779 UUCUSS fIEil THE WHITE HOUSE s I 1 id T I l'J J Q WASHINGTON February 18 1977 Presidential Review Memorandum NSC-10 TO The Vice President The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense ALSO The Director Office of Management and Budget The Director Arma Control and Disarmament Agency The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence The U S Representative to the United Nations SUBJECT Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review U I hereby direct that a comprehensive examination be made of overall U S national strategy and capabilities This examination will consist of two parts to be done co ncurrently One part of the examination will be conducted by the Policy Review Committee under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Defen e It will define a wide range of alternative military strategies and construct alt ' ·native military force postures and programs ' support each of the e military strategies Among other topics th' s segment will consider military force levels technological developments with regard to new weaponry alternatives to our reliance on foreign bases dete rence at reciprocally owe red strategic eve viability and desua u uity of the triad posture This portion should also evaluate the relative ability of the U S and its allies to achieve U S objectives in specified military contingencies It will identify the key issues for Presidential decisions including the budgetary implications of each of these postures The other part will be a dynamic net assessment conducted by the Special Coo rdinatiori Committee under the chairmanship of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs It will consist of review and comparison of the overall trends in the political diplomatic economic technological and military capabilities of the United States its allies and potential ii Sft ' P i lUE B 2 adversaries It will evaluate the objectives and national strategies that may be pursued by our principal potential adversaries and examine the alternative national objectives and strategies appropriate to the United States This two-part analysis should identify for Presidential decisions alternative national strategies and the major defense programs and other initiatives required to implement them The two parts should be carefully coordinated with one another In %4er to achieve this I have directed the Assistant to the President National Security Affairs to develop additionally more detailed terms of reference for this analysis These terms of reference will be presented for my review by February 24 I also want interim reports to allow further guidance as the study progresses A summary of the entire report not to exceed 70 pages should be submitted for NSC consideration not later than June 1 1977 the final version should be completed by June 15 1977 'JNCLASSIFIEC • MSECRft · THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 0 C 2030t HEHORANDUH FDR THE SECRETARY OF STATE DIRECTOR OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS DI RECTOR ARH S CONTROL AND DI SARHAHENT AGENCY CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SUBJECT · PRM-10 Force Posture Study C The PRM NSC Force Posture Study has served a useful purpose in focusing attention on the value of developing a strategy to guide the evolution of our milit ry forces for the next decade and in raising a · mber of key mi I itary strategy issues I do not think the study prov d s the basis for a selection of an overall integrated military strategy at this time None of the notional AIMS is completely satisfactory Instead I see the study as the first step in a process of refining our strategy choices and of eliciting initial Presidential policy guidance on key military strategy issues The President's guidance needs to in•ure our flexibility pending the definition of an overall US national strategy The importance of the choices ahead of us the size of the investments involved and the possible consequences of misjudging the Soviets all warrant that we do nothing now to foreclose our ability largely to determine the nature of our long-term competition with the USSR rather than to react to their initiatives in a context set by them The PRH-10 study and the Presidential guidance which follows will provide a framework for my review within DoD of specific program and budget issues Establishment of guidance on military strategy issues will also provide one of the bases for the conduct of our foreign policy our arms control negoiiations and priorities for our intelligence efforts This study does not provide a sufficient basis for specific decisions on US military force structures or force planning With this in mind I attach an Agenda defining Issues for Discussion for the two PRC meetings on the Force Posture Study UNCLASSIFIE -18P- SESRU ••s _c_r_e_t_a_r y_ f J ti f ti 'l ll ••••••• • _ _ _ ••• SUSJECT TO AL D -CU f--CATION SCH OULE OF EXECUTIVE O -TOr l TICALLY OOWNCRADCD AT --AR INTERVALS DEC il-1 ci l ON l Dec JSB ASSI k ' w· o l Uron rt noval of t ar attachmenh document I• downiraded to ltli1 SECRET ······-···--------···-----···· i l- _ l -·i______ •• _ UNCLASSIFIED 2 I would like the first meeting on S July to cover the first four sections of the Agenda I e the AIMS and general purpose forces issues The second meeting on 13 July will address the AIMS and strategic forces Issues I attach as TAB A of the Final Report an analysis prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Ml 1 itary lmpl ications of the AIMS This analysis evaluates the AIMS on the basis of the objectives spelled out In the Defense Guidance · Enclosure - --•· __ - - ' UNCLASSIFIEC UNCLASSIFIEr 1- - t· ·- _ I tr AGENDA PRC MEETINGS ON PRM NSC-1O MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORCE POSTURE REVIEW Issues for Discussion I USMilitar Section IV • · Quest ions 1 and 2 How should the US deal with the threat of Soviet aggression In particular what should be the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces for deterrence and defense What should be US military strategy in Europe to 1 deter a Warsaw Pact attack or intimidation and 2 to terminate conflict successfully if deterrence fails For deterrence Is it necessary to plan mi 1itary capability to restore the original borders or only to blunt an initial Warsaw Pact conventional attack Is it necessary to have a military sustaining capability greater than that of the Warsaw Pact If deterrence fails what conventional military capability is required To what extent should the US rely on the early first use of nuclear weapons • 1I To what extent should the US for political or military purposes state objectives for security in Europe which are inconsistent with the interpretation or implementation of NATO strategy by other members of the Alliance Specifically does it make sense for the US to plan military capabilities in excess of those of our NATO Al 1 ies Outside Euro e in Relation to US-Euro ean Key Questions 1 and 3 UNCLASSIFIED - - UNCLASSIFIEC 2 I I I • To what extent should the US acquire military capabilities above those required for the European theater to undertake military operations either offensive or defensive against the Soviets In a US-USSR war • What should be US military strategy toward China US Hi 1i tar Loca 1 Wars • Crisis Hana ement and Potential What should be the planned extent of US military forces and supplies available - for crisis management or intervention In local wars · To what extent should these forces or supplies be available without drawing from those required for a major US-USSR war In what Individual reaions of the world should the US plan for the use of US military forces in crises and potential local wars Middle East Korea Are there any regions where the US should plan for the use of land combat forces IV US Military Strategy for East Asia Key Question 5 • V What should be the US military strategy ln East Asia Should the US maintain the current military presence or include additional adjustments in US forces in Korea and the Philippines US Military Strategy for Strategic Forces Key Question 6 • To what extent should the US procure nuclear forces above and beyond those required to achieve other US -objectives In order to respond to US-Soviet force asymmetries What serious options should the President consider 'ihat should be the trend in US strategic forces a to stay ahead or equal In major indices of strategic power or b to deemphasize the importance of advantages in the major indices of st ra teg i c power • What kind and level of retaliatory capability is necessary for deterrence of Soviet conventional and nuclear aggression • To what extent should the US acquire an efficient hard-ta rget-k i 11 capab i 1 i ty and for what purposes 7 --· • 1 - 1 'JNCLASSIFIEC 'JNCLASSIFIED stCRET3 • Should the US acquire forces for a Strategic Reserve Force i e forces in excess of other requirements or for protracted withholding in a strategic nuclear war • What should be the relationship between the choice of a Strategic Force substrategy and the other components of an overall US military strategy What difference does it make for a US nuclear strategy whether the US chooses a limit-loss strategy In Europe or_ something else chooses a strategy requiring an increase or reducti n i forces outside Europe etc UNCLASSIFIEC ' UNCLASSIFIED -lQPSECREt • PRM NSC-10 MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORCE POSTURE REVIEW FINAL REPORT COPY c -a OF '2 SCJ COPIES · rom DECLASSIFICATION DOWN UNCLASSIFIEp TOPSECR •f'v oi-l C t 1L UNCLASSIFlEO - SEtRET PRH NSC· 10 MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORCE POSTURE REVIEW FINAL REPORT • TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I INTRO DUCT I ON 1-1 A Purpose 1-1 B Assumptions 1-2 c o Major Issues 1-2 Limitations of the Report 1-3 E Organization of the Report I- II CURRENT CAPABILITIES A Purpose and Cautions 11-1 B US-USSR Worldwide Conflict 11-2 Central Europe 11-2 NATO Flanks II- Non-European Operations II- US-USSR Nuclear Conflict 11-5 Other Contingencies 11-6 Middle East 11-6 Sub-Saharan Africa 11-7 Korea 11-8 C iECREt -rortrtDE- ftM - I ALTERNATIVE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRATEGIES AIHS • A Introduction 111-1 B Methodology 111-1 C Content of AIHS 111-2 D Forc es to Support AIMS 111-7 General Purpose Forc es 111-7 Strategic Forc es 111-12 E Costs of AIMS 111-18 F Comparison Overview 111-22 G Comparison of AIMS • H I Dimensions 111-22 Deterrence and the Nuclear Dimension 111-22 The NATO-Warsaw Pac t Dimension 111-23 Non-European Dimensions 111-25 Comparison of AIMS 111-27 lmpllc atlons Soviet Reac tlons 111-27 Foreign Policy lmpllc atlons 111-28 Arms Control Imp ic atlons 111-32 Flsc al Imp lc atlons 11 l-3li Domestic lmpllc atlons 111-i 2 Comparison of AIHS Non-Hllltary Implementation 111-i 2 Initiatives IV EVALUATION OF AIMS A lntroduc tlon IV-1 B Question One IV-2 C Question Two IV-7 D Question Three IV-10 E Question Four IV-15 F Question Five IV•20 G Question Six £QNf NTIAL I V·21i UNCLASSIFlEr EXECUTIVE SUHHARY Purpose The purpose of the PRH-1O Force Postures Study Is to elicit policy guidance from the President on key Issues pertaining to national military strategy The scope of this study ls Intentionally broad It partakes of al 1 but exhausts none of the numerous topics and factors which enter Into the determination of national military strategy It Is designed to provide a solid basis for further detailed work on defense force structure and program Issues using either the lntergency process or the normal PPBS decision process as appropriate AJproach In order to develop alternative Integrated military st• tegirs AIMS Substrategy building blocks were constructed to Identify a range of options In each of five analytical areas 1 NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict In Europe Including the NATO Flanks and the North Atlantic 2 Operations outside Europe during a NATO-WP war 3 East Asia 4 Peacekeeping activities and potential local wars 5 US-USSR nuclear conflict The major Issues in each analytical area or conflict category were isolated Then using this building block technique the substrategies shown below were developed to focus on what the US should achieve as well as the threats to that achievement Summary of Substrategies UTO-WP Ol'IU TIC I DURING 11 lUlOP A NATO-WP WAI WT ASIA PUC uu i MG ACTl't'ITIII AND POTIWTIAI LOCAL WU S OIHCT DUllf11 INITIATIVU IIIClU SlO PMSEIICI NlA'IY INTUVDIT 1011 LIMIT LOH L IIIIUD ACTION CUWWT -•lUlliOPIM US•U'SH IUCLEAI COIIIFlltT COUIITllOFflNS l't'I ILJJTIC Tlll'VIU TIIP'Vlll uct Lie NT INT AV WTIC UTAIN us oact MVMTAG ts AlDUtlD PU SEJICI MIIITAII O't'U ALL JIICIIPIU WITIIDUW ASS U Al TA IATIOM POMl IN Alltl PIG1' ML IMC v _ UNCLASSIFIEC - ffMJ -· A1ternattve Integrated Military Strategies AIMS were formulated from the analytical area substrategfes by excluding unworkable combinations of substrategles Eight final AIMS were selected for detailed evaluation In tenns of their ml1ltary economic polltlc1t both In technical and domestic and arms control Implications Each AIMS addresses In a different way the major mil ftary Issues facing the United States The range of AIMS Is Intentionally broad so that they will provide a comprehensive analytical framework for evaluation of the major elements of defense policy The cCOlposltlon of the eight final AIMS In terms of their analytical area substrategles Is shown In the table below il TUU Tlyt tllTfU AfUII IIILITUY UI ATtCIU Uld u oM • Lh•lt 1 ou e14 H 1 i i 1 1on tM IOI ti ll111r•Udo ' • ' ' ' r ro rft os0- 1 uu• t Ll•lto4 Actlo a u ru• u llaltU ActlOft lll1l11Col o _ 1 i l to•U hl u U • ltd A cl• t11rr1111 u Lltht l11U tl• IU1111 Ul Foru a 1t1111 C• tl'Wlt tlt MA IIIO l•tlr ftl lo i lloh1ttlt1 0 rtl L Ll • lt ii 1n1_ C rr at · _ llfl'I lllllh91111• lac II UI fo c a U • lte4 lltl• a tll tt4 ' 'A ll•lld Alli_ 11111111 0 1 I _u u 11 1 -i C11r _1 ••- '' ' 1111 110 0 IUtlfl VI h11e 11tl- IU11td 11111• • to o 'llet 111 h r - AIJtS t I 11 -'JD••·· HUI l _ltl 11 ty rC'hrl t ll•lt Lou • e ••• 5Df'lfl Ii fore t u w 1 u l Q 41•1•1• ttl U U 'tU-i HII lnttl wltlllty • ff U O tt lN lluor i 11 i 11 1 0 41 tl'l -tt • O•Hr lltltolll ellllr I lltHI Oilf u • • • • 1 0 • l•ltlnlwu - _t N D l•ltltlh•t lloCr 4 lt •• lu llltr • - Otfuttl AUMIII PIM II tlttCk ••t - II• lleS 1111 111 Mfltrtl lotl• 1l111t a IJO- 41rh• 11 u ' '' '' ''· 111111 l t-' I lty IMt _IIDf'I • Each of these strategies has • specific rationale for linking bul lding blocks Into coherent AIMS as surm arlzed below --iECREl 2 r u 1 •• iJNCLASS FIEC §EGtEl· AIHS E - This AIHS ls based on the premise that US objectives can be achieved with somewhat reduced reliance on military force but the US still would retain the capability to wage a major conventional war of short duration with the USSR US strategic nuclear capabilities would be somewhat reduced not all US advantages would be maintained nor would en extensive efficient herd-target kill capability be pursued The nuclear threshold would be about the same as it is currently In conjunction with NATO Allies the US would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days A defense which stabilizes along the Weser-Lech line yields to Pact forces about a quarter to a third of the FRG territory east of th• Rhine River In addition the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide In the event of European war A reduced presence ir East Asia no US forces In Korea or the Phil pines would reduce the potential for certain regional Involvements and would reduce but not negate the US ability to Influence great power relationships there Other global Interests would be advanced primarily by diplomatic and economic efforts and any limited military Intervention 1 ould require drawing do in forces dedicated to other purposes AIHS F - This AIHS ls based on the premise that US objectives can be met through a strategy achievable by approximately the current US military forces but with a capability for sustained combat comparable to that of our NATO Allies US nuclear capabilities would be somewhat enhanced all present US advantages in strategic nuclear force balance Indices would be retained with the expectation of a hard-target kill capability against all Soviet silos The nuclear threshold would be about the same as it Is currently As In AIHS E the US In conjunction with NATO Allies would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pac t conventional attack et the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days thus Involving loss of NATO territory In addition the US would maintain a limited c apablllty to confront the Soviets worldwide In the event of European war In contrast to AIHS E the current prograrrrned military deployments In East Asta less land forces In Korea would be retained Other global Interests would be advanced by a moderate capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes AIHS F Variant - This AIHS Is based on the premise that US objectives can be met by a modest Increase In US military c apablllty and a substantial Increase In sustalnabl llty by our NATO All I es This strategy Is Identical to AIHS F except that In a European war sustainability ts c ornnensurate with that currently programmed for US forces -Ith a requisite Increase In sustainability by our NATO Allies In c onjunc tlon -Ith the NATO Allies the US would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a detennlned Warsaw Pac t conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 90 days still Involving loss of NATO territory Both sides ere assisned to have the c epablllty to employ additional forces In Central Europe beyond the first month of confllc t so this AIHS requires more forces than AIHS F AIHS F·Varlant requires forces et least comparable to those In the current US Five Year Defens Program but In excess of those currently progranmed by the NATO Allies S CRET 3 1 'l l Cl 1 1 IJNCL SSIFiEC AIMS G - This AIMS ls based on the premise that achievement of US objective$ both Inside and outside Europe would be enhanced by a stronger conventional military capability outside Europe US strategic nuclear capabilities would be somewhat reduced not all US advantages would be maintained nor would an extensive efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued The nuclear threshold In Europe however might be raised because of the enhanced conventional capabilities outside Europe As in AIMS E and F the US In conjunction with NATO Allies would have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River 1lne for about 30 days thus Involving loss of NATO territory Contrary to previous AIMS however the US would maintain naval and air forces capable of taking conventional initiatives outside of Europe against the USSR In East Asia approximalely the current prograrnned mil ltary deploymenn ---H -ss iland forces In Korea--would be retained Other global Interests wourJ be secured by a significant capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes This Intervention capability would bt capable of direct confrontation with Sovlet·forces If necessary AIMS H - This AIMS Is based on the premise that support of US objectives requires a raising of the AATO nuclear threshold through a stronger conventional defense while reduced reliance on military force ls possible elsewhere This raised threshold Is assumed to permit a slight reduction of US nuclear capabilities not all US advantages would be maintained nor would an extensive efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued In Europe and in conjunction with NATO Allies the US would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days In addition the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide In the event of European war A reduced presence in East Asia no US forces In Korea or the Philippines would reduce the potential for certain regional Involvements and would reduce but not negate the US ability to Influence great power relationships there Other global Interests would be advanced primarily by diplomatic and economic efforts and any limited military Intervention would require drawing down forces dedicated to other purposes AIMS l - Th ls AIMS Is based on the premise that support of US objectives requires a raising of the NATO nuclear threshold through a stronger conventional defense whl le maintaining approximately current capabilities outside Europe The raised nuclear threshold would be accompanied by a slight Increase In the current strategic nuclear levels All present US strategic advantages would be retained with assurance of a hard-target kill capability against all Soviet s llos As In AIKS H the US In conjunction with NATO Allies would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack In Europe and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days Two excursions to size US war reserve stocks for 180 days •nd for an 5iCREl M - UNCLASSIFIED 1 4 UNCLASSlFiED indefinite time but without change to combat forces during those periods were evaluated In addition the US would ll'l llntaln 1 1 imlted air and naval capability to confront the Soviets worldwide In the event of European war In contrast to AIHS H essentially the current programmed military deployments In East Asla--less land forces In Korea--would be retained O her global Interests would be advanced by a moderate capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes AIHS J - This AIHS Is based on the premise that decreased levels of strategic nuclear forces are desirable A significant and sustainable conventional military capability permits such decreased nuclear dependence Thus US nuclear capabilities would be reduced to the level of assured retaliation only--the capability to substantially destroy Sovl t economic and leadership resources--and minimal counter-military capability would be provided with no attempt made to match or offset strategic force asymmetries In the Soviets' favor As In AIHS Hand I the US In conjunction with MATO Allies would have the conventional capabl ilty to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack In Europe and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days US war reserve stocks however would be sized to provide for Indefinite combat to avoid NATO's having to resort to nuclear weapons should the Pact be able to sustain the conflict beyond 90 days Contrary to AIHS Hand I the US would maintain naval and air forces capable of taking conventional Initiatives outside Europe against the USSR which would further enhance deterrence In Europe In East Asia approximately the current progranvned military deployments--less land forces In Korea--would be retained Other global Interests would be advanced by a significant capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other pur es This Intervention capability would be capable of direct confrontation with Soviet forces If necessary AIHS H - This AIHS Is based on the premise that significant sustainable conventional power capable of responding to any Soviet conventional attack combined with clear US nuclear superiority IS required to support achievement of US objectives US nuclear capabilities and threshold would be raised to near maxl11L1m l vels US strategic capabll ltles would exceed that of the Soviets In all significant lndlces--forces modernization and options for major active defenses Such a nuclear posture would be designed to deter Soviet first use and provide political leverage Should Warsaw Pact aggression occur In Europe the US In conjunction with NATO Allies would defend In Central Europe while the US would Initiate an attack against less heavily defended Warsaw Pact territory on the flanks to secure negotiating leYerage Major conventional capability Is also maintained elsewhere to assure fulfillment of US global Interests with a high probability of success This would call for an Increased military presence In East Asia and a major Intervention capability ln other regions UNCLASSIFIED aiREl _ 5 • I IIIJf I L 1 11 r•• • • ' • StCREJ - J ' ·sEOR T FIV YEfi 1 COSTS rY7J-03 TOA FY7G GUD3ET $B COSTS 1000 17A REPRESErJTS £L d RA JGE 900 BOO - 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 E F FIVl G H AIMS UNCLASSIFIEC 7 S E-fi t I J M FYDP SEGnET UNC'LA c -i • r ' lt - JNCLASSl Fl EC £EERET Assumptions The study ls based on six fundamental assumptions as to US poi Icy and the International environment If these assumptions are not valid a reappraisal of these AIMS would be required The major assumptions are 1 The Soviet Union will continue to pose the primary threat to the physical security of the United States and to US interests worldwide • 2 The United States will continue to view the security of Europe as a vital Interest and will continue to participate actively In the defense of NATO which ls threatened by the Warsaw Pact 3 The United States will continue to regard aggression against lapan as a threat to vital Interests 4 · The PRC and the Soviets will not effect a rapprochement sufficient to allow significant reduction In forces oriented towards each other 5 So long as Sino-Soviet hostility persists the US will not need to procure specific conventional forces to counter a PRC military threat 6 In an interdependent environment the US will continue to have major global Interests Limitations The study has several limitations some intentional others due to constraints on time or Information --lt is not based on overall US national objectives because no agreed set of national objectives exists --It does not evaluate the Soviet threat best available national intelligence on the threat was used ln estimating force postures and evaluating the alternative strategies --lt does not study manpower or industrial mobilization preparedness --It does not address specifically theater nuclear forces Issues Current Capabilities An analysis of the capability of the FY1978 force structure was accomplished for a worldwide war with the Soviet Union and also for sorre lower level contingencies JNCt ASS FlED 8 CR T IJNCLASSiFiEC REt- ··In Central Europe the chance of NATO stopping a Warsaw Pact attack with minimal loss of territory and then achieving Its full objec· tlve of recovering that land which had been lost appears remote at the present time It ls also considered unlikely that the Warsaw Pact would achieve Its full objective· of defeating NATO forces In Central Europe and reaching the French border and North Sea Coast ·•If NATO·could stabilize a defensive line In Central Europe the flanks could probably be defended though not without some loss of territory The establishment of a full NATO air and ASW barrier In the Greenland·lceland·Unlted Kingdom Gap would probably result In significant attrition over time of Soviet forces attempting to Interdict the North Atlantic SLOC The naval campaign on the Southern Flank would depend Initially on the ability of the Allied forces to absorb the Initial Pact attack but It is judged eventually to result In Allied control of the Hedi terranean ··The overall ability of US and Allied forces to prevail against Soviet forces outside of Europe ls uncertain -·The results of a major nuclear exchan e between the United States and the Soviet Union are that both nations would suffer very high levels of damage and neither could conceivably be described as a ''winner Further there is no decisive advantage to either side In terms of residual resources Today this ls true regardless of who strikes first or whether the attack ls a surprise or occurs after a period of warning With some slight variations It ls true regardless of the targeting policy adopted by either side In the three cases examined In the analysts the US suffers at least 140 million fatalities and the Soviet Union suffers at least 113 million fatalities Both the US nd the USSR would Incur over 70% destruction to economic recovery resources Examination of three lower level contingencies reveal the following ··The US would likely prevail against the Soviets If the two powers fought one·on•one In the Middle East ··The US would have substantial advantage over the Soviet Union In the deployment of combat forces to sub-Saharan Africa ··If the North Koreans were to obtain tactical surprise In a major attack on South Korea It Is possible that they could at least temporarily attain their most likely major objectlve•·the capture of Seoul However the North Koreans would probably not be able to gain and sustain major breakthroughs or wear down the ROK In sustained combat With US contributions In tactical air and materiel support the US and ROK would prevail against North Korea In the longer term iJNCLASS HED 9 tOP SECRET- - ·cLA'·' IJ • • L i lt • - 11 lC'-' Key Questions for Presidential Consideration Six key questions for Presidential consideration are discussed In the context of the AIMS The Intent ts to Illuminate the various aspects of each question rather than provide a single right answer The questions are Interrelated and should be addressed completely before final judgments are rendered on any of them UNCLASS FIEC ' 10 111ir'1 v • r • p ' ' ·' SECRET Q UESTION ONE Q uestlon How should the US deal with the threat of Soviet aggression In particular what should be the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces for deterrence and defense If deterrence falls to what extent should the VS rely on the early use of nuclear weapons Discussion The major threat to US Interests and security is posed by Soviet power worldwide A US national military strategy must address · the need to deter a US-USSR war and the ability to wage war in such a way as to terminate conflict on conditions acceptable to the US Europe because It Is where the US and USSR have substantial interests and confront each other militarily is the area of principal military concern Thus whl le any US strategy to deal w ti the threat of Soviet aggression must be worldwide in scope It is appropriate to focus the military elements of the US national strategy on Europe For illustrative purposes it is analytically useful to group the AIMS described in Section Ill into three broad categories Al HS E F G In AIMS E F G Group One deterrence is based on both conventional and nuclear forces which are designed to make the costs of military aggression outweigh potential gains NATO conventional forces to resist a Soviet attack are planned to deny the Soviets the prospects of a quick inexpensive low risk victory They are not planned to deny the Soviets territorial gain While Warsaw Pact susiainabiU ty and short term mobilization capabilities may exceed NATO's in conventional conflict with NATO destruction of a significant element of Soviet military power would occur The conventional forces through their ability to engage in high intensity combat would also Increase the credibility of a US NATO nuclear response While the Soviets might hope that the mutual hostage effect the US-USSR strategic systems would make an American use of nuclear weapons in Europe unlikely they could not be c rtain Moreover Soviet planners would have to consider British and French nuclear systems Finally deterrence is enhanced by the·fact that the Soviets must consider their relationship with the Chinese and divide their finite military resources between widely separated military regions of Continuing Sino-Soviet hostility both requires the Soviets to allocate their military resources between Europe and Asia and limits the Soviet ability to directly threaten Us Interests In Asia This Sino-Soviet host II itv _permits greater relative American concentration on Europe • Warsaw Pact logistical doctrine calls for each front to maintain enough supplies for 30 days combat prescripes strategy of 2 to 3 months supply · '-'CLASSIFIED for a theater and calls for national reserves of war materiel If ammuni1 • t I on and POL storage capac I ty ar• used as an Index the Pact cou 1d have available 2 to 3 months of POL and more than two months ammunition including that stored In the western USSR Great uncertainty attaches to such stl' 'tes of Pact sustainabi 1 i ty however as they assume optimal stockage f-if T f€REJ If In spite of the considerations outl lned above conflict should occur this group of strategies does not provide at a high level of confidence the capability to defeat a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack Whether the Soviet objective of a victory within several weeks could be achieved Is uncertain The Soviets may be able to sustain combat for longer than the 30 days for which these AIMS provide If the Soviets can persist in thiir attack a US NATO conventional defeat in Ce ntral Europe Is 1 ikely In that event the US could be forced to Negotiate an end of the conflict Resort to first use of nuclear weapons Fall back from Central Europe and continue the war conventionally elsewhere The probability of NA70 obtaining a satisfactory negotiated settleme nt to European hostilltie is slim since the Soviets would be winning ml 1 ltari ly If NATO's first use of nuclear weapons rather than terminating hostil I ties provoked a Soviet nuclear response the consequences are not clear but It is doubtful that US NATO would thereby obtain a military advantage and be able to reverse the losing situation If war escalated to strategic nuclear exchange major destruction would result without any foreseeable US advantage Finally the US would find it exceedingly difficult to continue the war by conventional means since its forces would have been sized and sustained only 'for the initial battle in Central Europe and not for a protracted worldwide conventional struggle Al MS H I J In AIMS H I and J Group Two deterrence rests on the US Allied capability to repel a Soviet conventional attack without resort to nuclear weapons The 'bbjective of IIATO forces is to deter a Soviet attack through a clear conventional capability to defeat it rather than to make a convent Iona 1 victory too cost 1y for the Soviets The 0MB representative believes that because of the large unc·ertalnty In Pact sustaining capability It cannot be confidently predicted that the Pact could conduct an offensive operation longer than NATO could sustain a less militarily demanding defense The uncertain reliability of nonSoviet Pact forces which contribute over one third of the total Pact forces contributes to this Judgment The 0MB representative also believes that AIMS E F and G slgnl flcantly upgrade NATO early combat capabilities · If NATO forces succeeded in containing a Soviet attack and establishing a stable defensive line the eventual outcome is not clear UNCL o - •·• ·• 'v- • t'l•t _· SEEREiIf conflict should occur the US would have planned the capability to In Central Europe these strategies are designed to allow the US NATO to move back to the original borders after first blunting and stopping the Soviet Pact attack defeat a Soviet attack without resort to nuclear weapons Having achieved their war objectives the US NATO could then initiate negotiations for conflict termination Although the Soviets ·would not have achieved their war objectives they might choose to limit their own losses and terminate the conflict If not the US NATO would still have conventional and nuclear forces which could be used to threaten the Soviets If a period of prolonged stalemate ensued the superior economic power of the US NATO and Japan could be brought to bear AIMS M In Group Three strategies AIMS M deterrence rests on the threat of offsetting a Soviet attack in Central Europe with a capability to seize other territory supported by superior US strategic forces The' threatened response to Soviet aggression in Europe is not confined to that theater rather Soviet aggression would be countered by US military initiatives against the Soviet Union itself Should conflict occur the probability of Soviet success is remote Unlike the options available in Group Two AIMS M provides sufficient conventional and nuclear forces to obtain a military advantage over the Soviet Union US NATO possibly in cooperation with Chlna could either threaten or actually use these capabilities to force a termination of hostilities Pol Icy Tens ions The basic policy tension Is that on the one hand Group One strategies which can be supported within current defense expenditures and are consistent with the capabilities of our NATO Allies promote deterrence but lf conflict occurs probably would not provide satisfactory options for conflict termination On the other hand Group Two strategies which offer more sat sfactory options for conflict termination and lessen the probability of nuclear war would require large Increases in US and Allied defense spending and may provoke adverse Soviet Allied reactions Affordability of military forces depends on the perceptions of the US NATO as to the urgency of the situation If It were perceived that a major Soviet Pact conventional attack were Intended great expenditures for defense would be acceptable to the NATO governments At present such • perception does not exist It is not that the US and Its Allies cannot afford greatly Increased defense expenditures but rather that the perceptions of the Soviet threat do not justify radical Increases Furtherrrore while the US and NATO possess the necessary resources there is Intense domestic competition for these resources in non-defense secto s 13 UNCLASSlFIEC JNCLASS FlEC 1 sECREt The Allies desire an Amerlc an C Ol fflitment to a restoration of the status quo ante but unlike the US show 1 ittle inc linatlon to provide convent i ona 1 forc es to ac c omp l i sh suc h a goa 1 The NATO A11 i i s c urren t l y provide no more than 30 days of ammunition and supplies For them deterrenc e appears assured by us· military involvement in European sec urity affairs and the potential escalation of any conventional c onfl ic t to strategic nuc lear'war Given such views dramatic increases In c onventional forces and sustainability such as in Groups Two and Three would probably be viewed as el ther lnc onsistent with the Soviet threat or undermining ·deterrence However · if Group One AIMS were interpreted as reducing the US corrmitment to Europe this would probably provoke serious Allied c onc ern especially ii the FRG Significantly increased German r ' t•pns of vulnerability can only jeopardize the US ability to lnfluence' FRG defense polic ies inc luding German nuc lear decisions Moreover the flank allies perceiving a reduction in US support for the defense of their territorial integrity sy seek security assurance outside of NATO Groups Two and Three strattqies avoid these difficulties through the US c inmitment to res tor at ion of the status quo ante However US NATO movement to ac qui re and deploy forc es capable of first absorbing and then defeating a Soviet attack might provoke a similar Soviet counter-buildup Thus while Group Two and Three strategies might provide the basis for stable deterrenc e if the c apabi lities described in the strategies existed movement from current c apabilities towards the increased force levels might actually be destabilizing Elements of a Solution A number of ways exist to try to rec onc i le the pol ic y tensions posed by the different AIMS These approac hes are not mutually exclusive in fact the US c urrently pursues portions of a number of them In seeking resolution The US could· have as its declared strategy a restoration of the status quo but acquire forces for a more modest strategy A public NATO comm I tment to forward defense and restoration of the status quo ante would ease anxieties in the FRG even without full US or Allied funding for the nec essary forces US reassurance of European allies c onc erning US nuc lear reliability forc es the Soviets to consider the consequenc es both of a failure to achieve their objective in a timely fashion and NATO nuc lear response to a c onventlonal attack See Question Two US could ac qulre conventional forc es to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities outside the European theater AIMS G for example provides forc es speclflc ally to undertake non-European initiatives against the USSR Bec ause this AIMS also plans for heavy intervention In loc al wars additional forces could be available for initiatives These same forces if employed In Europe could provide a limited enhancement of the c onventional capability NATO possesses In Group One trategies See Question Three •• The UNCLASSIFIEC 14 UNCLASS FlEr The US could Individually· or In cooperation with NATO expand the conventional sustainability of Group One forces to delay or avoid reaching a nuclear decision point AIMS F v for example provides the US NATO with 90 days of sustainability This would not permit restoration of the status quo ante but If also attained by the Allies it might avert a conventional defeat Increased US sustainability above that provided by the All les may be useful as an example for them and to provide the US additional non-nuclear options should conflict occur The US could enhance its nuclear capabilities to Increase the deterrent value of the various groups of strategies AIMS F F v and I include strategic forces which maintain US advantages in certain Indices AIMS M seeks clear superiority in strategic forces See Question SI x The US could undertake political economic and arms control Initiatives to promote Soviet-American cooperation and thereby decrease the 1 ikel ihood that war wo•dd break out in Europe Or the US could undertake foreign policy Initiatives which seek to undermine the reliabil ity of the military contribution of the Eastern European countries to Warsaw Pact strength For example the US NATO might adopt a public TNF targeting practice which excludes either non-Soviet Pact forces not participating in attack on NATO all East European targets except Soviet military formations lnstallations and logistic support or both The US could actively seek closer security 1 inks with the PRC to force the Soviets to devote additional resources against China Such a US China pol Icy might Include military sales lntell igence sharing or other Sino-American security ties ' The US In conjunction with its NATO Allies could plan to maintain in peacetime the forces and sustaining capability needed to stabll ize a defense line In Europe and plan to create in wartime the additional forces needed to counterattack to restore the original borders This would require manpower and Industrial base mobilization plans and capabilities sufficiently responsive to generate new forces on a timely basis At pre sent we do not have such capabilities neither our manpower mobil lzation capability nor our Industrial base have been planned on this basts To estimate the cost of such a capability would require study of 1 Warsaw Pact capability to sustain its existing forces in protracted combat while simultaneously creating new forces and 2 the cost to the US and NATO of maintaining in peacetime the capability to create forces on various schedules Insufficient work has been done on such total mobilization planning in recent years to permit even gross estimates of the costs in110lved fD- 's UNCLASSIFlEC SECREJ-QUESTION NO Question To what extent should the US for political or military purposes state objectives or fund programs for security In Europe which are Inconsistent with the interpretation or Implementation of NATO 1tr1tegy by other members of the Alliance Discussion NATO's official strategy expressed In HC-14 3 calls for preserving peace and providing for the security of the NATO area by maintaining a credible deterrent effected by forces which would cause the Warsaw Pact to conclude that If they were to launch an attack the chances of a favorable outcome would be too small to be acceptable and fatal risks could be involved Should aggression occur NATO's objective would be to preserve or estore the integrity of the NATO area by emp10 ing such forces as might be necessary within the concept of forward defense NATO's response to aggression could take the ·form of Direct defense--a response In kind to deny the attacker his objective Deliberate escalation--raising the scope and intensity of combat to raise the cost and risk not solely to defeat the enemy but also to weaken his will or Ceneral nuclear response While direct defense would be NATO's first response to any aggression short of full nuclear attack NATO should always be prepared to escalate and the main deterrent to aggression is the threat of escalation As a result the strategy calls for conventional forces to be designed to deter and counter a limited non- u lear attack and to deter any larger non-nuclear attack by presenting the prospect of non-nuclear hostilities at a scale that could Involve grave risk of escalation to nuclear war Within the ambiguities of this statement the US has been able to urge Improvements in NATO's conventional capabi 11 ties and the Al 1 les have been able to rely heavily on the nuclear deterrent None of the AIHS considered in this study is completely consistent with a strict This paragraph paraphrases portions of HC-14 3 relevant to the Issue at hand ••• i 1 LAs jfFIED ' 16 £ re P T reading of the NATO strategy although the force capabilities of al 1 but AIHS H could be Interpreted as adequate to execute the strategy However certain AIHS require a level of conventional capabilities which considerably exceed those presently planned by our NATO Allies and it might be difficult to persuade the Allies to procure the capabilities needed without raising questions about strategy In AIHS E F or G the US would In essence be adjusting its planning for conflict in the European theater to correspond more closely to that of the Allies Consequently there would be no need to challenge the current acquisition policy of our tlATO Allies The small decreases In total US forces that might result ln AIHS E and F could if desired be explai d 3 a way to obtain funds for increases in capability to reinforce Europe rapidly in the early days of a war NATO's conventional capabilities would continue to be inadequate to implement the wartime objective of preserving or restoring territorial integrity against a large scale attack and first use of nuclear weapons would be unlikely to provide 6 satisfactory solution Hany of the adverse pOlitical Implications of adoption of these AIHS probably could be avoided if the US continued to publicly support HC-14 3 particularly with reference to forward defense and restoration of the status quo ante The fact that the Warsaw Pact is aware of NATO's formal strategy may be an additional reason for the strategy to espouse goals and intentions other than those which would actually govern UATO force planning in AIHS E F or G One divergence between formal NATO strategy and all the AIHS considered ln this study is the concept of accepting either temporarily or permanently a significant loss of NATO territory The amount of loss of NATO terri ory contemplated in all AlHS ls 1 ikely to be viewed by the Al 1 ies as inconsistent with the concept of forward defense Consequently regardless of the AIHS proposed there will be the question of whether to continue to subscribe to the concept of forward defense in our declaratory policy or whether to reconcile declaratory pol icy and capabi 1 ity As we presently model land warfare imp lementatlon of a defense at the West German border would require significant increases ln NATO's peacetime deplqyed forces and in their day-to-day readiness posture Such changes are unlikely to be politically acceptable given the current assessment of the likelihood of an attack In addition they might appear threatening to the Pact and thus be counterproductive Failure to address wlth our Allies the problem of reconciling strategy and capabilities makes war planning difficult Yet it cannot be addressed without also raising the question of the circumstances under which the US would be willing to Initiate nuclear warfare · The JCS representative believes that adoption of any of these AIHS contains the high risk of the loss of Western Europe or early initiation of a nuclear response should deterrence fall 'JNCLASSiFlEC F-D-E-'f- - t·t·· ··c-·r- On the other hand Implementation of AIMS H I or J which call for the development of conventional forces adequate to restore lost NATO territory would require major increases in Allied as well as US capablllties It Is uncertain as to whether the Allies could be persuaded to make such increases given current public perceptions of the threat without opening up the Issue of strategy If a strategy debate should develop it might' be divisive and might guarantee that the US would not be able to persuade the Allies to make further force improvements AIMS F v falls between these two categories The Allied forces required are not much larger than those currently planned and the principal difficulty would be obtaining the necessary sustaining capability for the Allies We might succeed ln persuading the Allies to make the necessary im rovements in their capabilities if we did not question NATO strategy but continued to urge improvements in the conventional leg of NATO's TRIAD in reaction to Pact activities Mechanisms such as a corm on NATO war reserve stockpile have been suggested recently If the Allies could not 'be persuaded to develop the needed capability the US could consider planning to supply them in wartime from its own stocks recognizing the problems associated with commonality Congressional appropriations for a policy of stockpiling for the NATO Allies is however doubtful If neither of these solutions is achievable in the near term the question arises as to the extent to which the US is willing to fund sustaining capabi 1 ity in excess of that of the Allies Some greater capability might serve as an inducement to greater Allied effort and would be available for use in other perhaps more likely contingencies In addition no contingency considered in this study other than sustained conflict in Europe generates significant stockpile and industria base requirements If such a contingency is not to be planned for it must lie decided 'how much or how little sustaining capabll ity ls enough--a question somewhat anal9ous to the pol ltical sufficiency question for strategic forces Summary In summarY the US could implement AIMS E F or G without questioning formal tlATO st'rategy because the Al 1 ied capabi 1 it ies requl red correspond roughly to those currently planned Full Implementation of AIMS F v or M would require Allied cooperation but such cooperation might best be obtained by working within current NATO strategy Implementation of AIMS H I or J requires Allied cooperation ln making major increases ln capabilities There ls doubt about whether such Allied cooperation could be obtained without raising the Issue of strategy Thus choice of a strategy which requires a major Increase in All led capabilities would require a decision on whether to raise the issue of strategy within NATO The JCS representative believes that 'a variant of AIMS I which relaxed the criteria for early restoration of pre-war borders and provided for D-day to P-day sustainability vice 90 days would not require the major Increases in active NATO peacetime forces 18 UNCLASS FIEC SECREf QUEST I ON THREE Question To what extent should the US acquire military capabll ities above those required for the European theater to undertake military operations either offensive or defensive against the Soviets in a US-USSR war Discussion Recent strategic planning has necessarily focused on Europe and there has been little analysis of the conduct of the non-European aspects of a worldwide war However the steadily growing ability of the USSR to employ military force worldwide makes It prudent for the US to assess the need to confront them on that basis and determine whether the US should provide more forces either to counter Soviet initiat-lves or to take ts own Initiatives A major purpose of operations outside Europe would be to promote US objectives in a European war At a minimum the US would undertake operations to f·nsure that the war in Europe could be prosecuted effectively Additional force might permit the US to put off the decision try use theater nuclear forces or could provide hedges to reduce the risk inherent in any European strategy If the NATO defense in Europe were unsuccessful or a stalemate were achieved operations outside Europe' might improve the US negotiating position · The AIHS as presented all require Limited Action or lni tiatlves as the options for outside Europe operations Essentially the two categories represent the limits of a range of defensive and offensive capabll ities AIHS E and Fare basically deterrence strategies and provide a limited military capa0illty to counter Soviet initiatives outside Europe AIHS Hand' ' which also have Limited Action as the outside Europe option are less dependent on nuclear deterrence and provide a more formidable conventional warfighting capability for a longer period of time In these two AIHS Limited Action is designed to allow the US to focus on Europe but prevents the Soviets· from concentrating on Europe by confronting them worldwide The other three AIHS G J and H have Initiatives as the outside Europe option In the case of AIHS G also basically a deterrence strategy Initiatives raise the nuclear threshold and provide a hedge against failure In Europe In AIMS J and H lni tlatives and Increased presence outside Europe oupled with a strong conventional defense In Europe provide the US with a redible conventional deterrence Additionally AIHS H provides a substantial capability to wage war and defeat the Soviets worldwide UNCLASSlFIEC' l Ff tFT- 19 UNCLASS F EC Representative forces envisioned for operations outside Europe are shown be low TABLE IV·l • Forces Rep res en tat Ive L1ml ted Act Ion Initiatives Army Divisions Tactical Fighter Wings Navy Carriers Harlne Amphibious Forces 2 2 2D 9 3 9 6 3 9 As earlier Indicated all of the AIHS contain some air and naval forces 'for operations outside Europe in the context of worldwide conflict However AIMS G J and H which have initiatives outside Europe also have heavy Intervention for potential local wars Some of the forces perform a dual role and are not completely additive US-Soviet Advantages Disadvantages It Is useful to note the relative advantages that each major power enjoys when cons ldering options to pursue in a worldwide war Essentially the USSR has near term energy self-sufficiency and the US and its allies are Increasingly dependent of foreign sources of energy The USSR has either Internal or short length SLOC's and LOC's to the potential area of conflict while the opposite Is true for the US •• The JCS representative believes that given the limitations of the methodologies and assumptions used In preparing the illustrative force postures and costs they are not appropriate to use ln discussion of notional mi I ltary strategies · Limited fctlon forces were sized to accomplish the following tasks protection of oil SLOC's limited conventional attacks against Soviet facll itles and deployed air and naval forces extensive mining to deny Soviets free use of the seas assistance to allies In maintaining Pacific SLOC and assistance In the defense of South Korea with forward deployed forces ••• Initiatives forces were ·sized to do the Limited Action tasks and In addition Increased attacks on Soviet facilities as well as air and naval forces and attacks on Soviet fishing fleet Harlne forces are employed In support of naval campaigns Army force structure provides two divisions as part of the NATO requirement which are planned only for employment In the Hid-East UNCLASSIFIED ' 20 UNCLASSIFIED On the other hand the US has greater open access to the seas than do the Soviets Soviet 1imi ted access to the sea may be a disadvantage on the offensive but an advantage on the defensive since the sea avenues of approach are also limited As opposed to the Soviets the US Is free from hostile neighbors and has relatively rel I able al 1 ies has greater industrial economic technological and agricultural strength greater power projection capability and does not need to withhold considerable military power to defend national borders or control internal situations • Soviet Initiatives The Soviet Union has a capability to take Initiatives against US Interests outside Europe The problem for the US would be compounded If the Soviets undertook a varie ty of different initiatives simultaneously Potential Soviet initiatives include Attack US nuclear capabilities carrier submarine air forces and support bases in the Pacific to limit damage from US attack Attack Japan's sea lanes of corrrnunication and air and naval bases ln order to tie down US forces in the Pacific as well as limit Japan's war supporting potential Support a North Korean attack on South Korea Threaten Persian Gulf oil by attacking oil SLOC's or conducting land air attacks on these oil sources Attack US SLOC's to Hawaii and Alaska attack US bases and conduct raids on US territory ' US I n I t I at i ve s The US has 1 lmited forces available after European requirements are met to do what current strategy cal ls for Defending SLOC's to Hawaii and Alaska • Attacking deployed Soviet naval and air forces Present planning also requires that some US forces deployed worldwide swing to re 1n force the European war The concept of swinging forces Is more credible If a US-USSR war starts In Europe or ff the swing ls started as soon as Pact mobilization is detected However if conflict Is Initiated by crises 1n other areas and expands subsequently to a NATO-Pact war In Europe and worldwide US-USSR conflict then considerable portions of the swing forces may already be engaged and not readily available to move to the North Atlantic European theater Also in the case of a short war less than 30 days naval swing forces may not be able to reach the European theater 'in sufficlent time to accomplish designated tasks On the other hand if the war Is extended then these forces become critical SFCRFI 21 t f o I• ' · - ' ri ' ' I - H-r 1'9• Conducting limited attacks against Soviet facilities when beneficial to do so Assisting allies In defending Pacific and Indian Ocean SLOC's At Issue Is whether additional forces should be acquired to take Initiatives against the Soviet Union to exploit Soviet vulnerabl litles and for better defense against Soviet Initiatives The US could consider a number of different Initiatives Attack Soviet air and naval facilities Considerable advantage accrues to the pc er that can attack first in areas outside Europe as the other must adopt a defensive posture thereby invnobi lizing a large portion of his forces The ability to deny the Soviets free use of the seas or •he ability to conduct air attacks against US forces would be enhanced by des· troying forces before they deploy Preemptive strikes or actions such as mining passages prior to Pact D·day however might not be desirable politically More forces will be required and more US losses taken in attacks on Soviet bases afte D·day but it may be prudent to determine Soviet intentions before attacking Defend Persian Gulf oil SLOC's and oil fields The continued flow of Persian Gulf and North African oil is crucial to the war capability of the NATO Alliance Consequently neither the Soviets nor ourselves could Ignore the importance of these resources and US forces could be called on to counter Soviet attempts to interdict oil SLOC's or take over the ol 1 fields themselves Deny seas to Soviet merchant and fishing fleet Attacks on the Soviet merchant fleet would limit critical logistic support to the northeast Soviet provinces The Soviets also rely heavily on food from the sea and attacks on the fishing fleet would create problems in terms of a long war The northeastern provinces are particularly vulnerable and denial of economic and military reinforcement by sea renders the maritime provinces susceptiable to possible PRC initiatives POwer projection into Soviet littorals The principal goal would be a diversion of Soviet resources dlsorooortionate o our own Therefore limited objective operations with the purpose o tying down Soviet defensive forces and possibly encouraging support from other powers would be more appropriate than a unilateral attempt to open a second front In this regard Petro avlovsk and the Kuriles are prospective objectives In addition to actual operations the mere threat o sue operations and unconventional operations can tie down Soviet defending forces UNCLASSIFIED 22 bl b5 SJ LC C nt - J E ·l · -t • Deep Interdiction of Soviet territory If reinforcement and supply by sea of the maritime provinces has been disrupted t e only alternative transportation from the Soviet Uni en's western economic and Industrial heartland Is the Trans-Siberian rat lway which can be Interdicted by the US or PRC Attacks of this nature against Soviet territory would provide military political and psychological benefits However In this context as In al I major US-USSR conflicts there is a corresponding risk to US territory Surrvnary The US currently has the capability to perform 1 imited operations both offensive and defensive outside of Europe during a worldwide war with the Soviet Union A greater capability could be retained by delaying the swing of PACOH forces to NATO with an attendant risk for the European war The USSR has the lapability to conduct a range of Initiatives ag i st the US to which the US should be able to respond with those actions necessary to protect vital interests There are increased initiatives that the US can consider based on the objectives desired and the relative costs benefits derived The key issue Is whether the US should plan for only those actions to protect vital Interests or should the US plan for specific actions which will require additive forces and incur Increased costs outside of Europe ln an overall strategy for worldwide war against the Soviets • •• UNCLASSIFIED 23 UNCL O SS FlEC QUESTION FOUR • uestlon To what extent should the US plan to have military forces or supplies available for crisis management or intervention in local wars To what extent should these forces or supplies be available witho t drawing from those required for a major US-USSR war Discussion The focus of previous questions has been on deterring or waging a major war with the Soviet Union While consideration of this critical dimension remains central to US national security planning other militarily significant events are more likely International crises and local wars variously affecting US interests have punctuated the years slnc e the last war between great pO ers The probability is high that during the next decade similar confl lets wl 11 occur which nrte- ict directly threatening the territory of any major power may warrant the use of US military power Potential USiac tlons in these circumstances range from cris s management or peacekeeping activities--where military presence provides a mplement to diplomacy--to armed intervention in order to protect US interests The utility of military action as iell as the degree of involvement which is appropriate is a function of many variables Physical proximity to the US Is a dimension as is the extent of US commitment whether via formal treaty or perceived obligation The significance of interests in some regions such as the Middle East Y justify a degree of military involvement under any circumstances nile other areas may assume sufficient Importance only In a great power context Thus an Insurgency in Rhodesia might not warrant US military presence unless the USSR introduced forces there This dimension which ·could produce a direct confrontation between US and Soviet units continues to gain importance as Russian involvement In the Third World grows and their capability to project military power beyond their borders increases The Importance of Planning facto capability to deal with crises· and local wars would exist if forces·were acquired only to deal with a major US-USSR war However in the absence of an independent decision establishing planning guldance for local wars drawing on these sizable forces might not provide a satlsfactory capability for crisis management or intervention For example to make sure that these major war forces were in Europe when needed significant portions of the force and Its equipment might be forward deployed with the remainder tied to strict time-phased mobilization and deployment schedules If it were subsequently decided to employ these forces In a crlsls or local war the capability to make initial forcible entry such as that possessed by airborne and amphibious forces might be lacking Appropriate basing and rights of passage might be unavailable Additionally the strategic lift available might be Inappropriate to deploy these European forces and equipment In a timely manner Their training A de even Efttl 24 and equipment might be unsuitable for a non-European environment and they might have Inadequate logistic support to accomplish the local war mission Such potential shortcomings might be consciously accepted as the result of a planning decision They should not come as surprises based on the assumption that large forces acquired for one purpose are automatically employable for other missions Planning Levels A planning decision on peacekeeping and local wars can be made by establishing a level of effort which forces and supplies in the structure must be capable of supporting Implicit In this approach ls the possibility of employing other available forces to support higher levels of effort should US Interests warrant but the c 1pabi 1ity to do so would not be programmed A set of representational levels of effort were defined In the study and are outlined below They describe three points on the capability planning continuum and provide the components of global flexibi 1ity strategic mobility Initial entry capability environmental suitability and sustainability in varying amounts These levels and the resultant forces reflect approximately the three general groupings which emerged from the analysis of several local war force posturing scenarios postulated in the 1985 tlmeframe Amounts of sustainability though rather arbitrarily assigned are consistent with the options described and provided a basis for costing The levels of effort for planning are Limited Action - The US would plan to have the capability to provide logistical support and limited naval and tactical air forces to support US interests anywhere in the world for 90 days The commitment of US land combat forces would not be planned AIMS E and H Incorporate thls planning concept Light Intervention - The US would plan to have the capability to provide logistical support and moderat e naval and tactical air forces but only llmited land combat forces anywhere In the world Supplies to sustaln US and host nation forces for 180 days would be planned AIMS F F v and I i111corporate this planning concept Heavy Intervention - The US would plan to have the to provide logistical support and considerable land naval and anywhere In the world Supplies to sustain US and host nation 360 days would be planned AIHS G J and K incorporate this concept capability air power forces for planning Supplies would be planned to sustain both US and host nation forces Currently except for certain nations the acquisition of such war reserve stocks for use by non-US forces Is prohibited by law lJNCLASS FlEO 25 -0-fRfl- The chart below depicts representative forces associated with the three planning options TABLE IV-2 • • Limited Act I on Llght lntervent Ion Arrrry Divisions D 1-2 Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings 1 1·3 9 Forces reeresentatlve Harine Amphibious Forces 0-1 9 1 Aircraft Carriers 24 Wide-bodied Aircraft 2 130 Heavy Intervention 3-8 9 3-1 260 Additional Forces versus Drawing Down Once a planning level of effort has been specified the forces and supplies required to support it need not increase the total structure In many cases the capability equired may already be present in the forces provided for other purposes Where there are deficiencies e g In strategic lift or sustainability the shortfall would constitute at a minlmum the additive requirement to achieve that particular level of planned effort Beyond this it may be desirable to acquire further additive capability at additional cost to reduce the need to draw on other assets in order to cope with crises and local wars Such decisions must span the considerable range of choice from completely Inclusive forces for limited action to completely additive forces for heavy intervention The balance struck between drawing down and acquiring additive capabilities depends on the significance attached to several inter· related factors These Include force redeployability sequence of events available sustalnabil ity relative force sizes source of forces ·and the desirability of flexibility hedging Force redeployablllty or the blllty of forces to disengage and redeplov rapidly can best be appreciated by posing two conditionals If the US does not want to draw down major war capabilities for crisis management and loca 1 wars Land combat forces and associated support must be additive since they can only be disengaged and redeployed slowly if at all The JCS representative believes that given the limitations of the 111ethodologles and assumptions used in preparing the Illustrative force postures and costs they are nbt appropriate to use in discussion of notional military strategies S fR F 26 ·1NcL1 sn eo Some tactical air forces must be additive While such units ere easily redeployable complete withdrawal would leave land forces without air support In addition attrition of aircraft In local wars must be considered Naval· forces and strategic mobility forces need not be additive since they can be disengaged and redeployed relatively quickly and east ly Alrborborne and amphibious forces may or may not be additive depending on whether the US plans to corrrnit such forces to sustained combat or use the for initial entry only If the US is willing to draw down The requirements for local wars may affect the mix of forces e g numbers of heavy and light divisions Local war planning may influence the deployments of forces acquired primarily for other purposes F'or example the requirement to structure a single force for both local and major wars may lead to a different mix of POMCUS and airlift for Europe than would be optimum If Europe were the only contingency As noted above local wars may still generate the largest requirements for certain types of forces e g airborne and amphibious forces The Increment between local war and other requirements would have to be additive Dlfference$•in redeployablllty are the operative factor in considering the possible sequence of events between a local and a worldwide war with the USSR If US intervention in a local war occurred prior to the outbreak of a war with the USSR some Intervention forces would not be available rapidly for employment against the Soviet-s ·In Europe or elsewhere If the Intervention forces are additive no adverse impact would occur In the US-USSR war If the Intervention forces are Inclusive there would be a reduction I US forces available for the US-USSR war The effect might be to limit US capability in the critical early days of the major war On the other hand if the US-USSR war started before the local war the US would have already corrrnitted Inclusive forces to the US-USSR conflict and presumably would not want to undertake an intervention In this situation any additive intervention forces would be available as a central reserve to be employed in Europe or elsewhere to Influence the war outcome This problem might be offset at least partially by mobilizing reserve forces ln numbers corresponding to those active forces corrrnitted to a local war In this way readiness for the lnl tial phases of a major war could be maintained possibly providing sufficient time for local war forces to redeploy in the event of J major US-USSR war There could however be significant political ramifications of such a reserve cell-up 'JNCLJ ' SSIFlEC UNCLASSiFlEC -SECRETAnother factor Is the amount of available sustainability In most cases even though forces may exist elsewhere which can be dr wn down to wage a local war adequate logistic support wi 11 not be available Major draw downs of stocks for a protracted local war may prove disastrous if a mtJor war cx curs Thus even if intervention forces are even partially Inclusive attention must be paid to the possibly additive sustainability needs both for US and host nation forces The degree of risk associated with relying on inclusive intervention forces if a IT'oajor war follows a local war is a function of relative force sizes and resultant margins for error Thus drawing down on a limit loss defe se in Europe AIMS E F F v and G to completely satisfy the requlre --ert for a heavy intervention would invite disasr The diversion of forces fro i a European direct defense AIMS H I J and M especially if the intervention forces were taken from CONUS reinforcements perhaps with compensating activation of reserve units 1 would not be as significant If the farces for initiatives against the Soviet Union' in the event of a worlchdde war are acquired AIMS G J and M a source of forces for certain aspects of crisis management and local wars has already been created If these initiative forces are to be used for intervention some delay in commencement of actions against the Soviet Union would have to be acce table It should also be noted that in several instances a local war requiring significant US participation might already Involve a direct confrontation with the USSR In such situations the question of relative l verage who is tying down whom must also be considered Ultir tely the degree of draw down which is acceptable represents an assessnent of the probability and impact of military involvement in crises and local ars •with appropriate hedging against uncertainty The desire for sufficient flexibility to provide the optimum response to any military contingency r ust be balanced against such constraints as political and fiscal feasibility Any resultant risk of Inadequate military response must be acceptable • • Sun- iary • Planning for peacekeeping and local wars represents an Important dimension in developing a US military strategy Establishment of a level of effort for planning is essential Beyond this it is necessary to decide to nat extent the capability to support this level will be additive or drawn from forces planned for a major US-USSR war It should be noted that the reverse ls also true··the acquisition of additive intervention forces creates a source of some initiative forces This potential for partial interchangability becomes particularly useful at Heavy Intervention I eve Is UNCLftSSIFIEC -- SEER EtQUESTION FIVE Question What should be the US military strategy in East Asia Should the US maintain the current military presence or include additional adjustments in US forces In Korea and the Philippines Discussion In the years following the Korean War the US maintained strong sea and land based forces forward deployed In the Western Pacific to combat Sino-Soviet inspired and supported aggression against a weakened Japan Taiwan South Korea and throughout Southeast Asia The sl tuation today Is quite different As Sino-Soviet relations have deteriorated from alliance to illtary confrontation a similarity of Sino-American security Interests vis-a-vis the Soviets has evolved The threat of a Taiwan Invasion has roderated because of Chinese hostlli y toward the USSR preoccupation with internal economic problems and the advent of a less radical C inese leadership Japan has become the third largest economic and Industrial power in the world The Republic of Korea has developed Its econoeiic and military capabilities to the point wht re it Is less relia 't upon the US for Its security needs As the circumstances In East Asia have changed the primary US objective in that region has become a stabilization of the current relatively favorable balance among the great powers as opposed to contain nt of a Sino-Soviet threat Defense links with US Asian allies enhance the stability of this East Asian great power balance The US strategy In the Pacific should In addition to supporting US political interests provide for military requirements such as protection of the a proaches to the continental United States and LOCs to deployed US forces The Soviet Union Is perhaps less sensitive to changes in US deployments Although they are as concerned as the US about the security of the sea approaches to their homeland they are partlculady concerned about China Of the major powers the PRC Is perhaps least sensitive to changes In US force deployments In East Asia but has demonstrated considerable 'sensitivity to US global military posture vis-a-vis the USSR Chinese security needs are dominated by their Soviet requirements Inasmuch as the PRC does not appear at this time to constitute a threat to US Interests It would appear to be advantageous for the US to avoid a threatening posture relative to China ffRfl- 29 SEERE'r4 In this political environment the PRC can play an Important role In a US worldwide strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union The nature of the Soviet security problem which confronts them with powerful adversaries in both Europe and Asia Is an important American advantage Perhaps paradoxically US military policy and actions in Europe may have • more ir portant Hect on the Chinese ability or Inclination to remain hostile to the USSR than US military presence in Asia A strong US NATO position in Europe forces the Soviets to allocate substantial forces to that theater But Increases in US air and naval forces in East Asia could prompt Soviet buildups ln the Far East which China would not view as desirable Substantial Increases In US forces deployed to East Asia could result in a conflict of Interest between the US and PRC at the expense of the mutual interest of deterring aggressive Soviet behavior US inte rests in East Asia are defined In terms of both great power and reqlonal considerations The exact causal relationship between the level of US peaceti - e military presence and degree to which US regional interests In East Asia are secured is not known However five basic reasons for peacetime forward deployments are to Accomplish initial wartime tasks against the Soviet Union Protect US interests Proe-ote regional stability Discourage nuclear proliferation Enhance US influence The presenc'e• of US military forces In East Asia demonstrates tangible US military o· er and provides a sense of security to our friends The visible evidence provided by US presence and active US involvement in regional security affairs inhibits aggression provocation and coercion by local or outside powers and discourages nuclear proliferation While US Influence is not measured solely by our military presence It does contribute to our influence • • The visibility of Involvement Increased East Asian bl IJNCLASS flEC 30 - E-EREf • The East Asia forces generated for all AIMS were developed primarily to satisfy wartime requirements against the Soviet Union and secondarily to provide air and naval combat support during Korean hostilities or other local wars for the appropriate AIMS AIMS F F v G I J M The minimum military mission requirements against the Soviet Union In East Asia are the same In Reduced and Current East Asian Presence substrategies Increased forces for use against the Soviets as In AIMS G F and Mare the result of planned initiatives during hostilities Forces were not generated to satisfy peacetime presence requirements in support of US pol ltlcal interests In East Asia over and above those needed to satisfy military requirements except in the case of AIMS E and H In which the low range of carrier forces was based in part on maintaining a peacetime presence In Asia As can be seen in the table below the forces provided In all AIMS Insure that the US would retain significant anti-Soviet military capabl l lties in the Western Pacific TABLE IV-3 Forces Deployed in the Pacific Reduced Presence Army Div TFW AAF Ashore MAF Afloat CTGs Karl t lme Current Presence Without wartime Initiatives F F v I Current Presence With wartime Initiatives J G Increased Presence M E H 0-1 1 1 1 1 1 1-4 3 3 4 4 3 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 9-3 9 3 9 2 9-3 9 3 9 3 9-6 9 ' 1 1 9-219 1 9-2 9 1-2 1-2 2 2 2-3 2-3 3-4 • 2-4 2-4 4 4 4 4 6-8 Patrol Sqdr What may be of considerably greater significance than the actual combat power of US forces deployed to the Western Pacific is East Asian perceptions of the nature and extent of US participation In regional security affairs that US force levels convey In the altered East Asian political environinent the forces allocated to East Asia have declined steadily from the pre-Vietnam posture Vietnam aside the US has already withdrawn one division from Korea and announced plans to remove all remaining ground combat forces the airborne brigade has been withdrawn from Okinawa I Ut lCLASS FlEC t Qfl 31 i 11 i' LJl 1 i n r • I · J _ 0 • - fEREI deployed carrier task groups have been reduced from three to two US forces have been removed fran Thailand and significantly reduced In Japan US military presence in Taiwan has been significantly reduced the level of military assistance to East Asian nations has declined and the US is publicly committed to consideration of proposals which would limit US military' presence In the Indian Ocean Both US all les and potential adversaries are keenly aware of these trends and It may •be difficult to persuade Asian nations of a continuing US Involvement In regional security affairs The exact point at which further reductions may harm US interests is not known The question is whether further reductions in either US deployed forces or retrenchment In the US base line can be made without risk to US regional interests There are differing views whether reductions In US forces and or retrenchment in the US base line AIMS E and H could be conducted In a manner which would continue to provide for major US security interests vis-a-vis the Soviets without up etting regional stability or discouraging Chinese hostility towards the Soviets Further such reductions might encourage Japan to do more In its own defense and assume a greater regional military role There Is no question but that Japan could contribute a much greater share of its national effort to its own defense This may be desirable and could ultimately permit further reductions in wartime requirements for US air and naval forces in East Asia The current situation ls relatively favorable to the US The US is moving towards an offshore military posture which avoids automatic lnvolvemen t in regional hostilities but ls capable of combat operations throughout Ea it Asia the Soviets are In check China persists in its anti-Soviet attitude and military orientation while showing little Inclination towards aggressive action against Taiwan nuclear proliferation Incentives in Japan Korea and Taiwan are not pervasive North Korea must take Into account powerful US air and naval assets In any decision to attack the South Japanese-American relations are close and cooperative and ASEAN cooperation ls both relatively high and host I le_ to ORV expansion 32 UNCLASSIFIED QUESTION SIX Question What constltues an adequate strategic force posture Discussion Assessments of al ternatlve strategic force structure should begin by specifying objectives What Is it the United States expects to accomplish with these forces Clearly satisfying our strategic objectives depends on many factors declaratory policy is no doubt fundamental as are operational factors I e where the weapons are deployed and their operational readiness Specific objectives for US strategic nuclear forces are eter nuclear attack on the US our forces our allies and others whose security Is important to the US In conjunction with general purpose and theater nuclear forces enhance deterrence on non-ndclear aggression particularly against NATO an i our Asian allies Should deterrence fail and nuclear conflict occur control escalation I imit damage to the degree possible and terminate the conflict quickly on acceptable terms If escalation cannot be controlled obtain the best possible outcome for the US and its allies Insure that the US our allies and others whose security ls Important to the US can act without intimidation stemning from perceptions that the strategic balance favored or was Increasingly favoring the USSR ' Five distinct but Interrelated elements of nuclear policy can be Identified Declaratory statements on policy how policy to he public allies and adversaries we describe our nuclear Acquisition policy the planning criterta·for both developing and procuring nuclear weapon systems for the future -- Employment policy how available weapons are targeted and planned for use In the event of nuclear conflict addressed by NSOH 242 Deployment policy how we deploy nuclear forces Arms control policy how we seek to maintain a stable force balance and tf· possible reduce force levels through negotiations 33 1 n i 'L''' ' -11 ·- I -· ' ' M Alternative force structures were derived by selecting a combination of criteria one for each objective All told there are rrore than one thousand possibilities The lnteragency Working Group has Illustrated these possibl litles by grouping combinations of criteria into substrategles each representing a logical combination Substrategy 1 for example utilizes the least demanding criteria for each objective Substrategy utilizes the most demanding The other two substrategies lie between these two extremes and Illustrate the high and low side of the range of capabilities that could be derived from current US pol Icy and plans Even with agreement on the criteria appropriate for each substrategy the derivation of force structures which could satisfy it requires that a number of _additional· assumptions be made e g as to the capab i 1 i• i s of Soviet forces the desired diversity redundancy in US forces ancl ·t-i i• alert status of US and Soviet forces The National Intelligence Estimate NIE of Soviet capabilities for the mid-1980's was applied in all cases the sensitivity of results to these assumptions was not tested The target data base was 1erlved from the 1977 National Target Base revi · ed to reflect projected changes in the number and hardness of Soviet silos and related facilities for the 1986 time period Growth rates of other types of targets were ignored The consequences of maintaining various forms of diversity In US forces In terms of the resulting costs and size were demonstrated by configuring alternative forces for each substrategy based on differing combinations of existing or planned strategic force components Current policy ls to maintain a TRIAD of strategic forces--lCBM's SLBM's and manned bombers This TRIAD provides mutually reinforcing and partially overlapping capabilities which give high confidence that the US can achieve current US objectives 0 The JCS representative notes that the pi'anning factors used in developing forces to test the notional strategic substrategies fall to take lnto account significant current nuclear tasking requirements The current nuclear tasking criteria which are Ignored are the requirement to achieve 90% damage against Soviet military recovery resources and the requirement to allocate some alert weapons against the nuclear threat and conventional military forces of the Warsaw Pact and PRC Additionally the rrodeling used to generate forces does not recognize real world considerations such as HIRV footprint constraints target base growth no growth or hardening of industrial sites was considered cross targeting or timing considerations operational bomber loadings availability of strategic nuclear material and sensitivities of the planning factors to uncertainties in the Soviet threat Given these factors the JCS representative believes the force postures and costs that are displayed are not appropriate for use in dlscyssion of notional strategic forces l '··' I j i _ i j Cu I l Jf t n ' • jl' M ' '•' 1 · • J - t T St€R 4- The TRIAD also poses major problems to a Soviet planner contemplating a first strike Because Soviet ICBH's and SLBH's would have different flight times to their targets one or the other would provide enough warning time for the US to launch one of its two land-based components while still maintaining theoptions to employ sea-launched missiles For example If Soviet SLBM's and ICBH's were launched simultaneously the SLBH's would detonate first--probably on US bomber bases and command control--thereby creating the option for the President to launch the US ICBH's In the 15-20 minutes prior to arrival of the Soviet ICBH attack Alternatively if the Soviet ICBH's were launched first there would be additional warning to US bombers on alert to enhance their escape from their bases The central acquisition issue related to force diversity Is whether or not the US needs a TRIAD with relatively equal legs The major alternative would be a force with the required retaliatory capabi I ity primarily residing In two legs with equal capabilities This issue has arisen because of the projected vulnerability of fixed silo ICBH's The US choice is whether a to rrodernize our land-based missile forces with a mobile ICBH H-X to maintain a fully hedged TRIAD or b to permit the present ICBM force to become less survivable and to rely to a greater degree on SLBM's and bombers or c rely on a launch-on-warning policy for the present ICBM force Object Ives Assured Destruction and Counter-Recovery Criteria The US approach to achieving deterrence is and has been for some time to maintain forces which could sustain a massive Soviet first strike and survive with swf ficlent capability to inflict retaliatory damage which would be regarded as unacceptable by Soviet leaders There ls however no universally agreed set of criteria for unacceptable damage Possible criteria would include the destruction of 50% of the enemy's economic and political resources critical to recovery or the destruction of 70% of the economic political and military resources critical to recovery Various other criteria have been cited publicly by US officials In the past In 1965 then Secretary of Defense McNamara stated that he believed an aggressor would be effectively deterred by knowledge that an adversary had the capability to destroy one fourth to one third of his population and two thirds of his Industrial capacity These criteria were modified in 1968 to one fifth to one fourth of the population and one half of the Industrial capacity Even so the actual employment policy set forth at one point In the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy NSTAP was materially different It contained no specific criterion with respect to population but set a damage expectancy of 70% of the war-supporting economl c base and 90% damage expectancy against nuclear threat targets as goals recognizing that damage levels would vary no single US delivery system at that time could achieve a 90% damage expectancy galnst a hardened Soviet silo 35 UNCLASS FlE i Tn 1 t_ e RF T 1QP-SECRET US pollcy today ls oriented on maximizing US post-war power and Influence relative to the Soviet Union Thus while there have been differences In views of deterrence criteria these apparent differences are not as Important as are the similarities namely that retaliatory forces are planned ii be adequate to lnfl let some specified level of damage to Soviet society Current US policy as defined in NSDH 242 for the employment of US nuclear forces and In the Secretary of Defense Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy NUWEP defines the targets In terms which emphasize the objective of reducing to the minimum the strategic power and Influence of a potential enemy in the pest-war era and to prolong post-war recovery To this end the targeting Is defined under tour crl teria a Damage 70% of the war-supporting economic base b At least one weapon on an industrial facility In the tope 250 urban areas of the Soviet Union c At least one weapon on major centers of government d Neutralize other targets including military targets critical to post attack recovery not covered above In this I ight the levels of damge to resources critical to post-war recovery have been further defined as a Inflict' that damage to the Industrial sector of the economy critical to post-war recovery which will reduce the assessed value of the national output by approximately 70% of the USSR b Place special emphasis on targets the loss of which would cause economic bottlenecks and extend recovery time c Oamage•approximately 90% of the military resources crit cal to postwar recovery in the USSR d Damage other targets critical to post-war recovery not covered above These levels were chosen to maximize US post-war power and Influence related to the Soviet Union An alternative way not examined In the PRH-10 Study of deflnlng deterrence criteria could emphasize the relative post-war balance of usable power which ls suggested by Soviet writings on warflghtlng as opposed to absolute measures UNCLASSlF ED 36 roe fCCPE T Limited Attacks A second US objective is to deter smaller nuclear attacks Forces acquired for this purpose are additlo al to those obtained to deter massive attacks so that the latter can be held in reserve to deter escalation to a massive exchange The general rule adopted in the stlJdy ls that the US should have some capability to respond to limited Soviet attacks The substrategies differ as to whether the US should acquire forces capable of matching or offsetting any 1 lmlted Soviet attack i e to be able to respond with a comparable number of weapons against a comparable set of targets The most demanding requirement would be to match Soviet capabilities to destroy hardened targets especially missile silos and associated launch facilities The criteria utilized range from an ability to deliver up to 200 weapons against relatively soft targets to an ability to deliver up to li 000 weapons--including a capability to destroy up to 90% of t li 1 300 Soviet ICBH silos and 400 associated launch control centers Deterring Attacks on Our Allies The next objective the use of strategic forces to contribute to the deterrence of an attack on our allies proves to' be relatively less important for force sizing Strategic forces are maintained to enhance the deterrence of conventional or nuclear attacks against' US allies in Europe and East Asia by threatening nuclear strikes primarily against the East European members of the Warsaw Pact and China Insofar as these strikes are envisioned only fol lowing the outbreak of large scale conventional crisis or war it was assumed that for the purpose of evaluating force requirements to meet these objectives US strategic forces would have been placed on a generated alert Given this assumption no additional strategic forces were found to be necessary to satisfy this objective Some of the demand was already met by forces acquired to deter limited Soviet attacks in most cases the same strategic forces which could satisfy the other objectives when In a day-to-day alert posture could also satisfy the rest of the demand when placed on generated alert Thus US objectives in Europe and Asia resulted In no significant additiona 1 demands for strategic weapons This result Is currently being tested in greater detail Oama e limiting Fulfillment of the objective of limiting damage to the US should deterrence fail was addressed by a range of possible R O programs and deployments The capabilities directly applicable to damage limiting range from a modest civil defense program to the deployment of ABH systems to the acquisition of offensive counterforce capabilities Limitation of damage via passive defensive programs i e civil defense and Industrial hardening provides an approach which is controversial and would Involve uncertain costs and effectiveness The civil defense approach requires sufficient warning time about one week for implementing protection masures Passive ABH defense programs which do not rely on such warning Today the US covers targets in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact and China using day-to-day alert planning faciors UNCLt SSIFIEC JIAD e f ffi l 'I 37 UNCL ASS FiED roP SECR E-r times and so hedge against surprise attacks are costly and would 1 ikely· be politically unacceptable in the US unless the nature of US-Soviet relations changed Political Sufficiency The keystone In US strategic pol Icy Is deterrence 11'1 add It ion the US and Its al 1 ies need to be free from any Intimidation which could occur as a result of perceptions of an eroding strategic balance This requires the perception by ourselves our allies and the Soviets of an undiminished US ability and willingness to counter Soviet actions against US Interests A necessary element of this is a retaliatory capability that we perceive as adequate But Is this politically sufficient There Is general agreement that US strategic for es should be postured to provide freedom from intimidation but what is at issue Is whether major asymmetries In US-Soviet force levels or perceived offensive and defensive capabilities have political utility e g for Intimidation and If so f ow should the US deal with such major asymmetn·les Current US declaratory policy states that the US maintains at least rough equivalence with the Soviet Union in aggregate force measures Alternatives to this policy go from an active declaratory policy deemphasizing the significance of static measures or programmatic Imbalances favoring the Soviets to an acquisition policy seeking clear superiority in strategic power Even if a policy of rough equivalence were continued a collateral force issue sill arises should the US simply respond to Soviet programs in kind or take initiatives e g development and or deployment of improved cruise missile technology to offset major asymmetries and place the S oviet Union in a responsive position A case of particular Interest involve hard target capabilities A significant hard target asymmetry favoring the Soviets might lead to a perception on their part that they possess an important edge in warfightlng capability and thus to a perceived imbalance The study utilizes several alternative sufficiency criteria Including both Indices that are static i e indices of strategic power prior to a nuc'iear exchange and dynamic I e measures of strategic power after a one-sided exchange The resulting forces are affected ln various ways by the application of sufficiency criteria ln most cases especially those involving DYAD forces and substrategies with relatively low military requirements the impact of sufficiency criteria was to add substantially to the size of the total force The impact was considerably less for balanced TRIAD and augmented DYAD forces particularly as military requirements increased Strategic Reserve Forces Current US employment policy directs that survivable strategic forces be taken from forces generated by other requirements and be held back for trans and post attack protection An alternative approach would be to buy additional forces with the desired_ characteristics and maintain them as th strategic reserve force 38 T-OD ercot i • J _L -• D f- • ' t • _ UNCLASS riEC The SRF ls a hedge against wartime uncercalnties··prevlously unknown Soviet threats unexpected failures in US forces··as well as a force to cope with post-war contingencies e g attempted initimidation by other powers after a US-USSR exchange Knowledge by the National Convhand Authority that a survivable capable SRF If available could in some circumstances of less than massive attack provide additional decision time thereby aiding In the control of escalation The most Important characteristics of an SRF would be survivability responsiveness to political ·control flexibility for operating In varying environments versatility made possible by availability of a range of yield and accuracy in both aircraft and missiles and the availability of both MIRV and non-MIRV systems Alternative Substrategies Four ubstrategles were defined for strategic forces Substrategy 1 would ri eet the least demanding set of criteria substrategy the most demanding Not surprisingly the four substrategies are similarly ranked In terms of the pace and scope of modernization programs necessary to provide the forces for which they call Substrategy 1 would provide an assured retal lation capability against Soviet political and economic recovery resources No early strategic force modernization ls required Force levels could be reduced by retirement of the older B·520's Tital I I's and Polaris SSBN's Defensive capabilities remain at current levels or are slightly reduced The ability to respond flexibly ls limited and little countermilitary or damage limiitng capabilities are provided This substrategy assumes that domestic and foreign perceptions would not be seriously affected as a consequence of large disparities in US-Soviet force postures even If no SALT agreement were reached which would constrain Soviet force modernization and growth to the US force levels associated with this posture Consequently there is no atten·ti'on to forces for political suff I cl ency Substrategy 2 would provide a capability against Soviet political economic and military recovery resources a more extensive flexible response eapablllty and the appearance of US-Soviet strategic balance essentially by maintaining force levels at SALT limits and some countermilltary capability Including retaining some of the current counter silo potential Some strategic force modernization is necessary to provide the required retalla· tory capability e g one or more of ALCH B-1 and H-X Defensive levels remain at current levels or are modestly Increased The most distinctive feature of this substrategy which lies at roughly the low to middle side UNCLP SSIFIEO 39 ' UNCLA- SSlFIEC t€ftET of current US policy ls its decision not to pursue a highly effective hard-target-kill capability against Soviet silos and associated launch control facilities Forces to maintain equivalence depend upon agreed SALT limits and Soviet deployments Expected Soviet deployments within the Vladivostok l mits would require additional new systems Overall sufficiency requirements are to retain the US lead or equality in total warheads RV's bomber weapons while maintaining forces at or near SALT 11 mi ts Substrategy 3--whlch combines an assured retaliation capability against Soviet political economic and military recovery resources with a full range of flexible response options--would enable the US to respond dlr ectly to the potential Soviet hard-target·kill threat with an efficient hard target capability of our own while at the same time actively pursuing maintenance of some current areas of US advantage in the strategic balance Early strategic force modernization is necessary to provide the required retaliatory capability e g M-X and or D-5 for a time-urgent efficient hard target capability plus B-1 and or ALCM Defensive capabilities are maintained at about current levels with perhaps some modest increase The most Important strategic judgment associated with this alternative which Iles roughly at the high side of current pol icy is that a matching US response to the Soveit hard target threat is important for deterrence and that the Soviets would not act as if it were an unacceptable threat to their strategic forces Political sufficiency options are to retain a US lead or equality in static measures RV's bomber weapons HIRV'd launchers and hard target kill or status dynamic measures surviving RV's and bomber weapons surviving missile throw-weight and bomber payload Retention of current force balances alone could require substantial deployments of ew systems although requirements for equivalence depend upon Soviet deployments Substrategy 4--whlch combines an assured retaliation capability against Soviet political economic and military recovery resources with a full range of flexible response options--would enable the US to respond directly to the potential Soviet hard-target-kill threat with an efficient hard target ctpablllty of our own Early strategic force modernization is necessary to provide the required retaliatory capability e g M-X and or D-5 for a time urgent efficient hard target capability plus B-1 and ALCH Defens Jve capabilities would remain at current or substantially increased levels This substrategy represents Initiatives on our part to restore clear US superiority over the Soviet Union In strategic nuclear forces Political sufficiency objectives are to maintain or acquire US superiority In all Indices both static and dynamic Acquisition of associated forces would require substantial deployments of our new systems 40 1 EF Q FI • • ii _ - o - J - I 1·J • i i Alternative Forces Alternative Illustrative forces are sunrnarlzed In Section F of Annex D For each n1MT1bers and types of delivery vehicles are given Variations ln costs within substrategies will depend on whether It Is required to•maintain three relatively equal components of strategic offensive forces ICBH's SLBH's and bombers or if the diversity provided by maintaining two components of equal capability ls considered sufficient Variation in costs also wi 11 be strongly related to the scope and pace of modernization The greatest variation in costs however wil 1 occur in relation to which criterion of political sufficiency Is selected In this study the measure of sufficiency Is based on a variety of publ lcly discussed indicators of both the quantity and qua I ity of forces Each of these indices can be faulted as being biased or misleading We know that these indices can affect and have affected the perceptions of different audiences in different ways but we do not know how these perceptions are formed or ho consequential they are Although they are only representative the indite for offensive force appear to bound the problem sufficiently for this analysis The decision to meet requirements for political sufficiency if these indices or ones like them are used can in some instances result in strategic nuclear forces significantly larger than those that analysis shows are needed to rreet the target destruction goals established in this study As noted earlier such Increased occur primarily in cases involving DYAD forces in substrategies having relatively low military requirements The impact is considerably less pronounced for TRIAD and augmented DYAD forces particularly as the military requiremetns Increase Nevertheless differences in force requirements caused by the application of political sufficiency criteria justify the most careful and rigorous assessment of the relative importance of this objective of US strategic forces US Declaratory Policy Military Strategy and Acquisition Polley A continuing problem with US policy for strategic forces has been the degree of consistency and conscious coordination among the three major elements that'constltute US strategic policy our declaratory policy what we say about our strategic force objectives plans and capabilities our military strategy actual plans for employing US strategic forces and acquisition policy the guidance for procuring strategic forces There exists today for example some discrepancy between US declaratory policy and US military strategy with regard to what we will do in the event of a massive Soviet nuclear attack Our declaratory policy Is that we do not target people per se we target recovery resources Yet there are large numbers of people living In close vicinity to many If not most of the Soviet recovery resources targeted Consequently US assertions that we do not target people simply are not credible to the Soviets or Americans Hore Importantly we do not tell the Soviets exactly what would be entailed in the destruction of the political leadership economic and selected military resources critical to the recovery of their post-war power Influence and economy 41 J '' ' nil LASS FIEIJ At Issue ls how specific should US officials be In defining US strategic policy objectives There are occasions when ambiguity In declaratory policy may make sense e g as to exactly what the US response would be to a limited nuclear attack on the US but is there any case for being less than fully explicit ebout the kind and extent of the destruction that the US plans and has the capability to produce In the Soviet Union In response to a massive attack on the US Once we have determined these plans and capabilities some argue that deterrence would be improved If the Soviets knew precisely what our targeting plans were and were told in painful clarity the total amount of death and destruction the US would have the capability to produce Others argue that providing details of US tar• geting plans co_uld trigger unwanted Soviet responses e g accelerated defensive measures Industrial hardening _etc They suggest it would be better to leave the Soviets with uncertainties relying on the conservatism of Soviet planner to ''worst case their own estimates of our capabilities There also exists today an imperfect flt between US strategy and US acquisition policy as they relate to the objective of deterring a massive Soviet attack on the US In response to Presidential guidance our cur· rent military strategy ls defined in terms of the kind of targets recovery resources to be destroyed and the level of destruction 70% to be achieved But the President did not at that time decide that this strategy could be used as guidancefor acquisition pol Icy Indeed the last Presidential guidance on acquisition policy was NSOH 16 In 1969 which was concerned with a different military strategy the requirement Inter alla that the US would not Incur more deaths and Industrial damage than the USSR There Is at p'resent then no Presidential guidance on acquisition policy that matches our military strategy As a result the number and kind of US forces needed to execute this strategy are open to interpreta· tlon This point is not without some consequence since our present niilltary strategy is aimed at a moving target 1 e Soviet recovery resources are continually Increasing in number and varying ln kind • Sumnary • To define what constitutes an adequate US military strategy and acquisition policy for strategic forces the following specific questions need to be answered •· What kind and level of retaliatory capability ls necessary for deterrence of Soviet conventional and nuclear aggression •· To what extent should the US acquire an efficient hard-target· kl 11 capabl 11 ty and for what purposes iOP SteRB ' J ··' ' L i SSirlED 42 IJNCLASS flEC To what extent should the US procure nuclear forces above and beyond those required to achieve other US objectives In order to respond to US-Soviet force asyrrrnetrles7 Should the US acquire 1ddltlon1I forces for an SRF I e forces In excess of other requirements ' • 'l1 v-1 A•· • if'l ' 'C -·· '1 _ ·' '' le · -f £0R'i l SEER I INTRODUCTION A PURPOSE In response to PRM NSC-1O this paper defines a wide range of US Alternative Integrated Military Strategies AIMS for the next eight to ten years The military notional forces or in some cases a range of forces that would provide a capability to carry out each AIMS over that time period have been estimated As a base lne the paper assesses current US capability to support national objectives in certain military contingencies The AIMS have been evaluated In terms of their military economic political both International and domestic and arms control implications Certain key issues have been defined the answers to which are fundamental In determining the future direction of US military pol icy The range of alternative strategies described in this report has required that the scope of the analysis be broad rather than narrow As a result the AIMS are representative rather than definitive They rrcwide the analytical framework to assist understanding the issues and iGplications of alternative military strategies The AIMS also provide a general frame ork for consideration of US military strategy Although t'1e d cision need not be a choice of one of the AIMS which are illustrativ the AIMS do allow for id entification of the major elements of defense policy choices that can subsequently be explored o provide a basis for developing national military strategy As a first step Presidential guidance is needed on the issues discussed in a series of key questions relating to the future direction of US military pol icy Subsequently consideration of detailed force posturing options within that policy guidance can follow through either the interagency process or the normal planning programming and budget system decision process as appropriate 8 ASSUMPTIONS Several important assumptions corrrnon to all developed strategies have been made regarding US policy or the international environment during the next decade These assumptions project current trends into the future and obviously do not foretell radical or sudden changes such as a shift in the strategic balance through major unforeseen technologic l breakthrough or in a shift of political viewpoint of a significant portion of the world's population Should these assumptions not prove valid throughout the next eight to ten years another reappraisal of US strategy would be required The major assumptions are These do not include the many assumptions which were made in the course of developing Illustrative force postures some of which differ from current plans i I' ' • _ I · • ' - ' • - J t t ·1 • -·• ' ·'I • L The Soviet Union wl 11 continue to pose the primary threat to the physical security of the United States and to US Interests worldwide This assumption Is the cornerstone of US global military strategy The ijnited States will continue to view the security of Europe Interest and wil 1 continue to participate actively in the defense of NATO which Is threatened by the Warsaw Pact Without such a threat US military strategy would be profoundly different No matter what outcome may result from MBFR there will still remain a threat and a need for NATO military forces and the US with its strategic nuclear capability will play a leading role In NATO as a vital Jhe United States will continue to regard aggres$ On against Ja an as a threat to vital Interests This assumption is one of the two major features the other involves Sino-Soviet relationships of US military strategy in the Pacific and East Asia The PRC and the Soviets wi 11 not effect a rappro hement sufficient to allow sl nlflcant reduction In forces oriented towards each other Should a rapprochement bee fected this would require a fresh review of security requirements So long as Sino-Soviet hostility persists the US will not need to procure specific conventional forces to counter a PRC military threat Should a Sino-Soviet rapprochement be effected it ls not clear to tiat extent PRC military effort might be channeled into directions counter to US Interests Any dramatic change In JX tentlal threats to US interests in the Pacific and East Asia would require a reappraisal of strategy In an Interdependent environment the US will contfnue to have major global interests Access to raw materials and markets is vital to US interests in preserving both domestic and free world needs and as such the US needs the capability unilaterally In some cases and in conjunction with allies for others to lnfluence events beyond US borders--by use of military power where necessary C MAJOR ISSUES In order to assist the reader in reviewing the subsequent portions of this report some of the major Issues related to the future direction of US military policy are presented here These will help lend perspective on the variances among the respective AIMS and allow the reader to focus on the key questions that need resolution before any Informed evaluation of strategy or force posture can be made Among the major questions are ' ··I --- - question One How should the US deal with the threat of Soviet aggression In particular what should be the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces for deterrence and defense If deterrence fails to what extent should the US rely on the early use of nuclear weapons • Question Two To what extent should the US for political or military purposes state objectives or fund programs for security in Europe which are Inconsistent with the interpretation or Implementation of NATO strategy by other members of the All iance7 question Three To what extent should the US acquire ml 1 ltary capabilities above those required for the European theater to undertake military operations either offensive or defensive against the Soviets In a u -uss war uestion Four To what extent should the US plan to have military forces or supplies available for crisis management or intervention In local wars7 To what extent should these forces or supplies be available iithout' drawlng from those required for a major US-USSR war Question Five What should be the US military strategy in East Asia Should the US maintain the current military presence or include additional adjustments in US forces in Korea and the Philippines question Six What constitutes an adequate strategic force posture O LIMITATIONS OF THE REPORT The PRM-1O Force Postures Study ls a broad based study of national military strategy and defense policy for consideration at the highest levels of Government It partakes of most but exhausts none of the many topics and areas of interest which enter into the formulation of national military strategy This study attempts to present illustrative AIMS and force postures and to elicit Presidential guidance on key issues which bring out fundamental differences between the AIMS It does that There are however numerous other things which this study does not do and for the most part never Intended to do These Include the following The PRM did not call for the Force Posture Review to formulate national objectives In the absence of an agreed statement of those national objectives It was necessary to structure the study to analyze Implications of the different AIMS with respect to foreign policy arms control Soviet reactions fiscal policy and domestic considerations This study does not evaluate the Soviet threat The best available national Intelligence was used as the basis for force posture estimates and Soviet and Pact capabilities and Intentions were considered ln the formulation and evaluation of AIMS However In some Instances • • • ' ·· ·' - _ - -- · · r - •- I I _ _ 1-1 £E€REl- assumptions had to be made about the character of the Pact threat because agreed Intelligence was not available Soviet reactions to the AIMS were addressed specifically by the Intelligence Community Absence of a specific section labeled Threat does not mean absence of consideration of a threat but evaluation of threat was not an explicit part of the study Also no·systematic analysis of a responsive Soviet threat--i e Soviet efforts to negate a specific US strategy--was attempted • This Is not a study of manpower and Industrial mobilization preparedness Our finding Is that there Is no concise documentation of this nature available and time precluded completion of such a study Since no complete evaluation of military strategy is possible without se arch into this area the US needs to determine what preparedness policies should be established for both manpower ·ao_d-lndustrial resources to support a future milltary conflict This study does not directly address the theater nuclear farces The appropriate structure of these forces within the guidance that follows this report needs to be investigate' as a priority follow-on effort This study deliberately avoids programmatic issues The idea is to obtain Presidential policy guidance to serve as a basis for subsequent determination of specific issues by other more detailed studies and through the regular defense planning programing and budgeting system This study does not determine to what extent US readiness can hinge on centrally deployable forces nor does it establish to what degree the US should rely on reserve forces Both of these areas also need to be examined in a follow-on effort There are numerous other things this study did not address specifically basing strategic and critical materials stockpile naval shipbuilding nuclear weapon employment policy chemical and biological Issues security assistance and a technological net assessment Some of these issues are addressed In the Net Assessment part of PRM-1O others are addressed separately Finally the study ls·-not the last word in strategic pol icy formulation lt is a concise presentation of an extremely complex sub· ject designed to elicit broad policy guidance As such It should be considered as a point of departure rather than a point of arrival E ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT Section 11 CURRENT CAPABILITIES assesses the current FY 1978 capability of the US to wage war In eight selected scenarios ranging from worldwide war with the Soviets to US Involvement in lesser contingencies These assessments help In establishing a baseline for evaluating strategy alternatives This section ls supported by Annex A which Is comprised of the eight contingency assessments in their ful 1 form 1-L Section 111 AIMS has four major parts The first describes the methodology used In deriving the AIMS and their substrategy elements It ls supported by Annex B an earlier Memorandum for the President describing the substrategy elements In datall The second surrmarlzes the eight AIMS presented for final c onslderatlon--thelr content forces end costs It I supported by Annex C which contains full descriptions forces costs and lmpllc atlons of the alternative strategies and Annex 0 which contains a discussion of strategic forces and options The third part lays out the major comparative dimensions of the AIMS The fourth part assesses the various impllc atlons of the AIMS-·Soviet reactions and foreign policy arms control fiscal and domestic aspec ts--and describes possible non·mllltary initiatives to help ease Implementation Section IV EVALUATION OF AIMS evaluates the AIMS with respect to how each answers In a different fashion the six major Issues posed In paragraph C above _ _' • I ·• - - 51CRK -· 1-5 II CURRENT CAPABILITIES A PURPOSE AND CAUTIONS This part of the PRM-1O analysis provides an assessment of the current FY 1978 ability of the US to wage war in eight selected scenarios These contingencies fall Into two general ca tegories first II worldwide war with the Soviet Union including conflict In Central Europe the NATO flanks outside Europe primari Ty the Far East and strategic nuclear exchange and second selected lower level contingencies including US-Soviet conflict in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa and US intervention in a Korean conflict not involving the USSR or PRC These assessments provide an indication of how wel I the US and its Allies would do in these selected scenarios today In effect this paper provides a judgment as to the adequacy of the current US force posture The contingency assessments in their complete forms are contained in Annex A to this report This ass ssment focuses primarily on the warfighting caoaoillties of US military forces The ability of military forces together with other instruments of national policy to deter conflict at all levels or failing that to prevent uncontrolled escalation is treated only in the context that poteiitial warfighting capabilities have inherent decerrent value Det rrence is dependent upon not only the ability oP individual components of US military forces to prevail in a given contingency but also upon the interaction of all these forces Thus the outcome of a conventional conflict in Europe depends upon the deterrent value of our theater and strategic nuclear forces as well as the warfighting capabil· ities of US general purpose forces -- and those of our Allies The forward deployment of US forces for peacetime pr sence and cr1s1s response is a major element of both their deterrent value and their political utility US deployed forces have historically been used to signal political convnitment promote regional stability support A lies lnflu· ence potential adversaries and when required respond rapidly to developing crises Conflict deterrence and crisis response demand credible warfighting capabilities across a broad range of scenarios if US forces are to be successful in this role The following assessments of the outcomes In various conventional scenarios are made on the basis of static Indicators The term static In the context of the general purpose force contingencies means that we have looked at the ability of contending sides to build up and sustain key types of forces In an area of contention over time based on certain logical assumptions but that we have not attempted dynamically to game the conflict between the opposing forces after they are In place Thus the assessments do not examine in detail the attrition of opposing forces after the outbreak of hostilities Ground tactical air and naval Including amphibious force buildups have been examined and judged as to their combined adequacy using various criteria In the case of strategic nuclear exchanges between the US and the USSR dynamic analyses are presented These judgments of force capability are dependent· to some degree upon detailed scenario assumptions In order to appreciate fully the contingency assessment It is necessary to refer to Annex A ' 11-1 R- ffiPSE-eMT B US-USSR WORLDWIDE CONFLICT Central Europe US general purpose forces planning places primary emphasis on the defense of Western• Europe In view of the strong US political military economic and social ties to this area The confrontation between NATO and Warsaw Pact general purpose forces Is focused in Central Europe where the two alliances have concentrated large standing armies kept at a high state of readiness In FY 1978 the Pact has a larger overall fighting force than NATO anc would be able to take the Initiative at the outbreak of a war NATO however als6 has effective forces and a defensive mi sion for which It should need comparatively fewer forces The major imbalances from NATO's perspectfve are the Pact's potential for quickly building up its combat forces In East Europe and NATO's low inventory of combat consumables WRM On tho other hand NATO forces can mobflize rapidly once the political decisio is taken and offer considerable risks to the Warsaw Pact planner including of course the prospect of nuclear escalation as a hedge against unexpected conventional failure The assessment concludes that the chance of NATO stopping an attack with minimal loss of territory and then achieving its full objective of recovering that land which had been lost appears remote at the present time It Is also considered unlikely that the Warsaw Pact could achieve Its full objectives of defeating NATO Central European forces and reaching the French border and North Sea coast This uncertainty together with the risk of nuclear escalation ls judged to act as a deterrent to precipitate Soviet action In Central Europe In FY 1978 The Pact's large modern ground forces In Eastern Europe and the Western USSR pose the major threat to NATO A Pact headstart in mobilizing ground forces could lead to a significant Pact advantage at the time NATO commenced mobilization However once NATO orders full mobilization only about 2-4 days are needed to bring sufficient forces forward to reduce the ADE Armored Division Equivalents a measure for aggregating static combat potential ratlo of total Pact versus NATO forces to roughly 2 1 Estab1 ishment of logistics and other support would of course take much longer Even with a theater-wide 2 1 force advantage hlgher local ADE ratios -on the order of 3 1 or greater at the point of main attack or along axes of attack -- would be needed by an attacker In order to achieve a probable successful Initial breakthrough In this regard there ls a distinct tactical advantage accruing to the Warsaw Pact due to thelrabil ity to mass combat power on major attack routes of their choosing while employing economy of force elsewhere The ratio Includes all Warsaw Pact units even For purposes of this section Warsaw Pact moblllzatlon times of 14 and 30 days were assumed Short-warning attack scenarios less than 7 days NATO mobilization which are of growing interest were considered but not analyzed In detal 1 In the cont lngency assessment ·- v-boi elD O Jrn L _ l I- t · though some would likely be employed as combat attrition replacements In contrast NATO uses an Individual rather than unit replacement concept NATO must rely on Its tactical air forces to help blunt the Pact armored spearheads early In a war NATO al rcraft are generally more capable than those of the arsaw Pact even though they may be numerically fewer for the first few weeks of mobilization NATO maintains major maritime forces primarily In order to ensure that ml 1 ltary and economic resupply cargoes can be moved to Europe to sustain NATO combat capability and preclude the Pact from considering that it has an option of outlasting NATO NATO's maritime forces In f'Y 1971 S should be able to ensure that essential resupply and reinforcement could be provided to sustain NATO combat forces even though i11itlal merchant ship losses could be serious NATO maintains prepositioned stocks of equipment ana resupply items In Europe partly to prevent possible Initial shipping losses from being decisive in constraining the ground forces buildup NATO currently has critically low Inventories of war reserve mate· riel -- munitions attrition replacements for vehicles spare parts and other items The US five-year defense program provides for achievement of 90-days of stocks by l91 S2 with a goal of 11 SO-day·stockpiles The other NATO countries have only about 30-days of stocks based on differing consumption rates and do not currently plan to buy more The low WRM inventories would be the most significant factor limiting overall NATO and US force sustainabi 1 lty ln FY 1978 since al 1 the member nations currently fall well short of the DOD 180-day goal for ground force support Additionally there ls considerable uncertainty regarding the sustainability of Warsaw Pact forces A considerable amount of the concern felt for NATO military capabilities reflects certain judgments made concerning the starting circumstances of the war -- the length of mobilization time and the degree to which NATO mobill· zatlon might lag that of the Pact Part of the problem reflects the difficulty of identifying what the Pact views as adequate mobilization time and how they would balance additional build up time against reduced mobilization time for NATO In launching an attack A second Important factor concerns NATO's Judgment of its own likely response time to a Pact oulldup Some of the NATO fear for lts military security rests on Judgments that NATO would be unwilling to make the political decisions necessary to match a Pact buildup as soon as It ls recognized as such Other Important planning considerations exist f'or example NATO's conventional force posture must be complemented by nuclear forces designed to deter nuclear attacks NATO nuclear forces are generally considered adequate for deterrence of any lrrmedlate Pact escalation to this level of warfare Chemical warfare must also be deterred The Pact currently has superior CW capability thereby creating an undesirable element of risk In this part of NATO's deterrent · · ·· · ' i '- · ' I I I• _T@-SE REi - NATO Flanks This contingency examines conflict on NATO's northern and southern flanks concurrent with the previously discussed Warsaw Pact attack In Central Europe • If NATO can st blllze a defensive line In the Central Region the flanks could probably be defended though not without some loss of territory However the conflict on the North Flank could impact upon North Atlantic SLOC protection efforts and therefore the reinforcement and resupply of the Center The establishment of a full NATO air and ASW barrier in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom GIUK gap would probably result In significant attrition over time of Soviet forces attempting to operate in the Atlantic Neverthek s Allied support for operations in Norway would ·continue to face a significant threat from Soviet naval forces In northern waters Operations on the South Flank would not likely influence the conflict in the Central Region unless one side gained a quick string of victories permitting redeployment of some forces to the Center This is considered an unlikely probability The naval campaign on the southern flank would depend initially on the ability of the Allied forces to absorb the Initial Soviet attack but ls judged eventually to result In Allied control of the Mediterranean In this contingency Imbalances exist for both sides NATO faces a Pact superiority In tactical aircraft of approximately 2 1 on the southern flank The USSR has an additional advantage In interior lines of communication which would permit rapid shifting of materiel to either flank The Pact would have problems with the uncertainty of US commitment of the Marine Amphibious Forces MAF which could be employed on either flank and with restrictions In the deployment of Soviet naval forces from the Black Baltic and Barents Seas NATO would have problems with the uncertainties of Pact deployment of naval forces Into the Atlantic and Mediterranean before hostilities begin In Greece and Turkey much of the combat consumables would be exhausted after about two-three weeks of intensive combat However SLOCs to both countries would be open after two-four weeks of combat ln the Mediterranean There are major uncertainties In how the course of conflict In the Central Region would affect allocation of combat forces to the flanks and In how well both sides could sustain ground and air force operations NATO has an overall advantage in tactical air forces on the northern flank total major naval combatants available In the Atlantic and Mediterranean and the flexibility of MAF employment Non-European Operations This contingency examines the worldwide Implications of a NATO-WP conventional war concurrent with the previously studied Intense conflict In Central Europe and on NATO's flanks It concentrates on the ability of the US and Its Pacific Allies Japan Australia end New Zeeland to prevail 1 QP SECRET11-1 -WP SECRET against Soviet forces in the Far East after planned redeployments of US air and naval forces to the European theater upon NATO mobilization It assumes that conflict does not break out between North and South Korea The ability of NATO to protect the flow of Hlddle Eastern oil Is not considered on the assumption that in the event of oil SLOC Interdiction NATO would depend upon existing POL stockpiles until forces could be freed from other theaters to counter this additional threat • While the war In Central Europe ls of course the conflict of greatest Importance the outcome of the worldwide conflict influences foreign support resources and bases necessary for US prosecution of the war the stance adopted by the PRC and negotiations to terminate hostilities The overall ability of US and Allied forces to prevail against Soviet forces outside of Europe Is uncertain US advantages are based primarily upon control of critical maritime choke points acrc _•s to bases in Japan Including the Ryukyus and South Korea and the ability to threaten the territory of the USSR itself through naval and air attack These advantages are offset by the difficulty of establishing effective anti-air and anti-submarine barriers in the face of intense Soviet opposition Although essential military shipping to Japan could probably be maintained the possibility exists that the USSR could cut the economic and resupply LOC's to Japan endangering Japan's continued support of US military operations This would make the US task in the Pacific considerably more difficult There is always a possibility that the PRC North Korea Vietnam or other nations might take aggressive actions during or In the aftermath of a conventional war between the US and the USSR Both sides however have multiple deterrents to such actions ranging from threats on the low end to using nuclear weapons on the high end It would appear that these measures are adequate In F'Y 1978 to discourage any such peripheral activities The major problems for the US are the need to disengage forces under the current swing strategy which requl res redeployment of significant US naval and some air forces from the Pacific to the European Atlantic theater upon mobi 1 izatlon the 1 imlted Japanese defense capabll ltles and the strong Soviet forces available in the Far East Soviet problems Include the need to maintain substantial forces opposite the PRC the difficulty of sustaining extended naval operations In the Pacific and the vulneratblllty of Isolated areas to US air and naval attack Kajor uncertainties for both sides are the nature and Impact of Soviet measures to deny Persian Gulf oil to the West Soviet naval deployments prior to hostilities Japanese strength and determl atlon and the actions of third parties during the conflict primarily the PRC but Including North Korea and Vietnam US-USSR Nuclear Conflict The results of a major nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union are that both nations would suffer very high levels of damage and neither could conceivably be decribed as a ''winner Further 11-5 WP -SEGW ' SECREf there ls no decisive advantage to either side in terms of residual resources Today this is true regardless of who strikes first or whether the attack is a surprise or occurs after a period of warning With some slight variations it ls true regardless of the targeting policy adopted by either side In the three cases examined In the analysis the US suffers at least 140 mi 11 ion fatal I ties and the Soviet Union suffers at least 113 mi 11 ion fitalltles Both·the US and the USSR would Incur over 70% destruction to economic recovery resources • The results of several limtted nuclear attacks on Individual force components of both sides reveal the following outcomes Whichever side initiates a limited nuclear attack against the ICBM forces of the other side will not find itself better off In terms of the residual number of ICBMs ICBM RVs and thro weight In SLBM attacks on bomber bases the US would not lose a significant number of Its bombers on alert The limited nucleai attacks have been executed in Isolation with the objective of maximizing damage on the particular delivery systems involved without regard for other targeting requirements An attack on any single force component would result In the alerting of the remaining two force components thus the results of the one-to-one exchanges should not be aggregated since they may not be achievable In combination In fact the targeting in an all-out exchange might well differ significantly from that in these 1 imlted attack scenarios C OTHER CONTINGENCIES Middle East The contingency scenario the Middle East between he evaluation postulates a conflict The scenario Investigated here Is considered Illustrative probable course of events opportunity to mobilize bl e's This Hldeast scenario does permit a comparison of bl • Sub-Saharan Africa This contingency examines the ability of the US and Soviet Union to introduce and sustain moderate levels of combat forces in sub-Saharan Africa and to prevail in a limited conflict there It examines a notional scenario Involving US assistance to Zaire In combating an Angolan attack which is supported by Soviet and Cuban forces Neither the US nor the Soviets mobilize or employ air or ground forces deployed In Europe In the past the Soviet Union has avoided direct military confrontation with US forces In non-contiguous regions and would probably attempt to use covert assistance shipments of military equipment and surrogate forces to further their Interests It Is considered unlikely that the USSR would attempt to match a US force buildup In sub-Saharan Africa If the US c00111ited its forces first and the possibility of escalation to direct conflict between Soviet and American units were present The reverse may not be true for the US Although the US has been cautious In those contingencies with significant escalatory potential It has In the past risked direct confrontation with Soviet forces -- e g Cuba In 1962 Haiphong mining In 1972 and the worldwide alert during the 1973 Hldeast War The ability of the US to project forces over great distances and to establish and protect lts reinforcement resupply routes is well known and The following notional US combat forces were committed to this contingency 3 carrier task groups 1 Harlne Amphibious Force HAF 3 Army divisions and 12 Air Force fighter squadrons P -SECRf f- _7 ·-· -- ---- - ---- ---- ---- - ---- -- -_ _ ·· f P SECRH gives the US the flexibility to support Its national policies essentially where It wishes Thus even If the Soviets were given a headstart In the buildup of military forces In Angola the US would probably be able to match and surpass he Soviet efforts • If both superpowers were to corrrnence deployment of combat forces to sub-Saharan Africa either from a standing start or after a period of tension the US would have a substantial advantage owing to I Its more direct less encumbered LOCs 2 more mobile projection-ready forces backed by extensive strategic and tactical lift assets 3 better expedl· tionary equipment and experience and 4 amphibious assault capability If confl let w re to occur during or after the deployment the US would likely prevail we would be able to Interdict Soviet sustaining air and sea LOCs while at the same time protecting our own relnformcent resupply Ii nes Despite Its overall advantages the US would experience problems initially in malntalnlng POL stocks for Its forces deployed by air and In rapidly clearing any Soviet mining effort in Zairian coastal waters Soviet problems are much more extensive The Ir abl t ity to rapidly atr'1ift forces ls highly sensitive to overflight and landing rights their projection forces airborne and naval Infantry are not structured to fight their way Into a hostile area and they would be unable to either maintain their own sustaining LOCs or Impose an effective blockade of US deployed forces Korea This contingency examines a Korea The US provides Initial US ground forces Initially take corrrnitted by 0 7 The USSR and Korea surprise North Korean attack on South air and naval support at D-day In-place action only In self-defense but are fully PRC provide only logistic support to North If the North Koreans were to achieve tactical surprise It ls possible that they could at least temporarily attain their most l kely major objective--the capture of Seoul However the North Koreans would probably not be able to galn and sustain major breakthroughs or wear down the ROK in sustained combat The ability of the u s to project military power Into Northeast Asia Is the critical factor In this assessment If the North Korean reserves could be prevented from arriving at the DHZ the US ROK The following notional US combat force packages were examined for possible ccmnltment In this contingency 1-2 carrier task groups 1 Marine Amphibious Brigade 3 9 HAF 1 Army division and 2 Air Force fighter squadrons i' I ' ·• WP SECR T - i 1 -StCREtTULi 111-1 ION• UllliO A N I AYO-Iii' PIA UUPINC o rlATIO S OUIIIIN' A lilATO• _ WAl AST ASIA ACTIWITIU AHO tAl LOCAL AlS Oll CT OH IIU IIITIATIVES INClU S O ats NCI N AVY INT RW NTION CLEA A su ra1011n llNtT LOSS IINITID ACTIDII CUUCNT 'Rts NCI Lie HT INT lV WTIOII 1na1111 u- roacr AOVMTAGU WTIC TRINIR NINll IIL trroar l OUC D arstNCI LIOITU ACTIO• MI NTAI N OV 11 l LL IOkCI IALAIICI IIODll 11D VI THDMIIAI aon I• tu•o US•USU NOAEWOS NUCL Allli eoN lltT COUNT lOrr NSIWl e rsrn I ATIA lS ni w1at VITHDMIIAI l L IA NCI -· ASSUl O l TA l IATIOII To formulate composite AIMS substrategies were combined in a style that took one from the first column one from the second and so forth A process of elimination led to the eight AIMS analyzed in this report Out of the 216 possible AIMS variationi these eight were chosen as the set best encompassing a broad range while addressing in different ways the major military issues facing the US C CONTENT OF AIMS The final eight AIMS and their component substrategies are shown in Table 111·2 below The dotted line represents a rough approximation of current US capability in the terms of the substrategy elements listed The sustainability dimension··which refers to the nominal length of time the US or NATO is prepared to support a conventional conflict from stocks plus initial production··is not apparent from this table see footnotes but it is the key variable between AIMS F providing for 30 days and F Variant providing for 90 days Of the eight AIMS F Variant calls for forces closest to the goals established In the present US Five Year Defense Program FYDP Each of these strategies has a specific rationale for 1 inking building blocks into coherent AIMS as summarized below Detailed descriptions ahd implications of AIMS are in Annex C Strategic nuclear forces and related Issues are discussed In detai 1 in Annex D 1 • 111-2 - •i-- if - M RET·-· - defense could probably stall the Initial North Korean attack north of Seoul With the US contributions of lan and carrier-based tactical air assets and materiel support It would appear that the US end ROK would prevail against North Korea In the longer term • The level of forces which could be brought to bear et the front on 0-day would generally favor North Korea over the ROK In all categories The North Koreans would have the additional benefits of the Initiative an unconventional warfare capability pre-established LOCs with both the PRC and USSR and peacetime deployments which are conducive to tactical surprise The ROK has widely spread Infantry forces with limited mobility and vulnerable stocks of war reserve materiel Major uncertainties associated with this contingency are the actions of the USS nd PRC and the efficiency and maintainability of Soviet and PRC LOCs Into North Korea ROK forces supplemented by US assistance have the lead In number of tactical aircraft and in overall payload capability after about one week of conflict In addition the US ROK naval forces practically all US are generally superior Other US ROK advantages are the avallabllllty of J ipan es a staging area preppred defensive positions stronger manpower reserves and economic mobilization base more capable all-weather aircraft precision-guided munitions the availability of the US Marine Amphibious Force HAF and a good capability for long-term sustainability It hould be emphasized that despite South Korea's ongoing progress In strengthening Its forces certain forms of US military support still are required for• successful defense effort The ROK Army appears capable of self-defense without large-scale support from US ground combat forces However the ROK still requires US tactical al r air defense naval logistic command and control intelligence and corrmunlcatlons support · • The following notional US combat forces were conrnltted to this contingency 5 carrier task groups 2 Marine Amphibious Forces I Arrrry division and 2h Al r Force fighter squadrons 11-9 IOP-SECRE-T -- • -· · - 1 AIMS M IOll·t U 0fl' M l EAC 0 HPI 11G oru AT I OMS Ou« l lK ACTIYITl S MD ot NTIAL LOC AL WiJ AS A -ATO _ ' EAST ASIA US·uH• NUCL Aa i lff 1 fHMSIV tNIT'tArr t S JS - - - - 1 - - INClt ASfD PII ESOCE -ft AVY lltl£JIY NTIOII - Cl Al 'iUP IIIOltlT' - LI o Ho ACT I OM- - - CUllll NT E S NC •- - LIGHT I NT JIV NT I OM- J TA IN us rOJIC AOV AHTilG S '4 N _l HOltT UINIJI l DIJCED PJl S NoCE ll111T£D AC1'IOII l'l llNTAIN OV ' '- L roll CE SAlANC l'IOOlfl O WITl4DAAWAI 1 PIIOn' ll l 1-'MC ASSUl O l TAl lATtOIII OIOLY ih planned ability to sustain combat in Europe--sustainabi l ity--for the NATO-Warsaw Pact substr'ategy of each AIMS is as shown bel'ow Some AIMS were evaluated for more than one assum t ion as to the period of time for which a logiHic sustaining capability was designed AIMS Sustainability in Europe EI FI G Nominally JO day Nominally 90 day Nominally 90 day 130 days and Indefinite D·Day to the F Variant H I day production can meet consumption J• M 2 demands or D·P Indefinite D•P AIMS F Variant lies closest to prograJ'11'Tled US capabilities The major exception i'i that the strategic nuclea r capability of this AIHS is slightly greater than that currently on h nd I I I· 3 COMPONENTS OF AIMS 1 Al HS Ii « Ill lUJl O Alt - Ctl lt'I RATIONS OUIINC A IIATO· _ I U ACTIYITl S AMO 'OTEIUtAL lOCAl w t AS lAH ASIA IOt·tUll Ol AII US·USS• IIATO· IIU lE U OlffllCT I• UlO f OHSETTlltCi HHCs S orrs TTING ATTA kS or i11cc r outNSE •lflTIATIV S H AY'I' - tJlll NT Plt S lriC - LIMIT LOSS- - ELASTIC TRINIII GP TIOIIIS DUIWffi A IIATO· _ U - 'IIIIAAL FFOl T -LICHT INT II Y NTION INT£ IIY NTION - Lll'IIT O A Tl llf CL Al SUPlll lOIITY - t lAIN US f'OIIC AQylJUACES Olll T OU NSE LIHIT lOSS- - l ITIAT1YfS - - -LIPttTED ACTIC - - MINTAIN OV IUJ L fOll C IAlAHC ASSUJl 0 l TALIATtUN TIUP'wllt ° AIMS lUJI OPlAA P A fl EPIN ACTIYITt S ANO POT NTIAL lOCAl lodS JPf• H10NS 01Ul 1Nli _' _A_ __ lAH A IA US·U5SR NUCL Alt UlNFllLT _I COIJNTlll OTFfNSIVl OUECT OH NSE 1 IIITIATIY S LIMIT LOSS- - i•Ol O LAST IC U P'wl •E Ill CLtU S1 P010II IT1 INCUASE Pll S N H A'i''I' ACTION CuO IH PRlSE IICE L 1C HT IIIITEAY IIITION Jl TAIM US FOIICt ACES AL rrQ tT 11 0UCCD Pll S HC£ Lll ITEO ACTION -AINTAIN DY itALl FOIi 8ALA IIC M01' llf1 0 •ITHOIIAWAL rllNIIIE INTCll Y frilr10N Pll Oll t' 11 L IANCf The planned at Europe•·sustai substr'ategy of Some AIMS were assumption as a logistic sus E F G F Variant H I ASS1JltfO It£ TAL IATIVN ONLY WI THOU W l l J• M AIMS J ' - rrsnr 1111 y U11 -HP1 c oti• JAOP -'N OP UTIIJlltS DLtJl INC A TIYITl S l jr jQ POTENTIAL lOCAl AIMS F Variant capab i 1 it i es U i·U iU the strategic n • slightly greate 1 1 uc a s 1l CT O f NS l IIITI AflY 5 ll'OT LOS5- - 1 ASTIC Tll 111 HUYY Ultll NT PIIB ll t MIJIIIAAL FFOlT llf0UC£0 Pll S N - - •LIC NT INT lty NTIO INT IIY IIITION Lll IT O ACTION --11 TAIN US fQII £ AOV I MTAC S AINTAIN Ov II ALL FOIICE SALANCE AS5Ul D 11 TALIATt OHL Y t l WI THOII AWA ' -• - · COMPONENTS OF A I I-IS 1 AIMS H 110M tUIIOl'lAM 'lA tlClt IIIC O' IIAflC-5 0Ull•' ACTIYITl S ANO or TIAL lOCAl WAII S A NATO· _ WAIi _ 1 IOl·tt llC ENI US·USSl Ofl'Cl I• ' IS Du IIU l Al ca• ll T A U TC # WAIi COUIIT lliOfF S I Yl OH SETI r-c Aruo s INITIHIYfS l ll'IIT LOH- - Ll IT D ACTION - IN l AS O PlES NC - •CUU£1tT Pl SElf - CL Al SUP AIOllT - - LICHT IIIHAY fritrlC - - 41 UIII US FO C DIii HT DHOISE LIMIT LOU- - - - -LUOT l 4CTll lil AOYA IITA i S l EOUCED Pll£S NCE LIJIUT O ACTI _ - AINTAIN OV Ml L ELASTIC fllilPVIA ro11u BAL 01ct 1'1 101Fl D WITHDIU WAL Tlll - 111 PIIOXY l L IA MC ASSUl D l TALIATIUN TIIIIP'Vll ONLY AIMS uro- _ lilOfll ·lUMOPlNI oP IIATIONS DIJ IIIG Ill VII OP A NATO·W'P 'wAl P AC ll El'INC ACTIVITIES ANO 1 The p· ned Euroi e--sust subst · 1 egy Some t MS we assum ion a INITIATIV S a los s ic LIC HT INTfllYOH ON LUUT LOSS- - us ro11 ct ltt1 1111 AIMS AClS IIIIMl FrOll T L 11'1 T O ACTION MIIITAIII 0 A All FOIIC BA LAN PROXY ll L IANC ASS•Jli O IIHALIATIJH ONlV E F F Var c t H I J• H lil • •bll OPtA 11 i P ll ATll IIIS OL•ll IIIC NATO·Wf' 1111 lUII OPt - y f lAl -HPINC A Tl ltTl S A 0 POTENTIAL OCAL_'ol U S U ·U Sl H AYV 1 T II Y NTIO CU All SUP II IOII I TV 1- OFfS TTlltC ATTACKS 0111 CT D£fENU L1' 11' LOU- ELASTIC Tll - Ulf - - IHITIATl l S IHCll £AS D Pll S NLl l1IOT Q ACTION - CUU NT Pll S IIIC llfl L EHOlT - - LICHT tNTEI Y NTIOM LIPIIT O ACTIOIII Pl OX 11 l IANC --l TAIN US FOJIC AOYA IITAC S _ IIIUIN 01 IU LL '011 C ALAN ASSuAED 11 oA ONLY WI THDIU WA • 1 ' •' I Al 1S F ariar capabi 'ties the st a egic slight - grec -sECREr • AIMS E IION•fUJt0P AN • P A IC Pl NG NAT0•lo'P o JtATIC S OUJl IIIG 111 UMP A KATO·lo'P W U AST ASIA ACTtVITl S AJI0 US·USSJI POTENTIAL LOCAL WAJtS NUClfAJt CONFLICT COUNTEJt0HENS IV or sETTINt AITAClS OffS TT ATTAC I NI 1'1 lTI VU 011 ECT OH NS INCJl UHD PIUSEIICE LIPHT LOU ----ILIPIITEO ACTl0N H A9V 1NTEltV IIITION l U SUP ltOJtlTY --CUJl Jt NT PI ESfNCE--••LICHT INTEII V NTION--- it U 11111 US FOACf '-----✓ AOVNITAG S ELASTIC TJttPVIJt lt DUCED PJt SENCE MINTAIN 0 1 U LL fOltCE IALANCE PII0O RH I UI ASSUll O Jt TA i lATl0N Olll'f LIPOT L JH- ELASTIC ' ''WIii TII I P'JI A AIMS F anJ F VARIMNT P A K PUIG NOM· UII OPEM • IIAT0-lo'P OP JtATIC S OUJl 1NC I II UJl OP A N UO·lo'P WAJt AST ASIA A TIVlTl S A NO US·UHl POT NT AL LOCAL WAAS NU L Al CONFLICT NATO-WP JN fuA0 ' COUIIT JtOfFENSIV OFFSETTING ATTACKS orrsrn· - -r1Al• 0IJt CT 0 FENSE IIIITIATIV S LI PUT LOSS LIPOT D ACTION El lSTIC n 1 - 111 PONl -'l Erf0U Tll 1 - 1111 tUAWY lNTlllV IITIOII L AA SUPfl OIIITY 01111 ECT P NS CUl' 111 NT Pll S IIC L 1GHT I NTU llNT I ll TAIN US F0IIC A0 l TAC S lll'IIT LOB- - IIEOUCED Pll HNCE LIPHT 0 ACTION '°'INTAIII OV U LL F0IICE JALANCE ELASTIC •t PWIII OQIFllD - 1THOll l '-L PII0IY R l lANC E ASSUll D 111 TALl lTll ONLY WI THOll lWAI AIMS G NON·EUII0PE - OPEii AT OtlS DUii I fllC A NAT0-lo'P 'I All NAT0·wP 111 UII0P AST '-StA P AC KEEPINC ACTtv1T1ES AND POTENTIAL LOCAL 'olAIIS US·USSII NUCL AII CONFLICT NAT0-w1' IN EUR0P COUNTEII0H NS I I QFFS TTIIIC 4TT4CKS orrs TTING ATTACKS IIIITIATtVES DIIIECT 0tr NS LNCIIEASlD PR UNCE H A IT INTlllYENT10N LIPO T LOSS- LIMIT lDU • - - -•Lt IT D ACTIO -• CUU IO Pll S NCE --LIGHT - -RETAIN US F0IIC A0 NITAG S ELASTIC Tll _111 £ El lSTIC Tlll III INIP 11 L Erro•T IIEOU 0 Pll S NC LIPO £0 ACTIOfil MINTA IN 0 1£111 AL PIii OU ll L1ANC ASSUll D 11 ETAI IATIO FOIICE MLANC TIIINIIIE O0IFIED lil1TH011 lWAL Iii t THO U WAl ONLT - • AIMS£ P ACE1t i IIC N• UltOPEAII NATO- _ OP IIATIONS DUllJIIC IN U- 0PE A ll ATO- N 'ol U AST ASIA •c ACTIVITIES oUID US·UHl POT NTIAL LOCAL WAlS NU l Al CONFltCT COUNTElOH IIS I VE OFFS TT1 ATTAClS OFFS TTI ATTAC OIUCT DH NS INITIATIVES LI KIT LOSS L11'41TEO ACTION CLEAIII SuPEIIJOAlfl' INCltU SED PIIESOCE Plll SENCE--•-LIClolT INT ly JHION--•lt TAIN US FQlCE AOVA NTAGH INTAIII 0 IULL FORCE l AL t NC ASSUlit 0 Jt TA llATll tj ONLY PIIIQll lt L 1- Wt THOAAWAl AIMS F dnJ VARl NT MON·fUltOPU N OPEltATIONS OUllNG A IU TQ· WAA It AYO- _ IN UlOP • AST ASIA J P ACEKE P NG ACTIYtTIES AlilD US·USSII PQT NTIAL NUCL AII COlilFLICT LOCAL IIIAltS CDUNTEMHENSIY C0lnH II0H NSltl OFFSETllllG ATTACkS INITIATIVES DJ lECT DEFENSE IN llllASlD PR SENC 14£AY'f INTEIIV NTIO • L l GHT I IITE IIY NT I LIMIT LOSS IUTAIH US FOACE Ll IT LOSS- AOYA NTAG S ELASTIC TJU _111£ Mllllfllot l FFQU TIIIP'ltl lH lt OUC D Pl S NCE LIPOTE0 ACT Otl l' AINTAIN 0 AAll f0JtCE aALANCE l'IOOIFl O jJTHOAA'ol lL Pll QIY 11 l IA MC ASSUJtED MTAl AT1•_ 0NLT WI TH0AAWA l AIMS G 1N· UROPEA N 0PEIIATIONS 0UlitlNC A UT0· ° WAit NATO· _ 111 EUIIOP AST ASIA P A II HPIMC ACTl'-11Tl S AHO PQT IITIAL LOCAL lS uS·USSl NU L Al C0NfllCT NATO- ° I It E •JJIQP COUNTE I 0HENS I YE OffS£TT111C t TTAC • 0ffSETTIMG ATTAC S DIIIE T 0HENS INITIATIVES IN IIEAH0 Pll S NC H l VT IIT IIYENTI0N lEAl SUP l OllTY LIMIT LCSS- Lll'IIT LOSS • - - -•Lll'IITED ACTIOM-• ELASTIC Tllll i'III NINl L Erro•r CUUENT Pll S NCE IIEDUCE0 PA£SEMCE --LIGMT --IIETAIII US f0IICE -'DYAIITAC ES 4 AIMTAIN 0V II Al F0IICE BALANCE ELASTIC IIP'wll Tit I P'wl IIE ASSUlitED ll TA llAT10N ONL 'I' - AIMS M IOl·tUIIIO AN EACCIClO'INC 0 T ONS O MIJIK A 11 uo- WM UST ASIA A TIVITlt S ANO US•USU OT IITUL lOCAL S NUCL _ C041f ICr I' ruo run1vr fFSfTTINC An co omcr OfHlfst I Ill TIATI YES J--- IHCIH AHD Plfl S lf u i' toss - - - - - LI I'll T D ACT I ON - -f - - CUU lfT Plfl 5ElfC£•- - A'f'T llfTUY NT CUU ' U lltlOlllT L l '-HT I lfl ll'i'ENTI a - - - u I II us ro•n AOVANT- £S EL lSfl Ta I P' 11 a HIN Ml EF FOU A DUC D Plfl S NC MllfU IN OV MI L FOlll Ct IAUNC fUNIU ASSUlt D •ET '- IATION ° WI THOR AWAI l The planned abi 1 ity to sustain combat in Europe--sustainabi lity--for the NATO-Warsaw Pact 0 substr'ategy of each AtHS is as shown bel ow Some AIHS were evaluated for more· than one assum tion· as to the period of time for which a logistic sustaining capability was designed Sustainabi I ity in Europe E• F G f Variant H I Nominally JO days Nominally 90 days Nominally 90 days 130 days and Indefinite O Day to the J• H 'l day production can - eet consumption demands or 0-P Indefinite 0-P AIHS F Variant I ies closest to prograJrrT1ed US capabilities The major exception is that the strategic nuclear capability of this AIMS is slightly greater than that currently on h nd I I I- 3 ------ ---- ·- ---·-- --- AIMS E - This AIMS ls based on the premise that US objectives can be achieved with somewhat reduced reliance on military force but the us still would retain the capabl lity to wage a major conventional war of short duration with the USSR US strategic nuclear capabilities would be somewhat reduced not all US advantages would be maintained nor would an extensive efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued The nuclear threshold would be about the same as It is currently In conjunction with NATO Allies the US would plan to have the conventional capabi I ity to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River I lne for about 30 days A defense which stabilizes along the Weser-Lech line yields to Pact forces about a quarter to a third of the FRG territory east of the Rhine River In addition the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide In the event of European war A reduced presence in East Asia no US fo ce in Korea or the Philippines would reduce the potential for certain regional involvements and would reduce but not negate the US ability to influence great power relationships there Other global interests would be advanced primarily by diplomatic and economic efforts and any 1 imited military intervention would require drawing down forces dedicated try other purposes AIMS F - This AIMS is based on the premise that US objectives can be met through a strategy achievable by approximately the current US mi 1 itary forces but with a capability for sustained combat comparable to that of our NATO Allies US nuclear capabilities would be somewhat enhanced all present US advantages in strategic nuclear force balance indices would be retained with the expectation of a hard-target kill capability against all Soviet silos The nuclear threshold would be about the same as it is currently As In AIMS E the US in conjunction with NATO Al I ies would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for abou 30 days thus involving loss of NATO territory In addition the US would maintain a 1 imited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war In contrast to AIMS E the current programmed military deployments in East Asia less land forces In Korea would be retained Other global interests would be advanced by a moderate capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes AIMS F Variant - This AIMS Is based on the premise that US objectives can be met by a modest increase In US military capability and a substantial increase in sustainability by our NATO Allies This strategy Is identical to AIMS F except that ln a European war sustainability is commensurate with that currently programmed for US forces with a requisite increase In sustainability by our NATO Allies In conjunction with the NATO Allies the US would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a detennlned Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 90 days still Involving loss of NATO territory Both sides are ass-d to have the capability to employ additional forces In Central Europe beyond the first month of conflict so this AIMS requires more forces than AIMS F AIMS F Variant requires forces at least comparable to those in the current US Five Year Def nse Program but in excess of those currently programmed by the NATO Allies -iEtRff 1 I r ' ·· ' 1 ' -··· ·- - ' ·· AIMS G - This AIMS is based on the premise that achievement of US objectives both inside and outside Europe would be enhanced by a stronger conventional military capability outside Europe US strategic nuclear capabilities would be somewhat reduced not all us advantages would be maintained nor would an extensive efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued The nuclear threshold in Europe however might be raised because of the enhanced conventional capabilities outside Europe As in AIMS E and F' th'e US In conjunction with NATO All les would have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days thus Involving loss of NATO territory Contrary to previous AIMS however the US would maintain naval and air forces capable of taking conventional initiatives outside of Europe against the USSR In East Asia approximately the current programmed military deployments--less land forces In Korea--would be retainPd Other global interests would be secured by significant· capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes This intervention capability would be capable of direct confrontation with Soviet forces if necessary AIMS H - This AIMS ls based on the premise that support of US objectives requires a raising of the N TO nuclear threshold through a stronger conve tional defense while reduced reliance on military force is possible elsewhere This raised thresho ld is assumed to permit a slight reduction of US nuclear capabi 1 lties not all US advantages would be maintained nor would an extensive efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued In Europe and in conjunction with NATO Allies the US would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days In addition the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war A reduced presence in East Asia no US forces in Korea or the Philippines would reduce the potential for certain regional Involvements and would reduce but not negate the US ability to influence great power relationships there Other global interests would be advanced primarily by diplomatic and economic efforts and any limited military intervention would require drawing down forces dedicated to other purposes AIMS I - This AIMS is based on the premise that support of US objectives requires a raising of the NATO nuclear threshold through a stronger conventional defense while maintaining approximately current capabilities outside Europe The raised nuclear threshold would be accompanied by a slight Increase In the current strategic nuclear levels All present US strategic advantages would be retained with assurance of a hard-target kill capability against all Soviet silos As In AIHS H the US In conjunction with NATO Allies would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack In Europe and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days Two excursions to size US war reserve stocks for 180 days and for an --iECRE- - 111-5 iECREl indefinite time but without change to combat forces during those periods were evaluated In addition the US would maintain a limited air and naval capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war In contrast to AIMS H essentially the current prograrmied mil ltary deployments In East Asia··less land forces in Korea--would be retained Other global interests would be advanced by a moderate capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes AIMS J - This AIMS is based on the premise that decreased levels of strategic nuclear forces are desirable A significant and sustainable conventional military capability permits such decreased nuclear dependence Thus US nuclear capabilities -0uld be reduced to the level of assured retaliation on'y··the capability to substantially destroy Sov' • 0 - nomic and leadership resources--and minimal counter-military capability would be provided with no attempt made to match or offset strategic force asymmetries In the Soviets' favor As in AIMS Hand I the US In conjunction with NATO All Jes would have the conventional capability t' l absorb a determl·n d Warsaw Pact conventional attack in Europe a restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days US war reserve s ocks however would be sized to provide for indefinite combat to avoid NATO's having to resort to nuclear weapons should the Pact be able to sustain the conflict beyond 90 days Contrary to AIMS Hand I the US -0uld maintain naval and air forces capable of taking conventional initiatives outside Europe against the USSR which -0uld further enhance deterrence in Europe In East Asia approximately the current progranvned military deployments·-less land forces in Korea--would be retained Other global interests would be advanced by a significant capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes This intervention capability would be capable of direct confrontation with Soviet forces if necessary AIMS M - This AIMS is based on the premise that significant sustainable conventional power capable of responding to any Soviet conventional attack combined with clear US nuclear superiority is required to support achievement of US objectives US nuclear capabilities and threshold would be raised to near maximum levels US strategic capabilities would exceed that of the Soviets in all significant indlces·-forces modernization and options for major active defenses Such a nuclear posture would be des Qned to deter Soviet first use and provide political leverage Should Warsaw Pact aggression occur In Europe the US in conjunction with NATO Allies -0uld defend in Central Europe while the US would initiate an attack against less heavily defended Warsaw Pact territory on the flanks to secure negotiating leverage Major conventional capability Is also maintained elsewhere to assure fulfillment of US global interests with a high probability of success This would call for an increased military presence In East Asia and a major Intervention capability In other regions -M_CRET· 111-6 S-£CRE10 FORCES TO SUPPORT AIMS General Purpose Forces The major general purpose forces which are designed to support these strategies are presented In Tables I I 1-3 and 111-4 below The ranges of conventional force estimates in the tables show Substantial differences of forces within AIMS Large Increases In some forces but not in others between AIMS Overall Increases In forces between AIMS In sizing forces general purpose force levels increase from AIMS E to AIMS M because of the progression of increasingly demanding substrategies The force levels within each AIMS vary because of uncertaintie1 about the threat of because of different judgments about what level of forces and programs are necessary to support the strategy The size and sustainability of the Warsaw Pact threat to the Center Region in Europe were major factors in developing ground force requirements for each of the AIMS The number of forces that the Pact could be expected to commit to the Center Region Increases with the duration of the conventional conflict In short duration conflicts 1 e nominally 30 days 86-92 Warsaw Pact divisions are assumed to be available This 86-92 division threat is that against which the forces in AIMS E F and G were stzed For longer duration conflicts about 130 Wars2w Pact dtvtsions are assumed to be available The additional 40 or so Soviet divisions were assumed to be available from the central reserve and those allocated to the flanks Many of the divisions of this larger force would be used as attrttton replacements for a smaller aggregate of forces on ltne The precise number of dtvtsions which could be sustained on ltne during a protracted conventional conflict ts an uncertainty at present there Is Insufficient data and analysts to Indicate the long term sustained combat The JCS representatlve believes that given the limttattons of the methodologies and assumptions used tn preparing the tllustrattve force postures 1nd costs that they are not appropriate to use tn dlscusston of not tonal military strategies Specifically the estimate for Pact substatnabtltty whtch was used to derive the lower bounds for US land forces has a htgh degree of uncertainty The substantive tssue of non-US NATO sustainability beyond 30 days ls a110lded by ass nlng full NATO sustainability In addition naval force·s should be structured to provide a balanced flexible force capable of dealing with all aspects of naval warfare HIE 11-14 and the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning were source documents for the threat data Sov4et force generation capability beyond 130 divisions has not been addressed 111 1 • SECRH ' S ECREt I • r- I -•- l' - C 2 I I f • • I -· 1 cf I ii ·-- - r r • ·- • _ o_ - cl _ _ 1 -·· -I I i - cl ---- ---- • 1 ·---- -- - ii _ -N- ' ' ' w I I- u J 0 'ao J I-• u a ' ' ' ' ' N N ' ' u J c n fw • ' ' ' ' ' NN ' NN J ' ' • - N_ •N J N _' ' ' ' 0 Ne l I ' i I - t• I c • w I - £ f D·f f •I t •• • r lo• t 1·· i· • ' ' - 1 1 I • • - i • •• •r 0 ' ' •- 0 • ' ' N • • I 1 0 1 a ¥ • i C 1 0 ' C 0 - 0 - I - J $ ' $ I •0 - J -· J I ' ' _' - 1 _ It i C 'I I I 0 8 I w I ' aE - w I i C 0 • • - l __ l g •1i • - - i '• - - -• l · - 2i -· r - • t -• '1 • - -r - 1-•· ·--• ' 11 • s • 1 • 8 1- i 1-' • ·t• - i •i 11 re re lti i ·· s ' - -·- t-·l i-• • c l ·-- 1 a- • x- •· - 0 - •I ¼ ' • I lll' 11 I -e •• •• I 111 N • • ·i •I j1J X ' • • 0 Cl I' J • 0 ' N • •3 -K' ••r --• ••• •• • C - - I ¥ 'l 1 t J I' - X •0 •• • • ' I'' g - L •l • ' • -- - 1I i i 1 •-• 1 - c f1 i i _ ·1 • --1 ••• - -· - • -• I• i• 31 I• i I g • - -· 1 N J N2 ' J I l 1 '1' 1 -- · -• •• J ' • ·· - • I ' • - • - - ·-• • J ____ -e •- · i •_'' • 1• •• • •• _ •- • -- 1 1 - ' • • -· I s -• i • •- • -J _ • t · •-· • - lt · •• ' '• - • --• t •t•l- --·• § _ '' - ' •- - ' ·e·--I • • • I I • _ ' • · - N • 1 J N -i - _ s re_ s ·I -·- - - - s _ s -- - I •• i •t • ••• I l ••• • ··-·- 1 • 11¥ • X I• M • • i • i ·- l 9iij- i' 1 _ I i i r 1 1 • r g - • I • - •- 111- i J j -•••- i · -r·- L 1 • --c••1 a ' J 0- w II - l lll I re 0 • • I w I • J1-·i r _ 1r c - I •• i · TABLE 111- FORCE RANGES AIMS -SECRET - l ' •• I -••111 fOIICH 71 • ••JI -- - •• • __ -·· 1 JI I o TACTICAL fl8HTHI • AVT CA• IIIHI J1 • II JI Jl JI - •n 1 IUlfACI COMIATAIITI - --II Ill 1• 111 Ill RVI F E · _ - • II II z _ MJ1 iJ •• II II 11 • JI u ZI Jl JI JI Ill JI Ill Ill IN u JI FY IZ PIIIKIUII JI JI JI 71 • •• • II IM FY 11 PIIINIIIAII • J •• H • Ill I N II • 1 11 • 17 u II • n- I I I n I r1 IJ M IJ tn 111 ' HI Ill 111 Ml Ill 11 ' UI ZII -IECIIET --S£CR£l r capability of the Warsaw Pact The high side estimate for s·lzing force requirements for AIMS F V H I and J are based on the conservative assumption that the Soviets could sustain 130 divisions with munitions spares and equipment In Central Europe for the duration of the conflict At the lower bound of these AIMS the assumption Is made that the Pact can replace Its equipment for only about 30 days In AIMS M the low end is sized for the ass Jmed 130 division threat and the high end for a rough estimate of those additional forces--approxlmately 50 dlvislons--the Pact could create after their own mobilization and before a NATO offsetting attack could be mounted • In all AIMS forces are based on the assumption that NATO mobilization would lag that of the Pact by about four days It was assumed that the Pact could and might attack at NATO M-Oay mobilization day or any time thereafter No specific assumptfon wj_r made as to warning times or pre-mobilization activities by either side The major Increase in Army divisions between AIMS E F F V G and AIMS H I J M results from the requirer™ nt In the latter AIMS to restore the pre-war borders or to open a second front in a relatively short period of tlme--three to six months Forces required to carry out offensive missions exceed those needed for defensive missions As a consequence all the forces needed must exist In peacetime though many can be reserve units Fewer forces would have to be maintained In peacetime If the strategy called for a protracted defensive period during which the forces needed for the counteroffensive would be created On the other hand such a strategy would require manpower and Industrial base mobilization plans and capabilities sufficiently responsive to generate new forces on a timely basis Insufficient Information ls available about 1 Warsaw Pact capabilities under total moblllzatlon and 2 the cost to the US of malntalning in peacetime the capability to create forces on various schedules ln wartime to permit such a strategy to be Included In this study The range of Marine forces In all AIMS reflects differing mixes of Army and Marine forces for Intervention purposes In addition the larger ranges ln AIMS E F and H reflect differences in judgment as to the need for amphibious forces for deployment to specific locations as a part of the worldwide naval campaign ln a NATO Pact conflict Warsaw Pact loglstlcal doctrine calls for each front to maintain enough supplies for 30 day_s combat prescribes strategy of 2 to 3 months supply for a theater and calls for national reserves of war materiel If a11111unltlon and POL storage capacity are used as an Index the Pact could have available 2 to 3 months of POL and more than two months ammunition Including that stored In the western USSR Great uncertainty attaches to such estimates of Pact sustainability however as they assume optimal stockage levels Moblllzatlon day as used ln the· context of this study refers to the day on which the requisite political detlslons have been made and the buildup of NATO or arsaw Pact combat forces Is Initiated -MCREl111-10 SECREf There was general agreement on the methodology used to determine tactical air force requirements e g tactical figher wlngs··TFW and the force levels generated The spread of forces shown within the Individual AIMS ls due to a consensus that a range of forces would better represent the uncertainties of the analysis than would a point estimate Therefore a 5% to -10% spread was applied to the force levels developed for tactical fighter wings Naval forces In all AIMS were sized against a relatively constant Soviet naval threat over time The range of naval forces is wide In most AIMS nd reflects radically different views on the use of carrier task forces In wartime In all but AIMS H the lower force level reflects emphasis on the use of land-based aircraft vice carriers for certain mlsslons--speclfically anti-submarine warfare and sea lane protP ction The higher force level reflects ca der task force support for th se operations as well as support of amphibious operations on the flanks Fc r AIMS E F and G naval force ranges Including USMC reflect a different approach to the employment of naval forc'iss coupled with differences In assessed allied air and naval capabilities and differing views of the effectiveness of land-based aircraft versus carrier task groups The lower end of the range in these AIMS assumes that the Allies can provide a considerable force to attack deployed Soviet ships on the flanks that the US Navy's role ls limited to supporting the ASW effort and that amphibious operations will not be required on the NATO flanks The lower end of the range also assumes that Soviet surface ships wi 11 remain In the Norwegian Sea within land-based air cover that US and Allied Interceptors can form an Atlantic air defense barrier and that Allied land-based air will be available In the Mediterranean Further influencing the lower estimate ls the fact that no convoys are planned The high end of the range plans for a limited number of convoys and assumes that the Soviets will deploy naval units into open oceans It plans for more US forces to destroy the Soviet surface fleet wlth less capability attributed to allies Navy forces are provided In the Norwegian and Mediterranean Seas for flexibility against Soviet Initiatives on the flanks AIMS H I and J require use of convoys and naval force ranges continue to reflect a different approach to the employment of naval forces coupled with differences In assessed allied air and naval capabilities differing views of the effectiveness of land-based aircraft versus carrier task groups and differing views of the amount of seaborne support necessary to support the land battle on the flanks The low end of the range assumes that the SLOCs In the Atlantic can be kept open by maritime patrol VP aircraft and submarines with the help of two carrier task forces convoys would be protected by VP aircraft surface combatants and submarines and land-based air with air-to-surface missiles rather than carrier aircraft would be used to attack Soviet surface forces In essence sea denial and sea control would be performed by VP aircraft and submarines The high end of the range assumes that the Soviets will contest the airspace In the GIUK gap and the dlterranean and thus not permit heavy ECREl 11 I -11 '· reliance on land-based aircraft This assumption dictates a greater requl rement for carrier task forces which would provide a force capable of more flexible response The high end of the range also provides carrier air support for Marine Amphibious Forces assault-landed on the flanks and for allied land operations It should be noted that naval forces of fewer than 13 carriers plus associated escorts could not support simultaneous peacetime deployments of four US carrier task forces two in the Mediterranean and two In the Paci fl c Strategic Forces Four strategic force substrategies have been defined ln the paper and are linked with specific AIMS Substrategy 1 Is the least ambitious and is associated with the least demanding set of criteria for assessment substrategy 4 Is the most ambitious and has the most demanding criteria The four substrategles vary ln terms of the pace and scope of strategic force programs necessary to provide the forces for which they call Variation in costs within substrategies re ults from the scope and pace of modernization The greatest variation ln costs however occurs as a function of choice of military and political sufficiency criteria The decision to meet political sufficiency ln some Instances results in strategic nuclear forces significantly larger than those required to meet target destruction goals as specified ln this paper Strategic defensive forces and the considerations affecting damage limitation are discussed ln Annex D The decision on defensive capabilities must assess the military advantages to the US of significantly increasing defensive forces and the political advantages from more closely ''matching other Soviet programs such as civil defense as well as the possibility that stability might be undermined If Increases In defensive capability particularly missile defense coupled with counterforce capability appeared to the Soviets to threaten their retaliatory capability Additional major hurdles would arise from the need to get public and Congressional and Soviet support for modification to the ABM Treaty and for funding extensive CONUS air and ballistic missile defense and passive defense for population and Industry Six separate alternatives for notional defenses are provided In Annex 0 They Involve programs for civil defense air defense balllstlc missile defense space defense and strategic ASW defense against SSBNs Options range from attack warning and technology only with about 35% US population survival through Improved active CONUS air defense and passive measures to protect population and Industry to a high side alternative which provides for an active defense of CONUS beyond the current ABM treaty with about 75% US population survival Additional details are given at Attachment II of Annex 0 Strategic Forces I See pages IV-30 and IV-31 for more complete descriptions of these substrategles -S-ECR·H l i 111-12 • -5-iCREt Tables 111-5 and I I 1-6 display the Illustrative offensive strategic forces for all AIMS ln bar chart form The units of measure are strategic nuclear delivery vehicles SNDV and warheads RVs bomber weapons on Tables 111-5 and Table 111-6 respectively The graphs are arrayed from low to high options AIMS J to AIMS M and the total bars a e broken out below to Indicate the relative numbers of ICBMs SLBMs and bombers and the relative number of warheads A fundamental assumption In sizing the forces for military sufficiency was that the legs of the strategtc·TRIAD or DYAD would have equal damage-Inflicting capabilities this assumption often led to forces which were not attainable before the 1990's Details on attainability are given at the Force Tables in Annex D The forces depicted by the graphs Include consideration of requirements for the USSR the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact NSWP countries the PRC and a Strategic Reserve Force SRF Force sizing was further based on the assumption thit damage level goals In the USSR must be achieved with both US and Soviet strategic forces In a day-to-day alert s I tuat ion wh i 1e forces for the NS IP and PRC we re based upon generated alert conditions Except in the AIMS J case political sufficiency requirements based upon either static or static plus dynamic Indices exceeded to various degrees those generated by the desired military sufficiency damage levels Each case which ls represented by one or two bars on the Tables Is a separate option I e either a TRIAD or DYAD variation Short definitions of the specific analytical cases are found In Table 111-5 AIMS J and Mare the most strai htforward and only one total bar ls shown for each AIMS J Case 1 assumes no strategic forces are required for political sufficiency and AIMS M Case 11 opts for clear strategic The JCS representative notes that the planning factors used In developIng forces to test the notional strategic substrategles fall to take Into account significant current nuclear tasking requirements The current nuclear tasking criteria which are Ignored are the requirement to achieve 90 percent damage against Soviet military recovery resources and the requirement to allocate some alert weapons against the nuclear threat and conventional military forces of the Warsaw Pact and PRC Additionally the modeling used to generate forces does not recognize real world considerations such as MIRV footprint constraints target base growth no growth or hardening of Industrial sites was considered cross-targeting or timing considerations operational bomber loadings availability of strategic nuclear material and sensitivities of the planning factors to uncertainties In the Soviet threat Given these factors the JCS representative believes the force postures and costs that are displayed are not appropriate for use In discussion of notional strategic forces Strategic Reserve Force--Strateglc nuclear forces designated to be held for trans and post attack protection and coercion Additionally such forces provide a hedge against wartime uncertainties such as unanticipated threats and unexpected shortcomings In US forces -MtREi 111 -13 '·-• ' ' •·· superiority The cases depicted for AIMS J and Mare structured as balanced TRIAO forces although other cases DYADS and augmented OYADS are provided In the Strategic F'orces Annex In the case of AIMS 4 nearly all force mixes exceed the current force levels recorrrnended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff In the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan JSOP Volume I I and at least one nuclear delivery system In each mix assocfated with AIMS 4 Is not attainable by FYl990 The remalnln9 AIMS fall Into two groups--E C and Hare associated with Strategic Substrategy 2 and AIMS F' F Variant and I are associated with Strategic Substrategy 3 The six total bars displayed for each of these AIMS groups represent three kinds of force options any one of which Is applicable to the three AIMS listed above the bars The pairs of bars for a particular c oc e represent the use of different criteria In sizing forces for political sufficiency In the case of the AIMS E G H group1ng the smaller bar of each pair represents a US lead or at least equality in total warheads RVs bomber weapons while maintaining forces at SALT limits assumed tn be 1800 SNOVs wlch a subllmrt of 1100 MIRV'd SNDVs The larger bar In each· pair represents a US lead or at least equality In the same measures while maintaining higher SALT llmfts of 2400 SNDVs and 1320 MIRV'd SNDVs In the bar graphs for AIMS F F Variant and I the smaller bar of each pair of total bars has political sufficiency forces designed to retain a US lead or equality In certain static measures RVs bomber weapons MIRV'd launchers and missile hard target kill and the larger bar of each pair represents forces designed to provide political sufficiency via equality in certain dynamic measures surviving RVs bomber weapons surviving missile throw-weight bomber payload as well as the static measures The SNDV chart shows ICBM forces as the largest component of each total bar This results from applying the 11equal damage 11 criterion which would provide a cross-targeting capability to the forces Differing pre-launch survivability loadtngs yields and accuracies result In varying degrees of force effectiveness For example since Augmented DYAD--A force mix In which a 11 pure 11 DYAD composed of two delivery systems has been complemented by additional forces e g ICBM SLBM forces augmented by a limited number of B-52s In two of the four force alternatives for substrategy 2 1 a mobile ICBH M-X was required to satisfy the balanced damage criteria Sfnce a tenet of this substrategy Is not to develop an efficient hard target capability sane regard these two alternatives as Inconsistent with the substrategy Cross-targetlng--The process In which high priority targets are prograrrmed for attack by more than one type of delivery system or delivery vehicle to provide a high assurance of attaining desired damage levels Sf R-HI I I_ 1 '' '-- £ECRHthe pre-hunch survlvabltrty factor 111 JNld for ICBMs In the FY 86 tlmeframe was somewhat lower than that used for SLBMs and since the SLBHs are assL1T1ed to begin to draw closer to the ICBM In reliability and accuracy by then It takes more ICBMs than SL8 s to Inflict equal d1mage on a given class of targets In addition bOfflher loads 1-521 with cruise missiles and B-ls with bombs and SR Nils were consfderably larger than ICBM and SLBH loads--thu1 fewer bombers were needed to satisfy the equal damage_ criterion Except for Case 10 111 force options shown were within the 2 00 SNOV 1320 MIRV'd launcher tlmlts In Case 10 an augmented DYAD composed primarily of modernized ICBMs and SLBMs the pursuit of equality In dynamic measures caused the 2400 SNOV level to be exceeded-- and creates a strategic force somewh t larger than the one shown for AIMS H ab•• lanced TRIAD Case tt --where superiority 11 the goal Not apparent on this chart ts the variation In quality of the forces • The forces shown for AIMS M Case 11 are largely modernized across the board I e H-X D-5 and B-1 These forces are the basts for associating this AIMS with strategic superlorfty even though It has no more SNDVs than everal other cases Table 111-6 displays similar bar graphs In terms of warheads There is a one-to-one match to the cases shown on Table 111-5 Relative sizes of the ICBM SLBH and bomber-associated segments reflect different loadings damage-Inflicting capabllltle and other factors discussed above On both tables the FY 78 and FY 82 FYDP forces are displayed as a bench· mark for cooparlson bearing In mind that not all the AIMS forces displayed are attainable by FY 86 • ' Substrategy descriptions on pages IV-30 to IV·31 provide tnformatlon on the systems required for modernization 111- s J f P l- - ' TABLE II 1·5 HCIP ' 2 5K ILLUSTRATIVE AIMS STRATEGIC FORCES sfi ifi G1C NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLE ••• 1 f • UID SNDV UMrr 2K 1 5K • SK 0 •• 0 • 0 1 5K 1K • -· - AIMS -·-·-· -··-· - D'l'IUI AWO OHO AIMS E Q AND H Substrate 2 AIMS f f AND I Substrategy 3 • AIMS FYDP • - NOTE Forces represented hereon are prellminari - estimates and are subjec t to revision • Some force elements exceed JSOP Volume 11 FY 79-86 but are attainable by FV 90 - Some force elements exceed JSOP Volume 11 fY 79-86 an9 'a'r'e not attaiMble by FY 90 •'· 't SNDV's which include b0t11bers and ballistic missiles ICBM's'and SLB °''s All figures arc TAt Tc al Active tnver tory Other forces could have been shown e g nor -augmented DYAD's--see Strategic Force Annex Attachment v Uf'l'OP Five Year OehnH Plan is the 22 Febru11ry 1977 version TABLE 11cen ' - I '' • • ' 111-ci I - i •• _ IUU TRATIV AIMS STRATEGIC FORCES STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS• TOTAL RV ANO BMBR I I ' ' • 0 ' 0 • ' ' AIMI ' Al I AIMS E Q AND H FVOP- 4 RA VHp01'1 rtpreunud eo-- •re pre11tn1n•ry utitn1tU nd 1re l lb Kl to nvl1lo11 All figuret 1rt 011verttd to lndiv d 1 1 11111 urrln l - rhHdl N•X 10 C• SLIN c- 8 111d 0-s 8 9·51D't Ii 1•5Zlt'1 10 1•5211'1 12 tl111 penetru ing or 20 u1nc1 11g oH u eot rr 8 ALC '1 tre 11-d not 1nlhbl1 ll'ld lo1d h 8 il'I rY 81 ALtN•1 1 e 111-d 1•1ihblt l d 111 1·52 '' l ' t u • - d to Ptn1tr1t1 1•1 loaclll'lg 11 u_d to be Z1 A 11 other delivery 1Yltt1H urry ont IIOT I ICIN 111d SLI r •1ntry vehi le1 kY'1 incl t o t er _ pon1 11u 1 wupon1 pon uch SOOM of tht hi Jher ' •d f Juru Ny - t b • uuln11 le by rr 1 h1lt1tl00'11 NtFYOP F vt Yur Dth u Phn 11 t e 22 ru ry 1 11 or1ion 1 full tOO Pl ° 'nl ol SLl -'1 U due 10 Dalloy o iutoni re o- • • HOP SSIN't Ht 1111 ed 10 ln lud · r- Sf REr • COST OF AIMS The range of total costs es ti mate d f or each strategy Is shown In bar chart form on Tables I I 1-7 111-8 and 111-9 E The cautions expressed regarding the Illustrative force estimates to support AIMS apply equally to the costs of AIMS It Is emphasized that hese are cost estimates for long term attainment of notional forces and given the ftscaJ constraints and prograrrrning procedures of year-to·ye r force development the actual costs of achieving the AIMS forces could change Table 111-7 depicts estimated costs In billions of dollars for the five year period FY 79-83 A comparison of this table with Table 111- Force Ranges shc s that in general the differences In costs between AIMS and ranges of costs wtt hin A MS are driven by differences In force rang2s Not estimated but potentially Important ts the range of costs that would result from alternat'ive methods and rates of reaching the ultimate force structures The limit loss strategies for Europe AIMS E F F V and G each have a cost range that Include$ the FYDP The size of the range Is dominated by the range of estimates of naval forces for these strategies The range nar'rows In AIMS H I J and 11 reflecting fewer differences In force sizing methodology for the longer war strategies The high ends of the ranges for AIMS Hand I are less than AIMS G due to a l er requirement for air forces when major initiatives against the USSR outside of Europe are not planned - The outlay costs for FY 81 on Table 111-8 sh similar range patterns to Table 111-7 and are consistent with the above corrrnents Table I 11-9 shows the ranqe of annual costs estimatP rl tn be needed to maintain indefinitely a given force posture once the AIMS is achieved The fiscal year that the force Is attained Is also shown in parentheses for each end of the ranges This table ls the best single Indicator of the relative term costs Implications of each AIMS For the high end of the ranges the ye'irls dictated by naval forces for AIMS E D F V and G and Army forces for AIMS H I J and M Strategic forces are not attained until FY 89 for the low end of the ranges In AIMS E thru I and naval and air forces dictate the year in AIMS J and M respectively The length of time necessary to reach force postures to achieve the more ambitious strategies Is dc rninated by the prograrrmlng assumption that present Industrial base capabliltles would be used With the current tank production capability for example the time required for a major expansion In Arrrry forces ts quite lengthy Alternatively if a faster near term expansion was desired near term costs would be considerably 'ii'1'gher than sho n ln Table 111-7 • CREl111-18 ' 'i v TABLE 111·7 SECRET FIVE YEAR COSTS FV73-CJ TOA FV7C BUDGET $B COSTS 1000 In REPRESErJTS Cul RArJGE 900 BOO 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 E F F VI G H J M FYDP AIMS -5ECl'l£T '' 111-19 '• · ·• TABLE 111·8 -SECRET- OUTLAY COSTS FY81 $B COSTS 200 17' l REPRESENTS W RANGE 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 I E F F Vl G H I M AIMS 111-20 l ' FY81 fYDP g_ --r _ ' TABLE 11_' 1 SECRE - STEADYSTAT COSTSPE YEAR or JCE Alf 1S l' CMl VED TOA $B ao1 225 P7lnEPRESENTS t anAriGE 200 IYR ACHIEVED 11 1031 11131 175 150 t 91 125 100 75 50 25 ' E F FIV G H AIMS I J M FYB2 FYDP SECRET 111 •21 ' - F COMPARISON OVERVIEW There are three approaches useful to comparing the AIMS In paragraph G below AIMS are compared by content and capabll ity In paragraph H the Implications of the AIMS in terms of Soviet reactions foreign p0licy arms control fiscal and domestic considerations are analyzed In paragraph I non-mllitary Initiatives that might be Mecessary to ease Implementation are described G COMPARISON OF AIMS DIMENSIONS that bear highlighting are The major dimensions of the AIMS Deterrence and the nuclear dimension The NATO-Warsaw Pact dimension ·The non-European dimension ' l 111-22 l SttREl l The NATO Warsaw Pact Dimension In the event of a US-USSR worldwide war the NATO Warsaw Pact dimension of conflict would be critical Althcugh the threat has been discussed other major differences among the European aspects of the AIMS require highlightingi specifically tasks sustainability and deployment posture Tasks The tasks to be performed by the US in conjunction with its Allies vary among AIHS strategy of 11 AIMS E F 1 F Variant and G with a sub- Limit Loss in Europe have the least def'londing task that of holding a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line but not counterattacking to regain lost territory This would involve the loss of between a quarter and a third of the West German territory east of the Rhine River AIMS H I and J embodying the substrategy of 11 0irect Defense 11 have a more demanding task that of absorbing a determined Pact conventional attack counterattacking and restoring the pre·war borders AIMS M with an ' 10ffsetting Attacks substrategy seeks to offset Pact aggression in Central Europe by Initiating an attack against less heavily defended Pact territory on the flanks o secure negotiating leverage for recovering territory lost In the Central Region or elsewhere Naval forces In all AIMS are tasked with Interdicting and attacking deployed Soviet naval forces and merchant vessels and of protecting required shipping In AIMS H I J and 1 1 1 they have the task of more active US naval operations on the flanks Sustainability For force s1z1ng purposes the AIMS were created with specific assumptions as regards how long a conventional conflict in Europe would last AIMS E F and G were evaluated for 30 days sustainability AIMS F Variant H and I for 90 days All IS I was also evaluated for 180 days and All IS I J and M for an indefinite sustaining capability D to P The 11 short 11 nominally 30 days and 11 lntermediate 11 nominally 90 days lengths of sustainability do not Imply that any war would end on the 31st or 91st day They do Imply that major decisions 'r IOUld have to be • o to P sustalnlnq capablllty means that sufflclent stocks are provided in peacetime to sustain forces In combat until production can be increased after the start of the war to match wartime consumption rates--stocks are available from D-Day to P-Day ' 111-23 SE RE1 -StCREl made fairly early perhaps after only a week or after several weeks respectively on the best course of action to adopt whether to disengage whether to pursue separate diplomatic initiatives whether to rely on conventional outcomes probably unfavorable since little conventional capability would exist after 30 days In 11 short war strategies of battle whether to resort to nuclear weapons or some combination of these These dilenvnas are evaluated In Section IV but what is clear Is that those AIMS which are based on only 30 days of sustainability AIMS E F and G rely ll'Clre heavily on deterrence than on confident capability to win or draw a conventional war • TABLE 111-10 European Dimensions of AIMS AIMS Threat Tasks Sustainability E 86-92 Div Hold at Weser-Lech ominal ly 30 days F 86-92 Div Hold at Weser-Lech Nominally 30 days G 86-92 Div Hold •t Weser-Lech Nominally 30 days F Variant About 130 Div Hold at Weser-Lech Nominally 90 days H About 130 Div Restore pre-war borders Nominally 90 days About 130 Div Res tore pre-war borders Nominally 90 days 180 days and indeflni te J About 130 Div Restore pre-war borders Indefinite About 130 Div plus relnf Offset Central Region with flank attack on Pact Indefinite Deployment and Reinforcement Posture_ Another major issue not differentiated among the separate AIMS but covered in the range of deployment and reinforcement postures in Europe for all eight AIMS deals with the nl fllber of forward deployed forces In Europe ln peacetime and the effectiveness of prepositioned equipment in accomplishing NATO reinforcement As noted earlier In all AIHS forces were based on the assunption that NATO mobilization would lag that of the Pact by about four days and that the Pact might attack as early as MATO H-Day Therefore all force sizing analyses were based on the assumption that the security needs of NATO would require that NATO forces be postured to fight at NATO M-Day The critical time for NATO would be during the first week after H-Day during which time the European NATO nations would be mobilizing and deploying their forces while t e major combat reinforcements fran the US would just be beginning to arrive jtCREi' 111-24 £ REt • In the case of Army forces two different force postures CO l'll'Qn to all AIMS were derived to meet the Warsaw Pact threat The higher forward d ployment posture derives from the contention that If 0-0ay • NATO M-Day higher in place forces must be planned This posture calls for nine US d lslons to be forward deployed and ten brigade regiment unit sets of equipment POHCUS to be prepositioned an Increase of four sets over the stockage level In Europe today and at least equal to that prograrrmed for FY 1982 This higher forward deployment posture reduces the risk ilTITlediately after NATO mobilization but accepts more risk In the period from about NATO M -10 to H 30 while airlift catches up with prepositioning The lower forward deployment and higher POMCUS posture derives from three contentions 1 that major Increases In forward deployments in Europe are not politically feasible 2 that such Increases could be destabilizing and 3 that prepositioned combat elements could be on line within about five days of those forward deployed whether or not this could be accomplished remains questionable This lower posture calls for considerably increased POHCUS with no increase in US peacetime deployed fore es It retalnr five divisions In Europe about the same as currently and provides 30 brigade regiment sets of prepositioned equipment five times the current stockage and at least double the stockage programmed for FY 1982 This posture accepts a greater degree of risk in the fl rst few days following NATO mobilization Airlift reQulrements for 1r1lde-bodied aircraft would be some two to three times greater to support the first posture than the second This is caused by having to move about three more divisions by air to Europe In the first posture to meet the total reQuirement considering current POMCUS stocks Non-European Dimension Three further salient features about the content of the AIMS should be highlighted One has to do with East Asian peacetime deployments A second concerns levels of effort for non-European operations both for peacekeeping local wars and in a major US-USSR war The third addresses the degree to which forces for lnter ention are additive or inclusive East Asia The forces generated in the various AIHS were developed primarily for use against the Soviet Union In wartime Then a portion of those forces were forward deployed In the Western Pacific as the peacetime presence11 forces In East Asta for each AIMS In any AIMS the US will rernaln a major military power In the Western Pacific with visible forces present in peacetime The AIMS are thus differentiated In East Asia primarily on the degree of planned US involvement In a full range of po11tlca1 and military regional security affairs Kost US forces will be based off shore rather than on the continent Itself and would be less likely to become automatically engaged In regional conflict The fact that In AIMS E and H the_ US Intention is to avoid involvement In regional conflict notwithstanding no regional ' _ 111-25 - ---- ------------------ ---------- power could be certain no matter which AIMS might be selected that the US would not choose to involve Itself with strong air and naval forces and not Insignificant Marine ground forces • Non-Euro ean levels of effort The eight AIHS Illustrate three general approaches to providing or conventlonal capabilities for nonEuropean operations Each of these can be described in terms of levels of effort and each embodies roughly parallel capabilities for 1 Initia- tives against the Soviet Unlon In a worldwide war and 2 peacekeeping activities and Intervention In potential local wars These three levels of effort are graphlcal ly displayed In Table 111-2 page 111-3 AIHS E and H place relative IOrldwlde emphasis on the European component of strategy with AIHS E relying more heavily on nuclear deterr ence and AIMS H pro••ldlng increased conventional capability Both recognize the global interests and responsibilities of the US but provide only a moderate conventl nal capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event a major war erupts The strategies plan a quite limited military capability to Intervene unless draw downs are made on forces dedicated to Europe AIMS F F Variant and require a higher worldwide level of conventional capabllity than AIHS E and H The capability for initiatives against the Soviet Union remains the same--llmited--as In AIMS E and H To limit Soviet influence In the Third World as well as promote and protect US global interests the US would plan a moderate capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes AIMS G and J generally allow an even greater capabll ity for action outside of Europe In the event of war but this capability affects the rationale for the two strategies differently AIMS G places reliance on deterrence in Europe and enhances this deterrence by providing a warfighting capability outside Europe to ensure that the Soviets understand that any aggression on their part will place all their forces and territory at risk Conversely AIMS J raises the nuclear threshold in Europe by emphasizing conventlonal defense there and complements this by providing significant ca-pablllty outside of Europe The Third World Is seen to have such Importance that the US requires significant capabilities for uni lateral intervention to the extent of risking a military confrontation with the Soviets If necessary AIMS M calls for such a significant military capability In conventional and nuclear forces that US non-European Interests can be secured •ith 11tt1e dependenee on Allied asslstanee and In the face of Soviet oppos it I on -- 111-26 ·- • L ' ' ' crrRH · ' Intervention forces The capability for peacekeeping and Involvement In potential local wars exists In each AIMS In some cases the forces required for such Intervention are expressly provided for--they are additive not Inclusive In other cases they are not For example AIMS E and H call for only l lmited military action in potential local -wars so no additional forces are provided for this purpose Any required forces o OU d be drawn from forces dedicated to other purposes such as reinforcing Europe All other AIMS Include specific forces for Intervention In local wars and peacekeeping activities AIMS F F Variant and I specify 11 llght lntervention 11 corresponding to about current capabilities while AIMS G J and M specify 11 heavy lnterventlon 11 H COMPARISON OF AIMS IMPLICATIONS Surrmaries of the implication of the AIMS presented here are Soviet reactions foreign policy arms control fiscal and domestic More detailed consideration of the implications is at Annex C Soviet Reactions' As a general proposition unless the changes In US programs threatened to severely disadvantage the Soviet position It Is judged that the Soviet Union o OU d not be Inclined to react rapidly In terms of changes In their own military programs to alterations in US strategy or force posture This Judgment derives from Soviet persistence in viewing the -world in adversarial terms from their dependence on military power in International relations from the bureaucratic technological and economic rromentum of their military production sector whlch even the Soviet leadership has a questionable ability to change and because the Soviets tend toward extremely cautious calculations of their military requirements Finally the extremely cautious Soviet approach to structuring and sizing their military forces makes lt difficult to ascertain what the Soviets would consider their ultimate force requirements vis-a-vis any given US forces This in combination with the Soviet desire to maintain an advantageous military posture makes It unlikely that the Soviets would reciprocate to unilateral reductions in US strategic AIMS J or conventional AIMS E and perhaps AIMS F force postures What would probably cause them most alarm would be significant Increases In US strategic capability AIMS M large Increases In the standing NATO forces _ All'tS ' t J and H or In more formal US ties with China AIMS M Thus AIMS M would represent the most threatel ll 1g posture to the Soviets since It entails positive Initiatives In all three categories They would probably Initiate a worldwide propaganda campaign to Inhibit the US buildup and would almost certalaly attempt to curtail It by pursuing arms control agreements A massive Internal c mpalgn probably °uld be Initiated to condition the Soviet and East European populations to further sacrifices to Increase Pact military capability ' i _ 111·27 ·· ' ECRfl Host worrisome to the Soviets would be the buildup of a US strategic damage limiting capability both offensive and defensive which would allow the US to wage survlve and win a nuclear war such as Is the case in AIMS M In the near term they would probably Increase deployments of existing and planned systems to threaten the US or Its allies rrore land mobile ICBM's more forward deployed SS-X-20's and Backfires rrore SSBN's on patrol bombers on alert and SSGN's with cruise missiles enhanced air defense and perhaps ABM In the longer term Increases would be likely In R D civil defense and strategic military programs In general A buil up In NATO standing forces theater nuclear and or conventional forces AIMS H I J and M could also cause great concern More forward deployed US divisions might be viewed as more threatening than merely enhanr_ d re t n forcemen t capab i I tty but any Increase l F'RG eapab 111 ty wou 1d be partfcularly alarming All of these would tend to der y the Soviets their strategy of winning a European war quickly and on NATO's territory The rate at which the NATO buildup was manifested would be Important in determlninp the Soviet response since as in any reactlon to changed US or NATO trategles Moscow would not want to reorient fts planning in such a way as to reorder Its current economic and manpower priorities_ Any US overtures toward China AIHS H particularly direct political or military cooperation would be a major security concern for the Soviets They might seek better relations wtth the US through new arms control agreements and they might well build up their own Far Eastern forces·-naval and air units and theater nuclear weapons and ICBM's Soviet operations in the Third World have been developed In response to their own perceived requirements are of long duration and are largely unaffected by changes In US capabilities In the face of a US buildup they would probably Increase their military aid lolOrk closely with Cuban forces and other surrogates deploy their naval and air forces In ways to pronx te their Interests and Inhibit US capabllltles and orchestrate their propaganda In the Third World to undermine US ties and to have these countries pressure the US to stop Its programs The Soviets might perceive the improvement In US Intervention capabilities AIMS G J and H as a means of rapidly reinforcing NAT0 1 s forward deployed forces Foreign Policy Implications The strategy and forces developed by the US to meet existing and potential military threats and political challenges profoundly affect the US role In the world and others' perceptions regarding that role US military postures are seen by others to reflect US political priorities Stated military Intentions and the deployment of US forces powerfully Influence the way other nations-friends neutrals and potential adversarles--declde how best to provide for their own security Interests and ambitions and what their polltlcal orienta• tlon should be The behavior of other nations In turn affects such US national Interests as freedom of action In domestic ecOnomlc and foreign policy The Implications of the AIHS can be grouped Into the following aspects as they affect Europe East As a the Third World and anns transfers ' 111-28 r ECRtt Europe and Allied Reactions The reaction of MATO Allies to a chosen US military strategy would depend on several factors Consistency with accepted NATO strategy Degree of additional defense burden implied for them US willingness to link conventional defense to theater and strategic nuclear systems and • Perceived adequacy of US strategic forces Adoption of AIMS E F or G all of which include a substrategy o Limit Loss 11 for Europe would probably cause a lverse European political reaction if ·such AIMS were Interpreted as departlng frcim the current NATO HC-14 3 strategy While the US military forces In Europe would not be reduced and US capability would be planned to approximate the current military capabilities of NATO Alltes 1 the Allles-·and especially the FRG-'•woul d be shaken If the US stated a wl 111 ngness to accept terr I tor Ia I loss I the event of war Moreover a reduction In US reserve forces earmarked for NATO reinforcement would raise questions about the depth and durability of our conrnitment to European security Finally the flank allies--Turkey Greece and No™ay--mlght see In AIHS E F and Ga reduced US commitment to their territorial Integrity and might see advantages in nuetral ity AIHS E might cause particular problems in that reduced presence In East Asia might be seen as enabling the Soviets to concentrate more attention and resources on Europe AIMS G with an apparent increase In US emphasis on contingencies outside of Europe might amplify the image of reduced US convnitment to Europe however the US might be able to convince the Allies that Soviet power could be deflected from Europe In this fashion As long as the US strategic posture Is preserved or enhanced the Al lies would not find the US strategic posture a source of serious worry The effects of such European concerns are hard to predict If sufficient domestic support could be mustered the Europeans might begin to prepare Independently for their own security as a hedge against eventual American disengagement If the_ reduced US war goals and sustaining capability provoked anxiety In Germany pressures could mount to enlarge the Bundeswehr--and possibly to kindle West German Interest in nuclear weapons If however European governments found It politically Impossible to increase their own defense preparations they might over time find It only prudent to be more acccmrodatlng toward the USSR In either case of course NATO Itself and US-European relations generally would suffer At a minimum the somewhat reduced US force and operational goals would undennlne the US ability to encourage greater Allied defense efforts diminish somewhat the US leadership position and possibly weaken the Vitality and cohesion of the Alliance 111-29 These reactions could be stgnlflcantly softened-·at least for AIMS F and G--lf the US were to avoid any statements to the effect that a loss of NATO territory would be acceptable • • Some erosion of Al lied confidence would hO f ver still be likely In light of the reduced us reinforcement capability of these AIMS but could be offset In part by emphasizing effqrts to Increase the US capability to reinforce Europe during the early stages of a NATO mobilization Because there wOuld be no major changes In US programs AIMS F Variant should have little impact on the Alliance US-European relations and the US leadership posl tlon provided the US refra ined frcm any pub I le indication that NATO wOuld accept territorial loss in the event of Soviet aggress·ion Allied resistance could be expected however to funding fully the susta 1 nl 9 resources required for this strategy Should the US start Implementing the full conventional force requirements of 11 Dlrect Defense 11 in AIMS H I and J the Europeans might become concerned on three counts First they too would be exp ct d to expand their defen· Se expenditures beyond what their political and'f ' COnomic systems may likely be willing to support Second the Soviets mlg t be provoked by the NATO buildup leading to possible Increase in East-West tensions and military confrontations Third the Europeans could fear that the increased US emphasis on conventional forces might raise the nuclear threshold too high and lead to a possible US nuclear decoupling The West Germans in particular would find this latter aspect most worrisome Such concerns might be aggravated ln AIMS H by the danger that reduced presence In East Asia might enable the Soviets to respond more easily to the Increased US military emphasis on Europe With respect to AIMS J European fears about US nuclear decoupling and reduced escalatory credibility would be sharpened by the lowered US strategic nuclear posture of assured retaliation only 11 The adverse effects of AIMS Hand I might be substantially reduced If it were made clear that the strategy represented a goal toward which force Improvements should be aimed rather than a flat for massive new defense efforts and did not Include a reduction In the US theater nuclear posture AIMS M might disrupt US-EUropean and intra-European politics In three respects First many members of NATO would resist making the expenditures to canplement the US buildup even though the All led force buildup require wOuld be considerably less than that for AIMS H I or J Secon d Intra-All lance friction would Inevitably arise over which members were to serve as staging areas for offsetting offensive actlon from the flanks Finally scme Allies might object to what might appear as a transformation of NATO frc n a purely defensive alliance to one with certain offensive qualities jfCREl 111-30 ' S·ECREl East Asia and Chinese Attitudes Stability In East Asia depends on a complex balance among the polftlcal and mllltary po 11e rs In the region AIMS E and H by furthering US withdrawals from the region after the Vietnam and Korea pullbacks • could undermine that stablllt • bl AIMS F F' Va·rlant G I and J which malntaln the current US peace· time presence In East Asfa shou·Jd provide some reassurance to the countries In the region following the withdrawal of US ground forces In Korea par' tlcularly with the general Increase In conventlonal capabilities outside of NATO entailed by AIMS G and J AIMS J's dlmfnlshed strategic nuclear capabllltles however may cause some anxletfes and could contdbute tc pres- sures to acquire Independent nuclear forces AIMS M calls for Increased US presence In the region As such It Is likely to undermine efforts to get the Japanese to assume a modestly greater share of the regional defense burden Although Korea and Taiwan might be reassured It could concern the PRC about US aspirations for regional hegemony and Intentions to normalize relations If the Soviet Union or less ltkely 1 the Chinese viewed the US buildup as provocative It could conceivably challenge stability ln the area as they attempted to respond or preempt The Third World In all AIMS the US would have a major capability for Intervention In the third world Inherent In fts forces even If not bought specifically for that purpose The extent of this capability would depend upon US willingness to use forces otherwise intended for NATO Thus the perceptions of the developing countries of US military strategy would depend In the first Instance on US use of mllltary force In such contingencies but In the absence of such occasions_ on US statements AIMS E and especially AIMS H which have reduced capabilities and forces for Intervention outside Europe could cause 'concern among third world countries If the Impression were given that the US was not Interested In the security conditions of the developfng world This could result In Increasing acconrnodation toward the Soviets or pressures f'or self-sufflc lent security measures Regional stability might suffer If these pressures pro• duced Increased military programs particularly nuclear weapons programs At the same time these AIMS might reduce third-world anxieties about potential US Intervention In their Internal affairs while Increasing the potential for Soviet probes AIMS F F Variant and especially I provide capabllttles that should reassure most developing countries that prefer to see the US discourage Soviet troublemaking The limited US mllttary capability to engage In land combat could hc ever be perceived as a s1gna1 that the US would not p1an to counter the Soviets If they chose to become deeply Involved The US would still have the potentlal for majo Intervention by drawing down on _ · • 11 I ·l I t _ t European dedicated forces At the same time the retention of light lnterventlon 11 capab111tles In these AIMS would signal I US willingness to threaten or use some military force to protect national tnterests AIHS G J and M provide considerable conventional capabilities for use In Third World contingencies The developing countries may view this as a mixed blessing -- the benefits of US willingness and ability to counter any Soviet adventures and regional stab I 1 lty could be offset by concerns of US acttvlsm and the purposes of the extensive capabilities that these AIMS signal Additionally there may be fear that these AIMS would provoke an undesirable Soviet response thus potentially converting local disputes Into superpower confrontations Arms Transfers The Administration's arms tran fet• po11cy guide lines seek to achieve restraint In the volume and technological sophistication of US arms sales and grants Tenslon between the arms transfer policy and a mtlttary strategy ts ·most ltkely to arise tn those cases In which the military strategy shifts US defense responslbilltles to 1oca1 forces that cannot meet the challenge with lndtgenous resources Except In extraordinary circumstances the NATO countries Japan Australia and New Zealand are exempted frocn the arms transfer guidelines Korea Is also betng treated as a spectal situation In general then the greatest impact will be felt In the Hlddle East Latin AA erlca and Africa In AIMS E and H US drawdowns and pullbacks are llkely to generate increased requests for more and more advanced US systems The US In an effort to cushion the effects of a shift to the policy Implied by E or H could be strongly motivated to be responstve to such requests To do so however would vitiate the arms transfer policy In AIMS F F Variant and I the US plans to maintain Important conventional capabilities for possible use outside of Europe No vacuum would be created that Increased arms transfers would be required to fl11 In AIHS G J and especlally M the buildup In US conventional capabilities should curb requests for arms an d would permit more restrictive application of the arms transfer guidelines while preserving adequate total force capabilities Arms Control Implications These largely follow from the foreign policy Implications and estimated Soviet reactions described above None of the strategies would violate anns control agreement$ nCM In effect covering strategic offensive forces Ha iever some strategic force posture alternatives described could require adjustment to conform with limits specified In the Interim Agreement If this agr eement were still In effect after October 1977 Deployment of an ABI-I defense adequate to protect the complete US ICBM force and or CONUS CRE-t 111-32 ' ' -- ' - CREJ AIHS H would be prohtbtted und r the ABH Treaty and would require major revision or US withdrawal Any significant or precfpltous departure from the current US military strategy ts bound to have an Impact on the course of ongoing arms control efforts Strategies requtrlng a visible and rapid Increase In the size of US Ind Allied forces e g AIMS H I J and H particularly In Europe would disturb the HBFR negotiating environment While an Increase In sane Soviet forces confrontfng NATO would be a likely consequence the pursuit of such strategies might promote greater Soviet efforts to negotiate arms control constraints However Soviet suspicions of US motives might make It more difficult to conclude meaningful arms control agreements either SALT or HBFR The pursuit of a strategy which resulted In significant unilateral reductions In US forces such as AIMS E or H would reduce adversaries' tncent-ives for negotiating arms control agreements In some regions partlcuarly In Europe and perhaps In the Far East such unilateral reductions could destabilize force balances and Increase nat onal motlvatlons to acqulre weapons at a faster pace In sane countries Incentives for nuclear weapons acqulsltlon would probably rise Even the most resourceful US arms transfer and non-proliferation policies might not be able to counter totally such a trend since US ability to take the lnftlatlve to Influence multilateral arms control efforts would likely decrease along with decreased US presence AIMS with significantly Increased peacekeeping or Intervention capabilities without any Increase In strategic nuclear capabilities G and J could encourage greater global stability and foster Initiatives such as nuclear free zones and conventional force limits However anti-US regional powers might view the expanded US capability as betng threaten lng and seek Increased arms transfer support from the Soviets or the PRC With respect to strategic forces major nuclear force modernization requirements Inherent In AIHS F F Variant I and parttcularly In H would be somewhat constrained by qualitative limits such as proposed In the US Comprehensive Proposal 11 of March 1977 1 e freeze on new types of ICBH and limits on ICBM SLBM testing Strategies which called for maintaining current levels of theater nuclear forces tn Europe possible under all AIMS might Inhibit negotiation of substantlal reductions In the SALT aggregate because of Soviet concern over theater systems which could strike the Soviet homeland Although some opportunity for negotiation of reductions In the SALT aggregate or MIRV llmlt would be present under al I strategies unilateral US strategic force reductions as In AIMS J might not provide Incentive for the Soviets to negotiate equivalent reductions In sunmary the lmpact of any significant change tn US strategy on arms control prospects would depend not only on the political and security dynamics of the various regions of the globe but also on how the US exe• cuted the change see Non-Hllltary tnltlatlves below 1 and on how well the US Integrated Its •nns control policies Into Its global strategy for national security 1 _ 111-33 _ t • '• -l · F0R OFFICIAL USE ONtY Fiscal and EconooJlc Implications The President has emphasized his Intention to submit I balanced budget for 1981 With an actual deficit of $66 5 bl Ilion In 1976 and projected deficits of $48 bl llon In 1977 and $62 billion In 1978 effort• to achieve this balanced budget objective will generate substantial pressure for outlay restraints over the ne t several years • Anticipated econanlc performance significantly affects the fl1cal picture The underlying economic pr0Jectlon1 for 1977-1982 u1ed In thl1 exercise assume an average real growth rate of 5 1% bet een calendar years 1977 and 1981 tapering off to 4 3% between 1981 and 1982 Inflation as measured by the GNP deflater rema' ns at an average annual rate of 6% in CY 1978 slowing to % In CY 1982 The unemployment rate 11 projected to drop from an average of 6 3% In CY 1978 to an average of 4 5% In CY 1982 Under these assumptions a 5-year ft cal projection of outlays was prepared using base levels of current programs adjusted for Congressional budget actions and allowing for future Increases or decreases mandated by current law The projection Includes the effects of the Presldent 1 s energy program and social security tax proposals on receipts and outlays Administration c011111ltments to basic tax reform and national health Insurance are not reflected In the baseline projections however and are treated as budget options because specific proposals are still under development The baseline projection Is shown in the following table Defense outlay projections beyond 1978 are those Included In the January 1977 budget submission to the Congress These estimates are about $5 billion per year belo the Five Year Defense Plan FYDP but they do Include real growth In all years The baseline projection of outlays for 1°978-82 Is shown In- the follo ing table l t - · I 11-34 FOO OFFICIAL USE ONLY TABLE 111-11 BASELINE BUDGET PROJECTIONS In billions of dollars ill 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 OoD•Kllltory and IIAP 88 5 Nondefen1e • 2 2 95 I 311 3 110 6 358 6 120 I 388 2 132 8 415 5 145 0 441 8 fili 1 7 Total 365 7 406 4 469 2 508 3 548 3 586 8 617 7 Base Receipts 299 2 358 3 401 4 466 8 -- 536 6 606 9 676 5 Budget Deficit Surplus • •• • •• -66 5 -48 1 -67 8 -41 5 -11 7 20 I 58 8 Base Outlays i ct -- T1 T1 C ij C T1 T1 -r- C J J re en- e en ' C C I 156 0 z r- ' - z I -- I ' _ ' ' ' • ' FeR-OfflCIAL USE ONLYWithin the currently projected surplus In 1981 the Administration has three broad fiscal strategy choices for arriving at a 1981 balance Tax Policy Options The Admtnlstratlon's tax refom package Is still being formulated One prellmtnary set of proposals would Involve• $30 billion 1011 of 1981 receipts due to changes In personal and corporate Income tlJC structure and rates A1ternatfve provisions or tax rates could Increase or decrease the amount of loss of future recelptsj for present purposes however the 11 $30 bi 11 Ion case Is used The revenue loss fran a tax reform package of this magnitude follows TABLE 111-12 $ Billions ill Tax Reform Revenue Reductions -28 4 -30 3 -28 2 Nondefense Outlays Reductions tn ongoing programs and possible new Initiatives can both be considered Possible reductions have been grouped Into three areas Benefit programs for individuals such as tighter limits on cost growth In medical programs Increase medlcare cost sharing eliminate the security minimum benefit and reduce G1 bill benefits Grants to State and local governments Including reductions in EPA construction grants highway funding C01'1'111Unlty development block grants social service grants and general revenue sharing Other general government by reducing nondefense employment phasing out postal subsidies and i'IIOre austere water resource programs The outlay impact of these actions ls shown In the following table ill $ Bll lions 1 81 1 80 -4 7 -1 7 -7 5 -4 I -10 5 -6 7 -13 I -1 0 U U Ll l Q -7 3 -13 5 -20 1 -23 I TABLE 111-13 Benefits for Ind 1-vi dua 1s Grants Other General Government Total Outlay Reduct Ions 111- FORtFFICIAL USE ON LY _ 1 '••' ff R OFFiCIAL SE ONtv· Four groups of possible nondefense Initiatives are considered national heal th Insurance a 1-- elfare reform program more costly than the baseline projectlon both very rough order-of-magnitude figures but by far the largest potential budget claims on the nondefense side a doubling of US development a4d and a set of 11 other general government 11 Initiatives Threats frcrn undestred Congressional actions are not Included The outlay magnitudes Involved are shown In the following table TABLE 111-14 ill $ Billions 1980 1981 13 o 7 5 1982 15 o 10 0 National Heal th Insurance • Welfare Reform • • • • • Doubling of US Foretgn Aid Other General Government Initiatives • • 0 1 3 0 o 7 6 0 1 1 4 5 8 0 8 5 Total Out 1ay Increases 4 9 16 6 30 1 35 7 5 0 1 1 1 2 2 · Defense Outla t s In assessing the fiscal impact of the various Defense strategies a distinction must be made between the 1981 effect and the long-term impact of Federal spending levels Large Increases In Defense programs In a peace• time environment require several years to reach maximum rate Thus the long-term impact of AIHS H I J and H ls much greater than the 198 outlay level AIMS H and I outlay would reach an annua1 Increase of $50 billion while AIMS H would be close to $100 billion For purposes of assessing the fiscal implications of the various strategies the low and high force postures may be roughly grouped Into four categories The low force structure option under AIMS E which would put 1981 outlay $16 billion belc the baseline projection The low option under AIMS F Ith 1981 outlays $8 billion under the base I tne The low options under AIMS F v and G both $4 billion above the baseline -- All 12 other options all of l lch are approximately $25-35 billion above the baseline The categories covering the low force structure options under AIHS F F v and G can be considered for analytical purposes•• not 1l nlflc1ntly 111-37 rf R 9ff C Al USE ONl Y fO t-OFFIL IAL USE ONLY different fran the baseline projection Thus the matrix below shows only the two extreroes AIHS E low Option and the average of the 12 high 09tlons and the base The Tradeoffs The baseline projections Indicate that a $20 blll lon budget m1rgtn Is available In 1981 Ass anlng the base level for defense and nondefense programs It Is not possible to adopt the ccrnplete tax reform ck1ge 111 of the nondefense tnltlatlves or any of the higher force structures or the lower force structures under AIHS H '• J or H If a cut In nondefense outlays base Is chosen the savings combined with the $20 billion available margin In 1981 will permit adoption of one of the higher defense levels Similarly adopting the low force structure under AIHS E will permit either tax reform or all of the nondefense tnltlattves Reducing both defense and nondefense outlays below the current base would yield sufficient resources for the complete tax reform package and permit selected program Tnttlatlves In 5hort the 19Ul margin is not sufficient to fund either the major defen5e or nondefense Initiatives or the tax reform package None of these choices can be fully sati5fJed without a reduction In the base level of another area or a tax Increase 111-38 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY- TABLE 111-15 1981 BUDGET OPTIONS In BIil ions of DollarsJ 11ovement Toward Larger Surplus Base Receipts 606 9 Retain existing tax structure except for energy proposals and proposed Increases In social security taxes prlmarl ly on employers extra revenues appl led to reduce debt or ''Jp- 0 - Outlays Nondefen e 0 ' r -20 1 Tentative Treasury costing of tax refor1111 package JO JB Eliminate $10 5B In indlvldual benefits Sb 78 In grants and $2 98 In other government Keep all programs at current levels except where mandated by law to Increase them C - JO I Increase In foll0lil1ng areas -15 7 Adopt the low force structure option under AIHS E 145 0 Assumes continued real growth In non-pay purchases and constant man- power level Corresponds roughly to low force structure options under AINS F v and G Base Budget Margin 20 1 - r-x C- National Health Insurance $1 08 C welfar-e reform additional cost $7 SB additional foreign aid $1 68 and other genenl govern- 0 men t $8 OB Defense · 4•1 H · - -JO J port program grOlilth Tl -- ' 11oveaen t Towa r-d Def I c1 t J0 8 Adopt any of the high force structure options or low force structure options under AIHS H I J or · r- - TABLE 111-16 ILLUSTRATIVE NONDEFENSE INITIATIVES -- OTHER GENERAL GOVERNKENT Fiscal Years In Hllllons of Dollars 1978 Space program and ERDA basic research-· neti1 Initiatives 1979 19110 1981 1282 324 599 870 96b Higher furidlng level sewage treatment plant construction grants ••••• - 70 230 400 500 450 Water resources projects llf5 305 305 Uranium enrichment revenues 120 21t i 345 253 397 273 405 Federal hlghlilHly construction lbO 730 900 1 000 -i - ft al I road subsidies •••••••• • • •• •• • • 1 200 I 500 1 500 Higher 325 347 0 g C7 50 300 443 36 C 49 449 4 9 350 1 055 600 650 1 000 1 300 I 109 I 156 600 600 1 203 600 te C u 8 510 z r-- - c -- Ft c en n Jet engine noise reduction assistance Jlt2 education assistance 27 NIH and other ealth agencies -- funding level 115 Veterans benefits 500 Offshore ol 1 -- non-bonus bidding --- C z r- - i - 0 Total fflustratlve Initiatives 1 119 · 4 465 6 60 S 024 - • TABLE 111-17 ILLUSTRATIVE NONOEFENSE REDUCTIONS lln Bl 11 ions of Doi Jars 1978 Base Reduct Ions 1979 1980 1981 1982 Benefits for lndlvlduals Hore stringent means-testing for food stamps and chi Id nutrition el lglbl 11 ty ••• ••• •••••••••• •••••••••• •• •••••• • ••• • •• - C - C ' i Tighter Jlmlts tha now proposed on price Increases under medi-· care and rnedlcald further 5% reduction in 1981 price level ••••• Coostraln program levels for education programs •••••• • • • • • Phaseout GI blll benefits ••••• •• • • • • • • Limit veterans non-servlce-coonected medical care and consolldate hospitals ••• ••• • • • • •• ••• • • •• •• Eliminate social security minimum benefit net of Increase In means-tested SS I program ••• •••• •••••• •• • ••••• •• Increase medlcare cost-sharing I e raise deduct Ible amounts • •• Subtotal Benefl ts for lnd1vlduals ••• ••• • •••••• •• Grants to State and local governments Reduce EPA construction grants funding to $2 billion a year • • • Reduce h Ighlill'ay fund Ing ••••••• ••• • • •• ••• • • ••• • •• Reduce funding level for connunlty development block grants Phaseout soc Ial services grants C Subtotal Grants to State and local governments • • -j cfi rn 8 8 -0 7 -0 9 -1 0 -I I 37 J 10 I J 2 -o 6 -0 1 -1 0 -1 5 -o 6· -1 5 -2 8 -1 0 -1 9 -4 I -1 J -1 8 5 J -0 1 -0 J -0 4 -0 5 87 4 25 4 197 8 -1 3 -0 9 -4 7 -1 4 -1 J -7 5 -1 6 -1 8 -10 5 -1 8 -Z 5 -1 3 I 5 1 7 3 J I -o z -0 5 -1 5 -1 5 2 _ -0 8 -1 7 -0 9 -1 0 -0 6 -1 6 -4 I -2 7 -6 7 -1 8 -1 5 -1 0 -2 7 -o 8 -0 8 -0 J -1 9 -13 5 -I I -1 z -0 6 -2 9 -20 I 49 1 -0 2 Other general government Reduce Federal noodefense miployment by % by 1981 ••• • •• • Phaseout pos ta 1 subs t d I es • ••••• ••• •• •• ••• • • • •• • _ • Reduce water resources and power programs further • • • • •• • Subtotal Other General Government ••••• •••••• • •• • 4 6 46 6 l J Total lllustratfve Nondefense Reductions •• • • • •• • 293 5 -7 3 ZJ E l i -0 4 -0 4 -0 I -1 0 · n ' - c- C er FT' -1 0 a -1 Z -1 1 -0 7 - l Q -ZJ I Domestic Implications • Ariy change from the status quo Is llkely to generate public and Congressional controversy though that controversy might be minimized through careful education of the public and Congress of the reasons for the change Although stated national military strategy could be a lource of sc wne contention most of the debate will surround changes In defense postures· and In the resources allocated to defense • Certain reactions ar-e predictable and probably unavoidable In general anti-military elements wlll applaud decreases fn defense spending and oppose Increases pro-military forces will act In the opposite fashton The react Ions wl 11 depend ·a the magn f tude of the change and the projected effects of the change on other programs that they support Other adverse reactions will catalyze around specific Issues the draft reserve forces lnter er lce rivalries and base openings Or clostn s AIHS E F and perhaps G entailing reductions In reserve forces espe• clally the Army Reserve would provoke the reserve lobby although Increases in ac-uve forces could counterbalance the concern AIHS H I J and H entalilng slgnlftcant Increases In military forces ould raise an outcry over increased defense spending and the need for a peacetime draft AIMS M with Its massive mllltary requirements Is likely to find little dc mestlc support In the absence of a Soviet threat of much greater magnitude than now perceived The debate over strategic content might be somewhat less lively than that over domestic resources but still cause controversy This would be particularly true for those AIMS that make significant changes In US strategic nuclear posture -- AIHS J In foregoing US nuclear equivalence to the USSR and AIHS H In achieving clear nuclear superiority The second major feature to draw criticism would be the emphasis made apparent In Congressional testimony on the large Intervention forces called for In AIHS G J and H Procurement for that capability might provoke widespread charges of 11 gettlng ready for another Vietnam Although not Investigated In detail In thls study an Industrial base sufficient to provide for greatly Increased forces or to provide the logistic sustainability for conventional conflict In Europe for periods of 180 days or longer Is not currently planned and could represent a serious constraint on the reasonable and timely attainability of the assets needed to pursue this strategy I COMPARISONS OF AIHS NON-MILITARY IHPLEMENTATION INITIATIVES Since military force changes are among the most visible Indicators of changes In national pol Icy perceptions of force changes by domestic and foreign publics are key determinants to the success or failure of any new -- ' - - ECREt policy Changes to US military strategy need to be carefully coordinated with complementary Initiatives using diplomacy negotiation and economic Incentives to Alleviate certain undesirable foretgn policy consequences of a • part lcular defense' strategy Lower the potential military risks associated with a defense strategy that mtght be seen as destrable for Its cost or force posture features Cover gaps that may exist between defense strategy and capabilities by offering non-mllltary measures deslgned to Improve allied support Md assist In deterring adversaries Ensure that national strategy and force posture Is not seen by others as being more threatening than Is Intended Enable elements of an Initially selected defense strategy to be modified If non-military steps set In motion resulted In changes In the political or mllitary environment The following briefly discusses non-military initiatives that might be warranted by either reductions or Increases In current US defense strategy or military capabilities A more detailed discussion ls at Annex C Reductions If the US were to reduce Its military capabilities either overall or selectively as In AIMS E F G H J non-mtlltary initiatives are available which emphasize the advantages and significance of diplomatic and economic power In dealing with adversaries Allies and Third World countries The US might pursue arms control initiatives more vlgorously to obtain reductions In threats and opposing force levels thereby minimizing the risks of unilateral US reductions With respect to the Soviet Union the US might undertake a broad program of economic assistance to the USSR In trade credits food and technology directed toward lO'aCrlng political tensions and reducing the risk of war With our NATO Allies the US might pursue further specific economic measures responsive to West European needs In order to demonstrate concern and comnltment to their securtty and well-being Efforts to assure the FRG that US eonmltment Is clear would be particularly Important and a special relationship with Bonn on security diplomatic and economic Issues might be sought The US might undertake a major effort to strengthen US-Japanese diplomatic ties both under a strategy of overall reductions AIMS E and under a strategy where the US builds up'lts capabilities In Europe while 111-4 - ffRtl p' ···-- _ ' ' ' i ' - ECREt reducing military capabilities In Asta AIHS H but the utility of such Initiatives 1s uncertain bl b5 s • • In the Third World the US might pursue more vigorously with the Soviet Union a Hlddle East settlement and stress the peaceful resolution of disputes • Increases In the event of major overall military buildups by the US AIMS H associated non-military Initiatives would be based upon the assumption that this would be acccrnpanfed by an Increase In US-Soviet ten• slons · a major arms race a tightening of the NATO alliance dlrecte d tOW'ards countering the Eastern bloc and an unstable Third-World situation Non• military Instruments within this framework might be designed as consistent measures to punish adversaries reward Allfes and woo neutrals policy Regarding the Soviet Union the US might pursue• tough economic In the European area the US might reemphasize the Importance of NATO's Integrity and offer large-scale economic assistance to Western Eur• ope to help ensure that the Europeans develop both the will and the resources to do their part In the requisite conventlonal buildup In Asia the US might stmllarly Increase econcrnlc ties and Intensify political relatlonshlps wtth both Japan and Korea In order to Improve their positions vis-a-vis the USSR and China and convince them that nuclear pro• llferatlon Is both unwise and unnecessary In other regions the US might seek to limit Soviet Influence and enhance the US Image In the event of selective US military buildups oo the other hand the purpose and character of such non-military Initiatives could be correspondingly modulated In terms of Intensity and modified In terms of basic thrust Toward the Soviet Unlcn the US might cast Its policy In terM of rectifying an Imbalance In Europe and couple these assurances with a niore cooperative economic posture ' With respect to Western European Allies the US Might •tternpt to provide somewhat more cooperative econcrntc policies and more consistent polttlcal carrrnltrnents to help ensure NATO-wide Improvements In force pos tures and to keep the FRG from movtng •lone to upgrade Its conventional capabilities In proportion to the US In Asia the US might enhanee 1 eeooomlc cooperatlcn and potltle 1 eonsultatloos with Japan and Korea to reduce the fears of these countries that the US might Indirectly be lessening cannltrnents to them In favor of Europe ·- Another approach not nece11arlly In contradiction to the above considerations might be needed to COf'l'C'lement fncre1111 In mfllt1ry c• p1• bllltles • we may want to en1ure that I more robust ll'llllt • ry pct1ture dolls not appear too menacing•• to neutrals and ewn to 1dver11rl11 •• lest It damage US political leadership potential provoke the USSR end others Mtd genlrally Increase International tension to our own detriment An open economic policy c'onttnued creative dlpl0m 1cy and morel 1eaderlhlp and restraint In our rhetoric about the adv1nt1ge1 of our 111lltt1r' _ pcwer could contribute to this effect For example Improvements tn fnterventfon c1p1bllltle1 alone AIMS G would require some Third World non-military tnftl1tlve1 to help demon• strate that despite the greater Intervention c1p1bltlty of the US Its posture would be defenslve and tts objectlves would remain peace develop• ment and Independence In reg tons such as Africa Asia and the _Middle East -------------------------'-------- '' SECRET · IV A EVALUATION OF AIMS INTRODUCTION consideration AIMS described This section raises six key questions• for Presld-entl•l Each of these questions Is discussed In the context of the the previous section The Intent ts to Illuminate the tn various aspects of each question rather than provide a single 11 rlght 11 answer Because the questions are interrelated they should be addressed completely before final judgments are rendered on any of them The questions do not lend themselves to a simple yes or no 11 answer I They are intended to el lei bro d general guidance which will have the effect of creating an overall Integrated military strategy for the United States The JCS representative believes that evaluation of the AIMS requires consideration of additional questions Such questions include the determination of peacetime preparedness policies for both manpower and tndu1trlal resources to suppart future military conflicts possible US responses In conjunction with Its Allies to Increases In Warsaw Pact capabilities determination of what levels of combat sustainability are required for US and Allied forces the extent to llnlch US readiness can hinge on cent_rally deployable forces and the clegree to which the US should rely on reserve forces · ' 5-ECREl · B QUESTION ONE question How should the US deal with the threat of Soviet aggression In particular what should be the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces for deterrence and defense If deterrence falls to what e tent should th US rely on the early use of nuclear weapons Discussion The major threat to US Interests and security is posed by Soviet power worldwide A US_ national military strategy must address the need to deter a US-USSR war and the ability to wage war In such a way as to terminate conflict on conditions acceptable to the US Europe because It Is where the US and USSR have substantial interests and confront each other mllltarfly Is the area of principal mllttary concern Thus while any US strategy to deal with the threat of Soviet aggression must be rldwide in scope It ls appropriate to focus the military elements of the US national strategy on Europe For lllustratlve purposes it is analytically useful to group· the AIMS described In Section 111 into three broad categories AIMS E1 F1 G In AIMS E F G Group One deterrence is based on both conventional and nuclear forces which are designed to make the costs of military aggression outweigh potential gains NATO conventional forces to resist a Soviet attack are planned to deny the Soviets the prospects of a quick inexpensive low r·lsk victory They are not planned to deny the Soviets territorial gain While Warsaw Pact sus lnablllty and short term mobilization capabilities may exceed NAT0 1 s In conventional conflict with NATO destruction of a stgnlflcant element of Soviet military power would occur The conventional forces through their ability to engage in high Intensity combat would also Increase the credibility of a US NATO nuclear response While the Soviets might hope that the mutual hostage effect of the US-USSR strategic systems would make an American use of nuclear weapons In Europe unlikely they could not be certain Moreover Soviet planners would have to consider British and French nuclear systems Finally deterrence Is enhanced by the fact that the Soviets must consider their relationship with the Chinese and divide their finite military resources between widely separated military regions Continuing Sino-Soviet hostility both requires the Soviets to allocate their military resources between Europe and Asia and limits the Soviet ability to directly thr-eaten US Interests In Asia This Slno_- ovlet hostllltv permits greater relative American concentration on_Europe • Warsaw Pact logistical doctrine calls for each front to maintain enough supplies for 30 days combat presc ibes strategy of 2 to 3 months supply for a theater and calls for national reserves of war materiel If annunltlon and POL storage capacity are used as an Index the Pact could have avatlable 2 to 3 months of POL and more than two months an1T1unition Including that stored In the western USSR Great uncertainty attaches to such estimates of Pact sustainability however as they assume optimal stockage lf 'v 1• _ r --1 r_T ------- ---- - - - - - - -- S-ECRElIf in spite of the considerations outl lned above conflict should occur this group of strategies does not provide at a high level of confidence the capability to defeat a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack Whether the Soviet objective of a victory within several weeks could be achieved Is uncertain The Soviets may be able to sustain combat for longer than the 30 days for which these AIMS provide If the Sovrets can persist In thilr attacl a US NATO conventional defeat In Central Europe is lll ely In that event the US could be forced to Negotiate an end of the conflict Resort to first use of nuclear weapons - __ Fall back from Central Europe and continue the wa·r conventionally elseWhere The probability of NATO obtaining a satisfactory negotiate J settlement to European hostilities is slim since the Soviets would be · inning militarily If NATO's first use of nuclear weapons rather than terminating hostilities provoked a Soviet nuclear response the consequences are not clear but it is doubtful that US NATO would thereby obtain a military advantage and be able to reverse the losing situation If war escalated to strategic nuclear exchange major destruction would result without any foreseeable US advantage Finally the US would find it exceedingly difficult to continue the war by conventional means since its forces would have been sized and sustained only for the Initial battle In Central Europe and not for a protracted worldwide conventional struggle AIMS H1 1 1 J In AIMS H I and J Group T '° deterrence rests on the US Allied capability to repel a Soviet conventional attac without resort to nuclear weapons The objective of NATO forces ls to deter a Soviet attack through a clear conventional capablllty to defeat It rather than to make a conventional 11 victory too costly for the Soviets The OHB representative bel eves tha because of the large unCertalnty In Pact sustaining capability It cannot be confidently predicted that the Pact could conduct an offensive operation longer than NATO could sustain a less mllltarily demanding defense The uncertain reliability of nonSoviet Pact forces which contribute over one third of the total Pact forces contributes to this Judgment The 0MB representative also believes that AIMS E F and G slgnlflcantlY upgrade NATO early COfflbat ' ' capabllltles If NATO forces succeeded In containing I Soviet attack and establishing a stable defensive line the eventual outcome is not clear I _ 1 -SECRET If conflict should occur the US would have planned the capability to defeat a Soviet attack without resort to nuclear weapons In Central Europe these strategies are designed to allow the US NATO to 111Jve back to the original borders after first blunting and stopping the Soviet Pact attack Having achieved their war objectives the US NATO could then Initiate negotiations for_ conflict termination Although the Soviets would not have achieved their war objectives they might choose to limit their own losses and terminate the conflict If not the US NATO would still have conventional and nuclear forces which could be used to threaten the Soviets If a period of prolonged stalemate ensued the superior economic power of the US NATO and Japan could be brought to bear At worst a nuclear conflict might develop AIMS M In Group Three strategi-es AIMS M deterrence rests on the threat of offsetting a Soviet attack· 1n Central Europe with a capability to seize other territory supported by superior US strategic forces The threatened response to Soviet aggression in Europe Is not confined to that theater rather Soviet aggression would be countered by US military Initiatives against the Soviet Union Itself Should conflict occur the probability of Soviet success Is re111Jte Unlike the options available in Group Two AIMS M provides sufficient conventional and nuclear forces to obtain a military advantage over the Soviet Union US NATO possibly In cooperation with China could either threaten or actually use these capabilities to force a termination of hostilities Policy Tensions The basic policy tension is that on the one hand Group One strategies which can be supported within current defense expenditures and are consistent with the capabilities of our NATO Allies promote deterrence but If conflict occurs probably would not provide satisfactory options for conflict termination On the other hand Group Two strategies which offer more satisfactory options for conflict termination and lessen the probability of nuclear war would require large Increases In US and Allied defense spending and may provoke adverse Soviet and Allied reactions Affordability of military forces depends on the perceptions of the US NATO as to the urgency of the situation If It were perceived that a major Soviet Pact conventional attack were Intended great expenditures for defense would be acceptable to the NATO governments At present such a perception don not exist It ls not that the US and Its Allie cannot afford greatly Increased defense expenditures but rather that the perceptions of the Soviet threat do not Justify radical Increases Furtherrrore while the US and NATO possess the necessary resources there Is Intense domestic competition for these resources In non-defense • sectors lV-4 fffDCT- - ·S-ECREl The All les desire an American COff'ITlltment to a restoration of the status quo ante but unlike the US show I lttle inclination to provide conventional forces to accomplish such a goal The NATO Allies currently provide no more than 30 days of arrmunltlon and supplies For them deterrence appears assured by US military Involvement In European security affairs and the potential escalation of any conventional conflict to strategic nuclear war Given such views dramatic Increases in conventional forces and sustainability such as In Groups Ti o and Three would probably be viewed as either Inconsistent with the Soviet threat or undermining deterrence However if Group One AIMS were· Interpreted as reducing the US corrrnitment to Europe thlr would probably provoke serious Allied cor ct 'rn especially· in the FRG Significantly increased German perceptions of vulnerability can only jeopardlze the US ability to Influence fRG defense policies Including German nuclear d cisions Moreover the flank allies perceiving a reduction in US support for the defense of their territorial integrity may seek se'curity assurance outside of NATO Groups Two a·i'ld Three strategies avoid these difficulties through the US comitment to restoration of the status quo ante However US NATO rrovement to acquire and deploy forces capable of first absorbing and then defeating a Soviet attack might provoke a similar Soviet counter-buildup Thus while Group Two and Three strategies might provide the basis for stable deterrence If the capabilities described in the strategies existed movement from current capabilities towards the increased force levels might actually be destabi l izlng Elements of a Solution A number of ways exist to try to reconcile the policy tensions posed by the different AIMS These approaches are not mutually exclusive In fact the US currently pursues portions of a nl 1'11ber of them In seeking resolution The US could have as its declared strategy a restoration of the status quo but acquire forces for a rrore modest strategy A public NATO convnitment to forward defense and restoration of the status quo ante would ease anxletles In the fRG even without full US or Allied funding for the necessary forces US reassurance of European allies concerning US nuclear reliablfity forces the Soviets to consider the consequences both of a failure to achieve their objective In a timely fashion and NATO nuclear response to a conventional attack See Question Ti o The US could acquire conventional forces to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities outside the European theater AIMS G for example provides forces specifically to undertake non-European initiatives against the USSR Because this AIMS also plans for heavy Intervention In local wars additional forces could be available for lnltlatlves These same forces If employed In Europe could provide a limited enhancement of the conventional capability NATO possesses in Group Onetstrategles See Question Three S ECRH ' ' _ - 5fEREf The US could Individually or In cooperation with NATO expand the conventional sustainability of Group One forces to delay or av id reaching nuclear decision point AIMS F v for example provides the US NATO with 90 days of sustainability This would not permit restoration of the status quo ante but If also attained by the Allies It might avert a conventional defeat Increased US sustainability above that provided by the Allies may b useful as an example for them and to provide the US additional non-nuclear options should conflict occur The US could enhance Its nuclear capabilities to Increase the deterrent value of the various groups of strategies AIMS F F v and I include strategic forces which maintain US advantages In certain indices Al t i S l'I seeks clear superiority in strategic force Sec Question Six The US could undertake political economic and arms control initiatives to prooote Soviet-American cooperation and thereby de½rease the 1 ikel ihood that war uld break out in Europe Or the US ' ould undertake foreign policy initiatives which seek to undermine th reliability of the• military contribution of the Eastern European countries to Warsaw Pact strength For example the US NATO might adopt a public TNF targeting practice which excludes either non-Soviet Pact forces not participating in attack on NATO all East European targets except Soviet military formations installations and logistic support or both The US could actively seek closer security links with the PRC to force the Soviets to devote additional resources against China Such a US China policy might Include military sales intell lgenr- e sharing or other Sino-American security ties The US in conjunction with its NATO Allies could plan to maintain in peacetime the forces and sustaining capability needed to stabilize a defense line In Europe and plan to create In wartime the additional forces needed to counterattack to restore the original borders This uld require manpower and Industrial base mobilization plans and capabilities sufficiently responsive to generate new forces on a timely basis At present we do not have such capabilities neither our manpower mobil izatlon capability nor our Industrial base have been planned on this basis To estimate the cost of such a capability would require study of 1 Warsaw Pact capability to sustain its existing forces In protracted combat while simultaneously creatfng new forces and 2 the cost to the US and NATO of maintaining In peacetime the capability to create forces on various schedules Insufficient work has been done on such total mobilization planning In recent years to pennlt even gross estimates of the costs Involved ECREt C • • QUESTION T 10 Question To what extent should the US for political or military purposes state objectives or fund programs for security In Europe which are Inconsistent with the Interpretation or Implementation of NATO strategy by other members of the Alliance Discussion -NATO's o ficial strategy expressed In HC-14 3 calls for preserving peace and providing for the security of the NATO area by maintaining a credible deterrent effected by forces which would cause the Warsaw Pact to conclude that if they were to launch an attack the chances of a favorable outcome would be too small to be acceptable and fatal rl ks could be involved Should aggression occur NAT0 1 s objective would be to preserve or restore the integrity of the NAtO a ea by employing such forces as might be necessary within the concept of forward defense NAT0 1 s response to aggression could take the form of Direct defense-·a response in kind to deny the attacker his objective Deliberate escalation--raising the scope and intensity of combat to raise the cost and risk not solely to defeat the enemy but also to weaken his will or General nuclear response While direct defense would be NATO's first response to any aggression short of ful J nuclear attack NATO should always be prepared to escalate and the main deterrent to aggression ts the threat of escalation As a result the strategy calls for conventional forces to be designed to deter and counter a 1 imited non-nuclear attack and to deter any larger non-nuclear attack by presenting the prospect of non-nuclear hostilities at a scale that could involve grave risk of escalation to nuclear war Within the ambiguities of this statement the US has been able to urge improvements In NAT0 1 s conventional capabilities and the Allies have been able to rely heavily on the nuclear deterrent None of the AIMS considered in this study ls completely consistent with a strict • This paragraph paraphrases portions of HC-1 3 relevant to the issue at hand lV-7 cror-r reading of the NATO strategy although the force capabilities of all but AIMS M could be Interpreted as adequate to execute the strategy However certain AIMS require a level of conventional capabilities which considerably exceed those presently planned by our NATO All les and It might be difficult to persuade the Allies to procure the capabilities needed without raising questions about strategy In AIMS E F or G the US would in essence be adjusting its planning for conflict In the European theater to correspond more closely to that of the Allies Consequently there would be no need t6 challenge the current acquisition policy of our NATO Allies The small decreases In total US forces that might result In AIMS E and F could If desired be explained as a way to obtain funds for increases in capability to reinforce Europe rapidly In the early days of a war NATO 1 s conventional arabilities would continue to be Inadequate to Implement the wartime objective of preserving or restoring territorial Integrity against a large scale attack and first use of nuclear weapons would be unlikely to provide a satisfactory solution Many of the adverse political implications of adoption of these AIMS probably could be avoided If the US continued to publicly support MC-11 t 3 particularly with reference to forward defense and restoration of the status quo ante The fact that the Warsaw Pact Is aware of NATO's formal strategy may be an additional reason for the strategy to espouse goals and Intentions other than lhose which would actually govern NATO force planning in AIMS E F or G • One divergence between fonnal NATO strategy and all the AIMS considered in this study ts the concept of accepting either temporarily or permanently a significant loss of NATO territory The aroount of loss of NATO territory contemplated in all AIMS ls likely to be viewed by the Allies as inconsistent with the concept of forward defense Consequently regardless of the AIMS proposed there will be the question of whether to continue to subscribe to the concept of forward defense In our declaratory policy or whether to reconcile deelaratory policy and capability As we presently model land warfare Implementation of a defense at the West German border would require significant increases In NATO's peace• time deployed forces and In their day-to-day readiness posture Such changes are unlikely to be politically aceeptable given the current assessma nt of the likelihood of an attack In addition they might appear threatening to the Pact and thus be counterproductive Failure to address with our Allies the problem of reconciling strategy and capabilities makes war planning difflcult Yet it cannot be addressed without also raising the question of the circumstances under which the US would be willing to initiate nuclear warfare The JCS representative believes that adoption of any of these AIMS contains the high risk of the loss of Western Europe or early initiation of a nuclear response should deterrence fall -itCREl IV-8 ttCRH '' On the other hand Implementation of AIMS H I or J which call for the development of conventional forces adequate to restore lost NATO territory ould require major Increases In All led as well as US capa bilitles It ls uncertain as to whether the Allies could be persuaded to make such increases given current public perceptions of the threat without opening up the Issue of strategy If a strategy debate should develop It might be divisive and might guarantee that the US would not be able to persu ade the Allies to make further force Improvements • AIMS v falls between these two categories The Allied forces required are not much larger than those currently planned and the pfincipal difficulty would be obtaining the necessary sustaining capability for the Allies We might succeed In persuadln'g the Allies to make the necessary improvements In their capabilities If we did not question NATO strategy but continued to urge Improvements In the conventional leg of NATO's TRIAO in reaction to Pact actlvltie Mechanisms such as a conmon NATO-war reserve stockpile have been suggested recently If the Allies could not be persuaded to develop the needed capability the US could consider planning to supply them In wartime from Its own stocks recognizing the problems associated with corrmonallty Congressional appropriations for a policy of stockpiling for the NATO Allies is however doubtful If neither of these solutions is achievable in the near term the question arises as to the extent to which the US is willing to fund sustaining capability in excess of that of the Allies Some greater capability might serve as an inducement to greater Allied effort and would be available for use in other perhaps more likely contingencies In addition no contingency considered In this study other than sustained confl let in Europe generates significant stockpile and lndustria base requirements If such a contingency is not to be planned for It must e decided how much or how little sustaining capabll lty Is enough -a question somewhat analogous to the political sufficiency question for strategic forces Summary In sunmary the US could Implement AIHS E or G without questioning formal NATO strategy because the Allied capabilities required correspond roughly to thos -currently planned Full Implementation of AIHS nv or H would requl re Al 1 led cooperatlon but such cooperation might best be obtained by orking within current NATO strategy Implementation of AIHS H I or J requires Allied cooperation ln making major Increases In capabilities There Is doubt about whether such Allied cooperation could be obtained without raising the Issue of strategy Thus cholce of a strategy which requires a major Increase In Allied capabilities would require a decision on whether to raise the Tssue of strategy within NATO • The JCS representative believes that a variant of AIMS I which elaxed the crlterla for early restoration of pre-war borders and provided for D-day to P·day sustainability vice 90 days would not require the major Increases ln active NATO peacetime forces IV· 9 CRE1 --·--------------------------- --- - - - - ··· - 0 QUESTION THREE Question To what extent should the US acquire mil ltary capabilities above those required for the European theater to undertake military operations either offensive or defensive against the Soviets In a US-USSR war7 Otscusslon Recent strategic planning has necessarily focused on Europe and there has been 1 lttle analysis of the conduct of the non-European aspects of a worldwide war However the steadily growing ability of the USSR to employ military force rldwlde makes It prudent for the US to assess the need to confront them on that basis and determine whether the US should provide more forces either to counter Soviet Initiatives or to take Its own Initiatives A major purpose of operation5 outside Europe would be to pro11Dte US objectives in a European war At a minimum the US uld undertake operations to insure that the war In Europe could be prosecuted effectively Additional forces might permit the US to put off the decision to use theater nuclear forces or could provide hedges to reduce the risk Inherent In any European strategy If the NATO defense In Europe were unsuccessful or a stalemate were achieved operations outside Europe might improve the US negotiating position The AIMS as presented all re quire Limited Action or Initiatives as the options for outside Europe operations Essentially the two categories represent the limits of a range of defensive and offensive capabilities AIHS E and Fare basically deterrence strategies and provide a limited military capability to counter Soviet initiatives outside Europe AIMS Hand I which also have Limited Action as the outside Europe option are less dependent on nuclear deterrence and provide a more formidable conventional warfighting capability for a longer period of time In these two AIHS 11 L1mited Action Is designed to allow the US to focus on Europe but prevents the Soviets from concentrating on Europe by confronting them YiOrldwide The other three AIHS G J and H have Hfnltiatlves as the outside Europe option In the case of AIMS G also basically a deterrence strate3y lnltlativeS raise the nuclear threshold and provide a hedge against failure In Europe In AIMS J and H 11 lnltlatlves 11 and Increased presence outside Europe coupled with a strong conventlonal defense In Europe provide the US with a credible conventional deterrence Addltlonally AIMS M provides a sub stantlal capability to wage war and defeat the Soviets worldwide • ' ' I _ ___ ----------- IV-lo - SKREt •''1 ' iE€REt Representative forces envisioned for operations outside Europe are shown below TABLE IV-1 Forces Representative • L ml ted Act Ion Army Divisions 2' ' Tactical Fighter Wings 4 Navy Carriers Marine Amphibious Forces •• 6 3 9 Initiatives 2 20 9 3 9 As earlier Indicated all of the AIMS contain some air and naval forces for operations outside Europe in the context of 'l« rldwlde conflict However AIMS G J and M wt--lch have initiatives outside Europe also heavy Intervention for potential local wars dual role and are not completely addltive h lvet ' - Some of the forces perform a us Sov I et Adv an tages 0 i- sadvantages It Is uSeful to note the relatlve advantages that each major po er enjoys when considering options to pursue tn a 'l«lrldwlde war Essentially the USSR has near term energy self-sufficiency and the US and Its Allies are Increasingly dependent of foreign sources of energy The USSR has either internal or short length SLOC 1 s and LOC's to the potential area of conflict while the opposite ls true for the US • The JCS representative believes that glven the limitations of the methodologies and assumptions used In preparing the Illustrative force postures and costs they are not appropriate to use In discussion of notional military strategies Limited Action forces were sized to accomplish the following tasks protection of oil SLOC's limited conventional attacks against Soviet facilities and deployed air and naval forces extensive mining to deny Soviets free use of the seas assistance to allies In maintaining Pacific SLOC and assistance In the defense of South Korea with forward deployed forces Initiatives forces were sized to do the Limited Action tasks and In addition Increased attacks on Soviet facilities as well as air and naval forces and attacks on Soviet fishing fleet Marine forces are employed In support of naval campaigns •••• Arrrry force structure provides two divisions as part of the NATO requirement which are planned only for employment In the Mid-East £1CREl IV-11 S-ECREl · On the other hand the US has greater open access to the seas than do the Sov I ets Sov I et 1 i ml ted access to the sea may be a disadvantage on the offensive but an advantage on the defensive since the sea avenues of approach are also limited As opposed to the Soviets the US Is free from hostile neighbors and has relatively reliable allies has greater Industrial economic technological and agricultural strengthi greater power projectlon capabllltyj and does not need to withhold considerable military power to defend national borders or control Internal situations Soviet Initiatives The Soviet Union has a capability to take Initiatives against US interests outside Europe The problem for the US would be compounded If the Soviets undertook a variety of different initiatives 1multaneously Potential Soviet initiatives include Attack US nuclear capabilities carrier submarine air forces and support bases In the Pacific to limit damage from US attack Attack Japan's sea lanes 'o-f cOITITlunication and air and naval bases ln order to tie down US forces in the Pacific as well as limit Japan's war supporting potential Support a North Korean attack on South Korea Threaten Persian Gulf oil by attacking oil SLOC's or conducting land air attacks on these oil sources Attack US SLOC's to Hawaii and Alaska attack US bases and conduct raids on US territory US Initiatives The US has limited forces available after European requirements are met to do what current strategy calls for Defending SLOC's to Hawaii and Alaska Attacking deployed Soviet naval and air forces Present planning also requires that some US forces deployed worldwide 11 swing 11 to reinforce the European war The concept of swinging forces Is more credible If a US-USSR war starts In Europe or ff the swing Is started as soon as Pact mobilization Is detected However If conflict Is Initiated by crises In other areas and expands subsequently to a NATO-Pact war In Europe and '°rldwlde US-USSR conflict then considerable portions of the swing forces may already be engaged • nd not readily available to ll'Dve to the North Atlantic European theater Also In the case of a short war less than 30 days naval swing forces may not be able to reach the European theater In sufficient time to accocnpllsh designated tasks On the other hahd If the war Is extended then these forces become crltlcal 1v- t RFT- '· ' ' ·- S_ECR ET C0t1ductlng limited attacks against Soviet facilities when beneficial to do so Asststfng allies In defending Pacific and lndlan Ocean SLOC's At Issue Ts whether additional forces should be acquired to take Initiatives against the Sovfet Union to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities and to provide better defense against Soviet Initiatives The US could conslde a number of different Initiatives Attack Soviet air and naval facilities Considerable advantage accrues to the power that can attack first in areas outside Europe as the other must adopt a defensive posture thereby irrrnoblllzlng a large portion of his forces The ability to deny the Soviets free use of the seas or t c ability to conduct air attacks agafnst US forces woufd be enhanced by des· troylng ·forces before they deploy Preemptive strfkes or actions such as mining passages prior to Pact D•day however might not be desirable politically More forces will be required and more US losses taken In attacks on Soviet bases after D·day but It may be prudent to determine Soviet Intentions before att cking Defend Persian Gulf 011 SLOC 1 s and oil fields The continued flow of Persian Gulf and North African oil Is crucial to the war capability of the NATO All lance Consequently neither the Soviets nor ourselves could Ignore the importance of these resources and US forces could be called on to counter Soviet attempts to Interdict oil SLOC's or take over the oil fields themselves Deny seas to Soviet merchant and fishing fleet Attacks on the Soviet merchant fleet would limit critical logistic support to the northeast Soviet provinces The Soviets also rely heavily on food from the sea and attacks on the fishing fleet would create problems In terms of a long war The northeastern provinces are particularly vulnerable and denial of economic and military reinforcement by sea renders the maritime provinces susceptlable to possible PRC Initiatives Power projection Into Soviet littorals The principal goal would be a dlvr••Jon of Soviet resources disproportionate to our O fl Therefore Jim te objective operations rth th purpose ot tying dc m Soviet defensive forces and possibly encouraging support from other powers would be more appropriate than a unilateral attempt to open a second front In this regard Petro vtovsk and the kurlles are pros ectlve objectives In addition to actua operations the mere threat of sue operations and unconventional operations can tie down Sovlet·defendlng forces -5-ECREl- ' ' 1ECRtt •• Dee¥ lnterdfctlon of Soviet territory If reinforcement and supply by sea o the maritime provinces has been disrupted the only alternative transportation from the Soviet Union's western economic and Industrial heartland Is the Trans-Siberian railway wtllch can be Interdicted by the US or PRC Attacks of this nature against Soviet territory would provide mHltary political and psychological benefits However In this context as In all major US-USSR conflicts there Is a corresponding risk to US territory Sunvnary The US currently has the capability to perform limited operations both offensive and defensive outside of Europe during a worldwide war with the Soviet Union greater capability could be retained by dehyt_ng the 11 swfn9 11 of PACO forces to NATO with an attendant risk for the European war The USSR has the capability to conduct a range of Initiatives against the US to which the US st·i°ould be able to respond with those actions · necessary to protect vital Interests There are Increased Initiatives that the US can consider based on the objectives desired and the relative costs benefits derived The key issue ts whether the US should plan for only those actions to protect vital Interests or should the US plan for specific actions which will require additive forces and incur Increased cost outside of Europe In an overall strategy for orldwlde war against the Soviets r - r IV-14 SECRETE qUESTION FOUR uestlon or supplies wars To what extent should the US plan to have military forces avatlable for crisis management or Intervention In local To what extent should these forces or supplies be available without drawing from those requl red for a major US-USSR war Discussion The focus of previous questions has been on deterring or waging I major war with the Soviet Union While consideration of this critical dimension remains central to US national securfty planning other militarily significant events are more likely International crises and local wars variously affecting us intere ts have punctuated the years since the last war between great powers The probability Is high that during the next decade similar conflicts will occur which while not directly threatening the territory of any major power may warrant the use of US military power Potential US actions in these circumstances range from crisis management or peacekeeping ac tlvitles--where military presence provides a ccmplement to diplomacy--to arme_d Intervention in order to protect US Interests The utility of mi Jitary action as well as the degree of involvement which Is appropriate Is a function of many variables Physical proximity to the US is a dimension as ls the extent of US conmltment whether via formal treaty or perceived obligation The significance of Interests in some regions such as the Middle East may Justify a degree of military involven-ent under any circumstances while other areas may asst me sufficient importance only In a great power context Thus an Insurgency In Rhodesia might not warrant US military presence unless the USSR Introduced forces there T is dimension which could produce a direct confrontation between US and Soviet units continues to gain importance as Russian Involvement In the Third World grows and their capabil lty to project military power beyond their borders increases The Importance of Planning A de facto capability to deal with crises and local wars would exist even if forces were acquired only to deal with a major US-USSR war However In the absence of an Independent decision establishing planning guidance for local wars drawing on these sizable forces might not provide a satisfactory capability for crisis management or Intervention For example to make sure that these major war forces were In Europe when needed lgnlflcant portions of the force and Its equipment might be forward deployed with the remainder tied to strict time-phased mobilization and deployment schedules If It were subsequently decided to employ these forces In a crisis or local war the capability to make Initial forcible entry such as that possessed by airborne and amphibious forces might be lacking Appropriate basing and rights of passage might be unavailable Additionally the strategic 11ft available might be Inappropriate to deploy these 11 European 11 forces and equipment tn a timely manner Their training 5ECRtl IV- 15 ECREt and equipment might be unsuitable for a non-European envlromient and they might have Inadequate logistic support to accomplish the local war mission Such potential shortcomings might be consciously accepted as the result of a planning decision They should not come es 11 surprlses based on the assumption that large forces acquired for one purpose are automatically employable for other missions Planning Levels A plannfng decision on peacekeeping and local wars can be made by establ lshlng a level of effort which forces and supplies In the structure myst be capable of supporting lmpliclt In this approach ts the possibility of employing other available forces to support higher levels of effort should US Interests warrant but the capability to do so would not be prograrrrned A set of representational levels of effort were defined In the study and are outlined below They describe three points on the capability planning continuum and provide the components of global flexibility strategic mobility lnit al entry capability environmental suitabillJy 'and sustainability In larying amounts These levels and the resultant forces reflect approximately the three general groupings which emerged from the analysis of several local war force posturing scenarios postulated in the 1985 tlmeframe Amounts of sustainability though rather arbitrarily assigned are consistent with the options described and provided a basis for costing The levels of effort for planning are Limited Action - The US would plan to have the capability to provide logistical support and limited naval and tactical air forces to support US Interests anywhere In the world for 90 days The comnltment of US land combat forces would not be planned AIMS E and H incorporate this planning concept Light Intervention - The US would plan to have the capability to provlde logistlcal support and moderate naval and tactical air forces but only limited land combat forces anywhere in the world Supplies to sustain US and host nation forces for 180 days would be planned AIMS F F v and I Incorporate this planning concept Heavy Intervention - The US would plan to have the to provide logistical support and considerable land naval and anywhere in the world Suppl les to sustain US and host nation 360 days would be planned AIMS G J and M Incorporate this concept capability air power forces for planning Supplies would be planned to sustain both US and host nation forces Currently except for certain nations the acquisition of such war reserve stocks for use by non-US forces Is prohibited by law ' 5ECR-Et - • The chart below depicts representative forces associated with the three planning options TABLE I V-1 Llml ted Forces represe ntatlve Heavy Intervention 0 1-2 3-8 4 9 Army Divisions • Light Action Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings 0·1 9 Marine Amphibious Forces 1-3 9 1 Air -raft Carriers 24 Wide-bodied Aircraft Intervention 3-1 1 4 130 160 Additional Forces versus Drawing Down Once a planning level of effort has been specified the forces and supplies required to support it need not Increase the total structure In many cases the capability required may already be present In the forces provided for other purposes Where there are deficiencies e g In strategic lift or sustainability the shortfall would constitute at a minimum the additive requirement to achieve that particular level of planned effort Beyond this lt may be desirable to acquire further additive capability at additional cost to reduce the need to draw on other assets In order to cope with crises and local wars Such decisions must span the considerable range of choice from completely Inclusive forces for 11 limited action 11 to completely additive forces for 11 heavy Intervention The balance struck between drawing down and acquiring additive capabilities depends on the significance attached to several Interrelated factors These include force redeployabillty sequence of events available sustainability relative force sizes source of forces and the desirability of flexibility hedging Force redeployabllity or the ability of forces to disengage and redeploy rapidly can best be appreciated by posing t'l«I conditionals If the US does not want to draw down major war capabilities for crisis management and loca I wars Land combat forces and associated support must be additive since they can only be disengaged and redeployed slowly If at all • The JCS representative believes that glven the limitations of the methodologies and assumptlens used In preparing the lllustratlve force postures and costs they are not appropriate to use In discussion of notional military strategies '' IV-17 - I l Some tactfcal air forces must be additive While such units are easily redeployable complete withdrawal would leave land forces without air support In addition attrition of aircraft In local wars must be considered • Naval forces and strategic mobility forces need not be additive since they can be disengaged and redeployed relatively quickly and easily Airborne and amphibious forces may or may not be additive depending on whether the US plans to conmlt such forces to sustained combat or use them for initial entry only If the US is willing to draw down - --- -- The requirements for local wars may affect the mix of forces e g numbers of heavy and light divisions Local war planning may lnfluen- e the deployments of forces acquired primarily for other purposes For example the requirement to structure a single force for both local and major wars may lead to a different mix of POHCUS and airlift for Europe than would be optimum If Europe were the only contingency As noted above local wars may still generate the largest requtrements for certain types of forces e g airborne and amphibious forces The Increment between local war and other requirements would have to be additive Differences In redeployabillty are the operative factor In considering the possible sequence of events between a local and a worldwide war with the USSR If US intervention In a local war occurred prior to the outbreak of a war with the USSR some Intervention forces would not be available rapidly for employment against the Soviets In Europe or elsewhere ff the lnterventlOn forces are additive no adverse Impact would occur In the US-USSR war If the Intervention forces are fncluslve there would be a reduction In US forces avatlab le for the US-USSR war The effect mliht be to limit US capability In the critical early days of the major war On the other hand If the us-u sR war started before the local war the US would have already conrnltted Inclusive forces to the US-USSR conflict and presumably would not want to undertake an Intervention In this situation any additive Intervention forces would be available as a central reserve to be employed In Europe or elsewhere to Influence the war outcome Thts problem might be offset at least partially by m blllzlng reserve forces tn nl lllbers corresponding to those active forces coamltted to a local war In thf's way readiness for the tntt1al phases of a major war could be maintained possibly provid tng sufficient time for local war forces to redeploy In the event of1 a major US-USSR war There could · ho ever be significant po11tlca1 ramifications of such a reserve call-up £ ECRH - - - Another factor Is the amount of available sustainability In most cases even though forces may exist elsewhere which can be drawn down to wage a local war adequate logistic support will not be available Major draw downs of stocks for a protracted local war may prove disastrous if a major war occurs Thus even If Intervention forces are even partially inclusive attention must be paid to the possibly additive sustainability needs both for VS and host nation forces The degree of risk associated with relying on inclusive intervention forces If a major war follows a local war ts a function of relative force s izes and resultant margins for error Thus drawing down on a limit loss defense in Europe AIMS E F F v and G to completely satisfy the requirement for a heavy Intervention would Invite disaster The diversion of ·forces from a European direct defense AIMS H I J and M especially If t e ln •ventlon forces were taken from CONUS rel f ce ents perhaps with compensat'lng activation of reserve units would not be as significant If the forces for Initiatives against the Soviet Union in the event of a wor 1d ide war are acquired AIMS G J and M a sour e of forces for certain aspects of crisis management and local warShas already been created If these initiative forces are to be used for Intervention some delay In corrmencement of actions against the Soviet Union would have to be acceptable It should also be noted that in several instances a local war requiring significant US participation might already Involve a direct confrontation with the USSR In such situations the question of relative leverage who is tying down whom must also be considered Ultimately the degree of draw down which is acceptable represents an assessment of the probability and impact of military involvement in crises and local wars with appropriate hedging against uncertainty The desire for sufficient flexibility to provide the optimum response to any military contingency must be balanced against such constraints as political and fiscal feasibility Any resultant risk of Inadequate military response must be acceptable Surrmary Planning for peacekeeping and local wars represents an Important dimension In developing a US military strategy Establishment of a level of effort for planning Is essential Beyond this It Is necessary to decide to what extent the capability to support this level will be additive or drawn from forces planned for a major US-USSR war It should be noted that the reverse is also true--the acquisition of additive intervention forces creates a source of some Initiative forces This potential for partial interchangabtllty becomes particularly useful at Heavy lnterventlon 11 levels £ECRET IV-I 9 -- SECR·ffF QUESTION FIVE Question What should be the US military strategy ln East Asia Should the US maintain the current military presence or Include additional adjustments In US forces in Korea and the Philippines Discussion · In the years following the Korean War the US maintained strong • sea and land based forces forward deployed In the Western Pacific to combat Sino-Soviet Inspired and supported aggression against a weakened Japan Taiwan South Korea and throughout Southeast Asia The situation today is quite different As Sino-Soviet relations have deteriorated from alliance to military confrontation a similarity of Sino-American security Interests vis-a-vis the Soviets has evolved The threat of a Taiwan Invasion has moderated because of Chinese hostility toward the USSR preoccupation with internal economic problems and the advent of a less radical Chinese leadership Japan has become the third largest economic and Industrial power in the world The Republic of Korea has developed its economic and military capabilities to the point where It Is less reliant upon the US for Its security needs As the circumstances In East Asia have changed the primary US objective in that region has become a stabilization of the current relatively favorable balance among the great powers as opposed to containment of a Sino-Soviet threat Defense links with US Asian allies enhance the stability of this East Asian great power balance The US strateqy In the Pacific should in addition to supporting US political interests provide for military requirements such as protection of the approaches to the continental United States and LOCs to deployed US forces The impact of future changes In US military deployments in East Asia could vary markedly among the major powers Japan ls probably most sensitive to such changes It currently perceives no irrrnediate danger from either the PRC or the USSR In part because of confidence in the US Security Pact However tf this confidence were to be lessened the Japanese response is uncertain The Soviet Union Is perhaps less sensitive to changes In US deployments Although they are as concerned as the US about the security of the sea approaches to their homeland they are particularly concerned about China Of the major powers the PRC is perhaps least sensitive to changes In US force deployments In East Asia but has demonstrated considerable sensitivity to US global military posture vis-a-vis the USSR Chinese security needs are dominated by their Soviet requirements Inasmuch as the PRC does not appear at this time to constitute a threat to US Interests It would appear to be advantageous for the US to avoid a threatening posture relative to China fCREt IV-20 SECREl In this political environment the PRC can play an Important role In a US worldwide strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union The nature of the Soviet security problem whlch confronts them with powerful adversaries In both Europe and Asia Is an Important American advantage Perhaps paradoxically US military policy and actions in Europe may have • • a more important effect on the Chinese ability or Inclination to remain hostile to the USSR than US military presence In Asia A strong US NATO position in Europe forces the Soviets to allocate substantial forces to that theater But Increases In US air and naval forces In East Asia could prompt Soviet buildups in the Far East which China would not view as desirable Substantial Increases In US forces deployed to East Asia could result In a conflict of interest between the US and PRC at the expense of the mutual interest of deterring aggressive Soviet behavior US interests In East Asia are defln d In terms of both great power and reql onal Considerations The exact causal relationship between the level of US peacetime military presence and degree to which US regional interests in East Asia are secured ls not known However five basic reasons for peacetime forward deployments are to Accomplish initial wartime tas s against the Soviet Union Protect US Interests Promote regional stability Discourage nuclear proliferation Enhance US influence The presence of US military forces In East Asia demonstrates tangible US military power and provides a sense of security to our friends The visible evidence provided by US presence and active US Involvement In regional security affairs Inhibits aggression provocation and coercion by local or outside powers and discourages nuclear proliferation While US influence Is not measured solely by our military presence It does contribute to our Influence The vlsl·bllity of involvement ts greater In those AIMS with current or Increased East Asian presence AIMS F F v G I J M than In those with a reduced presence AIMS E and H AIMS E and H concentrate on major wartime tasks accomplished from a reduced baseline no Philippine or r orean bases whi1e accepting the resultant limitations Withdrawal from the Philippines would significantly reduce US capability to engage In combat operations throughout Southeast Asia and to project power Into the Indian Ocean In support of US regional Interests Withdrawal from Korean bases would Impose Njor obstacles to supporting combat operations In Korea '' IY•21 - 5-ECRET The East Asia forces generated for all AIMS were developed primarily to satisfy wartime requirements against the Soviet Union and secondarily to provide air and naval combat support during Korean hostilities other local wars for the appropriate AIMS AIMS F F v G I J M The mfnimum military mission requirements against the Soviet Union In East Asia are the same In Reduced and Current East Asian Presence substrategies Increased forces· for use against the Soviets as In AIMS G F and Mare • the result of planned Initiatives during hostilities Forces were not generated to satisfy peacetime presence requirements In support of US • military requirements except In the case of AIMS E and H In which the low range of carrJer forces was based in part on maintaining a peacetime presence In As 1a p ol ltlcal interests in East Asia over and above those needed to satisfy As can- be seen in the table below the forces provided In all AIMS insure that the US would retain significant anti-Soviet military capa· billties in the Western Pacific TABLE IV-3 Forces O' loyed in the Pacific Reduced Presence E Army Div TFW H Current Presence Without wartime initiatives F F v I Current Presence With wart me Initiatives G J 1-4 0-1 3 Increased Presence 3 4 4 3 5 5 Z 9-3 9 3 9 Z 9-3 9 3 9 J 9-6 9 1AF Ashore 1AF Afloat 1 9-Z 9 1 9-Z 9 CTGs 1-Z 1-Z z z Z-J Z-J J-4 Maritime Patrol Sqdr Z-4 Z-4 4 4 4 4 6-8 What may be of considerably greater significance than the actual combat power of US forces deployed to the Western Pacific ls East Asian perceptions of the nature and extent of US participation In regional security affairs that us force levels convey In the altered East Asian political environment the forces allocated to East Asia have declined steadily from the pre-Vietnam posture Vietnam aside the US has already wlthdrawn one division from Korea and announced plans to remove all remaining ground combat forces the airborne brigade has been withdrawn from Okinawa SECREt 8ECREr deployed carrier task groups have been reduced from three to two US forces have been removed frcrn Thailand end significantly reduced In Japan US military presence In Taiwan has been significantly reduced the level of military assistance to East Asian nations has declined and the US Is publicly c01m1ltted to consideration of proposals which would limit US military presence tn the lndlan Ocean Both US a111es and potential adversaries are keenly aware of these trends and It may be difficult to persuade Asian nations of a continuing US involvement In regional security affairs The exact point at which further reducttons may harm US Interests ts not known The question Is whether further reductions tn either US deployed forces or retrenchment in the US base line can be made without risk to US regional Interests Ther e are differing vlc-ws whether reductions In US forces and or retrenchment In the US base line AIMS E and H could be conducted In a manner which would continue to provide for major US security interests vis-a-vis the Soviets without upsetting regional stability or discouraging Chinese hostility towards the Soviets Further such reductions might encourage Japan to do more In Its own defense and assume a greater regional military role There Is no question but that Japan could contribute a much greater share of Its national effort to Its own defense This may be desirable and could ultimately permit further reductions in wartime requirements for US air and naval forces ln East Asia bl The current situation Is relatively favorable to the US The US ts rnovlng towards an offshore military posture which avoids automatic Involvement in regional hostilities but ls capable of combat operations throughout East Asia the Soviets are In check China persists in Its anti-Soviet attitude and military orientation while showing little lncllnatloR towards aggressive action against Talwanj nuclear proliferation Incentives In Japan Korea and Taiwan are not pervasive North Korea must take tnto account powerful US air and naval assets In any decision to attack the South Japanesew Alnerlcan relations are close and cooperative and ASEAN cooperation Is both relatively high and hostile to ORV expansion '· I V-23 - t · --- ---- _ ---·- I -------- ----- -------- --- -- -- - - - - - MILITARY IMPLICATIOtlS OF PRM-10 AIMS 1 INTRODUCTION Military atrategies delineate the requirements of the armed forces of nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the ap lication of force or the threat of I force Therefore a complete evaluation of the AIMS requires assess ent of their probability of achieving US national security objectives Since these objectives are not defined in PR l-10 this assessm nt will use the National Security Objective state cnt in the Defense Guidance as the basis for cvaluatinCJ the r -1s 'l'his paragraph statea The basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact This involves assuring the physical security of the United States and maintain ng an nternational environment in 'hich US interests are prot ected Achieving thh objective is dependent upon the US ability to deter• war to revent coercion to ·influence international affairs from a position of rec gnized strength to fight when necessary and to terminate conflict on terms compatible wlth US nationul security interests For greater explication of attendant security objectives and policies refer to the Defense Guidance Nove nber 1976 pages 2-12 It must be noted that military strategies are not vit out inherent risk At one level there is t he risk that the strategy' itself may not co npletely fulfill national policy and objectives At the other levfl the force capabilities may not completely fulfill the strategy requirements Traditionally we have adopted military strategies that contained risk at both these levels Consideration of the probability of military success of each of the AIMS to achieve US national objectives requires an analysis of the complex interaction of many assunption1 and variab es Some such as deterrence of enemies and assurance of allies -- which rest in part on t he perceptions of capabilities and the resolve to use them are less easily quantified and hence are more difficult to aaaess in finite terms • • 1 ' SE-r-· • 't ll'J • - UNCLASSIFIED Deterrence of aggression is a primary objective of U nationAl security policy and is an aggregat o the stabilizing effect of both nuclear ond conventional forces Other objectives include withstandin 1 an aggressor attack if deterrence fails and terminating the conflict or terms favorable to maintaining ft global environment in which US interests are prot cted Thus the probabilily of achieving US objectives should deterrence fail is an essential clement in considering the acceptability of any specific military strategy • -' assessment of these various factors il 8 they alate to the PR -1-10 AIHS is presented i tabular form in Inclosures A-E • 2 • -'SSESSMEN'T or AIMS a GENER IL The illustrative AIMS displayed in the PiU1-l0 Report fall into three categories -- one stressing nuclear deterrence a second stres ing con Jentional vadighting capobility · and· a third stressing both conventional and nuclear deterrent and warfighting capo lbil it ies AIMS E F F V and G emph size nuclear deterrence to aChieve US national security objectives If this deterrence fails they provide a low probability of achieving those o jectivea in convention 11 and nuclear warfighting and subsequent conflict terrnination actions AIMS G however does provide substantial co ventional capabilities for conflict outaide NATO 'AIMS Han J stress conventional warfighting capability rather than nuclear deterrenc to achieve US objectives and have J imited nuclear warfighting ca abilities Thus they are likely to achieve US objectives in conventional conflicts A IMS J and to a lesser degree Al S H do not provide sufficient nuclear capability to confidently deter Soviet use of nuclear weapons nor to achieve US objectives in a strategic nuclear exchange A IMS I I V •l and M provide high probabllitiea ot achieving US-national security objectives through I V is Al S I with D top sustainability and indefinite varfighting capability • • 2 ' UNCLASSIFIED - --·-·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - UNCLASSIFIEC ·· deterrence Should deterrence fail these strategics al10 provide warfighting capabilitie whic have relatively high probabilities of terminating a conflict on terms favorable to the US and it allies Forces for AIMS Hare not considered attainable within the tim framc of the st_udy AIMS E r and G have a low probability of accomplishin·3 the US objectiv of preventing Soviet domination of Western Europe if deterrence fails Since deterrence rests to a large de ree on perceptions these AIMS do not provide a highly credi le deterrent S1nci tt1c sustain bil ity of US Corces is limited to 30 day's in these AIHS decisions rf gardin'3 conflict termination either in the Corm ot deliberate nuclear escalation negotiation or withdrawal of US forces ftom Europe must be made shortly after com1 encement of hostilities These early decisions are necess ry in order to provide time to execute the withdtawal escalate to nuclear warfighting or conclude ne otiations within the 30 day sustaina il ty li itation Fightin will continue during this period and American forces Dust be sustained Under tiese conditions favorable conflict termination t irou j 1 negOtiation ot withdrawal from Europe is unlikely AIMS F V has siroilat implications but allows a longer period for decision• before conflict termination procedures must be initiated The Pact has consid rably larger general purpose Corces than NATO as noted in the Contingency et Assessment of the Report nd the Soviet leadersh ip would proba ly not have initiated ag9r ssion unless it believed it could achieve its obje tives An early US NATO offer to negotiate would probably be interpreted as a sign of weakness Even if the attack ere contained it is unlikely the Soviets would settle for a postwar situation which would even approach US objectives in Europe if they believed they could outlast the allies There is considerable uncertainty as to whether deliberate escal ation to nuclear wa rlighting would be UNCLA$SIFIE UNCLASSIFIEC likely to achieve us objective£ Some believe that display of US resolve througl1 initiation of theater nuclear warfare and or employ cnt of lin1ited or regional nuclear options by trategic f rces would cause the Soviet leaa rship to withdraw «nd or negotiate However the Soviets' considerable capability to conduct theater nuclear w r and thP vulnerabilit'y of many HA TO nuclear syster is sugge£t that the Soviets may well attc1 pt to pree t pt N TO first use if possible or respond in ind while continuing their attack The range yield asy metries between NJ TO and Soviet nuclear capabilities and the p essures on decision- akers raise the poosibility of continued escalation 'hic'h sidt' would be ·deterred first before a strategic exchun3c is not clear If the US succoodod in limiting esc lation in the Ei1ropcan the3ter the damage throughout Europe would be widespread a result inconsistent with NATO objectives If an all-out nuclear exch 1nge occurred the destruction in the US vould be of such magnitude that even though US Str tegic nuclear targeting objecti es were fully achieved with regard to th Soviet Union it would be a Pyrrhic victory In this context AHlS E and G with low strategic nuclear capabilities -oul d probably not prevent continued escalation and would make conflict termination through controlled escalation a very risky course The option of 'withdrawing from Europe would not achieve US objectives A free Europe is a vital Amer lean interest USSR dominance of the West European urban-industrial economic base would unfavorably alter the world balance of power US long term interests in the Persian Gulf and Africa would also be seriously aHected by the loss of EurOpe ps atrategic options in such a situation would be extre ely circumscribed acceptance of t e dra atically altered balance of power or the prospect of undertaking a major conventional operation to regain estern Europe when American industrial mobili ation capability and access to raw materials would be inferior to that available to the USSR c CONVENTIONAL WAR IGHTING E PHASIS AIMS Hand J which couple strong conventional capabilities with limited nuclear capabilities have • high probability of achieving US objectives in th• - 4 ' ET· NCLASSIFIED - ----------------'---------- UNCLASSIFIED ru p 11 c r dt trn I • event of a conflict in Europe which rem ins limited to conventional 1ums However AIMS J and to a lesse·c extent A IM I i nply a reduced nuclear deterrence objective and per nit orldwide per eptions of a strategic nuclear balance favorable to the USSR The striltegic force le· cls po tulatrtd in lt I -15 J in conjunction with Sovi t civil defense progra ns and warfighting c pabilitics _result in a condition which is inconsis ent with US objectives of deterrence The US itB fri nd5 and its allies could be subjected to Soviet nuclear coercion In the event of nuclear conflict us ability to control escalation would be 11 mited and the likelihood of nuclear conflict termination f · ora llC to US objectives wou lc be low d CUHVCNTIO AL AKO NUCUl' R WARFIGtlTIN'G EMPHASIS AIMS I I V and H provide balanced capabilities hich have the highest chance of attainir1g US security ac oss the spectr of possible conflict and take into account thi worldtdde interests of the US FcrcC s for AI S Hare not reasonably attainable within tha timefra ne of this _study •The study assumption that the direct defense of NATO includC s the restoration o lo s t ATC tC rritory within 90 days requires peacC time ·1r aintenance of lar9e in-being forces necesuary to achiC ve this objective The size of ac•tive forces is sensitive to the early restoration of the border require ent AIMS I V reduces the requirement for US active ·army and air forces while relying more heavily on non US SATO Forces to assist in stabilizing a defensbe line as far forward as possible pt eferably at thEi Weser-Lech However the naval forces r•quire for AIMS I V would prob ibly remain the sa ne as thoso t equired for AIMS I Provisions for a USO to P sustaining capabillty would enhance the NA'rO defense and achievement of US objectives outside Europe while new forces are mobilized and positioned for the counter-offensive Such a strategy would permit US NATO to capitalize on its greatest - dvantage its overall economic industrial and technological potential over the Pact The D to P capability in conjunction with adequate forces provide's more flexibility for the decisionmaker US conventional land force increases required to execute this strategy could be lessened by a mode9t increase in allied t eserve forces Additionally the 5 UNCLASSIFIEC UNCLASSIFiE US would require increa3 d re dincss of its forces especially tho c committed or ear arked for Europe AIMS I V of ers a possible means of achie· dng US security objectives within the bounds of reasonable attainability • Detailed de criptions of the relative probability of fflilitary su cess of all the AIMS by sub-strategy arc provided in Inclosures A-E 5 Inclosures A NATO WP in Europe D Outai e NATO Area Dur ng N TO PI CT Conflict c East 11 sia 0 D PeacekQeping Activities in L ocal Wars E US USSR Nuclear Conflict ·- UNCLASSIFIED ' UNCLASSIFIEC --s£CIU T ' MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF NATO-tUROPE j SUBSTRATEGIES IN PRM-10 AIMS ' Described in terms of elative probability of successful achievement of US national 1 security objectives Y • Aggregate Deterrence Nuclear and Conventional Substrategy Lindt Loss · Marginal-Low -E -F 'Fv Low Very Low 2 Low- Mai-ginal Moderate 3 Marginal- Moderate 2 Low- -H Moderate Hoder ate -I High Moderate High High-Moderate Moderate-High Kar-qi nal-Lov 6 Very High- Moderat Low Very High High y -Iv y -J Offsetting Termin i ti on 2 Marginal-Low -G _ -• NCA Options for Favorable Conflict Moderate-Marginal f Direct Defense Warfighting If Deterren c Fails -H Low • Key Probability of success descriptors M Jrgin il Moderate Very High High Hodcrate Marginal Low Very Low • I7 Assumes US national security objectives in current Defense Guidance Assumes decision for conflict termination must be made about D 7 to allow 23 days ·for conflict termination _ Assames decision for conflict termination must be made about 0 60 to allow JO days for conflict termination 4 I ls AIMS I witl D t9 P sustainolbility with indefinite w irfighting capability y C mparative N 1'0-PI CT mobilization capability requi cs further study Rc sonablc attainability of both GP and strAtegic forces associated with this I IHS is unlikely •J'Jrc•1 1tc deterrent would be very high only i t USSR did not rcsr o d with ccr -r r-• m- linn JI 1 f l •ii 1• 11 I · ' - ' _ ' i ' ' JNCLASSIFIEC - · MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF SUBSTRATEGIES OUTSIDE NATO AREA DURING NATO-PACT CONFLICT IN P -10 AIMS Described in terms ot 7e1ative probability of successful ·achieverr ent of US natio -1al 1 security objectives Aggrcgate Deterrence Warfic hting If 2 J • Dctc -re ce Fails - Substrategy Nuclear and Conventional Marginal Marginal -F Fv Moderate Marginal -H Marginal Man inal -I Iv Moderate Marginal -G Hodcr iite Moderate J Moderate-Marginal Moderate-Marginal -H Very High High Limited Action -E Initiatives y Key Probability of success descriptors - Very tiigh Hi9h oderate Marginal Low Very 1 Assumes US national security objectives in current Defense Guidance pp 2 7 8 and 9 2 J All Army divisions ar e committed to or earmarked for NhTO requirc cnts Assumes oil SLOCs ptotcctcd by SACLANT CINCLhNT I Iv is AIMS I with D to P sustp inability ilnd with inc efinite warflqhti ig cilpability - 'to • c SZCR T Enclosure e UNCLASSIFIED - ' r· ' UNCLASSIFIEt seeRET MILITARY I PLICATIONS··OF EAST ASIA SUDSTRJ TCGICS IN PR V -10 AIMS Described in terms oyrelative probablity of successful ac ievement of US national security objectives Wc' rfighting If Substrategy Aggregate Deterrence Nuclear and Conventional 2 Reduced Presence--B Marginal-Low Lo -very -H Marginal-Low Low Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Current Presence y -F F y -I I • Increased Presence ey Lo V -G -'I Deterrence F ils i Marginal Marginal V • -J Low-Marginal -M High Marginal High-M erate Probability of suqcess descriptors - Very High High Moderate Marginal Low Very l 1 Assumes US notional security bjcctives stated in current Defense Guidance pp 2 and 7 1 Assumes withdraval of us ground combat forces from ROX J Iv is AIMS I with D to P sustainability and with indefinite warfighting capability·· ' -I Enclosure C S CRBT • UNCLASSIFIE -- - _ • - • UNCLASSIFIED SECRET MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF SUESTAATEGIES FOR PEACEKEEPI G ACTIVITICS AN LOCJ L WJ RS IN PID-1-10 Described in terms o re1ative probability of successful achievement of US national security objectives · NCJ Options for Warfighting I l Aggregate Deterrence Fm o able Conflict Nuclear and Conventional Deterrence Fails Tcrmi iation Substrateqy Limited Action -E y y -H Light Intervention Heavy Interventldn -F F Marginal-Low very Low Very Low Marginal-Low Low Lo - Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate High High-Moderate Moderate V -I Iv High-Moderate -G Moderate -J Moderate-Marginal High Hod crate-High -H Very High Very Higt High • JCey Probability of success des¢riptors - Very High High Moderate • Harg_inal Low Very Low 1 Assumes us national security objectives stated in current Defen5e Guid nce pp 2 Assumes no us ground combat forces 4-5 7-9• Enclosure o S CRET 'NCLASSIFIED - I i • • -1--·-I 'NCLASSIFIED • • ' __ J I 5-ECReT· MILITl rlY r - rcr TIO S OF SU5S7RJ TEGIES FOR US-USSR MiCLEflR CONFi ICT Described in terms of relative probability of successful achievement f US national security object_ives Y Y NCA Options for Warfighting And Conflict Termination Deterrence of Deterrence of conventional conflict If Deterrence Fails Nuclear Attack • Acceptable Outcome SubStra cqy Relative Outco nc • Assured Retaliation Onlv RCl OCl NCl ACl OCl PSlJ Low · Low -J Low Marginal '' • l-1a intain Overall Force Dalance RC2 OC2 NC2 AC2 Low -E -G -H Moderate Marginal Lo -F Fv High Moderate ' Moderate Moderate High High Very High DC2 PS2 Retain US Force Advantages RC2 OCJ NC2 J C2 _ DC2 PS2 -I Iv Clear Superiority RC2 OC4 NC AC -M OC2 ' _ ' Very High PS4 ' r ey Probabilit of success dcscrJ etors - Very High High Moderate Marginal Low 1 Assur 1cs us nation 11 scc1 1rity obJectives in current De cnse Guidance pp 2 and 11 2 Ass mcs no break of AilM Treaty 3 Rcasonuble attainability unlikely 4 cccptable outcome includes ability to terminate conflict at less than total Nuclear W r - The estimate could be considerably in error if the Soviets can successfully evacuate and s 1eltcr their po mlation Furthermore these must remain ubjectivc estimates until such time as a capability is attained to conduct Comparative Postwar Recovery Analyses CPRA Maximize US postwar power and influence relative to the en my after ·• massive exchange 1' Enclosure E ' 'SECRET • UNCLASSIFIEr