I' • THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON 25 D C l ' I I · 13 March 1962 l MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba TS I• 1 The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum-for the Chief·of Operations Cuba Project which responds to a - _equest of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba • I '' il i 2 The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning pUI'poses It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phas d plan Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis 3 Further it is assumed that a single agency will be given the ·primary respons ibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and • covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Starr For the Joint Chiefs of Staff ' SYSTEMATICALL' ij IE 1 fh BY JCS ON __ d --1 CLASSIFICATION LJ TI 'J UEQ ___ ·-- q i fr fll- - b £-· L L LEMNITZER - Chairman Joint Chiefs or st rr 1 Enclosure Memo for Chief of Operations Cuba Project f CLUDED FROM GOS EXCLUDED FROM AfJTOMATrc REGRADING DOD DIR 5200 10 DOES NOT APPLY 1 D E' • ·rnrJUP··rSt C-RFI -Y_ l · 110 J Rll• • Ii Ii - - - SPEgl L Ii II II1PhltlC F _ ii JM@l li IZI ' - I I • iOili COPY NO TOP SECRET SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION JCS 1969 321 12 March 1962 Page 2165 NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF on NORTHWOODS S A report on the above subject is submitted f'or consider- ation by the Joint Chief's of Staf'f F J BLOUIN M J INGELIDO Joint Secretariat ' ·• Not reproduced herewith on f'ile in Joint Secretariat EXCLUDED FROM GOS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING DOD DIRECTIVE 5200 10 DOES NOT APPLY TOP SECRITT JCS 1969 32 2165 I j ••'flf 9 March 1962 011 _ COPY OF COPIES SPECI'i'iLDISTRIBUTION REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF on CUBA PROJECT TS The Chief of Operations Cuba Project has requested that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter by 13 Merch 1962 ' - t CLUDfO FROM GDS ' JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUB TS THE PROBLEM 1 As requested by Chief of Operations Cuba Project the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief description but precise of pretextawhich they consider would provide Justification for US military intervention in Cuba FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 2 It is recognized that any action w ch becomes pretext for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action 3 Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of actiwn proposed by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the Guantanamo area 4 For additional facts see Enclosure B DISCUSSION 5 The suggested coursesof action appended to Enclosure A are based on the premise that US military intervention will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances forum World opinion and the United Nations should be favorably affected by developing the inter- national image of the Cuban government aa ash and irresponsible and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the western Hemisphere 6 While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the present time it will continue to hold good only as long as there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union There is Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations l Cuba Project subject Operation MONGOOSE dated 5 March 1962 on file in General Craig's office Memorandum ·for the Chairman ·Joint Chiefs of staff ' f 'rom Chief of Naval Operations subjeot Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba TS dated 8 March 1962 on file in General Craig's office ' 2 f UI Ul fi lUII ii' i' i as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR to the defense of Cuba Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warsaw Pact nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe Therefore since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of the Cuba problem all projects are suggested within the time frame of the next few months ii'' CONCLUSION 7 The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem However these suggestions'should be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes and together with similar inputs from other agencies provide a basis for development of a single integrated_ time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba RECOMMENDATIONS 8 ·It is recommended that a Enclosure A together with its attachments should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and transmittal to the Chief of Operations Cuba Project b This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands c This paper NOT be forwar ded to US I' officers assigned I • to NATO activities d This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman US Delegation United Nations Military Staff Committee MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SUbject Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba TS 1 The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations Guba Project which responds to a request of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba 2 The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis __ D 3 Further it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primar i responsibility for developing military and ''- ' para-military aspects c f the basic plan It is recommended that this responsibility fQr_ l 1th ov _rt and c_ovEcrt military operatiombe assigned the Joint Chiefs o C Stat t ' I Memorandum for Gen Craig from Chief of Operations Cuba Project subject Operation MONGOOSE dated 5 March 1962 on file J ri Gen Craig ts office 4 Enclosure A r-- n-ura1u -··-·1 I lir · '•1 i1 APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS CUBA PROJECT Subject Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba TS I'' 1 Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations Cuba Project for General Craig subject Qperation MONGOOSE dated 5 March 1962 which requested brief but precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba 2 The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes It is assumed that there will pe similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan The indiVidual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis ✓ 3 This plan incorporating projects selected from the ··1 _ attached suggestions or from other sources should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention Such a plan roµld enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale directed at other countries as well as the United States ✓ The plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere U tl i Ht 5 Appendix to Enclosure A --f· P-ste-ttrr-·-S'PretA'HtN'fltlttP --u ni n JW _ ·•·- - ' · UNGlAt l lt J 4 Time is an important factor in reso¥ut on of the Cuban problem Therefore the plan should be so time-phased that projects would be operable within the next few months 5 Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention it is recommended that primary responsibility - - · - - - - •---- -·- _ for developing military and pa ra-l lilitary aspects of the plan for both overt and covert m Llita ry operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff · •1 - ' ' ' 6 Appendix to Enclosure A ijNtl f tO -rttP-SEtRti-sf 'Etl·ffHtN·DtlR·-Nfflitt - -•- _ VIII I ''- OHRULII _ UI LUIHL ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA Note The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order Together with similar inputs from other agencies they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single integrated time-phased plan Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual prefects within t le context of cumulative correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military intervention in Cuba 1 Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c c ould be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of 1mm1nent ·invasion would be emphasized OUr military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid · change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response Justii'ies 2 A series of well coordinated incidents_w111 be planned - ' to take place in and around Guantanamo 'td give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces a Incidents to establish a credible attack not in chronological order 1 Start rumors many Use clandestine radio 2 Land friendly Cubans in uniform over-the-fence to stage attack on base 3 Capture Cuban friendly saboteurs inside the base 4 Start riots near the base main gate friendly Cubans 7 Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A U tl Htij - J-0 P -S·F P Rf J -£ P Gl A I NMR t U Ul-- JJn r o n 11 • -·-· E Itlr -- nrru·mr '·· 5 Blow up ammunition inside the base start fires 6 Burn aircraft on air base sabotage 7 Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base Some damage to installations 8 Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City 9 Capture militia group which storms the base 10 Sabotage ship 1n harbor large fires -- napthalene 11 Sink ship near larbor entrance Conduct funerals for mock-victims may be lieu of 10 b United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base c Cononence large scale United States military operations 3 A Remember the Maine incident could be arranged in several forms a we could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and ' blame Cuba - b We could blow up a drone unmanned vessel anywhere in th Cuban waters we could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from tl le air or sea or both The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely inve i l gating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken ·under attack The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire The US could follow up with an air sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to evacuate remaining members of the non-existent crew Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation 4 We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area in other Florida cities and even in Washington 8 Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A ' -Yllbs Sf SFJ z1Nftt ft ft Nft Ifffft 11AliWI • '1L11 ni 1 AfMN _ fr u un r n nRNutl'll rtlllAL The terror campaign could be poi tij l t ll refugees seeking haven in the United States I we could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida real or silllulated we could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees 1n the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots the arrest of Guban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also WlJllld be helpful 1n projecting the idea of an irresponsible government 5 A Cuban-based Castro-supported filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti Dominican Republic Guatemala and Nicaragua at present and possible others These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure For example advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space Cuban B-26 or c-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found This could be coupled with Cuban messages to the Communist Ullderground 1n the Dominican Republic and Cuban shipments of arms wbich would be found or intercepted on the beach · · - ' 6 Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional p ovocation Harassment of civil air attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such faot The primary drawback to tbis suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft However reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months 9 Annex to Appendix to EncloSUl'e A --- - li ' ' ······ tl 1r1 7 Hijacking attempts against civil air nu1 UIIR and surface crai't l should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba Concurrently genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface Cl'aft should be encouraged 8 rt is possible to Cl'eate an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban·ail'ol'aft has attacked and shot down a chartel'ed civil airlinel' enroute fl'om the United States to Jamaica Guatemala Panama Ol' Venezuela The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan l'oute to cl'oss Cuba The passengel's could be a gl'oup of college students off on a holiday Ol' any grouping of persons with a common intel'est to suppol't chartering a non-scheduled flight a An aircl'aft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numberai as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted fol' the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers all boal'ded under carefully prepal'ed aliases The actual registered aircl'aft would be converted to a drone b Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida ' ' r Fl'om the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying ail'craft will descend to minimum altitude and go dil'ectly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status The dl'one ail'Cl'aft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed 1'light plan When over Cuba the dl'one will being tl'ansmitting on the intel'national distl'ess frequency a MAY DAY message stating he is undel' attack by Cuban MIG aircraft The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the ail'Cl'aft which will be tl'iggel'ed by radio signal 10 UNtl SS Ht This will allow CAO l'adio Al1llex to Appendix to Enclosul'e A ftP ·· fefftt'• 9fflltt tltttt tltfft•neatffWi•QAUw 1 nu1unn stations in the the US what has happened to the aircraft' instead of the US trying to sell the incident 9 It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Comnrunist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters 1n an unprovoked attack a Approltimately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispat hed j ' 1n trail from Homestead AFB Florida to the vicinity of Guba Their mission will be to reverse course and silIIUJ ate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise 1n southern Florida l These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at ' frequent intervals r• Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast however they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs b On one such flight a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft l'11111e near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down calla would be made No other The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base an Eglin auxiliary The aircraft would be met by the proper people quickly stored and given a ri w tail number The pilot who had performed the mission under ·an alias would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business The pilot and aircraft woul then have disappeared c At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a submarine or amall surface craft would disburse F-101 parts parachute eto at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found 11 Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A • -- --- -- ·--·· · 4 - _ ···-- ENCLOSURE B FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM l The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon'which to base overt intervention 2 The need for positive action in the event that current covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indicated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 March 1962 as follows 11 - - - determination that a credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United states to develop a Cuban provocation as justification for positive US military action 11 3 It is underst9od that the Department of State also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification • for US military intervention in Cuba JCS 1969 303 JCS 1969 313 12 Enclosure B