EFFECT OF OPTIO N III • SURVIVABILITY POTENTIAL THREAT SAFEGUARDS • Accurate MIRVed SS-9 Land-Baseq • Accurate· ICBM's SS-11 13 Restricted Overall ASW hnpr'ovcme t Sea- -Based SLBM's SSBN defense development 0 1110 1 S i 1 ' UL _ · _ i Deployment of nucl'ear attack submarines ·inc'redse inT -· S 1 11 srfcM - '-----Restricted Bombers ½i ·I '1 -·1 I I • Disperoion • Increased Alert -- Upgrading 'of SLBM LCM platforms and missiles • V arning A'BM aefense- of · ------ ---- --- ----- ------------- 1 c -' k 7 J _ _ ' ' _- I ' I PENETRABILITY POTENTIAL THREAT SAFEGUARDS Restricted · • MM III Mkl2 MIRV i i I I Poseidon Mk3 MIR' I Pen a1d discrimination Prohibited · EC fi 14 Mk3 on Poseidon · _v- MINUTEMAN SURVIVABILITY Soviet Threat The option stops further deployment of the SS-1 ' and SS-13 and unlike Options I and II would stop construction of SS- 9 silos as a substitution for other launchers However the Soviets could continue deployment of the SS-9 by retrofitting the 220 SS- 7 and SS-8 launchers with these missiles although most of the launche s are soft and the ha-rd silos are in clustered aiming points Thus the eventual threat to Minuteman might conceivably be no less than that without the la 'u ncher freeze restriction of Option III Restrictions on U S Response A launcher freeze witb current basing ' vould prohibit increases in Minute1nan launchers relocation to hard rock silos and mobility or deception as survivability measures Defense of Minuteman would depend on the ABM agreen1ent Safeguards Response Though increasing the hardness of existing silos is explicitly allowed changing the basic external configuration of silos is explicitly prohibited Upgrading the hardness of the sHos to 600 psi is · possible within these constraints This by itself is not an adequate safeguard against Soviet CEP's less than a quarter nautical mile should the Soviets be able to achieve this capabil_ity I hus there are three basic alternatives for the Minuteman force each of which places a different relative emphasis on the overail Safeguard program 1 Discount Minuteman for any' majorrole other than preemption should the Soviets be able to develop high accuracy Emphasis is placed on those safeguards which maintain the survivability and penetrability of the subma rinc· and bomber force 2 Deploy all or a portion of the allowed level of ABM interceptors for defense of Minuteman 3 Develop a credible launch-on-warning capability The apparent rctc Ji dion c2 _p abjlity is not criti c ll y clcpcndcnt on b0111ber and sub1narii-1c force safeeuards I S E MORE MISSILE THROW WEIGHT The Soviet total missile throw weight could contfnue to increase by_ retrofitting a larger payload missile in the SS-11 and SS-13 silos This together with a retrofit of the SS-7 and' SS-8 launchers 'ith SS-9 missiles ·could increase the total Soviet ICBM thro v weight by a factor of two or three The U S could retrofit the Minutem an force with a new larger missile of approximately 6000- 8000 kps if r _quirecl thus tripling the overall ICBM throw weight I · ULMS could replace Polaris and Pos_eidon with both a larger missile and greater percent of alert time PENETRATION -- - --· ------ ·--- ------ ---- - - - - - - - - - ---- - --- - - - - -- - - ---- --- ---· ----- --- ----- - -- - - - - --- Because of the question of Minuteman survivability the pc • tration capability of the missile force s sensitive to the Soviet AB1if defense The capability of the programmed Polaris Poseidon force for high confidence penetration vi l depend on the A BM level Increasing the Pose i lon payload from the programmed 10 to 14 RV's will improve the penetration capability Increa_sing the sea-based missile force is prohibited with the exception of ULMS as a replacement Thus those safeguards that maintain the capability of the bomber force and increase insofar as possi le the deliverable Minuteman throw weight could provide safeguards against either a covert Soviet ABM capability or an overt abrogation following a short warning of intent Limiting Soviet'ABMs to a low level in the agreement would also limit the possibility of an increased threat to our missile penetration capability 29 i- POSSIBLE SAFEGUARDS IN ADDITION TO CURRENT PROGRAM The following measures could be instituted within the const ints - _ he_-_t i _ fo_i-· -i pr i g --th _ _Mi uteman rorce fy I of Increase Silo Hardening ·-·· - --- ·· · --- ---- -------- ----- --- --- - _¥i u_t ma _ harclnes s could be increased to in excess of 600 __ psi A complete modification to the force would take approxbnately 5 years with about one wing out of commission per year In the ti1ne it would take for this modification Soviet accuracy im prove1nent could negate the gain 2 Launch-On- Warning Increase the number of 949 type sa tellitc s deployed for greater reclundancy of launch v1arning to assure early acquisition and good quality tracking of SLBM' s ICBM' s and FOBS Two additional PAR' s or FPS-85' s -i n the southern hc1nisphere and one in Greenland Maintain BMEW' s Develop a rcUable system for detection of sensor attack 3 Hardening Against Pin Dovm Launch- on-warning may require an increase in inflight hardening beyond the 1 cal cm 2 planned for Minuteman 4 Large Payload Minuteman A hot flyout i vould be feasible with a 90 diameter 6000 lb throw weight n1issile A cold launch could be as large at 116 in dia1neter and have about 9000 lbs of throv i veight D DE 5 Retargeting A rapid force-wide retargeting for those missiles not destroyed before launch could increase the effectiveness of a surviving force The penetration capability of the missile force could be improved over current programs with the foll wing 1 A-3 MIRV The ten SSBN' s not planned for Poseidon conversion could be fitted with an A-3 MIRV of four to six Mk-3 RVs This may have an earlier IOC than is possjble with ULMS replacement of these ten SSBN's 2 FOBS or DICBM for Titan II A possible area defense suppression weapon to be launched on warning 3 Strike Assessment With large uncertainty in Soviet ABM capability and in U s surviving throv1 weight the development of a real time missile strike reporting system may be ttractive If such a systen1 together with the necessary command and _control can be n1ade reliable and survivable both the sea-based and Minuteman forces could_ be employed with greater effectiveness The e Hectiveness of the b01nber force could be increased by increasing the total force 1 -- - ·- - -- ··- 2 SRAM on All B-52 G-H's -- - -·-- - - - - - - - FB-11 lA AMSA Increase the number of UE FB-1 l IA above those currently programmed Accelerate AMS A dcvelop1nent insofar as possible - - - - - - -- - - - -- - - -----·-·- - 3 Unmanned Mini-Bomber A force of SC AD-like cti re raft vchj cl s could be deployed for air launch ship l a unch or groun d bnrnch _ 4 Unmanned B-4 7 There are approximately 600 stored at Davis Monthan Arizona SUMMARY The restrictions in Option III which foreclose certain U S safeguards options also limit threat options open to the Soviets We are still left however with a potential threat to Minuteman survivability The only safeguards for MM survivability available under this option are · a Hard point defense as permitted by the agreed ABM level b Launch-on-warning c Increase the expected deliverable force by increasing the total r nissile throw weight and increasing the bomber force 32 I ' OPTION IIIA B These options are identical to Option III with the imp'ortant exception that Minuteman rebasing is permitted IIIA Minuteman could be relocated to hard rock silos The long tenn viability of this rebasjng depends on the level ·of defense permitted within the a'g reement $ 1 - e - lJe ard __ - __ sil_ s _ _ ai _be clestroie·d by- ·-- high yield- ve-ai -s ven a light defense voulcl deny c - fid- t -attack with single hjgh yield 15-25 K1T RV's For an ABM limitation below that of _ Safeguard the hard sil re basing would not provide a confident solution if the Soviets were to develop very high accuracies With Soviets CEP' s in the neighborhood of 1000 1 for exan1ple a 1v1IRV threat would require several hard point interceptors per silo to achieve confident survivabilHy ·Be c_ use ·o f t1 is -- _--_- ---- the viability of hard silos would be extended if the Soviet missile throw weight and or accuracy were constrained to the current level IIIB In addition to relocating to hard rock silos the option o -increasing the sea- based force v ith a comparable land- based rec1uction is available SUMMARY · --- -- - - --- · · -- - · - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - -·- · -- - - - - -- No additional safeguards to those currently available or within the pres cnt R D program arc indicated ·at the pre sent time for Option IIIB As in Option IIA the long range offensive missile safeguard requiren1ents would be determined by the n1ix of land and sea-based force that best responds to the evolution of the Soviet threat With Option IIIA the requirements · of Option III with respect to Minuteman survivability could evolve if 10' v Soviet CEPs were achieved 33 - ·- --- - - - -- --- - EFFECT OF OPTION IV SURVIVABILITY POTENTif L THREAT SAFEGUARDS Land-Based • Accurate ICBM' s SS-11 13 Sea-Based SLBM's • • Overall ASW_ ' Improvement • SSBN defense -· i - _ • • Dep oyment of As SSBN replacenuclear attack ment only submarines i -- - - - - - - - - - · - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - -· · B_o_m_b_e_r_s_---- 17 1 - -ta 6e7 • Dispersion r --- --- --_ Restricted • Increased Ale rt • Upg rad ing of SLBM • Warning SLCM platforms and missiles ½ JiM -✓d f i ' £ 1 I I 1 J J oA Gibas es •' - · I J l did- 41s-LcM - ----- _-- ----------'---------------------- j PENETRABILITY i · POTENTIAL THF EAT SAFEGUARDS I I · Re sfricted - Prohibited - - - - As MM replacement only-·----- -- Restricted - - - - Prohibited • Pen aid dis C runina ti on ---- • c- OPTION IV MISSILE PENETRATION · If the deployment of MIRv 1·s is to be mon tored by unilateral means only all flight tests of systems associated with such capability n ust be prohibited Thus limitations may have to be placed on penetration aid testing as well as f1 rt_h e r flights of the Polaris A- 3 system with multiple RV's The U S now his chaff deployed on some systems however we cannot be fully confide11t of chaff as a penetration aid With these restrictions penetration confidence becomes the ost critical safeguard requirement SAFEGUARDS WITHIN THE TREATY 1 The U S could continue to convert and retrofit the SSBN with Poseidon missiles It is estimated that a lead time of 24 months would be required to equip these missiles with a single Mk-11 C warhead The chaff package currently deployed on the MM II with this warhead would require modification Since it may not be possible to flight test this_ system in its intended ope rational form it is difficult to assess at this tilne the confidence one can place on the reliability of the chaff to effectively hidC the RV 2 - A new single RV warhead for Poseidon would take 4 years 3 Though developed and tested the Antelope penetration aid system for the A -3 missile was not deployed A two year to 30-month IOC would be possible for this system 4 Minuteman III could be deployed with the 1'1k-l 1 C ' Varhead and chaff system A 2 year slip in Minuteman III IOC is estimated 5 A ne v hard RV could be developed for MM III with an IOC in 4 years 6 A new larger Minute1nan and large RV could have an IOC within 4 years with FOC in 8 years --· 2 t a IOC It is estimated that a 500 cal cm hard 4 MT warhead could be thrown to a maximmn range of 2500 NM 3S r • • 1 'I j l 1 -l __- • 1' I -- - ' -- 4 - ----- -- 7 ' · -- - - -- The c eclibility of penetration would_ r st with the credibility of the chaff systems To develop higher confidence pen aid systems within the treaty the · developn1ent of a ground-based pen aid test simulator system should be studied Such a syste1n would consist of a full reentry simulator for decoy_ test and a large · space charnber for midcoufse sim ulatipn It is estimated that an IOC of ive years is possible • - -- - - - - - - ------ · - - - - - · · - - __ __ _ _ _ _ 1 _ __ _ _ ___ - - --- - - - - - -- - - - - ·-- - - - - - - - - - - - SAFEGUARDS AGAINST SOVIET PREPARATIONS FOR ABROGATION t -· -- - - If the Soviets abrogate the ABM limitation with a new A BM deploy-ment the pri1 ary safeguards will be the Poseidon and Minuteman ______ III deployed with single RV 1 s The U S could continue the development of MIRV short of flight test Refrofitting these systems at some future date with the currently programmed Mk-3 and Mk-12 MIRV systems _Y 1ill take approxin ately two years from decision to IOC MINUTEMAN SURVIVAJHLITY I j - -- - - - - - - - -- -----·T he agreement would eliminate a threat to the Minuteman force if the Soviets abide by the MIRV ban since an SS-9 MIRV represents the most immediate potential threat However 'a threat could conceivably evolve in time from several other sources _ for example 1 An accurate SS-11 together with the SS-9 force augmented by retrofitted SS -7 1 s and B's z An accurate small missile vitp several depoyed in each SS-9 silo and ripple launched 3 Covert MIRV development activity which could reduce the Soviet leadtime to deploy a highly ·accurate MIRV after abrogation · The potential seriousness of this threat is accentuated by the requirement for a high survivability in Minuteman to obtain a penetration capability against medium or high levels of ABM Without Minuteman there would be a maximum of only abm1t 400 RV's from the sea-based force arriving over the Soviet target system Accordingly those safeguards for Option III are also required here However Option IV w ould enhance the survivability of the Minuteman force by prohibi ti ng vfI RVs