OJCS SUMMARY SHEET ' _ - _ • FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATc CLASSIFICATION TO ····· 1 CJCS TOP SEel'tE'f T_H_R_U_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _D_JSM_H_O_ -------0-0-JS-SU_S_P_EN_S_E_D_A_T_E_-I DJS Director J-5 i-------------------1 DJSM DAT _S_U_B_J-EC_T_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - A - C _ T _ l _ O H - - - - - - - - - t APPROVAL · SIGNATURE· INFORMATION SCYLLA III-73 Quick Look U r OTHER __ X REMARKS •_ • '- The SCYLLA III-73 ·simulation Quick Look Memorandum to the Secretary Defense for his i orma tion is at ched • of if -- I - DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Attachment Authority EO 13526 Chief Records DJclass Div WHS D te - APR 2 fi 20H a s - - ' -·70 en· R e g dn _stifled ' when se 1 ted from Olil111ifie fosure COORDINATION APPROVAL ACTION OFFICER LTC Kott PMD SAGA Ext 53705 NAME OFFICE- C SAGA BGen Strack DATE OF PREPARATION ' '• EXTENSION 59162 OFFICE NAME EXTENSION l - ---------------- -WORKING PA DER - THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON D C 20301 DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div was· Date APR 2 5 2011 i' viEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject -_ SCYLIA III-73 Quick Look U 1 SCYLLA III-73 _an inter gency politico-military simulation yra s_ conducted in the Pentagon facilities- of the Studies Analysis - and Gaming Agency from· 26 November tjlr ough 14 Dec ember 1 7 3 • SCYLLJ wa s designed to create and evaluate- nuclear options for use· in military conflicts short of- strategic engagement Foll_o_wing is a Quick Look · st unniary of the· simulation Distribution is limited· p'end ing further evaluation at which time · a more analytical summary will be forwarded to appropriate agencies 2 • es- Iziitial Scenario Worl d scene 1973 1976 de- picted detente further disintegration of NATO contracting us commitment· overseas· us · domestic problems and continuing Soviet expansion worldwide with-emphasis on strengthened inf iuence in Middle East Dawn of 1976 portrayed gathe'ring storm in the Middle· East Friction between Iraq and - Iran grows King Faisal assassinated and Saudi junta declares hostility' to the United States and Iran Soviets abet deteriorating scene by increasing aid to Iraq _ United States incre_ases aid to Iran In June 1976 Iraqi_s attempt to seize dispu ed territory from Kuwait by force Iran pledges support to Kuwait and invades· Iraq · As fall of Baghdad becomes imminent · USSR intervenes Soviet military elements join Iraq s as two · S oviet divisions cross USSR-Iranian border south of· Caucasus · us intervention considered vi tal to save Teheran _but insufficient conventional strength immediately available· · OS President directs options be pre pared for use of tactical nuclear weapons in Iran t • BECtASSln OH DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority EO 13526 Chief Records S l lv WHS Date Z LU fOP SEBREt 1 APR WORKING PAPER 3 Move I a Blue Team United States assessed world leadership in balance If USSR exploited opportunity Soviet primacy -- and control of Middle East -- would be assured To counter Moscow's move Blue selected strong military response lesser diplomatic actions to accomplish political objectives as opposed to stronger diplomatic weaker military actions which might not guarantee end of conflict Blue objectives were to terminate conflict at lowest level and preserve stability status quo in Middle East unilaterally if necessary _b_ut preferably with NATO Allies' support Military option selected was strike against Soviet ground forces and LOCs in Iran with 85 nucs authorized 47 air delivered 30 artillery and 8 ADMs Of these· eapons were expended Concomitant US alerts and DEFCON 1 ·ordered NATO allies Japan advised in advance of Blue plan USSR advised _on launch and informed strike was manifestation of US resolve intent to preserve Iran Blue assumed strikes· would cause serious international domestic concern USSR reaction would be surprise at us first use and indecision on US eadiness to escalate further _OSD J 3 b 't t - b • Red Team USSR response to US nuclear attack and resultant casualties was reasoned and deliberate Moscow understood us signals intentions Recognizing struggle was political -- contest for world supremacy -- Red reacted for maximum political gain using conventional military force Two-p ase course of action was 1 Pause in Iran continue worldwide mobilization and conduct intensive anti-US propaganda campaign 2 After 48 hours press attack against Iran including coordinated airborne groun seizure of Teheran Red rationale was to deceive United States with nonprovocative buildup then spring·politically decisive conven _ional move Hope was United States would sense victory during Red Phase I and not press attack Phase II would present fait accompli making us use of nuclear weapons difficult If United States did use nuclear weapons again USSR contingency was forceful nuclear response -- avoiding strategic exchange 4 Move II a USSR pause and conventional response to US nuclear strik assessed by Blue Team as successful reading of 2 WORKING PAPER DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority EO 13528 Chief Records Oeclasa Div WHS Date ·TOP SEBRrf APR 2 5 2011 -wl tN6 PAfER Soviet game plan Blue Team concluded Red Team decision not to respond with nuclear weapons was consistent with historical Russian backdown in face of unequivocal firmness Blue Team evaluated renewed Soviet conventional advance as confirmation of Moscow's determination to control Middle East oil and achieve superpower primacy as well as modest probe to test continued US resolve without risk of strategic -- and possibly further tactical - nuclear xchange Accordingly Blue determined to maintain pressure on Red and pre serve Iran by continued reliance on·tactical nuclear weapons Course of action selected directed use of 118 weapons against Soviet troops toes in Iran 72 air delivered _30 artillery 12 PERSHINGs arid 4 ADMs Of these all but one ADM were e ended TACAIR to contra an suppress air orne ·1anding near Tehera n c1nd replenished expended US Iranian resources Simultaneous political' actions informed Mosco of American determination intentions and elicited NATO world support for United States Contingency planning considered USSR tactical nuclear response and provided· for - OSD 3 3 b 't £r C b Red Team was dismayed by apparent failure of conventional attack to seize Teheran and extent of the US nuclear response The Team believed situation left USSR no face saving out or satisfactory option in battle area Consequently· _Red Team resolve to achieve· original objectives hardened Nu¢lear retaliation planned to indicate· to the United States that Washington's brinkmanship had brought USSR to limit of its options restraint Soviet strikes would be large but non-strategic and would place onus on the United States to initiate major escalation of war signify willingness to engage in possible strategic exchange Accordingly _USSR strucR fiv e us aircraft carrier task groups two in Med two in Pacific one in Gulf of Oman and naval and air facilities on Guam with nuclear weapons launched from LRA and SSBNs In Iran Soviet forces took up nuclear defensive positions to regroup and replace losses Iranian field forces were ·struck with nuclear weapons sufficient to inflict 40% casualties all Iranian jet capable airfields were incapacitated by nuclear strikes Turkey was issued ultimatum indicating future use of Turkish territory by US aggressor forces would generate attack on Turkish soil by USSR strategic 3 fflf- SEGRE 1 - ·DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13528 • Chief Records Dec lass Dav WHS Date APR 2 5 2011 -·· ··--•------------------------ TOP SEBREJ C --WORKING PAPER - rocket forces In addition PRC was warned that US Chinese interference would be dealt ·with harshly NATO allies were warned to deny facilities to US forces At the same time as an adjunct to worldwide politico-diplomatic-· overtures _Moscow· offered to join the United States in cessation of hostilities and opening of negotiations on disengagement and withdrawal of opposing forces in Iran Pending us reply Soviet forces ordered to refrain from further attacks and remain in a maximum state of rea iness 5 Move III a Blue Team reaction to Soviet strikes was dichotomous On the one hand _Blu believed that it· had met ·Soviet _ch llenge and recognized necessity to cease hostilities consequently - _Washington indicated to USSR- that it was prepared to negotiate On the 0th er hand _Blue concluded they could best maintain a bargaining chip during negotiations demonstrate resolve and· reestablish US USSR naval balance· by initiating mining blockade of selected international straits Soviet ports channels ·and passages and ordering conventional offensive attacks against USSR Warsaw Pact merchant mil-i tary shipping i_n interna tional wa ter s - · Blue Tea_m was reasonably certain that USSR would·· perceive military actions as deescalatory since attacks were conventional although military co rrananders were authorized to use nuclear weapons for self-defense against nuclear counterattack -· not on Soviet soil and limited to shipping In addition Kremlin wo uld realize that negotiations would only aff·ect their short-term goals in Middle East without jeopardizing long-term aims · On balance Blue believed that combined political-military action was required to end the war at once and stimulate negotiations in which· both sides would accept positions of relative parity Ih related attempt to bolster us position Blue Team took firm stand against NATO allies reiuctant to support the United States in conflic·t Allies advised that unless NATO-mobilized for own defense in deterring subsequent USSR aggression US forces earmarked fo r Europe· might be redeployed to areas more advantageous for US defense · b The Red Team in responding to Blue's · strikes concluded that the USSR had in effect · at this point achieved its objectives i e had no t lost face as a superpower in addition USSR- po sessing a portion of Iran had access 4 ffJfl SfCRET · 'DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13528 Chief Recordl Daclass Div WHS Date tf OP SEBREI -IOWIN PAPER · APR 2 5 2011 to the Persian Gulf through Iraq The latter would ulti mately lead to Soviet control of the Middle East Consequ ntly Moscow offered to cease fire and negotiate -with Iran _not the United S ates As incentive it began withdrawing troop from Northeastern Iran Meanwhile Soviet forces in Northwestern Iran secured consolidated occupied areas hich Moscow intended to retain und·er its tutelage Consonant with their desire to cease hostilities no offt nsive action was- taken against the United States nstead soviet shipping was ordered to the nearest ports military ships assumed defensive po_stures missile boats were deployed to areas likely to be mined blockaded and Soviet submarines made thei presence ·known near· us and allied merchant ships - Simultaneously the United States and ·its - Allies were advised of Moscow's actions and- warned that any further offensive attacks would cause renewed Soviet retaliation 6 Preliminary observations a Both teams 1 Ex cised judicious behavior to avoid general strat gic war t • 2 Determined not to relinqµish superpower influence p 1 e st lge 3 ' Recognized that the use of nuclear weapons · required them to· reassess the relationship between their political military objectives 4 Agreed to cease-fire egotia te when they thought they had won or at ·least· not lost 5 Accepted shifts in geographic location· and change in types of targets as we11· as an increase in numbers of weapons as valid courses of action 6 Considered strikes against-sea forces and Guam as distinct from strikes against the- homeland 7 Regarded tit-for-tat exchanges as not necessary to convey signals intentions 8 Anticipated little willingness on the part of NATO to become involved 5 WtlRKff S PAPER -- DECLASSIFIED IN FULL 1 Div WHS lDate ir o s li lass APR 2 5 20H -- ------------------- iOP SE8RE-f WORKING PAf R - - -- 9 Accepted use of nuclear weapons when recourse to conventional alternatives was either infeasible or had not succeeded previously 10 Were subject to some misassessment of the exact intentions and the meaning of overture of _the other· side 11 Were unable to precisely predict the options and response of their adversary within the relatively limited range of candidate courses of action 12 Developed and executed as required to achieve objectives 6 f OP SE6RET - hoc- nuclear options _______________ __ @ - cy · · j DISTRIBUTION R QU • T 1-l Ct a• EO F lOM SAGA 0 JCS -U_N_C- 0 i · 5 Xerox Cy SCYLLA III073 Quick Look- U 7 pgs _ _ COR ' f -0-0-0-c 'u ' N T ' 1 0 ' a N - - T -I' r -----------'---Tm r r _i'i ' 'iciN Tcc lo5iN T i'i oi t - N iu ii 1i11il • • l------- --s- - - - - _WH - NO f · s 2Jan74-- DO cgsJA D OE't lVE RY TIME D D D8D0 11D0 DATE •D 1300 1600 Q • • URGENT PRI ROU 0 SPECIAL SIGNATURE Qpr Mlt lTARY Sl CIIETAIIY UNt Y - INoicATE IN COLUMN BELOW BY AN X MARK WHICH ADDRESSEES ARE S ECIAL 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below - AM£ 2 ' A ' - oA---- i 1 1 '- rt fk -- • • s aha II• al1n and f 111 in the information requl red 04TE · 1 i f in format l_on HCf ltfO 1 4 4 f 1 EMAl k$ ln-tlulo RtUASU · I ·-✓ 7 I •cu•••t• '••flJ - A O l -Jl t T •II •f ½h t- r2 y e tl••• ea4 - ¾ J 7 r f - b1·_ 4·- J 5 6 7 - - ' 8 9 I 10 11 12 13 l• 1 16 ·- 17 141 19 20 SO FCRM I g 1J JAH s PREVIOUS EDITIONS o THIS FORM AR OBSOLETE ccesbee re 'TOP -SECRET-INFORMATION COVER SHEET reeoxed t • le fess Ir 1-d M- ' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ r - A _ r _ • _ · ' 3B 1 · Ji_ _- 1 _ _·XL r- Jr f · ' 1Sf Tf 11 E -n _ ' __ __ _ t_r_1__r__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ nat 2CC _ __ I i ' I i · ' D Li rico-t i l LI -r AR' Sl v ULATION 4 i Ii__ i - I· I L l l J' ' FINAL REPOR'I1T - ' l ' ' Ii 'l' • 1-- • -- · - I • ·---··· i I STU DIES ANALYSIS AND GAMING AGENCY Of GANIZATION OF THE JOiNT CHIEFS OF STAFF VASHINGTON D C 20301 COPYJLOF 75 COPIES - _ __ I ' ·- F - --TOP 5EC ET-SE1i•e u'1 rre • • -· - ' _ J • ____ _ _ __ _ •• ' '·· on -- J _ __ -- ·' - a - - - _ - ' f _' ' t r-r -' r rn • - J 'rf Yf ¥ 'J -n i ' ' 't' 7'4 zl ' e7 t -i e - -- -- %f c - · g' -- ' ' #o 1' ' - - - 7 ' - - -- - J - Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief RDD WHS IAW EO 13526 Section 3 5 Date APR 2 5 2011 SECURITY ' ALTHOUGH THE TITLE SCYLLA III- 73 PIED ALL OTHER ASPECTS' OF THE' SI'rY CLASSIFIED IS UNCLASSI- sr fujfi Jt1i •ii · i i c E §· - - - SUCH CLASSIFICATION IS REQUIRED SINCE ' ' '' ·1 r • · · - ·· · ' ' UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT NATIONAL _ •- I •• •' SECURITY PLANNING OR POSSIBLY WEAKEN THE INTERNATIONAL - - ' - POSITION oi THE UNITED · •• ' • • 1 · ' ' f 'f j 1 i · 0 ·J ' ··' t - -' STATES ADDITI ONALLY' ···A'LL ' · ·· ' - _· • -- _ ·- I ·- POLITICO-MILITARY SIMULATIONS ARE CONDUCTED UNDER A· POLICY OF STRIC'l' NON-ATTRIBUTION ·• j - ' ' - i f ti i - · - i 1f_t _ _' i• ' ·' ' 6 • ' - · • ' •• ··- • t •• ol • 1°f 't4•· - 1' ••• - - 0 ·· -'•' ' 4 · · e ftl41i1tMit tlf§• IWMfit rt NYtt£ £4 k fN¥-4H'W N·¥#- iWli1 @Mt¥-½k¥%· t t ·1w'·'£%'i'iWiffiMiti ffl t-t-i t c -i _ · g f' l'§OO½fN im1it U SII _ -v s _ X • c J Ul '11 F' - r - -· t a bt-'Z 4 Wl i- --- -r ❖ r· - - - '11 c '·r- '1 Z r aj Y '·•--·#l7 j w··L -'7' Tft'1-J -- -·-l Ol t · 'w- 7 rfi -cQ _ 'POP aeeftE'f SEHS I'PITIS DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 1352 · Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date APR 2 5 2011 POLITICO-MILITARY sn ULATION SCYLLA III-73 26 NOVEMBER - 14 DECEMBER 1973 FINAL REPORT Prepared By POLITICO-MILITARY DIVISION STUDIES ANALYSIS AND GAMING AGENCY ORGANIZATION OP THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON o· C 20'301 'fl P- SBCRD'P S E lS I4'ITlS EXORDIUM DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date APR 2 5 20 1 The Politico-Military Division of the- Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency OJCS prepares develops and conducts manual simulations-which seek to identify future climaterics in na ion l security policy 'Accoidingly each exercise is created from an individualized set of circumstances designed to address specific issues normally projected at a poiht in the foreseeable future SCYLLA III 73 the third of a series of exercises re la ting_ to nuclear weapon strategy an_d mployinent was conLlucted in the Pentagon from 26 Novemb_e r to 14 December- 1973 Preparations for SCYLLA III-73 were directed by Brigadier Gen·eral Harold A Strack USAF Chief Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency OJCS and supervised by Colonel Donald M Marks USAF Chief Politico-Military Division SAGA _ This ' olume Final- Relort is thE r_ s·econd · of· t o volumes documenting SCYLLA III_-7 · and contains an Analysis and a summary of the· material contained-in the first volume It is compiled for the purpose of enabling readers to grasp quickly and easily the overa l impact of the simulation Volume One Simulation Documentation contains the Initial Scenario -Team Messages Scenario Projections prepared-by the Control Group and an edited transcript of the final Critique meeting A strict policy of non-attribution applies to all participants' remarks and comments 'thus guaranteeing an environment conducive to greater candor in discussing and solving crucial problems The material in this document does not necessarily repres nt the views of the Joirit Chiefs of Staff the Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency or any other Government agency ii SBCR£4' • Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief RDD WHS IAW EO 13526 Section 3 5 Date APR 2 5 20t 1 UNCLASSIFIED TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE NO 'l'I TLE PAGE •• i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS i i i INTRODUCTION Al SUMMARY •• Bl ANALYSIS •••• Cl CONCLUSIONS •• Dl PARTICIPANTS El Fl DISTRIBUTION • Gl EXORDIUM •• MAPS • •••••••• iii B10 c4 D2 E4 F3 UNCLASSIFIED •· - Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief RDD WHS IAW EO 13526 Section 3 5 Date · APR 2 5 2011 ' - - -- ' ' - _ _ _--c0 r r - - -' ' '1' 1 rr i r ·r · - - ¥ o- ' ' ' ' t 'ws- r m™1 · ' w - r gc-0- 1ii3•r r'7' m es ·M-z '• rt 3z TtiS t'i J'i-6P F- ir--- x-a - i i G'ti9'P'2'Ji e DECLASSIFIED IN FULL -SECRET Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date APR 2 5 2011 INTRODUCTION SCYLLA III-73 military factors States decisions appropriate to a was designed to explore major politicoand risks likely to influence Uni te_d for execution of nuclear attack options Middle Eastern environment The participants were organized into a us Blue Team USSR Red Team and a Control Group The Blue Team represented the National Command Authorities of the United States the Red Team representE d the National Command Authorities of the USSR and the Control Group represented all other n tions international organizations and other influencing factors • Each team meeting in sequence considered an initial scenario ·and two scenario projections Once the Blue Team had met and made its decision on a course of action the Control Group considered add tiona-1 influencing faqtors and prepared -b ief icenario projection for the Red Team depicting_ the Blue Team's actions and their consequences After this the Red Team met to evaluate the crisis in light of Blue Team's actions and to decide their own courses of action Following both team meetings Control Group prepared a new scenario projection for the Blue Team to begin the next move of the simulation This cycle repeated itself for each succeeding move At the end of three moves a Critique was held during which the decisions and rationale of each team were discussed and general conclusions were summarized A$ a starting point the scenario portrayed a situation which required the use of nuclear weapons This was done to stimulate thinking on option development for a nuclear confrontation Once the simulation began no effort was made to engineer nuclear warfare -- simulation play was allowed to progress in accord with team desires Al -t Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief ROD WHS IAW EO 13526 Section 3 5 Date APR 2 5 2011 DECLASSIFIED IN FULL - A·uthority EO 13526 Chief Rec rds Declass Div WHS Date APR 2 5 2011 · · SCYLLA III -73 SUMt fARY THE' INITIAL SCENARIO _ In the· Spring of 1976 --aithough _det nte prevailed throughout the world certain dist Jrbing signs were evident The NATO Alliance was suffering from transitional pains and the adverse influence·· of growing European antagonism toward the· Uni-ted States _ us troop· strength in Europe had been cut by 20 000 with rriore cuts _i mm inc nt _and the American armed forces ·reduced to 2 1 million • · US leaders had become iricreasing-ly- preoccupied with•·domestio is ues At the same time a·weakening Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe led i-toscow to take a harder_ line with its Pact neighbors Tlle USSR _continued to strengthen- its-military -forcesand political· influence worldwide particularly in the -fiddle East · · An interim settlE _IDent betweeri Egypt and Israel in 1974 and subsequent Arab-ts r aeli negotiations offered hope for genuine peace but Arab radical ism and anti-Zioni-sm remained as rea istic · threats The next s·ig-n · of a move toward a final settlement was expected with the scheduled reopening of the Suez Canal in the Winter of 1976 · · King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was assassinated in March 1976 and a military government with Arab nationalist leanings was established Fearing· instability in the Middle East and disruption of vital energy resources the us military presence in Turkey was increased • A carrier task force was deployed ori a good will cruise of the Persian Gulf· Simultaneously Soviet forces in the Caucasus north of Iran were augmented and additional advisory personnel were ordered to Iraq In June 1976 Iraq invaded Kuwait In response the Shah of Iran launched an attack into Iraq Four days later six Soviet divisions thrust across the northwestern border of Iran The Shah's armies pressed on two fronts fell back Bl 1 ·· ··•· f 1 z zq 4 - tir' ' tt Z lJ ' ffi #¢$ j t t ' ' 1 r mr 1 i7 ' JJ¼ UWJ•' 2 't®tfiW lt i ·j • X t o ' ' J· •·• • ·•'' ' 2' fw tm t • C J E ®tl• ' TciA _• · 1 3' 2 il ' 1 4 z 1 •' f' f ' 1 - o 'r ' ½ 't _ _ · ' t _t ' t' µ i z- n ct ' • i Hr -ta » r· t-'t 1 r ' fmt - ' DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Qeclass Div WHS Date · APR 2 5 2011 Appalled by the probable co equences of an Iranian defeat the President considered us'intervention vital However since the United States did not have sufficient conventional strength immediately available the President directed his advisors to provide him with options for the use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East crisis MOVE I Blue Team Actions The Blue Team saw the Soviet invasion of Iran as a two-pronged threat to US interests First as a move by the Soviet Union to exercise its traditional goal of dominance over the· Middle East and its oil supplies · Second as a threat to the US worldwide position The team made a key political judgment that Soviet forces had to be evicted from Iran prior to any negotiations The team· reasoned that if the US had simply called for an in place cease-fire subsequent negotiations would not be successful in evicting Soviet forces The United States would have been shown impotent in not being able to prevent a fait accompli · As US forces were placed in a OEFCON 1 posture NATO members were urged to initiate parallel actions Japan and the PRC were informed of US intentions Warsaw Pact members were asked to intercede with the Soviet Union Moscow itself received a stern warning that the US was prepared to repel the invasion of Iran The us military response was designed to force the Soviets to pause long enough to seriously consider whether they were ready to pay a higher price for their ambitions Blue decided to strike Soviet ground f o r c aOCs e s w in Iran with 85 tactical nuclear weapons in the range 47 air delivered 30 artillery and 8 ADMs o t ese 54 weapons were expended Collateral damage constraints aircraft losses and in the case of artillery and ADMs target acquisition and troop movements precluded expenditure of the remaining assets OSD 3 3 b '« The team attempted to dernonstra te US restraint by limiting the use of nuclear weapons to Iranian territory but B2 4'0P SECR B'f DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief _Records Declass Div WHS Date APR 2 5 2011 fOP SDCR-il'f it was prepared to consider expansion to other areas of the world including the USSR itself- if that became necessary to protect· US interests The nuclear options list d below were rej cted as being either purely psychological not contributing to the immediate obj'ective of repelling the Soviet in vasion of Iran or as too escalatory 1 Demonstration no target over the· Caspian orBlack Seas or within Iran 2 Strike qn Iraqi forces • 3 S_trike on soviet· naval- units in the Persian Gulf the USSR· south of 4 Strike on Soviet LOCS within the Caucasus S Strike on Soviet military targets within the USSR south of the Caucasus · · · · · 6 Strike on- POL refineries in the USSR - at Baku • Red Team Actions The Red Team was surprised by the magnitude of the initial United States response to the Soviet invasion of tran • The team felt - thinking as soviets that the United States had used nuclear weapons in a rather heavy handed rnanner·and had left the Soviet Union few options for response It decided on a conventional attack endeavoring to play to Soviet strength and against an American weakness --the lack of US conventional forces in the area A twophase operation was ordered- The intention was·to conduct a massive antJ -US propaganda campaign while reconstituting Soviet forces deceiving the United States with a non-provocative buildup and the abs ence of political re ponses to its messages and then 1 aunch·a quick decisive conventional attack against Iran Hope was that during the force buildup world opinion would denounce the us use of nuclear weapons and thereby · restrain any future US nuclear response If the United States did employ nuclear weapons again the USSR contingency was to be a forceful nuclear reply--yet one short of an all-out nuclear war BJ - 'feP SECRB'f DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date APR 2 5 2011 The options listed below were rejected as not militarily necessary Moreover the team reasoned that the Soviet rejection of a nuclear response would be viewed favorably in the world and would place the onus on the United States for any further nuclear strikes l Nuclear strikes on Iranian airfields 2· Nuclear strikes on us carrier task groups 3 Conventional attacks on us carrier task groups 4 Spread _of hostilities to other countries FIRST SCENARIO PROJEX TION The US nuclear strikes resulted in losses of 35 to 45percent of the--Soviet's two- lead divisions in northwestern Iran slight ca ualties in the o accompanying divisions and light damage to the LOCs Despite differences in the degree of concern and the lack of any positive commitments Free World reaction tended to coalesce behind us leadership On the domestic scene most· of the citizenry including congressional and government leaders gave measured approval to the apparently succes ful nuclear ploy As- time continued to pass without a Soviet nuclear response the world began to breathe a bit easier However the· So viet's explicit failure to respond to US demands resulted in a sense of fo_reboding among Iranian leaders and high officials in Washington In addition to indications that Soviet divisions in Iran were being reconstituted and that the Soviets had positioned additional long-range aircraf·t south of the Caucasus US intelligence reports revealed the marshaling of a Soviet Airborne Division along with extensive force build ups in the Caucasus Military Districts Other reports revealed the loading of military equipment at B4 · - - · · ff¾iiif ' M'- 'Jt t· t ·-'4• - ' Y ft#i 1iffi@ ffe¥ ®t ui %' ·t · t4 0 4Af#·i t' 0 iikih'ttlie'5d f ih #·· %@# ee 7N·7 --- 'L'g 0 - ✓ p _• r i «' c - c 71 $ ' t ci' ' i _1' ' '7t't ' · · ·J'57· - ftl wq i - - PW¥Wt @ ht a · _- '7 c $ t - - @ JrB'f'a' - e- -tp g g wtl i '•ii f''· • t 'fiiW il l¼'1ai-t W'·•ry f ' '· e t r I DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Dec lass Div WHS Date APR 2 5 2011 Soviet Black Sea ports and the mobilization of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe These preparations were but the prelude to the massive Soviet non-nuclear attack which was launched against Iran in the early morning hours or 28 June Four of the six soviet divisions in northwestern Iran proceeded with thei attack penetrating south from Zanjan and from Rasht along the Caspian sea coast on the· main routes to Teheran to link up with the airborne division which had launched an assault on the Teheran International Airport In addition two divisions invaded Iran along the northeastern border MOVE I I Blue Team Actions The Blue Team was surprised that the initial Soviet response was- conventional • They assessed it as a partial back down in the face of· us· resolve The team cone luded however that Mos cow still was determined to gain control of Middle East oil and to achieve superpower primacy without risking all-out nuclear war Accordingly Blue decided to increase its- previous political overtu res and maintain its nuclear pressure on R l In addition to urging NATO to declare a Reinforced Alert the Blue Team sought Turkish cooperation in closing the Bosporous and staging the 82nd Airborne Division • However under the pressure of Soviet counter-ultimatums Turkey agreed only to covert emplacement of ADMs along the Turko-Soviet border A high-level US politico-military delegation opened special talks with Chinese leaders in Peking The United States hoped that this ploy would make the USSR nervous about the Chinese threat and prevent any redeployment of soviet forces from the Sino-Soviet border On the military side the Blue Team redoubled· its nuclear fires One hundred and eighteen weapons 72 _air delivered 30 artillery 12 Pershings 4 ADMs were launched against Soviet troop ·and lines of communication in Irarir all but one of these were expended on target As a reminder to- BS -q 'O p -£ B CRE T DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Dec lass Div WHS Date APR 2 5 2011 the Soviets of the importance of the oil resources issue an SR-71 reconnaissance mission was successfully flown over· the Baku oil complex The options listed below ·w·ere rejected as not rnili tarily necessary too escalatory and in the case of those involving NATO and the PRC politically difficult to accomplish 1 us nuclear strikes conducted from Turkish bases 2 Nuclear response by the Turks under NATO auspices 3 Closing the Bosporus by military action 4 Reques ting the Peoples Republic of China to take military actions against the USSR 5 Nuclear strikes on Soviet airfields and oil fields in the Caucasus ' · Red Team Actions The second use of- nuclear we pons by the United St ates caused the Red Team to reassess the situation It concluded that continued conventional action appeared futile us actions had left the Soviets no facesaving option in _Iran and had forced them to the limits of_ · their restraint · The Red Team elected to use nuclear weapons in worldwide integrated but non strategic strikes This response would place the onus on the United States to escalate or to accept a cease-fire Accordingly using approximately 200 nuclear weapons the USSR struck··Iraniari air and ground units five u aircraft carrier task groups two in the Mediterranean two in the Pacific one in the Gulf of Oman and US facilities on Guam The Red Team recognized that there was risk involved in striking Guam but believed the American people would not view such a strike as an attack on the US homeland In addition to the psychological impact on the us leaders the Red Team saw the strike on Guam as important to the Soviets vis-a-vis the PRC The Red Team was concerned about poss ible- Chinese moves against the Soviet maritime provinces inspired by the US politico-military mission to Peking Thus the-strike on Guam was also seen B6 c w G AiM 1 ·· u v - - t'Wt5% 4 iidMfiii if''° · 'crrfE' U tft'f t J ii' f'7 f3 - ™ ry i 'tp - 1 tf t fi ' t i µr_ - c y w» -if -' ff'r rm np-m- r t t' M n 0 '·y r ' 'tfJit r- 7 -- a- DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHs· Date APR 2 5 2011 as a straightforward prudent military Jlove to minimize the US capab lity t support any Chinese ·action with Guambased us nuclear assets - - -_ In concert with their strikes · the- Soviets issued a second waming to the PRC· not to i nterfere- similar warning to NATO -and a second 1 1itiinatum to Turkey to deny the United states- the use of Turkish- bases_ or suffer the ·- c nsequences- _ · Following the nuclear strikes hostilities· and· open negotiations opp_os ing·_ forces in_ Iran _Pending refrained t rom further action but maximum- readiness- the USSR offered to cease on the•wi_thdrawal of· - · a µs· r ply- Soviet for¢es remained· in a state of The options listed below were rejectecl -as they no · ranger offered a viable inili-tary solution were- too risky · or in the- case of Rota Holy Loch and -Turkey were not consistent with the soviet des-ire to· weaken support for the United States _ l Continued non- nuclear operations· - • 2 A cc nveritional attack· on Rota Spain and Holy Loch · Scotland · j A nuclear- strike on the US nuclear capabili ies in Turkey 4 An attack on Israel by Egypt Syria 5 Reinforcement of the soviet Airborne Division in Teheran with an additional airborne division 6 A preemptive nuclear strike on China SECOND SCENARIO PROJECTION The United States met the renewed Soviet ·conventional attack of 28 June w'ith intensified nuclear strikes oh B7 -TOP SEiCRE'f DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date APR 2 5 2011 Soviet combat forces The first nuclear wave delivered air artillery missiles and ADMs was directed at the penetrating ground forces in the northeastern and northwestern sectors The strikes produced an estimated 18 000 Soviet casualties as well as an estimated 30 000 casualties among Iranian civilians by The Soviet counter-blow which fell by mid-day 28 June destroyed the bulk of the Iranian Air Force and the country's jet capable airfields and left the Iranian ground forces ina state of d sarray Casualties among Iranian civilians climbed to an estimated 500 000 Of the five us carrier task groups struck in· the Pacific eastern Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea three were seriously damaged and _two lightly damaged Two nuclear detonations-of- one megaton-each destroyed Anderson AFB and Apra Harbor Naval acilities at Guam A substantial reduction in the naval SIOP assets of the us resulted and thousands· of American lives were lost MOVE III Blue Team Actions· ·The Blue Team had anticipated a Soviet nuclear retaliation but had not foreseen the character of that response It was concerned about the altered naval balance resulting from the Soviet strikes on the carriers and was appalled by the strike on Guam The team recognized the necessity for negotiations to deesca-late and regain control of_ the situation It concluded that the United States could best maintain a bargaining chip during negotiations and reestablish US naval prominence by mining apd blockading selected international straits Soviet ports and channels and by ordering conventional offensive attacks against USSR Warsaw Pact merchant military shipping in international waters The Blue Team was reasonably certain that the USSR would perceive these actions as deescalatory since the naval attacks were to be conventional· and would not impinge upon Soviet soil BS Te-P SSCRE'P _ r4l0-P SECRE-41 DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date APR 2 5 2011 In a related attempt to bolster the US position the team took a firm stand with NATO Allies who had been reluctant to support the United States They were advised that unless NATO mobilized for its own defense in deterring subsequent USSR aggression US forces earmarked for Europe might be redeployed to areas more advantageous for US defense The options listed below were rejected because they would leave the United States in a very weak position for follow-on negotiations US capabilities to accomplish them were severely limited or they were too escalatory 1 Acceding to the Soviet offer for the immediate cessation of all hostile acts and the opening of negotiations 2 Conventional attacks against Soviet bases in the Middle East and Soviet· naval forces in Middle East ports 3 Nuclear strikes against 4 Nuclear military targets Soviet airfields- 5 Nuclear targets in USSR and other OSD 3 3 b S OSD 3 3 b r 6 Nuclear strikes on Soviet bases in the Warsaw Pact nations 7 Comprehensive nuclear strikes against Soviet strategic targets wherever located Red Team Actions The Red Team interpreted the American conventional naval response to the Soviet nuclear strikes as the first real evidence of US willingness to negotiate in a conciliatory fashion The team felt that the United States had presented the Soviets with an excellent opportunity while the United States itself was· left in a somewhat vulnerable position Soviet superpower status was undiminished and access to the Persian Gulf had now been assured through Iraq via the captured Iranian territory 89 TOP S SCRE'P DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 1352 · _ _ Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date APR 2 5 2011 Consequently the USSR offered to cease fire and to negotiate with Iran but· not with t_he United States By spurning negoti'ations with the United States the USSR expected to reduce the level of US participation and · influence in the al 'ea and perhaps establish a puppet government- in the occupied _Iranian territory The Soviet -thu proceeded to consolidate their positions in northwestern Iran At the same time as a sign of their willingness to negotiate they began withdrawing forces from nQrtheastern· Iran Soviet shipping was ordered to· the nearest ports- a·nd naval combata_nts assumed a defensive- posture -Missile ·boats were deployed to areas likely to be mined or blockaded and submarine a' made their presence known near US and Allied merchant ships _In concert with these m litary actions Moscow warned· 'the United States and its Allies_ that further offensive military actions would only lead to renewed Soviet retaliation • The options· listed below were rejected because they would result in a renewed escalation or prolongation of the conflict · 1 Renewed offensive in Iran 2 Immediate prosecution of a war at sea 3 -Use of nuclear weapons on US merchant ships _ 4 Immediate conventional attacks on us merchant ships B10 -4'GP SECRET ' Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief RDD WHS IAW EO 13526 Section 3 5 Date APR 2 5 2011 z - - V' V' ANALYSIS DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date APR· 2 5 2011 Motivations During the course of the simulation both teams operated on the basis that a nuclear exchange between the homelands of the United States and the Soviet Union was to be avoided Neither team however was unanimou·s just where such a threshold ·resides Some members of the Blue Team believed that nuclear attacks on Soviet forces on foreign soil such as in Iran · would be close to the threshold· however others expressed the opinion that attacks on selected targets in the Soviet homeland would not necessarily trigger an· allout nuclear exchange between the superpowers Some members of the Red Team supported this latter _view during team discu sions -- but it was never put to test during the simulation Throughout SCYLLA III the Red Team regarded the Soviet homeland as inviolate that is a US attack on the USSR itself would in all likelihood ·trigger a m·assive· nuclear strike against the United States · Several exceptions to · the policy- were expressed as con_tingency actions but it·· is questionable whether the team would have adopted them had th moment of truth arrived Considerations The Red Team did consider a nuclear attack on such forward us bases as Guam as lying below the all-out war threshold The team correctly reasoned that the United States would accept such an attack since it did not strike the US homeland thus the United States would desist from further nuclear escalation Although the Red Team was not in full agreement on the consequences of such an attack this action does underscore the susceptibility of the US forward-basing system to nuclear blackmail These differing opinions among both Blue and Red Team members emphasize· that those conditions for crossing the threshold of a homeland nuclear exchange are likely to change repeatedly as a crisis develops -- and will be C-1 rn ECRET DECLASSIFIED IN FULL -SECM 'i' • Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date APR 2 5 2011 highly dependent upon continuing assessments made by both sides as td their interests objectives and fortune Although both teams perceived only a remote possibility of a homela ld nuclear exchange resulting from actions in Iran they did recognize the risk Accordingly both studiously attempted to signal the limited nature and· intent of their actions The Blue Team recognized that in Iran it was operating from a weaker position than that held by the USSR Consequently it was vital that the United States obtain support for its action from NATO and the PRC - A mobilized NATO would have created a threat to the Soviets from Western Europe thus giving them cause to pause and reconsider their actions in· Iran The same situation held true in the Far East The United States· needed Chines •• support to give the Soviets concern over possible PRC mili tary actions along the Sino Soviet border us efforts to mobilize NATO fell on deaf ears -- a point not overloo ked by_ the Kreml i n • The Soviets accen uated the US_ NATO rift by avoiding any acts which would have furthere d NATO involvement -or co_alescence As a result the Red Team had little fear of coordinated NATO intervention The us courtship of the Chinese had a far more t lling ef feet than its efforts with NATO The Soviets were genuinely·concerned with PRC intervention and accordingly planned the nuclear strikes on the carrier task forces in the Pacific and on Guam in part as a warning to the Chinese not to become involved Implications of such an action are of obvious concern to us· policymakers The Red Team believed that the Soviet Union's offer to guarantee a continued flow of oil to its friends in West Europe would further erode any support for the United States In actuality the offer had been made as a simple propaganda ploy The Blue Team interpreted this guarantee as a prelude to Soviet seizure of Middle Eastern oil The team reasoned that the Soviet Union couldn't live up to this promise without such a seizure In fact the Blue Team used this threat in its propaganda and political messages to garner-support for the US position Thus the Red propaganqa ploy backfired c-2 DECLASSIFIED IN FULL SECrtET Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date APR 2 5 2011 From the outset the Blue Team recognized the need to retain use of US bases in Turkey without antagonizing the Soviets Therefore the team elected not to launch strikes against soviet forces from these bases but rather to use them for staging flights through forward bases inside Iran G nerally the Red Team would have preferred- to keep Turkey out of the conflict believing it more advantageous to Soviet long-term goals in the Middle East But the team was not willing to allow the United States a sanctuary Thus after the second US nuclear strike on Soviet forces in Iran the Red Team chose to warn Turkey that any future use of Turkish territory or facilities by us military forces would result in an immediate Soviet nuclear response Originating attacks solely from Iranian soil also played a role in Blue Team's use of carrier-based aircraft The team felt that the staging of such aircraft through Iranian air bases might minimize the probability of Soviet retaltation against the carrier The team recognized however that the simple physical presence of the carrier made it a prime target regardless of aircraft use The team also recognized that carrier aircraft were the most immediately available nuclear asset their use eliminated the need and potentially difficult political problem of redeploying ground-bas ed assets from West Europe From the onset of the simulation it was evident that both teams considered the crisis as primarily a political duel rather than a specific military engagement in Iran Operating with this view both teams were able to add other_ widely dispersed geographic locations to the military arena and vary the quantities and types of weaponry used without initiating a homeland nuclear exchange Observations As the simulation ended the Red Team believed that Soviet object ives of superpower primacy and control of the Mic ldle East had been partially obtained while US prestige as a world superpower had been damaged and her inflllence in the Middle East diminished C-3 s eeRE'f Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief ROD WHS IAW EO 13526 Section 3 5 Date APR 2 5 2011 ' 0 z ' r- e V 0 z V 'FQ F S ECFUJ'f DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority eo 13526 Chief Records Oeclass Div WHS CONCLUSIONS Dale APR 2 5 2011 The following conclusions are based on the participants' actions during SCYLLA III With due allowance for the artificialitie nherent_ in any· politico-military simulation they _may be considered as- valid swnmary statements of the s i muia_tion' s · insights _into lim j e4 nuclear options - - - - - 5 ' It ·w ifl' be andatory that political messages accompany the use of nuclear weapons Such messages will need to emphasize both _determination and restraint sufficient OSD 3 3 b r determination to deter further escalation and sufficient restraint to conv y a willingness to terminate hostilities 6 Selectivity in the application of forces i e geographic or _political area limitations size intensity and the relationship of destruction to military objectives appears to be the best method of providing the necessary signals 7 Assessments of an opponent's interesta objectives and intentions and his likely interpretation of· those of the United States will be of major importance in designing 3ppropriate US nuclear options Dl OOP-SECRE t •· t • 1 · i · ' • i f 1f • • - - - - A U ' i J ' X t ' f t S - i • - - ' l i r • 1' J • t _ ' Nt · 1 ' 4' SECRE'P DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date APR 2 5 2011 8 Forward-bases to include sea forces in international waters and territories such as Guam may not be construed as the US or USSR homeland and strikes on them may not trigger a strategic nuclear exchange They however may represent the upper limit or threshold at which an opponent must choose to a initiate strategic war b put his opponent in a similar position c deescalate or d capitulate 9 Within the range of force applications which might be available an opponent's responses to nuclear attack cannot be predicated with confidence 10 Predetermined nuclear options for use in a conflict area of conflict may provf _-inappropriate 11 The need-for ·restraint imposed by the mutual assured destruction capability possessed by the USSR and the us requires that the bargaining process aspects of conflict resolution receive greater attention in peacetime defense planning D2 - Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief RDD WHS IAW EO 13526 Section 3 5 Date APR 2 5 2011 DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority EO 13526 Chief Recoros Oeclass Div WHS PARTICIPANTS APR 2 5 2011 Date CONFERENCE DIRECTOR J-5 Rear Admiral Shannon D Cramer Jr USN TEAM CAPTAINS ' ' Mr Leon Sloss State Major General Samuel V Wilson USA DIA BLUE TEAM MEMBERS I US Navy Captain Jay E Arnold USN Major General Les lie w Bray Jr USAF Ret'd Preparedness DIA - OSD 3 3 b 1 Dr Eugene c LaVier DNA Colonel t illiam R Maloney USMC USMC Rear Admiral Robert F Schoultz USN US Navy Mr Richard E Shearer Defense Brigadier General John A Smith Jr USA US Army oso 3 3 b • CIA Colonel° Daniel 0 Walsh USAF USAF BLUE TEAM STAFF Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey c Brown Jr USAF J-3 Colonel Philip R Drennon USAF J-3 Colonel Robert E Edge USAF J-5 El U lCLA3SIFiiD 4 fiwtt@ ¥ - · •· - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ '1k _ -- •-• - v ' '1 a s -'Mi i l 's• eS ' ' l r 7 ii li il cc t1 c l ' ' ' '•LJ lc il s t• c tl e j _ I DECLASSIFIED IN PART Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS NJ LAS 3 U' ff Date APR 2 5 2011 Colonel Thomas C Fleury USA J-5 Colonel Maurice R Lee USAF J-4 Lieutenant Colonel Bradley s Snell USMC J-4 RED TEAM MEMBERS Lieutenant Colonel B Conn Anderson USAF State Lieutenant Colonel Arthur E Dewey USA US Army Mr oso 3 3 b Captain Wallace A Greene USN Major General George Captain Carl c c Loving Jr USAF Neidlinger USN Mr Frank H Perez DIA USAF DNA State Colonel Boris Pogoloff USA Brigadi r General Jasper A Welch Jr USAF Mr NSA OSD 3 3 b US Army Defense CIA CONTROL TEAM MEMBERS Dr Benson Adams State Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J Cody USAF 1r OSD 3 3 b 1 r James P Morris NSA Defense Major Louis T Nappi USMC SAGA Colonel Ronald A Roberge USA SAGA Lieutenant Colonel Erich E Schuler USAF E2 J-5 SAGA UNCb-1 SS I i'IiG- · · - · m _ •-'- - _ ' i'l '1' 1' l • p r s 7 2 • ''''M' · • Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief ROD WHS IAW EO 13526 Section 3 5 Date APR 2 5 2011 UNCLASSIFIED SIMULATION STAFF ORGANIZATION Politico-Military Division SAGA Colonel Donald M Marks U AF Colonel Arthur c Winn USA Division Chief Project Officer Lieut nant Colonel Vernon B Sones USA Project Staff Representative Blue Team Lieutenant Colonel Theodore E Mathison USA Project Staff Representative Red Team Lieutenant Colonel Joel J Snyder USAF Project Staff Representative Control Scenarist Lieutenant Colonel Richard F - Kott USAF Conference Manager Lieutenant Colonel Johns McK riney USAF Assistant Conference Manager ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF Technical Sergeant Carl R Baumgardner USAF NCOIC Administrative Support Staff Sergeant Gregory A Knowles USAF Intelligence Specialist Staff Sergeant Victor A Manning USAF Intelligence Specialist Staff Sergeant Michael D Hall USAF Administrative Support Staff Sergeant Lawrence R Jackson USAF Administrative Support iss Luz M Acosta Secretarial Staff Mrs Connie H Hayes Secretarial Staff E3 UNCLASSIFIED r ·· ' ' ' '· •'- - e ' € ' - •§ $• ' ' ® r t i z z H •fo• - •· I UNCLASSIFIED Mrs Betty L Nunley Secretarial Staff iss Sarah G Ruppert Secretarial Staff Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief ROD WHS IAW EO 13526 Section 3 5 Date APR 2 5 2011 E4 UNCLASSIFIED - - v Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief RDD WHS IAW EO 13526 Section 3 5 Date APR 2 5 2011 ridWiiiiiW i¥¥M UNCLASSIFIED Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief RDD WHS IAW EO 13526 Section 3 5' Date APR 2 5 2011 IOUNDARY REll'N EIINTATJON II NOT f'CECESIAAII Y AUTHOftlTATIYI U 60 I s· S R Caspian Sea Iran -Railtoad ---Road 50 O 50 100 UO_M let 100 150 ilomet - 511111 4' Ar•Dla 9ase 501297 3-73 Fl UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief RDD WHS IAW EO 13526 Section 3 5 Date APR 2 5 2011 Arabian Sea ••• I ' i il--- _ __ q ___ s90 Miles• s6o Kflom1t1rs i · · ·- 'lt Fi lndlaf Ocear Jq _1 1- F2 UNCLASSIFI D C 0 - C - - · ' L'• · _ ·_ - ' - c V 'I Page determined to be Unclasslfled · Reviewed Chief RDD WHSIAW EO 13526 Section 3 5 Date APR 2 5 2011 - Page determined to be Unclasslflad Reviewed Chief ROD WHS IAW EO 13526 Section 3 5 Date APR 2 5 2011 UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION Department of State 4 Department of Defense 4 Central Intelligence Agency 4 National Security Agency 3 Defense Intelligence Agency 3 Defense Nuclear Agency 3 Chief of·Staff US Army 4 Chief of Naval Operations 3 Chief of Staff US Air Force 3 Commandant of the Marine Corps 3 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Assistant to the- Chairman JCS l Director Joint Staff 1 Secretary of the Joint Staff l Director J-3 5 Director J-4 3 Director J-5 5 Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency 1 General Purpose Forces Division SAGA l Strategic Forces Division SAGA l Technical Support Division SAGA l Gl UNCLASSIFIED DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records Declass Div WHS Date APR 2 5 20 11 I -f l J tl 1-- -- f tt - r lij ¥ tJiiJtD1 · h1· ' · 1 -- S SCRE 1----------------------- ----- ---- ---- ------------------- - ----t 1l · SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROUTING SLIP ADV ACT INFO COPY COPY TO TO TO TO ri1--- -------------------i------1---i----1-------------------t---t---f -- f1--- -s_E_c_R_E_T_A_R_v_o_F_o_E_F_E_N_s_E_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _t---1t--- ---1-A-s_o_r_T_ _1 _c_o_mm_un_1_c•_t_1on_•_J_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ --- ----t 11--- - - - - - - - - E-Ac_L_R_ - -SA- - -A- - -o-E_F_E_N_s_E_ _ _ _ -- -- -- j-A- S-NT_E_ - -L-s_ - -u-o_ _sF_E_ _O_E_P_S_E_C_O_E_F _ _ _ _-- ----1--- alltll f i A TSO Atomic EnetQY SECRETARY OF THE ARMY l--- -S_E_C_R_E_T_A_R_Y_O_F_T_H_E_N_A_V_Y_ _ _ _ _ _ _--t-----t-----t-----t--A-T_S_O_ l _e_Q_i•-1-a-tl_v_e_A_ _f•-l- a-J-------- -- -----t ftkl--- -S-E_C_R_E_T_A_R_Y_O_F_T_H_E_A_I_R_F_O_R_C_E_ _ _ _ _-t--- ---t----t--O-E_F_E_N_S_E_C_O_M_M_U_N_IC_A_T_IO_N_S_A_G_E_N_C_Y_ _ _ --- -----1 -· ·--- -------------------t---1---t---t------------------------DEFENSE CONTRACT AUOIT AGENCY CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF t i ---1 illt f l l - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - l - - - - l - - - t - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - t - - - t - - - - - 1 Hltir1--- -0_1_R_o_F_o_E_F_R_E_s_E_A_R_c_H_ _E_N_G_1N_E_E_R_1N_G---t-----t----t----t--o_E_F_E_N_s_E_1N_T_E_L_L_t_G_E_N_c_E_A_G_E_N_c_Y_ _ _ _ -----i------t i Jal ASO Comptroller DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY -- ffi •·--- ------------------ -- - •'--- ------------------ -- ---t DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY CASO Adminiatretlon DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY ASO Ho•llh and Environment DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY 7--0P 0 ACTION COPY • ADVANCE ACTION COPY M A T I O N COPY o CLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority EO 13526 Chief Records DJ'class Div WHS-c f OP Date APR 2 f 20l1 SECRE f INFORMATlbN COVER SHEET co rliOL -UMBEA $ OfFICt Of Tit $£CR£TUT OF OtrEUt --t'OP a CRtr' INFORMATION COYER SHEET The attached p -- X of V n f o r r o • tion contain• • ta th• 1ecuri ty ••p•ct of which la parafftount • nd un • u ho iaed dl1clo1ur• of which would c • u1 • XC PTIOOAL CRAVE DANCER TO THE NATiat Special ·c • n totfy ind 1tor•1• · 2 J f - the • tt • ch • d Information must be e••rcla•d in • ccorti • nc• •I th· the in th• h • ndlin1 Thia cover 1hu t ii NOf A R CIIP'I' but• record of per1on • •ho hev• n • d • II or any p• rt of th• docu-nt • tlfied by number above CUI• ••curity reculatlona Iden r • ch per • on re-eeivin thit attached T P n f o r r n• tion 1h• 11· 1l1n and fi II in th• information requl red below DATE UN£ 1 --- -k-· --- V c - - I R MAIIU l C IY O r- 71 - ' ' -- ln J4l• ••ttl••• • ell •I 4••u• ·••4J ' ltlUH3 - VA fp-'l C 1 r • 5 6 1 8 9 - - 10 11 lZ -· •F • r lJ u l 16 ·- 17 11 lf 20 SO FORH 1 JAi s 19 l J PR VJOUS EDITIONS o THIS FOAM Alt OISOUTr TOP·SECRET f'Wiew illiikliNil ill 114 1 t alr f1M j1 un1l111J II•- INFORMATION COVER SHEET · ·•· • • t 'i Ja '- • - · · · - ·JOP SECRET -SENSffl lE - ' - POLITICO-MILITARY SIMULATION SCYLLA fil-73 ' ' ·s - - I CS n - - · SIMULATION DOCUMENTATIO N· ·-_ · ·-· ----· _ _ _ _ - -- -- - - STUDIES ANALYS_IS AND GAMING AGENCY ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON D C 20301 ·_ · - DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 · - _ ' · - Au thortty EO 12958 IS amended · - -' ·1»ief DoD Ole el Security Review · - s -· ' __ -------- COPYLOF 7 ScoPIES -fOP SECRET-SEN ITl'IE · • · _I • S E' C U R I T· Y R MrNDER • ALTHOUGH THE TITLE -- SCYLLA III-73 -- IS UNCLASSI· · · _ F IED ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF THE SIMULATION ARE OF NECES• • · ' ·• ' tJl ' ' t' ' 1 TY SSIPIED SUCH CIASSIPICATION IS REQUIRED SINCE -· - _·_ ' _ - ·UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT NATIONAL · _ -· -- · - - - · f'·'· SECURITY PLANNING OR POSSIBLY WEA KEN THE INTERNATIONAL c -' 1 _'···· · POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES '• i41 f' OLITIC0-MILITMY fi t _ OF POLICY · ' ADDITIONALLY · SIMULATIONS ARE CONDU ED UNDER A · •' S'l'RICT NON-ATTRIBUTION ' • • ' ' t j • ' I ' • • ---- - - i ' · ·' t ·- _ J -- · POLITICO-MILITARY SIMULATION SCYLLA III-73 26 NOVEMBER - 14 DECEMBER 1973 SIMULATION DOCUMENTATION ' - t _ · i t ' • Prepared By POLITICO-MILITARY DIVISION STUDIES AN ALYSIS AND GAMING AGENCY I ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CH IEFS OF STAFF · • 1 · i ·• 7 ' WASHINGTON O C DECLASSIFIB NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 • amended Chief Dao ore or Security Review ··f - - - 20301 - FOREW0RD Simulation Documenta tion is the first of t'1Jo volumes doc 1menting SCYLLA III-·73 a management-level politico-military simulation It examined major mi litary facto rs and risks likely to influence us decisions for execution of nuclear attack options appropriate to a Middle Eastern environment in the Mid-1970s SCYLLA III-73 was conducted at the Pentagon from 26 November - 14 December 1973 This volume contains the initial scenario team move messages scenario projections of the Control Group and edited transc ci-ot o f the Critique proceedings · • Participants were organized into a us Blue Team USSR Red Team and a Control Group The Blue Team represented th National Connnand Authorities of the United States Thev 'f· ·were issisted by a Military Staff representing the Joint · chiefs of Staff The Red Team represented the National Com·· · mand Authorities of the tJSSR The Control Group represented ' all other nations of the world international organizations and other influencing factors Each team meeting in sequence considered an initial sce- nario and two scenario projections Once the Blue Team had I J I met and made its decision on a course of action the Control t · Group considered addi ti onal influencing factors and prepared brief scenario projection for the Red Team depicting the l l i Team's actions and their consequences After this th ' Red Team met to e aluate the crisis in light of Blue 'l 1eam 1 s actions and to decide their own courses of action Follow -• ·ing both team meeti11gs Control Group prepared a new scenar Lo projection for the Blue Team to begin the next move of the simulation This cycle repeated itself for each succee ing move At the end of three moves a Critique was held durinq which the decisions and rationale of each team were discussed and general conclusions were s1 mmarized The material contained in this document does not neces arily represent the views of the woint Chiefs of Staff the t t lkr ' l Studies Analysis and Gaming Agencyr or any other Government agency DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review ' ii · · I I V I 1 j' - - -- - r r TABLE OF CONTENTS I Title Page •• _For word Table of Contents i ii iii-iv MOVE I Initial Scenario Part I Control to Blue and ' • A-1 - Red Team s • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • _· _ In-ltial Scenario Part II Control to Blue Team · - · t tt 1 · v e I Message Blue Team to Control Ji 11 1irrr - ·-t5 · · _ ' i J c' itial Scenario Part II Control to Red Team r · '• j' ' i titj Message MOVE Red Team to Control • B-1 - B-6 A-12 C-1 C-24 D-1 - D-11 E-1 E-J 3 II · ' '_ - · -First Scenario Projection Part I Control to _ · · • Blue Team • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • F-1 - F- 6 r-f i · 1 f j f -t · · ·' • _ ' - _irst Scenario Projection Part II Control to · t Mt· - _ t 1 _ • · · • • • · • • · • · · • · · · f · - ·-i l ti tsr II Message G-1 Blue Team to Control • • • • • • • H-l - H-23 · ·' '_ firs t Scenario Projection Control to Red Team • • I-1 I-13 J-1 - J-23 Move II Message Red Team to Control • • • • G- MOVE I I I · · g· cind i JJ IJ i - 1 ve Scenario Projection Control° to Blue Team I tI Message Blue Team to Control • • • • K-l - l -ll • • L-l - L-13 - - - - - - - - · · · ··· --- · ·· - · ·· ' i i r · · % 1 r liiii - ' -i-•·-·- - - - - - - - - l'a e determined to be U 1uslfied Reviewed Chief DoD OSR Date No 17 ooc r JAWEO J29S8Section3 5 i i iii UNCLASSIFIED 1 ' I I I·' Second Scenario Projection Control to Red Team Move I I I Message Red Team to control Critique • Distribution M-1 • N-l • • 0-1 • P-1 • • • • • • • M-9 N-16 0-21 -- ' _ t• -1 rj - I H - I I I' i_ · t- Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief DoD OSR Date NcN l 7 Ob°l IA W EO 12958 Section 3 S iv UNCLASSIFIED l - I I N 1 ·•· • Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief DoD OSR Date loV 7 2 ocff IAW EO 12958 Section 3 5 · ' · · ' · - JrJOM MESSAGE NO CONTROL llil MOVE No · _ _ _ _ _ _ _ r ___ TO BLUE - OTG · RED 22·osooz MAY 76 _ --- INITIAL SCENARIO - PART I '· The situation described in this scenario is hypothetical · - ·· '• d-is intended to provoke thought and to stimulate discus - ston It does not necessarily reP resent the views of the _ i · -oint Chiefs of Staff r the Studies Analysis and Gaming · _ · ·•· JgE1ncy or any other government agen·cy tt ·lJ · _ t • ft cenario -- t t •· rt r f_ i t lt t · lf p f - r· times are Greenwich Mean Time I ' f DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 '1thority EO 12958 as amended 1· · · · Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review A-1 ' '· f PART I THE WORLD OF 1976 Despite a general atroosphere of detente the roles played on the world stage by the protagonists suggested cautious optimism rather than euphoria The worldwide energy crisis which had been exacerbated by the 1973 Arab-Israeli war was somewhat eased by the interim settlement between Egypt and Israel in 1974 and the subsequent Arab-Israeli negotiations Oil production however continued to lag behind the world demand resulting in an energy environ·ment characterized by supply restraint and national selfinterests ·southeast Asia continued to simmer as the developing ft iia ions struggled to fend off insurgencies and to keep pace 1t J' flt t With · · _ • · · the political and economic needs of their people The multipolar worid which emerged in the early seventies ·the United States the Soviet Union the European Community _China and Japan -- apparently had committed itself to military detente and was engaged in fiercely competitive politi·_cal and economic rivalries to achieve its goals By 1976 ·this competition produced a vastly complicated intertwining skein of bilateral multinational and regional enterprises t i· hich transcended governme ts and ideologies THE INTERVENING YEARS 1973-1976 ·· · The United States ·' · President Nixon's second· term had achieved a notable · record in foreign affairs but evinced continued domestic -criticism Persistent inflation heightened by fuel · · • - · ·_shortages scattered unemployment and the approaching i r - · • -Presidential elections only aggravated the situation r- ·r · t n gress moreover had revitalized its legislative preroga· ' · ·elves acting on its Mn bills which were carefully tailored to suit an e lectorate it would soon face Opposing any tax increase and responding to the rising popular clamor for DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chi'1 DoD Ofc Of Security Review A-2 -t - ti' itaty reductions lawmakers held the 1974 Defense Budget at its 1973 level of $76 billion and cut fo re i gn aid by 4 percent This total was maintained in 1975 but was threatened in the fiscal year 1976 budget hearings In contrast to the disappointing domestic scene the Administration moved to maintain its momentum in foreign aff·airs But even f ast··moving international play did not allay some unspoken world anxieties that the united States was becoming increasingly isolationist Sensing a growing challenge to the credibility of its commitments Washington sought to assuage Allied fears by reaffirming us determination to adhere to its security obligations while expanding the role of its Euro ean · rtners in NATO's decisionmaking processes · A a further concession e ' · ·- · t _s_ th s·tructure of Europe changed so would I ift • _ - th at _ •- · pespite these declarations Europeans remained 05D 3 3 b 5 · - · ' -- - · ·· · ·tful · • · _·· - Tp ese common skepticisms about the United States commit · · · ····- -·- ment to European defense were wrenched again by the 1973 ¥ -Israeli war In the majority of NATO cotmcils · Antef' ican policy toward Israel found little welcome · • arid l ess support For the first time Washington and e w tern European apitals publicly cr ticized each · ·· - ··oth er· ' alleged self-interest to the detriment of the _ ·ift i i · • tt ··'' ll ance -·• · - - other shock to NATO unity was administered in February · 9 74 _congressional and domestic pressures forced the ··Administration to reduce the armed forces to 2 150 000 men · _ • r 1 ·· Xn ·a dition 20 000 troops were withdrawn from Europe in response to mutual force reduction talks with the USSR · · -vtl nment spokesmen privately admitted to their European · ·counterparts that additional cuts might not be far distant • _ ' -•• 0 ·q Jtfc · - · ·· e ·Soviet Empire • i ·r rft 1 - - i j_ 1· · ·'·· t 1 11ff l$ -th• Sovie Union was not immune to the forces of change G eneral Secre ary Brezhnev Moscow altered its modus · · gperandi and by 197 4 was in the forefront of the drive - 1 owau ·c detente economic competition and apparent coopera·· _- ·· · ' ·' tion -' The· United States and the OSSR contracted various - •- · ' - ·r fi S IFIED NOV 1 7 2009 · - • 'C rrw EO 12958 as amended - ·_ _ · n -O D Ofc of Security Review Wfft r i-tlitJ -iH ' 1 · · A-3 G ·_· -- fQP S§CB ' i · Jr 1f - • · · bilateral economic commitments and nursued mutual force reductions and SALT II negotiations Notwithstanding external appearances all was not well within the Soviet Union In 1 74 the two-edged sword of detente had caused serious wounds within the Pact Consumerism agricultural deficiencies and other trading gaps motivated bilateral economic arrangements with the West and with the Third world National identities began to resurface and Pact nations were partially persuaded that the Soviet Union would tolerate further nationalistic expression In the fall of 1974 discontent had surfaced in Poland The GDR hurt seriously by a poor economic situation was kept busy quieting the increasing demands of its inflation plagued workers and the ever louder harangue of underground reunification organizations Other Eastern European nations underwent similar disturbances By the •· - · •• - _ end· -of 1974 the Soviet leadership had introduced a discreetly _ _·harder tenor to the questions of detente and cooperation fr h jf titin November 1974 Premier Kosygin announced his retire ·_ '·'· · t· ·ment • He was replaced by Kirill Mazurov -- a long-time i · ·· critic of Brezhnev policies Shortly thereafter loyal · · Communist Parties were informed that the 25th Congress of ·the Communist Party of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics CPSU would be held in October 1975 Within a week after the meeting of the Congress Andrey Kirilenko replaced Brezhnev as General Secretary · The new leadership continued to emphasize military developments and improvements Soviet naval units including ' tii ' ti11 t ·ii U ious fore es cruised widely in the Mediterranean the Fir r- dian Ocean and Arabian Sea expanding their port visits • ' ·_·a nd ship days on station - e- ·- - ·_ · '' · - - Airlift capability for both troops and material also grew ··---· ste·adily Its resupply capabilities had been well tested il' l missions to Egypt Syria and Iraq • The Soviet AN-12s the huge AN-22s and the new jet-powered IL-76 cargo aircraft enabled two airborne divisions to be lifted to distant trouble spots within one week h· _ · irhe Soviets pursued the acquisition of basing agreements - - t • r - v lw· i tn stepped up vigor and increased the use of anchorages r - •· · 1 ·· ''t - tn ·the Mediterranean Arrangements similar to the Soviet DECLASSJFIED NOV 1 7 2009 ·Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review A-4 I I· f I t· f ·1 i ft ¥j '' i · use of Egyptian port facili·ties existed at Latakia and Tartus Syria Berbera Somalia Aden and Hodeida in tbe two Yemens and Umm Qasr in Iraq By 1975 there was no doubt that the Soviets were capitalizing on the influence gained from their opportunistic support fo Arab radicalism It served as a convenient means of increasing their presence in the Middle East and of reminding Western Europe and Japan of the tenuous nature of their oil supply arrangements In addition the Soviets had solidified relations with their friends in the neighboring Indian Ocean and South Asian regions especially with India Afghanistan and Somalia _ - - ' Soviet defense spending remained at an annual rate of· ·· -· · · · ·nine percent of the_ GNP Although spending for strategic · ·f - ·_ - _c _j 1d general purpose forces stayed relatively constant at · 11 n ' i ib t ' f · · 97 3 levels research and development funds increased 91iificantly each year Rumors persisted that the Soviets ·_ i_ _ 4ad urreptitiously developed radically new weapons systems · i frightening potential -- to include clean tactical ··t - i f t Ji µ 9 l a r weapons and sophisticated laser weapons systems f _ L - hr i r y r - ' r r· - f a t • - • -• • •• The'· European i I I Community - _ · ' _ ___ ·The evolving configuration of an economically oriented · - ___ Euro pa presented particular problems to the United States 1 rn u s f f i i e r i 1iu P nger · - f t - i · L ' _oJ ean· econOil ic jingoism was inflamed by the vulnerability _ · 9f · the Europeans to a cutback in the oil flow from Arab oil contrast to us energy policies of self-sufficiency - 7t · $ sp·±t e frequent meetings among the Allies to coordinate · - · ' · their oil policies and to avoid competition for oil supplies 4if erences in each Jl4tion's relative energy situation and the resulting domestic pressures prevented meaningful compro·mises Europe and Japan remained as dependent as ever upon -'• ·· - A_rab oil supplies _· _ '_r- - eJ'i e 4s ·in -- L - · - _· 1 _ -J _ _Aiq Qng the Allies France continued her special relations_ · • 'f _ i l the Soviet Union Acting as the main link between _·_ t USSR and Europe Pompidou sought to realize De Gaulle's _ ·vision for France Relations with the United States were ·- a · J hh f calculated not to wholly alienate the United States ·' f lt · from··France -- or Europe -- in spite of increasing politico ·· ec o omic differences _bu - - ·-_DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 _ · -A ority EO 12958 as amended - _ _ i Jk _ _ ·- et PoD Ofc of Security Review - _ · i ti · · - A-5 • The FRG position in the new Europe was unique Its special relationship with the United States through NATO had been eroded by US diplomatic and economic ventures Politically the FRG accommodated with the East but German strategy attempted to effect a neutral buffer in Central Europe Bonn recognized Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1974 and put particular en hasis on cooperation with East Germany which responded with popular enthusiasm Nevertheless the Honecker regime remained wary of the growing closeness of the two nations Britain although formally committed to Europe found it difficult to abandon its traditional ties with the United States For the most part Britain's venture in urope was an economic affair Militarily the UK did keep its hand in both Europe and N TO by maintaining its defense budget at four percent of the GNP f i J p - _ Predictably the actions of the minor powers of western neutral Europe were governed by those of France and G rmany • In general the Southern Flank aligned itself with France in community matters and foreign affairs while •t e Northern Tier and smaller central states cast their lots with the RG • · ' - - - -f- 'tt5r-T•··•and The Far East - _ Japan and The People's Republic of China dominated f i i - Far Eas uring 1973- - 976 Japan p ssessed econo i 7 i Ji p-ower and military poteni ial while the PRC garnered military ' -- ''• pow er and economic potential In 1975 Japan became the · · number two economic power in the worl'd with an adjusted clEpf ens·e budget which had grown two and one half times in the· past three years The PRC on the other hand preferred - · -i't9 concentrate on domestic and economic development and the most part qualitative defense spending Sino-Smriet relations continued to be troubled by co·nf lict ov-er politi cal _ideological and territorial issues Pek'ing hastened - for the deployment of its nuclear weapons and vied with the _ _lJSSR for increased trade and economic assistance from both • ___ '1 'bfi United States and Japan t - ' f _ Japan cultivated markets throughout t e world with particu·1ar attention directed to the Arab Middle East united States DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 J9 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief OoO Ofc of Security Review A-6 tt ' · · - · · · · 0£ -1 · ee·p- cse RF T tbs t · · and the USSR She intensified economic relations in th0 Persian Gulf and by 1976 hacl invested nearly one billion dollars in oil concessions Japan remained a member-in-gc Jdstanding of the us security commitments contacts with the USSR were insurance against Peking The Middle East The Israeli Army during 1974 staged a symbolic withdrawal from its deployments west of the canal to tactically more advantageous terrain at the Mitla Pass in the Sinai Both sides of the canal were patrolled by a UN peacekeeping force In return Egypt had conceded Israel passage rights hrough Bab el Mandeb Work to reopen the Suez Canal began in late 1974 but was not ·expected to be completed _-_ - ' --- · ' · ·before the winter of 1976 · _ t ii f i i - _ ' ··· --· ·- · ··· i' •-· - The $gyptian-Israel1 settlement did not erase the Syrian _- - - · _ · military confrontation with Israel Border crossings - i C iP c fire fights alo g the Golan Hei hts and terroris · ·· · • ntt ·· · inc idents by both Tel-Aviv and Damascus marked the cease-fire · _ · 1 - · - adical Baathist factions accusing their Syrian leaders '' _ ·- · ·- 1 of gross ineptness found willing sponsors in an expanding Soviet presence t • • Despite the obvious fissures and cracks in the Arab - ·-- -·· · • ·world a new degree of functional cooperation had been • f· · - · nieved Compared to Israel's isolation from her former ··i- tij l r - -ienqs in W stern Europe_ and Africa and her dismal poten '- - • • i t •l capability for sust- ained combat in the future the '·- · i f ·• si ic worl d appeared to be enjoying a vir ual Renaissance j i f' ft _ -' ithough a final solution to the Arab-Israeli problem ·· · - ·· - · ' ' - · - i mained as intransigent as ever the interim settlement and de facto cease-fires had reduced the danger of a deliberate military attack by either side __ -Seeking new opportunities to assuage their frustrations the militant radical Arabs renewed their traditional opposi •·'· -· t _ion to Iran and the conservative sheikdoms in the Persian · • _ •· ' · · i - Culf • S viet initiatives diplomacy and subversion had tmtrenched Moscow's interests even more firmly in Iraq - ' DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review ·• A-7 · · -ehan they were in Syria In fact the Soviet influence in · these two countries greatly exceeded the base of activity which they had briefly enjoyed in Egypt in the 1971 period Along the Persian Gulf radical Arabs led by the Popular Front For the Liberation of the Arab Gulf PFLOAG had established themselves in nearly every government center They were the predominant influence among the discontented elements of Bahrain They bad plagued Abu Dhabi with radical incidents which had gafned many adherents among Egyptian and Palestinian· immigrants and they represented a potential t eat to the ruling family of Kuwait Farther south in Oman the radicals had established an impressive base in Dhofar where the opportunities for insurgency continued to spread • ·' ' t•' ' In _ contrast to the radical Arabs led by Iraq Saudi · · Arabia continued to exercise a conservative hand in its · -· ·· ' i ' lations with its immediate neighbors and the great powers _ _- ·_Tp S udis had learned how to apply their weapons of oil · i'· I ig _1a d begun to exercise a titular Islamic leadership in -- f N fffi e-j qntest with radical Arab elements surrounding the ··· · f- r bian Peninsula King Faisal provided both financial _ '• J - echnical help to the enclaves of like-minded sheiks in · Kuwait Bahrain Qatar Omanr the United Arab Emirates and to Jordan The United States maintained its position as the leading ·- ·· sJ pp_li er of military technology to the Saudis however the · ' · id can Middle East force withdrawn from Bahrain at the ·· -ti9'¥ S t of Manama during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war had not _ · -Jt n restored Consequently no us military capability _ j · • i¥ 1 i j t _d_in the area The American presence in Saudi Arabia · J · Dfdo n i·sted of approximately 500 diplomatic commercial and · _ ·t e hn ological advisors Another 2000 advisors and depen·were in rran • ·• · · aefits - _ · 'the _Shah's government voiced Iranian support for the Arab cause largely as a gesture of solidarity with _' f ll C W Muslims However Iran had not supported the oil ·_ · b oycotts in 1973 and 1974 nor had she provided material ti t ·- -funds to Arab combatants Instead Teheran assured · - principal oil export conswners that oil supplies · j-1 9414 c ontinue to expand as scheduled to provide the ' • · til t • d revenue for Iranian d eveloprnent Tha Shah's balanced j _· t ··r - · · DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoO Ofc of Security Review J- ' ·· · A-8 · · - ·· ee tmof · • • · g ff· ' i '-kL -• c J PPr oach to Middle East affairs throughout 1974 served · t 1 ·to extend Iranian influence in Europe where Britain France and Italy assiduously wanned their relations with Teheran In addition both Iraq and Afghanistan sought to reestablish formal diplomatic relations 1 Growing concern for the increasing Soviet presence in the Middle East had led to a series of joint United StatesIranian exercises during 1974 and 1975 Despite the fear of the Soviets and an occasional domestic challenge to the Shah from Arab extremist elements or disaffected Iranians who were unhappy with the pace of development Iran appeared to be riding the crest of the wave in the Middle East • A Dolorous Pattern In November 1975 Sheik Ahmad ruler of the Trucial · _· ' - _ heikdom of Unm al Qaywayn was overthrown by Bahraini - _ ·based PFLOAG militants Rumors of Soviet assistance -· • · -·- •- ··to· this · la test venture of the Popular Front were not · _ - - _do ted The entire Trucial peninsula was thrown into ·t f f -$array as the new government preached the glories of i V ' ' 1 · t ionalist revolution As though on signal an outbreak - i •· ·f y t f- radical nationalism erupted in Dhahran Saudi-based · · · Arab Nationalist Move ment ANM leaders incited their ollowers to a revolt which destroyed large parts of the city and killed dozens of us citizens before it was crushed _ with the aid of Saudi military forces The ferocity of - · --_ _·t his attempted coup -- and its near success -- caused - -_ r J · · ·tµ ther alarm among the ruling sheiks who considered it · ·i ' a· direct threat to their own sheikdoms Sheik Zayid as · · _ 'leiid er' of the United Arab Emirates UAE called for i_ J• ' - 2 if•i _ _ a nqe_s of protect ion from King Faisal The Shah of · '· 7 l l · -- •_ ' l i l'ii deeply concerned over the spreading terrorism and · ·· · t __ l J - _L'ilplications informed Faisal that Iran stood ready ·· - t - io· ·assist in quelling any future insurgency should Faisal desire help The Shah further demonstrated his resolve by asau ing Sheik Isa in Bahrain that Iran would dispatch troops_immediately upon request if the militant revolution spread to that island These crucial developments were a prelude to the lightning · ' ' -· bolt events of early 1976 Shortly after midday on 8 March · ·_ · the fanatical A 'IM struck a dramatic blow in the tragedy of · t' f- - - · •• J · · - • ' J D CLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Otc ot Security Review - - _ - ••• t - - • A-9 ffle _ __ _- - _ · ---------------------------------- i f· I i J 91 ''JI t · · · i c pient anarchy in the Gulf states As King Faisal entered · - r ' ··in' fs tlimousine after a personal visit to Saudi Army headquarters a terrorist hurled a single grenade at the vehicle Faisal his Minister of Defense and his personal chauffeur were killed Within the hour Major General Hashim Cozmnander of the Saudi Air Force proclaimed himself head of a revolutionary military junta as well as Interim Chief Executive of Saudi Arabia Hashim's first official act after tersely deploring the assassination of the monarch was to declare a moratorium on all Saudi military and economic commitments to foreign governments pending a detailed reevaluation of the situation World reaction was electric The news from Jidda presaged certain catastrophe Almost immediately the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain called for assistance from Iran The Shah warily agreed At the same time Iran raised its $ tate of military preparedness to j·ust short of national · cH' rt ' 1-n t he United States the President in a televised • · _ JL P' r s cpnference informed the American people of his the· latest ·events in the escalating crisis in ·· · ··· - _g arsian Gulf deploring the assassination of the Saudi ·· ' @· and the senseless murder of us citizens in Dhahran 't' ' JJ t· c qricea h· over H wever he carefully avoided any intimation of involvement · us military Within the closed councils of government however the pi e s reported happenings of deep concern • ·' · · · On 14 March the us deployed a USAF F-4 wing along with _ 1¢· 13 tankers to Incirlik Air Base in eastern Turkey near J - - i M c On the same day two F-4 squadrons each deployed to · ·· t i ·t1t- •Eftjt ah and Diyarbakir air bases just 200 miles fr9rn the r SQ t-Iranian border A Navy Carrier Task Force assembled - · front the Pacific fleet was ordered to proceed on a 11 goodwill cruise to the waters of the Arabian Sea Within the Kremlin Faisal's abrupt death occasioned consternation General Hashim's threat to reevaluate eqQriomic commitnents showed a far greater Arab independence thah· Soviet planners anticipated The danger of exposure o xpulsion by the unpredictable Saud1 s was a critical possibility tt f · On the other hand assistance to the radical ' '· -· neci iss FteoNov- 1 1 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of SecurJty Review A-10 • - _ · • i' t t r t i i ' r ra i m i o s c indicated that Iraqi and Syrian harbors and wharves were choked with wa r materials Downtown areas of Baghdad and Damascus were resonating with guttural Russian Kayhan International press releases decried the menacing buildup of Soviet infantry and armor along the Russo-Iranian border Through April and May the Middle East seethed President Bakr in spite of clear Soviet disclaimers abetted the tur100il General Hashim expropriated without compensation all 11 alien enterprises within the Nationalist Republic of Arabia American companies citizens and embassy staffs gathered their families and belongings for evacuation Not clear as to the extent of disruption t e expropriation represented Western and international oil business representatives consulted among ·themselves and petitioned the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC for restraint Nevertheless the OPEC following a strong Saudi bid raised crude oil prices 50 percent and _ approved greatly restricted export quotas to countries who proved unfriendly More ominously the volatile General · · Ha him shattered former King Faisal's tenuous but tangible · f iendship with both the United States and Iran by siding wJ th · the true scions of Mohammed II and openly advocating P'an ·Arab confederalism On 21 May 1976 a James Res ton New York Times article recapitulated world fears darkening the Middle East horizon Lamenting the consequences of us worldwide military draw- _d_c wns he reviewed the increasing animosity between Middle · - Eastern nations and the impending crisis Increasing ·us public and congressional demands L·· - cq curtail military expenditures and to avoid ilitary involvement overseas have prompted ·_·__ - f radical Arabs with the backing of the USSR to attempt to overthrow moderate Arab governmer ts in the Persian Gulf area and the GovP r nment of _Iran Now Saudi Arabia formerly a steadfast friend of the West has joined the militants and expropriated American investments - · Irag with Soviet support has ir1creased the supply of arms to tjie dissident Baluchi t- · · i i· - ' · · - · - oerit ASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review A-11 ' - i · · · 3illeRrr tribesmen in Iran and infiltrated guerrillas and saboteurs across the mountain frontiers into Iran The Soviet Union has reemphasized·its support of Iraq and other radical Arab groups They have covertly supplied Iranian Marxist organizations and have augmented their forces along the SovietIranian border Moreover a Soviet naval task force in the Persian Gulf has recently conducted a combined amphibious landing exercise with the Iraqis at Umm Qasr Iraq which the Iranians view as a rehearsal for a landing in Kuwait or Iran Increased terrorist activities by the Marxist ···organization in Iran have included an aborteQ _ - _ assassination attempt upon the Shah Tensions Jt 'ii · f i 9 _et _feen __ Iran and Irag and now Saudi Arabia ' ·s _-i 5 J 1 f i re- r ached a point of imminent explosiveness · _ ·t i_t · -- Q nl ss there is determined effort by the super - - '1 i '- · -' 'p_bWers to defuse the situation another war · · · appears inevitable · · DECLASSIFtEO NOV 1 7 2009 Aµtho rity EO 12958 as amended ·' Chief DoD Ofc ot Security Review ' ·' · · - '• ' ·'- A-12 r t I i' _ • - FROM CONTROL MESSAr F NO TO BLUE MOVE N0 _ _ _ _ _ _ I REFERENCE CONTROL MS·G 10 l DTG 102 2323·1oz JUN 76 INITIAL SCENARIO - PART II THE CRISIS A Glorious Vindication On Tuesday 15 June 1976 the eruption occurred President Bakr ordered Iraqi forces into Kuwait Emboldened by i·Ytif f 't tk tl l - mentors aroused by the vociferous support of radical ' • -i r ' ' b -cohorts and faced with apparent confusion among the · · -U · r i · t• a ller Gulf States Bakr decided the time opportune to · ' · •i'' f' ' • · act in the name of Allah and settle longstanding terri torial disputes • - • · ·· The advance of the Iraqi forces was ra id and unimpeded By 1700 hours the same day armored units were reoorted passing the oil field at Ar Rawdah about 20 miles inside the Kuwaiti border on the main north-south road World reaction was vehement In New York the Kuwaiti repre - i · ·- J nt tive to the United Nations in an im-J assioned appeal tft j t M ··forS' help from the rostrum of the General Assembly refer jr § _d· to the recent ostentatious display of Soviet-Iraqi · tf ' ' ttt t • mti-li tary hardware as more than an unhappy coincidence · · · _ · and_ clearly indicative of Moscow's collusion in the sack -· of Kuwait 11 The Iranian delegate denounced Iraq's brutal and unwarranted breach of the peace r ·rfrr The Shah of Iran desires to make clear to Iraq -and to the world -- that this unbridled aggression will not go unchecked Unless Iraqi forces cease their advance and begin withdrawing to their estab' · - - 1 J · - i hed borders within 12 hours Iran will consider _r · _· -_·· ··_'this depredation an ·attack on its own inviolate · ·J- · _- °- _' 1 _ borders DECUSSIFl ltJOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 1299111 lffl8flded Chief DoD Ole If Securlly Revllw B-1 _ ' Diplomatic channels hummed as the world attempterl to sort out the growing crisis Hotline communications between President Nixon and First Secretary Kirilenko were frank The USSR denied any detailed knowledge of Iraqi intentions The President forcefully reiterated the gravity of the situation and urged maximum efforts by both nations to restore order Both nations agreed not to enter into the fighting and to restrain any nation not already involved from expanding the conflict PerseEolis Resurgent At 0430 hours on 16 June 1976 -- aimost 12 hours to the minute Iranian F-4s began flying sorties against the still •·advancing Iraqi forces and against installations in Iraq · Theus Embassy in Teheran reported that the Shah had informed __ · l oth us and soviet ambassadors that he did not intend i '· _ gJ il9 r ce ·a major war Accordingly he had taken a symbolic ' tJV 'ff'' '' · ··t to ·buy time His Air Force had bombed several strategi - ifr i% 1 l f - _ Yf oc ated Iraqi airfields with considerable success and • f e a ·attacked the spearhead of the Iraqi's armored concentra_ - - ' tions in Kuwait The effect of this bombing had been · ' - c - ·to slow but not stop the Iraqi advance The Shah emphasized that although he had not yet committed ground forces to_ e battle against Bakr he was prepared to do so _l t_nefessary to restore the status quo Any doubt of the Shah's d etermination was dispelled by '-- cl · - l y fternoon A flotilla of hydrofoils disembarked i ' ir lf f i6t ia #i a h infantry brigade at Bahr ah Kuwait and five ' rn · i P 9t' ting landing craft shuttled equipment to the beach · ' · ·· ·' 'f µEf ''fo_rce grouped and moved northward to meet the spear _head·of the Iraqi assault Concurrently the Iranian ii Force launched a new round of strikes against Iraqi ·airfields and armored elements of the Iraqi force in Kuwait -At first light on 17 June the initial elements of an Ir nian infantry division under heavy tactical air cover _ 9rossed the Iranian-Iraqi border astride route 46 the j fj Ji - f QS f -1 east-west artery between the front er and the - frt '-'fti ty of Basra At dusk the same day tne fo ce had - - nr1r - t e'1 11cted the main supply route from al Arnarah into - · ·• · sa 'rcf • ··• - •r • · - DECLASSIFIEdJOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review B-2 ----- Not until the evening of the 17th did the Shah break his official silence on the developments of the past two days On national radio he informed his countrymen that Iran was not at war but had acted solely to preserve the community of Gulf nations from the territorial aggrandizement of Iraq and its alien communist su-r porters which threatened to defeat them The Iranian leader claimed that his Army had entered Iraq only to force an immediate cease-fire on Iraqi predators in Kuwait and to insure their withdrawal from the territory of their innocent southern neighbor • At 1500 hours on 18 June the UN Security Council convened an emergency session Previously unable to obtain a meeting of the minds on the urgent necessity for a gen eral cease-fire the council members now exchanged charges ·and countercharges of aggression The Soviet representative condemned the Iranian invasion of Iraq and cited his _ country's treaty relationships to aid Iraq's efforts to · • t ' iit £ e cl itself He sternly warned that the presence of · i J ii jfm tf iap forces on Iraqi soil would be met with the · _ · ' Hfu il _ c st rebuff Calling for an immediate cease-f i re · ' • ' •· -· ' ' t '· th r·oughout the Persian Gulf the Soviet diplomat moved · · · · i hat a UN factfinding team be dispatched to the area ··· The session ended despite Iran's violent objec tions with a resolution calling for a general cease-fire e initial point of departure Yet another menacing development occurred on 18 June and was a topic of grave closed-door discussions in both L- ' c1 J · w ash n Jton and Moscow General Hashim the would-be ·· ' dtit ffHkJ$ qdi estrongman gambling on assuring his future x ··t i¾ ' f Z i ' 1 t l fltion in the Arab constellation took advantage of the ·· ·· ·1 ttt f J j rtunity and militarily reoccupied the Buraimi Oasis - - · · - •··· · ·with additional promises of aid to Iraq once Saudi forces · ' · · 4e e proved capable and loyal Hashim had mis·calculated ···however the point to which the momentum of events had borne the government in Teheran Sheik Zayid already gitated beyond rhetorical consolation implored the Shah to preserve the United Arab Emirates from the imminent hand of fate The Sheiks of Bahrain and Qatar endorsed the plea Late on the evening of the 18th the Shah air ·· f·• i• 1 -t i 1 d a t attalion of light infantry to Abu Dhabi The • ' t ¥ t_t j 8 · in Teheran paraphrased the earlier explanation of i · -f r - 1 · ervention in Iraq preservation of the innocent ••• ' · '·· '_' ·r···--- a errence of revolution ••• early withdrawal • t· - ·'oeCLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review • • 1 ' · ••• B-3 Iraqi forces now caught between the twin fires of the Shah's wrath began withdrawing from their forward positions in Kuwait During the next two days there was growing evidence of a complete Iraqi rout Iranian forces cha rged forward with panzer-like ·speed while Iragl diplomats futilely cajoled erstwhile allies for assistance The fall of Baghdad seemed inevitable if Arab or Soviet intervention was not soon forthcoming In spite of these favorable · uguries Iranian forces began meeting stiffer opposition in their advance Air battles became ferocious The F-4 attrition rate grew alarmingly when large numbers of MIG-21 Fishbed fighters began to appear and mobile SAM batteries took their toll The Supreme Commander 1 s Staff reported to the Shah that tank casualties had forced a temporary halt to -the advance Teheran called for US naval air support from the US carrier task force which had just arrived in·the Gulf of Oman but a reply was tactfully withheld pending consideration · f 'l · · · · t i•j · -' he· Sword of Ishmael lii i •ii r- · • - ' - r · · · · on -20 June with a measured Iranian advance again under · - · - _ _Way the Iranian delegate to the UN startled Assembly rep• ' · ''' ··i es nt atives by accusing the Kremlin of providing direct ·· assistance to the Iraqis Ortly yesterday 11 he flared 4 Soviet military personnel were taken prisoner ·· 'Interrogation of these unfortunates revealed that largescaie Soviet involvement was certain 1rhe new model MIGs harassing Iranian flyers were flown by Soviet pilots SAM · _· c ews__ and many antitank platoons were made up of Soviet In addition ome lian prisoners had admitted 1x t' -F1 f t t J ing reports that Soviet Diversionary Forces teams were -rr 1 1l ' jt tp afing for insertion into critical appl ·oache on the · · ·'- - ·_ · xtanian side of the Russo-Iranian border in the northwest · ·• · ·- - -qf t r a • II t t f- · f S • · ''i •• Although Moscow unequivocably denied direct participation in the conflict increasing evidence belied Kremlin propaganda Consequently us military planners ordered increased reconnaissance in both the battle zone and the I'ranian border areas with the USSR These intelligence · - 1- _$OUr9es reported that selected elements of the Soviet ' ' ii airborne divisions were placed on alert and that some routine l r i f ary air transport activities had been cancelled while • '' ' ' i- - i L• i -- i· I I r' - j i bLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended · · Chief oo Ofc of Security Review - i it i111 i _ · - _ - _ 1 B-4 ·- i · 'iffi6RiR ·- other transport aircraft apoeared to be deployed towards the Soviet-Iranian border To augment Iranian air defense in the northwest region two squadrons of USAF F-4s were transferred from Diyarbakir to Shahrokhi irfield Rules of engagement authorized involvement with enemy units only in self-defense By daylight on 21 June Soviet intentions appeared clear and Teheran's accusations justified While Radio Moscow explained the Soviet Union's actions as defense of Iraq's sovereign right to unhampered self-development Red armor crossed the border at Julfa and Astara The soviet Ambassador in Teheran in accordance with previous instructions personally delivered identical notes to the Shah and to the US Ambassador Predictably their contents regretted the circumstances which had forced Soviet intervention denied c - o ·· ' - · ·· er -itorial ambition and pledged cessation as soon as Iran 1 l 'ii _ y - '-i ' gf e4 to withdraw its forces to its own borders Outraged J -i ff f · _ _ Pahlavi tore the Soviet note to pieces in the presence t ··' - ··the Ambassador and swore Iranian Derseverance however -• ' ' · _' · - - i-t't er or long the war might be ·· rn - f ' i ' ' · · The next two days brought misfortune upon misfortune to hard-pressed Iranian armies Outnumbered in the north and able to reinforce because of combat commitments on the western front they could not s·tem the advance of Soviet forces By the evening of 23 June Soviet units driving - __ _down the coastline had reached Rasht -- 19J miles from _ _ _ ' it tK r fen an a second group had surrounded Tabriz and its advance _2 - ' '· -v ·- i m ·nts were proceeding along the Maragheh highway toward rt j n To all appearances the disastrous tide which had - _ -- ··_ _ ····'--ebbed from Baghdad was about to inundate Teheran · - - 't lf lh pp·alled - by the consequences of this probability the Unite States decided that Iran must be preserved Its loss would catapult the Soviet Union to the jugular vein of US and Allied energy resources Once the decision was reached it became startlingly obvious tha the necessary military capabilities were far short of intentions _ · _ · _ · At _2 300 hours on 23 June President Nixon summarily conthe National ecurity Council and explained the · ' purpose of the meeting 1 _ · -- UtiitiJW 4 i1 WP1 · _- • •a _ DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review B-5 Gentlemen the defense of Iran is vital to interests I have informed the Shah that the United States will assist him to repel the Soviet invasion I am advised however that sufficient conventional assistance cannot be provided before Teheran would be in Soviet hands In view of this I see no alternative but to use nuclear weapons What I desire from you and your staff are options for the best possible and most effective use of these weapons us The time is now 232310Z June 1976 ·- · 'i -i - i@i' iii hii lii · 'j li r l f · u - l• JjL z L ' iir OECLASSJFIE bJQV 1 7 2009 • ·•· · '- ° ' f ''f • i _ '· Authority EO 12958 as amended · · · · · · Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review I' t I lj i iik · - f'• z - · · · • J - 'i 1 f i¼ · · _ -··-----------------· ' · · ··- -· Page determined to be Unclaulfied Reviewed Chief DoD OSR Date Nov 1 A Oc Cl IAW EO 12958 Section 3 5 ··• J t•- · _ - 1 t i ti-t i r- i · • • ' ' · ' · --- -- i 1 · - · 1• FROM BLUE MESSAGE NO TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 101 102 DTG 101 I 232310Z JUN 76 l IMPACT OF CRISIS ON NATIONAL INTERESTS a us interests 1 us position of world influence directly challenged a Failure to meet challenge could hand to the USSR the role Qf world leader -- US position likely never to be regained · b Even by meeting challenge the united has·a great deal to lose and· probably only status gain _ 2 Loss of us influence in Middle East region a Growing dominance of USSR - ' ' r b Restrictions on Middle East oil both to the -United States and her allie ' t ii1l f n ·· c US movement throughout Persian Gulf Ocean area could he severely restricted · Regional instability likely to increase -·· · 3 Increasing stress as to NATO and other OS ailiances e g bilateral CENTO etc a Serious degradation of US system for i ternational security b Growing USSR influence in Western Europe • 1 Nt i Ii dl• ' • c Economic DECLASSIFIED NOV · 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review •• i119 act of restricted access to East energy resources 1 C-l d Requirement for allied bases and air routes to support us actions in Iran 4 Increased rlsk of all-out nuclear war i e massive strategic exchange This points out necessity to a Control escalation b Terminate conflict b USSR interests 1 Opportunity for direct Soviet access to Persian Gulf Indian Ocean o n · - _ _ · - Mtddle Ea a P u r r JJ r friiiit t i- · f- '1 6 ---- - -- 1 i ii _ - P - s 3 Enhanced position of world influence at the 9f OS inflqence an alliances • rt i 7J r Jl1 r J •• ' '• ·- • 0 ' - · _ ··· · ' · - • ·i- · the · ·-· ' · ' · · in the _ ' i • 4 Minimized risk of all-out nuclear war with United States '' i-1 f c Iranian interests • · 1 survival as a natiqn • · ' -·· fi i · -' - - - · - '_ a Retention of territory b Continuation of a viable stable govern 2 Retention of a position of regional influence d Iraqi interest '' I l Avoidance of further losses -- men and terri- - t ory -- J i ZJilL · 2 Survival as a viable nation ' I Y j - i ' ir- r _ -· Interests of others 1 Western European and Japanese interests • · _ DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review c-2 - 1 •• ·· -· ·· 1r · -·· a Continued access to '1iddle Eastern oil l Economic survival 2 Political and social stability b Reliance on US security guarantees 1 Strategic nuclear umbrella 2 Alliance system 2 Peoples Republic of China PRC ·· _ a No direct threat -- vital interests are · · J · - ' fft involved _ ' ' _ - · ·'· ' ·f i fiddle East t r r· b Opportunity to enhance influence in the • ' · · · c Probably would consider a setback to the _'Soviets to be in their interests 2 OBJECTIVES a US objectives 1 Immediate a Repel the Soviet invasion of Iran • C 0 ' · • • b Protect-US citizens and interests in the Middle East ··- · · c Avoid massive nuclear exchange· between the Onited States and the USSR d Alter to the United St ates' advantage 1 le USSR perception r · - of risks involved 2 Near Term a Restore peace order in the Middle East DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief OoD Ofc Of Security Review c-3 b Insure continued flow of Middle Eastern energy resources to the United States and its allies anrl _deny Soviet control of Middle Eastern oil c Limit Soviet influence in -the Middle East 3 Long Term a Preserve protect the NATO Alliance b Preserve protect the CENTO Alliance c Maintain viability of ti·st- -r t1 - • ·· · ·· • us conunitments • • I b United States perception of USSR's immediate - · · I lr tf7 jive 0 u i Iran · · ·whiie controlling the level of risk 3 The USSP will avoid massive nuclear exc ange ' ' i t ii '·tit the 4 The USSR·will attempt to weaken us influence Middle East and erode US power worldwide f ti i if iL ·- c The USSR will likely perceive the following as - · J c· ·u$ immediate responses - ' l At tempt 1- ' to retain the are-a status 51uo 2 The United States would desire to emnloy conventional forces if available L The United States would seek I i in the Irania noperation • 'f ·· · - 3 i r f1 ' 'f ' ' ' t · • · POLITICAL AND MILITARY 1-tEASORES Military attack option to be executed I I F • · ll_ t OSD 3 3 b ' · D QLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 y --- _ ··- Atifllority EO 12958 as amended k ' i • r- Chief DoD Ofc ot Sec rlty Review l t t C ' c-4 5' • • • i o ·· · • a Nuclear strikes should be scheduled in approximately 36 hours • If the loss of Teheran is imminent the theater CINC may request earlier implementation of a portion of the strike plan b Strikes should be conducted within a four o six-hour period • · c · Targets should consist of railway and ighway routes in northern Iran which comprise the primary USSR LOC Particular emphasis should be placed on cutting the LOCs and isolating USSR forces from their sources of supply ' d USSR forces would be struck simultaneously · · -- - bY _ _g z ou d del very me ns e g · 8 nuclear ar illery and · ·· · - US' tactical air Str 1 kes sbould be of sufficient scope to i ' i _ •r_ender USSR forces militarily ineffect ve approximately 50% · · · · ' f7j f l ion • e ADMs will be employed to delay the advance j _ - qt U SSR forces as part of a coordinated strike plan • ·· · ' · '' ' • ' ·•·' ' t - f The strikes outlined above would require pproximately eighty-five 85 nuclear weapons consisting -- t ·' of forty-seven 47 air delivered · and eight 8 ADMs _'·· _ · - - Weapon requirements will thirt 1 Air launched 30 artille OSD 3 3 b • Tactical air 15 strikes against Soviet· elements 17 - b Naval air • · Artillery fired - DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief Do D-Otc ot Security Review c-s OSD 3 3 b '- · · 0 SSSMll ·'· • • • • • • • • ' ttr ' # elements 3 ADMs 8 SADMs OSD 3 3 b '- Yields 4 -Total 47 air delivered 30 artillery -8 ADMs ·· · ·• 85 weapons •••1 2 Strikes will be launched from bases in Iran or from Iranian territorial waters and constrained to l ithin Iran · 5 ' J ' 'i i i - • · 3 Weapons will be selected with regard to yield t _ ' - - ' height of burst and targets to be attacked to minimize - ·cc lla teral damage • · ·· · ·· ' 'l iit 118ts · 4 Action must br t taken to move us nucle·ar from storage sites •• 1 •• • - fli ' ' 't '· b ha t1 sfst 0s ·i-' Y ' ' °' force by two additional squadrons from USAFE Similarly an RF-4 force of six aircraft should be moved to Iran from USAFE resources S C J 6 US TACAIR forces should be based in Iran as far as possible from the area of combat operations in · order to enhance the air defense at their bases A HAWK battalion and other air defense capabilities as required frc m USAREUR resources should be deployed to Iranian ' i · ··t - • up posi ions as soon as possible however scheduled i- - · • • · nuc rlear strikes will not be delayed for their emplacements if l L • • i t DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review C-6 7 In concert with the above action the following collateral military measures will be taken posture a Place all US military forces in DEFCON l b Dir ct CINCEUR to request that NATO forces be placed in a· condition of Reinforced Alert c Position US 7th Fleet assets on station off Soviet Pacific Maritime Provinces I I - fr f f' d Intensify effort to locate and trail· oyi_ t naval elements • 8 The Soviets will be advised that the strikes · · ha V'e been launched their purpose and of the ve ry careful c onstraints applied It will be forcefully pointed out '· _ s t Jlp t PUClear weapons are not being used on Soviet terri r Ji ' f t- i•qr y_ The Soviets will be advised that the Uf3e of nuclear j H'il f ff t t P bils is manifestat on of U intentioi i to a d Ircµt and • · • _ 1_'·' ·that such· aid will continue until the soviets w1 thd aw 1 _ _ _ • • · · _· ir I b Associated political responses 1 Associated political responses are reflected in the messages located in Attachments 1-9 In addition -·· · · i ll_e desired political signals are reflected in the mili- tary actions selected · i ' f ·i t1ii - · 2 It is also recommended that immediately on - ihl i fa un cn the President address both Houses of Congress and ·-i JtJ fT1 j ll e pub°lic with national and international coverage to -· _ · · · _ · gain worldwide acceptance of us support of Iran See · ·- ·Attachntent 10 • c Likely perceptions responses of protagonists l Soviet leaders may question US intentions i e do US actions represent only a localized attack or - re they indicative of a more serious readiness to esca- t J 'q ft z e i fra e r • '•l •• - • DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 20u9 Authority EO 12958 as amended Ch ief DoD Ofc of Security Review ' - - _ c-7 call for use of 3 USSR response may range from an agreement to stop further military action to a response in kind to a nuclear reply which escalates the degree of conflict d Other international reactions and domestic responses 1 International a Public demonstrations will take place in NATO capitals· decrying US use of nuclear weapons raising specter of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the effects on innocent human beings from r esul tant nuclear fallout e g radiation sickness birth defects etc f ii lipected to b bie f e 1 e0 t a e Cc Iraq and her Arab supporters will call for an eye for an eye response · · • · · d Saudis and other oil producers are likely to cut off oil supplies to United States and Western Europe ox may threaten to cut off us allies if they do not disso ciate themselves from US actions ' · J · r U f fY ' · • e Radical groups in Middle East may take jf t lrm ' iyantage of turmoil in Iran to sei'ze contr ol from moderate t' ' · t· 17 - nts 2 Domestic a Demonstrations protesting us use of nuclear weapons will take place in Washington D C size could approach 250 000 people _ · b US public opinion will express consterna- · ··· · _ _ · ti·on ·at us use of nuclear weapons question need for United fi c f tates to engage in war in Middle East and the real US tr t'J g uirements for Middle East oil ' -- ' · · e Other options considered but rejected 1 Nuclear demonstration no target - - DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 · · · - uthofity EO 12958 as amended L' t c·• ·chief DoD Ofc of Security Review r t Jt h '1_ _• · -' - f-' • aE - • C-8 I • -- • •• - • •I• a Thi would require detonation of a nuclear weapon s over the Caspian or Black Seas or within Iran so as to be easily observable to the Soviets was b The option rejected since its effects are psychological only and may actually be perceived as a lack of resolve · • 2 Nuclear strike on Iraqi forces ·would be made ith - OSD 3 3 b This option was rejected since it does it 1ri t'1- 1 r- f · accomplish immediate objective of r epelling USSR fo rce JJ tHf Ji li 1tj Jii-F ' n lves a strike against a third party whose forces · t J t ' _' r Z •- p resently on the defensive I t may serve only to ·• · ···· · · ·•further increase Arab enmity against the United States b _ · - · _ '· • 3 Strike Soviet naval units • a Units to be attacked are those located Strike vehicles to be used are US naval air resources · · in the Persian Gulf I •• •i·· • · •'t t •' • 1• 0 ' j _ ' _ _· · b This optio was rejected since it does -ifi t Jfili1J £ _ 9 · contribute to the immediate objective of repelling - -- 1 i ti'F§ viet aggression The action would expand the geographic • · · - · - i·• ea o the conflict and could serve to invite retaliation _ ag jn t OS CVAs 'This could result in greater losses to · · · tlie United States than to the OSSR ·i · t • ' y · iu fti-lttt i tlf · b ···· ' ·· ·_·1· ··- -J$a80 s·as le 3 ·• ' • •' • • • r I ' This option was rejected for the same above JS 3 3 b • ·•❖• ·DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 _ - _ · · Authority EO 12958 as amended 1tQ1i_ 1 DoD Ofc of Security Review 3t·• IHr • 1 ' •• ·• - 1 -t J ' - - - c-9 5 Ji 6 south of the Caucasus Mountains which were in support _of the attacking forces would be attacked Cb This option was rejected for the same general reasons as 3e 3 above • JS 3 3 b S Cb Thls action was rejected since it does· · not contribute to the immediate objective of repelling the Soviet invasion ''l'he targets ·are not clearly military ·· ' in-nature nor are they confined to·· Iranian ·soil · This 'J i · tfir _ - pp tion is too escalatory 'in nature· at 'this· time To • · _ - 7 · · fi - · · · · • · 4 CONTINGENCIES · I ' ' I i 'by _Actions • ·• · ····' ' t· Actions by the us • USSR l If ·USSR strikes with ··nuclear_ weapons preemptively • ' I a In Iran i' if i iltl l i 0 • c ••• I ••• • · JS 3 3 b S- b In Europe b US will pa ticipate in defense of Europe o In US selective critical target e g Alaskan pipeline ' ' it 1kt iitt cl 'f eir tial 1 OS a Attacks with nuclear weapons CVA task force in· Gulf -·· t· L i a OS will continue nuclear strikes on OSSR forces in Iran and · · D ECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 · · Authority EO 12958 as amended _ hlef DoD ore of Security Review Jr ii · r5 - · c US will consider striking like targets in in USSR e g Baku c-10 I Actions Actions by USSR by the us consider nuclear strikes on targets in southern USSR b Same as above JS 3 3 b 3 Actions by NATO US wi11·continue to plan and execute nuclear attack If NATO does not use of nuclear in Iran ' ' · · ji fi t i f ' - ' __ ' · · s ' i l t ·' i • • • 7 DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review C-ll MESSAG NQ 101 i i TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE 'CONTROL MSGS 10 1 102 DTG I 2·323·1oz ·JUN 76 --------------------FROM SEC STATE US AMBASSJ DOR NATO TO US AMBASSADOR JAPAN INFO OS AMBASSADOR ALL NATO COUNTRIES ·'-' I l FOR US AMBASSADOR NATO jfo i t ' In v iew of ' I the the threat to US and allied security posed by the USSR invasion of Iran the United ii - · iL J 1 te s has determined that immediate action is necessary WI ¥t J o consider possible allied actions It is apparent that · r· the use of nuclear weapons may be required Request you take action to convene the North Atlantic council at ambas sadorial level to prepare options for the best possible and most effective use of these weapons The convening of NAC · · - ' '' i n t¢nded to accomplish the following · · ·l terests ' r r k - a Impress on our allies the us determination to the attainment of USSR goals in Iran and the '· '· · ·M ddle East • - - 1 1 - l' · • i _ ttltt v nt L 1 us intent to consult with and encourage of our allies in this joint action b • Demonstrate -·' r ' ' i ' t lf pa rticipation c Determine the views and positions of allied governments as to the use of nuclear weapons in this instance for d Devise specific nuclear options consideration o appropriate NCAs Advise soonest of date and time of · c meeting· Specific instructions and us representatives ·• · · 1 · f om here will depart immediately to participate in the NA PromP t reporting of allied views is urgently required Atch 1 DECLASSJFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended -12 Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review · _ l ' ' t F' ' --··__ _ e e e ·'R tE FOR US AMBASSADO JAPAN Request you inform GOJ of proposed NAC meeting and intent and obtain thei'r comments and views soonest KISSINGER i fIi k t tj t I a r·- •• ·t · ·- ti't1i1l L - - - Atch 1 · ''•• ' c 13 ' · t' - ·•·· ' FROM CONTROL MESSAGE NO TO MOVE NO REFERENCE 'BLUE MSG· l'O l DTG ··-· -io1 '• I 323l'0z· ---------·2 ·JUN ·76' ------- -----------FROM USNATO TO SEC STATE - · t1 BJECT •·r-· • a •• • •• • - Request for NAC Meeting • 0 • J fl i J t· - L • -Message requesting convening of NAC at Ambassadorial - -- - ' ' ' le l received · · t _ -_ • 2 Have informed NATO Ambassadors of desire to convene NAC HO • ' OH 0 0 0 • •f ·3 Expect request to be met in next few hours • 0 0 t _ ·ti - ii ·unofficial' soundings indicate t _ · r fr i1 _seeing what alternatives us · -· r -· - t tttf • DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief Doo _Ofc of Security Review · 'E i ' ····· · · t· - l- - il • t912 2 ·- · - -·· ·· a reluctance to act proposes FROM CONTROL MESSAGE NO 101 TO BLUE MOVE NO I REFERENCE BLUE MSG 101 DTG ____ 232310Z JUN 76 _ _ _ __ ----------- --- ---FROM USEMB TOKYO TO SEC STATE _ _ SUBJECT ·· Response to Poli ti cal and Military Measures Request· · 1 GOJ appreciates us·informing them of intentions 2 Unofficial sot indings indicate -a reluctance to act without seeing what alternatives us proposes I • ·• ·· · • r DECL SSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Au honty EO 12958 as amended Chief DoO Ofc of Security Review · · Atc h 3 ·- • t · •' C-15 · _ l- FROM BLUE MESSAGE NO TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE· CONTROL MSGS '101 FROM SEC STATE TO AMEMB MOSCOW 102 DTG 101 ·I 232310Z JUN 76 ' · - __ - _ · ·· The following to be delivered to Soviet First Secretary receipt The United States views invasion of Iranian · erritory by Soviet Forces with gravest concern Their · inmtediate and total withdrawal is demanded as a first · A i _ i -' P- toward reestablishment of peace in the area The · ' ''··united States is fully prepared to take whatever steps may be necessary to support the Government of Iran and its armed forces in repelling this invasion including all necessary measures of force At the same time we will continue to exercise careful restraint to ensure that the · i of conflict is not further expanded t1pon L DECL SSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Au hor ty EO 12958 as amended C_ ief DoO Ofc of Security Review · ·1 · ' · •' _ · - - · Atch 4 ·· C-16 101 · · • _ · TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE CONTROL MS'GS· ·10·1 FROM SEC STATE TO AMEMB MOSCOW · 10 2 DTG I -------------2·3231_oz JUN 76 The following to be delivered to soviet First Secretary at TBA z The President has authorized US military per sonnel to utilize a limited number of low yield nuclear weapons on Soviet forces invading Iran All strikes have •- i- ' •· __ been launched from Iranian territory or territorial waters f 0 iiili•· dur use of nuclear force has so far been limited and t·_ iitl iI 1 l cti •• ' · 0 - __ ' 0 ve • i I restore the peace territory and integrity of Iran This objective is vital to us national interests To achieve this end ' - -- ·Theus obJective is to · a The USG demands the immediate withdrawal of Soviet · ·- _· fo ces from the territory of Iran b The USG demands Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait • ' · _ c If the above -actions are taken the United States ' __ g arantees Iranian withdrawal from Iraq · - · i- · The United States considers the freedom of all states in the Middle East and continued access to the area's energy resources essential to the security interests of the United States and Western Europe continued USSR aggressive military action in the area may result in further responses in this and other areas You should know that the ·united States nd its allies have available for employment a range of pas· ·• · s_ible fu ther actions to protect Iran and prevent the loss l -h fi 1 -ii ' ' r - e energy resources of the area D li i i-• DECLASSIFIEDNOV 1 7 2009 Atch 5 Authority ED 12958 as amended c-l 7 Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review · · ' • •·· •· ····· ··' ·•· The United States considers the freedom of all states in the Middle East and continued access t·o the area's energy resources essential to the security interes·ts of the United States and Western Europe Continued USSR aggressive mili- tary action in the ·area may result in further responses in this and other areas You should know that the United States and its allies have available for employment a range of possible further actions to protect Iran and prevent the loss of the energy resources of the area Time of delivery to be concurrent with strikes on soviet Forces in Iran • • •· f • ' f f ' 5 l Wt t i · ' ·· · ··· t _ · _ ·_ t- 0 CLASSIFJED NOV 1 7 2009 · ·· · · · · Authority EO 12958 as amended · Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review • FROM BLUE MESSAGE N0 _ _ _l_O_l TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE· 'CONTROL MSGS- 10 1 '102 DTG ------I · 2·J-2·3·10 Z JUN 7 6 -------------------- -FROM NSC TO SEC STATE i - t 1·t - t- · ' - ' - - You are directed to request consultations with Ambassa · · __ c 'iors from Warsaw Pact nations excluding the Soviet Union l ' t 1 'f1't i n views with grBVest convem the ··event s in Iran and Middle East · · • b USSR aggression in Iran has placed their countries · · · i serious jeopardy _ · - Series of events could cause severe damage to their 1I1t' t ·fo ··· in Iran and Middle East • · • use their good offices to intercede with · · Atch 6 it 1 r1rt ·- f ' USSR withdraw forces from Iran and reduce eliminate tensions · · _ - 1 ' J- - tr i' i · · _ ·t · -f ·I r t• 1 ·- C-19 ' rr ' i ' C Mt 101 FROM BLUE MESSAGE NO TO CONTROL MOVE No · _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I REFERENCE· -CONTROL MS'GS' ·10·1 · FROM NSC TO SEC STATE 10 2 · DTG 232310Z JUN 76 You are directed to ·call in the PRC Ambassador and him th at ' r _r o · ' - 1 - • a The United States views with gravest ·conce n the ' •· · • · -·- 1 •·· · • • • ··· ·· • · - · _- vents in Iran and Middle East · t1ttrt ff I1lf' i f · b The United States will take all necessary actions to insure defense of Iran and repel the Soviet aggression • c The Un-ited State·s feels that the PRC should be apprised of our views because of continuing better relat ions between PRC and us • c · d We will k ep PRC informed of further actions • Atch 7 J -· C-2 0 · ·-·f• • · ·· FROM BLUE MESSAGE NO TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE 'CONTROL MSGS 10·1 · 1'0 2 DTG FROM SEC STATE TO IRAN 101 I 232310Z JUN 76 1 As previously advised the United States is prepared t o provide whatever support is necessary to repel the _ · J i·Soyiet invasion · In order to accomplish this objective · ·' - - f-L - i efore the further decimation of Iranian forces and certain -· l1 t tJ iMt f-all of Teheran use of tactical nuclea-r weapons against - ··- · Soviet forces and LOCs in Iranian territory is the only _ ·· feasible military option Exercising careful restraint absolute minimum of such weapons necessary_ to _terminate Soviet incursion and ensure survival of Iran will be used In addition utmost care will be exercised to minimize collateral damage and casualties to Iranian civilians and u -med forces Prior Iranian approval and support for such a grave move is essential Urgent evacuation of Iranian J f- i · · ·- t i L P trili ns from the vicinity of Soviet forces should be t h1f - tJ• _ie j cilted to the maximum extent feasible _ _ 0 - · - _ · ••• _ - f¥ il - l ' f ' - - It is essential that your forces provide maximum r e istance until our plans can be prepared We will advise you three 3 hours in advance of our strike so that your forces can disengage the enemy · · · 3 Approximately one hundred 100 weapons will be used - Lii t 0 f2 - · - - ui A J· ·_ pECLASSfFfED NOV 1 7 2009 ' -·· · · - _ · · -Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security ·Review - Atch 8 c-21 MESSAGF NO TO CONTROL 101 MOVE NO REFERENCE 'CONTROL MS'GS' 10'1 102 DTG' I 3·23·1o·z 2 JUN 7 6 _ _ _ __ ------ • -------------------· ·FROM TO SEC STATE NATO To be delivered 12 hours prior to nuclear strike · ·· execution in Iran 1' ' i ' 1ii - _ l ' he United States h s det_emnined that the na iona1· vital importance to the united J if £1i 1firt jt # es ancl· the free world The Soviet invasion now ' ' ·r -_ ·· y ·th eatens the survival of Iran and efforts to repel the · ·· · _ invaders have been to no avail ·i' · J9grity of Iran is of ftiif t ' -· - · _ · _ ' · '' 2 ·since the Soviets are continuing their aggressio the only resort available to the United States in responding to· ·the Shah's request for immediate assistance is the employment of nuclear weapons This decision was taken only after close consultation with the Shah who concurs in this action · - 1 as an appropriate measure to save his nation Of crucial · 4 ·· ·· -i n pprtance in arriving at this decision was the awareness f_ m ·$ovtet domina tio n of Iran would result in the unaccept ' '· _r _ i' control of critically needed energy resources by forces · _ ·· ' · -f _allied against the United States and Europe - · r _ · 4 The immediate objective is to maximize the military · etfects against the invading forces and their LOCs and to ' ·1 i ·iiktr n te the conflict promptly with soviet Forces with- •-ii trt i i1 · 4tajqi from Iran _ Jl¥ tiif i 'i f r - tch 9 This will be accomplished by using DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review c-22 · JS 3 3 b 5 approximately 100 weapons against appropriate military targets All weapons will be targeted against forces in Iran Targets outside Iran will not be attacked withnuclear weapons The nuclear strike forces will be based in Iran S This action is clearly defensive in purpose and will phase ·· This careful limitation should not be construec l as a sign of weakness nor an unwillingness to use additional nuclear weapons wherever they may be required to _insure the survival of Iran · be carefully limited in the initial 6 In response to this action we are e pecting the Soviets to cease their aggression immediately and begin withdrawing Because-it is possible that the Soviets will retaliate we ci re placing US Forces worldwide on DEFCON 1 as of TBA Z nuoasures as as support- '' r e T ft cin lel · · - t • well DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Au horlty EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc ot Security Review ' • ' · t - - '- Atch 9 C-23 ·1 - ·- - - ' -_ i 1 RB ' FROM BLUE TO CONTROL 101 ------MOVE NO _ _ _ _ _ I _ FERENCE CONTROL MS Gs 'l'O'l ·102 DTG MESSAGE NO 2·3231o·z JUN 76 ------------------PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE 'TO CON GRESS AND THE PEOPLE t lifat i i Broadcast concurrent with I anian Strikes l _ ' _ ' __ Several days ago Soviet forces mounted an unproyoked · _ ··· - t tack against the people of Iran This incursion threatens _ ·_ t''L · tq · x te nd Soviet hegomony over the entire Middle East -- an · event·· that would drastically shift the balance of power and seriously affect us interests in that area of the world The Shah of Iran has _requested us aid in assis ting him to repel the soviet invasion consequently I have directed us military actions on Iran's behalf These operations will pro· y de the Shah with required US support to include if necessary the limited selective use of tactical nuclear i hh i ltt - 1 9 s - n 11 r · t t tiwl f b - - - · - ' ' ·· - - · · ·· · · • A tph 10 DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Au hority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review C-24 I FROM CONTROL MESSAGE NO TO RED MOVE NO - REFERENCE 'CONTROL MS·G 10 l DTG 103 ----I 2·s-i-aooz· JUN 76 - - - - · • INITIAL SCENARIO PART II THE CRI·SIS A Glorious Vindication __ • _ On Tuesday 15 June 1976 the eruption occurred Bakr ordered Iraqi forces into Kuwait Em t ' - · · b oldened by the sudden isolation of Kuwait from its t t ¥i f- 4 mner conservative mentors aroused by the vociferous - - · · _ · · -support of radical Arab cohor and faced with apparent · - - ir i 1 1sion among the sm ller Gulf States Bakr decided the _ -c' · ·· · • 1 -'t 1m -opportune t o act in the name of Allah and settle -_ ' · -· -- _long-standing territorial disputes · · ' · - •t· - · President • •• 'i' ' The advance of the Iraqi forces was rapid and unimpeded By 1700 hours the same day armored units were reported passing the oil field at Ar Rawdah about i ·c ·il- t· -0 _ mi les inside the Kuwaiti border on the main north _ · t t t•· • · s lith ·road World reaction was vehement In New York ' · - · ·% '- 'i ' -' 1 ••K aiti representative to th United Nations in an ' ic- -· · hy _terically unbalanced cry of disrespect for the members ' i ·t - 2 · ¢f 'the General Assembly referred to the recent osten · · · r t¥lffr t atious display of Soviet-Iraqi military hardware and · · - ·• -·····Moscow's collusion i11 the sack of Kuwait 11 The Iranian · ·· delegate in turn denounced Iraq's brutal and unwarranted ·· breach of the peace The Shah of Iran desires to make clear to Iraq -- and to the world -- that this unbridled i ··'_ ' t- - · aggression will not go unchecked Unless Iraqi · _ · - - -- · -_ · forces cease their advance and begin withdrawing · - l FN - 't ' to established borders within 12 hours Iran ·· · · · -·· will consider this depredation an attack on its own territory DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review D-1 ____ --- -- -------' -------•-----·----- - - ·oiplomatic channels hunnned as the world attempted to Hotline cormnunications from the United States were frank but not threatening First Secretary Kirilenko denied any detailed knowledge of Iraqi intentions President Nixon fo rcefully reiterated the gravity of the situation and urged maximum efforts by both nations to restore order It was generally agreed not to ·enter the fighting and to restrain any nation not already involved from expanding the conflict sort out the growing crisis Persepolis Resurgent At 0430 hours on 16 June 1976 -- almost 12 hours to the minute Iranian F-4s began flying sorties against the still advancing Iraqi forces and against installations in Iraq The Soviet Embassy in Teheran reported that the Shah had informed both us and Soviet Ambassadors that he did not _ i F d to force a major war Accordingly he had taken a · il t1t' J' olic step to buy time His air force had bombed several · ' f i_ f F te gically located Iraqi airfields with conside 7able · · f i i lfi es_ · and had attacked the spearhead of the Iraqi's armored ' · ' '' ·' r·' fdb centrations in Kuwait The effect of this bombing had · •·•' ·b ja n to slow but not stop the Iragi advance The Shah · · emplias i zed that al though he had not yet cornmi t ted ground forces to the battle against Bakr he was prepared to do so if necessary to restore the status quo • t · · · · MY doubt of the Shah's determination was dispelled by 4 J l ·afternoon A flotilla of hydrofoils disembarked _· 1 it fi i t-l-- an infa 1try brigade at Bahrah Kuwait and five · - c -• -· - · eorting landing craft shuttled equipment to the beach ' I fo c e grouped and moved northward to meet the spear · · · - r'h'Eiad of the Iraqi assault Concurrently the Iranian Air • · Force J aunched a new round of strikes against Iraqi air fie ds and armored· elements of the Iraqi force in Kuwait i · _· At first light on 17 June the initial elements of an Iranian infantry division under heavy tactical air cover crossed the Iranian-Iraqi border astride route 46 the principal east-west artery between the frontier and the pp rt city of Basra At dusk the same day the force had tW f Je icted the main supply route from al Amarah i nto Basra • · -- -·· i -- · - ot i -r •r _ L jfr Ji ntil the evening of the 17th did the Shah break his · · · · ' ' ' off cial silence on the developments of the past two days DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review · - it Jtiii1i i t Jit i ' D-2 • I- • • t • -· On national radio he informed his countrymen that Iran was not at war but had acted solely to preserve the community of Gulf nations-from the territorial aggrandizement of Iraq and its alien communist supporters which threatened to defeat them The Iranian leader claimed that his army hqd entered Iraq only to force an immediate cease-fire on • ' Iraqi predators in Kuwait and to insure their withd awal _6' from the territory of their innocent southern neighbor ' Jt •• • I • • At 1500 hours on 18 June the UN Security Council con-vened an emergency session Previously unable to obtain· a meeting of the minds on the urgent necessity for a gen- eral cease-fire the council members now exchanged charges and countercharges of aggression The soviet representative condemned the Iranian invasion of Iraq and cited his country's treaty relationships to aid Iraq's efforts to defend itself sternly warned that the presence of Iranian forces on · _- ' _ _ - Iraqi soil would be met with the fiercest rebuff Calling · _ ·_-- Jttf tii fl f f '- ' for an immediate cease-fire throughout the Persian Gulf Ht J -• __ _ he Soviet diplomat moved that a UN fact finding team be •- - • • th d t - -r -f -lii i ift 1 - di •• · spa- C e 0 the are The sess i n end e d d espl •te I ran 1 s '' ·'· -7· •' - _L 1 '' _ -violent obJections with a resolution calling for a general -_ t' cease-fire -- the initial point of departure · ' -_ '- -' · ·_- • ' rr- ' ' ' '• ' •1 Yet another menacing development occurred on 18 June • and was a topic of grave closed door discussions in Mose ow General Hashim the would be Saudi strongman gambling dlr'assuring his future position in the Arab constellation · - ·- ·· took advantage of opportunity and militarily reoccupied the · · J _ J3uraimi_Oasis -- with additional promises of aid to Iraq • ' · _ - i # J§· - · once Saudi forces were proved capable and loyal Hashim ii l M i f · -- · had miscalculated however the point to which the momentum ' ' 't t 1m 4 ' ' f events had borne the government in Teheran Sheik Zayid - · t · ··' · ··already agitated beyond rhetorical consolation irrtl' lored _ _· __- '··' the Shah to preserve the United Arab Emirates from the · _ _imminent hand of fate The Sheiks of Bahrain and Qatar endorsed the plea Late on the evening of the 18th the Shah airlifted a battalion of light infantry to Abu Dhabi The palace in Teheran paraphrased the earlier explanation pf the intervention in Iraq preservation of the innocent ••• _ · _ deterrence of revolution • • • early withdrawal j t j r' 'f i q r e g wf f w ef i o i DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review D-3 · l ' fl• in Kuwait During the next two days there was growing evidence·of·a complete Iraqi rout Iranian forces charged forward with panzer-like speed while Iraqi diplomats pleaded with Arab allies for assistance · The fall of Baghdad seemed inevitable if Arab or Soviet intervention was not forthcoming In spite of these initial successes Iranian forces began ·meeting stiffer opposition in their advance Air battles became ferocious The F-4 attrition rate grew alarmingly when large numbers of MIG-21 Fishbed fighters began to appear and mobile SM batteries took their eXJ ected toll The Supreme Commander's Staff reported to the Shah that tank casualties had forced a temporary halt to the advance Teheran called for US naval air support from the US carrier task force which had just arrived in the Gulf of Oman but - a reply was tactfully withheld µending consideration · _ _ •t 'J 'he Sword of I shma·el • •·t t __ i• • • •• • h -J - ' il ' -t - j _ On O June with a measured Iranian advance again under ift½ iltj ¥i ·- p e Iranian delegate to the UN startled Assembly rep• ····-- ·· · ' ··se ftatives by accusing the Kremlin of providing direct · · · s istance to the Iraqis Only yesterday he flared 42 soviet military personnel were taken prisoner Interrogation of these unfortunates revealed that large-scale Soviet ·involvement was certain 11 The new model MIGs harassing Iranian flyers were flown by Soviet pilots SAM crews and - any n itank platoons were made up of soviet soldiers In - · a l_d tion some pliant prisoners had admitted hearing reports · · · i -' r • t $oyiet Special Forces teams were preparing for insertion i - ' ' ' f ' 1 f ·f critical_ approaches on the Iranian side of the Russo t ' jfaitif ¾ bo 'd r in he northwest of Iran As a contingency - ·•· t' ' '' ' ' parachute regiments were placed on advanced alert · · Aµditional military aircraft were put under operational qontrol of North Caucasus and Transcaucas11s Military District c·c minanders • I In the United Nations Moscow unequi1mcably denied direct participation in the conflict but alarmist press reports in Western cities broadcast the sensational charges The _ CI - and us military intelligence activities stepped up their z - _ µpl Iection efforts in both the battle zone and the border _ - - _ · as with Iran Besides covert activities the Americans I r j· fii lj 19 yed two squadrons of USAF F-4 f 7om_ Turkey into Iran '· •· -·'· - -- J_l ey were reported to be at Shahrokh1 Airfield · ' - ·1 t ' ' _ _ · '•• · I • DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoO Ofc of Security Review D-4 By daylight on 21 June Soviet statements clarified the situation and denied Teheran's accusations Radio Moscow explained the Soviet Union's actions as defense of Iraq's sovereign right to unhampered self-develo oment The Soviet Ambassador in Teheran in accordance with previous · instructions personally delivered identical notes to the Shah and to the US Ambassador regretting the circu stances which had forced soviet intervention on Iraq's behalf denied territorial ambition and pledged cessation as soon as Iran agreed to withdraw its forces to its own borders Outraged Shah Pahlavi tore the Soviet offer of peace into pieces and swore Iranian perseverance however bitter or long the war might be •• ii t r · 'f - -% · The next two days revealed the weaknesses of the hard- · - --0- ' ·''f t·· p ressed Iranian armies Outnumbered in the north and 1 ·_ ·_ ·unable to reinforce because· of the combat commitments on i _ _• t· · ·· ' · L ff5' f 1 __ jf f i t istern front they could not stem the advance of -· _ t iiSeviet forces which had crossed the Iranian border early i · i·f 'i - on -21 June in the vicinity of Julfa and Astara By the ' · ·' _ · evening of 23 June Soviet units driving down the coast line had reached Rasht -- 190 miles from Teheran a second group had surrounded Tabriz and its advance elements were proceeding along the Maragheh highway toward Zanjan ·· -_ - Apparently ignoring the probable consequences of - f 2-i tfi tfftra nian aggression the United States elected to inter - jr11Jt ir -r 0£ Thor · t·1 1 t l i t ir T e first indications of the US decision to do so were contained in a note de livered by the US Ambassador to the Soviet First Secretary on the 24th The United States views invasion of Iranian ·territory by Soviet forces with gravest concern - _ •·· ··•'· ·· Their immediate and total withdrawal is demanded · •·t · · - as a first step toward reestablishment 0£ peace J v ·· - ir i ·- -n the area The United States is fully pre _ t f · f• t J 'ed to take whatever steps may be necessary ·· - - ·- ·_ · - to support the Government of Iran and its armed • forces in repelling this invasion -- including ' · ·'' all necessary measures of force At the same DECLASSIRED NOV 1 7 2009 _ ·- _ Authority EO 12958 as amended - - ' _' Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review D- s H M • ·•• · $lc REr _ 1 '•- - r · • time we will continue to exercise careful restraint to ensure that the area of conflict is not further expanded In the meantime Soviet intelligence sources pieced together ominous bits of information A covert source determined that an emergency meeting of the North Atlantic Council had been convened and that the agenda included a discussion of the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in the crisis KGB analysts disregarded the latter revelation although US forces were known to possess tactical low yield weapons in storaqe sites in Turkey and Western Europe Other reports indicated that air movements asr ociated with us fighter squadron de r loy- nent and support_ ·' _·_i Jtng· ·•air lift from Europe began on 24 tune and were suspected ' _ ·· · Qf including possible nuclear weapons for deliveries to - r _ tii fal'i p i an ·bases It was also learned that us forces had been - 5 -' ' -t'' f pit•t ·ori'highest alert seventh Fleet units were observed f ·· _ · moving toward the Pacific Maritime Provinces • - -' t ong the -intense diplomatic exchanges Soviet diplomatic · sources reported communiques from Washington to Warsaw Pact capitals and Peking These messages echoed the salient · points in the United States' note Obviously appeals for political support they indicated that the intentions ·· _ · · 9-fJ p ·-ullited States were to use its diplomatic channels - t o'gain ·time coerce its allies into line and to attempt _ _ - -'- Q - P - ure world opinion against the communist group _1 4 Ifi3 Ji ¥iQjt i' ii tider t ook efforts in the United Nations General· -' _ ' · r ·i i ty to arrange for a cease-fire in place · - j ri 'view of these indicators and the tone of the US · · -Aitjbass·aaor' s note Soviet leaders replied with a strongly worded protest The United States A 'Clbassador in Moscow and the US Secretary of State in Washington were informed by the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs that the USSR WSl 8- ully aware of the two US F-4 squadrons and other force ·· Gl p lc yments into Iran and that these might grievously · ·-e acerbate the crisis provoked by the vicious Iranian i· - ' tf t 4ava_ s i q_n of Iraq Secretary Gromyko further warned the i -·· ' ' 1'•· f tUH f ted· states -- in veiled threats -- of the possible ···· nj 'i ftary consequences which forces directly involved _· ''' ' itf ttie crisis might suffer He concluded that expansion ·· - ---o ' ehe conflict would be a tragedy and would be the direct • -_- 0 DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 4tMXi_ty EO 12958 as amended ·· ·· ·- -- _Hiet ·ooo Ofc of Security Review D-6 tiPh ti l t ' · m-'l iffl fault of the United States as world opinion and history -· would universally attest In addition the Minister advised both officials that the Soviet Union had also _delivered messages to NATO and CENTO members to Spain and to Israel These unmistakably frank warnings stated _that any use of allied territory or bases by US military forces for aggression against soviet or Iraqi forces would be viewed by the USSR as direct involvement in the conflict Colossus Under Strain As a military response to us alert measures Soviet strategic forces were alerted On 24 June a maximum dis _ - persion of missile armed submarines was ordered Five Soviet di visions at reserve bases in the North Caucasus __ -- --· - - and Transcaucasus Military Districts began filling to 2 ' t - - t ory I_ standards iff ' · t -i r-- _ · Oe elopments along the FEBA were closely monitored In •d '1 t 1 f'fJ 1t _wes - advancing Soviet uni ts of the Seventh GUards Army ' - 5lia 9-· secured the environs of 'l'abri z on 2 4 June By the even-· · ing· of the 25th the entire 168th Division had reached Meyaneh approximately 120 kms east of Maragheh Advanced elements had spearheaded through the junction toward 'l'eheran j ii t ' j _ Along the Caspian Sea coastal routes the Sixth Motorized _ ' • · 'Rifle Division entered Rasht where it encountered consider ' · · - _able refugee congestion and local resistance To avoid ifl- iiifi 1 if1'l CE l ss_ary cas1 alties t e d visio had paus« d to ecure its · _ · · _ zi t ' r i al ' ·areas and its cornmunioat1ons with the reinforcing 75th · J ji -' · 1 tvision 60 kilometers to the north Because of this delay ··· -· · -· · lE ad battalions did not move through to open the routes into ··the mountains south of Rasht towards Teheran until 25 June Iranian defenders of Rasht fell back to mountain defiles in a rear guard action _ _Goetterdaemmerung -· · · _ ' - °As flagging Iranian forces reeled Red armor again gathered mQmentum By late afternoon of the 25th us advisors on both alie'nts reported i pending disaster The valiant armies of the Shah had buckled before the renewed Soviet drive ' - · ' As evening approached effusive reports of Soviet com·manders became less sanguine Iranian forces had made no DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Au hority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Of c of Security Review D- 7 attempt to establish defensive oositions in soite of favorable terrain enemy air sorties increased in intensity and number -- then suddenly ceased The contrast to the fighting of a few hours ago perplexed division headquarters the Kremlin urged advance in spite of field commanders' mis ivings Shortly after 1500Z the same day the puzzle was startingly clarified Units advancing on the highways near Meyaneh and south of Rasht reported -- incredulously -a series of nuclear detonations on their lead battalions Initial reports indicated ground burst nuclear demolitions on the main routes and low yield air bursts over the · · columns Communication nets between Moscow and the front h d with almost unbelievable reports and demands for verification Field commanders reported the leading - ·_ -i-yisions sustained strikes from appro ximately 40 weapons · ·il'if J dd i tion about 10 weapons were_ detonated along LOCs -y -il f f1 h¢r to the rear Since most of these were airbursts t 'W ifHt y- f iled to disrupt key bridges or transport facilities ·• f i t 1 ft w·· low capacity wooden bridges were destroyed and •· · · r· s vera 1 land slides were report ed north of Tabriz Initial estimates indicated that sufficient repairs to restore critical LOCs would be completed within one to two days ·A t hough an overall assessment by Soviet intelligence rialysts was not possible it appeared that the routes of · - ·c d'lfance of the 6th and 16 8th Di visions were blocked for at 1east six to eight hours In addition it was probable · • • · _ that the lead uni ts which came under heavv nuclear attack t _' · ·i ·· 1 ' 1 suitained 30-40 percent casualties - i j _ - t 1 e· sovie·t military planners were ev·aluating initial · ·_ _' 'J t lefield reports Kremlin leaders pored over other diolomatic communiques AMEMB Moscow Hand Delivered at 251500Z _ The President has authorized US military personnel to utilize a limited nnmber of low yield nuclear weapons against Soviet forces · ' i_ _ nvading Iran All strikes have been launched · 1f' --Jr f ff ¥om ·Iranian territory or territorial waters - - i Ou i -· use of nuclear force has thus far been · · ' ' ·· _ «f' t ii mi ted and selective ' ' '• ECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Au hority EO 12958 as amended · ·· Pp1e D0D Ofc of Security Review 1 - - ·• ' • D-8 I 1 I I ' l The US objective is to restOJ e the peace territory and integrity of Iran This objective is vital to US national interests To achieve this end a The USG demands the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces from the territory of Iran b The USG demands Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait c If the above actions are taken the USG guarantees Iranian withdrawal from Iraq The us considers the freedom of all states _- '-'_ _ __ in the Middle East and continued access to the E-j ' i ' ' hi t_ ' _ o 1rea 's energy resources essential to the secur1l J-J f 1- I ' -- - ity interests of the OS and Western Europe - r--·• ' l i cK · -' Continued USSR aggressive military action in -· ' '- - · - _ ··the area may result in further responses· in -this and other areas You should know that the us and its allies have available for employment a range of possible further actions to protect Iran and prevent the loss of the energy resources of- the area SOVIET mmASSY WASHINGTON 251530Z JUN 76 t· _ _ · · · r• J • ·- · tY -tl - _ The· President of the United States has just n_i i J -Fit _ spoken to a joint session of Congress His ' ' ' ··•·•''· -F- ·· message · ·· - · is receiving full media news coverage here and on international wire services 'Several days ago Soviet forces mounted an unprovoked attack against the people of Iran This incursion threatens to extend Soviet hegemony over the entire Middle East -- an event that would drastically shift the balance of power and riously affect us interests in that area of the wqrld • 'The Shah of Iran has requested us aid in assisting him to repel the Soviet invasion consequently I have directed US military actions ECLASSJFIED NOV 1 7 2009 ALi hority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review D-9 s on Iran's behalf These onerations will provide the Shah with required US support to include as necessary the· limited selective use of tactical nuclear weapons ' ··· I I General reaction here is one of alar rn over the conflict in the Middle East However I believe a quick surge of Soviet information worldwide and appropriate initiatives with like-minded nations especially· in the Mindle East could deflect any sympathy the United States might induce for its rashness In Washington the enormity of the shock associated with the US use of nuclear weapons in Iran has created a stunned realization of the l- -- •· extent of us involvement Horrendous· reactions • 1 f y W ii probably can be expected in a few hours t ' ' _'1 '_ rnt tf e i°UeSt ipstrUCtiOnS • II Reports from the Soviet force commander provided some ·new facts COMMANDER CAUCASUS FRONT 251800Z JUN 76 The 6th Division Commander at Rasht and 168th ·_ 't · r i ' · JJ v ion Commander east of Maragheh report tpeir · _ -' _ _ y · fo_t ces attacked by nuclear weapons at about g j ' f jl im - 51$0 Z -J 76 Approximate y 1 000 dead in the J- _ •- f - 1 · i- fith Division and over 3 000 in 168th No accurate ' · ·• gount of Iranian civilian and or military casualties 168th Division is non-combat effective th Division Commander reports his situation is uncertain q__l le to loss of communications Uni ts north of Rasht also suffered casualties but extent of·damage is unknown - 0 Information is incomplete but General attack on his forces east of Maragheh included 18 separate airnursts · f -' · J i Teri airbursts were observed vicinity of Rasht · · Voronsky reports that the · ' i' ·· _ _i ' • ·'' · General Voronsky also reports that prior tc · attack on 168th Division our surveillance aircraft detected contacts approaching from bases DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 ·· ·-' _ Authority EO 12958 as amended •· - · ·' · ·Chief o o· Ofc of Security Review i ·t t ' t it j i i ifr _ ·_ ' D-10 l i ·· ' -· •• ••• i i 1 y r iitt - in southern Iran No ident if i cation or intercepts were made ELINT COT INT indicates US F-4 aircraft and possibly US naval strike aircraft My overall estimate is that because of the high number of casualties combat elements are unable to continue offensive operations at this time It is my intention to remain in present positions and regroup Time is now 251800Z JUNE 1976 I • DECLASSJFIEO NOV 1 7 2009 ' · · • ·· · hor1ty ·eo 12958 as amended i · l j •et DoO Ofc of Security Review t f i il _ J · ·· -· D-11 j FROM RED MESSAGE NO TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE· CONTROL MSGS l'O'l ' ·103 DTG 101 I ·2s·1sooz JUN 76 1 IMPACT OF CRISIS ON NATIONAL INTERESTS to a USSR interests The crisis presents an opportunity 1 Extend soviet influence and improve world power • • - 7 po i tion 2 Facilitate decline and eventual demise of our imperialistic competitors not only the United States but ·Japan and Western Europe as well However at the same time it increases the possibility of a strategic nuclear exchange between the soviet Union and the United States Such an exchange would not be in the interest of the Soviet Union • The crisis could also adversely affect our position vis-avis the PRC should the crisis result in diminished power influence for the USSR ·· · • f • b US interests The United States shares with us a primary interest of avoiding strategic nuclear exchange ' tfJt tfK t fa ween our two nations However the United states' use · · r li' M t f nuclear weapons creates uncertainties as to us inten · -· - · c · - - tions It is likely the United States recognizes that a major interest in Middle East oil is at stake The United States may also see in the crisis• its potential decline as ·a viable political and military-superpower It will need o maintain as many allies as possible to fprestall an eventual us demise T us it may be ready to take drastic measures to prevent collapse of US imperia ism ·• · ' -- ·-' i ·· · - · _ • • 0 • · q Iranian interests Iran· faces a situation in which the Shah's influence may have been denigrated with the weak ·_ening of both the Iranian government and armed forces The crisis presents an increased opportunity for dissidence Iran will act to preserve its present form of government and leadership in the region Its primary interest is seen DECLASSIRED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review E-1 Il -- ----------------------- --1 as national survival and freedom from coercion and outside influence d Iraqi interests Iraq also has a primary interest in national survival and freedom from outside •influence ·xn-addition its -actions indicate a desire· for territorial acquisition and a leading role in mobilizing radical movements in the region The United States' use of nuclear weapons may affect Iraq's resolve an -ally of the USSR With pressure on Iran eased as a result of US support the Iraqis may feel ore_depe de t on the USSR - as e Interests of others • • ••• a -' ••t - - - • Western Europe While recognizing thai its is tied to the United States the crisis will lfHf i tr ' oubts about the wisdom _of us acti n and the subse · - Fttt ' en impact on West Europe ill security west European ations can· be expected to examine the_ir c llliances as they · · - - ' · ·s eel to avoid direct involvement in the conflict and pre · · e-iude· economic losses sho uld their access to Middle Eastern - 1 - 1 _ l asic s·ecurity • ··_ · ' ·· ' oii' be curtailed or interrupted 2 Peoples Republic of China PRC · The ·PRC will n opportunity to exploit the situation in order-to ' · ·' ·jnaintain its relative power position vis-a-vis the USSR and • - _i - prevent either of the s upe owers _·fr ·gaining hegemony in · e r l' 111 f cidl J basic seci rity enains tied to the tini ted States The potential effect of the crisis on Japan's _ q'ap _•s_ oil supply will ·raise concerns of political black- ·ziiail'' and economic disaster 4 Third World Nations The Third World Nations will view their interests as being best served if they can avoid injury from the Middle East co fI ict 5 Turkey Turkey will seek to protect its terriand avoid involvement in the conflict turn Turkey's primary concern to ts own tt - l·trt Jtf and i1 terests - J ' • ffie -US act 1 on ·will 1• _ $ecurity DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Au hority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc ot Security Review E-2 --·- --·--- ---·-··--- - - --- -- -- - ·· ' _ __ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - J 1 • · ' ' i j ir SE - - s rtt IJ l -lf-l '-' - ··-· _c 2 OBJECTIVES a - USSR immediate objectives· 1 Improve maintain the credibility of the USSR as a world power 2 Maintain improve the Soviet influence in the Middle East by a Protecting and strengthening Iraq and b Weakening Iran rf N t ii' tes · 1 • _ • - 3 Provide an effective response · t·o the· United use of nuclear w$apons 4 Separate the United States from as many of her allies as feasible i · ·- · 5 Avoid strategic nuclear exchange C-6 Exploit·opportunity to marshall world opinion against the Uni tea States · · · - 7 Avoid nuclear strikes on Soviet territory i W ti ' ·t - _ -f- _ _- · · L1 t f j _ _ '••• I•' b US R perception of us immediate objectives 1 To resolve the oonflic · quicklf ' ' 2 To localize the conflict 0 3 To force the withdrawal of USSR forces and thereby humiliate the Soviet Union •·' - • 4 To maintain Iranian independence under the present Shah's government - i i -·interests · 5 in To preserve and protect US the Middle East imperialistic oil c The United States is likely to perceive the im- mediate objectives of the USSR as · DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoQ Ofc of Security Review E-3 · l Conquer Iran 2 Control Middle_ a t oil 3 Avoid s- ra gic nuclear e change • 4 Regain the initiative an objective which might be achieved by starti ng another crisis ·elsewhere 3 POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEASURES a Military attack options and associated political signals • _ f · ' · 1 Phase I _ - j· g aria moves f ' ' il li'f ' _· · a Institute worldwide politica1·and propa- as follows f · ' · · UJli ted States 1 Warn·us allies not to support the 2 Fan anti-us sentiments of leftist · liberal elements worldwide · · · 1 • 1 '1 • · 3 Denounce within the UN forum and United States' use of nuclear ft t ' _·1 ifpugh_ the world-press ' · _ ·· ·· ·r · f ·· apons · see Atoh 1 • -- _ ··I · • J_ • iL L • - _ •• ···· •' ' -· us force • • · · • •• • y i ' 4 S cifically w ax n Turkey to pJ ohibi t deployments £1 om Turkey _ 5 • Provide support to Baluchi tribesmen to incite dissidence ·in Iran _ ' 6 Alert all Soviet forces and initiate a fuil-scale mobili iation • • I • b Institute military readiness moves to 1 Deploying fleet units to best advantage - forces - 2 Alert and qeployment of Warsaw -Pact to assembly areas DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended t ·_ · - _· _ Chlff DoD ore or Security Review t - _ - J -- · _ E-4 ·--- - -- --- • •· ' _ · · r ·· · 3 Order Soviet forces in Iran to halt in place and regroup- See Atch 2 4 Redeploy conventional forces within the area to minimize ·nuclear vulnerability • decimated uriits 5 Provide individual replacements for in Iran 6 Deploy·nuclear capable units to best advantage includfng staging at Warsaw Pact airfields · I 7 Small-scale low level infiltration of Soviet forces into Iraq by land routes through Iran and '· · l y direct aerial emplacement I oad out ships in Black Sea ' l' • · ' w tth heavy equipment to be shipped to Syria for further · · _ - ·' '· • '-· · t·ra· nsfer to Ir aq· • - ·' A Y · · • · 2 Phase II Military phase to include a masshre · rion nuclear attack on Iranian airfields coincidental with -_ 'qll airborne assault at first light on Teheran Interna__ ·tional Airport in order to hold city hostage Order existing forces in northern Iran to continue to Teheran for link-up with airborne troops ·Order one motorized rifle division and one tank division on the eastern side of the Caspian to proceed to Teheran Step up augmentation of ·Soviet forces in Iraq This phase to be executed 48 hours · ·-·- t t er US nu9lear attack b Rationale constraints risks·and consequences for · -Ghe m i lit ary and political options selected • • r • - ' • ••• · ·· 1 Rationale Principal rationale for non-nuclear · · · approach is the opportunity to a Cool the situation b USSR will appear as a peacemaker in the - world and cast the United States in the odious role of ' _ · · · i · - • t gating WW III • · · · • ' '•1 · • • c Takes advantage of Soviet conventional and increases the difficulty for the United · States in resorting to a nuclear option in the future · rf - -_ 9 periority · i - '· ' • J - · • ' t · DECLASSIFIE OV 1 7 2009 A thority EO 12958 as amended ·· - ·_Cttief O oD Ofc of Security Review ' · - • · • - E-5 I I I ----- -- -- - -- - - - 2 Constraints a Need to hold·Teheran long enough for it to serve as a bargaining chip Cb Meticulous planning required to reduce the vulnerability to nuclear attack of link-up and tr s i ing forces in Iraq c Speed-is essential-to the success of air- borne operation d Extreme care is necessary to avoid provoking additiona1 us· tactical nuclear strikes 3 · Risks •and consequences • Cc Failure to link-up places the· entire opera-· · _ · · tipn in jeopardy - and· casts doubt on the validi 'i Y of Sovie_t- · conventional superiority · · · - · d Compromise of the secrecy required in the··· - _ · ' · loyment of forces through Iraq creates the ri·sk of · i n clea r attack on these forces 'f J' ' ' HO t d ·Likely percep ons r es of protagonists • f _ • _ - · _ · _ 1 Iran a Seizure of Teheran-and·other actions will create a military situation in which the us nuclear capability will be of no immediate help b Iranian Government could fight on but with · little expectation of success _ 2 Iraq otc'tAss1F1Eo Nov 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief PoD Ofc of Security Review E-6 • --• -•· ------ --------- - • •- - --- --- ------- • - - --- • •• - -• •• ••- • '•• o - ' '- _ _ __ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - - · ·-··- · - __ '-$BC ST gf iIJh@ il · · - - t lt · i i1k --' J t· a Will be strengthened in fact and in spirit by the Soviet reinforcements 1 b Irag will fight on 3 United States a Will be relieved that there was no im mediate Soviet nuclear escalation Probably will not use nuclear weapons on Soviet troops seizing Teheran b Will be dismayed by minimum vulnerability of Soviet forces and will be reluctant to attack Soviet forces entering Iraq during Phase I since 1 They pose no immediate danger to Iran 2 They do not offer a good target i h r country 3 Action would expand conflict to c Will not strike So_viet forces inside Russia before our strike on Teheran 4 Turkey a Will not initiate ground ·war against soviet Union but wil l not expel US forces b Will nervously maintain essentially he sta us guo and will blink at Soviet ships passinq ·t 1 i oqgh th Bosporus · _ c Will Drotest and may constrain US nuclear ·'operations from Turkish bases ' d Other international reactions and domestic response 1 Generally the world should reanily contrast Soviet moderation and sense of responsibility with US adventurism and recklessness ·' •_ · ' CJECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief OoD Ofc of Security Review E-7 - -- - ' ' ' ' - --•· --····--·· - ---·-· -· ----- -------· ---· 2 Soviet response should pry Atlantic Alliance· farther away from its irresponsible partner the United States 3 Nonaligned nations should clearly identify US actions with their worst characterizations of s_uperpower behavior with the USSR emerging ·as a champion of peace - 4 The Middle East nations will note ·ti-ie wilti g nes of the United States to turn their region into a · · nuclear battlefield to s cure its imperialistic objectives 5 The PRC may interpret the OSSR's moderate re -· s ponse as a lack of resolve to us·e-its total military power ' ··· ·· '_· ·· 6 Neutral nations Sweden and Switzerland in · y - _ p rticular should complain loudly and long in internaif ii J fo ums over the naked use of US nuclear power - • • • •• it1 -l •• 0 _ • -· 7 Within the United States schisms will un r _c t ' i'- ·'-·er6u' btedly occur within the Congress which will jeopardize future nuclear employment particularly when·confronted with patently incommensurate r·is·ks Sharp 'di-ssent among opinion leaders and pressure groups should also result - 8 Within the United Nations USSR leadership hotild b e strengthened and prospects for key Soviet _·· p oj cts such as a World Disarmament ·conference should be 11 -i ·l i i r tn · F -- ' ' 9 ·The option offers' an e·xcellent opportuni ty ' t -· £ it pontaneous consensus and defuses the issues of Soviet · - ·_ -· ' · - a her Warsaw Pact internal dissent and domestic demands over consumerism e Other options considered but rejected 1 Nuclear attack on Iranian airfields Not militarily necessary in overall Restraining such an attack puts onus • - ·r - Jf' G Pr- fur thei- indeed if any nuclear strikes on the United i·· ··· · States a i _ - i #' 1 -· of _action DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Qhief OoD _Qfc of Security Review · '• ' ' · · E-8 -· - lffH _ - ·-l- · Cim'i' b In a political sense the rejection of this option does more to protect Soviet forces against further nuclear attack since the USSR would be unwilling to strike all the bases that could bring us nuclear power to bear on Soviet forces 2 Attacks on US Fleet a Conventional attack would tend to mobiliize US support for a continuing campaign b Nuclear attack rej·ected for same reasons cited in paragraph 3e l above · 3 Immediate rather than delayed attacks on airfields and Teheran or other overtly hostile acts a ·Time is needed to organize airborne oper b There is insufficient time to permit a campaign to work c The United States has no apparent reason to act further unless the Soviets are ·overtly hostiie since the United-States has indicated 'a desire to terminate the conflict · -·- - -· ' ' 1 ' 4 Spread of hostilities to other countries # -L • · a Is inconsistent with intent of Phase I to ---- _ --_- _ g ·ve -the impression of a Soviet desire to minimize the ex _ • • f •· ·- pansion of hostilities 1 b Expansion of the conflict would risk· galvanizing the Western allie int a cohesive response • ·- ·e c It is inconsistent with the objective of ·pi esenting the United States with maximµm amb guity_ a desire to count to accomplish DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Au hority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoO Ofc of Security Review E-9 4 CONTINGENCIES Actions by s Actions by the USSR a If the United States again strikes Soviet forces on Iranian soil with nuclear a We will 1 Use nuclear weao_on on weapons · a Turkish tar·· get • b US naval targets in Persian Gulf and Medj te r nean- · 2 Initiate reinforcement of GSFG with second echelon units from estern -li t-ary Districts 3 Publicly propos·e summit _meeting at Geneva- b In highly unlikely event the United States uses n clear weapons against So'· tet targets in South · - Caucasus • • ' · f t i t i •· b We will 1 Carry out all of ab9ve • • 2 Select medium- sized US city_ •provide · 24-hour evacuation notice and then attack the city with one ICBM • - · ·_ · c Comment We will leak via several ·established intelligence channels all of aboye fnformation to the US Government with the excepti on of the 2 4 -hour evacua ion notice · This will be announced ublicly if and when it becomes nec ssary to attack a US city '1 2 ·i · Jj i i tf•i - - - · · · ··0Eci Ass1F1Eo NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chi_ef Ofc of Security Review ·· • 9 - E-10 ·'· ·· FROM RED MESSAGE NO TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 1-0'1 · l'O 3 DTG ___2 5 -1 8 00 Z_J_U_N_7_6 101 r -------------------UNITED NATIONS ADDRESS AND WORLD PRESS RELEASE The United States has brought the world to the brink of On the pretext of an alleged threat to their ·interests ·the imperialists have gone halfway round the _ globe to unleash the horror of· nuclear war Playing with - • •the fate of mankind in this manner is impermissible destruction f hii -· r · · i i ·such conduct cannot go unpunished The Soviet Union JH lls on the states·and peoples of the world to condemn ·_ · this reckless wanton action It is imperative that the _- _ · U_I i ted Nations should resolutely rebuff this bestial · ·attack imposing the severest sanctions upon the US Government The USSR and the progressive peoples of the Middle East call upon the people of Iran to rise up against the corrupt government which has engrossed their country to the threat - J_ j - ·· - - - of total destruction • • · -A -- iih Soldiers of the USSR moving to the assi tance of their · ' t ' c' · ' C'' ''traqi friends who are a subject of Iranian aggression were among the victims of this reckless attack The Soviet _ _ · Government is mindful of° its responsibilities for the fate of mankind in dealing with this attack At the same time the Soviet Government is deterrnined·that this crime shall not go unpunished Nor should the US Government delude itself into thinking that Soviet territory can be violated with impunity • ' i- -1fff T' i c· · 7 ' fi f 1j tr e ·soviets are ever mindful of the threat of cold and AQ ery which the brash actions of the imperialist warmongers fi ye imposed on many of the peace-loving peoples of the ' '_ · · __ · ··world The USSR will work to lessen this threat by main · -· - ••t ning a continuous supply of vital oil to the Govermnent a - • •• • a •• • 'f f i • r ' DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Atch 1 Authority EO 12958 as amended E-11 · Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review of Japan and our friends in western Europe Great will ·be the sorrow of those nations who aid the United States in her aggressive acts against the peoples of the USSR and Iraq They will go hungry because of their inability to harvest the crops in the fields and their peoples will shiver with cold in their homes factories and schools '• •• · I • fJ rl p · 1 ' · - · t ' '••'• ·Atch 1 E-12 · · FROM RED MESSAGE NO TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE CONTROL MS'GS 101 103 DTG· 101 I ---------251800Z 'JUN 76 FROM MOD USSR TO CDR CAUCASUS FRONT 1 Halt in place forces presently deployed in Northern Iran • il l y 2 Reorganize and reconstitute forces 3 Establish defensive positions 4 Report critical losses of personnel equipment and supplies 5 Initial medical reinforcements and medical evacuation aircraft being dispatched · · - i · - On order be prepared to continue attack along ° -' 'Zarfjan-Teheran axis to seize Teheran city and effect iJJ t i tk-up with airborne forces occupying Teheran Inter·· - national Airport Speed in effecting link-up essential 7 Once link-up has been effected assume command ·of all forces in area 8 Initial airborne assault of International Airport to be conducted by 104th Abn Div with 19th Mtz Rifle Div being air landed to reinforce airhead t - 1t t '· ''9· Secondary ground attack to be made along Sharud '' ki f hera n axis by 15th Tank Div and 54th Mtz Rifle Div of ' tii µrkestan MD to facilitate link-up and reinforcement airhead · ·r · of DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Atch 2Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review E-13 3 o·· rr -- Page detennined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief DoD OSR Date N ov 1 loc ' IAW EO 12958 Section 3 5 fi _ · - 1ij PJ i1 1 1w r- FROM CONTROL 1 ESSZ GE NO TO BLUE MOVE REFERENCE BLUE MSG 101 DTG 201 ----II NO ------- 272000Z JUN 76 FIRST SCENARIO PROJECTION PART I SCYLLA AND CEA YBDIS t · - · ·-· Following quickly on the heels of the 23 June National Security Council meeting a series of US rnili tary and '· tt ·' - t ' i t -giplomatiq actions· worldwide conf irmed President ixon I s ·it · · __ J itt solve-·to assist Iran in repelling the Soviet invasion - _- vrt • _ The tenor of the actions was set forth in a note to the rr iljL i l tsg_ f V t First Secretary ' _ 0 · The US views invasion of Iranian territory by Soviet Forces with gravest concern Their immediate and total withdrawal is demanded as a first step toward reestablishment of peace in the area The US is fully prepared to take whatever steps may -· be neces·sary to support the Government of Iran and · its Armed Forces in repelling this invasion in · c luding all necessary measures of force At the ' same time we will continue to exercise careful ·restraint to ensure that the area of conflict is l Ot further expanded In Washington Secretary of State Kissinger informed the Ambassadors from the Warsaw Pact nations of the salient points in the us note to the Soviet Union and urged them to use their good offices to intercede with the Kremlin to i'f · - · _ _ _ - · · -· withdraw Soviet forces from Iran He dispassionately out lined the danqer to their homelands if the Kremlin con it · • • • xd ihued its irrational action In a separate meeting the '' f f J1t Rc ··AJnbassador was apprised of us views and told that his · · ·_ · -' t ' · government would be informed of further actions At an - ' - • 7 - - rgency meeting of the North Atlantic Council the US -I '· DECLASSIRED NOV 1 7 2009 Au hority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoO Ofc of Security Review F-1 f'Ofl SECRi T Ambassador to NATO stressed US determination to rev nt th attainment of the USSR's goals in Iran and the Middle East and urged partici ation in joint actions to restore peace He outlined the possible use of tactical nuclear weaoons as well as the air movements currently under way Althouqh receptive to the US views NATO members equivocated The Government of Japan was advised of the NAC meeting and Japanese views solicited In a somber message the Shah of Iran was reassured of full American assistance He was told however that the grim situation made the use of tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet forces in Iran the onlv feasible option if the Soviet invasion continued The shah reluctantly aqreed _ On 25 June the continuing Soviet advance immediately ·· ti sfgnaled to the President the Kremlin's desire for overt f t i · t_ i-tary actions As a consequence the President ordered ·p_loyment of nuclear wea i ons lj -ii fii1 - ii ¾¢t leaders were shocked and surnrised by the US Lead divisions were not onlv deprived of ·· · relatively bloodless conquest of Iran but-- they had given critical maneuvering space and had lost the initiative to Iranian defenders · -'·'· · •t ' nu·ctear· attack · · up USAF USN aircraft in conjunction with artillery deliv- · r i•t_ i f I nuclear weapons against Soviet elements on two fronts i 3 i' f y ra l deeper penetrations also struck Soviet rear LOCs in ·· '- · · · -r i Iran Primary impact of the attack centered around · etc mation sites of four ADMs where more than 30 co i J · - - rd·in·ated nuclear artillery and air strikes lashed leadinq r 1 ' jjc ie t· µnits blocked by the ADMs r and neutralized the Soviet · · t th rus t Scattered Iranian battlefield reports post strike ·L·i p_ ' •riconnaissance and initial debriefings by A -nerican pilots 1nliicated losses of 35 to 45 percent in the two Soviet divitd·ons at Meyaneh and at Rasht Four F-4 s were lost To the rear nuclear air bursts over bridges at Archivan -·- ·· - · ·i l and iCh elvand north of Rasht and against choke points i · Tii bz iof Tabriz imposed light damage on LOCs and inflictea • l i it · ' llt casua 1 ties on two other soviet divisions nearby J - • _ · j ' -· · ··· • jiL l t Tin extent of the attack not only startled Soviet mili i _ ' t y ·prariners but also emboldened the hard-pressed Shah DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review F-2 L • - and stiffened Iranian fighting resolve Reg r oupinq their forces into new defensive positions north ano v 1est o f Qaz in the Iranians prepared to fight a delaying action aqainc t an' renewed Soviet attack · East of Tehera n nea r Gorgan at the Amol bridge and Shahi tunnel new ADMs were emulaced for possible use rn the meantime elements of two Iranian divisions previously located at Kermanshaw near the Iraqi border closed with the defenders and provided welcomed reserves Nuclear Alleriies Despite these battlefield setbacks the Soviets qave no diplomatic indications that they were willing to talk Vigorous appeals for conflict limiting negotiations had - • - accompanied the nuclear flashes but failed to revitalize · · · tt - · the Medusa-like stares of the world In the main the ' Jf J · t QV i et Union propagandized irrational American actions 11 1 f f tf 11 J harginq that United States in characteristic manner JA t_ E i tJ ra -e1 y damaged world peace for the present and future ' t ffl ' -n ra ti ons • the - r · _ · ·The impact of the Soviet diatribe was not complet7 ly - ·· · ' · · iost UP On the American public Remembering the aqonies of Vietnam many wondered had the US indeed acted in an irrational manner and again involved itself in a part of the wo ld where it did not belong But despite sporadic de on __ $ ations among some of the extreme camps on the American ·· • Y ·_ · · ·· •q J 11 eS1tic scene most of the citizenry including Congres__ iii l fl ' · i11 1 a_nd government leaders gave measured approval to · i i J fJ · ___ et apparently successful nuclear ploy As the l eriod of · i i't rt lf 3 r ' i · ' ' 1 m i t tiout a nuclear response from the USSR grew lonqer · si •·1 tt1 · ' ' 'f be ·'1 tiblic became more optimistic that a standoff had been _- - ach ieved and a negotiated settlement would somehow be ii ' ·· Y - · ossible T ·i i ' • - · On 26 June Roviet actions around the world airned at widening the differences between the US and its allies on • - '· e nuclear issue In Europe public outcry of the social - ' _ i ·· · ists flared in protest against United States actions How · i V r absence of a Soviet nuclear retaliation caught the IM Hl· Jptt di_ts of doom sans explanation Although the newspapers · •· 't· _ ry · · did· ·their exaqgerated be·st to fan the average reader's fears •'' - ' f- 1· ·l ree · world reaction tended to coalesce behind us leadership · · · _ · J•· _ - _ • • •• • DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended · · · N f DqQ Otc·ot Security Review i l J i f F-3 -I 1 1 1 1 I I i 1 · I ·j I ' -· 1 ' t t t f t r i l l i f •f-°i __ _ · rn i -_J ·· Inn eed there ivcre rUfferences in the rleq rec of concP-r · among the all i es and no government official G - rJn mefl mv positive commitmentt nevertheless the UK qave its assurances of understanding for the nuclear resoonse while West Germany fearing potential escalation of the conflict arque l strongly for concerted NATO oreparations France souqht to exercise its three-cornered relations with each protagonist by maintaining a neutralist position and offerinq to mediate the conflict The Soviet Union along with its propaganda about the horrors of atomic bombs issued a second warning to US allies not to support the United States Turkey became a special target abusive propaqanda aimed t deterrinq -- ·· United States force deployments from Turkj sh bases But 0- _· ·•· the capstone of Soviet· efforts was delivered to an ap r re _- · - h ns j ve audience in the General Assembly of the Uni ten for j f t iJ st ons -f th t· ···'· - - - · ' The United States has brought the world to f - bnd' l rink of destruction · - ·- · · On the pretext of an · · a'lieged threat to their interests · the imperial· '_Jsts have gone halfway round the globe to unleash · the horror of nuclear war Plaving with the fate of mankind in this manner is impermissible • c - Such conduct cannot go unpunished The Soviet _Union calls on the states and peooles of the world iiis' r i• j ft condernn this reckless wanton action It is •r ' f c 1 2 J't '1f h'iperative that the United Nations should r so t f J_y t ' t tiutely rebuff this bestial attack imposing the -'f - t J - - -r i ' ·· · · · • · · · · ·'' ' 1 i t severest sanctions upon the US Government · • i ' • ·r r g 1• f · · The USSR and the progressive peoples of the · -1Uddle East call upon the -oeople of Iran to rise Ul against the corrupt gO ernrnent which hc ts exposed their country to the threat of total destruction - i i - _ _ ' ··- 'Soldiers of the USSR moving to the assistance i p f their Iraqi friends who are a subject of J · 1 r ·' VXr 11ian agc ression were among the victims of The oviet Goverr ment is ' ·' 1·t J•' J 'il' tnfiticiful of its resoonsibili ties for the fate of · - iarikind in dealing with this attack At the T i i ii· l 1 1 r eckless attack DECLASSIFIED NOV l 7 2009 A-uthority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review · H- r W r 1 t_ F-4 • same tii'1e the S1 1viet Government is a tc T11i ne l that this crime shall not go 1 mounished Nor $hould the US Government delu e itself into thinking that Soviet territory can he violated with impunity The Soviets are ever mindful of the threat of cold and misery which the brash actions of the imperialist warmongers have im osed on many of the peace-loving peoples of the world The USSR will work to lessen this threat bv maintaining a continuous supply of vital oil to the Government of Ja an and our friends in Western Europe Great will be the sorrow of those nations who aid the United States in her agqressive acts against the peoples of the USSR and · - · · ·J- tj f ' l m tyT yh sioJ i' i ef u e ot r r _ their peoples will shiver with cold in their · 'L i ' - b mes ·• · f 1 ' - 1 ·- • _ - factories and schools 11 ' --- - _ _ t' -_ _ · Actions Speak Louder ' · - · -_ • · None of these warns matched the stark persuasion of Soviet military preparations which backstopped their pro n ganda efforts In London knowledgeable Rremlinologists po dered the significance of signs that a worldwide soviet · ' _ · lert was nc'lerway Did it portend more horrors yet to ··· ifa iiiii ' Jh ap r en r or was it merely a response to the tJS alert • - t - assy officials in Moscow confirmed that the Soviets were H ii J t 1 i t t1 et 1 p ni11g full-scale mobilization Reserve fill-ins unit nti t tJJ ji P 11 gs and cessation of normal training were observed · _ · 'f h c oughout the warsai r Pact while Pacific and North · · - t • · ··Atlantic fleet movements attracted anxious attention - _ __- · ' -· ·- · Despite the seeming popularity of Soviet pronaqanda there were some credits along with the pebits in world reactions to the United States' resolution to defend an ' ' ally · The NAC had listened carefully to US rationale for _ its actions F uropean leaders oubliclv conceded the issm U 1 Ut i 1ftc the popular clamor to avoid war at y cost Neverthe it • f -L -les s Soviet deployments throughout Warsaw Pact nations had - - fitMl ' ' m it · gone unnoti eit The NAC at the insistence of the · - 7- -7 _ - '- F d ±a-1 'Republic of Germany and Turkey reluctantly aqreed · _ • -- · ·to initiate Simple - lert • • • • ' -- - • • DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 - Authority EO 12958 as amended _ _Chief oD Ofc of Security Review w Jt i i' ihi F-5 American efforts to gain supoort in Asia received 1 eiler1 thank yous •• Japan was particularly distressed by nublic consternation over the repeated use of nuclear weaoons by its ally -- and appeared swayed by Soviet promises of assured oil su plies overnment leaders privately con veyed their hope that the United States would he able to successfully resolve the conflict in the Middle East The Peoples Republic of China informally acknowledged the United States effort to keep its leaders informed and went on maximum lert Iran conducted its own diplomatic overtures From Turkey it received discreet sympathy and increaRed liaison Pakistan on the other hand moved quickly to ouash the up·of· Baluchi dissidents along the common- southeastern · ' -L fV f $ bor'cmr There was no doubt in either Iranian or Pakistani -JC · t · I 1ijin s ha·t the Soviets were behind this diversionary unrest• ' · r ··· t ' - ire· tl1ff t¼-f - · i i · · · -r V'Ci- ft T - ' AEf Arab Middle East and the Third World natur ally ftf i J t'f q # 1- ed _ag inst the nuclear crisis • Even so this · ' l· if f it' _ ony of outcries neither moved the Soviets to the · · • · ·negotiating table nor displaced any tactical forces committed to the battle Redeeming the Time · _ j L - _-the lee of the nuclear storm Iranian and American tot·ce$ worked to exploit the pause gained by their ini tiioii fi iiif · • v 1 US airlift resu lied the nuclear weapon ex0enden 5J·• ' rts·· june to include aerial bombs T ii' r' · _ ·Qolster to the Iranian defenses two batteries of ifh il l - 1'1J r ig m ssiles These latter six weanons were e111placed ' · • _ ' - · -- i- e Just south of Teheran and although manned by a ·· us· Army craw training of Iranian launch crews beqan immediately The newly created Iran support Command ele m ent was ' · · - · · r s· a t ··· ol loca t d with the Imperial Iranian Chief Ruprerne Command in Teheran Tactical air supoort units arriven at Shiraz · 1 1 Base to maintain USAF aircraft A new dep1 Uent route via Diego Garcia Island in the Indian 3 _3 b ' ' ' J1f r opened OcQSD ftid• f · ···· - t _r sponse to NATO alert measures four CRESTED CAP -yr f '· - t r squadrons deployed into West Germa y to replace -- i -- s s·ets consigned to Iran RF FORGER uni ts were readied 1 J ' j tiffd ployment awai'ting a Presidential decision to enter ·· - ·tj ie battle either in Europe or in Iran DECLASSfRED NOV 1 7 2009 · ' · ·· AutlJority EO 12958 as amended · 1 _ ' · - tefHl 0 0 Ofc of Security Review F-6 l The Agony of Silence The first 24 hours after the US nuclear attack were markef by the absence of the anticipated Soviet nuclear counterhlow As time continued to pass without such a response the world began to breathe a bit easier Reinforcing this diaphanous feeling was the lack of renewed fighting and general lull over the battle area However the soviet's explicit failure to respond to the President's proposal resulted in a sense of foreboding among Iranian leaders and high officials in Washington Although there were no overt indicators of expanded Soviet activities in either Damascus or Baqhdad Turkish diplomatic sources reported that the Soviets intended to _ _ resup-r ly and reequip their training establishments in Iraq • ·_ ' tt --·'C- - e'f Iranian intelligence insisted that a renewed outbreak of - ·_-- ' _ ·_ fighting along the Iraqi fronts was imminent They doubted · · · t a their hard-pressed uni ts protecting the routes from __ __ t ' - the ·border to Ahvaz would be able to contain a revital' _ r§ti ' i Soviet-cadred Iraqi invasion In fact Soviet uni ts Utfff f fJJNt U re dy ·were_ reported moving in small groups alonq the _ ' ·Iranian Turkish border z ed Despite the nuclear strikes on the battlefield Soviet first line combat divisions remained in Iran By 27 June 4erial reconnaissance SIGINT and interrogations of cantured _ _ - - - _ i f t oops jointly reflected that the nuclear struck forces had r - '-' - ' ' lSE en reconstituted and reequipped soviet combat units j-- - L · _- _ · ·appe red capable of renewing their assault Except for i mtt$ J 'J l ' J' ri nian peasants who claimed to s e small qroups of · - · _'' c tt•·- ·-· if i eign ·troops moving in both directions along the roads -if near the Tabriz and Julfa routes no new Soviet uni ts had _ ' l 'kfJ i n- observed entering Iran Some Iranian field commanders · ·__ · _ -believed that soviet units had reacted to the nuclear attack£- by dispersing their surviving units into population centers and moving their replacements in small scattered groups Further proof of the Soviet's regenerated capability was ___ _ev_inced at dusk on the 27th by Soviet shelling of Iranian · i f iL ar echelon uni ts in the vicinity of Manjil In addition ·_ · · · · electronic intercepts confirmed the presence of FROG and i i - f x_ i- 01 - S missile uni ts in support of the Soviet divisions in ·Jttr ' z t J 1f i_ i J i n _ This new evidence was magnified by increased reports _ ' - j c ··of 'heavy equipment and vehicular activity in the Soviet · _ ·_ ·_ · f ¥ • DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 -_ AU flority EO 12958 as amended Chief Doµ Ofc of Security Review F-7 ·- ·· • • ·· - - • ·· rear areas during the night The increased artillery shelling and movements convinced Iranian leaders that a Soviet breakout was imminent The Soviet mobilization of reserves and the massing of divisions at assembly points were pointed out as further evidence of the Kremlin's designs toward Iran · anwhile in Washington intelligence briefers reported to the President the gist of the latest developments detailed by all source information 1 Soviet units throughout Eastern Eurone and the USSR had largely completed their mobilization Extensive reserve buildups continued in the Caucasus Military Districts • ·Of grave concern to Iranian military olanners were the movements of the 15th Tank Division and 54th Motorized Division · • - J 91 a semhly areas near Ashkhabad and Kizyl-Arvat on the · thortheast border and massing of the 104th Airborne Divi'' · s n at its airhead at Kirovabad ff _ -•'· - J r t iW ' 1 ' h • i- _ t 2· Black Sea ports reflected considerable activity 1 fi a 1l'arge i J J if amount of heavy equipment were being loaded · _' -· ' -' _ 3 The complement of TtT95 Bear aircraft normally at Mozdok Airfield in the Caucasus had been increased Troubled by the apparent failure of his diplomatic • 4-A iatives in face of the looming Soviet threat the - · · --- i il' ±$ sident warned his planners not to overlook the possi -· · ·· b ility of renewed fighting He directed that they consider -LJ Jr kt J J l ffsible us options mi itary or pol tical in na ure • i · · · f _a ' lght· b em loyed to bring the conflict to a rapid and · _ i JA t c onclusion • 1 · · ·· ·t rhe time is now 272000Z JUNE 1976 • FROM CONTROL MESSAGE NO TO BLUE MOVE NO REFERENCE BLUE MSG 101 ·si' CONTROL 2·01 D'l'G II 2so1oo·z JUN 76 FIRST SCENARIO PROJECTION PART II AMEMB 'l'EHERAN 280100Z JUN 76 · · · ·· · · · ' · · •· Commander Iranian 92nd Armored Division deployed eastern of Basrah reports heavy fighting with Iraqi armored H tii i _ 1 f f ' l-tunns Several command posts along his perimeter suffer_ kb - F·tf i · Tn g heavy casualties and in danger of being overrun ·• tnt- ' • Ir-aniari air cover in doubt Unusually aggressive MIGs and • · _ ·· - ·· highly accurate SAM firings may have eliminated most avail-· · · able air support Soviet leadership or direct involvement by advisors with Iraqi troops suspected Forward line of contact approximately 10 kilometers wide along Iranian border At this time deployed Iranian forces incapable of · · adequate defense Ahadan refinery certain loss US air ' 'i '· ' trikes essential to slow Iraqi invasion · W • i ·· r 49' ' •• • •••• I t'· · · · • ·-t i- ·· Aqtion reported above coincides with renewed hostilities J ot her regions of Iran Air battle over canital intensified · radar intercepts Soviet air J enetration pro- J jf lf t itf U - Reports now being received retreal several Iranian air bases under attack by Soviet bombers No repeat no nucclear detonations reported thus far -Just informed Soviet air transports dropping airborne outskirts of capital Apparently Soviets attempting -i 1 - - t' 1 P 3ta blish perimeter vicinity Mehrabad airfield where i •it'i f1 itfil'i ff ·can reinforce with air landed heavy equipment and -J J I _ _ _ ' a d itonal forces The Iranian Imperial Guard is making a · HJ - ' ' -_ ·_' ff· _very determined effort and appears to be containing the i · ·- ·airhead • · _· · ··· · _ f · · ' ·_ ·· · troops DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended _Chlet - qoo Ofc of Security Review ' _ •·' · -- ' J • t tJ i iiifi lt d ' · ·'' · ' G-1 A more menacing situation is l resented by the nexorable advance of Soviet divisions along the Tabriz-Maragheh and Rasht•Teheran axes Of equal concern are the movements out of Turkestan of the Soviet 15th Tank Division and 54th Motorized Rifle ·oivision which are drivinq alonq the Sharud-Teheran axis in an apparent effort to linkup with the airhead Iranian forces are engaged in dela ying operations hut it appears that a conventional defense on their part will be ineffective Accordingly the fall of Teheran seems to be a matter of time Despite these cataclysmic developments Shah gives appearance of courageous determination to resist enemy I urgently recommend we follow his example The time is now 280100Z JUN 76 G-2 FROM BLUE MESSAGE NO TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 202 DTG 201 II 2·Ro1ooz J'UN 76 1 IMPACT OF CRISIS ON NATIONAL INTERESTS a US interests 1 While our basic us interests remain fundamentally unchanged it is clear that I •· aj The challenge to US leadership has at least initially been met Our position of world influence Jf'ili t been i t s i n tentially 8 Mt 4· ' y · _ ri pf _etter position than previously assessed The former limitation of regaining only the status quo in the Middle East appears no longer valid In fact our position of influence in the Middle East has not been diminished and the United States may well be in a position to exploit the qurrent situation and realize gains for US interests in the -Middle East • · ·· '- t ·• ' 2 The apparent thrust from the USSR toward - - t· t i Middle East oil resources has been temporarily blunted Lii · ·•·'ht· 1 a owever the reconstitution of the Soviet forces in Iran f 1 H H l'rbf ou1 d engender a renewal of the situation that called for · - _' t t - the ·us nuclear strikes • •' •• • • • · ••••• • · • 3 The extensive·ussR buildup threatens us per sonnel and interests both civilian· and mili ta·ry throughout the Middle East and Europe Consequently US commitments _are likely to be exercised in areas other than Iran ·1 _ b USSR interests Despite temporary setbacks the ' y _ ' i ' QSS R_ - nteres ts remain fundamentally unchanged In fact · l rtl°' ' · e ossR moves to resupply and reinfprce as well as new - t tif W i t --i buildups indicate further Soviet resolve to ' ·'i - 'f iit-- f _ e pablish their direct access to the Persian Gulf Indian -· · _ - -ocean and to ultimately control the Middle East oil 1 resources • DECLASSfFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended ·Chlef •DoD Ofc of Security Review H-1 -· - -·---· • c Iranian interests Unchanged and intensifio-d d Iraqi interests Unchanged but now more expansionist in nature stimulated by direct Soviet support e Interests of others 1 Western European and Japanese interests Unchanged and intensified especially European interests in that their security is more seriously threatened 2 Peoples Republic of China a Basic interests unchanged b Opportunity increased to exploit the situ- · •- · ri t ion for gains with respect to their long standing differences · ·with USSR jji ft·''•'· J 2 i ·OBJECTIVES · · ' a us objectives 1 Irnrnedi ate a · Iran Continue to repel the Soviet invasion of d Alter to the United States advantage the USSR perception of risks involved e Marshal non-Soviet Warsaw Pact governments to support United States j·1 i f · ·· f Highlight to the Middle Eastern nations the t ·l at to them posed by the Soviet aggression and poten lL lil ·cont r ol ov er their oil i 'l'i ·· ··· · • _ i•ft f - · ••u' ' • 2 Neai· Term DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 ·Auth·ority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review H-2· · _ · a Restore peace order in the Middle East b Insure continued flow of Middle Eastern energy resources to the United States and its allies and· deny Soviet control of Middle Eastern oil c Limit Soviet influence in the Middle East 3 Long Term a Preserve protect the NATO Alliance b Preserve protect the CENTO Alliance c Maintain viability of us commitment·s · · b United States perception of USSR's immediate • · _ i _ _- bjectives ' · • continue to drive for control of 2 The USSR will attempt to confine scope of con flict tq Iran · ·attacks j r D it 3 The USSR will continue· to employ conventional • 4 The USSR will reserve tactical nuclear option tnost decisive t and place • • -x 1 - c The USSR will likely perceive that the US may again ·· · ' ' ' _ lfiploy nuclear weapons in the Iranian operation • · tY i Hl • · i • 3 POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEASURES - · ' - i ·· - a Military attack option to be executed • ·· 1 Engage Soviet divisions in Iran with nuclear · weapons to halt their advance and render them militarily • - ·· -··· · eff tive ADMs will be employed at choke points in advance of the invading foroe-s TACAIR delivered weapons · f M i i§fi -- ±·l h e µs d gains t rboop concendtrati ns anf LOdCLs • c t t J' - 25- ji -f- 1f • 1_ ng · m ssiles wi 11 e emp 1oye against ixe 0 arge s •'i ·• ···· i_ Jc i 'if 1tlclear artillery will be employed against· lea ding elements ' ' '1 • · ·• t DECLASSIFIED · ·· NOV 1 7 2009 Au f o ity EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review H-3 · «'OF SECRJM preferably in those areas where ADMs have been detonated A total of 118 nuclear weapons is scheduled for delivery Strikes against Soviet divisions are also intended to render ineffective FROG and SCUD units located in Iran a Eastern Turkestan Front Artillery _ _ Pershing 6 ADM 2 Air Delivered Naval Air ·- · 15 Fixed targets 29 Total Weapons axes OSD 3 3 ' b Western Front Maragheh - Zanjan ·and Rasht·1 Soviet Divisions Artillery lead elements 15 TACA IR 29 2 LOCs in NW Iran Pershing Fixed targets - ' f · If • · · TACAIR ·· 6 14 3 ADM choke points ADMs -·· r 1· i - · i lii'f t - _ 2 Total Weapons · 66 Ground burs-ts may be employed ·against the rnmost salient Meyaneh - Zanjan only 0 _ • 3 All nuclear strikes will be launched from DfClA$Sff fED NOV 1 7 2009 _·· Authority EO 12958 as amended Ch ef DoD Ofc of Security Review - _a·•••·- · • • • B-4 - - ·· ' ' • • •· · '· · H -f - ·· bases in Iran or from CVA at sea and constrained to targets ·· i · · · within Iran no closer than 50 km from Soviet border • • JS 3 3 b 5' 5 All nuclear strikes will be Qonducted within a 24-hour period 6 Temporarily redeploy two F-4 Squadrons from - key to Iranian bases to augment TACAIR release in- country assets for air defense role -- resultant 24-hour degradation in NAfO GSP - _ · 1•·- --· - ·' · • ' ti 7 Other military measures _·· f· - - • - •• ' l '· ··- i' a Attempt to establish and maintain tactical· in vicinity of Teheran At minimum deny '-_ - __ - '- ' -· sQviet -freedom of action in that area f tt - i sµ-pe riority 1 _ J t _ ¥ ' f j i f j · b Render Soviet airborne elements in ' r _ _ ·y 1n i ty of Teheran milit arily ineffective including · · · · destruction of reinforcements en route ponventi onal weapons only c Using CVA and Iranian AF assets establish a d maintain tactical air superiority in Basrah area At df - t _ -· · 'jlixnum deny freedom of action to Soviet and Iraqi TACAIR i11Ii iff' _ - -t iat a · · ···t · d Move 82nd Airborne Division into Tu rkey ·c jft ' ' prepared for possible further deployment • · · e Emplace ADMs in Turkey and release control OSD 3 3 b S' f Strike and render militarily ineffective - -- _ ·· • · __ _ - - ·-the small Stwiet naval force in the Persian Gulf using Iranian AF assets and conventional weapons - tt' i- t t · r - · Ji J i t lf -f f•1 F · ' · g Relocate one Iranian Division from NW I - ·_ _- - ·_ i 91'1 o assist in neutralizing Sovi t airborne elements ·-- - -· ' - -- vicinity of Teheran see paragraph 7 b above • · _ · · ·t - _ 1 • I • _1• I • ' - I •-' • • II ' • • • • · f t·t f fl_ - ' _ DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chi f DoO Ofc of Security Review B-S EeP- MiatE'l' l h Expedite necessary action to renlenish expended US Iranian weapons aircraft losses air defenses etc including CVA resources i Authorize CVA to use nuclear weapons over high seas if necessary for self-defense SAMs ·· b Associated political responses 1 Associated political responses are reflected in the messages at Attachments 1 - 11 n addition the desired political signals are reflected in the military actions selected 2 · It is also recommended that just prior to l' lew strikes the President address the nation with his remarks beamed via satellite to foreign countries Informs the i · · ni ted States and world of new US strike emphasizing the t ·i-- J ' 1 _ ¢ t that _soviet was initial aggressor that us response lJ fi f 1 L Hi i·mitec and defensive ·that it is in support of 00 r •· conimitments· and · in particular that Soviet goal is n ow · · '¢ learly exposed asdom1nat1ng oil supplies ·not only to rr frl i tj e United States but also to Europe and Japan as well ·· ·-He stresses that vital interests of our allies in serious · · · jeopardy if ·the USSR were ·to gain control of the r gi on 's oil resources 3 one hour prior to the President's address the Iran addresses his nation speech beamed to the i · t --dJJ 'lited 'States via satellite Thanks the United States 1 -_ _ _f' c» previous support and implores· it for con tinued· support 1 rf _kt _• · _ • · - · c Likely pe_rceptions responses of protagonists · -Sl lah · of ° --· i ·i ---'1t · · ft' ' J l-- · - '' · · · 1 United States is more determined than expected - · · · ·· · eans business risks• are greater than a nticipated · ' -· 2 Soviets may therefore withdraw to try again another day may preempt prepared to continue its resistance H-6 •' ii Lf --- QP--- _ ' ' __ itj Ji • i ' · '· - d Other international reactions and domestic responses 1 International a Favorable though cautious reaction by NATO and Japan b Arab countries 'less critical and wavering in view of Soviet oil designs They are unwilling to have Soviets control their economic and political destinies 2 Domestic a Near complete support in view of evident Soviet action and designs e Other options considered but rejected 1 ·conduct strikes from Turkish bases · a would not materially increase available in Iran b Objectives can be accomplished without · employing this option • c Turks may not desire to accept the risks d Slightly degrades CINCEUR GSP by employing earmarked forces e At this time do not desire to involve _ _ J ' u key because we ·require Turkish bases as sanctuaries and · · · · for logistic support ' _ 1_ auspices • 2 Nuclear response option by Turks under NATO a Difficult to obtain NATO consensus and would likely cause NATO internal conflict - ·- -- · ··- - - -c t r·- - _ Cb The step is not required at this time c May expose Turkey ·to attack unnecessarily '· ' ' · J - vrY·' '·· ri 'cLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 •· - · Auth6rity- EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review ' ' • • · • '· H-7 ------------------------------- · 3 Close the Bosporous with military action a Soviets may respond by attacking Turkey b Does not directly assist the accomplishment of objective c Turks may not accept the risk d Alternative· to military· closure presented · which accompiishes closure see Attachments 6 7 8 4 Request PRC take military actions· against USSR a Presumptuous • · · · '··· · - · · io verreaction - ' ' · · - · ' _ ' 2 - • b May escalate world tensions and cause USSR c Japanese would reject the proposal · • · ··· ·· 1' · #_ ·' - · · ··' _ J Jt - ' '° d Not necessary step at this time Concluded · · · tha sending proposed political military action team would _ · ··_ _·aeconiplish objective without incurring- risks 5 Attack Soviet airfields in Caucasus a Conside red too escalatory at -this time b Desire to limit conflict to Iran · t' - fj it t ll te¢i t-• ' c ' Cc Strike on soviet homeland may incur strikes States • - - · caubJ us Jt t te attack on Soviet oil fie1¢1s in a Considered too escalatory at this time b Desire to limit conflict to Iran • · - _ f t · c Option has merit as oil target for oil it arget tit for tat and should be retained for future e x amina tion ·- · 1 - _ t· t fi ' - '·· · lij_ SSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 · · Atifffority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review H- B 1 1 -· 1 - tr •'·-· ECRET DECLASSJAED NOV 1 7 2009 Au ftority EO 12958 as amended Gh1ef OoO Ofc of Security Review ftlif 4 CONTINGENCIES Actions by USSR 1 If USSR preempts planned second US nuclear strikes with nuclear strikes in Actions by the us 1 US would a Iran a Strike as planned Soviet forces in Iran and consider selective strikes in southern USSR b Turkey b Press for Turkish closure of Bosporus and conduct nuclear strikes on targets in southern press or concerted NATO action by virtue of attack on NATO member c Europe d United States If USSR invades rkey c ParticipateJ n3 · 3 b defense of Europe using nuclear weapons as appropriate 5 d Retaliate 2 US would a Release additional nuclear weapons 111111111111111 for use by T u r k i b Consult with NATO a11ies for implementation of follow-on joint action iY1 OSD 3 3 b qJ b 3 United States would reiterate its preconditions for negotiations to include withdrawal of Soviet troop from Iran 1 0l --SECRET ·· · r i - t rt _-1- ECRET i i f it' • - ' ' '• • - 0 Actions by USSR Actions by the US 4 If USSR retaliates with nuclear strikes in Iran and then asks for cease-fire and negotiate 4 Consider acceptance of the cease-fire but insist on Soviet withdrawal as a precondition to negotiations Alternatively if USSR fails to initiate withdrawal United States would pursue international discussions UN while fighting continues 'I I ' H-10 SECRET -iJtti i i l1' ROX-i -iESSA GE NO TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 202 DTG 201 ----- II ------ 280100Z JUN 76 -----------------------FROM WHITE HOUSE TO KREMLIN USSR Soviet forces have continued to press their aggression in Iran despite·my limited elll loyment of nuclear weapons The US is compelled to continue the use of these weapons which for the ·present time will be confined to the area of conflict You must immediately cease all attacks and with• · ·'· · · e ·- d raw all Sov iet forces from the area The vital importance · · - · -·'t i · ' • of the Middle East oil assets to the entire world has ac · - · celerated my efforts to solicit the support of all nations _ 1· ·• -' _-_ - gcµ -dl -e Ss of political alignment· 'in undertaking actions ' i- ··ft 6 mterln·g your aggression Continued SQviet advances · ' -' · - a gainst the world's primary energy source which is of vital · °j it i · r - limportance to all free world nations would -inevitably force · ' · ·_ · ' ·· - us_ to consider military action against vulnerable soviet ' · -•- _ · resources of a like nature 0 I again wish to reiterate the present level of con ·'_ - __ -- - traint being en-ployed but want· to make it perfectly clear · · __ ·_'· ·· _- · that extensive options are available Your further ag _ · ·· g x s sion will force expanded actions mW tif' f'• •• · - __ • r · i - - DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review H-11 - --- ··- - ·- ' __ ' MESSAGE NO TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 202 DTG 201 ----- II ------ 280100Z JUN 76 ----------- -------------FROM NSC TO SEC STATE SE DEF CJCS Addressees will prepare a team of us representatives to visit the PRC in Peking in accordance with the following ·gµ iines - · 1 ·1 Departure time will be 200oz 28 June lf iik-' ·' j J ' 'P tf 'IJ' _ gt · · · Team leaders will be Under Secretary of State •· · yt- p p ity··secretary of Defense and the Chairman Joint Chiefs · · ·· o · St aff each with appropriate staff members - ·· 3 Principal purpose of trip is to maximize political impact · 4 Establish a visibl e permanent joint US PRC politi cal rnilitary action team i n place in Peking 5 • Convey to the leaders of t·he PRC that crisis J tion is primary us objective · ' 1 _' • _ · ' · l iL 1 f' q 6 • Explore likely political targets of opportunities · ' · · 'a irectly relatable to Sino Soviet border problems in -· ·· Sii b eria To insure this action is understood a well · · • i civertised aerial reconnaissance ·of the PRC side of the contested Siberian border area by one or more principals of the us Team is encouraged · 7 • Public sta ternents from Peking· will include indi·ci ltions of us military assistance to the PRC without corn- ii i1 t f ' - i _J i r b·ci i DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 · wb · 2 Authority EO 12958 as amended H-12 Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review ' 'o'F ' CREQ ' · · r J - - I i y f i tJ-· mi tment to S ecific measures B Team will meet with Government of Japan durinq trip to and from Peking to insure ·full and obvious consultation with regard to Iranian crisis 9 Team less those remal n1ng as rnemhers of UR PRC political-military action team will limit stay in Peking to 48 hours · · 10 SECSTATE to coordinate in advanc with Peking all details of this mission to include puroose timinq ana the establishment of US PRC political military action team 11 SECSTATE will advise PRC of actions taken to date by the us in this crisis in particular planned deployment to Japan and movements of Seventh Fleet stressing thev pose no threat to PRC Deployments to Japan designed to allay any Japanese fears of PRC as well as exercise US reentry r±ghts into Japan · pe ployments will be without publicity and consist of air •cfr•a ft with nuclear weapons - see Atch 3 H-13 -SECRET TO CONTROL REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 202 MESSAGE N8 1-10VE NO II ------ DTG 201 280100Z JUN 76 -----------------------FROM SF CSTATE TO NATO Allies and Japan NATO NAC Continued Soviet aggression against Iran including a new threat mounted by Iraqi forces with Soviet suppqrt makes clear that a major Soviet goal is to dominate the oil _·_ resources of the Middle East Their recent offer to fur i h d il-- -to Europe and Japan can only be met if they con •Jt iddle East oil The USSR has moved militarily to· ji t tf Middle East oil If successful the USSR will 'ce the European nations and Japan in the position of · • _ being economic and political pawns of the communist world ·' - __ lit 4s -th ey have made their goal clear None of us can · afford to have our future access to oil controlled by the Soviets our vital interests -- those of all of us -- are s·eriously threatened It is essential that we stand together in this crisis The United States is prepared to join with its allies in an equitable sharing of energy • re sources if you are prepared to stand with us in meeting r 'J- r -t i- _ · -- - ur e n t m' 1 l'1 tarY thre a t • r-fi J· t rii IH¥ tt if Jtl1 1 j - ft -·' · - ·· -· · 1 i' i - c - ·• · - - 2 -· • i t S NATO AND NATO CAPITALS •- 7 - l Advise allies of militaxy actions taken by the United f $ t a tes and our most recent message to Moscow Atch 1 _ Request NAC to authorize SACEUR to place NATO forces on' REINFORCED ALERT __ ·· ·3 Request ma or allies to reinfor e our representations os·cow with demarches of their own - - ' · i · · ·· • ' f ••· · DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 - '·' t tc Ji- j uthority EO 12958 as amended H-14 Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review FOR TOI YO l Advise GOJ fully of actions taken by USG to date 2 Request permission of GOJ for reentry of tactical air into Japanese bases 3 Request PM privately for permission to deploy nuclear weapons into Japan -· 1 t Y t ' DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review H-15 _ OP-SECRET - - · A J 0 i if iit i ·- · ·· • Jlf l jmf J L UE MESSAGE NC TO CONTROL M OVE NO REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 202 DTG FROM ·TO ••• • - 1•• II ------ 280100Z JUN 76 WHITE HOUSE SECSTATE I You are directed to send the following message to all appropriate governments in Middle East and North Africa The current military crisis in Iran has grave implications for all freedom loving people The • -·· Soviet Union has brazenly moved to gain control of · t f if i · · _i qdle East energy assets Initially this action f _ _ i _ is · aimed at Iran If the soviets are permitted to · ii j y I jt Sfi 1-clµde this adventure successfully all Middle • ·'• ' 1t ' X· ·t 'Ea st · nations will be subjected to increasing Soviet · _ o nation and a reduction in ability to manage and · 1 _ - mark-et vital national oil assets Your direct military support during this crisis is not essential nCM You are· advised that the United States will continue to combat Soviet aggression using nuclear weapons as required --_i 1 ft Your rcucti_on to the US decision to use nuclear J i 4tifc - _ tf E FIPOns should include consideration of the delib iH jl t rat e aggressive nature of the soviet forces which _ _ - · · ·· ' · ·• · are in Iran as invaders and are attempting to impose their will on the Government of Iran US nuclear actions are lirni ted to those Soviet forces in Iran These actions will terminate promptly when the Soviet Union withdraws the invading force ' ' Your friendship cooperation and understanding are needed during the crucial days ahead H-16 201 ·•- ··· -·· · • 'feY'rECR-ET FROM BLUE MESSAGE NO HOVE NO REFERENCE CONTROL i·1SGS 201 FROM SECSTATE TO US AMBASSADOR UN 202 DTG 201 II 280100Z JUN 76 A statement along the following lines should be made i b f ore the Security Council soonest Soviets have increased their unprovoked aggression against Iran in the face of a clear warning and restrained response to their initial advance They have made clear their ultimate objective of obtaining control of all Middle East - • _ ' -- · · oil and thereby making Japan and Europe and other ' ' Free World countries pawns of the whims of Soviet JtMiti 1ll't_ fJ f 1Ji S ' politi al and military desires · · ' • The United States is taking all necessary steps that this monstrous design does not succeed It has no other objective than the political independence and economic welfare of non-Soviet countries a limitation on the present confrontation and the avoidance of general war ·1 0 see if jiiil Ira s of a n l k ng - · · force to enforce a cease-fire and arrange for with· · A ta wal of all foreign forces ·from Kuwait Announce · · the Iranian willingness to withdraw from Iraq as soon as UN units enter Kuwait DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoO Ofc of Security Review H-17 KISSINGER ' • ' • f · ·· · ' ' FROM BLUE MESSAGE NO TO MOVE NO CONTROL REFEREN E CONTROL MSGS 201 - FROM SECSTA' PE TO AME MB TEHER 2·02 DTG 201 ----II 280100Z JUN 76 - - · - · · you are requested to approach GOI with following proposal · 1 o be held on closei st basis us wishes to put special · forces crew aboard Iranian ·tanker now in the Mediterranean Purpose would be deliberate colli sion this tanker with ' J J JtJ 1fii 9 the r me rchant ship in Bosporus to impede Soviet shipping _ ' · -_ · i '3 - - ntly request Iranian cooperation t tf t l 'tfh r-- Y lfh 'tt f f KISSINGER - - - -· _ y· • -- -- - · ' - J ' § fi tttrif ·-- • • I' ' ' i • · • ' r · - - - - DECLASSIRED NOV 1 7 2009 Au horlty EO 12958 as amended Chief DoO Ofc of Security Review · ·1 ' ft i jr t · - - • H-18 ·- _ - - i - SSC RE' ' · · - · _ l · FROM BLUE MESS 2 GE NO TO CONTROL MOVE REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 FROM JCS TO USCINCEUR AMEMB ANKARA SUbject ·c-· · · IJi l' Et f 202 Tur er is 280100Z JUN 76 of concern · efore In light of current crisis inte crucial as t e military situation may dictate subject · 1Y1 ' - · _ - -·or· _ -· -·to concurrence GOT ··f' i i f-- -' __ DTG· Delegation of Authorization to _selectively detonate ADMs l For USCINCEUR t- t1 lF' · 201 ----I NO ------ - · OSD 3 3 b » J Advise GO'l' of above action and US intention to continue all possible support to Turkey ·· · ·· · _ · Advise Turks US temporarily deploying two F-4 squadrons to Iran from Turkey as additional air resources urgently needed for defense of Iran Also request GOT concurrence in deployment 82nd AB Div to Turkey for use as developments i _situation may dictate c itif · _ _ _ - dvise GOT of plans to block Bosporus Atch 6 and i ftf mf ·' 1'li•st their cooperation Attached as Atch 8 is suggested f t - rding _0£ message from GOT to USSR announcing the accident 2 For USE MB Ankara · ' _· _ · _ _ t L j i _ 0 i -ff · - · · _ · - - · -- 4 State concurs • _ DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 200g -A horlty EO 12958 as amended _90 ef DoO Ofc of Security Review _ t grif ii f i·· 1 - Atoll 7 H-19 11 - ' ·· - • S i Cft T JJi - i i tft - · t ' d LUE MESSAGE NO ·'to CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 '202 DTG 201 ----- II ------ 28O1O0Z JUN 76 -------- -------------- FROM TO • ' · -' ' • ·· • - ••• t ' · _ ·-• GOVT OF TURREY GOVT OF USSR ' ' · • REPORT OF ACCIDENT W TH POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE The Government of Turkey regrets to report a major collision has tenporarily closed the Bosporus A large · · _' •· 1H - nker of Iranian registry collided with a large ore 'd · j 'gci r r i r of° us registry at the base of the bridge across frtJr t i tiE f J sporus at Istanbul The hulks have temporarily _ c''i fblo gked all traffic through the Straits The conditions · t J1cii f ·i e coll ision are suspicious and under investigation _ ·' • - _ ' i ry e ffort to clear the waterway is being undertaken ¥otu •· ·1 tnbassy will be kept informed of the progress • • _ _ · i '• · iff t·' ··-·· ' - t · _ ' · - · · - ·'· · · DECLAss·rRED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority ·eo 12958 as amended Chief DoO Oto of Security Review · - _ ' ' ' -U I 1l t di _-J -- _ ' · i i - MESSAGE NO FROM BLUE TO CONTROL MOVE i JO REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 2·0·1 2 0 2 DTG FROM NSC TO AMEMB TEHERAN · - _· _ ' · __ Su_bject 201 II 280100Z JUN 76 ---------- Support of Iran Reference your 280100Z JUN 76 - · · ·-· • 1 In reply reference request you info the Shah that •· ·- -• · 'un'less he advises otherwise· the Presi'dent will take the · · -t · t¢ liowing immediate action to assi t in the preservation of ·' · · - ' 'T · ·the Iranian territorial integrity in the face of these new c · '- · 'Soviet assaults• · · '' ·· ' i' ' § i '· · · • a Initiate nuclear attacks against leilding ele rnents ·i - c L - - -· of two northwestern and one northeastern thrust - -i• • •• - - b · Reinforce us forces engaged in the air battle over 4 •• • •• • Teheran area _ '' Only conventional weapons will be used in Teheran c Lend air support to Iranian units defending in the icini ty of Bas rah -- conventional weapons only ' ' J F r ' ·j FSfi i liM t• · - ' ' 2 • In accomplishing the above additional tactical air · '_ · - · · i • - ffi ' ·units will be moved from Turkish bases Naval TACAI'P ' -·- · ' i1 rnents also will be used to effect the above L · t _ - ·_ 3 Every effort being made to minimize damage to civilian · population Strenuous diplomatic effort being made to force soviets to cease their aggression and withdraw from Iran 4 Additi'onal proposed action will follow • ' Atch 9 ·i ' - __ _ -·- · f · DECLASSIFIED NOV KISSI'NGER 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review H-21 r 'i L 9P_ 1-· ia ·-l •• _·f ' ••• j l •• · • ' ff ' · y i'rR_OM BLUE MESSAGE NO TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 202 DTG 201 II 2 so 10oz JUN 76 NSC FROM Lyi dlJO JCS US EMBASSY ANKARA ··_ INFO 1 82nd AB Div will deploy immediately to Turkey and · _will be prepared for further deployment to Iran to defend · · Te herc Ln or· to defend Abad an refinery Deception measures - ' w lJ be taken prior to and during deployment to make it appear to the USSR that the 82nd AB Div is being deployed · d rectly into the combat areas of the Middle East '·½or · - --i Ankara Please make appropriate arrangements - - ' · wi 'th Government of Turkey see Atch 7 ' _ · _' ' ' • 11 tii rl'r· DECL SSfRED NOV 1 7 2009 Au honty EO 12958 as amended Qhief DoO Ofc of Security Review ·I · ' ' · ' · · · i f_ -- 1 · - ii'·H8 P- s n cF W'fms T 201 ----NO ------- MESSAGE NO MOVE REFERENCE CONTROL MSGS 201 202 II ---------- DTG 280100Z joN 76 ------------------------ ht' · it • ••• J itii - FROM NSC TO JCS -· You are to arrange at once for SR-71 mission to obtain l- n i ••'- 1 J • _ • I · -- '1 ff -l ·li·'' up-·to-date photography of Baku and other major soviet oil i i· • • installations Mission is to be flown so that Soviets are · tt_ ·· r ' ' J dcC rly aware of it but risks of exposure to hostile action · - · ·a re to be minimized • --· ·y ' l' · 1 1f · '· ' I i H-23 ' I FROM CONTROL MESSAGE NO TO RED MOVE NO REFERENCE RED MSG 10 l DTG 203 II 280800Z JUN 76 FIRST SCENARIO PROJECTION The Precarious Balance • · ' The United States use of nuclear weapons against Soviet forces in Iran was initially viewed with dismay in the Kremlin Believing that the United States shared their interest in avoiding a strategic nuclear exchange Soviet ·' i L _aders were clearly surprised by the magnitude of the •·· ··attack To some it appeared the irrational act of a nation struggling to retain its position as a superpower ' '' ' ' ''··•_ P reliminary evaluation was that it left the USSR with ·precious few options for·response Surveying the damage _ S_9 viet military analysts drew a less bleak picture than -· ' ' f eared at the outset Although the 6th and 168th Divisions - • •' ··· - were decimated four other divisions in Iran had escaped · the nuclear attack with only slight losses of personnel and equipment Accordingly the Caucasus Front Commander was ordered to halt in place establish a defensive position and reorganize and reconstitute his remaining forces ·· JMedical reinforcements and evacuation aircraft were · ·- · · 'dispatched to assist the effort while surviving divisions •i ' C - - disp srsed into villages and other areas near Iranian refugee i k1 ' ti 1li _trJ rQQ ntrations The 164th Division was ordered to replace · · J' - • · ··o --1 he J 68th at Meyaneh hy incrementally moving forward under · · ·· ' qov e of darkness Likewise the 75th Division moved to · _·_ • replace the battered 6th Division at Rasht These movements · · · · were stealthily executed so as to avoid providing lucrative targets for any additional US tactical nuclear strikes By dawn of the 27th the actions were completed • After hours of debate with traditional strategists ·•_' f°ciiemtanding nuclear retllliation Politburo members elected · · · · ·a com1 entional responE-e • They ordered the Red advance be · i 'i i tl i t- e n- ed by an airborne attack n Teheran with the goal of ' L if· -f ' p pling the governmer 1t and making the fall of Iran a i- -·r -If i· o eL ss Fleo Nov 1 1 2009 12958 as amended ·•· Chief oD Ofc of Security Review · 1- _ · - • Atf or tty ·eo I-1 tTOP BCRt i' ' ·--- -t if ' ·• • • ' · p · The airborne attack would be su ported by the six divisions advancing on the capital from the northwest while two additional ·divisions from the Turkestan ilitary District would attack across the Iranian border east of the Caspian Sea Such action would exploit Soviet conventional superiority gain worldwide support for Soviet restraint in the face of the irrespc 1nsible and unbridled US nuclear attack and place the United States in a seemingly untenable position A necessary de12 y to position forces without alarming the enemy also provided opportunities for an energetic propaganda campaign aimed at portraying the tJnited States as a reckless despoiler of world peace who once again had unlea shed the horrors of nuclear war • fait accompli - - • ·· Wot ds or Warheads In an impassioned address before the Uni ted Nations the Soviet Ambassador warned that the United States would not - O unpunished for its wanton action Ja pan and other ·t'sl pathetic governments were assured that the Soviet ··JJ A ion · would work to maintain SI lpplies of vi t al oil from the i X • f ii_ l4ol$ ast Radical Arab governments were encouraged to • • ••• 0 · ry· t ' J t'¾f6qi erate their charges against the United States From _f' -' · i l a and Japan cam earnest a peals for an early cease- fxr -e- · Fran ce seeking to play its self-assumed role as · rte main link between the USSR and Europe • received a barely polite audience for its tremulous offer of mediation Most Western European officials replied to Soviet diplomatic veritures that the United States was not the aggressor 11 in · •· · Iran ' t'he Soviet Ambassador in Ankal ·a delivered a blunt warning '- _ _j - · _' eJ she Turks to prohibit US force deploy nents from their -' i · at the same time they were in£or- med that the Soviet · · ·· d'T Alnibn 'would continue to transit the Bosporous to resupply c t af d_reequip its military a ssistance programs in Iraq and · · · ' ' ' ' _1ii t 'sqwhere Turkey indicated concern while attempting to 9nceal its pro-western leanings with statements about free access to i nternational waters • Socialist students and workers around the world expressed p i -pfpund gratitude for Soviet restraint and de11ounced- the - - - imperialist US killers of innocent lranian peasants S· veral large demonstrations occurre-d ir Bt· rope the · _ J1-i i 4 1 1E _ ast Latin American ar1d on several universj ty ji i ajrt p s in the United States -- mostly by SDS activists J t ti 'l L - · ' ' 'PECL'l SSIR ED NOV 1 7 2009 · · · Authority EO 12958 as amended · · Chief OoD Ofc of Security Review I-2 -ssc 'l' -Ni ij Jr _ i - · - - _ -- CRHT of_·_ • L-·_ -r - ·---- 7 _ - · • t t • · Nonetheless Soviet information sources noted that most outbreaks of sympathy for the Soviet cause lacked popular support from the US population while politicians generally were rallying behind the jingoistic leadership of the Nixon coterie Cautious feelers in Peking sensed·tacit Chinese approval for United States nuclear strikes against Soviet troops -- despite a public posture of polite concern for a halt in the conflict The Fires of Prometheus Accompanying these polyphonic propaganda tunes and inducing deep reverberations was a series of military activities which nearly stunned the western allies The Soviet Union carried out full-scale mobilization deployed its fleet units and staged nuclear capable units at Warsaw Pact airfields Counterpointing its themes the soviets in stentoriall tones warned western allies not to _ s1 1pport the United States However the North Atlantic · - - f c p irici 1 apparently inf 1uenced by Bonn and Ankara re 1uc -H it ' f nf1t f ta htly agreed to adopt Simple Alert measures in an attempt 15 - ' '°' r •rt·- · t to match the Soviet posture • · -t - ' ·· • - •• • • An implied signal to Iran was manifested indirectly in the fonn of a soviet supported upsurg of Baluchi dissidents in the southeastern region where insurgent equipment propaganda and cadre training had posed a chronic challenge to · ·i r nian security However this support was offset by ' prompt assistance from Pakistan Along the western herder _- smal l groups C f insurgents led by Soviet diversionary · -- - i £0-rces continued their successful infiltrations i t iil l _ kf ' tiff - t -i·····' '¥he diplomatic and political smoke screen adequately Soviet military intentions Combat units in · ·' 'Iran were ordered to resume their attack at first light on 28 June along the Zanjan Teheran axis to seize the capital city and to effect a linkup with the airborne assault to be' concurrently conducted by the 104th Airborne Division A secondary ground attack was also launched along the Sharud-Teheran axis by two divisions from the northeast Preliminary artillery strikes along the northwest front during the evening of the 27th covered rnoverr nt of the ·1 ad' combat elements into assault positions 1 -1 ' · 1·- t• r Poncealed •- • _ V • o 28 June a coordinated air attack Iranian airfields was carried out by 38 TU-95 Bears · I n the early hours DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Au hority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review I-3 · mi t _·ijt Tu-·22 'Blinders In the initial air conf l i ct an ·estimated eight us F-4s were shot dow11 Severe da l 11aqe · -to in 51tallations runways and hangers at Shahr ' ' khi and Bushehr Air Bases was achieved at a cost of three TU-22$ However stiff aerial combat by interventionist USAF aircraft at Shiraz limited damage there ·to taxiways and temporary shelters while causing the loss of 11 TU-95s The battle for control of the ·sky over Teheran was reminiscent of the Battle of Britain in its intensity with 30-40 of the hard-pressed Iranian fighters being destroyed over the capital itself The Soviet air transoor ts were able to deliver most of their troops despite the loss of -- · ·• si i Xreral AN-12s in the lead elemen t· V i gorou_s Soviet combat · · a i'r missions struggled to gain freedom of action in the rea but intense dogfighting prevented the airlanding ·· of reinforcements which was necessary to secure the Te eran airhead • • - • ' ·· · · •_· · The initial advance of Soviet troops during the early - i t o f ·28 June also stimulated Iraqi armored units which · i' 1- H rf v - e Iranian 92nd Division from Basrah in headlong 'tb ea t Suffering great losses to· both aircraft and 1-if1tf t · 1 · ' ' · he Iranians abandoned their fo rward defenses and · t ' · ff · · J t'J i e4 _the border from Abadan to Khorramshahr • z tc · ·· _·- · · · ·Th twin breakouts of the 164th and 75th Divisions of Teheran the 15th and 54th Divisions which · h d cros·sed Ira ' s northeastern borderl and the sudden · i 4_pse of Iranian units in the south presented three 1 - · ··• nor·thwest fronts converging across the Iranian frontiers like barbs of a lance toward Teheran The fall of the government put a matter cf time - ·f -· 1 -J d • ' _ i • I • lii ff · · - - sevefal h urs 7 S0 7iet combat eler ients a' -va r c d · - _ '- - --· ds their obJective in Teheran While a s1gn 1 ficant · '· ··- '' •p'prt ion of the airborne di vision had landed successfully t· ·had-· not broken through the defensive blocking uni ts nor e ured ·the crucial runways The Shah's Imperial Guard O' f vision -counterattacked repeatedly causing heavy casu-alties 4 n pontaining t he airhead • f j Stiff resistance was also met by the Red Army 1n the - 1 l tj'lwes t Dispersed for protection against nuclear attack · _64th slm ly approached the northern edge of zanjan M ii i ' fJ ji i flED NOV 1 7 2009 - - --f _ ___ ·fo12958asamended · Iii i DoD Ole of Security Review · · •'•• 1 _ _ I T i ' • From the Caspian seacoast only light resistance impeded the advance of the 75th Its troops reached open terrain west of Qa2vin expecting to join their comrades on the road to Teheran Northeast of the capital objective two columns of the 54th and 15th advanced against a light enemy screen nearly to Sari and to a point about 30 kilometers east of Sharud respectively Soviet military commanders were jubilant The Growing Implications Perhaps understandably they excused President Nixon's remarks warning that continued aggression compelled the · - ·J -'United States again to combat Soviet aggression using - ' · · · · · nuclear weapons as required It appeared to the Soviets to _be an appropriate political gesture to satisfy the panic · · · · · - $ stricken Shah who had just cried for continued support The President's warning reached most foreign countries It was - · - - ··· · supplemented in the United Nations by a us proposal for a peacekeeping force to police a cease-fire and arrange for a jJt1iJ hi i 1 · i-thdrawal of foreign combat troops ore sobering words r- • d r1 fii J 'Uwere cabled to the I remlin from the Wlute House 1 i _ · Soviet forces have continued to press their aggression in 'Iran despite my limited employment · - - i · - of nuclear weapons The us is compelled to continue the use of these weapons which for the _ __ · i present time will be confined to the area of conflict You must immediately cease all attacks · • • · · and withdraw all Soviet forces from the area ·-' · · · · · i •·l The vital importance of the Middle East oil assets - - r · ' · to the entire world has accelerated my efforts to -t'mJ 1 Xltii n i j · sp lici-t the support of all nations regardless · ' ' -'--·' · ·' ' -' - of politica'l alignment in undertaking actions · · · _ · countering youz aggression Continued Soviet advances against the world's primary energy · · - -'-f_·· J- _1 ' · ource ich is of vital importance to all ···free world nations would in vitably force us to consider military action against vulner · able Soviet resources of a like nature •• --1 W ile the Soviet leaders determined the perceptions portended by this latest diplomatic jibe informed sources ••• 1 f i - • - Europe filed reports of another American call for NATO 7 i t i i ft _ 2 · ··-· ··· · iotci Ass1F1ED NOV 1 7 2009 uthority EO 12958 as amended d· Chief DoD ore of Security Review I-5 ' eP- I •'1 -- - '1 t - -· J · ---- n ' • SSRh·r rr fitr · • c'' - - · • ·unity to oppose the current military threat Europeans and Japanese were reminded of their likely depend noe upon the USSR for critical supplies of oil if Iran were to fall and the Soviets were to gain dominance in the Middle East Allied response was increasingly concerned but stopped short of any new measures of support Meanwhile RGB channels reported evidence suggesting an imminent move of the US 82nd Airborne Division from North Carolina to an overseas base This information coinciaed with urgent efforts by the Pentagon to find new F-5s air defense equipment and weapons to replace the heavy losses suffered by the Shah's troops · - -··1 - --- ··• ··Fr-om Turkey came the news that another two us F-4 · ·· · squadrons had just deployed to Iranian bases llo-wever e e was no indication that either Turkish aircraft or · OS aircraft on Turkish bases were a cmin for ossible - nuclear strikes • ··i- -· t · in the northeast border region but con- been received OSD 3 3 b s 'q f ·_ 11-r ll_-t f i e incident with the US warning to NATO a SITREP from · • - •• · - Soviet SAS control site near Baku reported an attempted ·8 1' 19'agement of a hostile aircraft on a southeast 11 eading at -- _ _ - -a_lt t de in excess of 90 000 feet and a speed of approxi · '-•- · •t ·· 4 ·tei y ·Mach 3 The track was identified by the Baku Air · ·· · De'fense District as an isolated SR-71 reconnaissance flight • nLt itl It t o - r·_ ' - Some limited air engagements excited tj1e battle scene t he Persian Gulf Tactical reports from Soviet advisors · ·r · vf it ·asrah ·and from the Conmander of the Soviet Naval Task _ f c e '_in the Persian Gulf indic ated sporadic conventional - ftt -t i tz it ikes without significant damage Spme si htings of • i J J · ·'l ostiles included reference to US naval markings The · ·So iiirit High Comnand estimated that attack aircraft probably · · · ¢ ante from the us carrier Task Force in the waters of the ·- · Gµ U qf Oman pver - · -- ' ·· · ' hese defensive responses of opposing· forces provided no real'clues as to a possible United States countering move The conventi_onally armed defenders made little difference _ - · · t o the $oviet advances except in the air w here daylight · · ' ' A dti' r s ·allowed visual target acquisition ancl attacks o er dJ _ _ ii W' fan and other combat zones The time was still early · ·• •1 1' f i DEC LASSiFlm NOV 1 7 2009 - · - AW OflJy O 129 as amended -' · ·· · Cm f DolJOfc of Security Review I-6 - '· ·· and the political toughness of Nixon's latest words was casehardened in a variety of diplomatic waters Of such the most turbulent to Soviet strategists was the announc ment jointly in Peking and Washington that a high level mission including the Under Secretary of State the Deputy Secre of Defense and the Chairman • JS 3 3 b Soviet intelligence sources were directed to confirm us intentions regard to Iran by obtaining if possible ·-·any new Iranian authorizations of nuclear strikes While they were about their business the confirmation arrived by other means in '- _ · ' i i tf fi' ' COMMANDER CAUCASUS MILITARY FR 280800Z JUN 76 Combat units report us NtJDETS delivered along northwestern and northeastern fronts at estimated 280700Z JON 76 Land routes temporarily blocked _by ADM and coordinated nuclear attacks possibly · ' ·· from aircraft and Iranian artillery Lead ele ·· ments north of Zanjan currently pinned down Reinforcing units west of Qazvin also unable to advance Lead units of four divisions may be _ _ • ·i' •-· · ·_ destroyed if attack continues Detonations ·1arger than previously used have caused wide C· ir · - i - ' pread destruction in rear areas conununica· f 6t ii-ii i ······ -_ 1fai - '- ions lith 'two brigade headquarter n eastern · - ·f'lf 'r•- ' -sector are disrupted Believe Div i sion Command · ·· ·· ··of 15th Armored also destroyed in initial attacks Decimation of troops east of Sharud is continuing ' · · - · Forces appear no longer capable of reaching • Tcheran as scheduled Initial losses may exceed 5 000 troops in each sector In addition ground burst detonations along road and rail routes supporting the 164th may cause 2 000 more • -· · · m·ilitary casualties Complete disruption caused by inhumane saturation bombing tactics against our division units will prevent early reinforce-ments of Teheran area Devastation and civilian ' · · · · ···· ·' • · _ DECLASSIRED NOV 1 7 2009 ' · · ·i uthorfty EO 12§58 as amended · · · Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review I-7 ' • • •• I • • • • carnage exceed belief May be 30 000 civil casualties but no reliable data Airborne units in Xeheran fighting heavy battle for survival but no repeat no nuclear weapons used by Iranians so far Nuclear attacks are continuing at this time on northwestern and northeastern fronts Current estimates of nuclear detonations sustained vary from 80 to 100 Surviving forces attempting to - establish defensive positions Right-thinking military spokesmen assailed their strate- gy opponE ts in the Politburo for this catastrophic debacle as they grimly confronted the new estimate of the situation and waited First Secretary Kirilenko' s decisions ift • •r •• •• _ J · · • The time is now 280800Z Jun 76 ·• • '-F kH f 1 H- - •d_ --Team ttac ents l-4 of this message represent responses queries which arose during the play of Move II ·r _- ·· - ·t _ · ••• - • • ••I' 'ff -fiif ' · - f ' • · ·· ' - • ' i •• ···- - • •• • - c• FROM CONTROL MESSAGE NO 'l'O RED MOVE NO REFERENCE RED MSG 101 DTG 203 II 280800Z JUN 76 KGB ESTIMATE OF ENEMIES' ACTIONS IN IRAN - Report of deployment of two F-4 squadrons from Turkey to Esfahan Isfahan Air Base now confirmed Base has 11 500 foot runway and POL facilities are available Current status is commercial 1 · 0 US nuclear transport units believed to be active between CONUS and Iran Local sources reporting unusually heavy T ecurity around temporary storage sites at Shiraz airfield ff he r it s suspected but not located ·• ·- - There is no firm estimate of the number of nuclear weapons in the possession of us forces However based on previous attack size we can expect that up to 100 nuclear weapons may be immediately available for use by deployed farces • Iranian armed forces' capabilities are seriously damaged Barring US resupply efforts approximately half of the Iranian aircraft have been destroyed and one-third of the ·Iranian Army has suffered casualties • ' ·· US n clear weapons previously thought to be located in Turkey are now believed to have been moved into Iran There · i no f irm indication that the nuclear stockpile in Turkey · has been replenished However this contingency is a · · · _ ·· · ·t· J i kely possibility There is no significant change in the · ·alert status of US fc rces from their highest readiness posture · l f i - Soviet air assets are available to support actions in Middle East to the extent required current order of · -f ti ·At h · 1 DECL SSIFIED NOV l 7 2000-9 Au honty EO 12958 as amended ···· · · i ' · · _ · Chief PPP Ofc of Security Review · · · l - - jj 1 t battle available to Soviet commanders is unchanged from previous information with the exception of the most recent losses to LRA resources resulting from strikes of 28 Jun 76 Intelligence lists 12 additional operational military airfields in Iran which are jet capable This includes 2 fields in Teheran which are under heavy combat Lis·t follows KGB LIST OF REMAINING OPERATIONAL MILITARY AIRFIELDS IN IR 7' N AS OF 280800Z JUN 76 Teheran Mehrabad Intl 35-41N 051-18E Teheran Doshan 35-42N 051-28E Vahdati AB 32-26N 048-23E 'L - ·_·'-' 4 9- an Ghale · ' t i 35-38N 051-22E Morghi 37-33N 045-55E · • ·· 7 - · - t e hah 34-19N 047-06E old _ _ _ - iii# 31-20N 048-45E Abfidan Intl 30-21N 048-13E · ashhad 36-14N 059-38E ·-r -_ - z cta n 29-27N O 60-54E ' · _ _ · t_ _ · - '''iiandar Abbas -' ·- • 27-20N 056-20E 30-15N 056-57E -_ ··- ' -- DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review I-10 FROM CONTROL MESSAGE NO TO RED M OVE NO REFERENCE RED MSG 101 DTG 20 3 I 280800Z JUN 76 FROM CG '104TH AIRBORNE DIVISION Unrelenting combat with fanatical Iranian palace guards forcing my pullback around perimeter Red soldiers struggling to survive Radio contact with elements of s cond _regiment being intercepted jammed -- their status uncertain • Jr eavy losses to my forces prevent the capture of Mehrabad -- rhead Urgent resupply and reinforcement essential to pr even overrun by Iranian troops • r · Atch 2 I-11 ' ·- • ' _ ' r - i • _ FROM CONTROL MESSAGE NO TO RED MOVE NO REFERENCE RED MSG 101 DTG 203 I 280800Z JUN 76 FROM COMMANDER CAUCASUS MILITARY FRONT Our forces find themselves between SCYLLA and CHARYBDIS ····If we disperse to avoid nuclear attack vul'nerability to _-_ _ ' p i ec emeal defeat by Irania·n forces inoreases If we group _-···- ·attack Iranian units vulnerability to nuclear attack · · _· creases Degree of dispersion also limited by channelling · i fture of terrain These factors combined with the US satura ·- RC mb ing attack and our efforts to regroup in prepara ft - n ' or the continuing attack led to high numbers of casu- ti t iff ' f s · ·• 'I -' i - - - · · - - i DECL SSIFIED NOV 7 2009 Au honty EO 12958 as amended Ch e DoD Ofc of Security Review -Atch 3 •a•••••••• I-12 FROM CONTROL MESSAGE NO TO RED MOVE NO REFERENCE RED MSG 101 DTG 203 II 280800Z JUN 76 FROM COMMANDER CAUCASUS MILITARY FRONT Reports from surviving combat elements indicate nuclear attacks are continuing at slower pace Approximately 10 more bursts reported against LOCs and troops in northwest Additional medical assistance required Remnants of valiant _Soviet army without any further means to attack the enemy r · _ _ · Casual ties among survivors expected to increase from radia· · ii i a J l d iot er de ayed effe ts Command and control is i io · • · _ 11 ·s · 'l onger poss ible with frontline combat elements Attempting · • J y · - · f• _ to pull back and regroup n • f f t•• 0 If 1 •· • • • · DECtASSIFJED NOV 1·7 2009 Authority EO 1'2958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review Atch 4 I-13 MESSAGE NO 201 ----MOVE NO ------ TO CONTROL II REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 203 DTG 280800Z JUN 76 l IMPACT OF CRISIS ON NATIONAL INTERESTS a USSR interests The crisis of fers opportunities while presenting certain dangers 1 Opportunities a Extend Soviet influence and improve world power position b Facilitate decline and eventual demise of o r imperialistic competitors not ·only the United States but - · · _ also Japa and Western Europe as well However at the same · - il ' iJ f i t increases the possibility of a strategic nuclear J k - ' 1eJG°change between the Soviet union and the United States ··tt _ ' J' ij qch an exchange would not be in the interest of the S v et - ' ' 'i''·' j· 1 •-- · union 'I'he crisis could also adversely affect our position vis-a-vis the PRC should the crisis result in diminished power influence for the USSR - • · 2 Dangers · •· - · · _ · a A military defeat in the Middle East would •• 1 be detrimental to Soviet influence worldwide -- L - • · -·•• - ·j - j'f i bF I _ · ' • • b The United States could exploit the current i Jt Y · t·'· f sis by strengthening its relati ns with China li V Flf • ir r - b us interests The united States shares with us the primary interest of avoiding strategic nuclear warfare between our two nations The United States recent actions clearly indicate that it intends to use tactical nuclear weapons in whatever numbers it feels necessary in order to halt Soviet military operations in Iran The United States clearly recognizes that Middle East oil is at stake and it also _co'1ld see in the crisis its potential decline as a iiif ·- · · c_M l • ppi tical and military superpower It will thus • -·· · ·_ Jt ij 1 'f x ' ·l o- • LI · hi efA§ sd tED NOV 1 7 2009 · Authority EO 12958 as amended - ·Chief OoD Ofc of Security Review J-1 'flQ P- SEC T ' t i l · ·· ··· · ·need to maintain as many allies as possible to forestall such a demise Overall the United States clearly sees its stakes as high·enough ·to take drastic measures to prevent collapse of US imperialism • c Iranian interests Iran faces a situation in which the Shah's influence may have been denigrated with the weakening of both the Iranian government and armed forces The crisis presents an increased opportunity for dissidence ·· ·although Iran will act to preserve its present form of government and leadership in the regiori Its primary interest is seen as national survival and freedom from coercion and outside influence - ·r _• • • -·• _ tr t 1 i•' d Iraqi interests Iraq also has a primary interest in national survival and freedom from outside influence · · J n addition its actions indicate a desire for territorial cquisition and a·leading role in mobilizing radical move me_nts in the region · The ·united· States continued use of le r weapc ms may··affect Iraq's ··resolve· as an ally of the ·l tfl e- r with pr ssure on Iran eased as a result of • l l pport the Iraqis may feel more dependent on the USSR • _ '' 1 i i_ t 1 i i l -ti t · 1 ·-•· ·· e •• •• • ••• • t • Interests of others 1 Western Europe While· recognizing that their basic security is tied to the United States West European nations may have increasing doubts about the wisdom of the ·US action and its subsequent impact upon Wes ern European curi ty These nations will reexa 'tline ··their alliances as · · -tji y seek to avoid direct· involvement in the conflict Dis_ · ·JJ9n _ C il shipments from the Middle East could cause 'rit ltatige'· e6bnomic ··1osses Should the disruption continue if L -e · iiii gll t be ·necessary to turn· to Moscow for oil All · f i - fejt rn European nations are becoming increasingly concerned · · about· US nuc'iear·weapons stored on their territory and fear aclear strikes by the USSR against such sites -- as well ·as ·-against -see 'an 2 Peoples Republic of China PRC The PRC will opportunity to exploit the situation ·in order to ma -ihtain its relative power ·position vis-a-vis the US·SR and ··•- _ e ent either of the superpowers from gaining hegemony in · '·· Mi dle tat it l '¼• 11 ·HA·J '- '· · · · rt c 1 i it L - -· 1 Nov 1 7 2009 i- i 0 A ltQority_ EO 12958 as amended - • '·• tctAsstF1eo · ·• ·_ --- - ·1'Chief t other US and NATO bases in their countries DoD Ofc of Security Review J-2 - 3 Japan Japan's basic security remains tied to the United States The potential effect of the crisis on Japan's oil supply will raise concerns of political blackmail and economic disaster 4 Third World Nations Third World Nations wil view their interests as being best served if they can avoid injury from the Middle East conflict 5 Turkey Turkey will continue to protect its territory and interests and avoid involvement in the conflict Turkey i·s becoming increasingly concerned about the possibility of a USSR strike against US forces based in and being staged through Turkey 2 OBJECTIVES 2 Improve maintain Soyiet influence in the Middle East by a Protecting and strengthening Iraq b Weakenin_g Iran • iti tr··· ·· j i w -i _ 3 Provide an effective res-ponse to continued us l ff otit J ' f Qf nuclea a i ng us nuclear strike capa ilities in _Iran and the Gulf of Oman • I b Neutrali ing the Iranian armed forces opposing Soviet forces c • Holding the northwestern corridor of Iran • d Supporting Iraqi occupation of Kuwait e Destroying significant portions of signal Soviet· resolve • _ _ - DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review J-3· us forces 4 Continue exploitation of opnortunities to separate the- United States fro its allies 5 Avoid strategic nuclE ar warfare with the United States • 6 Exploft increase momentum of world opinion against the United States 7 Avoid nuclear strikes on Soviet territory b USSR perception of US immediate· objectives 1 Resolve the conflict quickly 2 Localize the conflict 3 Prevent reinforcement and subsequently force forces thereby humiliating the USSR _ PQ awal · of USSR ' ntu · _ •--···•- 4 Maintain Iranian independence under the· p resen t Shah 's government 5 Preserve protect interests in the Middle East us imperialistic oil c The United States is likely to erceive the immediate objectives of the USSR to be 1 Avoiding strategic nuclear warfare • 2 Reg aining the initiative • 3 Placing onus for nuclea r· escalation on the - i · · · United States 3 POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEASURES a Military attack options and associated political s gnals j ' J ' ' · _ _ i i' - ' - 1• •• ' C • • - ' • • ' t j · l Deliver strong ultimatum to Turkish Government - ' ' ' #i f 0s military forces·· use of Turkish territory ·and • 'i ti-es or suffer grave consequences Atch l • 1 • i DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review J-4 • - 2 Institute following military measures in areas of responsibility a Deploy additional ground forces to positions north of Iranian border • • b Provide within existing capability individual personnel and logistical replacements to Caucasus Front units Atch 2 c Provide massive medical support and evacuation to Caucasus Front units Atch 2 d Halt Caucasus Front units in northeastern Iran and deploy them in defensive positions to minimize •f· · · - - ir vulnerability to nuclear attack Atch 2 ·•r i ' f e Attack Iranian ground forces with ground weapons to render them noncombat -_ •· - ·_· ·and air delivered nuclear _-- ·· •· ···· e fe_ctive Atch ·2 ·· 0 ' ·· f Deploy sufficient ir Force resources to Caucasus Front Atch 3 to accomplish the following 1 Insure destruct ion of enemy jet capable airfields in Iran7 2 Conduct nuclear attacks on enemy ground · _ · 3 Provide sufficient close air support _ · • • n 9l r and conventional to cover withdrawal of 104th -- ··_' ·t·· - -· ·· Afrborne Division Atch 4 • 3 Continue to fan anti-US sentiments of leftist liberal elements worldwide • 4 Continue to provide support to Baluchi tribesto incite dissidence in Iran 5 Continue fleet deployments to best advantage 6 Continue deployment of Warsaw Pact forces to ·· - - assembly areas • ·'· ' DECLASSIRED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended · ghlef DoD Ofc of Security Review J-5 - · 7 Continue deployment of nuclear capable units to best advantage including staging at Warsaw Pact air · · fields 8 Neutralize US Carrier Task Force in Gulf of Oman by attacking with submarine and air launched nuclear weapons Atch 3 • • 9 Neutralize US 7th Fleet Carrier Task Forces located off coast of Japan and Soviet Eastern Maritime Provinces by attacking with air launched nuc·lear weapons Atch 5 10 Neutralize US carriers ·in ·Medi terrane-an by attacking with submarine ·and air launched nu clear wE apons Atch 5 · ' · 11 Conduct nuolear strikes against Guam to destroy · ·• i 9t d military targets -minimiz·e collateral damage • 1 1r J reviously tU tJi i '_oi · Atch · s deployed submarine- launchE d nuclear ·- - 'r''' Ftti ' _ s · 12 Continue ·attempts to al1enate·the United States - O ·from· its West European allies Atch 6 - 13 Inform the world through the UN of ' a The Soviet rationale·for utilizing nuclear · ' 1 po to counter the imperialist actions of the United 'n irif 1 tch Soviet desire for a cl ase-fire Atch 7 • · -- - · · _ · -· • ···r 14 Warn the PRC that the USS P views with grave __ - ·· r pi i'cern' PRC reception of US war planners and that continued involvement with the United States could engulf the RC in i h e nuclear conflict Atch 8 • 15 Ignore US proposal for UN Middle East peacek@eping force and ' f f o 19 g e g n v l a · n CLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review J- 6 J QP-- f I I •i i7- - • Cc Offer to join with the United States in ending hostilities Atch 9 ' NOTE · It is desired that the nuclear attacks on US Iranian forces in Iran and on the CVAs in the ·Gulf of oman the Mediterranean and off the coasts of the· Soviet-Eastern Maritime Provinces and·Japan be initiated ASAP preferably at • - e same time However if delay is necessary to coordinate ·· ' all attacks those against the U Iranian forces in Iran should be given priority to relieve pressure on ·engaged Soviet forces In addition it is desired that the attack on Guam be conducted within 15 minutes of the completion of the other attacks The messages to the President of the United States the UN the PRC·and the Tass news statement are to be released as soon as all strikeshave been completed In the event that not all strikes can be completed as planned __ messages and news· statement are to be released on order tj t f - · · · _i · · 1'•' ' •• _ _ b Rationale constrain-ts risks and consequences for- _- uu -13 tary and politi al options selected i 'h J ' aC Cl Rationale Principal rationale for nuclear Ca Given futility of· further conven tional action there is the need to demonstrate firm Soviet resolve b Achieves revenge and avoids Soviet - · - ' -- - liati on by inflicting casualties on us forces -i' J -- t i t ' t·· ' · ' '· •• '#• 1 • i - · c Escalates level of nuclear conflict and · t ____ £ii f- l ines · the imminence of a strategic exchange places iJf · · t ·sp nsibility for this escalation cm the United States J ff ii · · i·- Signals to GOT t e imminent dangers which w_ould result if Turkey continues to provide support to US forces • 1 1 · _ · • · • '' d e Minimizes actual US capabilities to continue uclear attacks on Soviet forces in Iran J iftIJ - s poe ti ' t ' L' • Signals the PRC the dangers of supporting DECLASSIFJED NOV 1 7 2009 -Authority EO 12958 as amended ·· Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review J-7 - ' · 2 Constraints • a Need to minimize collateral damages on Guam b ° Need to _insure ·th t th Unite States _does i ot cc msider ·nuclear attack to b strategic or directed -at her homeland · L 3 Risks and conseq e es be destroyed a Airborne forces vic nity of Teheran could Cb Force in I ran remain vulner able nuclear conventional attack l r t · c Th United St tes may · s cal ate and attack fi f - · ii -within_ Soviet fif tt ci •··Likely · _ J f ' i to Union percep ions responses· of protagonists · ··· 1 Iran will have little actual capability to fight Some government officials will flee Iranian forces engaged in local defense of Teheran may panic as a result of conventional and nuclear aerial fire support for 104th Airborne Division iJi' ij i't' q il 2 be strengthened in fact and spirit -± t · '' 'p y oviet ·reinforcements and· succe s on southeastern front ' l • · b Iraq will fight on 3 United States • move t' N - - ' ·• • a Will be stunned by massive Soviet counter- • i fr k - 'Jf c Cb Will still take all measures to avoid exchange • __ - - c May continue to attempt use of nuclear · · f p s ·-to attrite Soviet ground forces in Iran The United · ··'St ates inay be reluctant to strike soviet ground forces that -m cfAs-S1F1Eo NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO i 2958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review J-8 are not advancing or those that are concentrating in majo cities d May well attapk ·soviet warships in Mediterranean e May attack Soviet oil assets inside Soviet Union This probably would be limited to the refineries in the Caspian Sea area vicinity_ot Baku • f Ma'y attack Soviet'·· airt'ields in Caucasus area to reduce air support of Sovi et forces· in· Iran g May deploy US airborne division to aid Iranian forces in Abadan K wai area even though airfields have been struck Thi$ move would serve little or ·no purl ose 4 tf f$ 1 iJ tf 1 · · • ' · Turkey a Will not initiate ground war against · -·sQviet Union but will not expel us forces • • · · · b Will nervously ma±'nt a_in essentially the s·tatus guo and will blink at aoviet hips passin J through the Bosporous ' ••• · · c Will protest anf i may c9nstrain us nuclear · ·- · · operations from Turkish bases · I• • · ' J·i 1i t h l - i r t · · - _d Other international rea·c tions and dom estic respons·es· it ii r t 1 Generally world will be shocked by massiveness --··1 ' n f 1 pf· soviet response Most world leaders will be intent upon · to ping the conflict 2 soviet response will definitely turn some allies aw y from the United States 3 PRC will perceive from attacks on us Pacific · Fl eet Guam that the USSR has the will to persevere and will Pt tolerate PRC US interference ti ' • Other op ions considered but rej cted -d · • d '•r · l · · ' ' 1 Continued non-nuclear operations are not · -· iµilitarily viable would show wea ness and would not · 'DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoO Ofc of Security Review J-9 SCQT bring pressure on the United States to negotiate 2 Conventional attacks_pn Rota _Spai and Holy Loch Scotland would have little· significant military advantage Withholding these attacks provides maximum opportunity for Spain UK to remain out of conflict -restricts conflict to US USSR 3 Nuclear attack on USSR des'ir s to h ve Turkey neutra_l in post-conflict era Aerial recon and··uJ timatum should produc1 the desired results of forcing the Uni ed States to withdraw its forces from Turkey OSD 3 3 b 5 l ' Attack· on Israel· by ·_Egypt Syi ia would not immediately relieve pressure· of Soviet forces ih Iran J 1 · · · addition it is to long term soviet advantage to have Israel as irritant to Arabs as this gives Arabs reason to court Soviet arms aids in maintaining Soviet influence in the region 4 Reinforce 104th'•Airborne with additional· air _ borne division High risk of parachutists landing on deployed engag d opposi t·ion also need to take Teheran has been greatly lessened as a result of the ·major nuclear escalation 5 1 l i Preemptive ·nuclear strike on China • Considerable risk of PRC retaliation The Ghirtese probl rrt is best handled by attacks on qs forces in Middle East and the Pacific 6 i 4 CONTINGENCIES Actions 'by the USSR Actions by US a If the United States conducts air strikes against·· USSR frprn Turkey a USSR will attack arid destroy all air bas es SAS sites in Turkey with IRBMs ' b If the United States ' conducts single attack on Soviet soil and attack is ' determined to be tit-for-tat for Guam there are r easonably DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review J-10 ' b USSR will take no retaliatory action and will accept cease-fire ·- I I I I l i Act ions by USSR Actions by US low civilian casualties and the United States calls for cease-fire c If the United States conducts multiple attacks on Soviet soil and attacks do not appear tit-for-tat for Guam and the United States calls for cease-fire d If us forces use WesternEuropean bases for attacks against Soviet fleet or forces c USSR will accept · cease-fire but will make a tit-for-tat strike to inflict US casualties based upon Soviet_evaluation of the weight of the US attack in terms of damage and or casu·a 1 ties and of possible Soviet gains in -the Middle· East • d USS·R will be prepared to conduct attrition strikes ·against al·l tankers in all areas· 0f the world_··and •wi-11 conduct nuclear strikes against oil ports ·· '· _in Middle East- · ·· e USSR will· ·use all · ·-available· resources in • _ cluding nuclear weapons to defeat and punish reactionary Chinese e If China attacks USSR with either conventional or nuclear weapons DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 11 amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review J-11 FROM RED MESSAGE NO TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFEBENCE 'CONTROL MSG 203 DTG ---- ---- ------ _ ' ·_ FROM USSR TO SOVEMB ANKARA· · - · - oEL'XVE R To ooir Vf1f f ' · II ·2 80 80 o·z- JUN ·7 6 · UPON RECEIPT -iJ @ · i - ·iptJB l C RELEASE -J i€ T tl 1 •f •• £ •2 201 AFTER • DELIVERY • • TO···GOT o O O · the soviet Government addresses the Government of · -ey ' fn a moment of grave peril for the peoples of ' · f- -'y the USSR and the worl i • -· · · i The American imperialists • -· •• •J ' aving unleashed nuclear war in a region of which Turkey is a part continue their · criminal acts and now threaten attacks ·-against the USSR - i_ •lf • The reckless policy of the· GO'I' in providing support _ · · t P _ _j bJ imperialists puts Turkey in an extremely precarious i41t1tl · t t 1 t f ' · -· · ' · considering its national security to be directly _ 3 j eJ1ed the Soviet Government warns the Government of _ ' ' · '- l'µrkey· ·that any future use of Turkish territory or facilities -lib y --US •Iilili tary forces will result in an immediate and de va s _ - ting Soviet respon·se against Turkey Appropriate ins tru ctions have been issued to the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces if' 4 The Government of Turkey should realize tha this • ning is of the utmost seriousness - ilJ -¾r ' 1 · i ' tJ c ' ECLASSIFIEO NOV 1 7 2009 ·' f IAY ho tt¥ o _12 58 as amended i_ ·' ' ' ·- ·Ch1ef DoD Ofc of Security Review · J_ · · · 1_ y i- - · ' At-oh 1 J-12 ·- · __ · --FROM RED ---- - •• · - - · · MESSAGE NO - TO CONTROL MOVE REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 2·0 3 DTG FROM MOD USSR TO CDR CAUCASUS FRONT 201 ------II NO ---------- JUN ----------280800Z 76 1 Halt forces presently deployed in northern Iran ·· · · · ·· · · ' ··- ·· 2 Reorganize and reconstitute forces within capability · t-_ · ·t tt·- lCin so doing avoid giving impression that additional Soviet - 1Jj j r·· i st es are being deployed into I-ran 1 fff - h J · l J tr t· - r · · · · J t ft i• - t · · · 3 Take appropriate defensive measures to limit losses to _ ' _ -·_ · enemy nuclea - - attacks • ·· · · · 4 Disengage and establish defensive positions ' S Re ort critical losses of personnel equipment and supplies · i -- J _ •i 6 ' H i i- Mil t · ·· ci - i• p c 1 t - 1 7 • Continue medical reinforcements and medical evaluation ·' · -•- a ·' · ·of casualties Attack opposing enemy units with nuclear weapons to · '' ' _- ·· render them combat ineffective whi-le insuring the safety of · · - • y_p ur own troops Expend up to 50 percent of available · · · _ - weapons ·utilizing yields· appropria-te for attack options 1 8 Air arm will provide backup nuclear strikes on enemy units Coordinate ·t _ · _ 9 104th ABN Div under cover of close ai r support J' ' r -'i f di --·Sengage and withdraw to defensive position Vicinity · _ - · ·•- - ·coordinate wv 0757 Garm Darren j l W ili ' ' · _ · -- _ __ _-_· Atch 2 IV DECLASSIFIED 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review J-13 - 0 · 4 •_ - l-Q Air Army will attack 81st Armd Div 77th Inf Div and 16th Armd Div See msg to Commander AF 11 Imperative that all nuclear strikes be completed ASAP DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Au hority EO 12958 as amended Chief Doo Ofc of Security Review · Atch 2 J-14 - SE · _ 7 1 i ·S T • f •' l - • • j _ • • I FROM RED MESSAGE NO TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE CONTROL MSG· 2·0 3 DTG _ __ 2 a o ·s o_oz _JUN _7_6 201 II ------- ------- '----- ' FROM MOD USSR TO CINC AIR FORCES · j i i f fii · · Take the following immediate actions ' ' ·• · a Deploy sufficient air assets to the Caucasus Front l f l J trcom t t kf t 1 1 e and render i' t • i· ieffective 40% destroyed the following Iranian ground forces · _ - ·- _ ·' a 77th Inf Div b 16th Armd Div c 81st Armd Div 2 Provide backup strikes for SCUD and FROG tactical nuclear attacks on other Iranian forces 3 Provide follow-up nuclear attacks initial · • _ · ··strikes to be made by IRBM MRBM on enemy jet capable air- fields in Iran ·J I I - 4 Provide conventional close air support for the 1Q4th Airborne Division detonate several nuclear air bursts · d·1 1f r-' -l P iacilitate withdrawal of force to west · J ·- r - ' ·· ·· • j llii t ' i •- nflf - •1 • -'••· ' · ' • • • _ n tt • - •- '• 5 Provide air defense cover for Soviet forces i p 1 6lred ·in Iran ·· · • • '- Atch 3 M ·• ' I t' · I d ·I DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review J-15' · 'i Bft-S T • • b Attack US CVA Task Force in the Gulf of Oman with LRA using nuclear ASM Attack with sufficient force to insure that Task Force is disabled c Provide continuous reconnaissance over all Iranian j et capable airfields d Provide continuous reconnaisance over all Turkish jet capable airfields e Imperative that all nuclear strikes be co pleted • · 1 · l' on t i · - • f Coordinate above actions with commander Caucasus DECLASSIFIED NOV i 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 u aminded Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review l tii tJ L Atch 3 1' r 6r- 1 ·· · · - J-16 i - · -- MESSAGE NO - 201 TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 203 DTG _ ___ 2 8 0 8_0 0Z_J UN----_7_6· II • COMMANDER CAUCASUS FRONT TO CG 104TH ABN DCG AIR CAUCASUS FRONT 1 On order be prepared to withdraw by foot-march to _ defensive positions 3-4 kms NE G rm Darren WV 0757 • - FROM • 2 Coordination • · 1 - f t ·- · · lt · _ · _ · y•· • n f i J J 1JFli f v a Air Force to provid on c iali · t tical •air suppo r·t · itJt i 1t Qt ·disengagement present positions · r• rr - - tJtJ J · · _ · · b Air Force to support with _lo ··y i ld ·nuclear air bursts to clear route from pr sent' posifio s ·to withdrawal positions · · · c Withdrawal to commence ASAl following termination rn u clear attack · · · closure w ithdrawal CG l04t ABN • DECLASSIFIED • · ' NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoO Ofc of Security Review At ch 4 J-17 - • - ' -- ' · - · · - -iJ · i'a ' - J - S OU ' 'Jf • _ 1-4 ESSAGE NO TO CON'l'ROL MOVE NO REFERENCE· CONTROL MSG 2·03 DTG 201 II ---------·2soa-ooz JUN 76 FROM MPD ISSR TO CINC NAVAL FORCES Take the following actions ' ·· • a Direct an SSG SSGN attack against us military bases ·_ on Guam Anderson AFB and Naval Station These naval units · ·· __ QW ployed to maximize accuracy and minimize collateral ·' ' - -r --··size attack to inflict heavy damage against sub · · · - ···aers · aircraft and above ground· facilities rrr _ -r tJtT r _ ' · · c · f ·- _ - · · · · b Direct submarine attacks employing nuclear weapons _against two US CVAs deployed ·-in the Mediterranean Employ - ui-face air as appropriate to insure success forces -to backup submarine attack ·_· · c Direct submarine air· as appropriate to insure · success attack employing nuclear weapons against CVA Tas-k c - t- orces located off coast of Japan and Soviet East rn Mari i ··· ··· P rovinces with subma rines now positioned in trail · -ff _5A - ntic1e·ar fal f o'lit or ·other_ damage -0 Japanese territory ' t · c a Direct attack ubmari es to proceed to the Persian Force to be used t o monitor and Qr attack petroieum tankers and oi1·ports · _ '- ' _ · · · tJGUlf o'f Oman region e Continue maximum state of readiness and be prepared to r pulse enemy attacks • _ _ °Atch 5 •• •l - ' i• J-18 FROM RED MESSAGE NO TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE CONTROL· MSG ·2·03 · DTG 201 II 2·so 800Z JUN 76 ------------ ------ TASS STATEMENT ·· · · TASS IS AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE THE FOLLOWING ON COMPLETION OF ALL NUCLEAR STRIKES The countries of the NATO Alliance face a grave peri 1 Acting on a pretext which poses no threat to the interests ·•·· of Europe one member- of··that Alllan e has chos en to unleash ' ' f _f n r lear _war et- P try· can - Should thi s· wa-r conti n tie and· expa n n6 c u - be safe The peoples of Europe are particul·arly · J i j jt iNuln rable to the devastating effect of nuclear weapons · · ' · f - t j J t· is clear to al l that Europe· cau1a not ··surviv ·-·such a · · · ·· ···· -· -confrontation • · · · · · · _ '• · · · · · ·' 1- 0 '• But once nuelear· war ••has begun no one can say h6w far it will spread The cr minal American attacks ·ort Soviet · forces cannot go unpunished ·and the USSR already has · undertaken appropriate countermeasures Should the Americans _ now persist in expanding nuclear war the USSR would have ' · ·no ehoice but to attack -us forees ··wherever 'they are located - - • · · -· The Soviet uni'on appeals to the peoples nd governrnen ts -·- fo f Europe to ·rEistrain the ·Amer±·can ·nuclear- a ggre'ss·ors whose _ ' _ ·reckless actions have plao ed Europe an·d the world in gravest jeopardy As the us Government ·'·a lready· has been informed · the Soviet Government urgently proposes an· ·immediate e_nd · - t_ r · ' to all hostile acts to be f ol owe·d ·by negot•iations concerning the ini•tial causes •of tha·· ·conflict in_ Iran The European peoples and gove·rnments· must insist· that the United States turns from its insane course and accepts these p7oposals in the name of the· ·f_ut re- of· mankind - • 1ii i lt 1j J J - - - a · ·_ Atch 6 DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 ·Authority EO 12958 as amend Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review J-19 l I FROM RED MESSAGE NO TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE -CONTROL MSG 2·0 3 DTG· 201 II 2a·o·sooz JUN 76 ---------- ----- -----------FROM USSR TO SOVAMB UN FOR DELIVERY TO UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF · · A LL 'NUCLEAR STRIKES • · _ h•o• i ' tile USSR acted initially to preserve the territorial ' · ' ' 1 't 9 r lity of its ally -- Iraq which had been attacked' by i l-is t Iran ' • · · · ' · 2 'The United States entered·_the war and employed nuclear weapons in great nllltlbers against soviet forces assisting the Iraqis thereby inflicting thousands of casualties upon _ · - · h t ic c soviet troops OS nuclear strikes came via aircraft · ··from us naval carriers deployed in the area as well' as via · t 1 · ' aptical aircraft deploying from Iran Turkey and other i f frt f tlf j f bases · - - • i' 3·• The USSR has taken measures to protect its forces from · turther nuclear attacks by US forces Jtt J iHfi 1 J • •'··The soviet Union cannot· continue to· suffer such casuacting in self-defens e • has taken measures to forces and the forces• of Ir aq from further · · Ufl ear attacks by· the United States ·The ·Soviet Union has · - · · confined its· response to strikes against US forces directly · tnreatening Soviet and Iraqi forces and ·has avoided any aa on the territories of other sovereign nations · · · a ' ii s· and · ·protect its - · · · _ -· t _is • • • • ' I • lj ' •• t · ••-1·• · the Soviet des$ re t·o avoid the spread of this bring about its rapid termination ·and · ¢ fll ic t • ' ti ' J · f J· ·T-he ·united States is urged to join the USSR in an ' · 1 • ' ·· y cease-£ire 1 I • -• ' • DECLASSIRED NOV 1 7 2009 Au hority EO 12958 as amendtta- 2 0 Chief ·ooo Ofc of Security Review f ·· · · ' Jl l r 1 SBe M ·· _-_ • FROM RED MESSAGE NO 201 TO CONTROL MESSAGE NO II REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 203· DTG 280800Z JUN 7·6 ------- - -------FROM USSR TO PRC TO BE RE EAS ED fOLLQWING CQMPL 1ION· OF ALL NUCLEAR STRIKES 1 The Soviet Government notes with astonishment that at ' · _ a moment when nuclear war threatens to engulf mankind a - • - i · -· d legation of American war- pla-nners ··has been received in fa l to co demn- this act which- assopi ·t · t1 i 'fates the Pec ples _Repubii-c of Chi-na with tQe reckless purposes of·the imperialists • ibJfihfJ t ij i J Jcing - One cannot · - ·2 • The Peoples Republic of China shopld· realize th at once nuclear warfare is unleashed no· country can be safe 1'pe populous country of China is j n fact particularly vul nerable to the devastating_effects of the-se weapons · ' - · 3 _The ·soviet C3overnment· regar¢ts the current deployment _ -·· 'of· ps naval forces in the western ·Pacific region as a - 'r i - 'e' • girect tllreat to it · security It has -rftf6 W J ·P_tiate niea sures against these forces • already taken approIt will not hesitate · · -- - • ·• f • to ·take similar- mea ures against other threats to i-ts · security i n this area of· the world • · 4 • The Sov iet Governm n urgently· appeals to the Peoples Republic of C hina to reconsJder the dangerous cour$e it is taking The· Soviet Union has no hostile designs upon China but it will not hesitatE ' -to-deal with ggressive acts against its ter1 itory and it _wil l not confine its response DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review Atch 8 · J-21 '· - •i '-t f OM MESSAGE NO MOVE NO · TO CONTROL RE FERENCE CONTROL MSG 203 DTG 2 0l II 2a·osooz JUN 76 -------------------FROM SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY h f iirilJ il Q 1 -itli i -1 i SJ DENT OF THE UNITED STATES j - · •• ' ' · _ TP i • •• • - I• • RELEASED FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF ALL NUCLEAR STRIKES ° • De r Mr Presi·dent- -• ···· ·- -- _ ·_-ir t ' ' 'l 'Qµr latest actions· and threats· have created a situation You should understand ·that the USSR l - 1 f ' _ ' ' irs its vital interests to be directl-v threatened in · - ii · - '-f ejt'9•' rpresen t Crisis • •J -i ii · - Jj ravest peril• - - _ _ ' ' -Y U will shortly learn ·from your co anders the military· ·• f _ f '' f # r actions which we have been forced to ·take I must ' ·· -·-at this -time tell you that we consider the USSR a d United States -to be on the very brink of total nuclear wat for which history -- if it does not come to an end - -- ll place total responsibility upon the American Government • • • - _ _ i' i • •• · 1° • • • _ _ - _ · - - tour last message speaks of·vulnerable·Soviet resources · i - 1i - i- t to regard this as a US threat to launch attacks against I _ f t 1 te rritory of the soviet Union Can- anyone imagine that · F l 1- _Soyiet people would tolerate such an -attack Please ·cphsider well Mr President the uncontrollable consequences ' - t• #l l -- -- --ElC t ion We for o r part -have never threatened ' ·- · t·· tbe - resources of other countries · nor do we do so now•· · '- · • • •• •· I cannot expand further d still remain under human control Should you refuse to _ join with 11s in bringing hostilities to an immediate end not allow the USSR to receive the first bl ow - - wi 'warn you directly that this war __ _ · f - - i t '1 tH f f - DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 ·· · -· ·t' - I ·Au hority EO 12958 as amended · ·--· ·· · Chief DoD·Ofc of Security Review r 1 1• i· __ _ · • - • • • -- $ ORBII' 1ti1 ' lt C ' --'·' ·- -f f ' j ttth the name of humanity we urgently appeal to you for an immediate cessation of all hostile acts and the immediate opening of negotiations concerning the disengagement and withdrawal of opposing forces in Iran · These negotiations should be directed at the restoration of peace and be based upon respect for the sovereignty of the nations involved Pending your reply to this proposal we have ordered our forces to refrain from further attacks and to remain in a max mum state of readiness A KIRILENKO • t- Yj_ rrt - ·· ' • •• a•• •• ' · ' i '· -4 1 · •• ' • • ·· ' ' · c J· · _ 1• - --❖ • • - - ' · _ · t ¥- i ·_ · - · ·- ·I t f t f i -· ' · - · · -· · • - r · Pap determined to be Unc1tulfled · Reviewed Chief DoD OS Date Nov i 2 oc q IAWEO 12 8SecdoaJ S ' - 301 FROM CONTROL MESSAGE NO TO BLUE MOVE NO ----- I I I REFERENCE BLUE MESSAGE 201 DTG 281500 JUN 76 SECOND SCENARIO PROJECTION An Ignoble Impact • - Iranian commanders were encompassed on all fronts by heavy fighting early in the morning of 28 June when Soviet combat elements of four divisions launched a headlong advance toward Teheran Dispersed for protection against nuclear attacks the 164th Division approached the northern edge of r · _ - - e- jan Advancing from the Caspian seacoast the 75th · 1- i _ ' · ' ' t1sion met only light resistance as its troops drove into _ _ ' ' jP ri' terrain west of Qazvin to link up with their comrades on - ' e road to Teheran I11 the northeast two columns of the t i 54th and 15th Divisions advanced against a light enemy screen __ · · ' '·to the ·•·Vicinity of sari and to about 30 kilometers east of - ' _ SI cl ud res pee ti vely · 1 · - ' · ' · · • In the air coordinated attacks by 60 Soviet bombers •c tgainst 3 Iranian airfields Shahrokhi Bushehr and Shiraz ·caused some damage and the loss of 8 defending F-4s How· ·ev er stiff opposition from scrambled USAF F-4s at Shiraz 'i · 9 j ··Ba se limited damage at that base to taxiways and tempo · · - YA ¥- shelters while shooting down 11 TU-95 Bears A ferocious t t l for control of the air chewed up nearly half of the · intperial Ir_anian Air Force fighters Over Teheran the f ti t' ri J •f ig3tt was reminiscent of the Battle of Britain -n - i '''· tt•s 1ntensity as more than 30 of the hard-pressed Iranian ' j _ · t 'att were destroyed over the capital itself Although · t• i•'·-' ·· a·' S6 viet airborne division had been airdropped on the western edge of Teheran during a momentary lull on the - ' - orning of the 28th Soviet air still did not gain freedom of action in the area Consequently indomitable Iranian Pi ots were able to prevent Soviet air-landings of reinforce - ' _ · - rt necessary to secure their airhead On the ground i t tCLASSmo NOV 172009 · · t f hE i ri K-1 · · ·below the Shah's Imperial Guard Division reinforced by uncommitted units from the northwestern front cou terattacked repeatedly causing heavy casualties The Spirit of ·Ha•ile -se·las·sie Shah Pahlavi repeated his desperate apneals to the United States and the Western World for help He thanked the United States for its previous efforts and implored its continued support In answer the Iran Support Command and American Embassy hurriedly informed the Shah of their plans to repeat an enlarged nuclear attack The strikes were planned against leading elements of two Soviet northwestern - nd two Soviet northeastern divisions while conventionally alt-med aircraft were to reinforce air defenses over Teheran ·and the southern Iraqi border Meanwhile a frenetic diplomatic dialogue emanated from Washington President Nixon proposed to the UN Security Council a peace-keeping force t9 police a cease-fire and to arrange for a withdrawal of ' _·-r J - J cir ign combat troops -' ' t ' ' · • l t ·• • • 1 ' ·' A idressing a somber ·_ ' · Pt e ident Nixon warned 1 mess ge to the nation and the world that continued aggression compelled ' ·i l f•·l 1gl 'H ni te d States to aga n combat Soviet aggression w th - _ · ·nucl$ ar weapons He reminded Eurone and Japan of their i i i - i y dependence upon the USSR for cri ical s 1pplie of oil · - - ' - ·'·i- f ·' ran were to fall and should the Soviets gain dominance in the Middle East Similarly Middle Eastern and North African nations were cautioned of a reduction in their abilitv to ·manage and market vital national oil• assets if the Soviet ·· · plan succeeded Private ambassadorial contacts with the - p ese also requested permission for reentry of USAF tacti_ _· · · al aircraft to Japanese bases as well as permission to · - - -·- ' - ploy nuclear weapons to Japan Not deter red by the · · '•- ·• Ai squie ting lack of response in 'l'okyo the White House ' 'Jt abled sobering words to the Kremlin · - _ w•• -the United States is compelled to continue 'the use of nuclear wea ons •••• Continued Soviet advances against the world's primary energy source which is of vital importance to all free nations would inevitably force us to consider · - -· i i fm L _ tary action agai st vulnerable soviet __ · l t• j r -sources of a like nature •• 11 -· _ - b J i _ - - ·t 1-1 rr t toc ss teo - Nov 1 7 2009 j ' ' ---J Jh orlty EO 12958 as amended - iiflf 1 rooo Ofc of Security Review K-2 s e c I '·• •• ·' •• • ' · • 1i fr · · • ' I • · Irt ·I ·5 rn order to make clear the portents of his diplomatic J H·f i f - r•ar ings -the President authorized SR-71 reconnaissance · flights over the Soviet oil complexes at Baku The mission was tracked but not intercepted Along with the multiule overtures of harried State Department officials the Pentagon honed its own plans The 82nd Airborne Division which had begun to marshal for deployment was delayed pending Turkish approval of its basing there Meanwhile two F-4 squadrons moved from Turkey to Isfahan Air Base Iran The United States urg·ently began allocating additional· aircraft air defense equipment · and weapons to replace the losses suffered by US and Iranian - i i r itHr s In Iran US naval aircraft began combat air support ·- i ' ' · -sions with conventional ordnance in support of the ' -'Y ill ' ' r aguered 92nd Division facing Iraq A few Iranian air · craft also using iron bombs carried the fight into the _ · Gulf striking the Soviet naval task force which lingered · ·offshore However these missions caused no significant damage to enemy ships The US naval task force prepared _ ·_ ts I 1uclear defenses for possible retaliatory soviet aerial · • • ' ·'· ·' ' tt cks • _ i r IA L rfusiv Eruptions H ·f C -'F • _''l 'he· se ds of strenuous diplomatic efforts to force the o t of Iran appeared to be planted in rocky soil · ·• • ·•' •'·' ·' Resolutely the United States launched a restrike of Soviet combat forces From 0700-0800 on the 28th the first wave f tactical nuclear weapons burst over and around the Soviet forces First to hit assigned targets in the north · · '· ¢as t were_ 12 A-6s from the US naval carrier task force · ' '· i '' ' ' · rity four troop targets and choke points were demolished _· ·• • 1i ii f me· northwest 22 F-4s repeated the carnage 1 · ' ' ittg_fi· P ts - · · '-'-· ·- · rL i it fii 7- J ri the ' ground three ADM sites were detonated one• in hthe titt · 1 J'H5 f m ast ·and two in th 7 northwest tempor ily ha 1 ting t e · f g rt iiQY le-t advance and forcin a moment mass in by the enemy 1f · · r -t t r f -1r - - - 1 ·· i-d- 11L i ft t ' • • • •· · '• · · '· '· JS 3 3 b S- K-3 - 3 BCR-K I _ - t • • •• _ · - · · t · · j ' b- · it - and three F-4s fell to enemy fire Detennined in this effort --··· ' · - - 'to annihilate any Soviet troops striving to take Ir an the United States continued to strike identifiable enemy targets the remainder of the morning Another seven artillery detonations burst upon Soviet troops in the northeast and five naval air sorties interdicted LOCs in the same area The last seven USAF strikes were carried out against northwestern LOCS One ADM in the northeast was not detonated as So'tl'iet forces were halted before thev reached the site By 1130 the last of r he 118 ·scheduled weapons had cratered the Iranian landscape on each side of the central capital Sterile statistical computations had predicted that as many as 3 900 troops in each of the four leading divisions ·_ mi ght become casualties In addition - d e t o n a ' -·-· _Qn along the road and rail routes S U 164th · t ffi • tt Piv lsion were expected to eliminate 2 ooo more soviet troops · · · In the early hours of the attack these anticipated results ·•· · could not be accurately evaluated - hawever it was ob rious that Soviet troops were decimated and that many Soviet lead lements were pinned down or scattered Dazed prisoners f - ·_ _ _ a # a _ other tactical intelligence sources gave evidence that · _·- · aaqua rter units were disrupted and surviving forces were · ·-- · a t · pting to establish isolated defensive positions SIGINT 7 t t 1 F · t ep ed frantic cries for medical assistance evacuation is · Ut Qtf t ic · Consequences JS 3 3 b S · - · _ ·The debacle of a second nuclear attack against Soviet · ·troops in Iran reverberated in communist camps For the · moment it appeared that another c nventional advance even _ - using the massive division reserves north of Iranian borden1 Ii· _'· ·' ' ¢ d _·nc t change the immediate situation On top of this · · · · -setback was a pressing need to support t 'ie 104th Airborne --- · _ P y isio z i fighting for survival on the outskirts of Tehermi t- - - L tilif 19 c ai_r support sought to help its wit 1-idrawa but by - - f-' ' - d _r'n1ng the 10 4th' s rennnants· barely avoided being overi t·t- 'f r' - by abandoning their perimeter and attempting to ex iff1 i J _ttate · piecemeal during the chaos The 10 4th no longer t•i - -' ·· ·e 1'isted as a fighting unit •'While Soviet military commanders attempted -to regroun their forces on the battlefield the Kremlin launched n - fessive political and psychological atta8k Propaganda -1 - s to every conceivable outlet were flooded with pict·ures of_ civilians and the atrocities of nuclear burns - s·uffering ' ' _ ·- sitrt ·1 ' ' ' · ·ssmm Nov h i 1 1 2009 AuJb _eo 12958 u amended tT t•··t fflet l oO'·Ofc·ot Security Review · K- 4 S ' ' I l i · 'is -' ' t ff - --- Radiation danger and destruction fanned the fears of the world Soviet efforts to alienate the United States fror its allies portrayed the United States once aqain as a reckless despoiler of world peace Leftist governments vociferated their charges against the United States From India and Japan came earnest appeals for an end to the nuclear· nightmare Demonstrations proliferated again in Europe the Middle East Latin America and on several university campuses in the United States -- led mostly by SDS activists Socialist students and workers denounced the 11 im erialist US killers o innocent Iranian peasants Nonetheless most of the anguished pleas for peace also noted that Soviet aggression in Iran wai the real casus belli Y 1 J- Itf i'• ' _ _ · - North Atlantic Council fears strained the limits of - t · f t the Alliance as members pressed the United States to pre· ' ·- - 'iL ' Nent a widened nuclear war American diplomats continued _ _ -_- __ ' '·' lo plead for joint defense including Reinforced Alert and preparation of the ACE Mobile Force for immediate ·deployment In spite of US entreaties the NAC pointedly refused to deploy the ACE Mobile Force or to declare a · Reinforced Alert • · _r _ ' · •· · •• ·· ' · _ The Soviet Union issued its · own warnings and exhorta tior s · _ _ · while ste adfastly ignoring us proposals The only response i - i _ · · f Qm t1' enemy camp surfaced in Bucharest where President ' · ' · t t f'·· ' ceausescu· remarked that the US note which made a veiled ····-- ·· · · ·· -·t hreat to vital oil interests raised the specter of another - t 1 r -- 1 '·Pl oes ti • He urged the Kremlin not to provoke the emotional Americans to carry out useless acts of revenge on helpless ·· · victims JS 3 3 b 5 · Turkey already the target of abusive Soviet propaganda received an ultimatum to deny US military use·of its • • • • • 'w'• t '• · territory -- or suffer the consequences A threatened attack by Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces increased the gr avity of the warning Not willing to become thG next zone of conflict Pres'ident Koruturk politely assured the Soviets that no US troops other than those presently con- tributing to Turkish territorial defense would be permitted to use its bases Also Turkey declared that the Bosporous would remain open to international shipping At the same time us and Turkish diplomats quietly agreed to emplace ADMs under CINCEUR control along its northeastern border with the Soviet Union Darkness at Noon - ' 'f y· mid-day with the completion of the· us nuclear · strikes Soviet forces still had not replied with their · _ __ ·· _in' lclear weapons They had however seriously attrited • · · - _tfie·Iranian Army only two-thirds of its fighting · _forces remained to continue the defense Nevertheless ranian leaders were jubilant The capital had been • spared a Soviet takeover Although sporadic fighting continued on the northeastern and northwestern fronts •• 1 0_ · the three-pronged soviet attack had been stopoed The i an otherwise 1 rightening picture wa_s · iJ ·11 X - p rt of c vilian casualties Fallout was reported ' t¼ i t i N rthwestern locales and along the Caspian Sea coast - -f y _ - ·f i- ns were beginning to suffer the effects of radia · ··_ t ion Because of widespread refugee evacuations no · _ st qis• casualty figures were possible but Soviet propaganda already claimed that well over 30 000 Iranian civilians had p ished Those who still lived began to sort out the debris 1 ·esurrect their hopes for survival iJiftflf ma rk ti r tl 1 · To manv Iranians and Americans the absence of a nuclea n · reply was-considered an inchoate sign of victory When · if ·- y j qrning sites and air defense centers in Iran flashed TLT- · · · iew wave of approaching Soviet aircraft at 1300 the ·· c tf _ _fr ' n n 4 an High Command was inclined to treat it as another · · ··· · · qc riv ntional attack The aircraft identified as Soviet · - ium bombers feinted towards the southeast and disappeared ·· · _ ·over Afghanistan USAF a i r defense fighters wexe alerted but most of the available aircraft were undergoing maintenance foll owing the morning sorties and had not YA t rearmed Thus t of the US and Iranian aircraft were on thei r 2 amps at 1400 --· when the first nuclear warheads of Soviet SS4 and SSS · · · ··ClrASilFIED t NOV ·1 7 2009 prity EO 12958 as amended _· 11 D Ofc of Security Review 'C K-6 - J I • missiles impacted on airfield runways with no tactical warning Every major airfield in Iran was struck by the Soviet weapons Except for a few combat air sorties loft when the attack began the bulk of remaining air fore es in Iran were destroyed A few of the airborne aircraft recovered on Turkish bases where they were stranded without weapons or support equipment · ••· Closely coordinated with these airfield attacks was a series of tactical strikes by Soviet FROG and SCUD missiles supported by tactical air delivered nuclear weapons Pzincipal victims of these smaller weapons were three Iranian divisions still relatively intact the 77th in the northeast the 16th defending the northwestern highway to Teheran nd the 31st recently deployed near Hamadan Command and communication links were destroyed along with command posts - quipment and troop reserves American advisors feared that more than half of the re maining forces were decimated • Missile strikes against airfields and against the command · -posts of the Iranian divisions also caused widespread · - · coilateral injuries to civilians who were just vacating their makeshift morning shelters k -r i H O $ ava l units on the high seas were not spared the nuclear Within a space of 15 minutes separate but Ji ·f ' pparently coordinated attacks involving hundreds of Badger ·•· - ·-r· · aircraft supported by submarine-launcl1ed missiles and sur · • face combatants struck five US naval carrier task forces in •··· -' · -c· the Pacific eastern Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea The Chief of Naval Operations received an extract of a message ·from tl1e task force in the Gulf of Oman ' - lf · h C fl ci9aust COMTASKFORCE OMAN 281420Z JUN 76 • - _- L- 0 Soviet aircraft and submarines attacking · ·r-c ' • •• 1 1··x' tt ·1 ' - 1 -f_ t· f' 'it - • ' i y i aw k an d supper t 'ing s h'ips D esp1te 0 fjtj 'i' - ••siV' ' t L evasive maneuvers and high casualties to enemy • - - ••· •17••- -- ·· '' • •• ·1 ' • _ _ J t pi l f ''f c forces have experienced two nearby surface · · ' · • •• · · _ • • • detonations Serious fires and damage to pro p lsion system hampering defensive efforts Bainbridge and Biddle have been sunk ing to clear to southeastern waters Attempt- The two naval task forces in the Pacific Oriskany and Coral Sea Groups faced the same concentrated attack as the task force in t he Arabian sea A stream of casualty reports poured in Approximately 30 Soviet Badgers and subsurface forces attacked each task group The Northern Task Force in waters adjacent to the Soviet Maritime Provinces lost two destroyers two destroyers and two frigates were badly damaged The CVA was also badly damaged and dead in the water Eight Badger aircraft were downed The Southern Task Group east of Honshu fared better One cruiser was damaged extensively one destroyer sunk and a frigate and two other destroyers incurred light to moderate damage The CVA was rendered ineffective with heavy flight deck damage • Tw lve enemy aircraft were shot down and two enemy SSGNs and one SSN were sunk Simultaneously · with the attacks in the P aoific and Middle East Soviet naval strike forces en · ··· ' ' gaged 'the Independence and Forrestal ca crier Task Forces i n the Ionian Sea A combined strike force of an estimated 16 · - µbmarines and 27 surface combatants was acco i-11 panied by more ·t Jian 100 Badgers many of which carried air-to-sur£aoe -· mi ssiles Shortly after 1400 COMSIXTHFLT reported - f ii • · COMSIXTHFLT 291420Z JUN 76 i' i l j' ri k i t 30 i 1• ir pickets detected BLINT from BEAR MIG Radar acquisition made at 1343 on 14 uni dent - -· ·· -- liircr ft us RECON CAP reported a soviet naval • _ force approximately 86 miles and closing At ' _ J 00 USS Standley reported sonar contact and · · -- ·· 'ii'isual observation of underwater launched '¢issiles clearing water By 1410 numerous · · -· · ' ini sile _hi ts sank 2 ODs and damaged four ' ljt i1 · ·_ -'-•l't is jPJ -9rt vessels Forrestal burning with little 1 ji cf 'i' ' pe Independence also severely damaged but ' Af-itbf 1 ' - 11 fighting Sov iet air and naval units ··· '· -t' · · · observed retiring toward Alexand r ia at 1418 · · · _-_ ' ' igh t casual ties inflicted on enemy sources • · ·· · - - t· ·ifrobabili ty - of reattack remains · · __ I nformation was lacking but so far as it -could be - e·t rm inod three of the five carrier task forces had been seriously damaged and were 'fighting for their survival The -r maining two carrier task forces had fought off the first __ -a' - 'wa_ve Q_f nuclear strikes with some damage but the outcome was 1J ll t ·· · · f OECLASSiFIED NOV 1 7 2009 ·· i · - - i tA ity Q 12958 as amended · · '· Chief poo Ofc of Security Jview K- s Cli'8P- ' --·· ••'•'' - - · - -· · SiCRE4' · ·'°i 1 uncertain • ' 1a f Thousands of US lives were lost Naval SIOP greatly reduced · Few US tactical units were available for support of Iran Ashened-faced military staffers and political leaders huddled with the President attempting to grapple with this Soviet response The Soviets had chosen to retaliate not only in Iran but also against tis naval forces worldwide In the first wave of nuclear blows they had spared the US homeland Although no other reports were received of nuclear detonations in either the Middle East or Europe mental shock waves compressed the terrible events into a single fear - expect the worst As the President agonized over his greatly reduced courses of action another crushing piece of news arrived from Hawaii and was quickly confirmed by the AEC CINCPAC 281430Z JUN 76 Two nuclear detonations of possibly one megaton size each have destroyed Anderson AFB and Apra · Harbor Naval Facilities on Guam Contact with sur ' f - ii D «i 1 • iv ors being established Collateral damage to Agana f · · ' _ p9pulation appears minimal but initial recce confirms · ' tJdt • 1 - J fl j 'that military installations obliterated Details on i f i i- tf 'ft%W 1 '' 1• i destroyed forces at these installations not known at · · · · · t h is time 'Into the inspissated atmosphere of dismay which gripped Washington came another series of communications from - oscow Tass originated a propaganda release calling upon Europeansto restrain the American nuclear aggressors and urged that the United States accept proposals to end hostili · · · - ties and negotiate concerning the conflict• in Iran The UN G e er4 1-l 'Assembly incredulously heard the Soviet Amba sador ti r§i t ttt i i·· • CPlain that the USSR had taken measures to protect its JJ i J itllf f 9rces from further nuclear attacks by the United States He claimed also that Soviet attacks had avoided the · t rritories of other sovereign nations and that the Soviets desired to limit the spread of the conflict He proposed that the United States join in an early cease-fire tf t t ·· •• ·- 0 · • he Soviet General Secretary addressed his own pointed appeals for peace to the US President · • · ' - '' • t ' r • -- a · · MOLINK 28144SZ JUN 76 Dear Mr President Your latest actions and threats have created a situation of the gravest peril You should understand that the USSR considers its vital interests to be directly threatened in the present crisis You will shortly learn from your commanders the military counteractions which we have been forced to take I must at this tirne tell you that we consider the USSR and the United States ·r 16 l j r-# Y- W i- ·to· b·e on ·the very brink of total nuclear war _·_ · ·' - · ' - · for which history -- if it does not come to an · i'- · · ri a i v n tal responsibility upon the • • Your last message speaks of vulnerable Soviet resources Are we to regard this as a us threat to launch attacks against the territory of the Soviet Union Can anyone imagine that the Soviet - - _ people would tolerate such an attack Please con - ' - --sider well Mr President the uncqntrollable con· · f s t J J equences of such an action• We for our part · ·• · · 1 • ---· · · · · · have never threatened the resources of other ·· · ountries nor do we do so now I i· ' t l 'i 'J ' '1' •f• a _r •'1•l• f - •I • _ L s 1 • '• • • We warn you directly that this war cannot expand further and still remain under human control Should you refuse to join with us in bringing hostilities to an immediate nd we will not allow the USSR to receive the first blow -i _- - _ 1kt •· ·· •· In the name of humanity we urgently appeal to _r ii - - t _you for· an immediate cessation of hostile acts and tiif -1 mmediate opening of negotiations concerning -' J· · ' ' -··· · the disengagement and withdrawal of opposing forces ' - _ - -- - · in Iran These negotiations should be directed at • ' -- - tt· ---f ·····the restoration of peace and be based upon respect ·· for the sovereignty of the nations involved j 1 · • h -' DEC LASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 t J • i·-- f Ad hority EO 12958 as amended - · tl•JlRQ fJ f of S ecurity Review · -·- t - -- --· - - - ' - -0- · · ___ - · ·- ·- K-10 l - l tis · - _- JAi - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -··· · -• - - · • Pending your reply to this proposal we have ordered our forces to refrain from further attacks and to remain in a maximum state of readiness A KIRILENKO The time is now 281500Z Jun 76 • • ' · • • • •v DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review l I I FROM BLUE MESSAGE NO 301 TO CONTROL MOVE NO III REFERENCE CONTROL MSG '3'01 DTG '281S0·o·z JT J N 76 1 IMPACT OF CRISIS ON NATIONAL INTERESTS a US inter·ests Basic OS interests have not changed the Soviet challenge has been met the US position in the world has not been eroded However although the USSR has been ·checked in Iran the problem facing the United States •i$ r ' 1_ s JiBt broadened greatly and relations with NATO and Japan have · F if t1·· eeri made more difficult · l' 1 · b USSR interests The Soviet interest is now to - · avoid general nuclear war and to withdraw from Iran without ' · _ · s eming to back down in the face of US pressure c Iranian interests Iran's interests are unchanged but have become less critical in the overall problem d Iraqi interests Iraq's interests are unchanged have become of secondary concern in the broad problem -··· • e Interests of Others 1 NATO and Japan Their primary concern appears to have been to avoid any involvement 2 Peoples Republic of China Unchanged 2 OBJECTIVES ·•· ' a US immediate objectives i Immediate a To attain negotiating leverage b Avoid massive nuclear exchange between the ·united States and the USSR DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 ·· · A u horlty EO 12958 as amended · ·· ' Ch1ef -PoD Ofc of Security Review · Jl lwJ 1 ·· · L-l 'fOr CRST ttl i - rwk - - -- ---------------------------------- 2 Near Term a Restore ·peace order while defending our naval forces· at sea b Insure ·continued flow of Middle Eastern energy resources to the United'· States and its allie-s -and deny Soviet control of Middle ·Eastern oil Limit Soviet influence c 3 Long Term a Preserve prote ct the NATO Alliance b Preserve protect the CENTO Alliance c Maintain viability of us commitments b US pe cept i on of USSR's immediate objectives • a a '• - ' '' tissR w lJ l $hEt back down t continue to with draw ' with out jJi k 2 The USSR has an immediate objective of aJ i z ing upon ·NATO's inaction with · a longer term J H ot becornirtg dominant in Europe ·· · ' j • i t · 1 t t- ti The USSR will likely perceive that the Unj ted not wish to continue a nuclear war and that lliJil t ed s tates -has -an appreciation cof -the -risks o£ ·-es cdoes · c6nt iriued escalation ' ' ' ' POLITIC1- L AND MILITARY MEASURES a Mi li't arv at tack o tion t'o b executed - 1 rmmediately initiate strike - agains t all i - tt llipping • l • • J ¾ f1t K • x 'i• · la In tially einploy o Ly conventi ona'l_ · f • 1 e pe ns- · sel eotea ·n i'dl'era r· re-re as1 f wi'll be ·c·c nsi·de refd · l·f° ireq ired arid r gues ted ' h owev r nuclear weapons ·are r leasable for se l f-defense · · 1 1' - •• f -· ------ f' -· -·- - - - - · - _ ·· ·- - ---- tOfl 9SCR E'I' _ · - b Conduct all attacks in international waters c Both rnili tary and commercial shipping of Soviet and Bloc countries are targets d No attacks are to be made on Soviet home·land bases or in territorial waters 2 Blockade or militarily close or seal various international waterways a Deny entry or exit through the Bosporus Dardanelles Straits of Gibraltar Skagerrak Kattegat and other restricted waterways ·· ··• •'·'· • ·· f'f tt tf ke b NATO support should be anticipated however preparations for unilateral actions _ J 1 rtl i tffL-l ' ' · 3 ' ' · ·· - · soviet ports · · - cllannels • Immediately commence mining of all possible restric_ted waterways and navigational a Mines are to be conventional ·· b Mine fields should be designed to deny the use of selected ports and bases for exit and entry of • s i pping • · ·• -· cf ' g iitl if f9 c CINCs are allowed to employ any assigned except strategic alert forces 4 Rationale constraints risks a The lirni ted mili tacy response enhances US bargaining position during negotiations e 11ilitary action is to be conventional excent in self-defense f No attacks on Soviet soil g forces Risks are primarily to other sea going b Associated Political Responses 1 Associated political res·ponses are reflected in the messages at Attachments 1-4 In addition the desired political signals are reflected in the military actions selected - f-r tirt --·· ·- · - · • 2 The Pres tden· would go to New York to deliver _ _ •- ·_ mes sage at Attachment 3 to the U ited Nations ' -- i J tJl · · · · -- - - · · · c Likely perceptions responses of protagonists 1 soviets may well perceive US offer to negotiate ·as a sign of relative weakness 2 soviet response to us convent ional attacks soviet naval forces may well evoke further soviet - a t· ' i i -'' · 9k s o us naval forces more probabl with conventional ··y f ' f Jt 4 · tjlan nuclear nav l war of attrition • -- - · -'···• _ -·' · -• - -- gains t · - -- f ·•· j • _J _ -i '_' _ _ ' 3 Soviets may terminate -- · -• 1 t -s on Soviet naval force · · negotiations due to US 4 Soviets willing to accept temporary setback in their quest for control of Middle ast and Middle E astern o l This does not defeat their long range goal for such •he emony • _- - i- '1- • · - ·· · 5 The United States is willing to deescalate ready for pos ible escalation ·iii-·f - • - ' · ce_ma ins • - wf · r · _ · • •• • 6 The United States will undertake vast measures f t ih t3supply rehabilitate Iran to insure continuance of · · _·· · - - i bi l ity of GOI - 7 Iran will attempt to regroup and restore order in their country 8 Iraq may perceive relative weakness of Iran and exploit same by attacking Iran or possibly re-energize the efforts to take over Kuwait -- t s L ji i · d Other international reactions and domestic responses 1 International a NATO countries · 1 In the main remain II stand of fish to preclude any further erosion of their POL supplies 2 Possibly seize this o portunity now ·· t b -• the fightingnas been temporarily halted to align more t ro giy with the United States at least from a moral support standpoint b Middle East countries 1 Turkey will remain obstinate vying · ' ' · ·for the best possfble post-hostilities position • ' u l•i t d to become as 2 e l n i s ie i 1 r dominance or Western alliance if gwill c Far East countries 1 Japan will welcome cessation of nuclear · ·· · · t' hbstilities become internationally vocal in support of · continuance of same and actively promote nuclear disarmament GOJ will also oress hard for open flow of oil supplies from Middle East 2 The PRC reaction is quite unpredictable · · i e on one hand-they may wish to exploit the situation tJ le USSR while on the other hand they may become j f autious due to a perceived failure of the United -- •·a nLa es to act more forcibly · 2 Domestic a A mixed but unbalanced reaction of domestic - ·• '· public opinion can be anticipated b A minority will decry US overseas involvement and cite lack of allied support as evidence of the lack ·of responsible leadership ··· c Majority of populace will close ranks behind Presidential effort to de-escalate and uncouple nuclear engagement Although appalled by military losses through Soviet nuclear attack the citizenry will strongly support negotiations motivated by fear of nuclear strike on the United States Continued civil defense actions stimulate fears and force continued awareness of overall thrust • 'o - il _ _ _ e Other options onsidered but rejected · · - - • • - • • • • • - - · - 1 Accede to Soviet demand for immediate cessation · · of all hostile acts and opening of negotiations Represents United States failure to respond Soviet attack on US · erritory and us forces on high seas unch llenged a · · ·eo a major escalatory move by USSR • ••• •••• t • b Leaves the United States in very weak ' __ ppsi tiQ f r foll ow-on negotiations • r _ - - i t tlS - L l - · • · c Would undoubtedly result in serious long -_i '2' 1 -tt rin erosion of us position of world influence ·r ·f· i'·'F' _ '·' ·- _ _ ·r t · d Soviet good faith in offe to negotiate · withdrawal from Iran not yet established 11 qt c paj le of enforcing i n near term ' · 2 Conventional strikes agc1 inst Soviet bases in -' t fii'ddle East and oviet naval forces in Middle East ports _ ' l1 trt tl ii e - ely i i - - · •- us capabilities to accomplish ' b Runs counter to our desire to establish - ssation of hostilities in Middle East as basis for -negotiated withdrawal and restoration of peac and order in the area · ' 1 _ _-f g The United States c Would inflict casualties on Arab forces Egyptian as well as Soviet forces and facilities 3 Nuclear strikes against Soviet naval air base s on perimeter of Pacific e g Petropaveousk or Kolr Peninsula Guam tit-for-tat with respect to Soviet attack on a Would not contribute directly to our immediate objectives in Middle East b Considered too escalatory at this time l Attack of Soviet homeland 2 High level of civilian casualties • ft ' united · · - · 3 Would likely result in strikes on the States itself Cc Withholding at this time demonstrates United States restraint but reserves option for future use · d Would significantly narrow the sco oe of remaining options available to the United States short of ·_ ·__-· ·'· 5 ···f '1 assive nuclear exchange · · · - _ · ·- ·· · ·•· It'lit · 11r r • •• 4 Nuclear strikes against Soviet airfields and military targets in Caucasus and Turkistan a We still desire to limit the conflict I • • • • b Considered too escalatory at this time 3e 3 above c See also rationale for rejecting option 5 Nuclear strikes against high-value industrial targets in USSR including Soviet oil fields f i m and le 1 e l e ting options 6 Strike soviet bases in Warsaw Pact Nations a Too escalatory at this time ' • • - • § • -- • _ J QLASSIFIEONOV 1 7 2009 · h JJ ii _ ¥ r Jty _ - _0 958 as amended ·• - _ i' _ t¢fit f 'Poo·o 'Of Security Review · - - - ·•• · · L-7 s ---- - _ · ' P · - - _ --· - b Inconsistent with our desire to limit ar a of conflict c Invites nuclear retaliation against NATO allies 7 Execute comprehensive strikes against Soviet strategic targets wherever located a We could not limit damage to the United States which would accrue from retaliatory strikes b Inconsistent with basic objective of _-avo d tng massive nuclear exchange r- r t r 1 - lr d• • · · f i' -·· t i ' ' · -4 - - i ' • - · • · l • ·CONTINGENCIES a Actions by us a Actions by USSR l If USSR strikes ···selected mllitary targets in - h United States '· 2 If USSR makes ·· · ·-· - turther nuclear attacks· on · - us -Fleet and forward de- q t lli d · s f 0 f USSR attacks · · us and naval shipping world wide ith conventional forces 4 If USSR·continues - th ·i nvasion of Iran using conventional forces • i 1t- _ i It 1 _ 1 J · ' · 1 The United States would execute selected nuclear options • 2 The United States would execute selected nuclear options • 3 The United States would sustain a conventional war at sea 4 The United States would execute nuclear at·tacke against selected military targets in the Caucasus C ·'· · ' ' 5 If USSR attacks · - ·· · - - 6-bas·es from which us forces have attacked Soviet shipping · - QE C AS_SIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 i - tf ftio_fify _ EO 12958 as amended t h itq p Ofc of S curity Review 4 _ 1 1 -· -- · - ·- L-8· 5 The United States -would be assisted in developing concerted NATO retaliatory action • ' ' '' - -·- 7 · ' ·f- i· - - by us b Actions by Arab Oil Producers b Actions If Arab Nationalist Movement ANM sweeps United Arab Emirates UAE The United St ates would do nothing c Actions by Allies 1 If EEC members propose dissolution of NATO military union as being counterproductive 2 If Japan proposes Russo-Japanese economic pact ·to guarantee oil supplies with ·_ parallel abrogation of us apanese Security Treaty c Actions by us 1 The United States would prepare to withdraw to fortress America 2 The United States would do nothing DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 · · uthority EO 12958 as amended _ · ·Chl f DoD Ofc of Security Review i1i lil £1 i •· L-9 SECRET f - - t fft L · · - · - ii· 1 1 f - · ·dPoP stemN FROM BLUE MESSAGE NO 301 TO CONTROL MOVE NO III REFERENCE -CON'l'ROL MSG· J·O 1 DTG 2s1·so·o·z 76 ----------JUN ------------------ -TO NATO 1Wtr i ri r · ' · · - r c ·'·•-• - J1S'J 'O Japan Philippines Political Mil Action Team in PRC _ 1 The government of the United States in li ght of · ·recent events urges the members of NATO tq recognize the grave implications for the Alliance soviet attacks on U $ naval bases and men-of-war on a worldwide basis jeopard· - · · · - us nd NATO security particularly us ability to re · rce and support forces in Europe - - fs 3 · 1 · •· · • • • s • · v 2 '-NATO failure to assist in subsequent actions to deter - ' ··_ - re sion and to mobilize for its own defense jeopardizes ho th NATO survival and that of the United States The USG i · · ' J J 9 refore urges the governments of NATO to take steps im·' · _- - 1itned iatf ly to assure their continental defense In t he ' ' · abs nce of such preparations the nations of western Europe ·- ' _· - ar e··to see to their security without those us forces both - in or scheduled to enter European NATO defenses so that '' · Jl_l se _OS forces may be redeployed to areas more advantageous ··' · '°for us defense ifjl t j ·· · DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review _ - · i1 ' t·t J iitl fl1 H jtr ' · · - • · · ·• t• tf• •_ r FROM BLUE MESSAGE NO 301 TO CONTROL MOVE NO III REFERENCE CON'l'ROL MS'G 3 0 1 DTG · ·2·a-1s·o o·z JUN 7 6 - -- ---------------FROM US 'l'O USSR -· - ' • - f ' if -L l The USG is pleased to concur in the request of the _government of the USSR to permit withdrawal of its forces • from the territory·of Iran and will likewise reduce US ·'·· · -· · i· · •· forces introduced to halt aggression against the GOI This - -- · · _ · - reduction of forces combined with the removal of Iraai _ _ J9 f e in Kuwait will serve the cause of world peace reduce · · - ·•i · - e threat of greatly expanded nuclear warfare and reduce • · the military threat to us and West European oil supplies · • • - · - · z 1 - _· · • • t ·· · ' 2 The accomplishment of the above force reduction will i li i tic-·_ • i Qf l' 1 the door to i ediate peace negotiations which could ' q H-i lt - to the total discontinuance of hostilities • --· · ti-- - • 3 The _soviet attack against the US territory of Guam us forces at sea has greatly shocked the people of the · h ·- -_ United States and has prompted fear for continued US freedom -' • · L · •• • · · · · and · · ·· · · · of the seas The USG regrets that pending the completion of ·· · peace negotiations several minimum steps will be continu d to insure the defense of US forces f · ' ' · · · 4· It is US intention that these defenses be conducted li thout resort to nUclear weapons 'i DECLASSIFIED NOV 7 2009 -_ · · - ·· · ·_ Au hority EO 12958 as amended • - · _ qhief DoD Ofc of Security Review - •• ··• - ·· • •• • •• • l • • ' ' •• · • _' · · --t i i i 11 r t i·t-' -JfROM BLUE MESSAGE NO 301 TO CONTROL MOVE NO III REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 301 DTG· 281S'0 0'Z JUN 76 --------------------FROM OS TO ON l j 1i •i t•'1'jS l'l •l 1' 'r '' - ·• ' ·· • ' '• ci - 'f fatfl i he United Sta·tes welcomes the request of the USSR to · · - _· ' ·· r draw its forces from· the territory of Iran to clear the · · -J l Y ·for negotiation of real peace we regret however that µnprovoked aggressi n agains-i the US territory f Guam · · · · · J-a nd the worldwide attack on us naval resources warrants the ' · · con tiriuation of defensive measures to insure· world freedom - ·· e f' tth' Ei seas However ·these defenses will be restrained ·and· non-nuclear to the degree perrnitted by Soviet actions · _ · - i t · · · '' · The USG guarantees the immediate oesscition and ijj i 1 U f J_i at on of naval defenses concurrent wi th the success •·¼ ' R J lih --' - ce negotiations -- t _ - _ _ · · _ · 3 ·· Further · the USG considers that· the UN should explore · - Pi ps to accomplish the complete di solution of na ional - ·t · w ff ns ive forces and urges immediate UN aid to devastated · · · ·•· are as us rebuilding contributions will equal those of the us sa · ·r· • __ ' ··-- · DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 ' ·Lf - iJ f t '1' · - · Authority· EO 12958 as amended i · · -_ ' ' ·' ·· -- · Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review - ' r - 3 L-12 • J r- •·· • FROM BLUE MESSAGE NO 301 TO CONTROL MOVE NO III REFERENCE CONTROL· 'SG 3·01 DTG i·a1s·oo·z JUN 76 ----------- -------FROM US TO Arab Nations · • ' i · i H • - J - J i 1- • · l The grave world situation jeopardizes world peace _ · ' 1 f i·Fn'his situation centers unfortunately on the oil resources _ '·' · ·· - of the Arab world This situation gives the Arab nations · · · an influential voice in determination of the course of world t'-Jf '•r L·· ff airs The USG strongly urges that these governments use i ·' their good offices to halt Soviet and Iraqi aggression • - ' '' - 2 The USG greatly fears that a failure to halt Soviet aggression could lead rapidly to actions to achieve the ·• ·· · •· • ' · de·s·truction of Soviet forces and military facilities on · _ r ab soil thereby jeopardizing the lives and resources - j - ' _ 9f the Arab peoples for generations to come such needless trYf' l f t · t i -v ct i on in the Arab world would sorrow the USG and · ·· ·- · ··r - -_ -pe'ople· who have a history of long-standing affection for ·· ·· · the A C'ab people US interests are demonstrably humanitarian · _ p _ si - he Un ted States is rapidly approaching selfi- suf-riciency in energy sourc s F - ··''i rt _ •· r •• • · •' - • DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 f ' ·- · · · Authority EO 12958 as amended · u 1 ·1 • if - · · · • ' - Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review Atch· 4 L-13 FROM CONTROL MESSAGE NO 3 TO RED MOVE NO III REFERENCE RED ZiSG 201 DTG 290100Z JUN 76 SECOND SCENARIO PROJECTION Zephyrs for Zoroa The Soviets recognized that the massive nuclear second _ · -strike delivered by the United States against their divi ' - sions in Iran had momentarily degraded conventional capa· ·r r ji ki jbflities Not even major division reserves could change · · · the immediate situation In fact it was deemed prudent · -· · that the movement of new Soviet troop units into Iran a l uld not provoke another us nuclear response Accord · -'ingly Soviet Commander of the Caucasus Front was ordered _ • f o take appropriate defensive measures to limit his losses · and to establish a defensive position All reinforcements were to avoid giving the impression that additional Soviet forces were being deployed Medical assistance and equip- ' - '•·0 •·· - _••• - •• _ ment resupply continued - · · · · -· Although it had escaped nuclear baptism the 104th Air- borne Division was fighting for its survival on the outskirts of Teheran The Division was promised close air support including the screening use of tactical nuclear ' w eapoits to assist its withdrawal and evacuation Un·fortunately by midmorning on the 28th the 104th remnants after barely avoiding being overrun by the Iranians and under heavy fire were forced to abandon their perimeter and cxfiltrate piecemeal during the chaos Attempts to maintain contact with the beleaguered division failed· - - and it was considered either lost to the enemy or funcg · i ·-jL 'tl ming in small group struggling sol7l_y tq gain free om • • i- · it t1id i1 r i1l1e 104th ceased to exist as an effective unit before i t --· -- · - t ' _' ' _ cci id be helped • f 1 - - t f· U ···· - -q· ·l - - _ -· D ECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 ·· · · · · · · · '- c iit ority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review M-1 While Soviet military commanders regrouped on the battlefield the Kremlin launched a dramatic political and psychological attack For several hours TASS flooded its subscribers with pictures of suffering Iranian sheepherders which it claimed were among more ·than 30 000 victL s of the atrocious American nuclear attacks Radiation dangers and fear of nuclear des·truction were expressed by oeacelovi ng groups around the world Even though soviet efforts had little if any initial success in alienating the United States from its allies loyal leftist governments intensified their charges of irrat ionality against the United States Demonstrators earnestly appealed for peace blaming the United States for its reckless despoiling of the world environment · · •··· _ i·- r · L '• ·· -- ' '' ·The Soviet Union also issued its own warnings and exhor --tations to Warsaw Pact members as well as to Western Euro_ _ i c j t I - n N 'I'O members Of particular interest · to the Kremlin ·1 1' p twas ' a1f editorial in the Manche·ster· Gu·ardian which asserted · f_· ' y· J· I 1 the fear of nuclear war had strained the limits of the _ _ ·' · ·' 'Nbrtl Atlantic Alliance As evidence the editorial referred to the continuing debate among the members over the appropriateness of the increased alert posture urged by Americans • i· 1-i' i1 ' ' _op g with the general warnings aimed at all of the us i i r gt f ·friends Politburo decisionmakers paid special ' · i -i a'f 'e ep- ±10 n to Turkey The Soviet Ambassador in Ankara _ · Ji l hr er q an ultimatum to Turkey to prevent US military use ' t j1 J i - _ ·or s1 lffer the consequences The Soviet diploroat f _ f ehcd the country with a possible attack by Soviet · _ _·· · S t' -ategic Rocket Forces and alluded to soviet reconnaissance overflights as if the ultimatum needed additional empha sis Nevertheless the pluckv Turks politely assured the Soviets · th at no us troops other- than those presently contx ·ibuting to Turkish territorial defense would be oermitted to use - - - - its· has es Turkey also agreed with the Soviets' desire J ' ' _ Jt i he Bosporus would remain open to international ship - -I p i'g· under present conditions ·· · • _ _ t · i ltf_i ter ·for the· Domain ·of Darius -''fr fi ¥' midday of the 28th Soviet Div sions i1 Iran had · -· - ··s'urvived the worst of us nuclear strikes Field reports indicated diminished attacks ending at approximately 1130 hours Ground forces confirmed destroying four us aircraft and claimed damage to numerous others Fortunately only two or three surface-to-surface missile ·1aunchers were destroyed As planning proceeded to mount a worldwide coordinated retaliation the ·surviving Soviet tactical nuclear strike units in Iran were in position ready to execute attacks Soviet leaders prudently surveyed previously ordered worldwide preparations for their retaliatory operations Fleet deployments continued into advantageous locations Warsaw Pact forces were at their as·sembly areas Nuclear capable units continued staging at Warsaw Pact airfields Finally at 1400 hours Soviet SS-4 missiles from Groznyy ·· · · --· · ·· and· Maykok plus ss- s missiles from Gelli impacted on _·_ _ _ _ 1 · evecy operational airfield in I i -an The Soviet rocket ' '' · ' Jftt ' £0 rtes caught most of the Iranian and US air force uni ts fr_ · lµl no tactical warning Except for a few sorties aloft · ii1l t ' E- wh n the attack began the bulk of enemy air forces was destroyed At the same time Soviet FROG and SCUD missiles 1 supported by Soviet Tactical Air Armies delivered nuclear weapons against Iranian ground forces They concentrated mainly on the 77th in the northeast the 16th defending the ·nc thwestern highway to Teheran and the 31st recently · '4¢ p loyed near Hamadan '11he damage to Iran's army was not · ' °ki l n immediately but low·-level sources in Teheran reported ' · '· ' that the inner council of palace advisors had been unable to Console the Shah over the widespread suffering and de • ·$·t tiction It was rumored that entire populations of small ·· · towns near the 81st Iranian Division Command Post and i · · - -'E'sfahan Airfield had been incinerated and that total casual ties could be greater than a half million Iranian civil· · · ·s · ·· ·ians OKEAN Occurs · · ''c · At H-hour minus Soviet naval air forces lifted off _-· - - i ' · 9n· caref lly orchestrated missions against US naval ' J '' ' carrier ta·sk forces Diligent exercises over the years _ LF¾ iftif · M t i# f refiected in a precise execution -·- and the opera - · ·· P PI l brought multitudinous returns • · i f tt1 frt ' · · ··· The Soviets within a space of 15 minutes conducted separate but coordinated attacks involving hundreds of Tli-16s TU-22s and TU-95s supported by submarine-launched · - _'l C SSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 ' · 1 tti ori EO 12958 as amended Chief Ooo Ofc of Security Review M-3 missiles and surf ace combatants These forC ' S succl S fully ·engaged five US naval carrier task forces two in the Pacific two in the eastern Medi terr ane an and one in the Arabian Sea The US aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea was not seriously damaged but two cruisers were sunk Subsequently the force withdrew into the Indian Ocean The naval task forces in the ·pacific faced the same kind of heroic attack Approximately 30 TU-16s plus surface forces engaged each task group The Northern Task Force which had intruded into waters adjacent to the Soviet Maritime Province lost two destroyers and its CVA was badly damaged The Southern Task Force attacked east of Honshu suffered a loss of one · · · aestroyer and heavy damage to other vess ls The aircraft · ·_ c arrier was damaged but still able to conduct air operations _ T-lle Pacific attack resulted in the friendly losses of 35 · ·' ·-aircraft and three submarines • - simultaneously with the attacks in the Pacific and Middle East Soviet naval strike forces engaged two us carrier ' ·t a$k forces grouped for protection in the Ionian Sea A combined strike force of six submarines 27 surface combatants and more than 100 TU-16s TU-22s and TU-95s armed with ASMs badly damaged both carriers sank several of the screening destroyers and damaged four other support · · v 51sel£S However the combined defenses of the OS Navy · _ ' p bved more effective than anticipated by inflicting severe - f at tle damage on 60 percent of the striking force TU-95 - 1 ·· q onna issance aircraft confirmed that three of the five • -• q rl er task forces were seriously damaged and f i gh ting for ·s urvival Specifically three CVAs were ineffective and a 9ther was operating at reduced capability In the midst of the Soviet naval attack the capstone _ c f tp j 3 Soviet retaliation arched down on two military 't i get$ at Guam Island submarine launched cruise missiles ·ciestroved Anderson Air Force Base with an air burst and · • ·· s i'vereJ y damaged the harbor facilities at Apra The ground i _ ·A Jrst there caused only light damage to the sub-base ' · · _ I· ' ·' · ' - _ · '· ' rii'terlocking I r i itiatives · Hewing closely to a coordinated political-military plan -So'Viet leaders awaited reports of success from theh · nuclear D ECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 'Au hority EO 12958 as amended __ hi f DoD Ofc of Security Review · ·' ' t 'l l - · M-4 attack forces At 1415 hours Soviet com' ' lunications co firmed their expectations Out of the Kremlin emerged coordinated series of political actions designed to capitalize on the shock resulting from its decisive military actions TASS originated a propaganda release callinq upon Europeans to res·train the American nuclear aggressors US allies were urged to implore the United States to acce t proposals to end hostilities and negotiate concerning the conflict in Iran The Soviet Ambassador told the UN General Assembly that the USSR had taken measures to protect its forces from further nuclear attack by the United States He claimed that Soviet attacks had avoided the territories of other sovereign nations and that the Soviets desired to limit the spread of the conflict He further proposea that the United States join in an early cease-fire Through private channels the Soviets warned Peking not ' ·- o respond to the pending American high-level visit They ' ' ' · ' ii i lf-' 'reminded the Chinese that their populous country would be · particularly vulnerable to nuclear devastation if a war engulfed the world but assured them that the nuclear strikes in the Pacific were to eliminate a direct threat to Soviet security as well as to their own security At 1430 hours General Secretary Kirilenko directly informed the President of the united States that the two · ·' · na tions stood on the very brink of total nuclear war and warned the President of the uncontrollable consequences ·· hould the war expand beyond human control He appealed ·•- i fo r immediate cessation of all hostile acts and the opening · o'f negotiations concerning disengagement and withdrawal of opposing forces in Iran He told the President that pending his reply he had ordered Soviet forces to refrain from· further attacks but to remain in a maximum state of readiness • •· Intervening Irascibility • ' ti t If1i · _ A sured an confident the Sovi 7t leaders consid red · ' •t tf ' f'f' L pos ·sible American responses to their offer to negotiate · i· ·· '_· fst ile hey awaited Washington's reply Within an ho ur · · 1 1 t ' t''trf llowing the Soviet nuclear attacks a US Presidential · · me sage to Secretary Kirilenko was translated OtCLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Au hori EO 12958 as amended · _ Jhief Do Ofc of Security Review rF f fif f · · M-5 ' -- ' ·· · The USG is pleased tc concur in the request of the government of the USSR to permit with- drawal 0£ its forces from the territory of Iran and will likewise reduce us forces introduced to halt aggression against the Government of Iran This reduction of forces combined with the removal of Iraqi forces in Kuwait will serve the cause of world peace reduce the threat of greatly expanded nuclear warfare and reduce the military threat to US and West ·European oil supplies The accomplishment of the above force reduction will open the door to immediate peace nego_tiirt%1 f T ti t ibns which could lead to the total disccn _ -- tt 1 1 tri e i e ainst the territory us of Guam and us forces at sea has greatly shocked · the people of the United States and has prompted fear for continued US freedom of the seas The USG regrets that pending the completion of peace ·· · ne_gotiations several minimum steps wil 1 be con ·· - · · tinued to il' sure the defense of us forces •-It i·s US intention that these defenses be conwith out resort to nuclear weapons • 11 - '· c - · tjf f ted fl' iii- r- i f Erb i _ several hours the Kremlin sifted the evidence of ' · · t _ _ '-t ioi-ia· ·reaction to their nuclear strikes attempting to · '_- un erstand the us response Among the conflicting torrents the world press reverberated with reports froni the American domestic scene There was shock and dismay at the bombing of American territory The New ' fork Dafly News splashed its afternoon edition with a _headli 11e Another Pearl Harbor -- Another World War - rly very television broadcast carried reports of the lf SJ r ci ents garnered from survivors and official The capitalist press while calling for a ·J' l J · - ay· of patriotic nationa1ism 11 forecast another -- · r - fiii ' eh if the United States failed to pick up the ·_ Guamanian gauntlet · ' · · · e s ' Some Kremlin analysts predicted that strong US action They pointed to the latest US contacts in _was likely oECLAssiFIED NOV 1 7 2009 · A V t or_ity EO 12958 as amended fHl t _poq_o c·of Security Review ti 1 i1 i M-6 i 1 f1 r • '• - r- s · · the NATO camp where American diplomats apparently had laid down an ultimatum for NATO support or else At the sac-ne time however several NATO ministers publicly expressed the hope that both superpowers would take immediate ste s to avoid creating any more nuclear wastelands Other US political actions were ·reported by friendly Arab nations to the effect that the US Ambassadors had begged the host governments to use their good o£fices to halt Soviet and Iraqi aggression 11 Naval Nuances Additional bilateral actions surfaced in Korsor Denmark indicated that US iT r i ·· _ ' naval attaches had visited the Danish and Turkish navies' ·· · 1ti1i ·if '' t J nelay1ng units It was surmised that t he UnJ ted Sta tes ' - ··i• ' ··· ·· - ·might try to coerce its allies into executing a NATO con · · · tingency to mine the 't 'aters of the Skagerrak Kattegat and · ···· ·• the· Bosporus KGB intelligence operatives in Japan also · were alerted to report any indications that the United States or Japanese planned to mine or blockade Japan's CPntiguous international waters ·· ditJ r 7 ti and ulcuk Turkey where covert sources • •• • • •• • • · '• • - t - I t • _ ·soviet naval intelligence reports provided further evi iii ·' ·' p e 4 - qf J' l$ a ctivities In contrast to the relatively jf' il F' ' i tjti 1i t ari f'routine command and control activity exhibited '' tjF-' g i most US strategic forces tactical naval communications ·· t i t t·b'radkled with numerous reports of activity These inter ' · · · cepted messages were thought at first to be the a f ter· math of Soviet nuclear blows against US Navy carrier task forces It was soon apparentr however that the US Navy was being alerted for new actions Satellite-based sensors began to show some US surface movement toward Gibraltar and 0 -·t he Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap in the North Atlantic Ocean Unconfirmed information from US Navy wharves in Naples •- - f nd earl Harbor referred to high priority activities at mine tl ff t jiJ H p ptf _• One submarine in Pearl Harbor was o serve9 offload· xf c 1f • ' 1 1 _ng _some of its torpedo ordnance Although it cou Ld not be - - dli iJ @ tfirmed US attempts to mine or blockade various inter ·· nati·onal waterways and Soviet ports were also expected • •' 't·· • ·_ · At· 2300 hours Soviet intelligence insights were justified A·soviet Kashin class frigate and guided missile submarine f uliett class trailing the US Navy task force in the Bay of DEC ASSIFIED NOV '1 7 2009 J µthority EO 12958 as amended 'ttEt@ Ofi of Security Review 1 l f •i ji i 1 ' _ M-7 Biscay reported that they were under a us attack with con ventional weapons intercepted messages indicated the us task force was under orders to seek and destroy Soviet naval units Piecing together these accounts and the other evidence co llected throughout the day the Soviets began to identify the main features of US intentions Foremost in the picture was SIGINT data which revealed that the US Navy had been ordered to initiate strikes against all Soviet and Bloc commercial and military shipping No attacks were to be made on the Soviet homeland bases or in territorial waters and all OS attacks would use conventional weaoons Naval intelligence believed that US forces would continue to use Jnuc J e·ar weapons for defensive purposes · · · 1 · ·-- ·-- - - i2f% f lf §f n ·ex cla1 1ation point to th s · r ·· ' i t 24Q 0 hours informed the Kremlin -y j t il fi l -had been sunk approximately estimate flash message that a Soviet merchant 60 km southeast of ·· __ •s 11t1 go Cuba Cuban naval elements were responding to its 1· - _-' _· · J i ternational SOS and they confirmed that US surface combat- - · _- •' tant s· had conducted the attack • -Dialectical Dichotomies • ·· · · Presented on the one hand with an agreement to their offer o f ·negotiations and on the other w ith an impending US naval J_ -··· k · soviet party leaders waited for the next signal from l tntc e • J d se i ' '° as the President Nixon addressed • _· _· · The United States welcomes the request of the USSR - J 9· _ j thdraw its forces from the territory of Iran to · · · · c I ear the way for negotiation of real peace We regret ·· 9wever that the unprovoked aggression against the US territory of Guam and the worldwide attack on US naval · ·· ' ·-· resources warrants the continuation of defensive measures • · · -to insure world freedom of the seas However these · · ¢tef nses will be restrained and non-nuclear to t t e degree ti tted by Soviet actions • - - i 'filf • •• • - ' • ' _ • tf ' • I _- 1_i f fii f The United States Government gt1arantees the immediate ' ' · · ·-' _ · ' ae·ssation and neutralization of naval defenses concurrent · _ ·-- 'i th the success of peace negotiations - DECLASSIFIED Nov· 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief OoO Ofc of Security Review M-8 Further the United States Government considers that the United Nations should explore steps to accomplish the complete dissolution of national offensive forces and urges immediate UN aid to devastated areas US rebuilding contributions will equal those of the USSR The time now is 290100Z Jun 76 J fi DECLASSIFIED Ndt ·1 7 2009 Au hority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoO Otc of Security Review - _ ' - - • for FROM RED MESSAGE NO TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 302 DTG 301 ----- III ------ 290l00Z JUN 76 1 IMPA T OF'CRISIS ON NATIONAL INTERESTS a USSR interests The crisis offers opportunities while presenting certain dangers 1 Opportunities - ·• •'L' • a Extend Soviet influence and improve world power position i • b Facilitate decline and mbµr _imperialistic competitors not only i · ··· r- _· eventual demise of ··- the United States _ ' · _· _ · l · t ut Japan and Western Europe as well However at the Y i i - i C S4'J ll - time it increases the possibility of a strategic · '· - ·· · nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States Such an exchange· would not be in the interest of the Soviet Union The crisis could also adversely affect our position vis-a-vis the PRC should the crisis result in diminished power influence for the USSR t r i s P t 1 8 1f f' · · _ · 1 gains Sovie c a f nfo_r e · 4 ti -e USSR to commence defensive and or offensive actions which ··' fr · - '· ·bould further expand the area of hostilities beyond that · desired by the Soviets i it · 2 Dangers a A military defeat in the Middle East would he detrimental to Soviet influence wo ldwide • •' · · - · · b The United States could exploit the _ _ _ _ _ --_ _i - i _ - Q rent crisis by strengthening its relations with China - - •• - i j't 1 pfl i _lit pr a ' between our i f e e t ic s a i r re two nations The United States recent actions -· -· - ' '-_ - _ ·clearly indicate that it intends to use tactical nuclear DECLASSIFIED NOV ' 1 7 2009 Authority ·eo 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review N-1 - -·· -Weapons in whatever numbers it feels necessary to haJ t Soviet military operations in Iran - The United States _ clearly recognizes that Middle East oil is at stake and it also could see in the crisis its potential decline_-as a viable political and military superpower It will thus need to maintain as many allies as possible to forestall such a demise Overall the United States clearly sees its stakes as high enough to take drastic measures to prevent co lapse of US imperialism - c Iranian interests Iran faces a situation in which the Shah's influence has·been denigrated with the destruction of the armed forces and the weakening-of the Iranian government The eris is presents an increased opportunity for dissidencer although Iran will act to _preserve its present - form of government and leadership in th·e region Its _ --•• t•• '-' _ ' - - pl 'imary interest is seen as national survival -·and freedom -• fjn I it t 1 - -qoercion and outside influence 0 __ - - r •• •• Z 0 V- • •' • •• ·- F tt i rt1 t r · Iraq also_ has-_a primary intere·st · · - ' f ' J rl 'addition its actions indica·te a desire for tei ri to rial acquisition and a·1eadirtg role in mobilizing radical move- m _nts in the region The ·united States conti_nued use of-nuclear weapons may affect Iraq's r solve as an ally of the USSR However with pressure on Iran eased-as a result of _ - - 'qS upp_ort_ the - Iraqis may feel more- dependent on the USSR ·----- -- -_ _ _ 1 -_ _ - _ d Iraqi interes'ts --f I 11 J Z ft na tional urvival and· freedom f i -oll outside influence - -- i jjHJf t - 1 ' I terestS Of others Western Europe While recognizing that their -- i '' l ' c ity is_ tied tC the United s ates w7st Europea n - - - · -iil ta ons' may have increasing doubts about the wisdom of the - - - us- action and its subsequent impact upo Q We tern European s curity Those nations will reexamine their alliances as · · tltey seek to avoid direct involvement in the C nflict Disruption of oil shipmen ts from the Mid_dle East· could cause short range economic losses Should the disruption ·continue -_- - i m ight be necessary to tu3 n to Mos ow for oil All ·' - te n European nations are becoming_ i ilcreasingly__ concerned fr rf -· J l t --us nuclear weapons stored ori ·their territory and fear tU iiif - ¢ a-r- strikes by the USSR gainst such s tes -- as well _ _ _· - -as -against other us and NATO bases· in theµ- c_ountries -- -· •- · • t-_ · ·· _ - 1 • itr - · - · - 2 Peoples epubi c of h a _P C The PRC will see an opportunity to exploit ·the situation in ·order to NOV 1 7 2009 DECLASSIFIED Authority EO 12958 as amended i 1 _ - - -·· 1 1 DoD Ofc of Security Review i i - - -- t N-2 ·- - fm t f'-T • • •• 4 • • • _ maintain its relative power position vis-a-vis the uss c and prevent either of the superpowers from gaining hegemony in the Middle East 2 OBJECTIVES a USSR immediate objectives 1 Improve maintain the credibility of tbe USSR as a world power East by 2 Improve maintain Soviet influence in the·Middle t j i fiJ tiitica lly i L r ti nd strengthening Iraq while b Establishing permanent land access through - ' t n9rthwe tern Iran and Iraq to connect the Caucasus with the · Jf fiffi - l n Gulf · · · · · The exact political arrangement to achieve this is incidental so long as a secure modern land trans · - port link is established · - ··- · _- - 1- _ ·- 3 Protect USSR and bloc shipping naval and a i i and discourage uture US attacks by open threat · f· _ __ - i i · ' • _ _ - · of ··reprisal - fJi fJ ilj_ i ·_ Prevent escalation i g1¥ is' i i 1tif T n measures or to nuclear war while poli tica 1 efforts to consolidate · ' -·· - f J· t cui rent gains continue 1 ' · • • ' ' · t- ·-re_turn 4 by passive r r- t1 i '· ·' ' · ' • 5 Continue exploitation of opportunities to s·eparate the United States from its ·allies 6 Exploit increase momentum of world opinion against the United States If t5jt1 '_ iJt - · 1 - tes AJ il_ -· i i l i r' b 7 Avoi d strategic nuclear warfare with the United RA e fs a e 1 Avoid return to nuclear escalation DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 A thority EO 12958 as amended h 1 t§ f _ DoD Ofc of Security Review fS'• • rk - ---·• -· N-3 RE tC • 2 Reduce USSR naval and maritime power 3 Force withdrawal of USSR forces trom Iran and Iraqi forces from Kuwait ' · 4 Maintain Iranian independence u der presen t Shah's Government 5 Preserve protect us·imperiaiistic oil interests in the Middle East 6 Improve naval supremacy c The United Sta·tes is likely ·1 0 perceive iII Ill d i ate objectives of the USSR to be ' i i f ' the 1 Avoid st rategici 'nu'Clear waz'fare 2 Domina Iranian - egoti _tions 3 Maintain Soviet presenc - ·i'n Iran and I_raq· - -- '·--- · politically and_ militarily · 4 Protect naval and maritime fore es • 3 • POLI ICAL AND MILITARY MEASURES · · ' _ ' a · Mili ary 0 J s 'iH f i i 1 attack option s and· associated pqllticai Acitions in Iran Iraq Ca Undertake necessary military measures to consolidate and secure t r tory p esently o cupied •PY Soviet forces in northwes e rn I n Specifically dir_ ct Comman er Caucasus District· to · · · J i _ -i - 1 Redepl oy_ existing force to secure a 1- fi d-'·1 -1 - ·1 ensive line running approximately froni Mishjav on the r to J andar-E ahlavi on- _ le Casp an Sea_• - 2 Assure throughout execution that _ - · - _ t -f µierability to further n ucle r attac_k i_s reduced such · ·· _ actions should also signal to the enemy· that the movement _ · · - s _purely defensive - n- n t_ur • _ __ DECLASSIRED NOV 1 7 2009 ·· -- - J Auth_orlty eo 12958 as amended £ D c _of Security Review jf- ·' ' · ii t t • • • ·· N-4 nf ttfi v S eftm 3 Continue low-profile Soviet troop movement from Caucasus into Iraq through northwest Iran Improve highway from Marageh to Irbil 4 Emphasize importance of friendly relations with local nationals develop appropriate-civic action programs to reduce hostility and or gain sunnort • 5 Direct Soviet forces northeast of Teheran to commence immediate phased withdrawal back to the USSR b Rationale constraints risks and consequences for the military and political options selected ifl if•i • · t a ar purpose 1 demonsttation of US · · _· lr i fri'· d n Iran counsels defensive rather than fu 'l her offensive · ·· - -' • ' ¢ti on at this point C - b Holding territory presently occupied in northwestern Iran-gives USSR stronger posture for subsequent negotiations1 offers a trade-off for US concessions in the negotiations1 reduces loss of credibility in Soviet ··· ·-- • -_ wil-1 and military effectiveness and offers land access · - · f •t '-rough Iraq to the Persian Gulf · j t 1w1 f1 r1 t · r · - ·t -7 i · · · _ c Retention of Iranian territory - - · _i _i· · -t fJ ers the opportunity to establish quietly an indigenous -· · ·· · _ r'' '_ administration with which the USS·R can deal This should _' · ·be considered as an initial step leading to eventual sub i' version and replacement of the Shah's government with one · · · · ·more acceptable to Soviet interests d Withdrawal of Soviet forces elsewhere in Iran should demonstrate a positive conciliatory attitude · _ · · · and a willingness to meet the United States part way on the _- i ·· fpad to a negotiated settlement fl I litary execu o a i P t · · ·t · insure this move is perceived as purely defensive and unprovocative in nature DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 EO 12958 as amended · · ·' iQf -DoD Ofc of Security Review _ •·· · · · ' 1 - - · Authority · l tl 1 · •-· - -- - - N-5 b Considerable attention must be oa i 1 to precluding possible guerrilla activity particularly on the part of tribal groups· in the occupied area 3 Risks a United States may not regard partial withdrawal as satisfying pre-negoti 1 tion condition • b Military commanders face difficulty of effectively controlling the occupie4 area without introducing significant and provocative reinforcements ·'· · 2 Actions involving shipping ff f' J tV diplomatic ' T - ··_ J ticha nnels and Press -- us· sinkinq of Soviet merchant and · · - -· ° ' - aval vessels on the high seas Atchs 1 2 · a Strongl y _condemn -- through UN · ' i L • b Order all Soviet merchant shins to proceed _· · · timnediately to nearest friendly or neutral 'P rts c Issue stern warning to the United States that further c ttacks wi_ll be met by aPT ropriate response · - tch 1 ·- · •· _ i i1i i1-t 1 d Warn ps allie that any assistance to - t ' C r uji ited States in attacking Soviet shipping will jeopardi ze r c freedom of the sea$ Atch 1 • ·_ _' -' Jt · r - f - F' _ ' _ _ _ e Stern warning 'tp all nations especially - · ' l'U'l key ·that any mining· of ·internationa l wat rways would be a serious act and would be met with appropriate responses Osa and Komar patrol boats will e deployed to international straits as signal of Sov et earnest Atch 2 • f Rationale ·· constr ints risks · and· co sefor the political and mi•litary o-i t_ions selected 1 Rationale a To deter United States from further -attacks on Soviet merchant political light _and naval vessels ' b To place United States in poor -···r2 • ··•··· c Further divide United States from its allies d Establish political basis for Soviet attacks should United States fail to heed warninrys 2 Constraints Soviet naval forces must be postured in manner which will make threats appear real and credible but which will not be perceived as pro ocative 3 Risks That United States witl ignore warnings and require Soviets to invoke threats _ Consequences a Soviet threats could deter further United States attacks b In the event of continued attacks Q$ ij would be required to at least re aliate in kind 'C t r _ _ 3 Naval actions • a Instruct the USSR Navy surface ships at sea to assume a defensive posture and protect themselves Def end USSR and Pact commercial ships against possible US attack roc eed to a friendly or neutral port as necessary for _ pport b Instruct attack submarines to proceed to B - n s -- especially in the Middle East and await further · · ' ·· ··in t ructions · · c Instruct reconnaissance elements to increase surveillance over us naval activities with satellites aircraft submarines and KRZ · Emphasize coverage of possible mining operations and blockades d Rationale constraints ris s ·and cons guences for the military and political options selected ' - •• -l ' · ' with Rationale a By avoiding a direct confrontation th 7 tJS N vy SSR avoids getting involved in the type tactical si tuat1on in which the United States holds a ··clear advantage I-- ·' - - ' · sf DECLASSIFIED NOV 'i 7 2009 A1 1thority EO 12958 as amended ' ·Chief D D Ofc of Security Review N-7 b By placing attack submarines near sea lanes USSR will be a posture to sink US commercial shios if the United States fails to respond to warning rn c By maintaining a close surveillance over US naval operations USSR should obtain a clear under-standing of us intentions regarding mining blockades and continued hostile actions again13t Soviet Pact ships_ in ample time to take appropria te _countermeasures · · · 2 Constraints There is a need to ensure that these actions are interpreted by the Uni ed States as being defensive in nature but not a sign of weakness • s_ ''·' -·'· · ·- - Risks There is a possibility that the t - - ' µA-itjed States may not immediately rescind their order to '' -- ° '1s ek and destroy Soviet naval uni ts ' H · ' a T T ' ec_essary ' · · In this case i t _ for the USSR to implement the contingency · · b Associated political signals 1 Offer Iran in place on disengagement withdrawal and credible by token withdrawals in qr wals to consolidcite positions cease-fire and negotiations reconstruction Make northeast and local with Atch 3 · 2 Protest sinking of soviet merchant ship _ --te t n etaliation on US merchant ships if further Soviet lijar a w · P act ships are attacked Also threaten ships of -· J on sf who ·help US Navy _ Atchs 1 2 ' ' ·r • '3 Respond in UN to US call for arms contro'l by --· -· p oposing rough UN general and · complete di sarmament Propose as a first step withdrawa l of armed -forces to national territory At_ch 2 • · · 4 Offer Iraq through vis'iting Soviet diplomats ·· - ·· -··· j i l ·z 1 1 • ' - · of a t- · •i '- f r Replacement and moderp _i iition· of military 1 •· • Economic assistance· to include construction north-south railway and ighwars ' '• c Technical·assistance to run oilfields and refineries - - - - - - - - · - - - - ··-· -u d Guaranteed world market for its oil -i e payment in gold if free world market fails to develo 5 Offer to other oil producing Arab States except Kuwait through visiting Soviet diplomats equipment a Replacement and modernization of military b Economic assistance to include construction of a north-south railway and highways refineries • ' fi J i '' · ' _ 1 e f l lj1 i1 ·-· ·-n - · c Technical assistance to run oilfields and Guaranteed world market for their oil payment in gold if free world market fails to develop • ·r 6 Through diplomatic action guarantee free access ' i ' fitii ' ' ' Mi4dle East oil •for Japan and Western Europe -- providing it1Ii' z IWtti¼ i t1 ltey ·stay out of conflict f i ·--· - · · · c Likely perceptions responses of protagonists 1 Iran Y1 t iit 'ft' es and cons id 1r r 10 r I o cease hostili t · s L - ' poses future May recognize that our remaining in threats to her however appears b • i •- - •- ii ' ' 't'cbun·try J JttKirni fbibe _little she can do · · and the United Nations there except appeal to the United States 2 Iraq a Will con olidate her position in Kuwait b Will reluctantly accept additional Soviet J Turkey a Will quietly maintain the status quo DECLASSIFIED NOV '1 7 2009 Au hority EO 12958 as amended Ch1 f DoD Ofc of Security Review - if'' 't fi4 t- l N-9 b Will ask the united States to limit military operations from her bases · c Will ask the United s·tates not to mine international a ters · ' 4 United -States a Will accept our attempts to pacify the situation at sea b Will not strike Soviet forces in· ran c Will attempt to initiate peaceful •' i•J eS'Qf -ia tions • ' z · · t - • ·- ·· - d Will make bellicose nois es as to -Soviet - t' wal from Iran lliiWfiiii i Other international- reactions Bnd do1nestic response' ' -F• t1 'c i Generally the world should note Soviet readi- - - '•i ' •''' ness to negotiate and preclude general nuclea·r war ·By contrast the world ·should regard the us performance as a series of provocations and unrealistic ultimata---·to which the USSR has responded with moderation and from which the ___ ·-- l - -Q $· · 1tas emerged with its credibility as a world power _ ·Y ·_ _· _ - vJ rtu ally i ni ac t ·_ -ritif · ff_ -lf' · ·· · · 2 us NATO allif s_ should be further inclined· to _ _'i J·1gue·stion th efficaqy of the Atlantic •Alliance and the · Tf -· ·t-u ·i lity of continued ties w-ith the United States · • ·_ ' •• · • • ' 3 Both US NATO allies and Japan should be sufficiently appalled by OS brinkmanship to refrain from aiding and abetting the United States in any further escalation of the crisis · 4' The crisis dramatized· by· the us_ sinking of a -- ··'' · r $t y iet ship in Caribbean waters should result in increased 1 ' f risir l i i u lb e g l to _' condemn both superpowers for the current crisis · ·· On the positive side the crisis may generate support from these NOV 'f DECLASSIFIED 7 2009 · _ - -_ A otity EO 12958 as amended ·' - '· 2 1 DoD Ofc of Security Review - 1 • • • · · - N-10 nations for the longstanding Soviet initiative of a World Disarmament Conference 6 Given the specter of Iran's nuclear battlefield other Middle East and South Asian nations are likely to become increasingly skeptical of either superpower as a protector 7 The PRC is likely to use the current-crisis to reinforce its credentials as the spokesman for the Third World and pose as the only responsible and peace-loving representative of the three superpowers 8 Within the UN Third World Nations are likely · · · to extend their influenpe by condemning the Security Council peace-making keeping apparatus giving a greater peace-making ' · rq_le to the General Assembly and giving the UN a role in ' ff J1 5 ' Vithe·'·peace negotiations between the United States and USSR -- •· '-· -- - ' • ' • • ·i tftf i·· fl of ti i the ted St s 1 i n s p 1 p s se USSR Warsaw Pact countries are likely to take an increasingly ominous view of the United States and more benign view of th USS e Other options considered but rejected 1 Renew offensive in Iran a Likely to produce re-escalation by United b USSR already has military presence in Iran that cannot be dislodged by Iranians • c Long-term prospects are excellent so option not required 2 Imme diate prosecution of war at sea # tlt ·· ' ' DECLASSIFIED a USSR b Increases risk of expanding conflict • 3 Use of nuclear weapons on US merchant ships NQ t·1 7 2009 · _ ' r A hority EO 12958 as amended · · · Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review i 11 ' f 'rJ i H ' is at naval disadva tage N-11 a Not necessary to accomplish objectives b Increases risk of re-escalation ships 4 Immediate conventional attacks on us merchant a Prolongs conflict thati if ended now ends in Soviet advantage b Can be commenced ·guidkly · if the United States persists with substantial offensive activities ··· ·· 4 CONTINGENCIES • · - · 1 -s t i ·• r· f Action by US · •• · · JJ li i £ ef d r 'by USSR • a 'We wi11··use nuclear weapons against launch · sites wherever they are located b We will initiate· theater nuclear attacks b In the event· the United States uses nuclear weapons against targets on -$oviet or Warsaw Pact soil • ·• • • • Actions c We will attack us naval comme-rcial shipping worldwide on a reciprocal basis · c If the United · - · tt iates ·continues attack tH itlli ifitt $ hr merchant or 1 ··· · - d We will maintain surveillance of the mine-· laying vessels in international waters ' d · If the United States allies mine interna ional waterways ·' · ' - • · e If the United $1 tes i troduces tropps ilfr fn t of • • ·1 e We will take no action as this will legitimize Soviet forces in the area Ir·an DECLASSIFIED NOV ·j 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoO Ofc of Security Review N-12 ·f We ·would negotiate with a Provisional Government of Zanjan -- to be created in the occupied territory - S i l RED FROM MESSAGE NO TO CONTROL MOVE REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 302 DTG 301 ----III NO ------ 290l00Z JUN 76 FROM USSR TO USG Note to us published after delivery ··· -1 The Soviet Government sternly protests the criminal · ·· ' _ · attack by us naval elements on the· Soviet merchant ship Mir Uft1 J ii · ·• -- ji zi Cuban waters Should other attacks of this kind occur l · ' fl1 f9 USSR will retali'ate on a reciprocal basis against US · · · · _ · co m 'llercial ships Soviet· submariners will not lack countless targets in such a conflict '• ' 2 The Soviet Government ta es note of the us threat to attack vessels of the friendly socia 1-ist states Throughout the present conflict the USSR has striven mightily against American efforts involve other countries in the hostilities ··'_ - i ' - I t _should be clear however that if Soviet allies or their · ·•_ ' ' -ips are attacked the allies of the us cannot escape the 6 - ih f i s·ame fate A similar fate awaits those who make their · I f itl J _ acilities available to the marauders of the American Navy to ·i· _ • ' DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review 1 t i r --- · - •· -- · · t'' P Atch 1 N-13 I _ J f N l fsEC '- · ¥ · FROM • - ' RED MESSAGE NO TO CONTROL MOVE NO- REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 302 DTG 301 ----- -----· I·II 290100Z JUN 76 SPEECH OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR BEFORE UN • Immediate Release - -·'· • - ·- _- - i The Soviet Union is well awai - of t1'e grave ·si tuation - · w j ch now faces the world as· resu 11 --o the_ aqqrei sive act · _ _ ' tl _ i - Uni ted States and her lackey suppo r t rs This action - - - _ p ii a f tw lce brought the world t9 the brink- of a nuclea i - holo di t -and f it were not fo the r strai r it and understat 1ding · -- i ' _ e U SR the worl d woul d by now be embroiled in a death ·• ' · · _ _- ' _ ggle- The Soviet Uniop deeply· regrets the loss of · · t··_ tj v ee which has oc urred to peace-lov nq peoples in Iran _· - - '·i µ m and lsewhere as a result of the actions which the · · - soviet· Union found itself coi npel Leq · to tak - aga i nst the fo c ces of the warmongering United ·states ·· The_ soyiet Union ·· -took· 'these actions only as a last resort to prevent the · ·s read of this holocaust 0 _ _ - ' ' lµ f oesp1te the restrained_·a tions 0£ the USSRr 'the United and her allies even now may be preparing to continue 'lfHJ -f st t ponf lict by striking innocent merchant vessels uoon the - -_ - j gh seas and by blockading those· international waterways - rough which the life-blood of so many nations flow The -·_- p-SSR condemns such dastardly acts and asks that all peace ·'·-_ --· f ioving nations from which the us aq-qressor navies have · · operated in the past deny their po ts and facilities to these for ces Rest assured the USSR will not fail to protect its -- · · naval and other vessels from these us attacks as well as those· waterwavs which lead to the Soviet heartland ithrfitt iiS tes • •• · _ 7 · rt i 1· _ - i · • _- - l · -_ ·_- f k viets are prepared to begin immediately negotiations Jt i · - t ·the withdrawal of foreign troops and an end to this -•-·1 · ' _ _ted conf ict Even now preparations are underway to •·- ·_-- __ _ n ne·gotiations for a settlement witb the Shah of Iran · i iie··-ruier in whose country the conflict was initiated by the Y ri _ted states We are also prepared to rush food medical ' '-' DECLASSIFIE D Nov· 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amendedN-14 Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review · -'i· · • · · supplies and other forms of assistance to the Iranian peoples to relieve their suffering and anguish DECLASSIFIED NOV '1 7 2009 Au hority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review Atch 2 N-15 - · · ·· T MESSAGE NO FROM RED TO CONTROL MOVE NO REFERENCE CONTROL MSG 302 DTG 301 ----- III ------ 290100Z JUN 76 -------------------- - FROM SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY TO SHAH OF IRAN The Soviet Government urgently approaches the Government of Iran with a proposal for immediate negotiations These ···· ·_negotia tions which we propose _should begin in Moscow on _ - · 2 July 1976 should aim at an immediate cessation of '· ·- · · ' · tii i ties the exchange of prisoners the restoration of -v · ·•fa J i pd i he disengagement and withdrawal of opposing 1 • ' ·-- · s The Soviet Government further proposes that · · · 'J _ft piri' one month negotiations for the reconstruction of ·i _ war_ damage be undertaken between the USSR and Iran · _fr - _ ·· _-• Atch 3 - - _ · · N-16 ' · -------- - ••• -· - •·-1· -·· I · r I• ' f I • ' - •l ·r· - · ''· • I r· ·····•fi - j'• - i • • · 1 ·'· ' ' ·' I• · • ·-1 i' • • ' I• I I' i • •• I - -L · ' f f i i 1 J • • ·1 I j' l 'i•• 1••· --• -· -- - i · - '' - · ·- Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief DoO OSR Oate · Nov l 1 ocri IAW EO 12958 Secti 3 5 · I• • ·- --c 0 -I · c•J• 'f l 0 rr • ' ' I ' j- · Tfi• '· ' - _ ' sen LA III-7 3 CRITIQUE The following is an edited transcript of the SCYLLA III-73 Critique Minor changes and deletions of non-substantive material have been made to insure syntax In consonance with GA•s policy of non-attribution references to individual ·team members have been removed GEN STRACK I want to thank the participants in the exercise who gave so generously of their time energies patience and understanding of our·goals I would in particular want to thank the members of the Control Team who worked the better part of the three weeks and gave unstint -ingly of thei time and their interest Next I briefly ·· · ·•-·· · · ··want ·to dwell on what it was we were really trying to do · · - · · The name of the game was to develop Blue selected nuclear u jd - d tU ck options and from them determine what might be Red ·· - _ f@j -r ptions and res onses For his reason the se e2 ario was ·· · _ · wri tt-en as- it was with the question of the probability of · ' · ·· • tJie use of nuclear weapons eliminated Thus the character · • - of the entire exercise moved from a point of nuclear con· -_ • - · -frontation There were ite a few differences from the ·typical 0 poiitico-military simulations or even previous $ YLLA iterations ·Among the major things that one might dwell upon is the fact at in about 19 calendar days of · · _ · -- simul ation we covered only about 5 crisis and war days i at is contrary to the way a politico-military simulation -i C -•-··· '1 J ally runs so you have to keep your clock and calendar ·- tfY ··· t v iew • Als as opposed to earl_ier iterations the teams · t- - t' tr r ··- • - ••ked ·to come up with a single preferred option instead - ' · f·· a· •·hopping list of options This allowed for a little - - ' _ mor pei iled material from both the Blue and Red Teams ' f - 5rt · - p•q e of this it was incumbent upon the control element •·· - • · t· _ - accept the decisions· ot each of the teams This was done rather faithfully with minimal Control arbitration In fact Red really was working against Blue and Blue was really working against Red • · _ ··· ' · - · Finally I would note that throughout five SCYLLA exerte d a overall fit l f1il cises elf we ha e d JS 3 3 b 5 DECLASSIFIED NOV ·1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended · C_hief OoO Ofc of Security Review 0-1 - ' recourse to anv other militarv means and v tal national interests are considered to at stake At the same time we have learned that there are other ways of looking at possible selected nuclear attack options Thus within the range of partial force applications that one might make there really is not a precis e _predictability a·s ·to w at- a • given team might do--what the asses sments ·i ind respqnses might be With that as my brief back drop I w uld like to call upon the Conference Directo to press on with _the conduct of the Critique be CONFERENCE DIRECTOR Tha q k yqu ·General Strack · ··Gt'§ntle - men as you know there is a lc t of interest in nuclear options--how our governmental leaders will µse them and how • ___t e Soviet leadership will perceive and r a-ct to· their· us·e· · ····'The purpose of SCYJ LA III ha been three fold _ First was to- ·· e plorc the nuclear ·options ·ayailab Le and the associ ted· · - ¢ qp r i erations Next and I think this as particularly - · mj ortant was to enlighten the· pa rt Lcip nts as t o the intel ·· · J Jgerice problelt s decision factors oppc rtuniti s _and r isks _ _ in yolv e·d in adopting any nuclear c ption · It i s impe rta n - · t· tjiat -·our military and civilian leaders become educated in · · _ ·' · th e problems risks · oppo tu·nities _and intelli epce concepts · involved Third we have to gain ins4 ghts i nto - the Soviet perception of us use of 'nuclear weapons and likely Soviet responses I think we have succeeded in all these opjec ives ··· The purpose of this Cri tiq e · then is -t o nter ain · the · '· · · i P- f s _and thinking that went on to elaborate 9n them and · · if t a i td them • In thi way w hope to· · shed· further light on · · · ' · ·i ft f 1' ·t'otal objectives outlined · · At ··this time I wouid like to call on the Blue Teain Capt d 'n ·t'or his comments BLUE TFAM We had one advantage over Rf ¢1 in that we were supported by a military staff This was -a decided advantage when we looked at the nuclea options particularly in Move I · · t iey gave us a rich range of options from which draw - - i Thi is indeed very close to the way the National Command _ - - ' i-Aijtjlol 'ities would operate in a real crisis so not only were · ' • ff r ' ery helpful to us in game term but I th nk we had a ·· · - •·icfnarice to exercise a mode of operation w 1'ich 'very likely · ··· · wp'tild be similar • • c r ' l- •' '' • • - • • 1 • to the mode of ope -ation· 'f hat would be used · · •x·-• ii · a r ea crisis - r '·' ' f - · · · · · ' • • • DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review 0-2 DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Rev ew In Move I there was one fve had been I Therefore the issue before us was to assess our situation and determine what the appropriate respi nse would be to the Soviet aggression in Iran JS 3 3 b 5' We saw this as essentially a two-pronged threat to US interests First we saw it as a move by the soviet Union to exercise their traditional goal of dominance over the Middle East and control of the oil supplies of the Middle East Second and more broadly we saw it as a threat to the us position worldwide we made a key political judgment in the· first move--we had to evict the soviet forces from Iran We were not going to evict these forces through negotiation since if we achieved a cease-fire in place we would find it difficult if not impossible to evict them at ' · _ tb e negotiating table Therefore our first move was de WftI ii ° i_ s gned to evict Soviet forces prior t o negotiation This · r - r - 1it - s a critical judgment one we should come back and talk · ·_· _ ··r - • ab9-ut since it was that judgment that led to ·greater esca j ·- - '_ t _ _ l'ation -On the other hand it was a correct judgment since tNf ijtP i _ _ J f - ha-d simply called for a ce se-fire in p ac7 the n goiJ frt ' ' ' • _ · t1ations would not have been successful in evicting Soviet · ' J forces We would have had an ally who had its territori 1 invaded We would have been shown impotent in n t being able to prevent a fait accompli That was a very key dilemma that the Blue Team faced and a critical judgment that we made That justified our relatively l'arge initial of nuclear weapons • f·-i ' ' ff f ' ' ··· We indicated to the staff that we wanted to stoD t 11e ' · ··- · f ·1 ading ·elements of the Soviet advance attack their LOCs _ ii·-i ii r ·'-Ac _ a o d damage to 7ivilian nd population centers In •_ ii fAN• •t-il' order to show restraint we limited numbers and collateral ·t fJ - _ q amage We limited the attacks in both Move I and II to '°_ · ' •- t··· ·t·ranian territory we used forces that were solely based in Iran or on the aircraft carrier just off the coast of Iran All of these actions were intended to demonstrate th desire to limit the scale and scope of the conflict • _ · There was one minor miscalculation in Move I I think we · ii · S k - Ql 9 ht-'in somewhat more aircraft than we needed to deliver Ji 'f -w l t¾w - t P i •o-some odd air weapons that were used _ ' fi _ · L I ··-_ · ·· · · T ere may be some in the group who questioned whether we ·_ · ·ff A i r iq u l- d have used the carrier aircraft They were the most · f tir '· · · immediately available They were there - OSD 3 3 b 5 ' '• ' tt i i ' 0-3 ready to go and could be used without havin -r to re-dt-p1 y units or weapons to Iran This is an important point t0 note in our Cri ti que--naval air that is with in range o f the target area is likely to be the most readily utilizable Op the other hand some of us were concerned about the v ulnerability of that carrier It presented a tempting target for Red retaliation We were persuaded to use the carrier by the argument that no matter where it sat it was going to be a tempting target for Soviet retaliation In Red's Move II it became clear that whether the carrier was in the Persian Gulf or the Mediterranean or in the Pacific i t was vulnerable to attack We felt that after we completed our move a Soviet nuclear ' $pqnse was more likely than not We considered this con 1 '$ gency and were just a little surprised when the initial _ 1 J d response was not nuclear but conventional In retro· · pect it seemed to make a lot of sense Under the circum - ' 'e · - s t anoe ·Red still had the predominant conventional super Itt-t i i 1ii fP -ltJY · n the area This factor really dominated the whole i t t 'We felt that the threat and US objectives remained ·· i - '- '-'·' unchanged Too the challenges were unchanged So based fr-t ft f -i5fi' r this plus o r lack of conventional capability the only course open during Move II was more of the same ·we again tried to demonstrate restraint by limiting our -us e of nuclear weapons to Iranian territory We even went -- · t f s__ome length to bring additional air into Iran from i i- ·-Jt ' r Jcey rather than to fly missions from Turkey This time · - ·-· w' -v er we extended the time period for execution because i - - ' fr- iif' _efr we qu_estioned our military staff we learned that the Jl l ji ifi rs allowed for the first exchange was insufficient J -tr · 5 _·- '9 'pt operly use the weapons In Move I we had instructed - to mount an attack which ·would inflict 50 percent cas· • - •·ualties on the invading Soviet forces The result of our initial attack was only 35 percent casualties dn one column and very little on the other Two reasons fer this low f- iffectiveness were our desire to limit collateral damage and · - -ti _ --short time allowed for the attack phase A conflict · -·- fJ ween goals and limitations existed Therefore we felt _ _ ji J aq to extend the second strike period to 24 hours which · --- ' i tt a led us to use all of the weapons that were authorized _ J i ' 1 e r i erally achie ed the military e fectiveness that we · l F e pee ted to have with the second strike i J£ · · il i iH f i ' - DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 • · -Authority EO 12958 as amended · Chief _ DoD Ofc of Security Review ·Jr J t1fJ • 1 · -- ' --- - -- · ' Jff · ffei ai n we anticipated that the Soviets would respond w i t'1 nuclear retaliation however I am not sure we anticipated quite the character of that response We were appalled at the selection of Guam as a demonstration by t he Soviets We had a dilerrana because clearly we had suffered a psychological blow At the same time however we received an offer to negotiate which we appreciated since it allowed us an opportunity to realize our number one objective--tc get ·the Soviet forces out of Iran our task then was to come up with an option which in our view redressed the psychological imbalance and let us get even We elected to do that by accepting the offer to surrender which is the way we attempted to treat the offer to negotiate To redress the psychological imbalance we elected to continue a non-nuclear war of attrition at sea _ to include raining anc1 blockading of Soviet ports Our - · · _if '·PU pose was to provide the negotiators with leverage against · ·-· · ' c-i - 1 he Soviets and to encourage the Soviets to negotiate in · • · ·- · g O _d faith It was our view that as negotiations progressed ·· t _i J ·anc 1_·Soviet forces withdrew the pressure on Soviet merchant 'i 1 Vm 1 t tr s lips and naval forces at sea would be decreased We were ' · · £ ftJ 1 j f' t 9 ··course appreciative to note that the Soviets in effect i· fff ·i - llf aicaepted that of fer RED TEAM I am very much impressed with what the Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency continues to attempt to do I think the value both actual and potential of these kinds of exercises is enormous What we expose and then what we qq with the issues in subsequent exercises and work is the · We may ·have failed tcJ explore some situations which could _ have t ied some knots of reality into Uncle Sam's coattails S wever throughout the exercise the Red Team did try to f6llow what we perceivec to be many of the basic tenets of Soviet political and military philosophy broad strategic doctrine and grand strategy · One of these was the Soviet proclivity to keep all options · ·· - - o P as long as possible This implies trying to take a long • ·- · ·· i t l ' l ge via and play the long range aspect of each situation • -· -· - ·f '' • t - - ·ond ly e tried to adhere to the principal that once the i i - ' - S i$ts e lect to use military force in achieving an objecJl1f ' ' t -i l ·the ir endency is to use these forces in ai i o r rwhelming i '' L ' _ - J P r This approach tends to cancel out getting into a 1 · ·nf tfrf f l·· · DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review 0-5 - q uid pro quo or tit-for-tat exchange betweeri the Soviet --union and the United States Third we conceived the Soviets as always striving to maximize their bargaining position Accordingly you may find them relying for the moment more on long term political progress than on an immediate military or purely tactical gain Fourthly we should note that the Soviets frequently alternate between political and military actions in a coordinated fashion designed to baffle and bewilder the opposition Finally we did endeavor to exhibit the Soviet propensity to present the unexpected · In applying these principles to our actions and reactions we were trying to build on the natural strengths and natur al advantages of the Soviet Union At the same time we -were trying to exploit any apparent us weaknesses In addition true to Soviet style we did treat Soviet terri·tq i -y as inviolate and were gratified to note that the US · r ad the Soviet position loud and clear We ·bel ieve that the national interests and objectives ''i# it' e Red Team laid out accurately reflect the Soviet ·· s_ign in the Hddle East There is no doubt the soviets r - - _ 4 iFe to broaden their influence in this region to dimin ' ' ·'·· ·- -1 if tJs influence to force the United States out of the · at 0a and eventually to gain a position from which they car1 influence the long term trend of events in Iraq and Iran f Te were in a box as we started Move I There was no The United States had achieved the • ' i fi't i ative We were surpri ed by t-he magnitude of the ini A- i _ i us_ response to th 7 Soviet g 7ound force ii vasion of Iran · a -1 _ ·J t · $ ee m d to us th inking as Soviets that this was a rather use of nuclear weapons particularly since ··1 f ' ' i µ'¢ l1 ar ·we 'lpons had not been used previously in this area · •i-_- r iff· n eJ et effect was to limit the options available to the ' · · Soviet · Team and to move us immediately several rungs up the -sea la tory ladder It left us relatively little in terms of a face-saving way out ql£ $tion about that ttf 1' flm ft f h nde'd We opted to respond to this situation by the use of a rather heavy conventional attack endeavoring to play to our strength and against what we rega rded as the American weak- - - ' tj ss We felt that we could bring an overwhelmi11g force to elenents and Iranian fo-rces in the area Ji·t l · 7 o · the US ' hi jA· DECLASSfFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authqrity EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review 0-6 •- -• • •• - · •--a--• - -• · i t- J 7 ·-it 1_rao we could through a concentrated politica l and propa·ganda campaign over a period of time marshal world as we11 as US domestic opinion against the US policymakers to the extent that it would be quite difficult for the United States to reinitiate the use of nuclear weapons Unfortunately the scope of the Soviet ttack did not come through in our messages We made some assumptions bu1 did not state them We made some broad brush moves on the map and did not reflect them clearly so they did not come· through as we should have got them through to yot1 Had the Soviet conventional attack been successful the United States would have been backed into a corner With no way of responding in a conventional manner and with world opinion aroused against the further use of nuclear weapons the United States might very well have been limited -- _ to two choices Either to escalate to some form of a '· - t-rategic exchange or to negotiate This was the kind of · _ ·- -- box which we were trying to put the United States in in o- lr i 1 '-· · • i - i i- · n £ - ' _ ' ' ·urifortunately we did not develop the situation as cleanly _ iiJti i 4i $ V should ave I _worrr lest in the future omeone -' _·- -- t· ·J oox ing at this exercise might make the assumption- that a Soviet conventional attack can be defeated solely by the use of us tactical systems 0 -· 0 - In Move II we expected a further nuclear response because · ·· · ··the United States did not have any other feasible options · · · •··· except to call for a cease-fire Once again we were taken • ' back by the magnitude of the attack At this point we felt r · · _ •- 't ·_ · ·• ' P ' fl h d pp recourse but to punish the United States - -·punish it hard Not only were Soviet objectives at _ __ -- ·S take as far as the Middle East was concerned but the defeat · · if f'i t f ii · h rniliatio n of the so·viet armed forces a s well Again · ·· · · · · the Soviets had been left wit 11out any face-saving way out and there was only one direction in which they could move · This was the coordinated attack on the US carrier forces _ - · in the Gulf of Oman in the Mediterranean in the Pacific _ _- •'_' •_- ·--and the rnilitar z' facilities on Guam It was designed to · · take the pressure off the Soviet forces in Iran to reduce ·· tpe apability of US anc' Iranian forces to continue wit ½ Ji hi Jl · con flict in Iran to demonstrate to the United States ' the Soviet Union's resolve to carry the war to the door ' ' J f nf·i f iii - • · DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief Doo Ofc of Security Review 0-7 step of the united States if necessary· to warn others particularly the PRC to stay out of the conflict and to deny assistance to the us This attack may have appeared to have bordered on overkill but once again it would appear to us to be a characteristic Soviet response to move in an unanticipated direc · ·tion and to respond at a higher level Al though there may have been some tendency for the team to want to insure that the magnitude of the nuclear respons was properly understood we should not be lulled into thinking that the Soviets would not take such a course of action As to the attack on Guam the tearn debated the pros and cons to some considerable length but concluded that the American people w cnµd not consider an attack on Guam an attack on the US · J1omeland per se They also believed that this attack would · ca lse the United States to mo·ve toward a cease-fire to ·avoid further nuclear exchange It seemed unlikely that · - the United States would escalate the conflict into a stra- ' e veth ife stti c do eG • Although the Blue Team elected to continue the con· flict in ove I I it did so by reverting to conventional means For the·first time the United States $eemed to be moving toward a negotiated cease-fire arrangement in a more_conciliatory fashion Prior to this all of the us · q v$rtures appeared to be ultimatums It also appeared to ' ' i ·· f j_rath r unlikely that the American public would really · ' · E9t i t President and continue a nuclear war in Iran f ijaily did not threaten the very survival of the ' t Jf States·but which was beginning to threaten US fa t f _ r • · •· · ··• ' feam -- Th · · -- · actions of the Blue Team in Move III -provided us with · · ·· ii _ excellent opportunity to bring this conflict to some sort of phase where sorce of the Soviet objectives in the Middle East were satisfied The Soviets rather than being e p- illed from Iran still occupied some of the nothern tier df the country The Iranian goverrunent had been greatly -weakened by the loss of much of its armed forces and its J i- i··· • · • rjtry ·was in ruins The Soviets had gained access to the - _ • ·•' - f f sian 'Gulf through northwestern Iran and Iraq In addition · · 'J ' t t h _ iraqis were occupying oil rich Kuwait and it could be t r f ' i gonstrued that the Soviet Union had pushed the United States I· • - · · OECLASSIREO NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief OoD Ofc of Security Review ·· - ' 1 •• 0-8 - - · - - -· - · ·f··· - • to the very brink of a strategic exchange from Jl- ic 1 th£' tinited States and not the Soviet Union had backed dow r The Soviets from this point would be branding the United States as an aggressor and would still be endeavoring to drive the United States and her allies farther apart Although we felt that the exercise left the United States in a somewhat vulnerable position I think this is a situation we military planners must scrutinize lest something like this should come to pass It seemed to me that in this exercise the central thesis --I gather this also from the statement of the exercise objectives--is can the sophisticated use of tactical nuclear weapons systems serve to defeat significant conventional · · forces on the ground A very key point we have debated in · many other forums And secondly on the politico-military ·· · · s ide is the United States prepared to pay the price both · · ·· Jl at4opally and domestically for the l 'ass v fi st ' pl l cat 1on of nuclea1 weapons when full Justification for of these weapons may not be perceived by the eri'can ·or the world audience I think these are central ·· Problems which emerge from this simulation and ones which ·-' ·usefµlly could be discussed and considered at another time by other people use CONFEFERENCE DIRECTOR I would hope that t 11 ere would be · ·some questions and thoughts on why specific moves were ' taken -L_ _ r4 J i UE ' J 'EAM From a political and propaganda point of one of the statements that the Soviets made in Move I •1 r • •·c·- ie _- · 1 t i t i 0i 1Sf4 t- i i•gued us and we thought it gave us a handle on their 1 'hey said to the United Nations that the - · Soviets were ever mindful of the threat of the cold and 'misery that the brash actions of the imperialist warmongers had imposed on many peace-loving peoples of the world the Soviet union would work to lessen this threat by maintaining -·continuous supply of vital oil to its friends in Western Europe and to Japan We thought that this was a tip off as · · · to Soviet objectives maybe it wasn't intended as such ·· · - q ' 3 e they couldn't live up to that promise without 1 zth'g a good deal of Middle Eastern oil I don't th ink ·· · as reflected quite as much as it might have been in our ·sage We tried to use that to point out to the countries of Western Europe and the Middle East that the real Soviet · _ ' _ ··' ··objectives DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958 as amended ··Chief DoD Otc of Security Review 0-9 ·t ft i · · - ik · - j fs t f S • -tl on was to seize the oil otherwise they co11ldn' t I - ' · · made such a promise We tried to use that to some · · extent in our propaganda The other ploy that I neglected · ·'to mention was the PRC ploy which I think was seen by the Red Team This was to be a rather visible high level US delegation to the PRC which would show the Kremlin that we were attempting to develop cooperation with the PRC It would have made the Soviets a little bit nervous about that threat on their flanks and might have pinned down as many · forces as possible on the Chinese front tf v e RED TEAM I think that was a very good move BLUE TEAM In some recent studies we have talked about _ PL°F f1 Uination as an objective of the li -rnited use of · nuclear weapons however we haven't thought enough about the political objectives of war termination There is no dou t in this circumstance that getting the Soviet forces out of Iran had to be a US objective however there is _se rious doubt whether that was an objective that warranted · t -11e • use of nuclear weapons In a sense we created a defeat i1t l f 1ii ' t Jty establishing publicly--an objective which we were -i ft'i - j ple to achieve militarily • ' •• _ 0 _ ft - J - ·-· - ' _-t · · r· '·' A nother aspect which is closely related is Allied and -' • ' ' jj lic support We drew from the scenario the assumption · i 'f- t _¥jat we were doing reasonably well in terms of Allied sup · port al though in the last move the Allies failed to respond io _our request for a Reinforced-Alert It was a tip off that we were running into some difficulties What would have happened in the real world is uncertain but we were - oinewha t encouraged to push ahead in Move I I on the as sump · p _ ' e ' 7e getting at least some support from our Allies Pl'Y _violent or widespread domestic opposition Does the · 'J ave any other comments they might want to make i· z - · · BLUE TEAM We were a Ii ttle surprised that the Red Team '· f -- ·-j h t the first offer to negotiate the withdrawal of _ · ' th'eir· forces allowed for the permanent establishment of a Sqyiet enclave in Iran That wasn't our understanding · ·· RED TEAM · It didn't necessarily allow for iti but if a physical presence could be maintained or partially maintained · ·_ _while negotiations were taking place we could stall More ··· Ji ll th event the Iranians would not negotiate we were __ _sj qei ing establishing a provisional administration of ·r iai i ' H ci • ja'n and negotiating with its leaders -· -- · - - - _ - - ' i·· i 1 EClASSIAED NOV 1 7 2009 · ' -·Auiliority ·eo 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review 0-10 -IJ OP S BLUE TEA 11 1 We expected the sta 1 RED TEAM If we in the stalling created no situations against which you could use nuclear weapons then the United States would be presented with a rather difficult nut to crack since the United States had no other way of physically sweeping Soviet forces out of Iran BLUE TEAM True but we were going to sweep them out in a rather indirect fashion using the one true asset we had going for us that being use of the natural geographical constraints which historically have denied the Soviet -conventional forces access to the rest of the world RED TEAM We felt the return to the conventional environment at sea in fact played into our powe r since it is the United States that is most vulnerable when merchant shipping is involved We depend upon ours very little Our strength at sea is in attack submarines and we didn't - 1 -hin you could keep the attack up for two months particu- ¥ t Y··-if• you attacked bloc shipping and we began to go · 1 r llied shipping •• 1 i ' · _ · _ ·-· · _ ion -- CONTROL TEAM There was clearly a difference of opinion the effectiveness of that particular option • BLUE TEAM Concerning the pros and cons of the option we knew we couldn't continue it very long however we didn't feel that we had to totally bar shipping on the sea We would prevent rearmament and the like and at the same time attrite the submarine force through lack of support and · ack_ o_f r earming capability The blockading of the area ijif going to limit what the Soviets could get out You · _ • f l- w _ · imed ·th4t they were all out we didn't really have that -·l t''1-' ti t _ n·'·the scenario We were looking for military options that · were viable How valid how effective the option would be - w as · argued back and forth but at that time we had very limited choices • _ BLUE TEAM A couple of other perceptions that we noted fit with the modern times We always informed our NATO • llies yet really never consulted with them which really t _· s eems ·to be one of their complaints today In keeping with _-- iti · · ·- ·· · t i ' we· a l so noticed that Control gave us little support 1 ' ' a tjy at all from our NATO allies--this is probably very l f h i f' l SIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 •'f --·Authority ·eo 12958 as '·t'···· •· ·'• • • • 0• · · amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review 0-11 realistic 1 00 we noticed that the Red Tea 1t didn't particularly apply any pressure on our Allies 1 RED TEAM In the various messages we did warn the NATO Allies that if the·y supported the Americans we would take rather drastic action against them In Turkey particularly we applied a lot of pressure Therefore I think you either misread the traffic or else it didn't get through properly · RED TEAM One thing that was highlighted by this exer·--c is·e was the basing system of the United States We all understood each others signals about limitation brinkmanship and who's got the guts to threaten to go further In Move II we felt threatened by your feints at Baku More ov we were worried that you had misinterpreted our Move I actiQil as a sign of weakness and as unwillingness to go ·nuclear We began to think of a way to impress you and bring you to your senses--that we were as gutsy as you were - _ _ i f not more so In doing this we found lots of intermedi l-'i · -·· · · · ·-- j' g tl · in what the Soviets would call FBS Forward ·· tems --sort of anonymous semi-territories that we fi t that would impress you for which you had no equi · -el'lt-' · You had nothing but the Soviet homeland to strike '' · · ' t ' The American system of bases provides a lot of targets · ·• • - that are halfway to the us homeland for example the US · facilities in Rota Holy Loch and of course Guam Attacks en these would impress the United States and do some damage · - o ·its war fighting capability but would not evoke all of ·tna emotion and feeling that would result from attacks on · the US homeland The American basing system does provide an i _ • ' yn tetry which we as •ricans have generally thought of as J ti - 1 tf 4g-- the United States a lot of extra capabilities Lookf J · · · • tirough Soviet eyes I was struck by the vulneral ilities · J te _United States that emerge as you play this kind of - 1· · · 1 t 1 · ' f i f kEo'·i TEA 111 Nay I refer back to the oil guarantee option ' ih wiuch we said we would guarantee the flow of oil to our · fri'ends We were primarily trying to get as much support as · we · could from the US Allies since it was totally in their interest for the conflict to end We were trying to put it in the guise that it is hard to keep soft production facil_ j • ·•·•- - t i es _ going in the midst of a conflict in general aside l' Bm ' J a'rtioular threat You just don't do business as _ J · · ' - • - ' ·· OfCLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 · ·Authority EO 12958 as amended · Ghi f DoD Ofc of Security Review 0-12 • · · · _ -·-· -· f • ' ·r1 • C' r-• - • usual in the middle of a wa r zone In 1 ove III we l ' ren went further in guaranteeing to the Arab producing states a market for their oil no matter what happened BLUE TEAM That's true anyway There is nothing you could do to make it untrue As long as there is oil there will be markets for it RED TEAM We also said that if it got complicated with shipping if all the tankers got sunk we would pay them -for X number of years in foreign currency or gold or whatever they wanted This would in a sense provide a pseudoworld market Again it was to their interest to be as nice to us as they could insofar as that lever could be used Next concerning the US objective to evict Soviet forces f rem Iran we were never convinced we were going to get thrown out of there Our version was that with small unit 9-0 -tivity produced through guerrilla activity if necessary over the long haul we could stay in Northwestern Iran I P _efinitely and that nuclear weapons were not a satisfac1tbry means to achieve eviction Our goal was to get a land route to the Persian Gulf We were somewhat indifferent a s '-° to J hat political arrangements went with it Looking into ·the ·future say even over a period of ten years all things are possible Thus there was a tremendous amount of selfconfidence CONTROL TEAM May I just elaborate a bit on this getting out of Iran Initially if I understand Red you had some pr b em in understanding why the Soviets invaded Iran It · i P _ 7 ars that omewhere during the p ay f the exercise you i p 4ed that 1 t was a paramount soviet interest to have ' ·· ·soviet forces remain in Iran Did you see your vital rf -• · ·· na _i_o nal interests as involved Were there some considera • ' •- · ·t ions of national pride that influenced your actions RED TEAM Our problem was not that we didn't think i t was a grand idea to have a land bridge to the Persian Gulf we just weren't sure that going in with such a minor force • as five divisions was the way we thinking· as Soviets _ 1 1 t - 1 ti - · · uld have gone about it had we decided from the outset to - r t J qfi t --'t- __gcf militarily We felt it was a poor middle ground betwet m · H -t f t tz't i-· ffi l 9 ng ·term political activity which nO'W' following ' liove III I t f l Y • i -l· j• 'i' ''·-OECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 · · · · _ · ' · · · Authority EO 12958 as amended · -• • -'· ir · · --Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review - '•' 0-13 · · · - - · · · • -· ··would ·get underway and a real first class invasion That was our problem Given that the Soviets had invaded Iran we looked for those factors which would have promp ted the move and seized on the land bridge as an immediate objective It was consistent with overall Soviet goals and consistent with the given military actions RED TEAM There was one move which we did not play up · as m1 1ch as we might but was very key in our decision--that to start the side-slipping of the rear forces in Northwestern Iran into Iraq direc·tly and to improve the existing all-weather road as a sort of a symbol and to get an Iraqi link up so that the Iraqis became as tightly· coupled to the Soviet Union as possible · ·-··was - ·-· - With regard to Guam we didn't know if t ings were · really going to get tough in China There was always the · · possibility that the whole scene of confrontation would · t fi i 1fit to Cl -ina • We d dn't want a 'a3 wi China _w7 i ·J i ' i · ' · p Ch ina might give us a hard time in the maritime i · es• · • We were in terrible sha e over there particu ·•· c h t ·· r y ··i _ t e were - fi ' 'in- pught to bea r T erefore Guam was a en as a straight ·' ·tlr £ brward ·prudent military move to minimize OS capability · t6 s·upport China plus it would dissuade the PRC from · adventurism because it didn't have direct American ·support 0 OSD 3 3 b CONTROL TEAM I would like to ask a question about both Blue and Red actions toward the PRC · Blue sent a high level · • · _ pQlitico-military team to the PRC Red saw their attack on · ·•• · · as sign to the PRC I wonder given the objectives ····· · t _by both Blue and Red in Move I and the fact that the a·l ·focus was the s truggle in Iran wbether or not these moves geographically escalated the conflict away from r ' ' flt- n t d Blue and Red find themselves in a struggle over · · ·· b il Lg down Had you begun to forget about the Iranian ' 5' _ a · · pf 1blem · · BL US TEAM We saw the crisis in· Iran from the very outset as worldwide problem US interests us stature worldwit ie were challenged by the Soviet invasion of an allied ·1-i •· i ·J n4 f·r iendly country tN•d · t ' ' fi We agr ee r' t •- - Jt' the crisis stay in 1 i t • •'••I •1' • •'lo• • •'•• I I •• · Although we were delighted to Iran where we thought we had by ' l l f f tit · ' DECl SSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 · Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review o-14 • ' i· · ft J · ' · _j ff- i · k the best uili tary position We felt a s irnilar c 1gage · ment of prestige in the American use of nuclear weapons We didn't want the United States thinking that tact teal nuclear weapons would stop us that we would be forced to roll over and play dead all around our borders Then they could have permanently intimidated us So we had the same worldwide approach to the crisis ' ' f f c F · · · 1 ar BLUE TEAM If the initial us use of uclear weapons had been more limited and if we had called for a cease-fire would the Soviet reactions have been different RED TEAM I think it was too limited RED TE AM So do I RED TEAM I think if Blue· had used nuclear weapons in a symbolic move there would have been much more room for maneuver on both sides In reality we would have had a dif£erent situation had the United States not gone to • those levels In reality--I don't know if anyone in the room agrees--the United States·would not have used that ' 1 iti ii1 fii er of weapons initially It probably would have used _ f•J ' · · 't 'fewer and then would have held to see what was going to ' - • 1- iappen and played it from there We zipped up the ladder ·- - · a fully fast - · J- · · -i' ' BLUE TEAM It would have been a different game if we had Seen more careful with our instructions on the first use The first use was so important to us that I don't understand how we wrote instructions or allowed our military staff to execute without havin been absolutel • ce i tain the were oin to use •· - · -· - • - i i l tl tfJJ ·i ' - · u e would not have 1 as quickly JS 3 3 b RED TEAM The political message we received from the United States was what really drove us--when you announced that total withdrawal was the only acceptable term for cessation that ended the question of cessation right there - 0-15 L • • • l ••• r •I • j •t • ' i • ·1 · r • l _ 1 ·······- • ' ''• •• --••'_ - what CONTROL TEAM · When you made -up· your options j Rin f r ' of consideration was given -to maneuvering roon for-your · · - _• 1 opponent You talked about reaching ·a point ·where ··there - was no more maneuvering room no -other' option but·'·to esca' · _ · late In your -deliberations was this a ·factor --· ··- · · · '·' · · • • • _ •• a Z • • ••• · 0 •• ••• • • 1 • • 1 • • ' ' - r 1 BLUE TEAM It is not ·a11 theft certai'n as to ··how ·inipo£- · · · tant face-saving would have been either after the initia Soviet invasion or after the initial ·us use df nuclear ·-_ •-·_ weapons but certainly it will play a ·part _ -There ·was · - a · · ·· · lot of talk by our team in· Move -III llbout• th·e trt'-fof· 1 atif- °v _ aspect of it i e we had · to do something to get· even for 1 1 Guam Nevertheless that didn't hold true''bf 'the t'iine_ · we _ 3 decided what we were going to do In other words we weren·1·t as much concerneq with saving face as we ·were -about· ·b etter - ing our position Another p int we w_ere ki d of l 9 4 q _ _J 1 ' ' into a losing position from the-beginning -by'-'several· · ev en ts -i many ·we brought ·on ·ourselves and niant 'were -'brought upori 'i us •i-' For the Soviet -union· to have' invaded Ir-an· suggesfts_ 1 froin· 1 'tJ t t_1 ' very beginning that the Soviets- ·felt i-·t was· to 'their ·-advan · tage _ If I read the Soviet mind· right' they 'Woui'dn' t'·have 5 started it· if they· ·felt they were- going_ to- ·1ose· ·-·so·--- 11 rs· 11 · • J · _ was their ·strong- area The· only a1·ternative ·that ·'the· Blue-i i1 Team had throughout was to £ ind ·some place her -·we c·ould· · -'_c exert some· strength whil·e ·at the· same ·tiine ··at-·best -· ha·1tip·g i ' that invasion This is why China was important to'us· · 1 1 • _ This is why NATO which hasn't been talked about-much- today was ·extremely· important to us • • From- the· ·-very·· outs e t J t w as -· i vital that NATO mobilize to - create a- threat' ·en· the1 Sov i i •1st ir _ l - ' western· front If we could· ge·t · china that ' Otila-· nave b' en 2tf -- three- fronts - The 'One thing we ·-couldn't afford was t ·· 9ivel 'il the Soviet Union a· clear ·sweep·•with--anythitig-- ·they· -had· at ' - i - 't Iran We had some trouble ·with the Soviet-·military ·capa n ' · bility in-- Iran ··Four divisions in t he--begirininc f didn - p i _ _ c _ _ _ impress- us v ry -much · -There was ·--no Arrny1- there-- was noefiifigmi I - · · · behind those divisions · We frankly·' didn '· t - see h9w'• they _' t11 • t'1 ' · ' could do as well as they did - Too we didn'th ·ecognize tliE J Soviet ability to reconstitute so rapidly The last thing_ 1 · _ • ' that didn't ·-get -too much play· was ·our last note to _th_ - il' -· · Arabs which was a thinly ·veiled threat that ·-if --th_ey ' -did-nf trr4 n J · · _i- get the Soviets ·out of ·there ·--they might next J t · imag ne· 1fJ_ · the nuclear- devastation- in· Iran made not only ·an impre·s·sion • c · in New York and Moscow but in the capitals of the Arab •·' trt _ · world as well The threat that they could be·· next would have gone a long way ·· l · • - • • • • •• • • J f • • ' • ' C i 0 be 1 I • DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 Authority EO 12958-as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review 0-16 a- ' · I -· • i • ' f 1 • • ' · · -L i r fr h ·' •I ' CONTROL TEAM Yes I think the fact that some 100 000 '···d Iranians were killed should have been highlighted -That·· may have had some long-range impact n the Arab nations v ' rr•' ' 1 CONTROL TEAM Would· the use of ·nuclear weap ns ' oll oWed by conventional warfare have an impact on ·either the NA TO · or Warsaw Pact countries Do you think perJ iaps · poli ti '' · ·I' 1· cally Warsaw Pact countries would say we can spl n e·r Iicn --this is a good time to move or would our ·N TO count ri•if - ·' ' ·· say the us nuclear umbrella is a·• myth 1 · · i-• · · ·· •• • J • • • I J • 'I •'' • I • 1 1 1 -• • • • t• i RED TEAM I think it is more' of' ·a prob'lem fo r NA Tq ·l11 ' ' ' it is for the Warsaw Pact by the very nature ·-the different -· · •·' ' natures of ·the two alliances · · · · ·· · • - · __ · ' 1 ·· ·i· o · f l f i 1 • • • • _ -· i • • ' z id' ' f f f S - ·i · • · j RED TEAM Along t iat· line the comment ·abc tif · '_s dibb r -i f' i ' '' · front in NATO was of no concern to us' whatscie-tier·'·'fc ir ·w 1 · l p ' ' I had no fear that NATO would launch ap inva io11 si ce r re · 1 · · • • 1 were very caref1 1l· no_t to provok any A i ri te7 s · Wf c- t _ · · ·f leaned over backwards not to do anything ·other-- ·than thr 9a eni · i · ·i 1 Turkey · · l 1 ·· ·• 2 • ·' · _· •· · -· • 1 i 1 -- - 1 1v · ' £ t r--··r ti · 1 BLUE TEAM _ _ Well' of course · we ·'di 'd·· not r ·· · · 1 NATO· to begin firing shots The· minimum· tha 'f8 want dt · • and didn't get was NATO to mobilize in its ·9wn efen _e'l ' c thereby eliminating the seven day disadvantage-which· NATO'· · ··· · invariably has It would have pres nted wi in th ee_ q y$ i a different picture on the··western front · · s condiy ' f r · · 1 r f the exercise opened with ·some·unrest in• eastern· Europe --we··· - · · envisioned a situation whereby NATO and par·ticiila rly· Wes·t'' · f ' · Germany would be in a position to aid thei - bi o er S iih •d· i · J the _East 1·It· would have pt ded a''di - gp r t 1 UJ L1 ·l' for ·a·•while· · · ·· - · · - _ ····· •1• 1· · ·· -·r·' rrea r tf • expecf· r t' -f I i · · · •' l 1 _ • · - • • l - 1• 1 t • L I I 9 t I •••• •1 f t ·cJ ' f l f r '• 1 · RED TEAM We did disperse forcesf·'s imply' for she r'J 1p u f' ·-- dence We alerted all of our • forces deployed our naval ' J· · ··' · ' · · • i '• · • · t •jd · commands · deployed our submarines that · is ··assumed a nor · · mal state of alert that would preclude• any·· up·risiri f·ifiiJE sf l 1 ··r f • '•1 ·' i·· E' 1rope We_ proceeded on the general ass J ti n·• th - -J e 1 ' first nuclear detonat1on··froze--everybody · and ithey wouldntt ·• · want to get' invol ved Our ·warsaw P ct l i wc ufd not· t 11 ' ··· this as· an advantageous time to revolt·· · · · · · ·•··· - · ff''-··• ··· · · • • •'• ' ' - ' ' · · 1r ri - r r1 _ - · · BLUE· TEAM ' We had quite a b'it ·of ·disc'ussio·ri · on-• NAT0 1 · Mlf ff · NATO has· been· sitting ·for·all thesei years' thin' kinc ·that rf - i t 1 i · · they are· attacked we will execute the SIOP umbrella • They · 1 t·· ' d • 1 1 _ · r ·' · r i· ' J itl 1 • t r l • I c · · j' ' · ' f' D ECLASSIF IEI _ NOV· ·f 7 2009 Auth ority EO 12958 as amended Chief DoD Ofc of Security Review I • • • • • • f'eP •t • 71 · -Tilk · · i - f · it-l neRM n L r · r '• 'I •l I ' •1• • ·i •' · • I · f i· - - in Iran an attack going on and they see how we are 'lpi g the Iranians yet they may not be too anxious to have that kind of help on their own soil RED TEAM Both sides did a skillful job of avoiding any seri ous conside·ration of a confrontation in Western Europe If the Soviets avoided the use of nuclear weapons fii response to tne lnue 's ·use in rah ·the ·would have come out much bett er in the long term First of all they would have shown that they could handle t-he _United States an cl that Amerl can nuclear weapons w'er ineffective in - controlling the situation The second thing is th at if ·- they didn It use nuclear weapons world public opfniop w_ould -- '·• J1a ve b n against the States for having lnitiated · h 'i -' tbjdus- f · · Th±·s would have put ·the Soviets a vecy decided YT - · pql±tical advantage As a matter of f adt e tried n ' ' iM6ve i to have that occur united in BLUE TEAM Did· you otually give considera tion to the _J q s of a number of divis ions in that objective ·• · 1 i9 l e' real'iy- di h di 1·•··ii·we igof -i_f iY E or six _ 3 i Xf Yotlcliic uld £1a ve been p'lace in a situ- • ttrhere the pressures on you· -·not to use nud ear weapons io ns chewed up 0 jrs t L t o e 0 hd icul •'· c _ li ert -decirnated That is unlike the normal Soviet doctrine1 th y ·would just ipu11 that group out and bring some more in _ - -· -RED- -TF AM· - - '-·We- go t- caught -by- --a s-ki-ng-f or-' twe--- t h4ng-s-- w-hioh- ·usE 1b i - e· mutually exclusive _We i t''' • wanted to have ·tho E -'divisions p 1 sed so th y would Q ' 'POQ targets but _we · also wanted m' ltto nove ' o the link up · · · 0 tITbJTROi t tf The Soviei div isions were --completely disfsei1 up -untll they resumed their atta k · ·· •iffi i' s% R D- 'l EAM· · · The purpose of the airborne ·division was to - -· -· fu l3 the Ir nlan forces -turn and _run to the defense of the 1 _g ptictl -We underestimated the strength of· the_ Iran i an resistance - oui - pian-_workea ·on' ··one· front but no -tA i t ' -J he way · ·- · - e -it as on -·the· the game was played -_-Our-whole strate·gy was diffi-cul-t as possible _f9r the United States t to make a case in itB own inner circles as to the efficacy of its use of nuclear weapons That didn't work out as well as we thought it would RED TE Al- our goal in Move I was to continue with the conventional attack It might have been a more interesting game if Control had forced Red to continue the conventional attack--without Blue knowing that Red was required to do so It would be interesting to consider US options in light· of a more successful conventional Soviet attack CONTROL TEAM To explain what happened during that 60 hour period--we tried to give Blue the picture that Red wanted presented That is there were no Soviet mass movements to the combat area thus Blue did not have any logical targets to hit We tried to get them to take some action· for a couple of hours We used a two-phase scenario projection In the first phase Blue was told that Soviet forces had paused that there were no indications of unit 1 1eplacements but there were signs the Soviets were rein forcing the divisions in Iran through infiltration and ·W' ere moving some forces into Irag Blue was also told of the Soviet worldwide propaganda campaign - -··tfe· moved Blue into the second phase of the Red plan i e _the resumption of the Soviet conventional attack when as lunch time approached·Blue had not yet reached any decision on a follow-on attack When Blue received the message indicating the soviet conventional attack had resumed and an airborne assault had been launched on Teheran they _ - - n1 ade the decision to conduct the second nuclear attack · ' - i · thi jf' J i _ IU D TEA M We did not throw away t li e airborne division -t J tt ft J 'f Y any means In our minds the reinforcements that would J1b11 _ Y t ' J 1ave been made before the Soviets ever entered Iran had '1- f ' f ' U Jt J ee maqe We didn't think we had to spell that out ··' • - · erefore we expected that the air head which we estab- i f1 '· r - · we# •i it th t tbitn o n a e t e w would have had air superiority We could have presented our plan a little more clearly Probably what would have occurred was that we would have reconstituted our forces an initiated an attack from east of the Caspian Sea and 9'0t some momentum going until we were within a feasible t t t Ji nk-up di stance of the Teheran air field Then timed our iJ ri 1 -· _ f i t-·_ _ · '· -- · · _ _ DECLASSIFIED · · ·· '· NOV 1 7 2009 _ - - Au hority EO 12958 as amended · ' 1ef DoD Of of Security Review o-19 ' t t t i i - j • • · ' ' -'if ' •°i'9¥l 3 '· · airborne operation to take place so that a link-up feasibly could have been achieved We would at the same time try to avoid using such massive forces that we would automatically ask for ·reinitiation of nuclear attack So it was a balanced proposition RED TEAM Probably that was the crucial point in the Red Team's actions If we had had -a three or four man group sitting behind us we would have said Look this is what we want to d o Lay it oµt time it give us distance factors movement factors tell us what we can achieve against the Iranian elements while moving in the nuclear mode in other words a·dispersed mode as opposed to a-conventional mode Tell-us at what point time we_can intro---- --- ·'·' ·'· '··· ''·'g _µce the assault elements of one airborne di vision or two airborne divisions or one division than the other in order to make the attack work • '· j -· ·-' CONTROL TEAM It has been alluded that a tit-for-tat · ·exchange is not characteristic of Soviet actions Did Blue i' - ' ••• · g - · ·iii-' rceive -ji JI r J e-sp ns e that their actio l S would g_e·t a n1uch larger Soviet TEAM We were mixed on that Some of us felt that qere targets within the Soviet Union that we could hit w i th9ut_initiating a nuclear response Generally the per·_ _ _ y · s c $ption on the Blue Team was ·that the soviets coµld respond · · - i n one of four ways First they could stop We didn't think that was very likely since Soviet forces were commmitted in Iran Second they could continue to use conventional ' •· weap'ons third they could respond in kind and fourth t hey tftf '· f t¥ f T _1 · ··- SLUE _ · · • - 'there · - could respond massively However there is no way to really · now· precisely how they would have responded CoNTROL TEAM It is interesting to note that one of the - ea ·contingencies in Move III was that i f yo-u did hit one of the Soviet's homeland sites they would swallow it · · - BLUE TEAM The Soviets d id in fact escalate and I wonder whether this was considered bv the Red Team when they fi11 ally launched their nuclear attack It was pointed out that there were certain advantages to the Sovi t side • because 'there were us overseas t ases _with no comparable J §lviet facilities On the other hand Red used Soviet based - 'ct t if•'i f · weapons--was there any concern that you were leaving yourself fi fr1 j1tii ' · · - ' · _' DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 EO 12958 as amended --- Chlet DoD Ofc of Security Review · c - - - · · - l JJJh rity - - - ' o- 2 o · •• i ' · open for retaliation by using weapons based on home territory which we on Blue studiously avoided during 1oves I and II RED TEAM We didn't think about that much for a fairly simple reason by accident of nature we didn't have anything else I don't think the question of whether it would inhibit Soviet actions really came up for active discussion We thought about it from your point of view • We very early on recognized that the best way to keep a nuclear attack off our forces was not by force of arms but by presenting you with a politically difficult situation and at the same time a minimum military target We d id not believe you would shrink from using at least bombers · CONFERENCE DIRECTOR I notice the time is about up ·we have had a good exchange and a lot of good points have · i _t J ' --· p een ma de yet there is a lot to learn--perhaps these exer r rt - l • ' c1ses will aid in that task Thanks once again • 1 t r i - - • · · ·- · Itttf · t lt p - · -·i t r i · J · · DECLASSIFIED NOV 1 7 2009 · · - ·' ·- · · ' · · Authority EO 12958 as amended Chief OoD Ofc of Security Review - · ' · · · Jb ' 1@ r ifJ-q H ·IJ it f 1 1i i i - _ -1--· · - 1 • • c • • •• · · ·· •_ 0-21 - 0 V -I 0 - a C -z --f 0 • - - -'• ' '• · · _ - ' •· - - · ·· • · i ' · ·• ' · •• - UNCLASSIFIED _ g •l-l ' · DISTRIBUTION Department of State 4 Department of Defense 4 Central Intelligence Agency 4 Nation al Security Agency 3 ·Defense Intelligence Agency 3 Defense Nuclear Agency 3 'fr - •• • ' •• chfef of Staff us Army 4 Chief of Naval Operations 3 Cllief of Staff us Air Force 3 ·• · • 1 · • t fr • -1 - • ' I '· ·i ·- i C6nunandant of the Marine Corps rriW1 iI ·· ' ii tm n· Joint Chiefs of Staff • ·· i s_sistant to the Chairman JCS · ·· ' Dir ctor Joint Staff Secretary of the Joint Staff Pirector J-3 5 3 5 and Gaming Agency ¢e ne tal Purpose· Forces Di vision SAGA Sfrategic Forces Division SAGA · m Hlinical Support Division SAGA lned to be Unclassified Reviewed Chief DoD OSR - OJtet Nov 7 1 oo f JAW BO 12958 Sectfon 3 5 ' ·· P-J 1 1 l 1 UNCLASSIFIED 1 - 4 • • •• J F e 1 1Rf · · · oF oeFENse Rour1MG sL1P - C ' d ' ' ADV INFO ACT COPY COPY TO TO JI ADV SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ASD Telecommunleatio DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GENERAL COUNSEL THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT ASST TO SEC DEF SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ATSD Atomic EnetlJY SECRETARY OF THE NAVY ATSO LclJIBIBlive af alrll SECRETARY OF THE AIR F'ORCE DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY CIR OF DEF RESEARCH a ENGINEERING INFO ACT COPY COPY TO TO TO a OEP SEC DEF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ASO Comprrotler DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY DASO Admlniallation DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY tT D 1-leellh and Environment DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY AS0 lnte llilJance •c · _ • ••• NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY · ' · ' · · • SD Interl tional Security Affairs • • · · • ·' ·_ · · · - D- npowcrand Reserve Allaltlf j i j j ' 4 f ablii ftmira i f t- -' t ii 1 Id ·•· · ·· J ACTION REQUIRED ' J' REP 0 F REPLY FOR SEC OF DEF SIGNATURE INFORMATION AND RETENTION ---------J-- --------------------1 PREP OF Rt PL Y FOR DEP SEC OF DEF SIGNATURE - R EfFV_ °IRECT Fwd cy ot reply fa Sec of Del records COMMENTS AND OR RECOMMENDATION COORDINATE REF'LY WITH t -- -' wf ----------------1-- ---------------------t · ° '' p RO IA TE - t ACTION · · Page detennined to be Unclassified · ReviewedChie DoDOSR · · Date Nov 7 aoC q IAW EO 12958 Section 3 51 ' itf i' - -------------- J 0 AC I NOT LATER ROUTING DA TE THAN OSD CONTROL NUMBER _ uQ f · 1 · - ' •0 ADVANCE ACTION COPY PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE Q Lt 7· INFORMATION COPY -l- i·· -- • ' _ J U 1 ' _- _ _ V •' 11 · '··· - I • • • • 'I - • • 1 _• i r _'_ - •i • ET - • 2 i a tl cihed · - 11 • - i • I - 1_·· COHROL UMBER S E 11 T inforn ation contain • tl • ta the • ecurity •• pect of which 11 para ount and unautho1- hed d·hc 1o• ure af which would cause EXC PTIONAL ORA ' ANGER TO THE NATJC Special care in the handlina t·u •• tor'y and • tor • we or the attached l nrorm• tion must b exerei • ed in • ccot lance with the • eeurity re1ulation1 Thit eover sheet i • NOT A RF cEIPT but • reco rd c f rton• who have read • JI or any part of the document • icli n- tifled by number above E • eh per • on nceivlntt the attech•d TOP SECRET informetion shat 1- sign and fi 11 in the information rf'qulred below DATE O CE I •E IIHH5EO R Nl S ln Jlcara orti•n• •1td •1 el IQav •nt• r•••IJ 2 ··- ' if r r· ·•o • ·•·· 1 ' • •· •·_ l _ -'_ _ _____________ fi · i ' - -_ - f- ------ ------- -------------•----------•-1 Ill ' l'tl ' O ' ··• · •'h ·•J -_ 1--------------------- --------I------- ---------------------·- '• a -------------------------1---------1------- --------------------·----1 ' -1-- Rt f9 l' _$4 t -•1 fi PIIEVIOVS EDITIONS OF THIS FOl ol ARE OBSOLETE • ·• • - • - · r -- · r - • · - r ' '°·5 ' -·