Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION 99 aJK- SE tli UMB J l _ t9 1aijT DATE OF COPY NO S -- CL DISTRIBUTION TO fWM NUMBER IN RC 5 ii STAT RC - I DATE RECIPIENT _SENT - JI 1 I 11 l_q r '7te_ • lhAd q P r Vp All 1-- dl _ _ z £- tJ J - li Jo ·v 'L_ Z Jn qip U I s I • n J l v l r --JI - RETURNED - ' - n L - -·· - - - - -- - ·-· - ·- - - - - - -·- --- -· •· - -· - ·- - -· - - - - ---- - ·- -- ·- - ·- - ·• •·- -- ·- - - ·- -- ·- --- -· ··- -- •· ·- ····· - - - - - -- I - - - -- -- ·-· - -·-- - - - -- - -· - -·- - ---- - - - ·•• -· - -- ·-· --- - - - - ·- IS Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 _ Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 rcx P ------ L • - ADMIN llff ftNAL 'tfSE 9NL¥ WHITE KEY JUDGMENTS SPECIAL WHITE KEY JUDGMENTS Distribution ' COPY# RECIPIENT HOW DELIVERED 1 President with PDB VIA COURIER 2 Vice President VIA Briefer 3 Sec State VIA Briefer ti Sec Defense VIA Briefer 5 CJCS VIA Briefer 6 Nat'l Sec Advisor with PDB VIA COURIER 7 DCI VIA Morning Briefing Book 8 DDCI VIA Morning Briefing Book 9 ExDir VIA Morning Briefing Book 10 DDO leave with DDO DO 11 DDA VIA Morning Briefing Book 12 DDS T VIA Morning Briefing Book 13 DDI VIA Morning Briefing Book 1 J ADDI VIA Morning Briefing Book 15-16 VC NIC Eli vra deliver 17 D CPAS Helene L Boatner CPAS Registry 18 The Honorable Douglas P Mulholland Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Room 6531 Department of State 19 Lieutenant General Harry E Soyster Director Defense Intelligence Agency Room 3E258 Pentagon ABH EH HfllERHAL lfSE 8NLY Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY COPY# RECIPIENT 20 Vice Admiral William O Studeman US Navy Director National Security Agency Room 9A197 Fort George G Meade Maryland 21 Mr James H Geer Assistant Director Intelligence Division Federal Bureau of Investigation Room 4026 J E Hoover Building 22 Mr Robert J Walsh Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs Room 4A014 Forrestal Bldg Department of Energy 23 Michael Romey Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary National Security Room 2049 Main Treasury Building 24 The Honorable James F McGovern Under Secretary of the Air Force Room 4E886 Pentagon 25 RADM Thomas A Brooks USN Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy Room 5C600 Pentagon 26 Major Charles Eichelberger USA Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army Room 2E464 Pentagon 27 Maj Gen C Norman Wood USAF Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department or the Air Force Room 4A932 Pentagon 28 Major John A Studds USMC Director of Intelligence US Maring Corps Headquarters US Marine Corps Room 2117 Navy Annex Washington D C 20480 ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY 0 COPY# RECIPIENT 29 Robert M Gates Deputy Assistant National Security Advisor White House Situation Room 30 The Honorable Lawrence S Eagleburger J eputy Secretary of State Room 7220 New State Bldg 31 Mr Robert M Kimmitt Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs New State Bldg 32 The Honorable Donald J Atwood Deputy Secretary of Defense Room 3E944 The Pentagon 33 Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Room 4E830 The Pentagon 34 The Honorable Henry S Rowen Asst Secretary of Defense for Internat'l Security Policy Room 4E838 The Pentagon 35 Stephen J Hadley Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internat'l Security Policy Room 4E838 The Pentagon 36 Mark Sullivan E ecutive Secretary NFIB 37 STAT Deputy Executive Secretary NFIB STAT COPY# RECIPIENT STAT 38-lJO lJ 1 42-44 -- ---· NIO Action Officer APMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 STAT Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 • '-'' UI '- '11 ill l U I llll 'lli III _ •• t ' t L_ _ _ _ 25X1 i Colombia Challenges to Democratic Government C 7 25X1 National Intelligence Estimate Key Judgments These Key Judgments represent the views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community 'Sec et NIE88-89W November 7989 Copy 53 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 - - - Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of these Key Judgments The Central Intelligence Agency The Defense Intelligence Agency The National Security Agency Bureau of Intelligence and Research Department of State also participating The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army The Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence Department of the Air Force The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurs The full text of this Estimate is being published separately with regular distribution Warning Notice Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved WNINTEL National Security Information Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Dissemination Control Abbreviations NOFORN NF NOCONTRACT NC PROPIN PR Not releasable to foreign nationals Not releasable to contractors or contractor consultants Caution-proprietary information involved ORCON OC Dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator REL This information has been authorized for release to WNINTEL-Intelligence sources or methods involved WN i I STAT I I I ' I Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 1 1 rta 25X1 Colombia Challenges to _ _ __ Democratic Government 25X1 • Colombia faces severe challenges-but no country in Latin America possesses greater capabilities to combat them - The economy will grow at 3 percent plus into 1991 - The armed forces' increasingly favorable force ratio and growing aggressiveness should allow some inroads against guerrilla forces 25X1 • Drug-related violence-some possibly directed at US targetswill continue at high levels - But President Barco is almost certain to stay the course and his most probable successors are likely to support his tough antinarcotic and security policies - Boosted US aid levels and US initiatives against narcotics problems at home will be important considerations for Barco 's successor however • Even if Colombia maintains its counterdrug effort over the next year it will have only a passing effect on US drug supplies a reduction in world demand is necessary to carve back the cocaine industry 25X1 25X1 • There is a 30-percent chance that a confluence of misfortunes or negative trends in the economy and public fatigue with the antinarcotics campaign could spur Colombia toward accommodation with traffickers Secret Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 25X1 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 C ill a Growing Challenges Impressive Resources Average Annual Growth 1982-89 Seizures of Cocaine Percent Metric tons 5 50 4 40 3 30 2 20 0 O 1986 87 Estimated Colombia Latin America 88 8 89 Pipeline Attacks 1985-89 Incidents • Estimated Thousands 250 Guerrilla Armed Strength Thousands 10 200 8 Armed Forces Strength 150 100 4 50 2 0 0 1985 86 87 88 89 1985 86 87 88 89 Note scale change 324296 U-89 Secret 2 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 2sx1· Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00Z qoo400130001-3 Key Judgments Colombia today is a paradox With one of strongest economies in the region and one of the most enduring traditions of democratic government it is beset by a level of political violence guerrilla warfare and drugrelated corruption and murder that are fraying the fabric of constitutional government No other country in Latin America faces more severe challenges---or possesses a greater capability to combat them The economy will continue to be a strength We expect it to grow at about 3 percent plus through 1990 and into 1991 Colombia's clearly improved counterinsurgency capability is a second plus Colombia's guerrilla groups totaling about 9 000 combatants will be able to sustain a serious level of violence especially against economic targets But they are unlikely to unify and are being hunted by both civilian paramilitary forces and a strengthened military The government's increasingly favorable force ratio its talkfight strategy and growing confidence and aggressiveness should allow it to manage the threat and make inroads into insurgent strength in some areas The greatest threat to the stability and integrity of the political system over the next two years will stem from the narcotrafficking groups Compared with the guerrillas traffickers will be better equipped have superior intelligence networks have greater influence in urban areas and be more ruthless Their threat extends beyond violence and intimidation-their rapidly increasing rural real estate holdings for example will be a major impediment to the government's land reform program Drug-related violence-including terrorism against the government civilian and business sectors and trafficker-financed rightwing assassinations of leftists-will be a potent destabilizing force The overlap and interrelationships between trafficker organizations and local rightist paramilitary groups will sustain very high levels of political violence This situation is likely to be exacerbated by the inclination of some military and police officials to condone and even support paramilitary violence against the left Taken together these problems will challenge the effectiveness of Colombian democracy and the economic system but not their viability The drug lords will make more energetic attempts to manipulate and infiltrate the two major parties but will be hindered by the conservatism of the system and popular rejection of trafficker violence More dramatic violence against key government figures would probably serve to further galvanize support for harsh measures against the traffickers 3 Secret Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 President Barco is almost certain to stay the course and his most probable successors in August 1990 are more likely to pursue his tough security policies than to reverse them They also would maintain conservative probusiness programs that are key to investment and continued if somewhat slowing growth The residual strengths of the Colombian state make it a prospective strong partner for the United States in helping to combat the drug problem and to continue to anchor democratic rule in Latin America but the magnitude of its problems will make it more reliant on foreign aid Government tactical progress against the insurgents will begin to be undercut by the logistic strains of sustained armed forces participation in antidrug operations by mid-1990 unless offset by increases in external assistance In short if the military is to sustain both a counterinsurgency and antinarcotics effort at current levels or beyond higher levels of external support will be necessary In addition to boosted US aid levels demonstrated US initiatives in the narcotics battle at home-stiffened penalties actions to counter US drug money laundering and efforts to reduce domestic drug consumption-will be important considerations for Barco's successor in choosing his drug policies Even then the antidrug campaign is not likely to have a major impact on the US drug market If Colombia maintains its present level of effort over the next year and beyond-and there is a good chance it will-it will have the potential to disrupt the Colombian trade by causing traffickers to reconfigure and relocate some operations forcing cutbacks in processing and exports Nevertheless the drug industry is extremely resilient and for the campaign to have much more than a passing effect on drug supplies in the United States over the next year or two would require efforts of similar magnitude in other Latin American countries Lacking this successes in Colombia paradoxically will prompt drug traffickers in other countries including those outside the Andes to take up the slack Permanently reducing the size of the cocaine industry will require a reduction in worldwide demand One price of the antidrug campaign in Colombia for the United States will be the terrorist risk to US facilities and personnel These are important if secondary targets of insurgent and trafficker violence and they will be in higher profile as new US assistance comes into play and if drug kingpins are extradited Attacks on the Embassy and attempted kidnappings of senior US officials will be well within the range of options considered by the traffickers and to a lesser extent the insurgents Strikes at other US targets in Latin America Western Europe and even inside the United States are within the narcotraffickers' capabilities Secret 4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00I q00400130001-3 While on balance we judge that Colombia can cope with the significant threats it confronts and stands a good chance of making progress in some areas there is perhaps a IO-percent chance that a confluence of misfortunes-a large-scale offensive by insurgents aggravated by trafficker terrorism beyond even current levels and against the backdrop of an economic recession--could lead to a downward spiral of insecurity and violence Regardless of the level of external support such a situation would probably breed near chaotic conditions and exhaust Bogota's financial resources There is a somewhat greater chance perhaps 20 percent that less dramatic but persistent negative trends in the economy and public fatigue with the antinarcotics campaign would spur a successor government in 1990 toward greater accommodation with the traffickers This could seriously strain relations between Washington and Bogota 25X1 5 Secret Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 STAT Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014 03 18 CIA-RDP94T00766R000400130001-3