No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-31-62-4-2-3 MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL TOP SECRE' r CQD E WORD October 20 1977 - MEMORANDUM FOR Z SKI TINGTON c-- I- y ' FROM SAMUEL P SUBJECT Principal Findings and Political hnplications ' of Inter agency Study of Soviet Civil Defense _J- Y C 'C 1 The interagency intelligence memorandum on Soviet civil defense now exists in a final draft of some 350 pages It will be reviewed by the NFIB on November 1 The report reflects a general interagency consensus on key points except for the State Department which takes a more relaxed view of the Soviet program 2 The key findings of the report are sumznarized in the attached statement the gist of which you may wish to convey to the President Deepite its high codeword classification the report is bound to be leaked to the press and to become a focus of controversy Indeed the process has already started as the attached story by Henry Bradsher indicates Both the alarmists and the relaxers on this issue will £ind material in the report to support their position The conclusions of the report about the meaning of the Soviet program to the Soviets tend to support the relaxedi' view which Bradsher articulates On the other hand alarm could well be aroused by some of the findings oft he report to wit 3 1 The Soviets have blast shelters for -- all their top leadership about 110 000 people -- about 10 to 20% of their urban population 2 In three days the Soviets could evacuate the bulk of their urban population and reduce their fatalities in a nuclear exchange to less than 20 000 000 and their total casualties to less than 50 000 000 3 In 7 days the Soviets could fully evacuate their major cities and reduce their fatalities to less than 10 000 000 and their total casualties to less than Z0 000 000 TOP SECRET CODEWORD XGDS B t State Dept review completed No Ob'ection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-31-62-4-2-3 I No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-31-62-4-2-3 TOP SECRET CODEWORD 2 4 The Soviets have 117 000 full-time civil defen se workers 5 The Soviet civil defense program costs about 400 million rubles a year or about $2 billion if it were to be duplicated in the US compared to less than $100 million a year in current US programs 1 These findings once they become known will become grist for those alarmed about Soviet capabilities and intentions Inevitably they will have an impact on the SALT debate in this country Given the almost total lack of a meaningful US civil defense program these findings will clearly generate demands that we do something in this area PRM- 32 was launched just in time cc David Aaron TOP SECRET CODEWORD XGDS No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-31-62-4-2-3 No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-31-62-4-2-3 TOP SEGRE T CODEWORD Smnmary of Major Finp ings of Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE OBJECTIVES PAGE AND lqFFECTIVENESS 1 The Soviet civil defense program focuses primarily on the protection of people leadership essential workers general population in that order Other goals are the maintenance of the economic activity in wartime and post-attack recovery Z• The pace of program increased substantially in the late 1960s 3 A publicly recognized highly-structured military-controlled civil defense organization exists at all levels of the Soviet government and economy headed up by a national organization led by a General of the Army and Deputy Minister of Defense There are about 117 000 full-time Soviet civil defense workers 4 The 1976 costs of the program are estimated at about 400 000 000 rubles If the Soviet program were to be duplicated in the US it would cost about $Z billion 5 Programs for the protection of leadership are well-advanced The Soviets have command post shelter space for virtually all leadership elements at all levels about 110 000 people 6 A minimum of 10 to ZO percent of the total urban population can presently be sheltered Assuming the continuation of current programs 15 to 30% of the urban population would be sheltered by 1985 7 Despite shelter construction large-scale evacuation from target areas is the key to reduced casulaties Two to three days would be required to evacuate the bulk of the urban population and a week to evacuate fully the major cities 8 While any projections are very uncertain it is estimated that a US attack with 2 200 weapons directed at economic targets would produce the following results TOP SECRET CODEWORD XGDS B 3 No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-31-62-4-2-3 'l''fl·I No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-31-62-4-2-3 2 TOPSEGRET CODEWORD Time £or Preparation Fatalities Total Casualties Less than 2 hours 50-70 000 000 120 000 000 Less t n 24 hours Over 50 000 000 Over 100 000 000 2-3 days 15-20 000 000 50 000 000 Over 7 days 5-10 000 000 20 000 000 9 The Soviets cannot prevent massive industrial damage a breakdown o f their economy and the destruction of their most significant material acci mplishments 10 The Soviets have a favorable view of their civil defense organization They almost certainly believe that their present civil defense system would improve their ability to conduct military operations and enhance the USSR' s chance of survival following a nuclear exchange Given all the uncertainties involved in a nuclear exchange they cannot however have confidence in the degree 0£ protection their civil defense will provide them Hence their current civil defenses will not embolden them deliberately to expose the USSR to a higbe r risk of nuclear attack 11 There is no reason now to believe that their judgments on the matters in Paragraph 10 will change in the foreseeable future TOP SECRET CODEWORD XGDS B 3 No Objection To Declassification 2008 04 30 NLC-31-62-4-2-3