_ _ cc - - l ·- - - - - -•• • - • ---ct o _ DECu SS FiED -1 ' ' •• -'• _ ll p 1 Reproduced al lhe National Arch - r 'iI 1 ' i C t O ' · ··• ----- 1--- ---· 1 _ j MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON TOP SECRET INFORMATION November 3 1969 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT Verification Panel Meeting October 31 1969 After opening the meeting Dr Kissinger asked Dr Lynn to outline the report he prepared on behalf of the working group During Lynn I s presentation there was a brief discussion of criterion 3 US-Soviet fatalities Packard id that the fatalities calculation was not consistent with the SIO P said that many thought that the computer underestimated deaths ckard said this was realized but he was not sure that all factors were taken into account in calculations Richardson said that the politicalpsychological aspect was a problem there was the imbalance between ability to inflict fatalities and reluctance to cause or accept large numbers of deaths Dr Kissinger commented that one aspect of the problem was that both sides might not accept the same concepts one side poses challenge which the other can only meet with assured destruction response then the side with assured destruction strategy is at a disadvantage For example if Minuteman is destroyed then would the US use the Polaris at the cost of great damage and fatalities to the US The discussion continued with Packard promising further study of calculations At the conclusion of Lynn I s briefing Dr Kissinger said that assuming these basic decisions are made then someone must evaluate which Options meet the decisions Dr Kissinger called on Richardson for comments Richardson said that more of the findings of the Verification Panel should be in the report especially in describing which Options were sensitive to cheating and how much significance to cheating both in strategic and diplomatic terms Sonnenfeldt said that assuming an Option is acceptable in strategic terms if sensitive to cheating then it is unacceptable TOP SECRET _ - -- ---·-- l 0 • • OECU SS FiED ' - G ' ti - _ - r _ 1 11 - I 1 I ' - • t 1 1 n t 1 •' •· I • TOP SECRET Reproduced al the National Arch _ __ r r ' ---- ----- •• '7' --- -2- Packard commented that one problem was the reliance on submarines which we could not be as sure of as the paper suggested Dr Kissinger asked about vulnerability of command and control There was then a discussion to the effect that CC was indeed vulnerable and the effectiveness of Polaris communications would depend on the kind of attack and the time to resume contact with remaining National Authority Smith then made extensive comments on the report His points were suffering from rushing ahead we need not table treaty NSC should not select Option report diffuse President will need some recommendation from key advisors must be a common sense clustering of ideas we should identify changes from NSSM-28 and make a list Dr Kissinger said that as the President goes through decisions he would in effect prejudice certain Options for example deciding against MIRVs would rule out certain Options Richardson said there were two different sets of Presidential decisions what to table and what to negotiate in interactive process with the USSR Options important in deciding what to table but at least as important is to recognize the highly complex system of variables revealed in analysis we have done Dr Kissinger said our purpose is to avoid renegotiating with ourselves in previous arms control discussion unless the Soviets made an analogous proposal we had to renegotiate within our own government This way we can ask the President what relationship he will not consider Packard said that if initial discussion is to be on issues we can decide which is sues we are willing to discuss Smith said we need four pages on scope of talks Dr Kissinger said NSC could give definition of scope TOP SECRET _I _______ DECLl SSIFIEO Reprodured at the National Arch - I· --1 I _ G r 1 1 · • c ri I I ri- 1 ' t 1 ric• I 'I ' --- L t' - - - · -- 0 _ J Ill TOP SECRET -3- ___ - • There was some discussion of criteria for strategic sufficiency with Smith making the point that new criteria seemed to be invented this was denied by others There was also objection by Smith to political discussion of Allied attitudes he said Allies welcomed SALT Weiss said that attitudes are ambiguous especially beneath the surface Dr Kissinger concurred William Hyland TOP SECRET