MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON SECRE NODLS XGDS MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PARTICIPANTS President Gerald R Ford Dr Henry A Kissinger Secretary of State Mr Donald Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense Lt General Brent Scowcroft Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs DATE AND TIME Friday February 13 1976 11 20 a m - 12 30 p m PLACE The Oval Office DECLASSIFIED £0 12968 Soc U Decisions on Moscow Signal There is some merit in the claim that some of the radiation is caused by us so we are turning off our equipment In response we expect them to turn off their radiation In addition we expect action to reduce the radiation emanating from their installations in the U S SALT Kissinger I have just glanced at Don's memo I see the differences as being he wants a general statement on the grey areas I think that is a mistake He also wants to conclude the deferred negotiation by October 1977 I think that is not possible I would like to work it like SALT I - - a permanent agreement on ABM and the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons I would propose deferral to October 1981 We would say no increase in Backfire production and would defer deployment of cruise missiles I have no objection to beginning the negotiations right away We and they have to decide what to do about detente Are we going to be restrained in third areas and settle this If so you would tell him there are no bargaining issues in this Brent Scowcrdft Si C RET NODLS XGDS CLASSIFIED BY NERAL DECLASSIFICATION EXE WT FROM GEi 1652 SCHEDULE OF EXECUT VE EXEMPTION CATEGO 'x D ON Imp AUTOlVIATICALLY DE---LASSlFIE s 1 f 3 to det h- SECitE NODLS XGDS 2 The President I think we should go with a date which is about when we are ready for deployment - - but I wouldn't sell it that way Kissinger Yes I would say that eight years are too long because we don't know what will happen on cruise missiles just as they don't But we are willing to try four years which represents a unilateral restraint on us The President We shouldn't set a date before we would be ready to break out if need be Rumsfeld I think we really need to face up to the grey area problem Kissinger I agree on the substance but I just wouldn't face up to it now I am afraid if we discuss all grey area systems they will bring up FBS and the British and French nuclear systems Rumsfeld I agree with that so we don't disagree Ultimately though we have to deal with systems which are peripheral and central We would describe the protocol as dealing with systems which are difficult and which are different in character Kissinger That is a constructive way to do it But we have to realize that for the Soviet Union putting Backfire into any negotiation will be a massive problem You can say though that they can claim it's a refinement of the Vladivostok Agreement -- because SLCM's clearly aren't in that Agreement Our negotiating position by 1980-81 should be strong -- they can't do much to accelerate Backfire and we can break out on cruise missiles The President data Let's start with 1980 but let me see the deployment SEGB E'l' NODLS XGDS